Multi-Donor Support for the Democratic Institutions Programme: Terminal Evaluation

MAIN EVALUATION REPORT (FINAL)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This evaluation was conducted in Ethiopia over a relatively short period of three weeks. In order to accomplish the considerable task outlined in the terms of reference, the evaluation team was dependent on the dedication and cooperation of a great many people in Addis Ababa. Chief among these were Eugene Owusu and Samuel Bwalya, who, as Resident Representative and Country Director of UNDP respectively, encouraged our team to be as objective and open in our comments as possible and provided us with sound and thoughtful guidance. They were extremely supportive throughout, and with Bettina Woll, ensured that our team received full cooperation from the staff at UNDP and that we had access to all of the partners involved with this multi-donor programme. Bettina Woll was instrumental in ensuring that the staff at UNDP provided our team with access to all necessary information and data and that our mission’s agenda was properly organised. Without her involvement we would definitely not have achieved our objectives and we are deeply grateful for her dedication.

Thanks are due to Admassu Nebebe Director of UN Agencies and Regional Cooperation at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and his staff for ensuring that relevant institutional partners were available to the evaluation team for interviews along with other stakeholders. All of the seniormost officials of the Implementing Partners met with the evaluation team and provided us with as much of the information that we requested as possible. Their openness and willingness to cooperate is greatly appreciated.

The team met with each of the partners in this multi-donor programme and their willingness to be frank and share as many of their own insights with the evaluators was an essential factor in setting the evaluation on the right track. We hope that we have succeeded in providing them with the insights needed to make a decision on how to proceed with the support to some of the most critically important institutions for Ethiopia’s ongoing journey towards a more open, participatory and accountable system of governance.

Finally, special thanks must go to Dassa Bulcha who accompanied the evaluation team on its visit to Hawassa in order to ensure that our time was spent efficiently. He was also instrumental in ensuring that our agenda was set up for Benishangul Gumuz. Chrysantus Ayangafac (acting head of the Governance Unit of UNDP), Dirk Wagener and Rachel Pell were also all very supportive in ensuring that arrangements were made for the evaluation team and that documentation was collated and submitted to us.
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDINGS

1. The Multi-Donor Democratic Institutions Programme is well aligned with the Government’s stated priorities of broadening and deepening participation, improving accountability of government officials and creating added transparency in governance. The DIP has served to lay the foundations for key democratic institutions that are now beginning to contribute to the achievement of these long-term objectives, which have been restated in current national plans including the PASDEP and the GTP. Any expectations of dramatic political change in the short term on the part of DIP stakeholders, if they exist, are both misplaced and counterproductive. It should be understood that while the government is committed to its stated objectives, it is pursuing them with a view to maintaining stability and a continued trajectory of development and growth for which Ethiopia has come to be known. In light of developments in neighbouring countries, this is not a difficult stance to understand.

2. The UNDP has, through the DIP and other sensitive programmes, developed a level of considerable confidence and trust with government institutions, providing UNDP with a level of access that is perhaps unparalleled.

3. The DIP has produced a number of outputs with major policy implications. To ensure commitment of the donors and to raise their level of comfort and commitment, the government could have done more to organise forums for more open discussion of the use of such outputs.

4. The DIP has contributed to the preparation of enabling legislation, has strengthened the outreach capacity of DIP institutions by strengthening capacity at the federal level, facilitating access and contact at the sub-national level between the public and officials from the federal level, and through the establishment of subsidiary branches of each IP at the regional level. The establishment of regional branches of the IP’s is still underway and in the case of some IP’s remains at a relatively early stage.

5. Capacity has been created at the federal level in each of the IP’s to perform their functions through training, the provision of essential equipment and the payment of operational/recurrent costs through the DIP. The capacity created at the regional level and below has been mixed, and additional attention urgently needs to be paid to strengthening capacity at the sub-national level to implement the mandates of IP’s in full.

6. Outreach capacity of the IP’s has been extended through their operational association with local CSOs. Local CSOs already have limited capacity, but the capacity created in the past through DIP is being lost as a result of the curtailment of DIP funding and new regulations that have been introduced concerning the funding CSOs both from the national budget and foreign organisations.

7. Extensive measures have been taken to raise public awareness of the mandate, role and functions of each of the IP’s with a view to ensuring public demand for their services.

8. The demand for services of each of the IP’s has increased, implying a marked increase in the credibility of the IP’s themselves among the public. Evidence does not exist to be able to definitively link the DIP’s extensive awareness raising public communications programmes to the increase in credibility of the institutions and will need to be collected on a systematic basis in order to make the connection although such a connection is implied.
9. Several IP’s have developed gender strategies for raising the representation of women in their staff and for ensuring ready access for women to their services with DIP support. Some of the IP’s have resulted in very significant representation of women at the seniormost levels (e.g. the in the EIO where each of the Ombudspersons are in fact women). Most of the other IP’s have achieved representation of women of between 25-30 per cent among their staff through quotas and active gender-influenced recruitment.

10. Procurement has been largely local, reducing unit costs, ensuring compliance with government standards and reducing the costs of maintenance. Resources received have been somewhat less than originally planned, but funds actually received have been fully expended and delivery rates have been high.

11. In light of the heavy emphasis on local procurement, however, the value added of UNDP and donor involvement has largely been limited to i) the efficient and accountable management of funds and resources; and ii) added flexibility in the use of such funds. The use of external involvement to access comparative international experience and to adapt alternative models and best practices from abroad has, despite some study tours, unfortunately remained largely underexploited. Procurement procedures have at times – particularly during the first two years of implementation – resulted in delays.

12. Donor funds under the DIP have been largely used as programme support. While steps have been taken to phase out DIP assistance (particularly through the replacement of DIP funds with the national budget), this process has not been sufficiently systematic and was abruptly curtailed with the termination of the programme, reducing sustainability. Although different and higher salary scales have been established for some of the IP’s (such as FEACC, EHRC and EIO), they vary between the IP’s and above all, salaries remain lower than those in the private sector, in foreign aid agencies and even in NGOs. As a result, all of the IP’s continue to experience rapid staff turnover, further reducing sustainability. Local CSO involvement may be a major casualty of the termination of DIP funding and there is a very real chance of a loss of investment made to date. The government has taken steps to counter this loss of sustainability by significantly raising contributions from the national budget to most of the IP’s, by training trainers who can continue develop human resource capacity by preparing manuals and guidelines for the operation of each of the IP’s and by ensuring at least a partial transfer of staff posts away from DIP funding to the national budget.

13. The overall programme structure is complex and multi-layered creating numerous coordination and administrative levels.

14. National Implementation has served to maximise national ownership by ensuring that the IP’s take the lead role in defining priorities and managing programme implementation. The modality has afforded the IP’s with a degree of flexibility and responsiveness that is not available to them with other sources of funding.

15. Monitoring, whether as a result of the loss of institutional memory or otherwise, has been relatively weak. In most instances, indicators of performance that were tracked regularly were activity and output oriented and did not focus on measuring results at the outcome and impact level. Baselines were not sufficiently established at the outset of implementation. For a programme that is largely based on the notion of broadening participation, accountability and transparency, systems to monitor trends in public perception were singularly absent. Although financial monitoring was in line with global standards that have been agreed upon between the UNDP and the EU (the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, or FAFA), some of the donors have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of detail available as for the most part financial reporting has been aggregated to the level of budget components.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Future Cooperation*: In order to consolidate the considerable achievements attained in a relatively short period of time and to prevent a loss of their previous investment, it is recommended to the donors and UNDP that they should consider renewing and reorienting their support to the core democratic institutions of Ethiopia. Such assistance, if it is to be renewed, should be viewed as a separate and new phase, focused on i) consolidating and raising the sustainability of the capacity created at the federal level; ii) on continuing to expand the outreach of democratic institutions at the sub-national level, an endeavour that has begun, but remains incomplete; iii) reinforcing the separation and independence of the individual IP’s; iv) promoting synergies between the IP’s; v) reducing and phasing out dependence on external assistance; v) focusing on the exploitation of the real value added of external assistance; and vi) focusing on strategic activities that are geared to strengthening the core competencies and mandates of the IP’s. Support to the following IP’s should be renewed and continued: HOPR, FEACC, NEBE, EHRC, EIO and OFAG. Support to the HOF has largely achieved its goals and if external assistance should continue to the HOF, it should probably be in the context of supporting the HOF’s role in conflict mitigation and resolution and could more effectively be managed under a separate, more targeted programme.

