



**FINAL EXTERNAL EVALUATION REPORT
NATIONAL INSTITUTION BUILDING PROJECT
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
AFGHANISTAN
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Evaluation of National Institution Building Project that was launched by UNDP under some noble compulsions is not an easy task. A project that was formulated for Institution Building for a Nation with a huge budget estimate and HR component really needs to be evaluated with sincerity and commitment considering the circumstances and conditions under which it was formulated and launched.

The evaluation team sincerely, thanks all those who have honestly supported the team to accomplish this otherwise tough task.

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The reportage and analysis provided in this report is that of the authors and do not represent the views of UNDP

I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACSI	Afghanistan Civil Service Institute
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ADF	Afghanistan Development Forum
ASGP	Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CAP	Country Action Plan
CBRF	Capacity Building for Results Framework
CD	Capacity Development
CDA	Capacity Development Advisor
CDO	Capacity Development Officer
CDP	Capacity Development Plan
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSLD	Civil Service Leadership Development
CSO	Central Statistic Organization
CTAP	Civilian Technical Assistance Programme
DAIL	Department of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock
DFID	Department for International Development
DMoI&M	Deputy Ministry of Information and Media
DMoYA	Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs
DoLSAMD	Department of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
GDPDM	General Director of Programs Design and Management
GEP	Gender and Equality Project
GM	Gender Mainstreaming
GIRoA	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GIZ	German Agency for International Development
GoI	Government of India
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
ICCD	Inter-ministerial Commission for Capacity Development
IDLG	Independent Directorate for Local Governance
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
JHRL	Justice Human Rights and Rule of Law Project
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
LoA	Letter of Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock
MIS	Management Information System
MoEc	Ministry of Economy
MoEd	Ministry of Education
MoLSAMD	Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
MoTCA	Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoWA	Ministry of Women Affairs
NABDP	National Area Based Development Program
NIBP	National Institution Building Project
NPP3	National Priority Programme 3
NTP	National Training Policy
PAR	Public Administrative Reform
PTC	Provincial Training Centre
RRF	Resources and Results Framework
RTC	Regional Training Centre
TOR	Terms of Reference

Final Version

UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Political and economic circumstances obtaining in Afghanistan at the end 2009 and 2010 have led many international organisations to focus more on institution building in Afghanistan. The international community's approach of bringing in a balance between military support and civilian capacity development through programme of 'civilian surge' has led UNDP to work on institutional development in Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). Accordingly, after the successful conclusion of UNDPs two capacity development projects - the Civil Service Leadership Development (CSLD) - and Capacity for Afghan Public Services Project (CAP), UNDP has launched a four year National Institution Building Project (NIBP) with a budget estimate of USD 115 million. This was partially funded by Australia, Azerbaijan, Canada, India, Japan, UNDP, Switzerland, Japan, and Italy. The project was launched on 1st January 2010 and was closed on 31st December 2013, exactly after four years after its launch.

The project adopted an all-of-government approach to institution building, thereby seeking to bring about changes in the way the Government operates both at national and sub-national levels. It has positioned national and international Capacity Development Advisors (CDAs) in 17 line ministries and departments in Kabul, and 13 Regional Training Centres (RTCs) and line departments in provinces. The project has borrowed the approach of coaching and advising from its predecessor CAP project that was supported mainly by the Government of India (GoI)' practicing civil servants through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed early 2007. This MoU was extended to NIBP with a few modifications to include twinning arrangements and concepts of south-to-south cooperation. GoI promised to place 30 of their civil servants to work with NIBP under the terms, conditions, and entitlements to be decided by NIBP.

The project has expected to work in alignment with the Civilian Technical Assistance Project (CTAP) operating in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). However, CTAP started independently supporting GIROA from MoF. NIBP later modified its outputs by removing its alignment with CTAP.

NIBP has signed a Letter of Agreement (LoA) with Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) Afghanistan, to manage the programme through transferring some of the management functions, especially with regard to recruitment of national CDAs, strengthening Public Administration Reforms (PAR), and to strengthen regional and provincial training centres.

The project estimated a human resource requirement of nearly 500 technical experts, advisors, and consultants for its activities. However, NIBP ultimately ended up deploying a meagre 7.63% of total estimates. Concerning financial resources as well, NIBP could mobilise a little over USD 23 million as against the estimates of USD 115 million allocated. Over 48 months of its operations, NIBP has deployed 498 person months support of international advisors, and 1309 person months of support of national advisors. (As the advisors have worked at different times during the project, at any given point in time there was no full contingent of staff provided, the calculation is given in person months). This was against the total promised 23,677 person months of support. During 2010 and early 2011, NIBP has adopted an approach of assessing the required capacities in the line ministries before taking up capacity development initiatives. NIBP strongly felt that there should be a need base for support activities under the project. Accordingly, Capacity Development Plans (CDPs) were developed for Central Statistical Office (CSO), Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs (DMoYA), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL).

Although focus of the advisors has shifted from institutional development to training and development, exposure visits, workshops, there have been some successes for the project. For example, NIBP as a concept has been widely accepted by the government and the donors alike. Further the CDPs produced an approach of coaching and advising was successfully followed for individual capacity development. International training courses have increased the individuals' knowledge levels in CSO, MAIL, and DMoYA, concept of twinning agreements established, south-to-south cooperation commenced. Today, the slogan 'Saffron for Opium' is vibrating across the globe due to the support of NIBP for drafting the Saffron policy.

Gol assigned the responsibility of selection of beneficiaries under Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) initiative; there were improved relationships between the UNDP and other international partners. NIBP was able to organise 99 international and 189 national training events for over 5600 civil servants from different line ministries.

Despite these successes, NIBP has taken the blame of being a project of training and development, and the 'institutional development' aspect was kept untouched by the experts of NIBP. The project was seen as a supply driven project ignoring the demands of GIRoA. NIBP was a very big project with very small means. The project suffered from design defects, non-availability of a resource mobilisation strategy, exit strategy, monitoring and evaluation systems, coordination mechanisms, clearly defined reporting lines, performance evaluation systems, confusion between outputs, outcome, and activities. Operational aspects of NIBP also suffered seriously due to lengthy processes

and dissatisfaction of senior management of UNDP with NIBP management during initial years.

Partner government agencies like IARCSC felt that they were ignored during the implementation period of the project, and the promised transfer of ownership, or the functional independence was not done. Even, the expected technical support was not provided, and the capacity development advisors ignored to coordinate with IARCSC, which is engaged in government wide public administration reforms and institutional development.

Now, the way forward is designing a project in alignment with National Priority Programme 3 (NPP3) after conducting a full diagnostic study, and aligning its activities with IARCSC's Next Generation PAR programs. Principles of national ownership, engaging short-term technical experts instead of hiring long-term advisors, supporting a selected group of line ministries based on their demands are recommended.

III. INTRODUCTION

The National Institution Building Project (NIBP) of UNDP Afghanistan was a USD 115 million four year project partially funded by Australia, Azerbaijan, Canada, India, Japan, UNDP, Switzerland, Japan, and Italy. The project was launched on 1st January 2010 and was closed on 31st December 2013, exactly after four years after its launch. The project adopted an all-of-government approach to institution building, thereby seeking to bring about changes in the way the government operates both at national and sub-national levels. The project has chosen to engage itself with specific sectors - most immediately in the areas of agriculture, rural reconstruction, education, statistics, labour, and social affairs. NIBP positioned national and international CDAs in 17 line ministries and departments in Kabul, and 13 RTCs and line departments in provinces.

After successful conclusion of UNDP's two capacity development projects - the Civil Service Leadership Development (CSLD) - and Capacity for Afghan Public Services Project (CAP), NIBP was launched with an intended approach of coaching and advising, inherited from earlier projects for institution building, with four years duration ending on 31st December 2013. This evaluation is taken up as the project document envisages a final external evaluation at the end of the project with a set of evaluation questions.

The final external evaluation began 21 January 2014 with a timeframe of 30 working days to complete. The results are expected to feed into the next phase of the project, if there shall be one. The work has been executed by two consultants - one team leader and the other team member drawing from their experiences of the many actors who have been involved in implementing the project. The consultants – the authors of this report have adopted the methodology of primary and secondary data analysis for evaluation - spent time at the offices of UNDP Afghanistan, and visited provinces. Interviews were carried out with a wide range of personnel in several line ministries, UNDP senior management, cross practice unit, past project managers, representatives of the international donor community, and with a selection of provincial government officials. The evaluation has been slightly limited by non-availability of data with the implementing line ministries that might normally be expected in a project evaluation. Nevertheless, for the purposes in view, the results may be considered adequate.

As expected at the beginning, NIBP has suffered its share of teething and growing problems. The reasons are well evidenced and summarised in section 2.2 of this report. UNDP and the GIRoA have learned important lessons from their experience to date.

The concerned parties are now committed to an approach that builds on the need to strengthen institutional capacity in Afghanistan, but one that is less ambitious, more focused, and better attuned to the political and operational realities in which GIRoA and UNDP officials have to contend. By general agreement, UNDP, donor community, and GIRoA are committed to an implementation modality that better suits the needs of a nationally owned project. For the next phase in particular, mechanisms are to be adopted that will ensure enhanced good quality and the timely delivery of outputs. At the same time, the opportunity is being taken to redesign the project to take advantage of the experiences gained.

Part 1 of this report describes the project as designed. Part 2 describes the project as it has been implemented to date, focusing firstly on its achievements and then on its challenges and limitations. Part 3 of the report is a list of the lessons learned. Part 4 narrates the approach of moving ahead and illuminates a range of opportunities and challenges confronted by the project at the end of its first phase. This part of the report concludes with some recommendations.

This final external evaluation report aims to be candid and constructive, illuminating a wide range of issues that are pertinent to project design and management. What is written cannot possibly take into account of all historical details and of all perspectives. Therefore this evaluation can be a lesson to draw roadmaps for future institutional development projects in alignment with the overall institutional development programme of GIRoA being led by Afghanistan government institutions with clear and approved mandates. This evaluation is an objective observation of two external consultants during their interactions with implementing partners, UNDP, and the donors.

IV. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

Developing viable and effective governance institutions for public service delivery, developing core teams of civil servants who work in reconstruction of nations was an immediate necessity before GIRoA and the international community immediately after the prolonged war in Afghanistan. United Nations (UN) and several other international governments and organisations have formulated assistance programmes and national development strategies. Under the overall directives of United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been supporting in re-building of nations.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) in partnership with the international community has identified Capacity Development (CD) as one of the priority areas for donor coordination, and has been playing a fundamental role in coordinating

CD activities together with the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) and the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Capacity Development (ICCD) in the Ministry of Economy (MoEc).

The IARCSC has outlined its vision for public sector CD in terms of change management and operational CD. The IARCSC with the support of the international community developed a National Capacity Development Plan for the public sector endorsed at the Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) in 2007, a strategic plan for the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI), and a civil service legal framework. Given the heavy mandate of the IARCSC on PAR management and CD coordination in general, the weak capacity of IARCSC needs to be addressed.

In this background, UNDP launched two projects for capacity development, namely, the Civil Service Leadership Development (CSLD), and Capacity Assistance for Afghanistan Public Service (CAP).

Meanwhile, the international community, particularly the United States of America (USA) has felt that there should be a balance between the military and political interventions in Afghanistan. Accordingly USA policy makers advocated focusing on a “civilian surge” under an integrated strategy to support GIRoA. The programme sought to support the government through civilian technical advisors. The key principles of the civilian surge are:

- (a) **Afghan Ownership** – Advisors must be seen as an extension of the government, not as foreign presence who must work within Afghan structures and Afghan priorities;
- (b) **Demand Driven** – Advisors must be deployed at both the central and sub-national level in specific functional and technical areas in accordance with the needs of the recipient agencies;
- (c) **Capacity Development** – Advisors should focus on long term CD goals, while helping the recipient ministries and agencies to deliver specific outcomes in the short term; and
- (d) **Effectiveness** – Advisors must report to both GIRoA and donors on the impact of their work on the lives of ordinary Afghans.

UNDP felt the need to align its support for GIRoA with the principles of civilian surge. UNDP also expected large donor support for capacity development activities. Therefore,

on successful conclusion of these projects, and based on lessons learned from CSLD and CAP projects (please see Annexure III), there was an immediate need to develop national institutions. Therefore, UNDP has formulated the National Institution Building Project (NIBP) project to strengthen national institutions in Afghanistan.

The project had immediate support from Government of India, however, NIBP also expected support from other international donors which was diverted to Civilian Technical Assistance Project (CTAP). Having designed and commenced with the implementation process of the project, NIBP continued with its programme implementation.

PART 1. THE NIBP PROJECT AS DESIGNED

1. The Problems Addressed

Institutional capacity in Government of Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) has been perceived as one of the major challenges for development. In GIROA problems of capacity existed at all levels where capacity needs required assessment and addressing through capacity development initiatives. At the overarching systemic level of the enabling environment, the legal and policy framework needs to be put in place to guide and lead the implementation of measures for the development of effective institutions and improved performance. At the organizational level, some of the major problems include an incoherent government structure with overlapping functions across government ministries; outdated work processes, procedures, and systems; patronage and nepotism in appointments; gender imbalances; and the absence of well defined mechanisms for carrying out common government functions, namely policy and strategy formulation, project management, financial management, procurement and human resource management.¹

In the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), Capacity Development (CD) has been identified as a cross cutting issue and the improvement of public sector capacity in particular as the key challenge to development in Afghanistan. It has been recognised that unless adequate capacities are built, technical and financial support will remain underutilised to the detriment of the development process.

In line with national priorities of developing capacities of civil servants in Afghanistan, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported the

¹ NIBP project document 2010

government initiatives through two special capacity development projects. First Civil Service Leadership Development (CSLD) that mainly focused on leadership development in GIRoA through institutional training and development approach; and secondly the Capacity for Afghan Public Services Project (CAP) which adopted a modality of posting coaches and advisors through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Government of India (GoI) and UNDP to deploy practitioner civil servants from GoI in Afghanistan. The final evaluations of these two programmes have given a successful account of implementation in terms of their acceptability within the government, alignment with GIRoAs' individual capacity development agenda, and leadership development through international experts. Those projects used the approaches of coaching, advising, and classroom training.

Based on the successes of these two projects, UNDP and GIRoA have come together to address the challenges of institutional strengthening in GIRoA through a new project, the National Institutional Building Project (NIBP). The main problems to be addressed through the project were:

- (a) Building the organizational capacity of leading government ministries or agencies at the national level and local authorities at the sub-national level; and
- (b) Strengthen the capacity of the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) and its centers at the national and sub-national level as well as the newly established General Directorate of Projects Design and Management (GDPDM) of IARCSC to efficiently manage the programmes and projects of IARCSC.

1.2. Purposes

NIBP as the flagship project for institutional building in GIRoA had specific purposes for which it will support:

- a. Inclusive Strategy: The inclusive CD strategy of NIBP would cater to all three levels at which incapacity resides i.e. the enabling environment, organizational, and individual levels respectively.
- b. Coaching & Advising: The NIBP will institutionalize mechanisms of using an optimum combination of advising and coaching to bring about effective and comprehensive CD to address the needs of all three levels. Advising will play an important role and will cover various policy formulation needs and organizational restructuring requirements within overall PAR framework.
- c. Common Standards: A significant value addition to the existing system would be the establishment and use of common standards for coaching.

d.Skills Development: The NIBP will support Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) to design and deliver training programmes based on pre-established standards and methodologies.

e.CD at Sub-national Level: The interventions of NIBP for ACSI will be closely linked with efforts to strengthen the Regional and Provincial Training Centers (RTCs and PTCs)

To work towards the above purposes, NIBP has greatly depended on United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) outcomes and outputs:

UNDAF Outcome 2:

Government capacity to deliver services to the poor and vulnerable is enhanced.

Output 2.1: Institutions have strengthened capacity to develop and implement quality pro-poor service delivery and employment policies.

CPAP Outcome 3.0: The state has improved ability to deliver services to foster human development and elected bodies have greater oversight capacity.

CPAP Output 3.1: Inclusive legislation, policies, and programmes are in place, and government institutions are strengthened to improve the quality of service delivery.

CPAP Output 3.2: PAR management and coordination capacity of IARCSC strengthened and institutional and policy support for implementing required training programmes for civil servants established.

The project, however, does not have any specific outcomes or outputs other than the above. This will be discussed separately in another section on challenges faced. Nevertheless, the overall development objective of the NIBP has been stated *“to strengthen national institutional capacity and to create an efficient and capable public sector workforce through the development of institutions and civil service at the national and sub-national levels, the establishment of accountability mechanisms and effective utilization of resources for better service delivery”*.

Accordingly, the immediate objectives of the project were two-fold as stated below:

Immediate Objective 1 – Development and implementation of policies and strategies for institutional strengthening and organizational reforms in select government entities.

Immediate Objective 2 – Putting in place policies and working mechanisms for implementing required training programmes for civil service in line with the ANDS monitoring framework and PAR strategies.

In order to realize these objectives of NIBP, project resources were to be applied towards achievement of the following three outputs within two components:

Component_1: Activities in select government entities

Output_1: Institutional and organizational capacity of select government entities strengthened by policy and strategy development, systems improvement through coaching and advisory services to improve service delivery, and to support Public Administration Reform (PAR) objectives.

Output_2: Institutional and organizational capacity development of select government entities through coaching and advisory services in alignment with Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP).

Component_2: Activities in IARCSC

Output_3: PAR management and coordination capacity of IARCSC strengthened and institutional and policy support for implementing required training programmes for civil servants established.²

1.3. Implementation Arrangements

The implementation arrangements for NIBP have been threefold:

- a. NIBP under the overall supervision of a project management board, and a project headed by an international project manager;
- b. Implementation transferred to IARCSC through a Letter of Agreement (LoA) under national implementation modality with certain provisions reserved with UNDP; and,
- c. A MoU signed between Government of India (GoI) for deployment of practitioner civil servants, twinning arrangements, and following the principles of south-south cooperation.

NIBP project management and UNDP expected to work in close cooperation with Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) of Afghanistan under 'civilian surge' modality. Therefore, Output 2 was inserted in the project document in the initial stages, but later it was merged with Output 1 during 2012.

The project started with an estimated budget of USD **115,019,355**, and paid up fund of USD **4,000, 000 for** the project duration of four years beginning from 1st of January 2010.

² NIBP Project document 2010

Table 1

	Total	2010	2011	2012	2013
A. Development Activities	106,649,462	25,064,517	28,619,356	25,821,506	27,144,087
B. Other Activities	8,369,8932	2,490,323	2,243,011	1,943,011	1,693,549
TOTAL	115,019,355	27,554,840	30,862,367	27,764,517	28,837,636


(Compiled by the evaluators)

1.4. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Government of India

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of India (GoI) was signed early during 2007. This MoU was modified to include twinning arrangements and elements of south-south cooperation, and to extend cooperation to NIBP. Government of India (GoI) has agreed to release USD 4,320,000 over a period of four years. GoI agreed to send 30 practitioner civil servants to be recruited by NIBP in accordance with its terms and conditions, and entitlements. These civil servants however were to be paid by NIBP from its resources. The MoU further agrees to send short-term technical experts to Afghanistan, organise specialised training events in India, and allow deputation of Afghan civil servants to select line ministries and departments in India. All costs are to be borne by NIBP from its resources.

The management structure of the project was:

Chart 1



(Taken from the project document.)

The project provides for establishment of a robust management structure based on the experience of UNDP projects.

1.5. Letter of Agreement with IARCSC

Immediately after the start of the project, UNDP signed a Letter of Agreement (LoA) with Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) Afghanistan and assigned the project management responsibility to IARCSC in respect of a few outputs considering its overall responsibility of administrative reforms in Afghanistan.

The NIBP project was thus started on 1st January 2010 shortly after the closure of CAP project. The staff of CAP shifted to NIBP. The CDAs working with CAP were also automatically shifted to NIBP. The CAP project manager was also selected as project manager of NIBP.

PART 2: THE NIBP PROGRAMME AS IMPLEMENTED

2.1. SUCCESSES

As seen from the context and background, there was an urgent need for UNDP to launch NIBP in accordance with the priorities of UNDAF due to the prevailing circumstances and situation in Afghanistan to balance military and civilian capacity development efforts. Although, as we have seen, the institution building project delivered more on individual capacity development, there are many successes to its credit. The expected results, actual results, and impact have been put into a table (please see Annexure IV).

2.1.2. Government Wide Acceptability as a Concept

Departure from earlier CAP and CSLD projects made a conceptual difference in NIBP; therefore the concept of institution building through a dedicated UNDP project has been widely accepted in GIRoA. While Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) has been mandated with government wide administrative capacity development through institutional development and training, adopting the institutional development plans was the responsibility of different line ministries and departments in GIRoA. However, line ministries lacked the capacity to implement change plans, take up institutional reforms, formulate policies, and legal frameworks specific to the functions of the line ministry. In this situation, line ministries viewed NIBP as a supporting project that institutionalizes reforms in their ministries. Therefore, line ministries have readily welcomed the concept of institutional development as promised in the NIBP project document. To this extent, it was a success for NIBP to sell its concept in the first place. However, the lines ministries have been approached after the formulation of the project. Impact was that many GIRoA were not consulted before launch of the project, the officers were able to appreciate the support promised under the project and were ready to participate in the training and development activities initiated by NIBP.

2.1.3. Capacity Assessment Reports Produced

During the first year 2010 of the project, and early second year, the Capacity Development advisors (CDAs) have taken up a plan of assessing the capacity requirements of the line ministries they have been assigned with. The CDAs have produced capacity assessment plans for Central Statistical Office (CSO), Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, (MoLSAD), Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs (DMoYA), and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL). CDAs have utilised these plans to organise workshops, training courses, and study visits abroad. This approach of assessing the capacity needs before taking up support actions has been appreciated by the line ministries where such assessments were carried out by the earlier batches of CDAs. They have drafted capacity development plans with the line ministries and delivered some of the planned activities. The impact was that the line ministries were able to identify the capacity needs and were ready to plan for future action, if continued support was provided for a longer period until the system was institutionalised.

2.1.4. An Approach of Coaching and Advising Followed

NIBP was expected to be an improvement over CAP and CSLD projects of UNDP. While CSLD project used the approach of classroom training for leadership development, CAP programme followed the concept of assigning coaches and advisors within line ministries who work with the ministry staff and bring in the required change in the processes. Although NIBP was a new project, the project manager of CAP, other staff members, and some CDAs of CAP shifted to new NIBP. The MoU with the Government of India also continued to support NIBP under a new MoU similar to that signed under CAP. Accordingly, the culture of coaching and advising moved to NIBP as it was inherited under CAP. The approach of coaching and advising was accepted by some of the line ministries, especially MAIL, DMoYA, and CSO. Advising on the change management and coaching on daily business processes was the approach used by the CDAs. The coaching and advising approach has improved individual capacity to a certain extent in line ministries like DMoYA, MAIL, and CSO. For example, officers of DMoYA were able to appreciate the approaches of drafting a National Youth Policy, and they have drafted it. Officers from MAIL are able to use the knowledge gained in seed certification approaches, pest control, and selection of varieties for organic farming. Technical staff of CSO are now able to use statistical tools like STATA and SPSS and analyze statistical data. The regional training centre of civil service commission at Herat has benefited by the constant support of the coaching and advising approaches of the national CDA.

The coaching and advising approach of CDAs has an enormous impact on certain line ministries like MAIL, DMOYA, MoIC, and CSO. These line ministries benefited more by the knowledge shared through the advisors sitting by their side and sharing their knowledge, working closely with them, and facilitating them to take decisions. It is observed in these line ministries that the officers directly working with the CDAs are now able to work independently, even after the withdrawal of CDAs at the end of the project. Thus, the approach has enhanced the decision-making abilities of the officers in these line ministries.

2.1.5. Capacity Building Observed through Training Approach

NIBP has been able to organise training courses and workshops to almost all the line ministries it has positioned CDAs. Specifically, MAIL, DMOYA, and CSO have benefited by the training approaches and international study visits. MAIL is now able to utilise the knowledge gained for plant protection, pesticide control, and organic cultivation. CSO is now able to utilise the knowledge gained in production of statistical bulletins, and organizing data collection programmes. DMOYA is now able to work with finalisation of National Youth Policy for Afghanistan. These have happened with active support of CDAs in these specific line ministries. Thus, NIBP was able to influence the thinking of these line ministries in direction of continuous knowledge gaining and sharing.

NIBP conducted 99 international and 189 national training and learning events, engaging about 5600 officers including Deputy Ministers and senior management officers from GIRoA. The training courses included very generic programmes like Human Resources Management and Team building in Government to very specific courses in Statistics, Civil Aviation, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Plant Protection. The training courses established links between certain Indian training providers and Afghan line ministries that can be used for future capacity development endeavours.

Training courses organised at the line ministry level by the CDAs to certain extent have reduced the burden of IARCSC, which has the mandate of training all the civil servants in the country with limited resources.

The clear impact was twofold: One: the line ministries have gained knowledge, which was otherwise not possible through the training courses offered by the IARCSC. Two: It reduced the burden on IARCSC to organise training courses to these line ministries.

