**00050817 STOCKTAKING/EVALUATION SRED PROGRAMME**

**Lessons learned**

1. The limited background information and knowledge available make it more difficult to validate assumptions and propose an adequate project strategy. Moreover, the project context can change quickly due to international issues, and changes in mandates and staffing of national counterparts. UNDP is still in the process of understanding the role of national actors, which limits its possibilities to identify key partners and processes. This situation asks for a robust project design.

2. Project activities need substantially more time than anticipated. The renewable energy projects take more time than expected due to external conditions (among others: the long, idle winter period) and inadequate local managerial skills. Also, product development (including the design and production of efficient stoves) is underestimated. Even under favourable conditions SRED’s objectives and timeline would be very ambitious.

3. The communication of the Project with the national partners, as well as the coordination between them, is inadequate and greatly affects overall effectiveness. While the State Academy of Science (SAOS) should develop technological know-how, the State Commission for Science and Technology (SCST) is in charge of transforming this technology into useful products and processes, and of delivering them to society. However, the roles between SAOS and SCST are not clearly defined (or understood) and one may question whether both entities are actually prepared to deliver technology to end-users. Coordination issues inevitably extend to the people from the cooperative farms and the equipment suppliers.

4. SRED pays little attention to the design of delivery models for energy solutions in the rural areas. This situation is not in the interest of the beneficiaries targeted by SRED and does not generate any leverage on the resources provided by UNDP. This does not provide a paradigm for sustainability.

5. The energy projects requested by the Cooperative Farms (specifically the capital-intensive small hydro power plants) are not always justified from an economic perspective, or are not the least-cost solution. It is recommended to apply appropriate analytical tools (such as life-cycle analysis) to energy solutions, once initial experiences have been gained with the demonstration pilots.

6. The Programme would seek external funding from the international donor community and/or financing mechanisms through the SRED Resource Mobilization Strategy. This strategy has not been successful and synergies for cooperation with other agencies did not develop. The international context for DPRK is not favourable for attracting external funding.

7. National partners and local people have little experience with renewable energy projects and lack the managerial and technical skills to implement them. Up-scaling will not be possible if project implementation is not successfully transferred to a national entity with substantial executing capacity.

8. The political context directly affects project implementation and execution. As a result, the policy-related activities were suspended. High-level considerations also directly intervene with the project budget, thereby altering the overall project strategy and limiting direct investment in equipment. A negative side-effect is that false expectations are created among rural beneficiaries, which are not met.