![Programme Principles](image)

**Figure 1: A Changing the Focus of Future Cooperation**

2. *Exploiting the Value Added of External Cooperation*: The Government of the FDRE should consider better exploiting the latent value added of external assistance as a means of providing exposure for nascent Ethiopian democratic institutions to the experience and best practices of equivalent foreign institutions. Such exposure and learning is best applied through a process of regular and frequent contact, comparing experience, adaptation, mentoring at the seniormost levels and adaptation to the specific needs of Ethiopia. In this respect, one option that may be considered is a twinning arrangement for each IP with one or more similar institutions abroad that are recognised as repositories of best practice. Each IP could be paired with one European or North American Institution and one African, Asian or Latin American institution with a similar mandate. A twinning arrangement with equivalent institutions operating under different development circumstances would provide the IP’s with more varied exposure from which they could pick and choose relevant and applicable approaches and options. Such an arrangement would afford the IP’s with access to a wider array of experts in a cost effective manner than would
be the case if one or two international consultants were to be recruited for a limited period of time. Such an arrangement, which should involve frequent exchanges and continuous communication over the lifetime of the programme, should also require regular review of practices and ways in which to adapt them to the specific conditions of Ethiopia.

3. **Substantive Coordination:** Coordination arrangements for future support to democratic institutions in Ethiopia should focus on substantive exchanges that reinforce the independence of such institutions and their links to elected institutions in addition to the more operational aspects of collaboration. In this respect, two possible alternatives could be considered: i) locating the lead coordination function at the apex of the executive branch of government; or ii) locating the lead coordination function in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, which is the main federal institution for executive oversight and is answerable to the electorate. Additional human resources may be considered along with sufficient added resources to ensure that sufficient capacity exists to take on burden of substantive coordination as necessary. MOFED would, of course, continue to serve as the clearinghouse for external assistance and as the preferred mechanism for the coordination of ODA flows in conjunction with domestic resources and the national budget. Any coordination mechanisms established should not be too unwieldy and should also be designed to facilitate substantive discussion and transparency.

4. **The Role of Milestone Products:** In order to further the growth of the democratic institutions, the design of any future programme should specify from the outset the production of key outputs that can be expected to have a major impact on national and sub-national policies and their implementation. The production of such outputs should be treated as key milestones in the implementation of the programme(s) and should be organised in a manner to generate broad stakeholder dialogue around them in a systematic manner. Such dialogue should be geared to support policy decisions that may be taken by the Ethiopian policy-makers and should be viewed as an integral part of establishing acceptance of democratic institutions in the political and social fabric of Ethiopia. For this reason as broad a range of national stakeholders as possible needs to be mobilised for such dialogue sessions in addition to the national and international partners in this endeavour.

5. **Realigning UNDP’s Role:** It is suggested that the UNDP, as perhaps the most acceptable multilateral channel for donor assistance to programmes of this type, should continue to serve as administrator and manager of the multi-donor programme(s) of assistance. For its part, the UNDP should:

- Continue with its current modality of National Implementation (NIM) as the mechanism that best supports national ownership;
- Focus activities on ensuring that the core, mission-critical functions of each IP can be delivered independently at the federal and regional level in the absence of any external assistance at the end of the next 3-5 year period. This means focusing training, the development of policies, procedures and systems in a more targeted and strategic manner.
- Strengthen and raise the level of its Programme Coordination Unit by appointing a Chief Technical Adviser at a more senior level (L-6 recommended) than in the past with extensive international comparative experience in the establishment of democratic institutions, practices and processes in a range of countries and who can serve as a substantive partner to government units coordinating the programme(s) and the IP’s and can be a substantive adviser to UNDP’s senior management and the senior management of contributing partners to the multi-donor programme(s). The Chief Technical Adviser should view her/himself as an adviser to **ALL** partners involved;
- The Chief Technical Adviser should be supported at the very least by a finance officer and substantive monitoring and evaluation officer who are, between them, capable of ensuring systematic monitoring and reporting on a continuous basis on all aspects of the programme and of managing the administrative and financial aspects of programme implementation;
9. **Improving Access and Accessibility Through Co-Location:** Those key IP’s that are dependent heavily on their interface with the public (viz. EHRC, EIO, FEACC, OFAG and of course, NEBE) need to be located in user-friendly premises that are easily accessed by the public. It is recommended that consideration be given to the co-location of these IP’s in a “House of Democracy” in central locations in Addis Ababa and in each of the regional capitals with a view
to: i) Improving accessibility; ii) Raising the user-friendliness of the IP’s; iii) promoting efficient referral of cases across IP’s; iv) Raising cost-effectiveness through the sharing of facilities and economies of scale; and v) Raising the visibility of the IP’s themselves. The House of Democracy would have a common reception area where trained receptionists receive walk-in clients who are then referred to the most relevant IP. Staff of the appropriate IP, trained to deal with the public and including a high percentage of women, also present on the premises, would receive the client and process their case. Common internet/satellite connections and IT facilities would ensure connectivity between regional branches of the IP’s and their federal counterparts and enable more effective tracking of cases and caseloads. Common logistical and transportation facilities could also be considered to further boost economies of scale.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... 2  
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 3  
FINDINGS ................................................................................................................................ 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................ 5  
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... 9  
LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................. 11  

## PART I: EVALUATION DESIGN .......................................................................................... 12  

### I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 12  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROGRAMME ........................... 12  
II. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION ........................................ 12  
OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................ 12  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF REFERENCE AND THEORY OF CHANGE ............................... 13  
EVALUATION CRITERIA ............................................................................................................ 14  
STAKEHOLDERS ....................................................................................................................... 14  
PRINCIPAL DELIVERABLES ...................................................................................................... 15  
PHASING OF THE EVALUATION ............................................................................................... 15  
EVALUATION TECHNIQUES AND MODALITIES APPLIED .................................................. 16  
VISITS AT THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL .................................................................................... 17  

### II. LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY ................................................................ 18  

## PART II: THE EVALUATION ............................................................................................. 19  

### I. MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN ISSUES ........................................................................ 19  
DISTRIBUTION BY SUB-PROGRAMME .................................................................................... 19  
RELATIVE GEOGRAPHIC EMPHASIS OF THE PROGRAMME .............................................. 20  
WHAT VALUE ADDED DID DIP AS A SINGLE, UMBRELLA PROGRAMME PROVIDE? .......... 21  
THE QUALITY AND FREQUENCY OF MONITORING AND REPORTING ............................... 24  

### II. RELEVANCE ............................................................................................................... 25  
THE INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT ........................................... 25  
ARE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS A NATIONAL PRIORITY? .................................................. 29  

### III. EFFECTIVENESS ....................................................................................................... 32  
DRAFTING OF ENABLING LEGISLATION ............................................................................... 32  
CREATION OF AWARENESS .................................................................................................... 32  
CREATION OF CAPACITY AND THE EXTENSION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES .................. 34  
ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTION .............................................................. 37  
DIP AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR POLICY DIALOGUE .............................................................. 39  

### IV. PROMOTING THE ROLE OF WOMEN ................................................................. 39  

### V. EFFICIENCY ............................................................................................................... 41  
WHAT MODALITIES DID THE PROGRAMME APPLY AND WHAT IMPLICATIONS DID THEY HAVE FOR EFFICIENCY? ............................................................................................................. 41  
TIMELINESS AND RESPONSIVENESS .................................................................................... 42  
WHAT EFFECTS DID THE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE ON EFFICIENCY? ........ 42  

### VI. SUSTAINABILITY ....................................................................................................... 43  

### VII. PARTNERSHIP’S .................................................................................................... 45  

### VIII. MANAGEMENT ISSUES ........................................................................................ 46  
A Complex Management Structure and Its Implications .......................................................... 46  
What Value Added Does The Umbrella Structure Provide? ..................................................... 48  
What Value Added Does UNDP Provide? .................................................................................. 48  
To What Extent Does The DIP Apply DAC Principles Contained in the Paris Declaration? .... 48
### LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>EXTENDED FORM</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFROSAI-E</td>
<td>Organisation of English Speaking African Supreme Audit Institutions</td>
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<td>AWP</td>
<td>Annual Work Plan</td>
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<td>BGNRS</td>
<td>Benishangul Gumuz Regional State</td>
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<td>BOFED</td>
<td>Bureau of Finance and Economic Development</td>
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<td>CBNA</td>
<td>Capacity Building Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>Coordination Programme Unit</td>
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<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DIFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>Direct Implementation</td>
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<td>DIP</td>
<td>Democratic Institutions Programme</td>
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<td>EHRC</td>
<td>Ethiopian Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>EIO</td>
<td>Ethiopian Institution of Ombudsman</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAFA</td>
<td>Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (between the UN and EU)</td>
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<td>FEACC</td>
<td>Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
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<td>GTP</td>
<td>Growth and Transformation Plan</td>
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<td>House of Federation</td>
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<td>HOPR</td>
<td>House of Peoples Representatives</td>
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<td>INTOSAI</td>
<td>International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
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<td>National Bank of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>National Electoral Board of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Implementation</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (of the UN).</td>
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<td>PASDEP</td>
<td>Programme for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to Eradicate Poverty</td>
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Part I: EVALUATION DESIGN

I. INTRODUCTION

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROGRAMME

The Multi-donor Democratic Institutions Programme (DIP) is the principle vehicle for external support to the process of strengthening the key democratic institutions of Ethiopia. Conceived in 2007, following the controversial and at times contentious, aftermath of the 2005 elections, the complex umbrella programme was signed and became effective in 2008. The programme commenced implementation in 2008 with five institutional partners (IP’s). Two additional IP’s (Office of the Federal Attorney General (OFAG) and the National Elections Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) joined in 2009. As of June 2013, the programme had been implemented for a period of five years. Controversy over the way forward has resulted in an extension of the programme pending the outcome of this evaluation.