2.1.6. Twinning Agreements Signed

One of the novel features of this project was to have multi pronged approach to capacity development in the GIRoA. Firstly, through deployment of coaches and advisors within the line ministry who are practitioner civil servants who are culturally very closer to Afghanistan. Secondly, through international study tours to introduce world best practices to the emerging civil servants, and develop linkages between best practice governments in the region and GIRoA; thirdly seeking support under South-South cooperation. Twinning agreement has been an instrument that bridges a link between the countries willing to enter into partnerships. As part of this approach, NIBP facilitated signing of nine (9) twinning agreements between GIRoA and Government of India.

Under the twinning MoU, it was agreed that:

- i. Provision of advisory services for supporting policy and strategy development and systems improvement in accordance with identified needs of the partner ministry/ agency of GIRoA. This will include medium-term and short-term assignment for experts from Gol for assessment, capacity development, policy development, and other advisory services including services of technical experts for specific identified needs. The range of activities primarily would be technical areas that the CDAs located in the respective ministries/agencies would identify, but are not be in a position to support themselves.
 - ii. Provision of services of advisors in technical areas for on-site support in short visits to Afghanistan as well as off-site support from India.
 - iii. Study and exposure visits of civil servants of the partner ministry or agency of GIRoA and to the ministry or agency of Gol.
 - iv. Short-term international training of Afghan civil servants at the training institutes of Gol and other relevant institutes in India.
 - v. Deputation of Afghan civil servants for on-the-job practical training at the ministries/agencies of Gol.
- The handholding and support under the twinning MoU shall be tailored to bring about change management and operational efficiency of the particular ministry/agency of GIRoA for improved service delivery.
 - The cost to carry out the activities under the twinning MoU shall be out of NIBP funds mobilised from different resources.

The impact is, through these twinning agreements, a permanent linkage between relevant line ministries of Gol and GIRoA have been established. Government of

Afghanistan did not look at other areas for immediate support, rather NIBP seen support and guidance from Government of India within the agreed terms and conditions. The twinning agreements paved the way for GIRoA to have direct relations with Government of India even after closure of NIBP, thereby paving a way for sustainable relations. However, follow up actions on these arrangements and institutionalisation of twinning agreement was a much sought after activity to be taken by the line ministries with the support of NIBP.

TWINNING AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA³



HE Deputy Minister of MAIL signing Twinning MoU with his counterpart of Ministry of Chemical and Fertilizer, India On 11h February 2011



HE Deputy Minister of MAIL signing Twinning MoU with his counterpart of Ministry of Agriculture, India on 14 February 2011



Exchange of signed „Twinning” MoU between Dr Sima Samar, Chairperson, AIHRC and Justice K. G. Balakrishnan, Chairperson, NHRC, India on 06/05/2011



Exchange of signed „Twinning” MoU between H. E. Dr Raheen, Minister of Information & Culture, GoIRA and Mrs. Ambika Soni, Minister of Information & Broadcasting, GOI on 24/05/2011



H. E. Dr Raheen, Minister of Information and Culture, GoIRA and Ms. Kumari Shelja, Minister of Culture, GOI signing the „Twinning” MoU on 27/05/2011



Her Excellency Amena Afzali Minister of MoLSAMD of Afghanistan signing twinning MoU with HE Mallickarjun Kharge Minister of Labor and Employment of India on 12 October 2011



H. E. Dr. Daoud Ali Najafi, Acting Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, GoIRA and Mr. Vayalar Ravi Minister of Civil Aviation, GOI discussing areas of cooperation after signing of the twinning MoU on 16/06/2011



Mr. Abdul Rahman Ghafoori, President General, CSO, GoIRA and Dr. M. S. Gill, Minister, MoSPI, GOI signing the „Twinning” MoU on 30/05/2011



His Excellency Mr. Farooq Wardak, Minister of Education, GoIRA signed twinning MoU with his counterpart His Excellency Mr. Kapil Sibal, Minister of HRD of India on 8 December 2011

³ NIBP report submitted to Japan, 2011

2.1.7. South-South Cooperation Established

One of the strong achievements of NIBP was to have signed an agreement with Government of India (Gol) for cooperation under the modality of south-to-south cooperation. Whether the principles of south-to-south cooperation followed is a question of debate and evaluation and will be dealt with later in this report.

Gol has a support programme for Governments in need under the name of Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC). Under this programme, Gol extends technical and economic support to the governments in dire need. The support includes scholarships, training, small grants, etc. Gol operates this programme through its Embassies. Gol deviated from its normal practice for Afghanistan, and has considered assignment of administration of short-term technical support to NIBP⁴. This is an achievement in itself, for NIBP had an opportunity to select and depute Afghan civil servants to India for technical training without any additional financial burden. This shows, the Gol has faith and confidence of NIBPs administrative capabilities to administer ITEC programme.

NIBP's project management in the initial days was able to win the confidence of Government of India that kept faith in NIBP to support Afghan citizens' capacity development requirements. The approach of seeking support was later further extended to Japan, Korea, and Turkey.

2.1.8. Improved Relationships between UNDP and International Partners

Another success of NIBP has been the establishment of strong working relations with various international and national partners. Successes of CSLD and CAP have facilitated the NIBP project team to move ahead with same zeal to muster the support of international partners.

The Korean government has seen NIBP as an opportunity to select and train Afghan civil servants in their country. Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has put on record the efforts made by NIBP's earlier project team for establishing effective relations between KOICA and the GIRoA.

The government of Italy supported NIBPs efforts in Herat province. Government of Switzerland felt that there was still a need of such projects such as NIBP. The Government of Azerbaijan came forward to support the Government of Afghanistan due the efforts made by the project manager of NIBP.

⁴ MoU between Gol and NIBP Dt. 30 March 2010

Although Ministry of Finance managed, Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP) has a very large presence in all the line Ministries and has good recognition; NIBP has made its presence felt through workshops, training events, and international study tours.

Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has faith in UNDP and foresees well designed, more focused, and demand driven projects from UNDP come in the future and support the Government.

2.1.9. International Best Practices Introduced

NIBP has introduced international best practices in several functional areas in select line ministries Afghanistan. The international study tours, exposure visits through twinning arrangements and specially organised workshops have introduced international best practices in the line ministries like Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs; (DMoYA), Central Statistical Office (CSO), and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD).

The concept of self-help groups was introduced to Afghanistan from India, where women form themselves into groups for economic empowerment and political rights. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development was very much impressed with the concept of self-help groups and wanted to emulate similar approaches in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it feels the need to work further on the concepts and adaptability in the socio economic context of Afghanistan.

Working on the Saffron policy was possible only with the support of NIBP. Now the saffron for opium approach is widely recognised. In today's Afghanistan, Saffron is considered as best alternative to narcotics produced in the country for economic value and social recognition. The line ministry is working to finalise the saffron policy for its effective implementation. NIBP's most noble contribution is 'Saffron for Opium'.

The Ministry of Transportation and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) has been able to identify critical areas of capacity development among civil servants in the civil aviation sector after returning on a study tour from India where they have been exposed through twinning arrangement.

Indian systems of agricultural revolution, plant protection, control of pesticide use in farming, sustainable food production, and policies on Genetically Modified (GM) seeds and other agricultural products has been a tremendous learning experience for MAIL. The officers today feel that their knowledge levels are increased after visiting India.

Deputy Ministry of Youth affairs benefitted from the best practices in youth development and having a Youth policy in place.

The Indian training in statistics, statistical analysis, collection of population data, and production of statistical bulletins was of immense use to Central Statistics Office (CSO). The officers from CSO today feel that the study tours to Indian statistical institutes and awareness of central statistical systems made them realise the gaps in Afghanistan's statistical analysis systems. With the knowledge gained through NIBPs support to statistical systems, CSO is moving ahead with a bigger project with the support of German Agency for International Development (GIZ).

2.1.10. Early Efforts of Organizational Reforms and Restructuring Observed

During 2010 and early 2011 the capacity development advisors undertook organizational reforms and restructuring in DMOYA, MoLSAD, CSO, and MoTCA under Public Administration Reform (PAR) strategy for institutional strengthening and improvement of service delivery. Some notable contributions under the reform process were supporting the Priority Restructuring Reform (PRR) National Institution Project in MoIC and DMOYA, structuring and setting up of the Civil Aviation Authority of Afghanistan, Training of Trainers (ToT) department in the Millie bus unit of MoTCA, organizational structure of Aviation Security Directorate and its field units, restructuring and preparation of organograms of CSO and restructuring of Social Affairs department of Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD).

It is also observed that NIBP helped the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock to carry out an assessment of the office of Chief of Staff, and proposed a revised organizational structure, linking the positions with the functions required to be performed by the office. Subsequently NIBP supported in the restructuring of executive offices of the three Deputy Ministers. The line Ministry places on record that the restructuring efforts of NIBP resulted into increased efficiency and qualitative improvement of work in their offices. The impact was that the officers were able to make quicker decisions, are able to decide speedily on policy issues.

2.1.11. Policy Formulation Support in a Few Line Ministries

Before the start of NIBP, UNDP was running a Policy Analysis and Development (PAD) project. The NIBP project document envisages *“policy advisory services will be provided to the ministry or agency by the CDAs and linkages will be ensured with the Policy Analysis and Development (PAD) project of UNDP which supports placement of senior policy advisors in the requesting ministry.”* However, from April 2011, the activities of PAD have been merged with NIBP, and NIBP was assigned the task of PAD as well since the development of policy and legal framework is a part of institutional development that enhances environmental capacity. Therefore, the decision to merge policy-making process to NIBP was timely and reasonable.

NIBP supported a Policy Analysis and Development initiative at MAIL, under which the ministry was undertaking policy and strategy formulation in key areas for agriculture sector development. These important areas included agriculture market analysis, public private partnerships, support to peace and reintegration process, capacity development on programme implementation at rural level, support to resolve land conflict issues and conflict resolution of settled nomadic communities.

NIBP has supported policy formulation in nine key areas in the Ministry of Mines alone. These are the National Mining Policy, Gemstone Policy Framework, Compressed Natural Gas Policy, Chromites’ Policy, Decorative Stone Policy, Coal Policy, Construction Materials Policy, Social and Environmental Policies for the Mining Sector. These policies are however under review for approvals and implementation. The other policies were National Youth Policy, Civil Aviation Policy and Saffron Policy. The immediate impact seen from the saffron policy today is the slogan ‘Saffron for Opium’ is vibrating across the globe, which is contributed by NIBP. The visible impact in these line ministries is the senior level functionaries are able to appreciate policy support for decision-making. Secondly, the responsibility of line ministries to draft the ministry specific policies was realised. However, the ministries have to realise the importance of far and wide consultations before formulating any policy, and national policies cannot be written by international advisors.

2.2 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

2.2.1. External Factors

NIBP experienced teething troubles right from its inception stage. The project designers were not able to factor the imminent external risks to the project management. There has been an undocumented cold war taking place between at least three dominant players engaged in restructuring and administrative reforms in the country. First, it is the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) with a large agenda of public administration reforms in GIRoA. Training and development has been the mandate of IARCSC, and so was the overall institutional reform for effective and efficient service delivery at central and sub-national level. Second, it is the Ministry of Finance (MoF) which is working to enforce economic governance, financial discipline, and fiscal controls over the development administration in the country. MoF is therefore supported by the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Australian Aid, and Department of International Development (DFID) for its capacity development initiatives. The third is the Ministry of Economy mandated with policy planning and economic planning in the country, and to be one stop shop for capacity development information clearing house.

While MoF runs its flagship programme, the Civilian Technical Assistance Programme (CTAP), IARCSC takes lead in overall capacity development of civil service. NIBP was unable to foresee the acting forces behind these agencies trying to claim their own supremacy over capacity development efforts in the country. The result was NIBP has put an Output 2 to develop organisational and institutional capacity in alignment with CTAP. The donor support expected to flow into NIBP was diverted to CTAP. Documentary evidence to this is not available, yet the sequence of incidents happened before and after the drafting of NIBP project document. Logically this leads to conclusions that the conditions external to NIBP have not allowed for the project to pool up required funds. This could be one of the many reasons why a project projected to spend USD 115 million ended up only with USD 15 million. The deliverables promised with a budget line of USD 115 million are destined to fail on this single count alone.

2.2.3. The NIBP Programme not Demand Driven

It is not only the claim of the implementing line ministries of GIRoA that the project was not demand driven but was rather supply driven, as it is also clear from its design and implementation. There is no evidence available to show that

the deliverables under the project were discussed with implementing line ministries. Some of the line ministries expressed that they were taken by surprise when a capacity development adviser (CDA) was posted in their ministry.

The capacity development advisors posted at different line ministries were recruited through a single generic Terms of Reference (ToR). It would have been more effective if ToR could have been linked to the mandates, deliverables, and institutional capacity requirements of the specific line ministry in which the CDA was to be posted.

The line ministries like Ministry of Communication & Information Technology (MCIT) was in need of short-term technical support, whereas a long-term advisor under a generic ToR was posted there to provide technical support. However, the political and economic conditions obtaining in the country during late 2009 and early 2010 should not be ignored. There was an urgent need before the international community, particularly, before UN in Afghanistan to follow the approach of 'civilian surge' to balance military and civilian capacity development and establish viable and vibrant institutions for public service delivery. This could be one of the reasons why UNDP did not have adequate time to conduct a full-fledged diagnostic study before launch of the project.

2.2.4 Importance of National Ownership Not Recognised

There are two issues of national ownership. One is the national ownership of the project to be fully under national implementation mode, and other is the management of the project by nationals with international ownership. Neither ownership issues are fully recognised by the project. Today, Afghanistan has excellent capacities at all levels. Afghan civil servants are now able to articulate their needs, debate on issues, critique dominant policy issues, and formulate important national policies, and legal frameworks. There is no issue of inherent incapacity among Afghan nationals; on the contrary, it is a question of inadequate preparation. It rests with the selecting and recruiting agencies to tap into the available talents and assign them with leadership responsibilities. UNDP and NIBP without recognising this available capacity in the country recruited an international project manager, along with their international team, and international CDAs. It could have been more effective and sustainable if national capacities were identified and deployed. The evidence of this is the large number of international organisations operating in Afghanistan who are utilizing and Afghan nationals for different technical and managerial positions. An Afghan national managed project with international short-term technical consultants

could have been more acceptable and prove to be more effective and sustainable. Or, as an experiment, ownership could have been fully transferred.

2.2.5. Promised Technical Support Not Provided

At the time of project formulation, it was felt that the project will support institutional development across all the line ministries in Afghanistan. It was estimated that there was a requirement of huge human resources contingent comprising technical experts, advisors, consultants, and other support staff. Accordingly, the project had promised to provide a large number of technical experts over a period of 48 months that included international and national CDAs mainly through the MoU signed with the Government of India, and short term technical support through contracting out. NIBP was able to provide only 7.63% of its promised technical advice over a period of 48 months as evident from the table below.

Table 2
Person months of support promised and provided by NIBP

Support category	Promised	Provided	% of provision
International Capacity Development Advisors	2993	498	17%
National Capacity Development Advisors	8636	1309	15%
Contractual Services-Individual Consultants	12048	0	0
Total	23677	1807	7.63

(Person months = No of persons * number of months each person has to work)

Even the provision of international technical advisors was observed to be limited. While the GoI promised to position 30 CDAs, NIBP was able to recruit only 18 advisors from India over a period of four years at varying stages of the project. The CDAs posted in the line ministries worked for as short period as two (2) months and at the most for 36 months despite the duration of the project being 48 months.

There were six (6) CDAs working during 2010, eight (8) CDAs during 2011, fourteen (14) CDAs during 2012, and twelve (12) CDAs during 2013. Documentary evidence of non posting the required number of CDAs under GoI's MoU are not available. However, the Indian Embassy in Kabul expressed its dissatisfaction on the entitlements of CDAs, their utility by the line ministries, and non-recognition to the level of seniority they were bringing with them from their home country.

There is enough evidence available to say that very senior civil servants deputed from the Indian civil service were not able to cope with the work load in the line ministries, neither were they able to establish required linkages at the lower

levels in the line ministries. NBIP was not institutionalised itself to utilise the senior level of experience and expertise drafted from Government of India.

Table 3

UNDP/NIBP (National Institution Building Project)									
Capacity Development Advisors:									
No.	Ministry/Agency	Name	Nationality	No. Months	Contract	2010	2011	2012	2013
1	Independent Administrative Reform & Civil Service Commission	Vinaya Prakash Singh	Indian (M)	3	Under LoA	January 1-March 31, 2010			
2	Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs	Sirajuddin Shaik Mohammad	Indian (M)	3	Under LoA	January 1-March 31, 2010			
3	Ministry of Transport & Civil Aviation	Gyaneshwar Kumar Singh	Indian (M)	28	SSA	January 1, 2010-April 2012		Apr-12	
4	Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs	Tanweer Qamar Mohammad	Indian (M)	28	SSA	January 1, 2010-August 2012		12-Aug	
5	Independent Directorate of Local Governance	Sofia Dahiya	Indian (F)	25	SSA	January 1, 2010-January 31, 2012		Jan-12	
6	Central Statistics Organization	Atul Kumar Gupta	Indian (M)	12	SSA	January 1-December 31, 2010			
7	Central Statistics Organization-CSO	Dr Prafulla Chandra Mishra	Indian (M)	36	IC		January 2011-December 19, 2013		December 19 2013
8	Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs, Martyres and Disables	Siddharth Dev Verman	Indian (M)	36	IC		January 1, 2011-February 22, 2013		22-Feb-13
9	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock	Khushwant Sethi	Indian (M)	36	IC		January 2011-December 19, 2013		19-Dec-13
10	Ministry of Information and Culture	Ravi Rama Krishna	Indian (M)	10	IC	February 6 to December 5, 2011			
11	Ministry of Education	Srinivas Injeti	Indian (M)	10	IC	August 16, 2011 to June 15, 2012		15-Jun-12	
12	Department of Agriculture-Herat	Tomas Limpo	Philippines(M)	27	IC		March 17, 2011-June 25, 2013		25-Jun-13
13	Department of Labor & Social Affairs-Herat	Martin Hillario Mapolon	Philippines(M)	27	IC		March 17, 2011-June 25, 2013		25-Jun-13
14	Department of Agriculture-Mazar	Anindo Majumdar	Indian (M)	24	IC		March 17, 2011-March 2013		Mar-13
15	GDPDM	Serwat Perwaiz	American(F)		Under LoA				
16	Ministry of Economy	Bibhudutta Basantia	Indian(M)	15	IC			September 16, 2012-December 31, 2013	31-Dec-13
17	Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Sanoj Kumar Jha	Indian(M)	15	IC			September 30, 2012-December 31, 2013	31-Dec-13
18	IARCSC/CSMD	Meera Ranjan Tshering	Indian(F)	15	IC			October 18, 2012-December 31, 2013	31-Dec-13
19	IARCSC/GDPDM	Malavika Sah	Indian(F)		Under LoA				
20	Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Sayed Ahmed Baba	Indian(M)	13	IC			November 6, 2012-December 31, 2013	31-Dec-13
21	IARCSC/GDPDM	Kalpana Rajsingth	Indian(F)	11	IC			November 29, 2012-October 28, 2013	28-Oct-13
22	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation Development (MRRD)	Nandita Chatterjee	Indian(F)	12	IC			November 28, 2012-November 27, 2013	27-Nov-13
23	Department of Agriculture-Bamyan	Bernardo Galgo	Philippino(M)	18	IC			June 1, 2012-December 31, 2013	31-Dec-13
24	Department of Agriculture-Mazar	Canisius Sovis	Sri Lankan(M)	12	IC			August 8, 2012-August 7, 2013	7-Aug-13
25	Regional Office of CSC in Kabul	Valentina Hoxha	Albanian(F)	12	IC			December 3, 2012-December 4, 2013	4-Dec-13
26	Regional Office of CSC in Nagarhar	Christophe Casuabon	French(M)	12	IC			December 6, 2012-December 5, 2013	5-Dec-13
27	Regional Office of CSC in Kunduz	Angel Dimitrov	Bulgarian(M)	12	IC			December 5, 2012-December 4, 2013	4-Dec-13
28	Department of Education/Herat and then to project office	Janak Raj Joshi	Nepalian (M)	12	IC				Jan 3-Dec 31, 2013
29	Regional Office of CSC in Balkh	Nurun Nabi	Bangladeshi(M)	12	IC				Jan 2-Dec 31, 2013
30	Regional Office of CSC in Kandahar	Badri Bastakoti	Nepalian (M)	12	IC				Jan1-Dec 31, 2013
31	Ministry of Transport & Civil Aviation	Yahya Mir	Canadian(M)	11	IC				Feb 20, 2013-
32	Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs, Martyres and Disables	Nandita Mishra	Indian(F)	2	IC				Nov 7-Dec 31, 2013

2.2.6 Big Agenda: Small Means

The project started with a very big agenda of supporting government wide institutional development. NIBP promised a provision of 23,677 person months of support. This works out to deployment of 493 persons for four years, a massive undertaking indeed. The baseline for this calculation of this support, specifying line ministries and departments where such supply is required, and what demand was required needs a clear explanation in the project document. Although a budget of USD 115 million was estimated for these activities, means of these resources, and probable list of donors, approaches to mobilise could not find place in the project design document and implementation of an effective resource mobilisation strategy.

Afghanistan is a country where huge international support is flowing into the country from different players like different UN agencies, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, GIZ, International Embassies, International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs), JICA, DFID, USAID, faith based organisations, and other donor organisations. Everyone of these organisations is working on capacity development directly or indirectly. In such an environment, the projected outputs might become redundant the following year after the launching any such projects. Projects like NIBP should be dynamic to re-adjust its deliverables in alignment national priorities, available resources, and flexible to external players providing similar services.

2.2.7. Defective Project Design

Project outputs and activities are mixed up and overlapping. The project has divided its activities into two major components. Component one: activities in select government entities; component two: activities in IARCSC. The project has not appreciated that the activities of institutional development are directly linked to the decisions taken by IARCSC being the lead organisation to provide government wide civil service reforms, institutional, and organisational development. The line ministries were in need of guidance and support to institutionalise their structures within the overall direction of IARCSC. The design could have incorporated clear and direct provisions for working with IARCSC, develop strong coordination mechanisms, and ensuring that IARCSC guidelines are institutionalised. Alternatively, when such institutional standardisation was not possible, the project could have identified ministry specific or service specific institutional mechanisms without deviating from the overall government structure.

The project could have been more appropriate if the project document identified the requirements of the line ministries in terms of their institutional development, and aligned those requirements with the overall reform initiative of GIRoA taken up through IARCSC. This could have avoided a great deal of non-performance.

The project document articulates its objectives in the following words:

“The overall development objective of the NIBP is “to strengthen national institutional capacity and to create an efficient and capable public sector workforce through the development of institutions and civil service at the national and sub-national levels, the establishment of accountability mechanisms and effective utilization of resources for better service delivery”.

Accordingly, the immediate objectives of the project are two-fold as stated below:

Immediate Objective 1 – Development and implementation of policies and strategies for institutional strengthening and organizational reforms in select government entities.

Immediate Objective 2 – Putting in place policies and working mechanisms for implementing required training programmes for civil service in line with the ANDS monitoring framework and PAR strategies.

In order to realize these objectives of the comprehensive project on CD in Afghanistan, project resources will be applied towards achievement of the following three outputs within two components”

Similarly, the results and resource framework is developed with very generic activities under each output. The project does not describe any project outcomes, except declaring its alignment with UNDAF and CPAP outcomes described in the signature page of the project document.

Normally, development projects will have specific outcomes, measureable outputs, time linked activities, list of required inputs, resources, and finally strategies to mobilise required resources.

The repeatedly claimed flagship programme of UNDP of this magnitude has very generic outputs with much confusion, unable to distinguish whether it was an activity, an output, or outcome.

If we seriously look at one output described in the project document:

“Output_1: Institutional and Organizational capacity of select government entities strengthened by policy and strategy development and systems improvement through coaching and advisory services to improve service delivery and to support Public Administration Reform (PAR) objectives.”

It has an outcome, it has outputs, it has activities or processes, and it has an element of impact. Such examples are available all through the project. The document is verbose and there are many repetitions.

The project document identifies a number of risks that might derail or limit the implementation of the project. However, the mitigation activities found no place in the activity list as seen from the table below.

RISK MANAGEMENT	
RISK IDENTIFIED AND MEASURES TO REDUCE	ACTIONS INITIATED
Lack of physical security: The still fragile and insecure situation in most of the provinces and the violence and fear brought on by the armed conflict will defy even the best international efforts to make headway. It may prevent the project from mobilizing qualified advisors willing to work in Afghanistan. Mandatory compliance with required security instructions of UN may prevent placement of CDAs in particular locations. <i>The mitigation measure will be to train and appoint Afghans as national coaches and to place them in such locations (largely in provinces) as they are generally not subject to same level of risk as foreigners. Suitable CD strategies need to be adopted, such as conducting training and coaching at nearby secure places and using distance learning or other modalities.</i>	Although it is the biggest risk in Afghanistan, there is no evidence to show that NIBP has faced this risk and therefore no measures to mitigate the risk were required.
Lack of national human resource pool: The talent pool within Afghanistan is very limited and to find national coaches and advisors is a challenging job, made more complex by the competitive demands from various CD providers, including the Government, UN, multilateral agencies, NGOs, CSOs and other private organizations. <i>The project will build linkages with other CD projects to create a cadre of national coaches, train the national coaches and advisors through special training up to required levels, and recruit expatriate nationals.</i>	The risk is properly identified by NIBP, but no actions have been taken up to mitigate the risk as suggested. The mitigating strategy could have been properly factored into the activity list of the document. Nevertheless, in today's situation, one cannot say that there is a lack of national capacity. It requires being identified available talents and putting to use.
High turnover and talent drain: a comprehensive CD process will result in benefits to senior and middle level management in the long term and there is likely to be high turnover of the trained personnel from the Government institutions. There is a lack of interest among the retiring civil servants and a lack of opportunities for the emerging leaders. <i>There is thus a need to coordinate between CD agencies in liaison with ICCD and IARCSC so as to develop mechanisms and criteria for selection and placement and to apply the Pay and Grading system to improve employee retention.</i>	This is a challenge to Human Resources Management and Human Resources Development in Government of Afghanistan. However, no actions have been initiated by NIBP to mitigate the risk.
Performing line functions: Due to a lack of requisite trained and capable expertise in government institutions, the CDAs may often be asked to perform line functions of his/her core expertise and functional areas by his counterparts at the cost of	No such risk was seen happening. On the other hand, there was no inherent incapacity in the

<p>coaching and advising for CD. In such cases, the project would suffer from the usual risk of replacing capacity instead of developing capacity. <i>Proper monitoring and performance reviews of coaching and advisory services will therefore be undertaken to ensure strict adherence to the project mandate. The services of CDAs will be provided to the Ministries and agencies of GIRA under a MoU that will require the Ministry or agency not to utilize the services of CDAs for line functions.</i></p>	<p>Government. However, no MoU was signed between NIBP and the line ministry.</p>
<p>Incomplete demand formulation and job specification: For a comprehensive CD initiative to be successful, it is imperative that it be demand driven. Some of the government Ministries and agencies, particularly at the sub-national level, may not have the requisite capacity to identify their CD needs, including specifying the job descriptions. There would thus be the risk of CD implementation in these Ministries and agencies becoming supply driven. <i>To guard against this risk, the project will undertake promotional and publicity campaigns regarding the CD objectives, facilities and Public Administrative Reforms envisaged in the project, especially at the commencement of the project.</i></p>	<p>Although the suggested mitigation strategy was required, no such promotional activity appears to have been taken up by NIBP. The mitigating strategy could have been properly factored into the activity list of the document.</p>
<p>Low motivation and resistance to change: The current organization structures and employee emoluments in the public sector result in low employee motivation levels in terms of CD programmes. Further, the PAR focuses on reorganization, restructuring, CD in functional and core areas, democratic functions and accountability and transparency in the government institutions. <i>This will in the initial stages lead to a resistance to change. The results based management techniques, continuous monitoring and senior management involvement along with public representatives at the sub national level are some techniques to mitigate this risk, which will be used by the project.</i></p>	<p>Expected risk was unfounded. Suggested mitigation strategies are not implemented. The mitigating strategy could have been properly factored into the activity list of the document.</p>
<p>Stakeholders Relationships: Facilitating government stakeholders to improve their capacity to carry out their assigned tasks also risks leading to a number of management risks, including delays with slow partners particularly at the sub-national level. <i>Effective planning and reporting mechanisms will help in managing this risk to a large extent, and will be utilized by the project.</i></p>	<p>There was no evidence to show that the processes slowed down due to CD activities. On the other hand, the support by NIBP was said to be slow. Nevertheless, actions to mitigate this risk are not documented.</p>

Another major design defect was transferring the culture and practice of coaching and advising from CAP project to NIBP with available technical advisors including the project manager of CAP. Although, the project was initiated with a different mandate of institutional building, the coaches, advisors, and operations continued with the old practices of CAP. The project continued coaching and training with the past practice of training from CAP. Institution building or institutional development in fact requires short-term technical experts who design, test run, implement the systems and processes in accordance with the major business process reform agenda of IARCSC.

The most important design defect was NIBPs support estimations. Baseline calculations however are not available. It was estimated to provide 23,677 person months of support over a period of 48 months. This works out to 493 experts per month, whereas the actual support provided was only 37.64 experts. (See table 2)

These design defects appear obvious in terms of the scope of the project and in a complex implementation environment where a large number of players are working. Avoiding multiplicity and duplicity are major challenges while design and implementation of large programmes in countries like Afghanistan can be quite complex. Yet, these challenges can be avoided through a clear articulation and should be taken into account prior to drafting the project document. Precisely, it appears that NIBP could have taken up a serious exercise of the internal and external environment risks and opportunities prior to drafting the project document.

2.2.8. Unorganised System of CDAs Lacking Guidance and Direction

Although NIBP planned to deploy about 500 technical experts, no rationale was explained as to why there was a one ministry one international CDA approach. This appears to be another major design defect. One international CDA recruited and supervised by NIBP and one national CDA recruited and supervised by GDPDM of IARCSC in one ministry/department. Both these CDAs have a generic ToRs, and the same time, have to guide the line ministries through a large institutional reform agenda. Although both these international and national CDAs had to work as a team, their reporting lines, recruiting agencies, work arrangements were inconsistent. There were no clear guidelines on their working relations and this ultimately resulted in ineffective management and coordination support to the line ministry. The project management was not able to plan, organise, supervise, direct, control, and coordinate the work of advisory services provided to the line ministry.

The international CDAs were recruited under the MoU with Government of India. Later on, there was a minor deviation from this MoU to recruit from other countries under the guise of diversification of CDAs without a prior assessment of the value added by Indian civil servants. The issue of diversification could have been discussed with Government of India before making a departure from the original MoU with GoI.

The Indian CDAs have come from different backgrounds under one generic ToR. The earliest batch of CDAs was provided with orientation to NIBP and project deliverables. The earlier batch of Indian civil servants; Mr. G.K. Singh, Mr. Tanweer Qamar, Dr. P.C. Mishra, Mr. Siddarth Dev Verman, Mr. Kushwant Sethi, and Ravi Rama Krishna were still remembered in the line ministries although they left the services in the middle of their assignment. In the absence of any guidance, the later batches of CDAs mainly focused on trainings, workshops, and international study tours. This has happened mainly because they were from very senior levels in the Government of India.

In Afghanistan, the CDAs were not clear on what to do. The line ministries were looking at local talents for support, and short term technical experts who can develop required products, familiarise the line ministry in implementation of the systems developed, test run it, hand over to the ministry, and then leave. Some of the line ministries like Ministry of Communication & Information Technology (MCIT), Ministry of Economy (MoEc), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) have unwillingly agreed posting of CDAs as they felt the project was not demand driven. Under these circumstances, even the CDAs pulled on with their contract engaging themselves in trainings and workshops.

Guidance, orientation training, and clarity on institutional development goals of NIBP could have made the CDAs more acceptable in the system and the results could have been different at the end of project.

2.2.9. Focus on Individual Capacity Observed than on Institution Building.

The project was for national institutional building, whereas all the activities taken up by the capacity development advisors have been for organising training programmes, workshops, and international study tours. The CDAs have taken the blame that they have become travel agents of line ministries. In fact, they have focused more on training events as seen from the table 4 below. Excepting this, no other contribution of CDAs has been adequately documented either by line ministries or by the project.

While some of the CDAs organised effective and line ministry relevant training courses like the ones conducted for the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, & Livestock, Central Statistical Office, and Deputy Ministry for Youth Affairs, many of the CDAs have felt training was substituted as a tool for institutional development. Rationale behind their approach of training and workshops requires explanation that is more reasonable.

Table 4
TRAINING COURSES ORGANISED BY CDAs

It is observed from the table 4 that there was no consistent approach to training and development in the line ministries. While some line ministries have sent in a large number of individuals for training, some have ended up with

Ministry/ Department	No of events		TOTAL Participants	2010	2011	2012	2013
	Afghanistan	Out side					
ASGP	3	0	35		35		
CSO	13	9	529		124	319	86
CSMD	12	0	201		0	0	201
DMoYA	24	3	383	47	265	0	71
GDPDM	2	4	63	20	43	0	0
IARCSC	36	11	1310	50	74	1150	36
IDLG	0	3	36	0	21	0	15
MAIL	16	26	602	0	125	402	75
MoCI	10	6	459	0	0	0	459
MCIT	0	2	23	0	0	0	23
MoEc	24	1	300	0	0	210	90
MoEd	7	6	298	0	0		20
MoF	0	2	6	0	0	0	6
MoIC	1	4	46	0	36	5	5
MoLSAD	30	7	797	0	85	693	19
MoPH	0	2	30	0	0	0	30
MRRD	0	2	30	0	0	0	30
MoTCA	10	10	428	41	177	182	28
MoWA	1	1	17	0	2	0	15
	189	99	5593	158	987	3239	1209
The above numbers include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training courses in Afghanistan • Training courses outside Afghanistan • Discussions with Ministers/Deputy Ministers • Workshops • People attended signing of MoUs • Conferences 							

Five to six officers attending the training courses. At the same time, it is not clear why NIBP has organised training courses for Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP).

2.2.10 Missing Conceptual Clarity on Institutional Building

The project document has mixed up institutional building activities with all other capacity development activities albeit it was fully an institutional development project that wanted to make a shift from CSLD and CAP, both focusing on individual capacity development projects. Specific institutional development outputs have not been identified. List of activities suggested in the results and resources framework have mixed up activities of institutional development with that of training and development. Without conceptual clarity, it has been stated in the project document that coaching and advising approach would be adopted for institutional development.

The following excerpt from the project document clarifies the above observation.

“Capacity building of leading Government Ministries or agencies will be done based on demand and through prominent international advisors, primarily from the region. These advisors will support the leadership of the Government Ministries or agencies to first prepare a comprehensive organizational capacity building strategy & plans and secondly implement the plans through mobilization of international and national resources. Based on the capacity building strategy and plan, the advisors will provide support through coaching and training which will result in practical capacity building of different organizational units of the Ministries. Similarly, the project will promote twinning arrangements or partnerships of the Afghan government ministries or agencies with their counterpart ministries in other countries for transfer of specialized international or regional know-how through specialized short-term interactions and trainings.”⁵

The above statement leads one to draw many conclusions like: Was there any demand survey? What exactly the project was looking at by saying ‘capacity building of leading Government Ministries or agencies’? Which capacity was it focusing on? It was expected through the above statement that coaching and training would result in practical capacity building of different organisational units of the ministries. Conversely, there were coaching and training activities in large number, but have not resulted in any improved capacity of any organisational units in the ministries. Thus, the evaluators observed that there was no conceptual clarity on institutional development or institution building.

2.2.11 Generic Training Courses could have been Integrated

CDAs conducted a large number of generic training courses in the line ministries they were working with. Training courses in Human Resource Management, Team Building, Leadership Development, and Staff-Management, Gender issues in Civil Service Personnel Management, Accounting, Management, Project Design and Management were generic to all the line ministries. These courses could have been integrated and conducted at one place to avoid multiplicity and duplicity on activities, which would save time and resources. There was also a

⁵ NIBP project document

possibility of pooling up the talents of the advisors and using for government wide individual capacity development activities rather than for each line ministry. Thus, the productive time of CDAs could have been utilized for effective institutional development.

2.2.12. Sub-National Commitments Not Met

The overall intent of the project was to develop institutional capacity at the central and provincial level to strengthen service delivery. NIBP was programmed to develop close partnerships with IARCSC to strengthen sub-national structures, and enhance training and other capacity development activities of Civil Service Centres at provincial levels. In support of its endeavours, NIBP recognises *“In addition to these projects, the Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) of UNDP has undertaken extensive capacity development activities at the provincial, district and municipal level.”* Further, the NIBP guarantees that *‘Systems will be put in place for partnerships and synergies with other programmes and projects of IARCSC and UNDP at the implementation level, in particular with ASGP.’* Furthermore NIBP more ambitiously states:

“It is to be noted that the UNDP’s ASGP has been providing support of different kinds to 23 provincial training centres. The support being provided to these training centres is expected to be transferred to the NIBP once the project is launched and is firmly grounded to take over these responsibilities. In order to ensure continuity of functions of these institutions, a clear and complete transition/migration plan will be prepared in consultation with the provincial affairs department of the IARCSC and involving all concerned stakeholders. ASGP will continue providing support to these provincial training centres until the proposed transition/migration is complete. The support to these institutions shall migrate from ASGP to NIBP in accordance with the transition / migration plan approved by NIBP”.

However, no such transitional arrangements were made, neither was there any effort by NIBP to take over capacity development initiatives of ASGP. On the other hand, NIBP has posted an international CDA in Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) who later permanently moved to ASGP. IDLG was not in fact, one of the line ministries identified by NIBP for institutional development. It was the mandate of ASGP.

Further, international CDAs were posted at provincial locations late during 2012 and early 2013. It is not clear why Indian civil servants were not posted at provincial headquarters. We observe that CDAs from Nepal, France, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Albania, and Bulgaria were posted in provinces.

It is also seen that the CDAs from these countries have been recruited from open market through Independent Contractor (IC) modality of UNDP, which later became a cause of dissatisfaction for Indian civil servants because of the entitlements of these international CDAs.

Table 5
LIST OF I-CDAs posted at Provincial level

	Ministry Department	CDA	Nationality	Mo	2011	2012	2013
1.	Dept of Agriculture-Herat	Tomas Limpo	Phillipi (M)	27	Mar 17		25-Jun-13
2.	Dept of MoLSAD Herat	Martin Mapolon	Phillipi(M)	27	Mar17		25-Jun-13
3.	Dept of Agriculture-Mazar	Anindo Majumdar	Indian (M)	24	Mar 17,		Mar-13
4.	Dept of Agriculture-Bamyan	Bernardo Galgo	Philipino(M)	18		June 1,	31-Dec-13
5.	Dept of Agriculture-Mazar	Canisius Sovis	Sri Lanka(M)	12		Aug 8	7-Aug-13
6.	Regi Office of CSC in Kabul	Valentina Hoxha	Albanian(F)	12		Dec 3	4-Dec-13
7.	Reg Off of CSC in Nangarhar	Christophe Casuabon	French(M)	12		Dec 6,	5-Dec-13
8.	Reg Office of CSC in Kunduz	Angel Dimitrov	Bulgarian(M)	12		Dec 5,	4-Dec-13
9.	Dept of Education/Herat and NIBP	Janak Raj Joshi	Nepalian (M)	12			Jan 3-Dec 31,
10.	Reg Office of CSC in Balkh	Nurun Nabi	Bangladeshi(M)	12			Jan 2-Dec 31,
11.	Reg Office of CSC Kandahar	Badri Bastakoti	Nepalian (M)	12			Jan1-Dec 31,

(Compiled by the evaluators)

2.2.13. Transfer of Ownership and Recruitment Commitments not Met

Transfer of ownership of the project has been one of the key elements and understanding between GIRoA and UNDP. A LoA was also signed to this effect between UNDP and IARCSC. This letter of agreement was signed on 11th May 2010. The covenants of the agreement were very clear and straightforward. A large number of activities under all the three outputs were assigned to IARCSC/GDPDM. Thereafter IARCSC was expected to take the lead, manage the project, and deliver the assigned tasks of the project under the overall guidance of NIBP. IARCSC was also vested with the powers of recruitment of CDAs for the centre and provinces in accordance with the agreed terms and conditions and as agreed under LoA.

For the convenience of the reader, the relevant extracts from LoA are produced hereunder:

2. In accordance with the Project Document and with the following terms and conditions, we confirm our acceptance of the activities to be provided by the IARCSC towards the project, as specified in Attachment 2: Description of Activities (hereinafter referred to as "Activities"). Close consultations will be held between the IARCSC and UNDP on all aspects of the Activities.

3. The IARCSC shall be fully responsible for carrying out, with due diligence and efficiency, all Activities in accordance with its Financial Regulations and Rules.

The activities assigned to IARCSC are:

Work to be performed by the IARCSC

Activities of the project shall be undertaken and the project resources shall be applied in accordance to the Project Document and the annual work-plan.

The IARCSC shall be responsible for carrying out the following activities under the Project:

Output	Activity
Output_1	1.1 Provision of services of Capacity Development Advisors (CDAs) in select government entities to provide coaching and advisory services for institutional strengthening, organizational reforms and skills development.
	1.2 Provision of advisory services for specialized CD under Twinning Arrangements with ministries / agencies of other regional governments for institutional and organizational CD
	1.3 Development and implementation of a Gender Mainstreaming Strategy (GMS) to bring about empowerment of women civil servants.
	1.4 Support to ICCD in MoEc to serve as a government body to oversight, coordinate, advocate, monitor, and report to both government and donors on CD interventions in Afghanistan.
Output_2	2.1 Provision of services of CDAs in select government entities in alignment with CTAP to provide coaching and advisory services for institutional strengthening, organizational reforms and skills development.
Output_3	3.1 Strengthening institutional capacity of IARCSC for improved PAR Management and Coordination
	3.2 Development of a National Training Policy.
	3.3 Deepening support for the operational Capacity Development of Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI)
	3.4 Developing the operational capacity of Regional Training Centres (RTCs) & Provincial Training Centres (PTCs)

With the assignment of above tasks to IARCSC/GDPDM, a major portion of work was transferred to IARCSC from NIBP. It was the responsibility of IARCSC to implement the activities as agreed to under the modality of national ownership.

However, in practice this has not happened. Although there was a LoA, no standard monitoring mechanisms and transfer of ownership has taken place, leaving a scope for dissatisfaction of ownership on processes.

Furthermore, UNDP and NIBP agreed with IARCSC that all the recruitments under the project will be done by IARCSC and in exceptional cases; NIBP would help IARCSC in the recruitment process as evident from the following clause:

“B. Contracts for CDAs

The CDAs hired under the project shall be recruited and contracted by the IARCSC as individual consultants from sources identified in the Project Document. The UNDP as its discretion and in consultation with the IARCSC may consider hiring international CDAs on UNDP contract on case-by-case basis as an exception so as to attract qualified personnel.

The recruitment process for the recruitment of CDAs under contract with the IARCSC therefore shall be internal to GDPDM, IARCSC. The UNDP/NIBP project shall have the responsibility of disbursement of remuneration and allowances from the project funds in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.”⁶

Instead of making it an exceptional rule to recruit CDAs on case by case, NIBP resorted to recruit all the CDAs for the project excepting the national CDA/CDOs who were recruited by IARCSC under the Letter of Agreement. Similarly, NIBP has not taken serious interest in the recruitment of national CDAs. It was left fully to the responsibility of IARCSC. In the absence of total national ownership, there should have been joint efforts in recruitment to ensure transparency.

This not only caused a major concern for the national counterparts, but also delayed the process of recruitment by NIBP. Ultimately, NIBP has ended up posting 498 person months of international CDA support as against the estimated requirement of 2993 person months, and 1309 person months of national CDA support against the estimated requirement of 8636 person months of support. No short-term technical expertise was provided against the estimated requirement of 12,048 person months of expertise.

This all led to further non-performance of NIBP. Here we need to emphasize on one astounding aspect of the project. NIBP was predominantly a project of providing soft support for institution building in Afghanistan through provision of technical experts and capacity development advisors. It is obvious that any project that does not produce the desired results when the required amount of

⁶ LoA with IARCSC

technical expertise was not provided. This was precisely what happened in the case of NIBP.

It is worth mentioning that there was no proper justification on providing funds of USD 1.066 million to IARCSC out of USD 27.554 million projected for the year 2010. This constitutes only 3.87% of the year's estimations but the task for IARCSC was very large. Neither projected amount of financial resources, nor estimated number of experts were mobilised by NIBP.

2.2.14. Resource Mobilisation Not Matching with the Needs of the Project

The project was unable to mobilise the required resources for full implementation of the project. We do not find any resource mobilisation strategy for effective implementation of project.

Strangely enough, the project was designed to spend about USD 115, 019 million, with a start up fund of USD 4 million. The project document does not speak about the approaches of resource mobilisation. The probable donors and expected donation from each donor, or donor commitments are not documented in the project documents. The following paragraph leads us to think that it was the responsibility of CDAs to mobilise national and international resources. Since the word 'resources' is not qualified enough, it may be construed that all the required resources have to be mobilised by CDAs.

*"Capacity building of leading Government Ministries or agencies will be done based on demand and through prominent international advisors, primarily from the region. These advisors will support the leadership of the Government Ministries or agencies to first prepare a comprehensive organizational capacity building strategy & plans and secondly implement the plans through mobilization of international and national resources."*⁷

Over a period of four years, NIBP was able to mobilize USD 23, 897 million out of which only USD 21, 300 million was spent leaving a balance of USD 2, 597 million unspent. The evaluators felt that funding was not a problem for the project, as it could not spend over USD 2, 597 million of the available funds. Therefore, non-performance of the project cannot be directly attributable to fewer resources than planned. (Please see the table 6).

⁷ NIBP project document

2.2.15. South-South Cooperation Principles Not Followed

Table 6
Financial Results of NIBP
2010-2013

Donor	Income	Expenditure	Balance
00012 UNDP	4,825,346	4,825,346	-
00095 Denmark	172,000	30	171,970
00131 India	4,519,219	4,252,206	267,013
00137 Italy	1,285,873	1,183,582	102,290
00141 Japan	10,567,317	8,715,075	1,852,242
00232 SDC	2,047,505	1,864,466	183,039
00550 CIDA	92,324	89,827	2,498
10282 Switzerland, Gov	157,600	145,592	12,008
11234 Aus AID	230,481	224,524	5,957
Grand Total:	23,897,665	21,300,648	2,597,017

(Data supplied by Cross Practice Unit of UNDP)

The project document and subsequent annual reports speak much about south-to-south cooperation as a successful element of the project. There was an agreement with Government of India to provide support under south-to-south cooperation modality. The MoU signed by Government of India to provide the support with facilitating recruitment of 30 Indian civil servants was also given the colour of south-to-south cooperation.

In fact, south-to-south cooperation envisages cooperation between countries in the global south. International donor agencies and international organisations like UNDP may help these countries to come together for cooperation. Additionally, the agreement signed between Indian and Government of Afghanistan/UNDP/NIBP is a triangular cooperation where the MoU seeks NIBP/UNDP fund the activities taken up under the initiative. It looks more at a cost sharing agreement than a south-to-south cooperation.

Gol has clearly conveyed that all the expenditure towards support like CDAs salary, travelling, other costs of international training, field visits under twinning arrangements, and others will have to be borne by NIBP out of its resource from different sources. Gol agreed to grant USD 1,080,000 every year for a period of four years totalling to USD 4,320,000. If NIBP recruited all the 30 civil servants

as promised by Gol, the total payments to CDAs by way of salaries and allowances could have been an estimated USD 17,280,000 million at the average rate of USD 12,000 per month per international CDA. Gol contribution accounted to USD 3,000 per month per CDA. This share of Gol does not include other expenditures under the MoU. ($30 \text{ CDAs} * 48 \text{ months} * 3000 = 4,320,000$). Logically this could have been the calculation by Government of India to donate USD 1,080,000 per year. ($30 \text{ CDA} * 12 \text{ months} * \text{USD}3000=1,080,000$). Thus Gol's constituted 3.75% of total projected funds of USD 115 million.

Hiring of experts, organising training courses and other project activities was also possible even in the absence of any MoU if NIBP was ready to meet the expenditure towards hiring of CDA, training courses, seminars, and tours. The south-to-south cooperation agreement could have been drafted with more support that lessens the burden on NIBP.

The support agreed by Gol under MoU in the name of south-to-south cooperation appears to be very basic. Provision of Curriculum Vitae (CVs) of candidates, allowing the candidates to participate in interviews, allowing them to have email exchanges with NIBP, ensuring the selected candidate comes to Afghanistan within the timeframe have been the covenants of the MoU.

Thus, the elements of south-to-south cooperation could have been more strongly documented in the MoU signed between Government of India and Government of Afghanistan. NIBP and UNDP supported triangular agreement in the name of South-to-South cooperation agreement.

NIBP could have worked more closely with Government of India, to take full advantage of Government of India's commitment to the regional development, especially supporting the development initiatives in Afghanistan. Nowhere is it documented that NIBP has worked with strong coordination with Government of India or its Embassy in Kabul to establish permanent and sustainable links with the Government of India's organisations back in New Delhi and elsewhere in the country. Considering the size of Government of India's support, there could have been an expert to liaise with Government of India to organise regular interactions, and share communications between Gol and Government of Afghanistan.

SOUTH-TO-SOUTH COOPERATION

South-South cooperation is a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. Involving two or more developing countries, it can take place on a bilateral, regional, sub regional or interregional basis. Developing countries share knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts.

Collaboration in which traditional donor countries and multilateral organizations facilitate South-South initiatives through the provision of funding, training, and management and technological systems as well as other forms of support is referred to as **triangular cooperation**.

Basic Elements of South-South Cooperation

South-South cooperation is initiated, organized and managed by developing countries themselves; often, Governments play a lead role, with active participation from public- and private-sector institutions, non-governmental organizations and individuals. It involves different and evolving forms, including the sharing of knowledge and experience, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions. South-South cooperation can include different sectors and be bilateral, multilateral, sub regional, regional or interregional in nature.