Under the overall programme, support to the individual constituent institutions (viz. the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HOPR), the House of Federation, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), the Ethiopian Institution of Ombudsman (EIO), the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC), and the Office of the Federal Attorney General (OFAG) at the Federal as well as the sub-national level. The programme structure included an umbrella document outlining the programmatic framework and seven separate sub-programme documents tailored to address the specific development needs of each institution.

Of the original list of donor partners under this programme (see Table 3), USAID, withdrew from the programme in September 2010 and the Netherlands terminated its support towards the end of 2012. The relatively limited contributions from Austria, Denmark, Irish Aid, Italy and OHCHR were fully used up in the first two years of programme implementation and their participation in the programme has been less pronounced since then. The most significant contributors to the DIP have been CIDA, DFID, Norway, and UNDP (Figure 6). In this respect UNDP has been more central to the programme as a result of its key role in the management of the resources channelled to the IP’s than because of the financial contribution it has made through its own core (TRAC) resources.

II. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION

OBJECTIVES

This exercise was commissioned by the UNDP as an independent, terminal evaluation of a five-year programme of assistance to the major democratic institutions in Ethiopia on behalf of the government and all of the donors to the DIP with a view to assessing the achievements and shortcomings of the programme as implemented and to identifying lessons learned. Commissioning of the evaluation does not in itself presage the commitment of donors to a future programme of assistance to any or all of the same institutions. However, this report does contain recommendations in this vein, as it is believed by the evaluation team that achievements to date warrant continued support as part of a longer-term commitment of the donor community to a programme of democratic change envisaged by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE).
A CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF REFERENCE AND THEORY OF CHANGE

The conceptual frame of reference for this evaluation is based on four inter-dependent, strategic, long-term programme goals of the DIP as stated in the original programme document as follows:

1. Ensuring wider participation in governance;
2. Asserting and institutionalising the political rights of citizens;
3. Greater efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of policies; and
4. Ensuring greater accountability and transparency in the implementation of policies and programmes.

The inter-relationship between these broad strategic objectives and the institutional entry points for addressing them under the Democratic Institutions Programme is illustrated in Figure 1. It is assumed that strengthening of the human rights commission and its capacity to inform and raise awareness about the rights of individuals within Ethiopia as well as its ability to study the overall status of human rights within the country and to investigate and support the prosecution of individual cases of human rights violations will both reduce the incidence of such violations and also raise the confidence of the public in the rule of law and state institutions in Ethiopia. Similarly, strengthening of the ombudsman function is intended to reduce the incidence of “maladministration” by the individual officials and state institutions by encouraging whistleblowers and reporting on the part of individuals who feel that they have been victims of unfair or illegal practices. Strengthening of NEBE is intended to ensure that an independent mechanism is created with universal legitimacy to prepare for, to plan and to manage the implementation of free and fair multiparty elections at the local and national level. Support to OFAG and FEACC are intended to increase accountability and transparency in the performance of government functions and to reduce the level and frequency corrupt practices at all levels and in all braches of government. Finally, support to both houses of the national and regional legislatures is intended to increase and broaden participation in decision-making and to provide democratic oversight of the activities of the executive branch of government.

Put together, the strengthening of these institutions is intended to broaden participation, raise equity and perceptions of equity in the distribution of resources, increase transparency and accountability and broaden perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and its institutions among all segments of the population. These long-term objectives, it should be noted, were stated as the development objectives of the programme towards which the shorter-term outcomes level results of the programme activities were to contribute. Although the expected time frame for the achievement of these broad development objectives was never explicitly stated, thereby becoming a source of some confusion, it should be assumed that only the outcome level goals could expect to be achieve during the lifetime of the DIP.
EVALUATION CRITERIA

UNDP’s contribution to the achievement of the broad strategic goals under the Democratic Institutions Programme in Ethiopia were analysed by intended outcome as stipulated in the official terms of reference applying the following general criteria and key evaluative questions in Table 1:

| TABLE 1: UNDP’S CONTRIBUTION BY THEMATIC AREA: -- KEY EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Criterion**     | **Key Evaluative Question**                                      |
| Relevance         | How relevant are the sub-programmes, their outputs and intended outcomes within the context of Ethiopia’s overall political outlook and development, its national plans, the most significant changes and taking place in Ethiopia during the period under review and the overall perception of partners and stakeholders? How effectively was the DIP positioned in order to ensure achievement of the intended results? |
| Effectiveness     | How effective have the DIP’s interventions been in terms of achieving stated goals and the extent to which intended results have been achieved at the output and outcome levels in the case of each of the sub-programmes as well as the DIP as a whole? What specific, gender disaggregated indicators are there to demonstrate change in: i) the level of participation of the public; ii) the strengthening of the political and human rights of individuals; iii) increased effectiveness and efficiency in the development, implementation and enforcement of policies; and iv) the accountability of governance institutions and officials and the transparency of decision-making and management processes? |
| Efficiency        | What is the relative efficiency of DIP interventions in terms of the timeliness and cost effectiveness particularly in terms of human and financial resources used in implementation? Have all of the DIP’s intended outcomes been achieved and if not, why, and what steps may still be taken to achieve the intended results? |
| Sustainability    | Is the capacity that has been created in terms of the ability of target institutions to perform their functions and the systems and processes created sustainable beyond the duration of the DIP’s external programme of assistance? Are the broader results achieved sustainable? Can beneficiary institutions continue to perform their functions effectively and efficiently beyond the duration of DIP assistance? If not, what measures may be adopted to ensure a smooth transition at the end of the programme? |
| Partnership’s     | What partnerships were created with national as well as international institutions? What were the respective roles played and how did each contribute to the achievement of results? What results can be attributed to DIP activities? Was substantive and operational coordination evident and if, so, how effective was it? What were UNDP’s comparative advantages/strengths as perceived by its partners? |

STAKEHOLDERS

The following is a list of the principal stakeholders of the DIP originally targeted for interviews .

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**TABLE 2: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS**

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<td>Human Rights Commission of Ethiopia and Regional Branches</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and Regional Branches</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman and Regional Branches</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocacy CSOs working as contractors/partners in the DIP</td>
<td>Yes (limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>No (nobody with institutional memory available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian Cooperation</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italian Cooperation</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Sub-National Legislative Bodies</td>
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<td>Sub-National Governments</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Council of Nationalities (in SNPPR)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standing Committees of the HOPR</td>
<td>Yes (limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standing Committees of the HOF</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations with a Focus on Advocacy on Human Rights &amp; Transparency</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral observers</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complainants to the EIO, EHRC, FEACC</td>
<td>Yes (very limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other beneficiaries of IP services</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal advice centres and University Law Departments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University researchers/academics analysing Ethiopian political, economic and social trends</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media Association or key media companies (broadcast and press)</td>
<td>Yes (very limited)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PRINCIPAL DELIVERABLES**

Based on the terms of reference, the following were the principal outputs produced by the evaluation team:

- An Inception Report;
- A PowerPoint Presentation for UNDP management, partners and stakeholder briefing(s);
- An Evaluation Brief consisting of the principal conclusions and recommendations; and
- An Evaluation Report;

**PHASING OF THE EVALUATION**

The overall exercise was conducted in four phases (see also Figure 3):
Multi-Donor Democratic Institutions Programme: Terminal Evaluation
Main Evaluation Report

- **Phase I – Preparation**: This phase, undertaken by the country office entailed scoping of the work to be done, preparation of a terms of reference, consultations with partners and recruitment of the consultants.