Guiding Principles of South-South Cooperation

South-South cooperation is a manifestation of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South that contributes to their national well-being, their national and collective self-reliance and the attainment of internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. The South-South cooperation agenda and South-South cooperation initiatives must be determined by the countries of the South, guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit.

Objectives of South-South Cooperation

The basic objectives of South-South cooperation are interdependent and mutually supportive and contribute to the broader objectives of international development cooperation. These objectives are to:

- foster the self-reliance of developing countries by enhancing their creative capacity to find solutions to their development problems in keeping with their own aspirations, values and special needs;
- promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among developing countries through the exchange of experiences; the pooling, sharing and use of their technical and other resources; and the development of their complementary capacities;
- strengthen the capacity of developing countries to identify and analyze together their main development issues and formulate the requisite strategies to address them;
- increase the quantity and enhance the quality of international development cooperation through the pooling of capacities to improve the effectiveness of the resources devoted to such cooperation;
- create and strengthen existing technological capacities in the developing countries in order to improve the effectiveness with which such capacities are used and to improve the capacity of developing countries to absorb and adapt technology and skills to meet their specific developmental needs;
- increase and improve communications among developing countries, leading to a greater awareness of common problems and wider access to available knowledge and experience as well as the creation of new knowledge in tackling development problems;
- recognize and respond to the problems and requirements of the least developed countries, land-locked developing countries, small island developing States and the countries most seriously affected by, for example, natural disasters and other crises; and
- Enable developing countries to achieve a greater degree of participation in international economic activities and to expand international cooperation for development.

Benefits of South-South Cooperation

Benefits of South-South cooperation include:

- strengthening of the voice and bargaining power of developing countries in multilateral negotiations;
- use of experience and capacity that already exists and the development of new capacities in developing countries;
- fostering of economic, scientific and technological self-reliance;
- increased knowledge of and confidence in the capacities available in developing countries;
- coordination of policies on development issues relevant to a number of developing countries;
- development of indigenous technology and the introduction of techniques better adapted to local needs, particularly in traditional subsistence sectors such as agriculture;
- promotion of:
 - national science and technology plans;
 - economic and social planning;
 - linkage of research and development with economic growth;
 - project planning and evaluation;
 - use of human and natural-resource potential;
 - modern management and administration;
 - technical, scientific and administrative manpower; and
 - accelerated professional training at different level
- opening of additional channels of communication among developing countries;
- promotion and strengthening of economic integration among developing countries on as wide a geographic basis as possible;
- enhancement of the multiplier effect of technical cooperation;

Ref: http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html

2.2.16. Follow Up on Successes Missing

After the signing of nine (9) twinning agreements with other governments and the establishment of working relations, NIBP has not established any mechanisms for follow up on the actions to be taken. Line ministries that have signed the twinning arrangements have not institutionalised proper follow-up systems so that they can take advantage of the arrangements. One of the reasons why such systems were not established could be that, the MoU wanted NIBP to meet the financial requirement of activities to be continuously undertaken as can be seen from these covenants of MoU:

- (d) *The handholding and support under the twinning MOU shall be tailored to bring about change management and operational efficiency of the partner ministry/ agency of GIRoA for improved service delivery.*
- (c) *The cost to carry out the support under the twinning MOU shall be met out of NIBP funds mobilized from different resources.⁸*

These costs are not factored into the budget estimates of the project. Neither were these issues clearly discussed with the Government of India to establish continued regional support under south-to-south cooperation. For any reason, the systems for follow up on the actions taken, follow up on the knowledge gained through international workshops, study tours, and training courses were not established.

One of the keys elements missing in NIBP was a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. This follow up can be incorporated into the M&E system, which can utilise a mix of qualitative and quantitative data (including beneficiary or stakeholder inputs) to track the progress and impact of the project. It should also be able to detect misses and aid in follow up.

With no long lasting and sustainable follow up actions, the twinning agreements turned out to be standalone activities. After the closure of the project, the situation in the line ministries reverted to its previous stage.

2.2.17. Staffing Problems

Although it was not properly documented, the interviews with project personnel, past project managers, and government officers revealed that NIBP struggled tremendously to recruit CDAs, and other staff required for the project. The

⁸ MoU between Government of India, Government of Afghanistan, and UNDP

required P4 and P3 level positions were filled during the later part of 2012 and early 2013. The micro management approaches of earlier leadership of UNDP have created staffing problems within the project. Out of the promised 30 Indian civil servants, NIBP was able to recruit only 18 CDAs in different phases of the project and not on time defeating the very purpose of MoU and capacity development. The project manager was not able to function independently. In every aspect, the senior management started interfering during first two years of the project, which ultimately forced the resignation of the first project manager. Later, the Chief Capacity Development Advisor (CCDA) has been given the responsibility of managing the project and no fulltime project manager was appointed. Due to this the full contingent of human resources required was never made available to the project. As there was no system of record keeping of email exchanges, it became difficult to find evidences.

2.2.18. Inadequate Guidance to CDAs Observed

The international CDAs were recruited from diverse backgrounds under one generic ToR. The earliest batch of CDAs was provided with orientation to NIBP and the project deliverables. The earlier batch of Indian civil servants Mr. G.K. Singh, Mr. Tanweer Qamar, Dr. P.C. Mishra, Mr. Siddarth Dev Verman, Mr. Kushwant Sethi, and Ravi Rama Krishna were still remembered in the line ministries, although they left in the middle of their assignments. In the absence of any guidance, the later batches of CDAs mainly focused on trainings, workshops, and international study tours. This has happened mainly because they were from very senior level in Gol, and posted in Afghanistan; they were not clear on what to do and were provided very little guidance. On the other hand, the line ministries were looking at local talents for support, and short term technical experts who can develop required products, familiarise the line ministry in implementation of the systems developed, test run it, hand over, and depart. Some of the line ministries such as the Ministry of Communication & Information Technology (MCIT), Ministry of Economy (MoEc), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) have unwillingly agreed posting of CDAs as they felt the project was not demand driven. Under these circumstances, even the CDAs pulled on their contract engaging themselves in trainings and workshops.

The Indian CDAs have interpreted the MoU in their favour and organised training courses in India, their hometown, accompanied the teams, and when they came back to Afghanistan, they were already ripe for their Rest and Relaxation (R&R) leave and their contribution to capacity development remained minimal. The national CDAs, remained as their support staff rendering translations, photocopying, and travel management services instead of providing technical advisory services to the Government of Afghanistan.

Guidance, orientation training, and clarity on institutional development could have made the CDAs more acceptable in the system and the outcomes could have been more effective than they are at the end of project.

2.2.19. Coordination and Reporting Systems were Not Clear

The biggest functional flaw in entire international CDA system observed is that the CDAs were directly dealing with Deputy Ministers and Director Generals for the most part. International CDAs have not coordinated with the junior and middle level management with GIRoA. In Afghanistan, it is well evidenced that if one Minister is changed, many senior managers will also move from the ministry. This aspect was not recognised by the international CDAs while interacting with the senior managers alone, therefore the required knowledge transfer was not sustainable.

Further, the project implementation suffered from weak coordination mechanisms and undefined reporting structures. In fact, the coordination between IARCSC and the CDAs posted in the line ministries was near to zero despite strong communication links between IARCSC and CDA was necessitated by the PAR mandate of IARCSC. Line ministries expected greater coordination among UNDP, NIBP, line ministries, and IARCSC. IARCSC was the lead agency to support the line ministries in public administration reforms and institutional development. Ministry of Finance is working on fiscal reforms and developing systems of reporting on budget expenditures and annual budget formulation. Therefore, government wide institutionalisation of systems and procedures has to be taken up in close coordination with these agencies. Thus, the line ministries expected support from CDAs to have better coordination among all the supporting partners. CDAs could have worked as catalysts of proposed changes.

Secondly, the reporting relations between the international CDAs and line ministries were not clear. Even if line ministries wanted to communicate their desire to have different approach to the activities initiated by the international CDAs, they were hesitant to discuss and direct the CDA as there were no clear reporting lines. On the other hand, CDAs have given an impression that they cannot work beyond what had been agreed to in the MoU between GoI and GIRoA. CDAs were sitting in the line ministries and reporting to the project manager back in NIBP. Even the national CDAs were only working as support staff to the international CDAs, although they were respected in preference to international CDAs.

2.2.20. Some Operational Issues - Slow Processes

Right from the beginning, NIBP has not recruited the required number of operations staff. The Chief Capacity Development Advisor (CCDA) was recruited after one year nine months after the launch of the project. Immediately after the appointment of CCDA, the project manager left the project for reasons not known, and he was given a lower level position in another UNDP project. During the initial years there was an operations manager working with NIBP. After he left, his replacement took time, and this increased the work of the project manager first, and later the work of Chief Capacity Development Advisor (CCDA), who's main duties were to extend technical advisory services and manage a team of CDAS. Productive time of the project manager and CCDA was spent on operational matters like logistics, payment of bills, clearing R&R applications, procurement, and other activities.

Although UNDP senior management took direct interest in project administration, NIBP took the blame of being a slow project that had not heeded the requests of line ministries on time. Positioning of CDAs and other technical support has been delayed beyond the reasonable time required for the recruitment process. Some of the CDAs were also abruptly removed from the line ministries and no replacement was provided in a timely manner. Leave, R&R, transfer, travel of CDAs was maintained at the NIBP office and prior intimation of CDA movement was given to the line ministries.

Financial processes were slower than the administrative processes as expressed by line ministries like DMoYA, MAIL, MoLSAD, and MCIT. Many bills are said to be still pending and unsettled. Embassy of the Government of India expressed its concern on non-settlement of bills of some training institutes in India even after a year of providing support.

Some of the line ministries expressed that even in organising workshops and training courses, there were delays in execution of actions. Instead of assigning tasks to the ministry staff, CDAs performed the work on their own.

Considering the size and significance of the project, NIBP should have established systems for periodical performance evaluation of the national and international CDAs. CDA time sheets for salary payments and allowances were maintained but there are no performance evaluation and feedback given to the CDAs. The other operational issues were late payments of salaries and

allowances of CDAs, accounting management and arrangements with GDPDM, problems with banking arrangements, and relations with national CDAs.

The other operational challenge was the management of national CDAs. They used to be called Capacity Development Officers (CDO), later they were rechristened to National Capacity Development Advisors (NCDA). They have a typical recruitment arrangement. IARCSC recruited them under a LoA and positioned them in the line ministries. Their reporting lines, support to be provided to the line ministries were not clearly articulated. With that, some NCDAs at Kabul have worked to the satisfaction of the line ministry, for example DMoYA. Others have not developed any strong working relations with the line ministry, but worked as assistants and translators to international CDAs. Again, it was not an issue of non-availability of capacity among NCDAs, but rather that the NCDAs were not strongly oriented to work with the line ministries. In comparison with international CDAs, NCDAs have worked for longer periods with the line ministries. Besides this, line ministries were not happy with NCDAs as they were detached from the system, and functioned as representatives of UNDP and NIBP.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the project was given the least priority in the project. In fact, there should have been strong monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure that the project was moving ahead with its intended mandate. However, the project has recruited a UN volunteer as an M&E specialist only during second half of 2012 who left the service on conclusion of his contract after one year.

Recruitment of operational staff is also delayed beyond the reasonable time required for recruitments as seen from the table below.

Table 7

UNDP/NIBP (National Institution Building Project)							
Project Staff							
No.	Name		Contract Model	2010	2011	2012	2013
1	Raj Kamal	Project Manager	FTA	1-Jan	30-Sep		
3	Sulaiman Stanekzai	Project Associate	SC	1 Jan - 10 Apr			
5	Haroon Sidiqi	Driver	SC	January 1, 2010-December 31, 2013			
6	Aminullah Onya	Driver	SC	January 1, 2010-December 31, 2013			
7	Mohammad Haroon	Cleaner	SC	January 1, 2010-December 31, 2013			
8	Mohammad Yousuf Sharif	Security Guard	SC	January 1, 2010-December 31, 2012			
9	Tooryalai Alizada	Security Guard	SC	January 1, 2010-December 31, 2012			
10	Zamir Frotan	Operations Manager	SC	August 23, 2010-May 2012			
11	Abdul Rahman Farid	Admin/Log associate	SC	November 1, 2010-December 31, 2013			
12	Lutfullah Amani	Finance associate	SC		January 26, 2011-August 2012		
13	Sohaila Abhar	Project Associate	SC		February 15, 2011-December 31, 2013		
14	Aimal Feroz Zalland	Capacity Development Program Officer	SC		February 20, 2011-December 31, 2013		
15	Khwajah Ahmad	Driver	SC		July 29, 2011-December 31, 2013		
16	Rohullah Ahmadi	Driver	SC		July 29, 2011-December 31, 2013		
17	Sultan Hajiyeve	Chief Capacity Development Advisor	FTA		August 16, 2011-October 2013		
18	Nawab Ashrafi	Driver	SC			May 20, 2012-December 31, 2013	
19	Mitch Teberg	M & E Advisor and Reporting Sec	UNV			June 11, 2012-June 6, 2013	
20	Mohammad Yousuf Walizada	Finance associate	SC			August 27, 2012-December 31, 2013	
21	Nilofar Barikzai	Gender Analyst	SC			August 13, 2012-December 31, 2013	
22	Barry Greville Eyres	CD Specialist	FTA			September 4, 2012-31 March, 2013	
23	Han Heidi	CD Specialist	IC				
24	Zaheeruddin	Driver	SC			November 4, 2012-December 31, 2013	
25	Sayed Maqsood Hashimi	Operations Manager	SC			November 28, 2012-December 31, 2013	
26	Nasratullah	Finance associate	SC			December 9, 2012-December 31, 2013	
27	Mohibullah	HR Associate	SC				March 3-December 31, 2013
28	Salahuddin	Driver	SC				April 3-December 31, 2013
29	Shah Mahmood Wardak	Security Assistant	SC				April-December 31, 2013
30	Safullah	Project Clerk	SC				April 17-December 31, 2013
31	James Cooper	Training coordinator	IC				April 29-December 31, 2013
32	Azizi Ahmad	Driver	SC				May 19-December 31, 2013
33	Jason Ian Lee	Capacity Development Program Officer	FTA				July 22-December 31, 2013

(Compiled by the evaluators)

The system of NCDAs suffered from many operational maladies including disregard to the experience and expertise required, but not limited to the following:

- a. Financial arrangements and approval procedures were very lengthy. The proposals made by the CDAs have gone back and forth for approvals and release of money required for proper implementation of any activity. This was more severe in the case of national CDAs posted at provincial level. They were required to make a plan for a training or workshop, obtain approvals from the line ministry at the centre, and send the concept note to Kabul (NIBP). Once the Kabul office approved the concept note, NCDAs had to submit the complete project proposal including financial proposal, then it took a long time before it was finally approved. Once this process was complete, the project released money to the international CDA. Sometimes whole process took longer than four months.
- b. Money for contingent and immediate expenditure on procurement of stationary, office equipment, computer peripherals, and for other immediate needs was provided; the provincial CDAs were highly depended on NIBP in Kabul. Getting approvals from the central to the sub-national level was a lengthy process.
- c. NCDAs were not trained enough in their functional areas. Persons with limited experience were recruited and posted to work as advisors to the government officers who have been working in the system for decades. (See box below).
- d. NCDAs at the provincial level kept aloof from international workshops and training courses thereby limiting their capacity to gain and transfer knowledge.
- e. With confusions on the functional responsibilities of CDAs at sub-national level, they worked on capacity substitution rather than on capacity development.

Mr. X has taken his Bachelor's Degree in Economics from Kabul University in the year 2005. Later, he was recruited by the Ministry of Finance as an assistant to support economic data collection, support in filing documents, and support in the areas of daily administration.

Mr. X was later recruited by CAP project of UNDP as a Capacity Development Advisor. He was trained neither in capacity development nor in training and development. When NIBP started, he was automatically moved to NIBP and posted as National Capacity Development Advisor (NCDA) in regional headquarters to support, advice, guide, develop, and institutionalise capacity development in a regional IARCSC centre which has the mandate of training and development in five provinces covering 44 districts.

This shows NIBPs capacity to understand capacity development needs of government and support them with experience and expertise.

2.2.21 Lack of Attention to Gender Issues

Project has not focused on gender issues and has not clearly articulated to CDAs that they should work on gender mainstreaming. In the recruitment of NIBP, a reasonable mixture of men and women is not observed. Of the 30 international CDAs recruited during different times of the project, there were only 7 women and 23 men CDAs. The gender analyst for the project was recruited during August 2012, which was about two years and eight months after the project was launched. Similarly, under representation of women is evident in almost all the training courses conducted by NIBP during the course of the whole program.

2.2.22. Working Relationships between UNDP Projects

For effective implementation of the NIBP project, there should have been strong relations and linkages with other UNDP projects and programmes. National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) which is working with Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Programme (ASGP) working with IDLG, Gender Equity Project (GEP) that is working with Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA), Justice Human Rights, and Rule of Law project (JHRL) are just some of the key projects/programmes where NIBP could have developed and build strong partnerships for institutional development. Minimal efforts of working with these UN projects in Afghanistan have been documented.

2.2.23. Overall Efficiency Suffered

Evaluators observed that the efficiency of the project suffered greatly. Efficiency can be measured in terms of relation between inputs and outputs, and how economically the inputs-funds, expertise, and time has been converted into outputs. The project does not have well defined outputs. Activities are mixed and confused with outputs. Therefore, it was a little difficult for the evaluators to measure efficiency of the project.

The visible outputs under the project are 99 international and 189 national training events, workshops, and study visits. Their impact on the capacity of the line ministries is neither visible nor documented. If the total funds spent by the project were for an ultimate result in the government, the project has spent over USD 15 million for 288 training and learning events, and trained about 5600 persons from the line ministries.

At this rate, the project has spent on an average USD 79,787 on each event and USD 2,678 on each trainee. (This amount includes total project expenditure because the entire project expenditure is ultimately for deliverables under the project, and this was delivered through training events).

Other aspects of institutional development like policy formulation, developing legal frameworks, developing coordination mechanisms, bringing in change, implementation of reform initiatives of IARCSC have not been taken up by the CDAs. Thus, the result is that the entire project funds were spent on training and workshops.

Value for this money is not visible in the line ministries as there is a large variance in number of trainees from each line ministry/department. (See Table 4).

Another calculation based on Table 4 is further alarming.

a.	Total number of line Ministries and Departments engaged in training activities over a period of 48 months	19
b.	Total Number of events	288
c.	Total number of officers trained	5593
d.	Average per month events: 288 /48	6
e.	Average number of trainees per event per event	19
f.	Monthly average number of persons trained per Ministry/Dept 5593/19/48	6
g.	Monthly productivity of advisors 5593/1807 person months	3

The above calculation makes it clear in terms of how efficient the project was in terms of per capita delivery of its advisors.

One more factor that contributed to inefficiency was that the Indian government released funds at the rate of USD 3,000 per international CDA, where as NIBP paid an average of USD 12,000 per international CDA.

Another aspect of efficiency found is the non-utilisation of available funds for institutional development. While on the other hand, the funds were utilised on training and development.

2.2.24. Project Not as Effective as Envisaged

The achievement of deliverables of any project in the project duration shows its effectiveness. NIBP has the following objectives to be achieved over a period of

four years from 2010 to 2013 with a spending of USD 115 million, deploying 23,677 person months of technical advisory support, and through modalities of coaching, advising, twinning arrangements, and south-to-south cooperation.

“The primary objectives of the project would be to enhance capacity within the Ministries / agencies at all three levels of capacity, namely institutional, organizational and individual which would ultimately result into improved service delivery through a responsive, organized and efficient civil service. The visible results would be improved resource utilization, rationalized organization structures and efficient civil servants at both national and sub-national levels”⁹

With the exception of a few initiatives like support to CSO, Saffron policy, knowledge sharing in agricultural practices, there is no sufficient evidence to show the achievement of visible results as envisaged in NIBPs objective statement. Improved utilisation of resources cannot be separately and distinctly attributable to NIBPs interventions as there were a large number of other advisors from other projects like CTAP, GIZ, USAID, and World Bank who were also working in the line ministries. Secondly, there was no evidence to show that NIBPs' CDA have advised or developed institutional mechanisms for effective utilisation of resources specific to project deliverables.

There is also no evidence to show that the organisational structures in the line ministries were rationalised with the support of NIBP in coordination with IARCSC, with the exception of MAIL. It was one of the mandates of CDAs, however, the CDAs ended up with few training courses and workshops. Coordination with IARCSC for institutional development was not observed.

The third expected visible result was developing efficient civil servants at both national and sub-national levels. In the absence of any evaluation mechanisms developed by either NIBP or by the line ministries, the effectiveness of the project cannot be measured. However, line Ministries like MAIL, DMoYA, CSO have benefited from the individual capacity development in specific technical areas.

Effectiveness greatly suffered due to non-maintenance of working relations by international CDAs with middle and junior management staff at the line ministries. The international CDAs identified themselves with senior management in the line ministries and maintained relations only that level. The net result of this was that the expected knowledge was not transferred to functional, middle, and junior management levels. In Afghanistan, movement of senior managers out of line ministry is incidental mainly due to political decisions and changes. Unfortunately, institutional memory and skills move out with them. These

⁹ NIBP Project Document

dynamics were not recognised by international CDAs thereby making the project ineffective in capacity retention.

2.2.25. No Efforts made on Sustainability

This is the most concerning observation, that there were no efforts to establish systems and procedures, which continue to deliver desired results even after the closure of the project. NIBP has already become a forgotten history in many line ministries except in MAIL, DMOYA, and CSO. The institution of international advisors and long term national advisors has not been acceptable for the line ministries. The line ministries are confident that they have the capacity and only need job specific short-term support for sustainability. Efforts to sustain achieved results are not observed.

At the sub-national level, some NCDAs worked mainly to substitute capacity instead of developing capacity, as there was no clear direction. Some of the NCDAs are still supporting the line departments voluntarily in their day-to-day administration.

2.2.26. No Smooth Transition

The project was closed abruptly. There was no intimation to the user line ministries. Transition could have been planned and some alternatives to continue support mechanisms could have been put in place. The project document does not have any exit strategy. When the project projected to recruit a large number of national advisors for four years, it has left all the national CDAs unemployed at the end of the project. Some of them feel they are socially stigmatised after they had left the project. Some continue to work in the line ministries voluntarily without any payment with the fear of being branded unemployed or removed from the service. When the project was to end on 31 December 2013, it is also not clear why some international staff were recruited in the months of May, July, and November 2013 when the CDAs should have started to handed over and transitioned their responsibilities to the NCDAs.

Some of the ministries at the central level in Kabul such as DMOYA felt the sudden impact of withdrawal of CDAs from the ministry as they had planned activities counting on the support by NIBP.

PART 3: LESSONS LEARNED

The following is the list of lessons learnt after conclusion of the project based on its functional and operational difficulties. The lessons learnt can be beneficial for the formulation of the next phase of the project.

3.1 Project Document Could have been Reviewed by Experts

The project was launched as there was an immediate need to rise to the occasion in accordance with the principles of balancing military and civilian capacity development efforts taking place in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the project document could have been reviewed thoroughly to remove redundancies, ambiguities in outputs, activities formulation, and identification of required institutional strengthening areas in association with IARCSC and user specific line ministry.

3.2 Conduct a Diagnostic Study of User Requirements

The project lacked user back up. In many instances, it was felt that the project was forcibly pushed on the line ministries with little regard to their core institutional requirements. It could have been more effective if prior to the launch of the project, there had been a diagnostic study of the requirements of the specific line ministries. This could have developed a demand driven project instead of a supply driven project.

3.3 An Assessment of Political Power Dynamics

The project suffered greatly from the clash of titans in the civil administration in GIROA. There is an apparent claim of ownership over capacity development initiatives in Afghanistan. IARCSC has the clear mandate of the entire Public Administration Reforms (PARs), which is directly linked, to the capacity development efforts. This makes IARCSC feel that it was the one stop shop for capacity development initiatives in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, MoF feels that it can introduce effective and efficient systems in the country ensuing economic governance. At the same time, MoEc has been identified as a place of capacity development information clearing house. Unable to clearly identify these power and political dynamics around capacity development, NIBP was initiated with all its assurances. Innocently, it only went with its objectives of alignment with CTAP

at MoF for more than two years, where a larger amount of the available funding was already channelled into CTAP. Dozens of CTAP advisors started working in the line ministries.

3.4 Revised Project Outputs and Activities Immediately the Following Year of its Launch

In countries like Afghanistan where multiple agencies are supporting governments without proper coordination, there is a possibility of expected outputs becoming redundant the next year after the launch of any such projects. NIBP could have forecasted this during its first year of operations and revised its outputs the following year instead of prolonging with unachieved targets and irrelevant activities. At least NIBP could have assessed the support given by other projects like CTAP, World Bank, USAID, GIZ and aligned its activities in accordance with the major agenda of institutional reforms taken up by IARCSC. Coaching, advising, and training were the predecessor approaches of CAP project and irrelevant for institutional development. If this was realised early on and revised in the project document there could have been better achievements and results. Strong M&E systems could have addressed this lesson well.

3.5 One Ministry One Advisor Approach has not Yielded Desired Results

NIBP forecasted to deploy over 500 people for institutional development activities, however, instead it ended up with one ministry one advisor approach. This has not worked well as the tasks were many and talents were limited. This forced the CDAs to utilize their time through organising training courses and workshops that were easy in their home country of India. Further, the tasks were many and the one international advisor had limited technical knowledge required for the capacity development in the line ministry/department s/he was assigned with. Thus, one advisor and one ministry approach did not yield desired results.

3.6 Effectively Utilized the MoU with Government of India

A serious reading of MoU signed between GoI and GIRoA could have avoided the damages caused. Clearly, there was minimum support in terms of funding but the conditions were many. When the project was ready to pay USD 12,000 a month, open market recruitment could have been a better option to recruit institutional development experts in place of Indian CDAs. This aspect could have been strongly negotiated with Government of India. The frequent absence of CDAs from the workplace created a lot of mistrust and misunderstandings

among the line ministries. Gol has allocated USD 4,320,000 and sought NBIP to spend more than this on 30 advisors, training courses, workshops, international study visits, and technical support under twinning arrangements.

3.7 Developed Strong M & E and Joint Coordination Mechanisms

One of the glaring defects of NIBP has been the non-establishment of strong monitoring and evaluation systems and joint coordination mechanisms with IARCSC. M&E expert was recruited almost nine months after the advertisement for the post. Later, the project manager understood that M&E is a reporting tool rather than management tool that helps decision-making. This could have avoided major lapses of the project implementation. M&E could have guided the project management through on time implementation, and could have avoided the much talked about training and workshop orientation instead geared the project towards institutional development.

3.8 Selection of Few Ministries for Deeper Engagement instead

NIBP could have selected a few important or under developed line ministries and worked on their reforms. Instead, NIBP had taken up a very big agenda. To start with, NIBP could have closely collaborated only with IARCSC for effective public administration reforms across the country through the establishment and strengthening of regional directorates of PAR.

3.9 More Focus on Provincial Capacity Development

Although there was some capacity substitution at the provincial level, NIBP could have focused more in the provinces in alignment with ASGP to support strong sub-national institutions in delivery of services. The national CDAs at the provincial level were more respected and found dependable by the provincial line departments and regional training centres.

3.10 Avoided Vagueness in Output Setting

Instead of describing institutional development, organisational development, environmental development, NIBP could have identified what exactly it wanted to achieve. For example, standardisation of welfare payment systems in MoLSAD or reducing payment time by introducing reformed processes. Alternatively,

design and implement a complaint management system in MAIL. Very specific outputs could have guided the advisors of NIBP to lead to intended goals.

3.11 National Project Management Could Have Given More Results

NIBP could have worked on more national project management than managing the project through international support. Due to commitments and constraints of capacity gaps, at least part management of processes could have been by nationals with strong monitoring mechanisms would have provided better results. Procurement of international expertise not only delayed the processes, but also led to procurement of insufficient numbers. Further, national CDAs at provincial level, and the centre were always available for the line ministries were respected.

3.12 Approach of National Ownership for Project

Considering the international agenda of transferring ownership to Afghan nationals, UNDP could have thought of transferring the ownership of the project fully to a national implementation mode through IARCSC. Partial transfer through LoA approach has not given desired results very effectively.

PART 4: MOVING FORWARD

4.1 OPPORTUNITIES

4.1.2 Government's Willingness to Accept Support

Primarily, the opportunity for the next phase of the project lays with the government's willingness to accept support from UNDP but in a different form. The government foresees a project fully demand driven and nationally owned to the extent possible within the sphere of international commitments. Government looks at short-term technical support in preference to long-term advisory support. Deliverable based technical support is mostly sought after in the government.

4.1.3 Availability of National Capacity

The second opportunity is the availability of national capacity and national expertise. There is no inherent incapacity anywhere in Afghanistan. However, there is inadequate preparation to position Afghan nationals in the right positions. The available national talents can be utilised for the next phase of the project.

4.1.4 Donors Willing to Support Institution Building in Afghanistan

Donors like Italy, Switzerland, Japan, India, and others are still willing to support national institution building. However, if it has to be taken up by UNDP again, it has to be in accordance with national priorities and international commitments. However, the donors also feel that the national ownership was an important element for effective implementation of the project, if Phase II of the project was designed. India still has some issues with the entitlements of the CDAs being seconded to NIBP that could be favourably sorted out.

4.1.5 Build on the UNDP's Comparative Advantage

UNDP has the respect of the government and donor community alike. UNDPs comparative advantage is recognised by GIRoA. UNDP is known for its technical expertise and rigorous selection processes which ensure the positioning of best talents available in the world. UNDP can approach to any level in the government to negotiate and plan development interventions. UNDPs support in public

administration reforms, area based development, and sub-national governance is well remembered by GIRoA.

4.1.6 Realisation of Government to Build Institutional Capacity

GIRoA has realised that institutional capacity development is more important than individual capacity development. Today, almost all of the government staff is able to deliver on their assigned tasks. What is required are strong institutions, guidelines, systems, procedures, and work process reforms.

4.2 SOME CONCLUSIONS

Based on the interviews, review of reports, and project documents the following conclusions are drawn. These conclusions are the observations of the evaluators and are not influenced either by UNDP, donors, or by the line ministries. Readers of the report may choose to differ from the views expressed by the evaluators and such views may not necessarily influence the findings.

The context and circumstances under which the project was formulated need not be ignored while drawing the conclusions. As has been discussed above under the head 'context and background', UNDP's immediate need was to develop a project and implement it for national institution building in alignment with national priorities and international commitments. The circumstances led to formulation of this project were during the time when the international community wanted to support robust government institutions through an approach of civilian surge. The responsibility of UNDP to rise to this occasion and implement a project to meet the immediate needs of the hour need not be overemphasised. While formulating the project, it appears that NIBP missed the opportunity of bringing in the expected support under civilian surge or it has erred in its judgement to estimate the required and probable resources for the project. These conclusions should therefore be under circumstances that led to formulation of NIBP.

4.2.1 Project was a Supply Driven Project

The biggest challenge for the project was that it was totally a supply driven project. There was no evidence to show that the project had consultations with the user line ministries and departments in detail before it was drafted and implemented. The line ministries' demand survey was not conducted before the posting any CDAs. Many line Ministries expressed that since the advisers were available in the ministry, their capabilities were accepted for any support they

were able to provide. However, many of the CDAs had not discussed the need for training courses they had conducted. The merger of CSLD and CAP projects to was considered as the formation of NIBP. This was a blunder committed in undertaking NIBP. In fact, after closure of both individual capacity development projects, logically there was a necessity for an institutional development project. Instead of focusing on institutional development, the NIBP project document has mixed up many other elements. Nevertheless, the earlier batch of CDAs deployed in 2010 and early 2011 have developed capacity development plans in accordance with UNDP capacity development guidelines. Some of the plans took the shape of academic and theoretical approaches rather than practical.

4.2.2 Ambitious Resource Estimation

When the coaching and training approach was adopted for project delivery, it is not clear how the project budget estimates of USD115 million were drawn up. There is no list of proposed line ministries, proposed products to be delivered; estimation of technical support required in addition to coaches and advisors linked to technical areas of support. In the absence of this pertinent information, the budget estimates and person months of support appear to be very ambitious.

Technical support estimated in the project was 23,677 person months over a period of 48 months. This works out to 493 persons per month. This is a very huge contingent by any estimate. Neither the government nor the project was physically prepared to deploy such a huge technical force for institutional development. This almost equals to a country operations team of a big country. To manage such a huge contingent of human resources, there could have been well-established operational and financial management systems in place.

4.2.3 Ownership Issues Not Considered

National ownership aspect of the project was weak. Even partial national ownership as promised in the project document was not practiced. IARCSC was to take the lead in implementation of the project. However, except in the LoA, there were no mechanisms established to ensure ownership processes by IARCSC as planned. Further, the project has ignored the GIRoA sentiment of utilisation of national talents. Every line ministry is of the view of that; there is an untapped treasure of national talent available which should be utilized by international projects. This issue has not been given a serious thought by NIBP project designers.

4.2.4 NIBP Project was considered to Organise Training Courses

The CDAs moulded the project according to their own capacity in the absence of proper supervision, guidance, and control of their activities. The main institutional development was not clearly conveyed to GIRoA. With this, NIBP was seen as a project to organise trainings and workshops. CDAs have interpreted the MoU with GoI as a tool to organise training courses and workshops. This enforced misunderstanding of the GIRoA which diluted the very purpose of institutional development. CDAs were not able to foresee and diagnose this perception of the government. On the other hand, they went on organising training courses and workshops. NIBP could have specifically hired institutional development advisors instead of CDAs. Like others, the NIBP CDAs have understood capacity development as training and development.

4.2.5 Non Development of a Senior Executive Service

There should have also been focus on senior executive development which could lead to creating an enabling environment for others to function. Senior leaders could demonstrate effective direction to the teams and taking the decisions as needed. The bureaucratic system of Deputy Ministers authorising small amounts of fuel bill in some line ministries still exists. Developing institutional mechanisms and the ability of senior executives to delegate authority should form a part of senior executive development. There still exists a need for such a requirement to develop the senior executive services in the government. Strong advisory support to civil service commission is needed. The senior executives are the catalysts of an enabling environment at the level of the line ministry. Institutionalisation of senior leadership development beginning from the Deputy Minister level is still a necessity. At provincial level, development of leadership skills of Provincial Governors, at district level with the leadership development of District Governors is essential. These officers and Ministers are the catalysts of change in their administrative domain. This aspect was not well covered by NIBP.

4.2.6 Lopsided CDA System Observed

The adopted Capacity Development Advisor system was found to be lopsided. First, with a large number of tasks, one international and one national CDA were posted in the line ministry. They were recruited under one generic ToR. The CDAs were not properly oriented towards their duties and responsibilities which needed to be taken up. Second, almost all of CDAs posted in Kabul were drawn from Indian civil service. They were all in very senior positions back home in

India. In their government, they were trained in getting things done in very advanced institutional environment which has been developed over decades of reforms after the independence of India. However, in Afghanistan, the institutions are in formative stage. Therefore, the advisors did not know where to begin the institutionalization process. In the absence of guidelines from NIBP along with the demand from the line ministries, the CDAs delivered whatever they thought and understood reasonable; and government accepted whatever support was given, as support provided by the CDAs did not disturb the internal systems in the line ministry. NIBP did not realise that there was a requirement of short-term technical expertise with experience with government, and not senior bureaucrats. The estimated short-term expertise was not procured which created a mismatch. The very senior Indian civil servants' support went unrecognised. The approach of one CDA for one ministry was also lopsided considering the magnitude of reforms required. While activities to be taken by NIBP were very large, only one CDA was not able to organise the entire work of institution development in the line ministry thereby defeating very purpose of institution development. Furthermore, there is a strong feeling among the line ministries, that the CDAs were more loyal to the government of India rather than to NIBP or the line ministry where they were posted. Therefore, for all the training courses and workshops, all the roads led to India.

4.2.7 Unrecognized Coordination Issues

NIBP could have mainly focused on addressing the coordination issues between the line ministry and IARCSC, which is leading civil service capacity development. Systems could have been developed to establish coordination linkages between institutions for knowledge transfer and for implementation of reforms agenda. This was also discussed in the project document. However, in practices, the project managers of NIBP were not successful in ensuring establishment of coordination mechanisms in line ministries that could address many public administration reform issues.

4.3 SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations are based on series of discussions held with the line Ministries, donors, and project personnel. These recommendations are beneficial only in case when a second phase of the project is proposed.

4.3.1 Demand Driven Project Formulation

The first recommendation is that the project should be demand driven. Every line ministry should be approached before a project document is written. If feasible, a diagnostic study engaging the line ministries should be conducted, needs to be identified and project document drafted. While doing so, instead of working on government wide institutional reforms, UNDP should focus on a few ministries. For example, ten important or ignored/less important/low profile line ministries should be identified and supported for deeper and effective institutional development. While surveying the demand, the diagnostic study should consider institutional strengthening in the overall PAR agenda in line with the National Priority Programme 3 (NPP3) with specific focus on strengthening Civil Service Training Institutes, Budgeting, Financial Management, Financial Reporting, Oversight and Accountability, Project Formulation and Management, Work Process Simplification, Service Delivery Improvement, and Public Grievances Handling. Gender & Disability mainstreaming should be a crosscutting issue in these areas.

4.3.2 Alignment with NPP3

There is an opportunity for UNDP to align the next phase of the project with National Priority Programme 3 (NPP3). NPP3 clearly articulates the areas of capacity strengthening and the results framework is well structured and focused. Component 2 foresees “to Increase Civil Service and Public Administration operational efficiency and effectiveness at the central, ministry and sub national levels.” Under this, the outputs, activities, and actors are clearly identified. Phase II of NIBP can adopt NPP3 deliverables, discuss with selected line ministries, recruit required expertise, and start implementing the project under a national project manager’s leadership. This will be in many ways acceptable for GIRoA as there was clarity in deliverables, and priorities have been discussed. This will also avoid multiplicity and duplicity of activities. Time consumption on project formulation can be reduced.

4.3.3 Stronger Alignment with IARCSC Reform Initiatives

UNDP should think of working closely with IARCSC to ensure development of a well thought out and realistic project document with dynamic outputs. It must be closely aligned with reforms and capacity development initiatives of the Capacity Building for Results (CBR) project and the Next Generation of Public Administration Reform Strategy (NGPAR).

IARCSC will be the nodal agency for implementation of NGPAR as per NPP3. Ministry of Finance will also play a key role. UNDP can discuss the implementation modalities with these two prominent agencies and formulate an implementation plan for the next phase of NIBP with a new name. This time around, the coordination and monitoring mechanism have to be established very strongly so that all the agencies engaged in the reform should not feel that they are being ignored. It is important to have a common agenda for reforms with divided and dedicated results. A joint board for strong management, supervision, monitoring, and evaluation is recommended. Nevertheless, the requirement to establish a direct alignment with IARCSC's next generation public administration reforms need not to be overemphasized. IARCSC is the mandated statutory body to lead and oversee public administration reforms in the country. Any international support for public administration capacity development should be in line with this mandate, priority, and agenda of IARCSC. The next phase of NIBP should therefore work as an extended arm of IARCSC with presence in select line ministries as may be needed. The next phase of the project may be called: Support for Afghanistan Public Administration Reforms. (SAPAR).

4.3.4 Management by National Officers

As much as possible, UNDP should highly consider of running the project with national staff. This may include appointment of a national project manager, national operations manager, national monitoring and evaluation specialist and national senior management team. An international senior technical expert on public administration reforms may be appointed to advice the project manager. There needs to be a minimum number of international technical experts when needed for specific deliverables in cases where national talents are not available. If required, the national project team may be sent for project management, financial management, team management training to UNDP regional or national headquarters. IARCSC, MoF, and MoEc can formulate a tripartite body to implement the project with strong monitoring and evaluation systems. GDPDM can take lead in all the project activities including assessment of the needs of the line ministries.

4.3.5 Selection of Specific Line Ministries for Deeper Involvement

Unlike NIBP, which was implemented without any clear selection of target agencies for implementation, the next phase should focus on selecting specific ministries, ideally less than 10 ministries for deeper and effective implementation reforms. For example, if Ministry of Communication & Information Technology is

taken up for reforms, its central office, provincial directorate, and district level offices should be taken up for reforms and reform implementation. Policy and legal framework for service delivery, service delivery tools, work processes, guidelines, public interaction systems, reporting lines, budget making, budget reporting, resource planning, human resource management, audit, accountability, conduct, discipline and other areas should be take up strengthening. Selective intensive institutionalisation would be the key element in the next phase instead of government wide extensive reform.

4.3.6 Strong Sub-National Presence

IARCSC has strategic plans developed for all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Sub-national governance policy of IDLG advocates for stronger sub-national entities. It is only possible through capacity development of sub-national governments as planned by IARCSC. The next phase of the project should work on developing sub-national governance institutions. If required, the project should establish two management teams. One team for central PAR and another team for sub-national PAR both under the overall leadership of a project manager.

4.3.7 Replacement of CDAs with Short-Term Technical Experts

Long term CDAs should be replaced with short term technical advisors who can be procured for specific deliverables, on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a short term technical consultant is procured for simplification of procedures for welfare payments for the persons with disabled, s/he studies current payment systems, develops simplified tools for welfare payment, trains the staff in the use of these tools, ensures taking proper approvals from the government agencies, test runs the tools for payment by engaging national officers and then leaves the country. Such systems are more acceptable to GIRoA as opposed to long-term advisors.

4.3.8 Development of Institutional Development Experts Roster

UNDP and/or IARCSC should develop a pool or roster of institutional development technical experts on the lines of BCPR roster of experts for rapid deployment. The probable areas of technical experts could be in the areas of: budget experts, account experts, financial management experts, audit experts, human resources experts, training and development experts, programme cycle management experts, IT solution experts, business process reengineering experts, and a range of other areas as may be needed for institutional

strengthening. The rosters should not be generic PAR, capacity development, or institutional development experts.

4.3.9 Resource Mobilisation Strategy

There should be a clear resource mobilisation strategy with donors. Donor relations should be maintained, and report on progress should be discussed with donors quarterly, at the least. The donor relation portfolio should be managed by UNDP country office for uniformity and effective communications between the donors and UNDP. Resources should be clearly worked out based on the possibilities of deliverables, unlike NIBP where it has made extremely ambitious projections to post about 493 technical and advisory experts (23,667 person months of expert deployment over a period of 48 months, i.e. about 493 persons per month). NPP3 can be a tool to assess required resources and it can be a strong base to approach donors.

4.3.10 Strong Management Systems and Procedures

A strong management team with adequate authority for procurement and financial management is highly recommended. As suggested, a tripartite management with strong monitoring and coordination mechanisms is recommended.

At the sub-national level, the systems should be established with proper delegation of authority and province/activity specific budgets. Operational aspects of provinces, their recruitment systems, and capacity development of NCDAs should be rationalised. It is very important to select sufficiently senior and experienced national capacity development expertise, trained, and deployed at provincial levels. A transparent procurement system will avoid the blame of recruiting people based on nepotism, and from one regional or tribal orientation.

4.3.11 Sustainability

Sustainability should not be confused with the sustainability of the project, but sustainability in terms of changes the project has brought in. More importantly, sustainability of institutions the project has built in the line ministries. Sustainability depends on drafting a clear exit strategy and national ownership from the beginning of the project document formulation. The project should start with full contingent of staff from the beginning and should go on reducing the staff strength as the project progresses, based on the achievement of deliverables.

The outputs to be described in the project document should be dynamic because in the countries like Afghanistan where there is a multiplicity of international experts and agencies working in reforms, the outputs described today may be redundant tomorrow. Therefore, the project should have annual outputs with clear deliverables.

As the project enters into the proceeding years of its implementation, increased national ownership of processes should be encouraged ensuring gradual withdrawal of technical experts, national or international as the case may be. The gradual exit strategy transfers the responsibilities to the CDAs working in the line ministries whose capacities are simultaneously developed during the project cycle for increased sustainability. From the last quarter of the third year onwards, the line ministries should gradually take up the lead to close the project on schedule. Budget estimates should also have reducing levels as the project progresses.

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ANNEXURE I: NIBP SUPPORT IN LINE MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS, AND PROVINCES

1.	Kabul	Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabilities
2.	Kabul	Ministry of Transport & Civil Aviation
3.	Kabul	Ministry of Energy & Water
4.	Kabul	Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs
5.	Kabul	Ministry of Economy
6.	Kabul	IARCSC
7.	Kabul	Central Statistics Organization-CSO
8.	Kabul	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock
9.	Kabul	Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education
10.	Kabul	Ministry of Information & Culture
11.	Kabul	Ministry of Finance/GCC
12.	Kabul	Ministry of Public Health
13.	Kabul	Ministry of Commerce & Industry-SME
14.	Kabul	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
15.	Kabul	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation Development
16.	Kabul	Ministry of Communication & IT
17.	Kabul	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
18.	Province	IARCSC Regional Office/Balkh
19.	Province	IARCSC Regional Office/Nangarhar
20.	Province	IARCSC Regional Office/Herat
21.	Province	Department of Agriculture/Balkh
22.	Province	Department of Economy/Herat
23.	Province	Department of Agriculture/Herat
24.	Province	Department of Education/Herat
25.	Province	Department of Labor and Social Affairs/Herat
26.	Province	IARCSC Regional Office/Kunduz
27.	Province	IARCSC Regional Office/Kandahar
28.	Province	Department of Agriculture-Kandahar
29.	Province	IARCSC Regional Office/Kabul
30.	Province	Department of Agriculture-Bamyan

Annexure II: PROJECT DELIVERABLES AS PLANNED AND DELIVERED

PROJECT DELIVERABLES	
As Promised in the Project	Actual Performance/Observation
1.10.1 Output_1 – Strengthening Institutional and Organizational Capacity	
<p>The activities of output 1 will include the provision of services of the CDAs, provision of advisory services under twinning arrangements with Ministries and agencies of other regional governments, gender mainstreaming and support to ICCD in MoEc.</p>	<p><i>Although provision of services of CDAs is not an activity but an input, the other activities to be taken up by CDAs are explained in the project document.</i></p> <p><i>Many deviations have been observed even in providing the services of CDAs in actual implementation of the project. For example, a MoU was signed with the Government of India for provision of 30 civil servants for a period of four years under the guise of south-south cooperation. The MoU stipulates that the NIBP will pay from its funds, the salaries of CDAs, meet expenditure in connection with twinning arrangements, for trainings and workshops. It is not explained how it was a south-south cooperation. Nevertheless, Government of India agreed to contribute USD 1,080,000 per annum for four years, totalling USD 4,320,000. Whereas, at an average expenditure of USD 12,000 per ICDA per month, it would have cost USD 17,280,000 to NIBP had it recruited all the 30 promised CDAs from Government of India. There could have been clear gap of USD 12,960,000.</i></p> <p><i>Another point of interest observed is, all the covenants of the Letter of Agreement with IARCSC give a meaning of national execution of project, and NIBP to be a facilitator and guide. At the discretion of UNDP, on a case-by-case level, in exceptional circumstance, NIBP will recruit international CDAs. However the practice was, NIBP had recruited all the international CDAs.</i></p>
Activity 1.1: <i>Provision of services of CDAs in select government entities to provide coaching and advisory services for institutional strengthening, organizational reforms and skills development.</i>	
The project would address CD needs through placement of CDAs, who would support the administrative and organizational reform process in select government	<p><i>Coming to the activities described under this output, it is observed that the CDAs were able to conduct 189 national and 99 international training events, workshops,</i></p>

<p>entities under the overall PAR strategy. As a first task, the CDAs will undertake comprehensive analysis of organizational structures, functions and CD needs of the Ministry or agency to which they are assigned. The needs analysis has to be done at the individual, organizational and institutional level in collaboration with and under the guidance of the respective Ministry or agency. The entry point under the integrated approach for the CDA will be organizational level. The CDA will study the major policy documents, consultants' reports, reform and restructuring proposals, strategy of the Ministry or agency and ANDS strategy for the sectors. The CDA will undertake a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis to understand major challenges and opportunities in the organization. The CDA will undertake wider consultation with the leadership and the senior management to get their views on the CD needs of the organization. Finally, the CDA will, after wider consultation with senior management, prepare a CD plan for the Ministry or agency. This will be followed by preparation of a policy portfolio and programmatic portfolio for the Ministry / agency. In order to provide programmatic support to the Ministry/agency, linkages will be established between NIBP and other UNDP projects.</p>	<p><i>and study tours engaging about 5600 persons from the line Ministries and departments. While a majority of training events were very generic in nature, Central Statistical Office (CSO), and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) were provided with Ministry specific training courses.</i></p> <p><i>Whatever activities described for institutional development does not appear to have been taken up either by the CDAs or by IARCSC.</i></p> <p><i>Although, NIBP annual progress reports claim to have produced capacity development plans for few line Ministries, the line Ministries appear unaware of this activity.</i></p> <p><i>Observations on all other activities described alongside require no elaboration, as they have not been taken up by CDAs.</i></p>
<p>The CDA will identify the areas of major policy reform needs and will provide policy support to the senior management in the development and implementation of the policies and programmatic portfolio of the Ministry. The CD plan will be a dynamic document as priorities and challenges of the Ministry or agency are likely to change over time.</p>	<p><i>It is observed that CDAs recruited and deployed in the line Ministries during 2010 and early 2011 were able go with a systematic diagnostic approach to capacity needs assessment (UNDP CD Framework), and plan for the later interventions.</i></p>
<p>The institutional and organizational reforms shall be undertaken under overall PAR strategy. Various policy formulation needs and organizational restructuring requirements will be linked with on-going PAR restructuring and reform efforts and will account for the lessons learnt from earlier PAR efforts. The establishment of RIMUs by IARCSC under other programmes shall be supported including establishment of a model RIMU. In Ministries / Agencies where RIMUS are not currently planned, the NIBP international and national CDAs shall constitute RIMU and undertake PAR activities. The support under NIBP will supplement and complement inputs available to the institution, if any, from other projects to accelerate the reform process. Based on the organizational CD needs, the needs at the individual level will be finalized.</p>	<p><i>This activity requires close coordination with IARCSC the leader of PAR in Afghanistan. However, CDAs focus had been on training and development through training events, workshops, and international study tours. No evidence to the effect of NIBP supplementing and complementing PAR efforts of IARCSC and working with RIMUs is available.</i></p>