- **Phase II - Design**: This phase involves a thorough review of relevant documentation by the consultants at their home bases and preparation of the inception report that served to firm up preparations for subsequent phases. *(17-27 October 2013)*.

- **Phase II: Country Visit**: Involved further document and data collection in-country by the evaluation team as well as interviews with partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries. It also involved visits to the sub-national level on a sample basis. At the end of the phase the evaluation team debriefed with the UNDP and key stakeholders (selected in consultation with the UNDP country office) and presented its preliminary findings and draft recommendations. *(28 October – 22 November 2013)*.

- **Phase IV - Report Preparation**: This phase involved further data verification, compilation and analysis and intensive report writing. The Country Office and other partners was presented with a draft report and a final report was prepared and presented incorporating comments received while strictly maintaining the independence of the report. *(23 November-30 December 2013)*.

![Figure 3: Evaluation Phases, Outputs and Activities](image)

**EVALUATION TECHNIQUES AND MODALITIES APPLIED**

The evaluation applied both *meta evaluation* and *direct evaluation* techniques. Meta evaluation entails the use of secondary evaluative information contained in past reviews and evaluations to the extent that they are still relevant and valid. In general, the evaluation was based on individual and group interviews, a thorough review of data, a review of programme documentation including progress reports and evaluations, regular monitoring data, a review of the outputs of the project itself and on a review of reports, plans and legislation of relevance. *Triangulation* – particularly through interviews -- was used to
the extent possible to verify conclusions drawn from the documentation and to verify opinions and information received in interviews.

The following are the main elements of the methodology:

- **Semi-Structured ‘Insider’ Stakeholder Interviews.** Individual Interviews with relevant insider stakeholders under each of the sub-projects. Interviews with agencies and organs of state including all three branches (executive, legislative and judiciary) and at the centre as well as in the regions, UNDP, donors/partners under the programme, etc. (see list list of stakeholders).

- **Semi-Structured “Outsider” Stakeholder Interviews:** In practice, these interviews were limited to the Deputy Speaker and two heads of a standing committee of the HOPR, the Deputy Speaker of the SNPPR and the Chairs of the standing committees of the SNPPR, the Speaker of the House of Nationalities, a mass press organisation and a handful of beneficiaries who had sought advice and support from the EIO. All were interviewed at the regional level. Despite requests for more interviews, they were apparently not possible to arrange.

- **Visits to the Sub-national Level.** The Team visited a sample of 2 regions to assess the results of the programme at the sub-national level.

- **Desk Review of Documentation:** The evaluation team reviewed a large selection of key documentation during the design and country visit phases of the exercise.

**VISITS AT THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL**

In order to assess the results of the DIP more effectively and the way in which the capacity created is functioning in the context of an increasingly decentralised and federal system of governance, the evaluation team visited two regions (provinces) and subsidiary woredas (districts). The regions were selected to ensure the inclusion of:

- Regions with several sub-programmes supported by the DIP;
- At least one region with an ethnically and religiously diverse population;
- A mix of wealthier and poorer regions and/or woredas; and
- Regions that were relatively easily accessed in light of the limited time available.

Based on the above, the following two regions were selected and visited by the evaluation team:

1. **The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region** which is relatively wealthy, comprises 10% of the total area of the country, is administratively divided into 14 zones, Haswassa City Administration, 135 woredas, 5 special woredas and 243 towns, 3,759 rural kebeles and 56 indigenous ethnic groups within it. The region also comprises an estimated 20% of Ethiopia’s total population. The region, with its capital city Hawassa, is granted extensive autonomy including the right to issue its own laws in its legislature, the Regional Council.

2. **Benishangul Gumuz** is categorised as an “emerging region” and receives significant inter-governmental transfers from the centre and wealthier regions. It comprises 3 administrative zones, is made up of 19 woredas out of which two are special woredas (Pawi and Tongo), and 33 ka beles. The capital city is Assosa.

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1 Hawassa City Administration is pegged at the same level as a Zonal Level Administration in the hierarchy of the SNPP.
2 The number of indigenous groups recognized were only 46 at the creation of the SNNP administration. Over time, the HOF has recognized a total of 56.
III. LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team worked within the set institutional framework in Ethiopia. Appointments were made through appropriate channels and as a result the range of secondary beneficiaries that could be interviewed was limited.

Access to Beneficiaries: Any systematic, in-depth evaluation requires an assessment of the perceptions of beneficiaries and an assessment of the impartial views of observers not directly associated with management or implementation of the programme. The evaluation team was unable access secondary beneficiaries in a meaningful way. In the HOPR, the evaluation team only held individual interviews with the Deputy Speaker and two Chairpersons of standing committees, albeit important ones. In the SNPPR, in the Council of People’s Representatives, although the team was able to meet with a wider array of Members of the Legislature, those interviewed were all Chairs of Standing Committees and thus members of the ruling party, the EPRD, raising the question as to whether a wider assortment of members would have provided more varied opinions or not. Group meetings with the media – either those actually involved as part of the public awareness raising strategy of the IP’s or those that are merely observers of the functioning of key democratic institutions was not possible. The evaluation team did, however, meet one representative from a mass media organization in Hawassa. Access to analysts of political developments in academic circles was also not possible to organise in the time available. Requests to meet an assortment of political parties in the context of an evaluation of NEBE were also not fulfilled. In Hawassa, the evaluation team did manage to meet three separate beneficiaries of assistance provided by the EIO.

Baseline Data: The evaluation team was also faced with the uneven collection of baseline data at the outset of the programme in 2008 or that of the sub-programmes in 2008-2010. This was offset through to a large extent through retrospective reconstruction based on institutional memory and the compilation of data available on file in a variety of different reports.

Sampling: In the time available, and given other limitations, the evaluation team had to rely heavily on sampling. As a result, in addition to the federal level, only 2 of 9 regions were visited. Similarly, in the absence of all of the final narrative reports of the project, the evaluation team focussed more on the sample data from one or more of the sub-programmes to extract data and extrapolate conclusions of relevance to the programme as a whole.

Staff Turnover: National institutions, donor agencies and UNDP have all experienced and continue to experience rapid turnover of staff, limiting the institutional memory that could be tapped into.

Record Keeping: Record keeping of narrative performance reports was uneven with numerous gaps in the reports currently available for review by the evaluation team (see Table 5).
I. MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN ISSUES

DISTRIBUTION BY SUB-PROGRAMME

The overall DIP was defined in an umbrella programme comprising a programme coordination unit and seven sub-programmes – one for each implementation partner (IP) – each of which was approved in a sub-programme document. The IP’s were as follows:

1. The House of Peoples’ Representatives (HOPR), or lower house of the Ethiopian Parliament;
2. The House of Federation (HOF) or upper house of the Ethiopian Parliament;
3. The Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC);
4. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC);
5. The Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman (EIO);
6. The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE); and

With the creation of subsidiary branches or corresponding entities at the sub-national level, the programme also channelled funds to the sub-national entities for operational support, awareness raising and capacity building.

Figure 6: Original Budget Allocation by Sub-Programme /US$ and %
The HOPR, or the lower house of parliament, which constitutes the largest and most significant IP and is the main legislative body in the country, received the largest proportion, or 27% of resources. NEBE received 18%, and both the EHRC and EIO received 13% each. The HOPR received as much as the HOF, FEACC and OFAG combined. This is in line with government priorities. Apart from the HOPR and the HOF, all of the IP’s -- the EHRC, the EIO, NEBE, FEACC and OFAG are defined as independent democratic institutions although OFAG, and FEACC are more closely related to the Executive and the EHRC, EIO and NEBE more clearly to the HOPR. Support to the HOPR and HOF has been primarily to their Secretariats. With respect to the latter, although the constitution and the original legislation stipulates a joint secretariat for both houses, in practice, separate secretariats have been created and are supported separately by the DIP.