<p>The CDA will liaise with the senior management and department heads to strengthen institutional and organizational CD activities. For advising work, the respective Ministries and agencies will identify a nodal person at the senior management level to coordinate the activities within Ministry or agency.</p>	<p><i>CDAs have liaised only with the senior management for the purpose of study tours and training events, However being advised by NIBP management to align all the CD activities with the HR Director.</i></p>
<p>As part of the activity, standard manuals and guidelines will be prepared for CD policy and assessment methodologies, performance assessments, monitoring and evaluation guidelines, etc, through the support of the NIBP. The project will put in place a system of performance assessment of CDAs and project activities in the Ministry or agency to continuously monitor efficiency and effectiveness of project services.</p>	<p><i>No evidence of availability of such activity has been brought to the notice of the evaluators. The line Ministries were not able to share information on this activity. Line Ministries have expressed dissatisfaction on these issues. This is also noted in the project board meetings.</i></p>
<p>The CDAs would be expected to play a key role here as a facilitator of change and change management. CDAs will plan development towards the above in appropriate achievable measurable stages.</p>	<p><i>CDAs have facilitated international study tours, signing of twinning agreements, and sharing of knowledge through international study visits.</i></p>
<p>Organizational change management under NIBP will include processes and tools for managing the people side of the change at an organizational level. These tools will include a structured approach that can be used to effectively transition groups or organizations through change. When combined with an understanding of individual change management, these tools will provide a framework for managing the people side of change. Organizational change management processes will include techniques for creating a change management strategy (readiness assessments), engaging senior management as change leaders (sponsorship), building awareness of the need for change (communications), developing skills and knowledge to support the change (education and training), helping the civil servants move through the transition (coaching by CDAs), and methods to sustain the change (measurement systems, rewards and reinforcement). Most of these techniques are being used in the existing CD projects. However, these initiatives will be made systematic and standardized in NIBP.</p>	<p><i>As promised herein, no standardization of change management techniques observed.</i></p>
<p>CDA's responsibility would also be to detect trends in the macro environment as well as in the micro environment so as to be able to identify changes and initiate programs. It is also important to estimate what impact a change will likely have on employee behavior patterns, work processes, technological requirements, and motivation. CDAs would assess what will be the reactions of the civil servants at various levels and craft a</p>	<p><i>No change programmes developed with specific tools and implementation plans, at least no evidence of development towards this activity has been brought to the notice of the evaluators.</i></p>

change program that will provide support as they go through the process of accepting change. The program will then be implemented, disseminated throughout the Ministry/agency, monitored for effectiveness, and adjusted where necessary.				
The NIBP will use the CDAs as a pool of resources. While one or more CDA will be placed in a government entity, the CDAs under the project will be used as a pool to provide policy advice and conduct organizational reviews. For example, CDAs having expertise in human resource development issues and conducting needs assessments will be used as a pool to assist all beneficiary entities under the project. It is acknowledged that different kind of expertise will be required at various levels and appropriate mechanisms will be put in place to use the pool of CDAs to supply the range of expertise.	<p><i>No knowledge pools of CDAs created as envisaged.</i></p> <p><i>However, there are very few instances where NIBP supported drafting policies such as Mili-e-bus policy in MoTCA, MAIL Restructuring Guidelines, Labor Law, and Journalist Code of Conduct.</i></p>			
The CDAs shall be recruited under the modalities of south-south cooperation that was followed in CAP project as well as from other pool of international experts. To a large extent, the south-south cooperation modality to source practitioner civil servants and regional advisors, who are culturally more appropriate, shall be pursued. However, the sourcing of CDAs shall be diversified such that the requirement of the project for a well qualified pool of institutional development specialists, technical advisors and coaches are met. Prioritization of Ministries / agencies and selection of CDAs / experts shall be in accordance with the priorities of PAR implementation.	<p><i>A MoU was signed between Governments of India for provision 30 of CDAs in south-south cooperation modality. However, only 18 CDAs from Government of India have been recruited during different years of the project. However, CDAs available under this modality for support were:</i></p>			
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>
	<i>6</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>10</i>
	<p><i>Further, the modality did not follow the principles of south-south cooperation. The salaries and allowances paid to the CDAs under MoU exceeded the contribution made by Government of India towards all activities under MoU.</i></p> <p><i>In 2011, there was a plan to recruit more CDAs based on the South and South Cooperation, but senior management of UNDP during that time has directed NIBP to recruit more CDAs from the open market and NIBP could not achieve the target of employing 30 CDAs based on the MoU.</i></p>			
A provision is made for placement of 30 international and 60 national CDAs in Ministries / agencies of GIRA at central level. Advising would cover various policy formulation needs and organizational restructuring	<p><i>Out of the promised 30 international CDAs at central level only the following were available for support:</i></p>			

requirements in respective government entities based on their customized needs and in close partnership with the relevant Ministries. The reforms, including development and implementation of appropriate systems and procedures, that would be carried out in these government entities will be supplemented by staff capacity development through coaching and training to ensure enhanced performance for improved service delivery.	2010	2011	2012	2013
	6	8	11	11
	These CDAs were also not available for full 48 months of the project duration. In the case of national CDAs, only 41 CDAs were appointed at different periods of the project as per the table below			
	2010	2011	2012	2013
	17	18	21	20
	This supply of technical expertise affected the results. Even at the government level, some Ministries did not want to have international advisors and neither had they wanted to hire national capacity development advisors.			
At sub-national level, the NIBP shall undertake capacity development of civil servants through provision of services of 15 international CDAs at regional offices of the Provincial Affairs Directorate of IARCSC and 60 nationals at provincial locations. While inclusion of provinces for project services will happen during project implementation, the target would be to extend coverage to all provinces. The focus area for staff capacity development would be change management, office management and general administration to cater to immediate performance improvement of the offices and increased resource utilization. At the sub-national level, the focus of the work of CDAs shall be coaching for skill development to enable better implementation of projects and programmes.	Only 5 international CDA were posted at provincials CSCs for a period of 11 to 12 months towards the end of the project, and only 13 national CDA were posted for all provincial activities at different stages of the project. Some of the provinces were not covered due to the security reasons and others, as they did not have the interest from the government and donor.			
The NIBP will support IARCSC in design and implementation of a strategy for training and retention of nationals recruited under the project to work with International CDAs such that the NIBP approach becomes a permanent instrument of IARCSC for CD in Afghanistan and National CDAs replace Internationals in the long run.	No evidence is available.			
Activity 1.2: Provision of advisory services for specialized capacity development under twinning arrangements with Ministries / agencies of other regional governments for institutional and organizational CD of Ministries / agencies of GIRA.				

<p>The efforts of CDAs in the Ministries or agencies of GIRA for institutional and organizational CD will be supplemented with advisory services under twinning arrangements with Ministries and agencies of regional governments, such as India and other regional countries culturally appropriate for such twinning arrangement. The project will establish contact with such counterpart Ministries or agencies of regional governments through appropriate channels and open dialogue for CD support under a twinning arrangement. A MoU will be established between the UNDP, the Ministry or agency of GIRA, and the counterpart Ministry or agency of a regional government to provide advisory services for institutional and organizational CD. This will include study and exposure visits of civil servants of the Ministry or agency of GIRA to the Ministry or agency of the regional government, as well as short term international training of Afghan civil servants. This could include deputing Afghan civil servants for practical trainings at the Ministries / agencies of regional governments as well as at their training institutes.</p>	<p><i>Nine such twinning arrangements signed between GIRoA and Government of India. However, no sustainable follow up action has been taken up. As per the MoU signed, there are many activities to be conducted including: Short term follow up activities to be taken up include:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>a. Sending short term technical experts;(this has taken place in 5 Ministries – MoEc, MAIL, MOLSAMd, MOTCA)</i> <i>b. Provision of technical advisory services through CDAs;</i> <i>c. Study and exposure visits; short term international training;</i> <p><i>With the exception of training and study visits, nothing more happened. In addition, the costs for these were borne by NIBP.</i></p>
<p>The Ministries or agencies of the regional government will provide support for policy and strategy development and systems improvements in accordance with identified needs of the Ministry or agency of GIRA. Under the MoU, the project will support visits of experts from regional governments for assessments, CD, policy development and other advisory services including services of technical experts for specific identified needs. Such handholding and support is aimed to bring about change management and operational efficiency for improved service delivery.</p>	<p><i>No evidence available</i></p> <p><i>Copy of Civil Service Survey claimed to have been done by an International Advisor is not made available.</i></p>
<p>Over a period of four years of project implementation, a provision is made for securing services of 120 experts / advisors for an input of an average of 3 months each. The range of activities primarily would be technical areas that the CDAs located in respective Ministries / agencies would identify but would not be in a position to support themselves.</p>	<p><i>No evidence available</i></p>
<p><i>Activity 1.3: Development and implementation of a gender mainstreaming strategy to bring about empowerment of women civil servants.</i></p>	
<p>The implementation of the Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for the NIBP will be in alignment to that already in place for the CAP project, with enhancements and adjustments where necessary. The project will review the strategy of IARCSC and the CAP project to develop a</p>	<p><i>No Gender Mainstreaming Strategy of NIBP was developed. At least, no evidence of actions initiated on Gender Mainstreaming is made available to the evaluation team, albeit there were a few</i></p>

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gender mainstreaming strategy for the NIBP, the implementation of which will aim at enhancing organizational gender sensitivity. Activities will also be undertaken to empower female civil servants. The strategy of the project shall be specific in terms of provision of CD opportunities for women so that the benchmark of IARCSC for 1/3 rd representation is achieved.	<i>workshops conducted for Gender Mainstreaming.</i>
Coaching will be the tool for bringing about empowerment of female civil servants and advising will be the medium to facilitate gender mainstreaming in the government Ministries and agencies. There will be clear linkages and coordination with the different units within the Ministry and with the external gender units. Dedicated resources will be allocated for gender activities of the project.	<i>A few workshops to share knowledge on Gender Mainstreaming conducted</i>
<i>Activity 1.4: Support to the Inter-ministerial Commission for Capacity Development (ICCD) in Ministry of Economy (MoEc) to serve as a government body to oversight, coordinate, advocate, monitor, and report to both government and donors on CD interventions in Afghanistan.</i>	
<p>The ICCD has been set up at the Ministry of Economy as a central body to increase the level of coordination between the donor agencies and the Government in the area of CD. The NIBP will aim to increase the effectiveness of the ICCD to the fullest extent possible. In order to fulfill its duties, the ICCD will:</p> <p>receive quarterly reports from Ministries and government agencies on the status and progress of CD programmes; receive and review comments and recommendations from the CD technical secretariat on existing programmes;</p> <p>Be entitled to request formal reports and evaluations from independent bodies on projects that are not fulfilling their performance targets; and</p> <p>Prepare and distribute to ICCD members, rolling annual work plans with clear targets and priorities to ensure that activities of ICCD are conducted in a timely and efficient manner and to bring maximum support and minimum disruption to existing CD initiatives.</p>	<p><i>Ministry of Economy is not satisfied with the support provided. There is no evidence of enhancing the capacity of ICCD.</i></p> <p><i>Only a draft report prepared by one international and 2 national CDAs</i></p>
	<i>No such activity has come to the notice of the evaluation team.</i>
The NIBP will support the establishment and maintenance of an ICCD Secretariat, including staffing, equipment and operation cost. The Secretariat will have as its role to organize meetings of the ICCD, take minutes of the meetings, distribute papers and documents to ICCD members and others attending the meetings and collate and store relevant information and data. As the Secretariat will be small in size, the project will render staffing support to it accordingly by providing the	<i>Only one International advisor was posted on 16th of September 2012 who left the project on 31 December 2013 on closure of the project. During his time, only few workshops were conducted and no contribution to strengthening of ICCD secretariat was observed.</i>

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following manpower:	
One International Advisor on CD and Coordination	<i>Only one as above</i>
Three national staff, who will handle administrative and secretarial work and extend administrative support to the overall management arrangements of the ICCD	<i>Only two national advisors were provided. One advisor worked for 3 years and the other for four years.</i>
The project will provide technical assistance and operational support to the ICCD and for the development of an MIS system to monitor and assess all CD programmes in Afghanistan. All Ministries and donor agencies need to fully cooperate with the ICCD and inform it of all their activities. This will enable ICCD to form a pool of 'Best Practices' which can then be replicated by other programmes. Synergies between different CD programmes will be encouraged and unnecessary duplication avoided. Once a particular programme is initiated, information about it should be properly disseminated. To further this objective of information dissemination, the project will support development of a website for ICCD.	<i>No evidence found.</i>
The project will also support ICCD for establishment of a CD Working Group with technical assistance in priority areas of governance, public sector, private sector, coordination on higher education, technical education and vocation education. This will include conducting studies on current status of CD interventions and needs identification in these priority areas.	<i>No evidence found.</i>
UNDP shall execute a separate Letter of Agreement with Ministry of Economy for implementation of this component.	<i>No letter was made available to the evaluation team.</i>
1.10.2	
Output_2 – Strengthening Institutional and Organizational Capacity	
The activities of output 2 shall be similar to Activity 1.1 but will include the provision of services of the CDAs in select government entities in alignment with Civilian Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP) of the Ministry of Finance (MoF).	<i>With the establishment of CTAP under the aegis of Ministry of Finance, these activities have not been taken up by NIBP. During later years of implementation, this output and activities have been merged with Output 1. Therefore, no separate evaluation of the output and activities found necessary.</i>
Activity 2.1: <i>Provision of services of CDAs in select government entities in alignment with CTAP to provide coaching and advisory services for institutional strengthening, organizational reforms and skills development.</i>	
1.10.3	
Output_3 – Strengthening IARCSC and Training & Development at ACSI	

<p><i>The overall aim of output 3 is to implement a series of sequenced and integrated activities that are aimed at strengthening the PAR management and coordination structure of the IARCSC, and to lay a solid foundation for implementing the required training and CD initiatives for civil servants in accordance with the monitoring targets of ANDS. The activities of output 2 will include strengthening institutional capacity of IARCSC for improved PAR management and coordination, developing a National Training Policy and supporting ACSI and regional and provincial training centres in fulfilling their mandate.</i></p>	
<p><i>Activity 3.1: Strengthening institutional capacity of IARCSC for improved PAR Management and Coordination.</i></p>	
<p><i>The government has a vision that by the year 2014, the civil service should be (a) small and focused, (b) more diverse and decentralized with structures designed around the tasks to be performed, (c) driven by an accountable and results-based ethos, (d) significantly better skilled; and (e) more representative of Afghan society in terms of gender and ethnicity. PAR is a capacity development process, which allows the civil service organizations to deliver services more effectively. The major pillars of government's PAR programme are:</i></p>	
<p>a. Organizational restructuring which facilitates the implementation of strategies and service delivery;</p>	<p><i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i></p>
<p>b. Design and implementation of fundamental management and administrative work procedures;</p>	<p><i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i></p>
<p>c. Monitoring and evaluation of the efficiency of the administrative systems;</p>	<p><i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i></p>
<p>d. Pay and Grading Reform for the Civil Servants; and supporting organizations in setting up human resource procedures.</p>	<p><i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i></p>
<p>In order to manage and guide the PAR in an effective manner, IARCSC should be at least one-step ahead of other government agencies. It has to develop an ongoing programme to gain support for reforms, prepare staff for change and effect fundamental changes in its own organizational culture. A team of national and international professionals will support IARCSC to map out the way forward for managing the PAR process with very high standard of efficiency and quality. The organizational capacity of IARCSC will be strengthened and a robust management and coordination system for monitoring the developments will be implemented.</p>	<p><i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i></p>
<p>Mechanisms and indicators for measuring results and achievements of CD efforts need to be developed. This will foster greater learning and help pinpoint weaknesses and areas for improvement. It will also contribute to greater accountability of the individuals and organizations involved. The M&E unit of IARCSC will be strengthened to have the required human resources and systems and tools to assess CD needs and achievement. For this purpose, the M&E capacities will also be developed within the line Ministries as well as in</p>	<p><i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i></p>

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the regional offices of IARCSC, including ACSI and RTCs, through the support of the NIBP. In order to ensure proper measurement of results, indicators will be developed to assess skills transfer at the individual, organizational and institutional level.	
The broad areas of interventions to bring about the desired results under this sub-activity will include:	
Review of the existing PAR management and coordination structure at IARCSC and implementation of a suitable revised structure, including staffing and reporting lines	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
Development and implementation of systems to measure public sector CD results	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
Development and implementation of an effective PAR implementation and communication strategy including support to communication unit of IARCSC.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
In addition to the M&E unit of the Administrative Reform Secretariat (ARS) of IARCSC, the project will support the operations of its communication unit. The support will include provision for national staff at both central level as well as the seven regional offices. The activities of the communication unit shall be strengthened and supported in terms of publication of booklets, brochures and publicity material.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
This activity will also support the CD of the implementing partner namely the General Directorate of Projects' Design and Implementation (GDPDM) of the IARCSC. This will include development of manuals, systems and procedures, conducting on-the-job training for skill development of its staff, organizing exposure visits and study visits, sponsoring need based overseas training and providing equipment support for its institutional development.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
<i>Activity 3.2: Development of a National Training Policy.</i>	
One of the main instruments of CD is the implementation of well designed and need based training programmes for the target groups. The ANDS has stipulated the need for developing a National Training Policy (NTP) and putting in place institutional arrangements for the delivery of required training programmes to civil servants. The target further specifies that, by 2013, that each member of the workforce needs to be trained at least once in two years in organization specific and job specific training along with the generic training programmes. It is therefore important to implement a series of sequenced and integrated activities that would ultimately lead to capacities for fulfillment of	<p><i>There are contradicting responses on development of a national training policy. The NIBP project documents and the project managers say that they have supported development of a National Training Policy. However, as per Mr. Masood Tokhi, the General Director of Civil Service Management Division, they have not seen any National Training Policy drafted or supported by NIBP.</i></p> <p><i>All other activities flow from implementation of National Training Policy. As there was no training policy,</i></p>

the ANDS target. In this regard, the need for development of a NTP and building capacities of the national training institute (ACSI) and regional and provincial training centers is of paramount importance.	<i>there were no other activities.</i>
<i>Activity 3.3: Deepening the support for the operational CD of ACSI</i>	
The estimated number of civil servants inclusive of national and sub-national levels is 150,000. If each civil servant is to receive at least one training programme of one week duration in a year, this translates into creating capacity for delivering at least one week training programme for 75,000 civil servants at all levels in a year. Based upon this assumption, the project aims to enhance the training delivery capacity in the country progressively over the life of the project (current 5% to 15% by year 1, to 50% by year 2, to 80% by year 3 and full capacity by year 4) such that by 2013 the training institutes have the capacity to meet the ANDS target. During the project period, the NIBP will target to conduct training programmes for civil servants equivalent to of 112,500 trainee weeks (3,750 in year 1; 11,250 in year 2; 37,500 in year 3 and 60,000 in year 4).	<i>NIBP supported 36 in country, and 11 outside the country events engaging a total staff of 1310 over a period of 48 months.</i>
The project will provide focused support to ACSI to deepen the implementation of sequenced activities to bring the institute to the desired level in accordance with its strategic mission and vision. The following are the broad intervention areas under this sub-activity:	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Further refinement and implementation of the ACSI Strategic Plan	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Institutional and organizational CD of ACSI, including staffing, systems and procedures	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Strengthening of the training management and delivery function of ACSI	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Improving trainer capacity development by providing focused ToT and subject matter exposure visits	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Refining and updating of training materials and curriculum.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Top leadership competency training programmes (Grade 1-2)	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Middle management competency training programmes (Grade 3-4)	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Clerical and support staff competency training programmes (5-6)	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Other organization specific and generic training programmes as required for different levels	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Induction and Foundation for fresher civil servants	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Need based programmes, including establishment of long terms training programmes	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>

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○ Fast track management programme	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Training of Trainers (ToT) for ACSI, RTCs and PTCs	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
○ Incorporation of coaching modalities in the delivery of all training programmes	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Development and implementation of a system for the design and production of standard curriculum and training materials	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Design and implementation of oversight, quality assurance and accreditation systems and procedures.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Design and implementation of e-learning and distance learning modules	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Strengthening of the library and information management, research and advisory functions	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Improvement and update of campus infrastructure development and facility management systems	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
➤ Promotion of regional cooperation through twinning arrangements with other civil services training institutes and universities and institutions of the region, exposure and study visits of the ACSI faculty and regional workshops and seminars	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
Development of standards will constitute an important component of the NIBP. The project will provide technical assistance to the IARCSC to enable it to emerge as a fulcrum of standards development in the areas directly related to the public sector capacity development.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
As a next logical step, the project will engage in the necessary development of curricula in the relevant areas after uniform standards in the areas identified for public sector capacity development have been developed. A significant feature will be to follow a segmented approach in developing distinct curricula for the senior, middle and junior levels in the civil service in line with the competency requirements of the pay and grade system, so that their specific needs in each field or area are duly catered to. The needs of the civil servants at the sub-national level will also be kept in view.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
In order for common standards to be developed for CD of the civil servants in the generic themes, the training courses conducted earlier will be examined with reference to their contents and target training population from the civil service. This may involve appropriate modification and addition or deletion in the list of subjects or fields covered hitherto. This exercise will conclude with the development of standards with reference to the contents in each agreed generic field. The project will thereafter take up curriculum development in each of the agreed generic field or subject for the senior, middle and junior level civil	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>

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servants keeping in mind their training and coaching requirements.	
The ACSI, as the training arm of the IARCSC, will be the apex training institution of the GIRA to lead and manage all training related functions at the national level. The ACSI will, through the NIBP, be strengthened to have an in-house capacity to design and deliver such training programmes, which are superior in quality and address the training needs of civil servants at all levels.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
ACSI, as an apex level national training institute, will not be able to deliver quality to its clients if its human resources are not improved. With this end in view, the existing pool of trainers in the ACSI will be exposed to best practices in the delivery of training programmes. Apart from developing them in the generic subjects on management and leadership, the trainers will also be imparted ToT courses on organization specific and job specific functional areas. The staffing needs of the ACSI will be carefully assessed and due care will be taken to optimize the human resources.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
The project will also support the ACSI to set up high quality physical infrastructure and facilities on the campus. Standard systems and procedures will be prepared and the capacity of ACSI employees will be developed in these.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
Training and CD will constitute the core function of the ACSI. The project will offer distinct streams of quality training programmes to different strata of civil servants. The design and delivery of the training programmes of the ACSI will be in consonance with a new performance culture being injected in the public sector management and governance in Afghanistan. The training programmes offered under the project will have built in assessment and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that the training programmes are on track and participants internalize the concepts and principles. As part of its Gender Mainstreaming Strategy, the project will work towards increasing participation of the female civil servants in all the training programmes conducted at the ACSI. The selection of training programmes, to be delivered under the project, shall be made in consultation with other projects / programmes at ACSI, so that there is no duplication of efforts. The project will undertake only such training programmes which are not offered by others.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
Training programmes at sub-national level shall follow guidelines already developed for sub-national level CD	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>

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by the Provincial Affairs Directorate of IARCSC. Wherever required, these guidelines shall be reviewed and updated. The sub-national level CD interventions of NIBP shall include equipment and technology support to provincial offices in accordance with the needs assessment carried out under the project.	
All classroom training programmes at ACSI, conducted by ACSI trainers, will be followed up by a structured coaching support through the CDAs, who will be located in the Ministries and agencies. This will instill a sense of confidence among the participants when they apply their theoretical concepts and learning in their real work situation.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
Moreover, the project will help the ACSI in collaboration with reputed civil service institutes and universities in the region, such as LBSNAA (Mussoorie, India), IIPA (New Delhi, India) ASCI (Hyderabad, India), NIFM (Faridabad, India), IITs and IIMs in India, National Institute of Business Management (Sri Lanka), etc, and will arrange exposure and study visits of the civil servants and the ACSI faculty in the region. The area of collaboration and twinning include institutional management, curriculum and training modules development, trainers' capacity development, and experience sharing and exposure visits in other relevant areas. There are clear benefits of using a twinning arrangement to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Afghan training institutes but it will be important to identify the right institution. The suggested list here is illustrative. Possible options shall be explored keeping in mind the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of the option. It will also help in organizing regional workshops on themes pertaining to capacity development of civil services and governance.	<i>No evidence of support by NIBP found</i>
<i>Activity 3.4: Developing the operational capacity of RTCs and PTCs</i>	
The experience of building the operational capacity of the ACSI under the CSLD project will be used to develop a prototype for enhancing the operational capacity of RTCs and PTCs. ACSI will provide standard training modules and quality assurance services to RTCs and PTCs. The modality of relationship between ACSI and these training centers at sub-national level will be worked out in consultation with the provincial affairs directorate of IARCSC and other concerned agencies. Currently the CSLD project is implementing a videoconference link connection between ACSI and the seven RTCs of IARCSC. Such a link will be of significant benefit to exchange information, and in	<i>NIBP has posted national CDAs at Herat, Mazar, Kunduz, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. However, nothing exiting about the support provided by NIBP is observed.</i>

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particular for delivering selected training programmes to participants in these regional centers from ACSI on a real time basis. Using the already created relationship, and in line with the new direction proposed by IARCSC to bring the RTCs under the umbrella of ACSI, the NIBP will build the operational capacity of these centers to bring them to the required level for meeting the ANDS target.	
The prototype that will be used to build the operational capacity of the RTCs would be used to replicate activities for building the operational capacity of the remaining 28 PTCs. The activities to support the implementation of this component will include:	<i>No evidence available in this regard</i>
Review the current organizational structures of the RTCs and PTCs	<i>No evidence available in this regard</i>
Design and implement responsive organizational structures for RTCs and PTCs	<i>No evidence available in this regard</i>
Design a responsive training management and delivery system in RTCs and PTCs including training programmes, trainers, curriculum and delivery modalities	<i>No evidence available in this regard</i>
Design and implement e-learning and distance learning capability including library and information documentation	<i>No evidence available in this regard</i>
Improve and update campus infrastructure and facilities development at RTCs	<i>No evidence available in this regard</i>
It is to be noted that the UNDP's ASGP has been providing support of different kinds to 23 provincial training centers. The support being provided to these training centers is expected to be transferred to the NIBP once the project is launched and is firmly grounded to take over these responsibilities. In order to ensure continuity of functions of these institutions, a clear and complete transition/migration plan will be prepared in consultation with the provincial affairs department of the IARCSC and involving all concerned stakeholders. ASGP will continue providing support to these provincial training centers until the proposed transition/migration is complete. The support to these institutions shall migrate from ASGP to NIBP in accordance with the transition / migration plan approved by NIBP.	<i>No migration of activities from ASGP to NIBP took place. On the other hand, one international CDA was posted in IDLG where already ASGP was operational.</i>

Annexure III: LESSONS LEARNT DURING CLSD & CAP PROJECTS

LESSONS LEARNT	ACTIONS TAKEN DURING NIBP
A CD strategy must follow an integrated approach and address all levels where capacity is required, i.e. the level of the enabling environment or institutional capacity, the level of organizational capacity and the level of individual capacity. This must be suitably considered at the design stage of any CD programme.	Some of the CD plans prepared by CDA have spelt out the requirements of capacity at all levels, but they were not put into practice.
In order to be effective in Afghan context, the CD strategy must provide comprehensive support for institutional and organizational development and must have training, coaching and advising elements with proper linkages between these.	Training, coaching, and advising activities have been taken up focusing on training, workshops, and international visits.
The mix of coaching and advising is more effective and better accepted by the government counterparts as compared to the traditional TA modality.	NIBP has continued with coaching and advising.
Regional cooperation for sourcing experts is a model that has worked well in Afghanistan. Practitioners make effective coaches and advisors.	The same culture has been brought into this project, but a difference was required to focus on institution building.
Even though CAP improvised its model to suitably use a combination of coaching and advising, a missing element has been formal classroom training. On the other hand, training is a necessary but not a sufficient tool for CD. For classroom training programmes to be effective, they needed to be followed up with on the job coaching in the same areas. It is the trilogy of classroom training, on the job coaching and advising which would complete the CD process in Afghanistan and make it truly sustainable.	More training courses were conducted, and less or no on-the job training was imparted.
There is a need to strengthen the ACSI and to make it an apex level training organization. In order to augment the training capacity, intensive efforts are required towards strengthening the capacity of ACSI, Regional Training Centres (RTCs) and Provincial Training Centres (PTCs).	No strong and sustainable initiative found in practice to strengthen ACSI, RTCs, PTCs.
Training programmes must cater to all levels of civil servants, senior management as well as middle and lower functionaries. While CD of the senior civil servants is needed to take forward PAR initiatives in the Ministries and agencies, equal thrust needs to be laid on the wider reach of the training programmes to cover all the civil servants in Grade 3 and below in the new Pay and Grading structure. Also, training needs should comprehensively cover all areas of management and core functions.	189 domestic, and 99 international training courses for about 5,600 participants of senior and middle level officers including Deputy Ministers were conducted. This accounted for 116 persons per year, which is grossly insufficient considering the large number of civil servants in Afghanistan.
Approved standards and course curriculum need to be established for each area of training or coaching. In the absence of such standards, training and coaching material would differ from coach to coach and consequently Ministry to Ministry. There is thus a pressing need at this stage to develop common standards for all the subjects on which training and coaching is provided.	Standardization of course curriculum not found.
More effort is needed in the area of training of trainers.	No ToTs conducted
More emphasis needs to be put on incorporating gender considerations in CD projects along with allocating adequate resources for the same.	Gender mainstreaming workshops held, however no separate budgets were allocated for this endeavor.
CD is a long term process, more so in the Afghan context, which is continues to undergo conflict. Therefore, efforts should focus on long term results and not on quick results in isolated areas.	Focus was only on quick impact, like international study tours, and workshops.

ANNEXURE IV: RESULTS AND IMPACT ANALYSIS

EXPECTED RESULTS	ACTUAL RESULTS
<p>The NIBP will undertake institutional and organizational development in select government entities at central level through provision of services of Capacity Development Advisors (CDAs) and through provision of advisory services under twinning arrangements with ministries / agencies of other regional governments. The choice of ministries shall be dependent on an extensive demand assessment at the start of the project.</p>	<p>NIBP is a well-respected programme across the Government. GIRoA has many hopes on NIBP due to its financial size list of assurances made in the Project document. NIBP has provided 17 line Ministries at the center with the services of International Capacity Development Advisors (CDAs) and national Capacity Development Officers. NIBP has also facilitated signing of eleven twinning arrangements with government of India and other Governments. NIBP mainly focused on individual capacity development, study tours, training, and workshops. The policy documents produced by NIBP in association with the line Ministries like National Statistics capacity development policy, Saffron policy, and transport policy are in different stages of acceptance and development. NIBP focused more on coaching and mentoring with a view to enabling institutional development in the line Ministries. Before extending the support to the line Ministries, NIBP held discussions with the line Ministries an extensive demand assessment has not been documented though.</p> <p>Impact: Although, institutional development has not been observed as promised by NIBP, the training and development approach impacted way the civil services think and conduct their daily business in CSO, MAIL, DMOYA, and MRRD. These agencies started using the knowledge gained through trainings and workshops organized for them.</p>
<p>Policy formulation needs and organizational restructuring requirements of partner government entities shall be addressed based upon their customized needs. The reforms undertaken shall be within the overall strategic framework of PAR. The reforms shall be inclusive of development and implementation of appropriate systems and procedures leading to immediate</p>	<p>National level Policy formulation is a lengthy process involving multi stakeholder dialogue, and beneficiary participation in policymaking. Policy formulation and implementation has several steps and should be aligned with overall Government's mandate and intentions. Nevertheless, NIBP CDAs have drafted policy documents and submitted instead of helping line Ministries formulate their own specific policies. Examples can be seen from MoLSAD, MRRD, MAIL, MCIT, and CSO, However, the focus of</p>

<p>performance improvement of the offices and increased budget utilization.</p>	<p>CDAs was not on structural reforms. The data on increased budget utilization is not available. Secondly, in the presence of other Capacity Development advisors like CTAP advisors, World Bank Advisors, and Adam Smith International advisors, the line Ministries are not able to figure out the performance increase specific to NIBP support. However, NIBP has been able to work on knowledge enhancement of line Ministries through workshops, training, and international study tours.</p> <p>Impact: The line Ministries has realized the need to have policy support for environmental capacity development. However, they were not able to finalize the policies as the policy planning has not been taken up in standard approach.</p>
<p><input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Significant results of the intervention would be development of a CD plan followed by a policy portfolio and programmatic portfolio for the ministry/agency. In order to provide programmatic support to the ministry/agency, linkages will be established between NIBP and other UNDP projects.</p>	<p>Capacity Development plans (CDPs) for all the line Ministries are stated to have been developed by CDAs attached to the line Ministries. Only three such plans have been made available to the evaluators. However, Ministries appear to be ignorant of such plans for continuous use by them. Trainings and workshops designed and delivered were in line with CDPs.</p> <p>Impact: Only three line Ministries have used these reports. Others have not.</p>
<p><input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Specific needs in technical areas specific to respective ministries shall be addressed by advisory services under twinning arrangements. This will include provision for short-term trainings of Afghan civil servants at the ministries / agencies of regional governments and its training institutions.</p>	<p>Many specific short-term training courses were conducted for line Ministries under twinning arrangements. For example: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Economy, Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The list of such short term training courses conducted over a period of four years is very big.</p> <p>Impact: As a large number of courses were generic, much impact has not been documented. However, the training courses have opened up avenues for international training courses; and to certain extent, development of organizations skills among line Ministries' staff is seen as they were engaged in</p>

	organizing training courses and workshops.
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The tools and methodologies used by the CDAs would be advising and coaching & mentoring.	<p>CDAs have used the methodologies of coaching, advising, and training. However, NIBP has provided only an average of 20 months of CDA support over a period of 48 months. Further, only one CDA for line Ministry has been assigned with multiple tasks. A major part of his/her time is spent on facilitating training, workshops, twinning arrangements, and study visits out of Kabul. Out of a total of 30 CDA deployed, only three worked for about 36 months, six worked for 24-28 months and all other worked between 3 and 18 months. A majority of these CTAs have worked for less than a year.</p> <p>Impact: Over 5600 staff members from different line Ministries have been given training in different functional areas. However, retention of their knowledge has not been measured.</p>
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The focus area for staff capacity development through coaching and mentoring would be to strengthen core functions of government.	With the main focus was on short duration training courses, workshops, and international study tours, strengthening core functions of government is yet to be covered under capacity development support.
<input type="checkbox"/>	
A National Training Policy (NTP), as envisaged in ANDS, shall be developed and implemented.	<p>An initial work on a National Training Policy has been initiated. The policy requires to be fully drafted with multi stakeholder consultations; it needs to be strategized for implementation after necessary approvals.</p> <p>Impact: As the NTP is not available, no impact can be measured.</p>
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The NIBP will provide institutional and policy support to ACSI, the apex training institute for training of civil servants, for implementing required training programmes for civil servants at both national and sub-national levels.	<p>NIBP has positioned two advisers on this task for a period ranging between 3 months and 15 months. However, this area of support required continuous engagement of CDAs with specific deliverables.</p> <p>Impact: ACSI is not able to appreciate the support provided by NIBP. Therefore, no impact of advisors supporting ACSI found.</p>
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The subject areas for training will be widely covering the core	This area appears to be a non-starter. Although some line Ministry specific training courses were

requirements of Afghan civil servants and they would cater to all hierarchical levels in the government. This will include leadership and competency training programmes; other organization specific, job specific and generic training programmes as required for different levels; induction and foundation courses; need based programmes, fast track management programmes, and training of trainers. The training programmes shall be supplemented with coaching and mentoring for skill development.	organized with twinning arrangements with regional governments, strengthening ASCI with NIBPs support is not seen. No impact is seen.
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The NIBP will develop and prescribe common standards for training and coaching. Standards will be established by ACSI for various subject areas in which capacity is to be developed and also for methodologies to be used by various trainers / CDAs. Training programmes will be designed based on the pre-established standards and methodologies.	Interviews with line Ministries, IARCSC, and other stakeholders have not revealed the availability of any common standards of training. Impact: As this was a non starter, no tangible impact is seen.
<input type="checkbox"/>	
At sub-national level, the NIBP shall undertake capacity development of civil servants through provision of training at Regional / Provincial Training Centers and provision of coaching services of international CDAs at regional centers and national CDAs at provincial locations.	Some training courses were conducted at Sub-National level at Herat. Other areas at sub-national level kept un touched by NIBP. Civil Service Commission offices in Kabul, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Kandahar, and Balkh have been supported with CDA during the last year of the project for a period of 12 months. While Indian Civil Servants were predominantly deployed at central level, regional offices of CSC were provided CDAs from other countries. Albeit, necessary linkages between the centre and sub-national level have not been developed.
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The NIBP will support strengthening of PAR Management and Coordination capacity at IARCSC. The Civil Service Management Department (CSMD) shall be	CSMD was supported with a CDA under a letter of agreement as requested by CSMD for 15 months. However, her contribution to PAR and Civil Service Commission has not been clearly articulated by IARCSC.

strengthened for effective supervision and implementation of PAR.	Impact: No tangible impact is seen
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The NIBP will support strengthening of the newly established General Directorate of Projects' Design and Management (GDPDM) of IARCSC by providing staffing and infrastructure support for its institutional development and CD programmes for its staff to develop it as an effective department to manage developmental programs and projects of IARCSC in a sustainable manner.	General Directorate of Projects' Design and Management (GDPDM) was supported with a CDA. However, main focus of CDA had been on conducting training courses and workshops instead of developing institutional capacity of GDPDM in a sustainable manner. Impact: No tangible impact is seen
<input type="checkbox"/>	
The NIBP will support the ICCD in MoEc to serve as a single reporting point for both government and donors on CD interventions in Afghanistan. ICCD Secretariat shall be made fully operational for providing efficient services and an MIS (Management Information System) shall be developed for ICCD for monitoring and assessment of all CD programmes in Afghanistan.	Ministry of Economy was supported with a CDA for two years. However, the focus of the CDA was not on institutionalization of ICCD as explained by the deputy minister. NIBP only held workshops and nothing more as explained by the Deputy Minister. Impact: No tangible impact is seen

Annexure V: EVALUATION QUESTIONS ANSWERED

QUESTION	ANSWER
Are the intended outputs being achieved and contributed in achieving the outcomes set out in CPD, UNDAF and NPP3?	The outputs are not clear in the project document. Some activities and processes are described as outputs. The overall objective of the project and UNDAF outcomes, and NPP3 outputs not achieved.
To what extent has NIBP output/outcomes resulted in actual changes on the ground?	The main intent of NIBP was institutional development-a departure from the earlier CAP and CSLD. However, NIBP continued to practice training and development in preference to institutional development.
What internal or external factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving the intended results?	Supply driven practices, internal management practices like senior management intervention in the earlier stages of the project; ambiguous and unrealistic assurances, one Ministry one advisor approach; ignored national ownership aspect, internal confusion of institutional development with individual capacity development contributed to not achieving the desired results. Externally, internal clashes among MoF, IARCSC, MoEc; launch of CTAP, non-ownership of line Ministries; CDAs loyalty to their government than to the project led to poor achievement of results.
Has NIBP met the real institution-building objective as stated in the document?	No, it has fully focused on training, coaching, and workshops.
Is the project design and intended outputs/outcomes still consistent with the national priorities and in synergy with other similar interventions by other donors?	There are many design defects in the project. Although the objectives have synergy with national priorities, the implementation deviated from its original path.
What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness of NIBP?	Non-national ownership, non-availability of required expertise, ambiguous planning, supply driven approach, and mismanagement of project have contributed to ineffectiveness.
One of NIBP output / outcome was to build capacity of the IARCSC to take over the implementation of the project, has NIBP achieved	No, the project did not build the capacity of IARCSC as it intended to during the implementation of the

this?	project.
Has NIBP had a balanced approach to respond to CD needs at all three levels – environmental, institutional and individual?	No, entire focus was on training courses and workshops
Has NIBP met sub-national commitments?	No, it has not met the sub-national commitments the project intended.
What are additional recommendations to improve service delivery within respected Ministries and departments?	Full engagement of line Ministries in alignment with national reform agenda and coordination with reform agencies.
What should be the UNDP approach in similar interventions in the future?	National ownership and demand driven project formulation in strong alignment with national priorities, IARCSC, and NPP3, and recognition to national agenda of change.

Annexure VI: REPORT OF INTERVIEWS WITH LINE MINISTRIES

NIBP FINAL EVALUATION

Ministry of Information & Communication Technology (MICT)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	<p>NIBP as a concept was good, but it totally failed in providing what it had intended. They have promised to develop institutions but ended up with trainings and workshops. Most of these trainings and workshops were not sustainable. They have not developed or advised on the mechanisms to follow up on the knowledge gained. The project was totally a supply driven. They have not asked at the beginning of the project what exactly the Ministry needs were. Instead, they brought advisors and posted them in the line Ministry without any clear reporting lines.</p> <p>The project lacked proper leadership and was very slow. When the Ministry was progressing at rocket speed, the project was travelling at the speed of an animal driven cart. It clearly appeared that there was no coordination between the project management and the country office of UNDP.</p> <p>The line Ministry is more interested in short- term technical support than long-term advisors who sit with the line Ministry and provide any tangible results. Secondly, the deliverables of advisors are neither measureable nor were the advisors reporting to their respective line Ministry.</p>
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	<p>There is no worthy contribution made by NIBP to the line Ministry. NIBP has positioned two national advisors for the Ministry one with national capacity another with international background. When the Ministry started utilising the services of these advisors, the project was closed. Although, the twinning agreement signed with the Government of Azerbaijan was very good, the agreement between Turkey and Afghanistan could not be materialised due to inefficiencies of NIBP. To a certain extent, NIBP was able to organise workshops and short training courses.</p>
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	<p>Although the concept of institutional development promised by NIBP was good, it could not communicate it properly with the line Ministry about its contribution. It was a supply driven project. It took time for the Ministry to understand what exactly NIBP was going to contribute. The line Ministry expected that NIBP would help them in critical areas of institutional functions by supporting design and implementation of work processes, systems, tools, and operationalisation of the Ministry's policy initiatives. However, NIBP had limited itself to training and development, and workshops. NIBP has not delivered whatever it had promised. Thus, the Ministry missed the bus in utilising the support promised by NIBP.</p>
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	<p>NIBP was very slow in delivery. They have positioned two national advisors very late in the line Ministry. By the time the Ministry realised the relevance of the support, the project was closed and the advisors left. The line Ministry then approached CTAP to engage under their contract one of the advisors provided by NIBP. There were visible leadership problems within NIBP. The Project Manager made many promises, when he met the senior management in the Ministry, however when it comes to implementation, there were always excuses from others in the project. Project staff always shifted the responsibility to UNDP's procurement processes and approaches.</p>

	<p>The coordination mechanisms of NIBP were also very poor and MCIT did not know where to report the progress and failures in the work.</p> <p>The ToRs designed for the advisors were quite generic and was not MCIT specific. MCIT was consulted not engaged before drafting the ToR or at the time of recruitment of advisors/consultants. That created a technical requirement gap within the advisors recruited for MCIT.</p>
5.	<p>Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP</p> <p>NIBP in the present form of NIBP is not required for GIRoA, or at least for the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. Today, the country has developed tremendous capacity within the government. Nevertheless, MCIT wanted to learn international best practices development, and wanted to strengthen institutional capacity with no more training courses, workshops, and unclear study tours. NIBP, if at all starts its second phase, should focus on national ownership, demand driven support, and line Ministry specific ToRs for consultants. MCIT does not require long-term advisors sitting in the line Ministry with no accountability and unclear reporting lines. Instead, MCIT is in need of short-term technical consultants who work with the national teams, develop products, and tools, take their fee and depart.</p> <p>NIBP phase II should also focus more on PRR, pay and grading, and the remaining public administration reforms. NIBP should look at what other agencies like CTAP, Adam Smith International, GIZ, and World Bank were doing, and avoid duplicating similar efforts.</p>

Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAD)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	NIBP as a concept was a good project if it started with a needs assessment of the line Ministry and the Ministry should have been taken into confidence while the project was designed. The line Ministry expected transfer of knowledge through the ICDA, but it has not happened barring a few interventions suggested. If the line Ministry is asked to give marking on 100 point scale, NIBPs contribution to MoLSAD was only 40% or less. MoLSAD in fact required lower level capacity development, systemisation of work processes, and daily business operations of the line Ministry. However, there were personality conflicts with the international consultants. MoLSAD has realised that the CDA could have contributed more than what the Ministry was already capable of doing. Thus, NIBP failed to identify the requirements of MoLSAD and provide the necessary support accordingly.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	The long-term stay of the International Capacity Development Advisor (ICDA) was good. ICDA was able to support MoLSAD in drafting a National Child Labour Policy, and contributed to other policy development initiatives. He has also assisted in the fundraising approaches and actions of the Ministry. The training courses, workshops, and international study tours facilitated by ICDA were helpful to some extent as the Ministry was in need of regional knowledge.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	<p>Although the concept of institutional development promised by NIBP was good, it could not communicate with the line Ministry properly about its contribution. It was fully a supply driven project not a demand driven one. The National Capacity Development Advisor (NCDA) positioned in MoLSAD was not able to deliver any tangible results. . The Ministry does not know what activities he was pursuing.</p> <p>There was no clear ToR for the International or National CDAs. They have worked the way they wanted to work. Although, NIBP was a project for institutional development, the CDAs have not realised that aspect and were not able to guide the Ministry through institutional development processes.</p>
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	<p>NIBPs operational support was very slow. Even in organising workshops and training courses, there were delays in execution of actions. Instead of assigning some tasks to the Ministry staff, CDAs have done the work on their own.</p> <p>The reporting arrangements were not clear. National and international CDAs were working in the Ministry but their reporting line was to report to UNDP and NIBP. Their leave, R&R, hours of work, etc, were not communicated to the Ministry in timely manner. Secondly, I-CDA worked directly with senior management without engaging lower level staff. That created a gap in the transfer of knowledge.</p>
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	<p>NIBP, in the second phase, should focus more on institutional development, system development, and business process re-engineering, and organisational development. Percentage wise, 80% focus should be on systems development, and 20% on Individual capacity development.</p> <p>The second phase should be fully demand driven and no CDA should be posted in the Ministry without a clear ToR discussed with the Ministry, and without prior knowledge of the Ministry. The project should be fully demand driven, and deliverables should be</p>

	<p>clear, measureable, and discussed with the line Ministry before the launch of the project.</p> <p>Systems should be developed for inter-ministerial coordination. Support is needed to work with the Ministry of Communication & Information Technology for E-Governance. The development of procedures and implementation of standard procedures of the Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Finance for budget implementation and reporting should given consideration in the second phase of the project.</p> <p>MoLSAD strongly informed the evaluators that they do not require any advisors. They need consultants who can deliver the specific goods as required by the Ministry. The consultants should be modelled like the World Bank consultants, who come and work on specific tasks and deliver on systems improvement.</p>
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Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	<p>NIBP as a concept made a shift from its predecessor project of Capacity Assistance Program (CAP) & Civil Service Leadership Development (CSLD) of UNDP. This was an excellent change and very good concept of building institutions in the country. However, it has not delivered what it had promised. The Capacity Development Advisors (CDAs) focused only on trainings, which was however the mandate of IARCSC. There was no need of any training to be provided by the CDAs or NIBP. The support sought was to strengthen IARCSC and its regional centred to deliver more effectively, but this has not happened.</p> <p>NIBP has not delivered what it had promised in the project document. IARCSC expected that NIBP helped in Administrative Restructure, Policy Development, Systems Design, Business Process Review and redesign, etc., but focused solely on trainings and workshops.</p>
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	IARCSC has not seen any strong support provided by NIPB except support to some training courses. One such support was for design and delivery of English language classes.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	NIBP has not delivered on what it had promised. The project was very ambitious and was not properly organised in terms of its resource mobilisation, and institutional development initiatives. Although the project appeared to have been aligned with national priorities, in delivery it has completely failed. IARCSC expected to develop a National Training Policy at least by the closure of project, but even today, there is no complete, final, accepted National Training Policy in place. NIBP has also not supported in the partnership building with other line Ministries, departments, and cooperating partners. Neither was it able to establish coordination mechanisms for the purpose of institutional strengthening.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	Recruitment and positioning of Capacity Development Advisors CDAs was a major challenge for NIBP. Next was the creation of national ownership of the project. In this aspect, NBIP totally failed to transfer full project management to IARCSC as promised in the project document. Reporting lines of CDAs were unclear. It was also very vague as to the arrangement of performance reviews of institutional strengthening. IARCSC did not know what was happening in the line Ministries where NIBP CDAs were

	<p>working. In fact, IARCSC is the nodal agency in Afghanistan to lead reforms and guide the line Ministries in implementation of Public Administration Reforms. It was expected that NIBP would support line Ministries in delivering in accordance with the mandate of IARCSC. However, no such interventions have been taken up by I-CDAs.</p> <p>NIBP has not developed any performance measurement and management systems for its CDAs and the line Ministries to measure their progress and performance.</p> <p>NIBP people were rarely available for any discussions, coordination, or clarifications.</p>
5.	<p>Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP</p> <p>The next phase of NIBP should focus more on institutional strengthening. No more training courses by NIBP in Afghanistan are acceptable. Training is the area of IARCSC and it should be strengthened as required.</p> <p>NIBP Phase II should work in the areas of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business process reengineering; • Policy formulation; • Systems development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technology innovations - Service delivery systems, - Appreciation of development, - Project formulation, control, monitoring, and analysis, - Reporting systems <p>The second phase of NIBP should have a strong project management component with national ownership. The project management should work in close liaison with IARCSC and the line Ministries. The entire government reforms are the mandate of IARCSC. Therefore, any reforms initiated within the line Ministry should be in line with the institutional reforms agenda of IARCSC. No deviation from the national reform agenda is acceptable. NIBP consultants, not advisors, should work in coordination with IARCSC and facilitate institutional strengthening in the line Ministries.</p>

Central Statistical Office (CSO)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	<p>General Observations:</p> <p>NIBP has helped in training and study tours in India for capacity development in the area of national statistical development. NIBP facilitated to learn more about statistical methods and tools from Indian experience. In general, the project was good. However, CSO is in the need of technical support for strengthening and institutionalisation of statistical systems in the country. CSO is not fully operationalised yet. Therefore, it seeks to have experts to strengthen its systems and procedures with the support of projects like NIBP. CDA posted at CSO was very good in supporting and organising interaction with the Indian government and understanding of Indian systems of statistical offices. Nevertheless, a large number of technical areas have been missed out and NIBP was not able to identify the actual institutional requirements of CSO. In comparison to other line Ministries, CSO has a bigger mandate with the collection of population data and making it useful for decision makers.</p>
2.	<p>Contribution made by NIBP</p> <p>NIBP has supported drafting a capacity needs assessment of CSO. NIBP advisor helped in finalisation of statistical yearbook of CSO. The training provided by NIBP through Indian contacts was very good. Such type of specific training facility and capacity was not available in Afghanistan.</p>
3.	<p>Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic</p>

	Considering the requirement of CSO's huge mandate, one CDA was not sufficient. He spent more time on organising workshops, study tours, and training courses. More assistance that is technical was foreseen but it was not forthcoming from NIBP. CSO has expected establishment of a Training and Research Department for Statistical Human Resource Development with the support of NIBP. But, this has not happened. CSO wanted introductory basic courses, secondary courses, advanced courses, full professional courses in statistical methods and systems. Additionally, functional specific knowledge is also a requirement that was not addressed by NIBP. Use of statistical tools, poverty analysis, calculation of wholesale price, retail price indices, inflation indexation, wage and employment data collection, and analysis are some areas where specific knowledge and tools are required. NIBP was not able to successfully provide this kind of support to CSO.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	NIBP was a bit slow on delivery. The line Ministry required more number of technical experts, but NIBP has provided only one international CDA. The first CDA was changed within one year and another CDA was posted. Continuity of work suffered to a certain extent due to the change and transfer of knowledge. Before posting CDAs, NIBP should have discussed the ToR of the experts with CSO for their input.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	During the second phase of NIBP the line Ministry is expecting help monitor the work of support to be provided by GIZ team as part of World Bank's Statistics for Results project. GIZ is expected to take up institutional strengthening in the areas of statistical plans, Data analysis, report writing, using SPSS, STATA, business process reforms, poverty analysis, food security data, and developing cooperation with other line Ministries for using the statistics provided by CSO. If GIZ does not provide this technical support, CSO is looking at Phase II of NIBP for more support that is technical by deploying short-term technical experts in different technical areas relevant to CSO.