Total allocations to each of the constituent projects of the Democratic Institutions Programme are provided in Figure 6 and in Table 3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Five-Year Capacity Building Programme for the House of the People’s Representatives and Regional Councils</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>$12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Capacity of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)</td>
<td>Nov 2009</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Capacity of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>$6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Year Capacity Building Programme: Strengthening the Capacity of the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman</td>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>$6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Capacity of Ethiopia’s Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building Project for the House of Federation</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Year Capacity Building Programme: Strengthening the Capacity of the Offices of the Auditor General in Ethiopia</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIP Coordination Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>$951,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Reserve</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$8,991,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>$53,942,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELATIVE GEOGRAPHIC EMPHASIS OF THE PROGRAMME

One of the achievements of the DIP has been to extend the capacity of the IP’s from the Federal to the Regional and in some (exceptional) instances, to the Zonal and Woreda level as well. DIP has provided capacity building and operational support to the regional and sub-regional branches of the Implementing Partners particularly in the last three years of the programme as the federal level institutions established themselves fully. Table 4 provides a partial breakdown of the funds transferred to the sub-national level under DIP. Based on interviews with UNDP staff, it would appear that in general, funds allotted to the regions were directly transferred to the regional branches by UNDP based on a quarterly workplan issued by the IP at the Federal level. The Federal level IP was required to report back on the implementation of the funds transferred both at the Federal and sub-national levels. As is apparent from Table 4, a record for a significant number of the IP’s was not available – either at UNDP or at the IP’s themselves despite repeated efforts by the evaluation team to secure the data. It is essential that such information be maintained in a more systematic manner.
monitoring and oversight of the programme

Several measures were put in place to ensure the required degree of cohesion in management, procedures while ensuring a standardized approach to implementation.

through a single channel (i.e. the UNDP) would simplify reporting requirements and serve to harmonize procedures while ensuring a standardized approach to implementation.

Because of the potential value added of contributing to collaboration between these key institutions and the potential benefits to be achieved through the exploitation of obvious synergies between them, it was felt that from a substantive point of view, a broad programme based approach would be preferable to management under separate, independent projects. It was also felt that structuring of external assistance through a single channel (i.e. the UNDP) would simplify reporting requirements and serve to harmonize procedures while ensuring a standardized approach to implementation.

Several measures were put in place to ensure the required degree of cohesion in management, monitoring and oversight of the programme:

- A coordination committee, consisting of MOFED, all seven IP’s (viz. HOF, HOPR, NEBE, EHRC, FEACC, EIO and OFAG), the five donors contributing the largest share of funds and UNDP;
- A technical committee, composed of MOFED, two donor representatives and representatives of the IP’s (based on the relevance to the agenda);
- A DIP coordinating ministry in the form of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development with a national programme coordinator and support professional staff;
- A DIP coordination unit housed in UNDP consisting of a programme officer, an M&E officer and a finance officer, a programme associate and a programme assistant.
- A national project coordinator in each IP; and

### Table 4: DIP Expenditures at the Regional Level (2008-2012)/Ethiopian Birr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>HOPR*</th>
<th>HOF**</th>
<th>NEBE*</th>
<th>OFAG</th>
<th>EHRC</th>
<th>FEACC*</th>
<th>EIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>1,648,408</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>2,172,806.12</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Use head office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>4,093,417</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,613,901.16</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amhara</td>
<td>15,687,339</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>4,295,360.94</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,532,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bensh. Gum</td>
<td>2,964,713</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,155,043.04</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>About to open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>64,728,817</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>9,833,252.64</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>5,101,407</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dire Dawa</td>
<td>1,003,174</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>920,289.18</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>366,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>2,824,801</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,362,523.92</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Open this year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harari</td>
<td>2,154,031</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>856,357.05</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>About to open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromia</td>
<td>19,629,801</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>7,800,076.94</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>947,970***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNNPR</td>
<td>14,746,873</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>4,357,462.04</td>
<td>2,351,360</td>
<td>742,901****</td>
<td>1,929,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>7,878,137</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>3,535,173.42</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>About to open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>6,478,457</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>2,518,457.75</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>621,983</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>143,837,968</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>40,318,724.20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Excludes direct payments made by UNDP

***Funds transferred directly to the regional level by UNDP

****the figure was obtained from the SNNP Regional Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission

††FEACC did not have a budget earmarked for the regions. Expenditures at the regional level were incurred from the central budget. Figures were not readily available.

‡‡With respect to NEBE all expenditures at the regional level are included in their national headquarters-based budget

General Note: Except the HOPR, OFAG, and to some extent. EIO, other institutions were not clear with regard to expenditures or transfers to the regions.

### What Value Added Did DIP as a Single, Umbrella Programme Provide?

The structuring of the DIP as a single, wide ranging, umbrella programme, encompassing seven implementing partners and one coordinating ministry, the executive and legislative branches of government as well as national and sub-national institutions of state was, from the very outset, an ambitious undertaking.

Because of the potential value added of contributing to collaboration between these key institutions and the potential benefits to be achieved through the exploitation of obvious synergies between them, it was felt that from a substantive point of view, a broad programme based approach would be preferable to management under separate, independent projects. It was also felt that structuring of external assistance through a single channel (i.e. the UNDP) would simplify reporting requirements and serve to harmonize procedures while ensuring a standardized approach to implementation.

Several measures were put in place to ensure the required degree of cohesion in management, monitoring and oversight of the programme:

- A coordination committee, consisting of MOFED, all seven IP’s (viz. HOF, HOPR, NEBE, EHRC, FEACC, EIO and OFAG), the five donors contributing the largest share of funds and UNDP;
- A technical committee, composed of MOFED, two donor representatives and representatives of the IP’s (based on the relevance to the agenda):
- A DIP coordinating ministry in the form of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development with a national programme coordinator and support professional staff;
- A DIP coordination unit housed in UNDP consisting of a programme officer, an M&E officer and a finance officer, a programme associate and a programme assistant.
- A national project coordinator in each IP; and
A *project coordination body* in each IP\(^3\) that consists of the *national project coordinator*, relevant department heads and a representative of the DIP coordination unit. In the case of NEBE, there, an additional unit entitled the *NEBE Programme Steering Committee* chaired by the Deputy Chairperson of NEBE, with members including UNDP, SIDA, DFID, and MoFED. Based on interviews with each of the implementing partners, the consensus appears to be that the various DIP forums served primarily to share information, to plan and to ensure efficient implementation. Professional interactions and relationships between the IP’s themselves was conducted largely outside these forums and were not influenced one way or the other by the existence of the programme-wide management arrangements under the DIP. Interaction was fairly regular – for instance between the EHRC, the HOPR and the EIO or between OFAG, FEACC and the EIO – but was not influenced by the DIP management arrangements – nor could any concrete evidence be found of such instances.

It was repeatedly stated by the IP’s that the principal value added to them of the DIP’s management arrangements was that it provided a unified framework for their financial and substantive progress reporting on the use of DIP funds. Instead of having to produce 11 different reports in 11 different formats, they were able to produce a single report in a unified format that was accepted by all the donors, reducing transaction costs significantly. The same holds true for the donors; they were able to hold a single coordinating ministry and UNDP responsible for reporting on the programme instead of having to chase after 7 reports from 7 different IP’s.

**OPERATIONAL COORDINATION**

The operational coordination mechanisms are described in the foregoing section. Coordination was, as discussed primarily administrative and financial in nature and multi-layered, all decisions being ultimately channelled through MOFED and UNDP. By virtue of its positioning, all requests for advances from the IP’s that involved reallocation of the budget were cleared first by MOFED before reaching UNDP. This served to ensure financial accountability and compliance with government and UNDP procedures, but may also have served to dampen the range and substantive nature of the dialogue between the partners involved in the DIP (i.e. the IP’s and the donors). The size of the coordination committee and the technical committees may also have in some way compromised opportunities for substantive dialogue, focusing it instead on operational issues, it also no doubt ensured that virtually all of the committees established

\(^3\) NEBE has requested that the evaluation team specify that in its case, this coordination body was called a Programme Management Unit and consisted of a Programme Coordinator, Programme Officer, NEBE secretariat management and departments and other relevant staff.
were attended primarily at the technical level (this is borne out by records of the attendance at CC and TC meetings).

Furthermore, although there is no indication that MOFED may have compromised the independence of the IP’s, its role in coordination did nothing to enhance independence of the IP’s or reinforcement the separation between the legislative organs of the state and those institutions that report to it on a regular basis and the executive organs of state over which the legislative branch is supposed to exert oversight. Any future phase of support to the key democratic institutions should, in addition to administrative and financial coordination, cater to substantive coordination where the substantive implications of outputs can be discussed and the lead role for coordination on the national side should lie in the hands of a centrally important IP in the legislative branch – most appropriately the HOPR.

IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES

DIP, was implemented using UNDP’s modality of national implementation (NIM). In practice, the vast bulk of activities were implemented using the advance payment system, in some instances, where urgent needs had to be addressed, activities were implemented on a reimbursement basis. In exceptional cases – especially those that involved expenditures in foreign currency such as for the procurement of international consultants or certain types of equipment, direct payments were effected by UNDP, but there were important differences in the way in which NIM was implemented between the sub-programmes, reflecting differences in capacity. In some cases the advance payment modality was applied, while in others, the direct payment modality was used. These sub-modalities are characterised as follows:

- **Advance Payment:** Involves all procurement and payments being managed by the implementation partner. The IP issues an Annual Work Plan (AWP) at the beginning of the year or at the end of the prior year. The AWP is reviewed and approved by MOFED and then UNDP (and by the Technical Committee as well). At the beginning of each quarter, a quarterly advance is issued by UNDP based on a statement of intended activities that are in accordance with the AWP. In instances in which delivery exceeded expectations, advances were issued by UNDP even before the end of the quarter. Advance payment is effected based on a review of both the AWP and programme documentation and is dependent also on successful delivery of the planned activities in the prior quarter. All project activities are managed by the IP and payments purchases and services rendered are effected by the IP.

- **Direct Payment:** Under this modality, payments for activities are effected directly by UNDP for activities that are implemented by the IP in accordance with the AWP and quarterly statements of activities by the IP. Funds are not managed by the IP and are handled directly by the UNDP, but all selection and contracting processes associated with procurement are handled directly by the IP with only general oversight by UNDP. UNDP issues payments directly to the supplier based on a request submitted to it by the IP. This modality was generally opted for in cases where contracting entailed the use of foreign currency.

- **Reimbursement:** In this instance, unforeseen expenditures incurred and settled by the IP in connection with planned activities are reimbursed by UNDP upon presentation of receipts and a payment request from the IP.

All expenditures are verified by Programme Implementation Support Officers (PISOs) located at UNDP who are called on periodically to verify items paid for on an item-by-item basis. In general, the modality is intended to maximise national ownership of the substantive products and the use of three modes of operation is intended to introduce added flexibility and efficiency into the system.

The IP’s indicated unanimously that they were extremely pleased with the responsiveness and flexibility of NIM and compared UNDP favourably with government. There are indications however, that there were significant delays incurred in the first two years of implementation as IP’s had to become progressively more familiar with the modalities involved and as they established their own capacity. Subsequently there
were delays resulting primarily under government procurement procedures and this is reflected in the carryover of funds from one quarter into the next. Delays were also sometimes incurred in payments because of insufficient documentation under the direct payment modality (this was generally rectified and payments issued as required). IP’s were reluctant to admit these issues to the evaluation team as they may have assumed that the findings of the evaluation would determine in (small) part the likelihood of future funding.

### THE QUALITY AND FREQUENCY OF MONITORING AND REPORTING

Monitoring of the DIP could be considerably strengthened. Indicators at the outcome and impact levels were not always identified and baselines were not established at the very outset of implementation. In some instances, attempts were made to retroactively construct baselines. It was assumed by the evaluation team that the sub-programme for each IP was required to produce two semi annual narrative reports of programme performance per year and one final report at the end of implementation. In practice, the evaluation team found the narrative reports that were available to be activity and output, rather than outcome and impact based, and although the evaluation team was assured by MOFED that reports had been systematically produced by all of the IP’s and forwarded to the UNDP, the evaluation team was unable, despite repeated attempts, to secure a number of reports (see the red and yellow cells in Table 5). The yellow cells indicate the existence of special reports (i.e. not semi-annual progress reports).

| Bi-Annual Progress Reports Located and Other Key Monitoring Reports |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| IP                          | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Final Reports |
| HOPR                        |      |      |      |      |      |      | Yes           |
| HOF                         |      |      |      |      |      |      | Yes           |
| NEBE                        |      |      |      | -    | Annual report, 2012 |      | Yes           |
| OFAG                        | Report on Staff recruited | OFAG Major Results Report |      | 2012 – 2013 Audit coverage | Yes |
| EHRC                        |      |      | Final Election Report (2010) |      |      | Yes |

**TABLE 5 : LIST OF MONITORING REPORTS RECEIVED BY THE EVALUATION TEAM**
A so-called “monitoring and evaluation framework” was prepared with the assistance of a consultant in March 2010. It is, however, far too vague a document to be taken seriously and seems to focus on explaining what M&E is about rather than constructing a DIP-specific series of outcome indicators and establishing mechanisms for collecting, compiling and analysing them. The document, which is only available in draft, also outlines a series of periodic reports to various stakeholders/coordination groups, but there is no indication that any such reporting regime was ever institutionalised.

A separate and apparently roughly simultaneous consultancy was carried out in February-March 2010. Billed as a “Democratic Institutions Programme Capacity Assessment and Development Consultancy”, it was based on a collaborative workshop with DIP staff and identified indicators or performance that could measure capacity and capacity development in each of the IP’s. Most of the indicators identified track regular products that the IP’s should be producing. While several of the outputs identified are mentioned in subsequent progress reports, there is no indication that they were used as indicators of capacity development in a systematic manner. Furthermore, for credible indicators of capacity development to be used, it is clear that a broader definition of capacity needs to be applied and indicators constructed accordingly. To capture current definitions of capacity development, such indicators must capture:

- Human resource skills, competencies and capabilities (including levels of education and training in the core competencies required by the IP concerned);
- The processes and systems established to perform the functions concerned;
- Broader organizational factors such as positioning, independence, reliability of funding; and
- Factors affecting sustainability including, but not limited to, salary scales, benefits, financial and non-financial incentives and the retention of personnel.

Financial reporting is conducted on a quarterly basis and in line with the quarterly advances that were issued to each sub-programme (for each IP) and their format is in accordance with FAFA requirements. It was argued by several donors, however, that component based reporting of expenditures was not detailed enough to fulfil their own reporting requirements to their home offices. Furthermore, it appears that a record of whether the funds were utilised at the central level or at sub-national branches was maintained systematically only by HOPR and OFAG. The evaluation team in consultation with EIO staff extracted data at the EIO. All of the financial data should be the subject of a detailed financial audit if its accuracy is to be verified.

II. RELEVANCE

THE INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The current constitution of Ethiopia is enshrined in a proclamation issued in 1995. In the same year, the Secretariat of the House of People’s Representatives (HOPR) and of the House of the Federation (HOF) were established. The relevant proclamation provided for the establishment of a joint Secretariat for both houses, with the Head of the Secretariat being elected by members of parliament and responsible to Speakers of both houses. Since then, in practice, each house has established its own, independent secretariat, each of which is supported by the Democratic Institutions Programme (DIP).

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4 Democratic Institutions Programme, Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (Draft), March 2010.
5 UNDP, Democratic Institutions Programme: Capacity Assessment and Development Consultancy, Implementing Partners Capacity Assessment Report, by Peter Reed and Yaw Adu-Boahene, Addis Ababa, March 2010
1995 also saw a “Proclamation on the Legislative Procedure of the House of Peoples’ Representatives”\(^8\) which established the standing committees as well as the procedure for the initiation, consideration and ratification of legislation and oversight of the implementation of national plans and policies.

An Amended Electoral Law issued in 2007\(^9\) formally established the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) with nine members, each appointed for a five-year term with a term limit of two terms by the House of People’s Representatives upon recommendation by the Prime Minister. The proclamation established the wide-ranging duties of the electoral board, which includes both administration of all elections and the hearing and investigation of claims of irregularities in elections. It also specifies the roles and functions of all units within the national institutional infrastructure established to administer elections down to the most local (Kabele) level, providing them each with clear functions and responsibilities.

An amendment of an earlier proclamation in 2010 institutionalised the Office of the Federal Auditor General (OFAG) in 2010\(^10\), re-establishing it “… as an autonomous body of the federal government”. The Federal Auditor General and two Deputy Federal Auditors General are appointed by the HOPR upon recommendation by the Prime Minister for a term of 6 years each with a term limit of two terms. The proclamation states that the “Federal Auditor General shall be accountable to the House of People’s Representatives and between sessions, shall be accountable to the President of the Federal Republic”. It goes on to require the Auditor General to be “neutral from any political party”.

The establishment of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was mandated in Article 55(14) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which came into force on 21 August 1995. In practice, the Eritrean/Ethiopian war in intervening years diverted from establishment of the EHRC until July 2000, when Parliament issued Proclamation 210/2000\(^11\), which established the Commission, defining its mandate and powers. In July 2004, Parliament, following a procedure that included public consultations, nominated the Chief Commissioner, and in July 2005 a deputy Chief Commissioner and Commissioner for Children’s and Women’s Rights. With the appointment of the latter two Commissioners, the Commission was able to constitute a Council of Commissioners and began the operations of the EHRC. Proclamation 210/2000 established the EHRC “as an autonomous organ of the Federal Government having its own juridical personality” and stated that the “Commission shall be accountable to the House” (the HOPR). It goes on to require the EHRC to raise public awareness of human rights and to see that human rights are “protected, respected and fully enforced as well as to have the necessary measures taken where they are found to have been violated”. It also empowers the EHRC to ensure that laws, regulations and directives as well as government decisions and orders do not contravene the human rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution\(^12\). In this context it empowers the EHRC to investigate cases based on complaints or its own initiation and make recommendations for the revision of existing laws, enactment of new laws and formulation of policies and to report to international human rights forums.

The Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman is established in Article 55(15) of the Constitution. In 2000, enabling legislation for the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman (EIO) was passed in the form of Parliamentary Proclamation 211/2000\(^12\), establishing the main function of the EIO as the prevention and rectification of “maladministration” and thus the promotion of good governance. Proclamation 590/2008 on implementation of the freedom of information provides an additional basis for the work of EIO.

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Chief Ombudsperson and the Deputy Chief Ombudsperson were appointed in 2004 and 2005 respectively following a procedure that included public consultations, and the Ombudsperson for Children and Women was also appointed in 2005 (all of whom are currently women). Proclamation 211/2000 empowers the EIO to “supervise that administrative directives issued, and decisions given, by executive organs and the practices thereof do not contravene the constitutional rights of citizens and the law”, to “receive and investigate complaints in respect of maladministration”, “ensure that the executive carries out its functions in accordance with the law ... preventing maladministration”, “seek remedies” where it believes maladministration has occurred, “undertake studies and research on ways and means of curbing maladministration”, “make recommendations for the revision of existing laws, practices or directives and for the enactment of new laws and formulation of policies, with a view to bringing about better governance” The EIO, however was prohibited from investigating or has no power to investigate decisions by Councils established by election in their legislative capacity, cases pending in the courts, matters under investigation by OFAG or decisions issued by Security Forces and units of the Defence Forces, with regard to matters of national security or defence.

The Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) was established in 2005 under Proclamation No. 433/2005, as an “independent Federal Government body”, accountable to the Prime Minister, but “free from any interference or direction by any person with regard to cases under investigation or prosecution or to be investigated or prosecuted”. The mandate of FEACC is to raise awareness of corruption and ethics in government, to investigate or “cause the investigation of” any complaints of “alleged or suspected serious breaches of the codes of ethics in public offices or public enterprises” and “follow up the taking of proper measures”. The proclamation gives FEACC the mandate to register the assets and financial interests of public officials and “to freeze, by court order, the assets of any person who may be under investigation for corruption and cause, through court order, the forfeiture of any assets and wealth obtained by corruption or its equivalent to the state or dispose same (sic) by or without public auction”.

A Proclamation to Provide Freedom to the Mass Media and Access to Information in 2008 reasserts the provisions in the constitution on freedom of the press. Stating “The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, guarantees freedom of expression and of the mass media... by prohibiting censorship, the Constitution promotes a free mass media”. It then goes on to state “restrictions on freedom of expression and of the mass media shall only be based on laws which secure and preserve the wellbeing of the (sic) youth, honour and reputation of persons, national security, public order and other overriding rights”.

Despite these important institutional reforms, two developments illustrate the government’s intention to introduce democratic reforms without raising the spectre of instability seen with the rapid and uncontrolled changes that have taken place recently in other countries — most notably in the Middle East and North Africa.

The first is the introduction of the Anti-terrorism Law of 2009. It is argued by critics of the legislation that, article 6 of this proclamation constitutes a curb on the press; “Whosoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism stipulated under Article 3 of this Proclamation is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 20 years”.

Critiques of this law focus on the vague definition of terrorism contained in article 3 which, its is argued, is too open to interpretation and arbitrary application, and that the punishments contained in article 4, 5 and 6 for individuals who take part in an act of “terrorism” are overly harsh. Organizations can be classified as terrorist too easily in accordance with articles 2.4 and 25, and provisions for the detention of suspected terrorists too easily.

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terrorists imply a very low burden of proof. In terms of harshness, Article 19.1 accords up to 20 years in prison or the death penalty for those determined to be terrorists. The law is seen by its critics to be, depending on its interpretation, as a potential curb on the freedom of speech and expression.

The second such development has been the government’s recent introduction of legislation to regulate civil society. On January 6, 2009, the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 of Ethiopia (Civil Society Law or CSO law) was enacted. It came into effect on January 6, 2010. Although its preamble states that the CSO law is aimed at ensuring “the realization of citizens’ rights to association enshrined in the constitution... as well as ...to aid and facilitate the role of [civil society] in the overall development of the Ethiopian people,” key provisions of the proclamation have severely weakened the work of independent civil society organizations, particularly human rights defenders and advocates of democratic governance. One particular provision of the CSO law prohibits foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from engaging in activities pertaining to human rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, rights of people with disability, citizenship rights, conflict resolution and democratic governance. The Government of Ethiopia views these activities as being within its own sovereign powers and those of its citizens (as individuals and as a group) and must involve and be financed by Ethiopians. The new law also stipulates that national NGOs that receive more than ten percent of their funding from foreign sources are to be classified as “foreign”. As the vast majority of domestic human rights NGOs in Ethiopia receive the bulk of their funds from foreign sources, the new CSO law has forced them to either close their doors or drastically reduce their scope of work.

Despite the government’s perspective on civil society organizations, the anti-terrorism provisions and the press, Ethiopia continues to also take steps that demonstrate a commitment to broaden inclusion in decision-making and to empower minorities.

Following a cabinet reshuffle in July 2013, each of the parties in the coalition were accorded at least one deputy prime ministerial post and similar sectors are clustered into one leadership. The objective is to broaden the leadership base. Furthermore, the current Prime Minister reshuffled his cabinet in July 2013, in which the division of power and the new assignments, it could be argued, resulted in an added focus on development and good governance. Furthermore, the institutions supported by the DIP can be said to reinforce and broaden participation by ethnic groups and nationalities in national decision-making (viz. the HOF, HOPR and NEBE) while at the same time providing mechanisms for the public to convey and seek resolution for their concerns and complaints including against the authorities (EOI, EHRC and FEACC).

Radical political change, however, is unlikely to take place any time soon. The government is committed to incremental and steady, if not highly controlled, change. Furthermore, opposition parties remain severely underfunded and under-resourced. They lack strong leaders and are prone to internal schisms. Most importantly, they do not have the infrastructure required to mount a nationwide campaign. It is therefore almost certain that the EPRDF will be returned to power in the 2015 elections.

The Ethiopian government follows a state-driven development model; in light of this, donor have reduced their financing and the government is likely to face some difficulty in raising the requisite funding for the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (2010-15). To date, the government has raised financing for the GTP from tax revenues and the issuance of domestic debt instruments, central bank financing through monetary policy and encouragement of Ethiopian private banks to purchase Treasury bills. This policy has, as might be expected, fuelled inflation and may be unsustainable in the long run, although inflation has fallen somewhat in the first half of 2013. It is that in the medium to long term this continued policy will require the government to curb spending, introducing contractionary policies so as to rein in inflation and/or return to the IMF for financing and accept its contractionary policy prescriptions.

Ethiopia is, as a result, expected to continue to run fiscal deficits that risk creating macro-economic imbalances following several years of rapid growth. According to the state minister of MOFED, Ethiopia will boost spending by 12%, to Birr159.4bn (US$8.5bn) in the fiscal year beginning July 8th, with approximately one-third of the total being allocated to the upgrading of the road network. Details remain scarce, it is understood that MOFED’s intention is to focus expenditure on infrastructure, human-resources development and basic services. The government views infrastructure as a catalyst for economic activity and expenditure on infrastructure is therefore seen as being in line with its focus on pro-
poor projects. Although there is progress in the achievement of the MDGs (Ethiopia is going to achieve six of the eight MDGs by 2015), the country has ranked low in the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index. The GTP thus focuses on Human Development. According to the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, external sources will account for about one-fifth of the 2013/14 budget, and it is clear that the government aims for the time being to at least maintain current levels of public investment -- which, according to the World Bank, is, at 19% of GDP, the third highest in the world.

The government is implementing reforms that serve to broaden and deepen its revenue base as a share of the GDP\textsuperscript{15}. In this respect, the national revenue institution, the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority, implements measures to broaden the tax base, improve compliance and reduce evasion. Nonetheless, the budget deficit will remain as revenue growth is likely to fail to keep pace with public spending in the absence of cuts on the expenditure side. The deficit may continue to be financed from external borrowing and cheaper domestic borrowing and the government will continue selling T-bills to commercial banks at low, and perhaps even negative, real interest rates.