Ministry of Economy (MoEc)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	As per NIBP project document, Inter Ministerial Committee on Capacity Development (ICCD) has to be established and made functional to make it a one-stop shop for all the capacity development information in Afghanistan. However, NIBP provided CDA support only for 15 months, that too, during the last 15 months of the project. NIBP was not a demand driven project. It was not based on what line Ministries needed but was a project designed on what UNDP wanted. In countries like Afghanistan, country requirements should be taken into consideration while designing projects like NIBP. ICCD is in operation for the last five years, but no results are visible, neither did NIBP help it to make fully functional. Requests of the Ministry of Economy (MoEc) were not given due consideration by UNDP.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	Only few workshops were done. There was no other contribution.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	The major programmatic challenge was NIBP has conducted a few workshops, which MoEc does not understand what purposes it served. In fact, there was no support from NIBP as promised in the project document. Further, the project document was not shared with Ministry at the beginning of the project. This was brought to the notice of NIBP and UNDP in many of the project board meetings by the Honourable Deputy Minister of MoEc. Need assessments of MoEc or any other line Ministry was made to

	<p>launching the project. Capacity development was understood by NIBP as training and development whereas the project document promises institutional development.</p> <p>Training programmes were very generic, even they were not even effective. NIBP has conducted the training courses just as a formality to complete some targets.</p> <p>Central and provincial coordination was to be strengthened with liaison between the provincial centres and central capacity development institutions, which was not achieved. Poor engagement with line Ministries and non-development of coordination mechanisms was another challenge with NIBP. The management of NIBP was not professional to underline the capacity requirement of Afghanistan. They started with a notion “Afghanistan does not have any capacity, therefore anything can be done in Afghanistan”</p> <p>Only one visible thing NIBP has done in the Ministry of Economy was affixing a strong iron door for the safety and security of the international advisors to work at the Ministry, but only one international worked for 15 months on and off.</p>
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	<p>No CDAs were posted from the beginning of the project. CDA has worked only for 15 months of the last stage of the project with no tangible results. MoEc was not consulted before posting the CDA. The support was very slow and not responsive to the needs of MoEc.</p> <p>Engagement of IARCSC was another challenge. NIBP/UNDP has not realised the dynamics of relations between different organisations operating in capacity development and public administration reforms taking place in Afghanistan.</p>
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	<p>NIBP during its second phase should give more local consideration than was previously provided in the first phase. The deliverables should be discussed with the line Ministries before appointing CDAs. To strengthen ICCD, not only soft support, but also hard support is needed. Coordination mechanisms should be established with other line Ministries, IARCSC, and Ministry of Finance. UNDP should be clear about who is leading capacity development in the country before starting the next phase. If possible, UNDP should directly take the overall lead without engaging IARCSC. If this is not possible, clear demarcation of duties and responsibilities with national ownership is suggested and required.</p>

Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	<p>In fact, the Ministry was not able to understand the nature of NIBP. Therefore, the Ministry could not speak much about institution building aspect of NIBP. Barring on a few training programmes and workshops conducted, NIBP was not able to guide the Ministry in the areas of institutional strengthening. The advisors posted were not able to appreciate the requirements of the Ministry. The Ministry was looking at NIBP for support in drafting national policies on road transport, surface transport, and air transport but little contributed to NIBP with the exception of a few study visits, training courses and workshops. This kind of capacity development approach is suitable only when well-structured institutions are in place. The workshops and study visits will help to enhance available knowledge. NIBP has not realised this and sent individuals for</p>

	trainings and study tours- with no clear value addition.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	NIBP helped the Ministry to organise some trainings and workshops. A study tour to India was organised and the signing of a twinning agreement with Government of India was signed.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	NIBP missed entirely on institutional development. In fact, it should have developed linkages with Public Administration Reforms (PAR) in Afghanistan and guided the line Ministry in implementation of PAR. In doing so, many institutional and restructuring issues were to be addressed by NIBP, which were not done. The Ministry expected support in the areas of law, policy formulation, financial planning, budgeting, transparency, and accountability systems development. None of these was achieved through NIBP.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	NIBP was very slow in responding. There was no continuity of CDAs working for entire duration of the project. Reporting systems of NIBP were not known to the line Ministry. The Ministry did not have any supervisory role to monitor the work of CDAs. They have come, spent the time in the Ministry and departed. Sometimes, NIBP rules were very rigid where the Ministry could not get the required support.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	NIBP next Phase should be made more user friendly than it was in the first phase. Engagement of line Ministry staff from the drafting stage of the project document is very essential. Before approval of the project document, it should be shared with the Ministry to incorporate their requirements and deliverables.

Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	The line Ministry is not at all satisfied with the support provided by NIBP. NIBP's management was not professional, neither has it developed any coordination and communication mechanisms to interact with the Ministry and guide them as appropriate. The approaches of NIBP and guidance given by them were weak. NIBP has not discussed the requirement of support with the Ministry during the first three years of the project's existence. Only at the end, NIBP has provided an Indian Civil Servant of a very senior level who worked only for nine months and abruptly left without contributing anything to the line Ministry.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	Only two training programmes were conducted by NIBP during its presence in the line Ministry, one in India on Planning and Rural Development for 15 participants, and the other is in South Korea on Rural Development. There was no contribution other than this from NIBP.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	The approach was unprofessional and uncooperative. MRRD expected support for institution building, whereas NIBP ended with conducting only two training courses. MRRD wanted a decentralisation strategy to be developed with multi stakeholder consultation; whereas the CDA engaged by NIBP has drafted a strategy on her own and shared the zero draft on the day of their departure taking everyone by surprise.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	The CDA positioned in MRRD was a very senior Indian bureaucrat. She reported for

	duty and went on leave for three months without the knowledge of MRRD, and came back and worked for nine months. She was abruptly removed from MRRD with no replacement. The reporting lines were not very clear, and CDA limited herself meeting only the Deputy Minister occasionally. She never developed working relations with others in the Ministry.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	NIBP Phase II should focus on strict institution development in line with national priorities and with national ownership. MRRD should be consulted before anyone is posted in MRRD. The reporting lines should be very clear and should have reporting arrangements within the Ministry. NIBP Phase II management should be always available for discussions and support, MRRD should be allowed to hire available national talents and utilise them for institutional development. NIBP can take CTAP as an example before starting the project.

Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs (DMoYA)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	NIBP was an excellent project in principle, but implementation could have been a bit more aggressive. The national and international advisors posted in the Ministry were excellent, and they knew their jobs. The overall contribution of NIBP to this Ministry was 60% of what it has promised. However, they focused more on training and development. The Ministry had expected more support from NIBP. Although the project duration was for 48 months, the international support was provided only for 28 months. When the international CDA left, there was no one to take the lead and support the Ministry to taking ahead the reform agenda. Thus, NIBP was not able to make sustainable contribution to the line Ministry.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	NIBP helped DMoYA in fundraising activities, donor relations, organising meetings, and finalising the National Youth Policy. The national CDA appointed by NIBP was excellent and he could support to the extent of 60% of National Youth Policy formulation. Capacity Development Directorate of DMoYA was also supported by NIBP.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	NIBP focused more on individual capacity development. NIBP was thought to be an advanced stage of CAP and CSLD. However, the Ministry observed only a name change of the project. Neither the culture of CAP, nor the management of CAP was changed during the initial years when the project was launched. Thus, NIBP's focus was on training and coaching instead of institutional development.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	Always, there were challenges with the financials of NIBP. The financial systems and bureaucratic procedures of UNDP were always a matter of concern for DMoYA. In fact, UNICEF and UNFPA were very quick in supporting the Ministry. NIBP struggled a lot to provide what it had promised. Other operational issue was that although NIBP had agreed to support with an international CDA for 48 months, only 28 months of input was provided.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	During the next phase, NIBP should focus on overall development of the Ministry in line with PAR and PRR priorities. It should not limit itself to some basic trainings. The Afghan youth are the present and future of the country. If possible, UNDP should think of having a separate and standalone project for youth in Afghanistan. That programme

	can be jointly managed by the Ministry and UNDP for effective and sustainable results.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	MoFA is unhappy with the project. MoFA was not taken into consideration when the project was formulated. NIBP has not delivered on what it had promised. The project was not managed professionally. The Ministry was not given any freedom in selection of relevant topics for training or places of study tours. NIBP has worked the way it liked without any major contribution to the institution building in the Ministry.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	Except a few training courses, there was no contribution by NIBP.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	NIBP has not done any diagnostic study to help the line Ministry, therefore the entire project delivery approach was a challenge for MoFA
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	Communication links were very weak. There was no focal point at the NIBP project level to communicate with. Budget allocations were not clear; coordination was very poor. Very restrictive in recruiting afghans for the position of CDAs.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	MoFA has very specific suggestions for Phase II of NIBP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make it a project run by nationals • Project deliverables should be demand driven • Line Ministries should be asked to prepare their institutional development plan for support • ToRs of CDAs should be discussed with the line Ministry • Interviews should be conducted with the knowledge of the Ministry • Focus should be more on institutional strengthening in accordance with the overall mandate of the government and the Ministry • There should be clear reporting lines and accountability systems • Termination of the project should be discussed with the Ministries before a decision is taken. • Outputs should be dynamic, with provision to change after one or two years.

Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	Although there were two International Advisors posted in this Ministry, the support of NIBP was not satisfactory. The Ministry expected a major contribution for its systems development, institutionalisation of the SME department, and public private partnerships for industrial growth. However, there was no support forthcoming. The advisors were non-cooperative and the communication systems between the project and the Ministry were not satisfactory.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP

	NIBP has organised 10 domestic and 6 international training events engaging 450 participants from this Ministry. Additionally, NIBP helped to support an incubation centre but was not successful. The workshops and trainings were useful to a certain extent. The line Ministry expected sustainability of the knowledge gained through these training courses.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	There was no international support from the beginning of the project. In the initial days of the project, the Ministry was ignored by NIBP. Only a year before the end of the project two technical advisors were appointed. By the time they understood the requirements, the project was closed. No action planning was done by CDAs therefore; the Ministry was not able to get the required support from CDAs. Ministry was in need of pure technical support for commerce and industry, where as the CDAs ended with trainings and workshops.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	The communication linkages between the project and the Ministry were very poor. Out of the two CDAs posted, one was a very senior Indian Government officer. The CDAs maintained relations only with senior level. Lower level and functional officers were not fully engaged. Ministry was not engaged in the recruitment process.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	Ministry foresees more national engagement in the next phase of NIBP. Any project designed should be done in association with the Ministry, after assessing their needs. Both short term technical experts and long term technical experts are required, mainly in the areas of institutionalisation of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) activities. ToRs, diagnostic/ need assessment studies, and the project document should be shared with the Ministry before its implementing. Budget allocations should be made known to enable the Ministry plan their activities accordingly.

Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	The support provided by NIBP was very useful. Many things that were not known to the Ministry staff in the area of agriculture were made known through training, workshops, and study tours. Projects like NIBP would greatly help Afghanistan. However, there were issues like follow up on the training courses conducted and other actions suggested. The involvement of IARCSC in the support functions should have been reduced to have greater support from UNDP. Institution building will be possible with continued long term support from the projects like NIBP.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	NIBP has conducted many training courses and workshops on a number of critical knowledge areas. It has also helped in restructuring the directorate. Overall, there was a very good support from UNDP.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	The project appeared to lack a focused approach to the extent of the requirements of this Ministry. There was no follow up action, and action planning for the activities taken up in the Ministry. The Ministry expected guidance and institutional building in the areas of internships, seed banks, identifying world best practices in agriculture, disease control, pesticide production and usage, water management in agriculture, livestock production, and income generation activities for small and medium farmers as well as others.

4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	There were certain problems like language problems. For international training, only those familiar with the English language were supported. That created an internal dissatisfaction. IARCSCs engagement was another challenge. Slow processes of UNDPs financial management system sometimes upset the enthusiasm.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	<p>Next phase of NIBP should focus more on technical needs of the Ministry. The project should be designed in consultation, and with inputs from the Ministry. Training courses should be designed in alignment with the Ministry's priorities or with its knowledge, not only through the civil service commission. Core mandates of the project should be shared before the project is implemented. A diagnostic study of the Ministry should be conducted before any project is designed and implemented.</p> <p>Ministry should be informed before posting a CDA and before removing a CDA from the Ministry. More nationalisation is required in the next phase of NIBP</p>

Head of Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	NIBP has been an excellent project. However, it suffered greatly in its implementation. Therefore, it did not achieve its intended targets. It has tried its best to provide training courses to the civil servants as deemed necessary by the advisors. The main agenda of institution building was not achieved by NIBP.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	NIBP has excellently contributed in organising training courses and exposure visits to many of the civil servants in Afghanistan. But for NIBP, it could have not been possible for IARCSC to organise such a large number of international trainings and learning events. However, the impact of this learning is yet to be measured.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	NIBP was not able to focus on the objectives it has declared. It has focused more on training and development. It was a challenge for the international advisors to work with the national counterparts. Fulltime availability of International Advisors was also a problem. This was because of security advisory to the international staff. Secondly, as a number of training courses conducted in India, I-CDAs preferred to accompany the teams. Thus, time spent on tours, leave, and R&R left the CDA with no time to spend in Afghanistan.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	Processes were very slow. Recruitment has not taken up on time. National advisors were not provided with necessary training before they were assigned the tasks.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	<p>The next phase should focus on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National ownership in alignment with IARCSC reform agenda • Systems development; • Development of administrative structures; • Implementation of civil service law; • Business process revision and reengineering; • Develop national teams for future leadership teams • Establish good coordination between implementing Ministries and IARCSC.

Head of Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	CSLD was good. It has produced good leaders in the administration of the country. However, NIBP was not able to reach its goals as promised. If we look at the project document, 60% of the work should have been done in association with the Civil Service Institute. However, nothing has been done in association with the Civil Service institute except some training courses and workshops outside the country. In fact, decision making for training for civil services is the mandate of ACSI, but no formal approval has been taken from ACSI before sending people for training outside the country. Thus, the sanctity of ACSI and training suffered.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	There is no contribution made by NIBP to ACSI. Therefore, ACSI is not able to provide with a list of contributions made by NIBP. However, NIBP missed a chance of associating ACSI with other training institutes in India for better coordination and cooperation.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	NIBP has no policy of sending people abroad for training. It has sent same people repeatedly. Knowledge gained by those who returned from the training abroad has not been transferred through ACSI, neither has there been any arrangement to share at least the course material they had brought from the trainings abroad. In this way, NIBP has not only institutionalised the systems, but was not able to communicate the importance of knowledge sharing by the internationally trained national officers. The training courses have ended up as sightseeing trips. There was no meaning in sending people to Nepal on PAR, when the country itself has not formalised PAR fully. There were some individual interests at the senior management level at UNDP and in the Government.
4.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Operational
	NIBPs financial operations were not at all transparent. All the procurement requires a thorough audit. It has procured goods at the rates that were more than market rates. There were no strong reasons why a person from Government was sent to do a Masters Degree in an Ivy league college in USA spending more than USD 70,000 when the country is very poor and his contribution to knowledge in the country does not match the amount spent. It went on with the model of empire building. The national advisors were recruited from acquaintance of the people already working.
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	The next phase should focus more on transparent and accountable systems with more national ownership and demand driven.

Director of Donor Coordination at General Directorate Program Design & Management (GDPDM)

S. No	Line Ministry's comments
1.	General Observations:
	In concept, NIBP was a very good project. The Government would have benefited from the program greatly, had NIBP aligned its objectives with the overall national public administration reform policy. The project document is good, well written and produced. The scope of the project was well recognized.
2.	Contribution made by NIBP
	NIBP contributed greatly to developing the capacity of individuals, and less so on

	environmental and more specifically institutional capacity and systems development. There were many trainings and exposure visits of government officials.
3.	Challenges encountered with NIBP- Programmatic
	There were many challenges along the way of NIBP. One of the biggest challenges was the lack of coordination between the Commission and UNDP. There were many problems with the project manager, who was not supportive and engaging the commission. NIBP was implemented as a stand-alone project and was not aligned with the national priorities such as NPP3 and CBR.
4.	Challenges with NIBP-Operational
5.	Suggestions for II Phase of NIBP
	Commission should have the lead on the NIBP project. Stakeholders should have mutual priorities and goals. The commission has the lead on the CBR project and its implementation and highly requests UNDP to align the program with the national reform strategy of the government. The project should also be aligned with other public administration reform projects such as NPP3. Advised for strong coordination and national ownership of NIBP. There should be joint Monitoring and Evaluation team of NIBP, stronger utilization of resources for optimization of the program.

Annexure VII: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND CONTACTED

1. Abdul Bari, Policy Advisor, Swiss Cooperation Office of Afghanistan
2. Abhar Sohaila, Project Associate, UNDP
3. Ahmad Basir, Acting Director of Department of Ministry of Irrigation and Livestock
4. Ahmadzai Noorullah, Acting Head, Cross Practice Unit, UNDP
5. Asimi Saed Aref, National Capacity Development Officer, Department of Education, Herat
6. Azizi Abdullah, Program Officer, UNDP
7. Dhia, Sophia, Capacity Development Advisor, ASGP, UNDP, Kabul
8. Eshaqzai Taimoor Shah, Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs
9. Esmati Tariq, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
10. Ghafarzoy Mukhthar, Policy Advisor, Economic and Policy, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD)
11. Habibi Nematullah, Administration and Finance Manager, Department of Ministry of Economy
12. Haidari Mir Amanuddin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL)
13. Hajiyev Sultan, Chief Capacity Development Advisor
14. Hussaini Sayed Assadullah, National Capacity Development Officer, Department of Ministry of Economy, Herat
15. Jalali, Director of Donor Coordination, General Directorate of Program Design Management (GDPDM)
16. Jamizada Shir Mohammad, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Economy
17. Kamrany Waheed Ahmad, National Capacity Development Officer, IARCSC, Herat
18. Komaki Motalil, Deputy Minister, Private Sector Development, Ministry of Commerce and Industries (MoCI)
19. Kumar Rohit, Representative of Government of India, Embassy of India
20. Lee Jason, Capacity Development Advisor, UNDP
21. Mansoori Jarullah, Deputy Minister for Policy and Planning, Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (MoTCA)
22. Marjan Aimal, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT)
23. Masjoon Abdul Rahim, Acting Director of IARCSC in Herat
24. Minniti Fabio, Deputy Head of Mission, Italian Cooperation
25. Mohammadi Basirah, Director of Department of Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs Martyrs and Disabled (DMoLSAD)
26. Mowahed Hasibullah, Deputy Minister, Central Statistics Office (CSO)
27. Nastuh Wahid Ahmad, National Capacity Development Officer, Department of Economy, Herat
28. Noori Nastratullah, Finance Associate, UNDP
29. Osmani Farhad Osman, Director General, Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI)
30. Raj Kamal, Ex- Project Manager, NIBP, UNDP, Kabul
31. Rodriguez Alvaro, Country Director, UNDP
32. Sayed khaili Ahmad Zia, Director of SMEs Management and Development Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Industries (MoCI)
33. Spinghar Moheb, General Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)
34. Sultani Samimullah, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAD)
35. Tahiri Basir Ahmad, Director, Department of Ministry of Education

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36. Tokhi Ahmad Masoud, General Director, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)
37. Timory, Shoaib, Assistant Country Director, Sub-National Governance Cluster, UNDP
38. Usui Takaaki, First Secretary, Economic Cooperation Section, Embassy of Japan in Afghanistan
39. Utam Kumar, Senior Advisor, CTAP, Ministry of Commerce and Industries
40. Walizada Yousuf, Finance Associate, UNDP
41. Xue, Yuxue Sr. Deputy Country Director, UNDP
42. Yama Freshta, Program Associate, UNDP
43. Yong, Park Jong, Deputy Resident Representative, Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
44. Zalland Aimal Feroz, Program Officer, UNDP

ANNEXURE VIII: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED AND REVIEWED

1. Capacity Development Plans, CSO, MAIL, and DMoYA
2. Independent Administrative Reform And Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) Strategic & Corporate Implementation Plan 1385 – 1387 (2006 – 2008)
3. Letter Of Agreement Between UNDP & Independent Administrative Reform & Civil Service Commission 2010
4. Letter Of Agreement Between UNDP And Ministry Of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock 2010
5. Letter Of Agreement Between UNDP And Ministry Of Foreign Affairs 2011
6. Memorandum Of Understanding Between Central Statistics Organization And Government Of India 2011
7. Memorandum of Understanding Between Ministry Of Information And Culture Of Afghanistan And Asian Broadcasting Union 2010
8. Memorandum Of Understanding Between Ministry Of Transport & Civil Aviation And Government Of India 2011
9. Memorandum Of Understanding Between The Government Of Afghanistan, Government Of India & UNDP In The Field Of Public Sector Capacity Development Under NIBP 2010
10. Minutes of Project Board Meetings VI, VII
11. National Priority Program 3 (Npp3), Afghanistan Efficient And Effective Government Program Of 2012
12. NIBP report to Japan
13. NIBP Mechanisms Ppp English 2010
14. NIBP Annual Progress Report 2010
15. NIBP Annual Progress Report 2011
16. NIBP Annual Progress Report 2012
17. NIBP Final NIBP Mid-Term Evaluation Report 2012
18. NIBP First Quarterly Project Progress Report 2010
19. NIBP First Quarterly Project Progress Report 2011
20. NIBP First Quarterly Project Progress Report 2012
21. NIBP First Quarterly Project Progress Report 2013
22. NIBP Project Board Meeting Minutes Monday May 23, 2011
23. NIBP Project Document 2010
24. NIBP Second Quarterly Project Progress Report 2010
25. NIBP Second Quarterly Project Progress Report 2011
26. NIBP Second Quarterly Project Progress Report 2012
27. NIBP Second Quarterly Project Progress Report 2013
28. NIBP Third Quarterly Project Progress Report 2010
29. Third Quarterly Project Progress Report 2011
30. Third Quarterly Project Progress Report 2012
31. Third Quarterly Project Progress Report 2013
32. United Nations Development Programme National Institution Building Project Final Evaluation Terms Of Reference 2014
33. UNDAF document
34. UNDP Country Action Plan