According to the CSA Report of 2012, inflation slowed to 22.9% in 2012, from 33.1% in 2011. A further slowdown, to an average of 8.4%, is expected in 2013. The reasons for this are that the international food and fuel prices will possibly moderate and that there will be a solid increase in the primary harvest, which should exert downward pressure on domestic prices. Critics of government policy, however, argue that fiscal deficits, weak monetary policy, particularly if the NBE resumes direct financing of the government, and a depreciating exchange rate will keep inflationary pressures high. According to this view higher international food and industrial raw material prices will add to the above pressures. Inflation will therefore remain a major challenge for monetary policy.

Since the end of 2010 the NBE has said that it is adopting a low reserve-money growth target. This strategy is designed to address the problems of excess liquidity and demonetisation. There have been two main barriers to the efficiency of monetary policy: negative real interest rates, which limits demand for government bonds and T-bills; and direct central bank financing of the government deficit, which may be inflationary. The NBE's direct financing of the government is expected to resume in 2014, which could raise inflationary expectations and add to macroeconomic imbalances. This is partly because the government prefers to spend resources on development rather than to build up reserves.

All this would render it more difficult for the government to accelerate phasing out policies on major programmes that would render them more sustainable although it has demonstrated a commitment to reduce its dependence on external funding of its development budget and recurrent costs in particular. From the point of view of supply, however, instability in the Horn of Africa, the geopolitical location of Ethiopia and its substantial population of 77 million are factors likely to result in continued significant flows of ODA to Ethiopia for the foreseeable future as well as continued commitment of the donors to Ethiopia's development and institutional reforms.

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**ARE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS A NATIONAL PRIORITY?**

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| TABLE 6: RELEVANCE TO CURRENT NATIONAL PLANS AND LEGISLATION |
|---|---|---|
| IP | Legislation | PASDEP | GTP |
| EHRC | - EHRC Establishment Procl. 210/1992 | - Identified as key institution of democratization | - Build institutional capacity of EHRC |
| | - Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall | - Assess human rights violations and advise the government on human, political, economic, social | - Assess human rights violations and advise the government on human, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the |

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\textsuperscript{15} According to the World Bank, the performance declined from more than 20% in 2003/04 to less than 17% in 2011/12. However, the performance has to be viewed from the broad-base economic performance and growth dividends in 2011/12.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>PASDEP</th>
<th>GTP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be determined by law.</td>
<td>and cultural rights of the people of Ethiopia</td>
<td>people of Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 13) - All Federal and State legislative, executive and judicial organs at all levels shall have the responsibility and duty to respect and enforce the provisions of this Chapter; The fundamental rights and freedoms specified in this Chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIO</td>
<td>- Establishment of EIO Procl. 211/2000</td>
<td>- Identified as key institution of democratization</td>
<td>- Compliance of civil servants and public officials with the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Freedom of Mass Media and Access to Information Procl. 590/2008</td>
<td>- Compliance of civil servants and public officials with the law</td>
<td>- Build institutional capacity of the EIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall be determined by law.</td>
<td>- Build institutional capacity of the EIO</td>
<td>- Implement Freedom of Mass Media and Access to Information Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall be determined by law.</td>
<td>- Assess administration malpractices and gaps in national laws of Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEACC</td>
<td>- Revised FEACC Establishment Procl. 433/2005</td>
<td>- Identified as key institution of democratization</td>
<td>- Ensuring transparency and combating corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall be determined by law.</td>
<td>- Build institutional capacity of, ethics and anti-corruption</td>
<td>- Build institutional capacity of, ethics and anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall be determined by law.</td>
<td>- Develop anti-corruption strategy</td>
<td>- Develop anti-corruption strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall be determined by law.</td>
<td>- Registration of civil servants’ assets,</td>
<td>- Registration of civil servants’ assets,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAG</td>
<td>- Establishment of OFAG, amended proclamation 669/2010</td>
<td>- Build capacity of Federal and regional states OFAGs to ensure that audit coverage and quality improved; audit backlog reduced</td>
<td>- Establishing a more transparent, accountable, efficient and effective governmental financial management system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall be determined by law.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Build institutional capacity of customs and revenue, and, auditor general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 12) - The conduct of affairs of government shall be transparent; Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties; In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative; The particulars of recall shall be determined by law.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HOF</td>
<td>- Establishment of the Secretariat of HOF and HOPR proclamation 13/1995 (Later by Council of Ministers Directive, separate Secretariat were formed)</td>
<td>- Protect the rights of nations and nationalities of Ethiopia as per Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution</td>
<td>- Protect the rights of nations and nationalities of Ethiopia as per Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ensure equitable distribution of national wealth to the people of Ethiopia by drafting equitable grant allocation formula</td>
<td>- Ensure equitable distribution of national wealth to the people of Ethiopia by drafting equitable grant allocation formula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Solve conflicts among communities including by referendums</td>
<td>- Solve conflicts among communities including by referendums</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Interpret the</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE 6: RELEVANCE TO CURRENT NATIONAL PLANS AND LEGISLATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>PASDEP</th>
<th>GTP</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>disagreements on constitutional provisions</td>
<td>-Interpret the disagreements on constitutional provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPR</td>
<td>- Establishment of the Secretariat of HOF and HOPR proclamation 13/1995 (Later by Council of Ministers Directive, separate Secretariats were formed for each house).</td>
<td>- Enhance capacity of MPs, Parliament and political institutions</td>
<td>- Enhance capacity of MPs, Parliament and political institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Enhance Standing Committees and federal and regional law making bodies</td>
<td>- Enhance Standing Committees and federal and regional law making bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Enhance the capacity of policy formulation, legislative drafting, parliamentary working procedures, oversight functions and the role of MPs and political parties</td>
<td>- Enhance the capacity of policy formulation, legislative drafting, parliamentary working procedures, oversight functions and the role of MPs and political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Amended Electoral Law Procl. 532/2007</td>
<td>- Ensure direct democratic participation of citizens</td>
<td>- Ensure direct democratic participation of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethiopian Constitution (Article 8) - Their sovereignty shall be expressed through their representatives elected in accordance with this Constitution and through their direct democratic participation</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ensure free and fair elections via universal standards as applied to Ethiopian context</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the constitution and enabling legislation in the form of Proclamations and Acts (covered in Table.... above and in the foregoing section on Institutional, Political and Economic Context), the current national priorities of Ethiopia are formally stated in two documents: i) The Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/2011-2014/2015 (GTP); and ii) The Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). Conformity of the DIP with the priorities of the Government is summarized in Table 6, which is self-explanatory and quotes the relevant statements in each document. Relevant legislation is also explained in greater detail in the section on Economic and Political Context in Part 1 of this report.

Based on the statements in both documents and legislation passed by the HOPR, there should be no doubt that assistance provided by the donors under the DIP is clearly aligned with the priorities of the government and that the government is committed to broadening participation through key democratic institutions. Furthermore, it is clear that through the DIP the participating donors are supporting all of the institutions viewed as top priority by the Ethiopian Government in this endeavour. One can therefore argue that the programme is well aligned with national priorities and is very relevant to current national development plans. It is clear however that expectations of the various partners involved in the DIP vary considerably. The programme is inherently political and entails shifts in the relationshiP’s between branches of government, between the centre and the sub-national levels, between elected bodies and the executive and between the public, civil society and the state. In a nation that has gone through painful conflict, the government is naturally reluctant to allow such changes to take place too rapidly and in a haphazard manner. It should be expected that this process will be incremental although with the establishment and public recognition of the role of the key democratic institutions supported under the DIP, momentum will inevitably increase based on growing demand for broad participation from the public. The Government appears to welcome this as long as it is not destabilizing. The role of each of the IP’s is indeed to ensure that mechanisms, systems and processes are created to ensure widened participation in an orderly manner. There is no doubt that the DIP is achieving this in an incremental and in the view of the evaluation team, a surprisingly rapid manner. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the IP’s supported under the programme constitute the most promising institutions to spearhead long-term democratic reforms.
III. EFFECTIVENESS
Aggregate achievements under DIP may be broken down into the following categories:

1. Drafting of enabling legislation
2. Creation of awareness
3. Creation of capacity and extension of professional services
4. Establishing credibility as an institution.

DRAFTING OF ENABLING LEGISLATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Legislations drafted</th>
<th>Legislations approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEAC</td>
<td>- Disclosure and Registration of Asset Procl. 668/2010</td>
<td>- Disclosure and Registration of Assets Procl. 668/2010 Protection of witnesses and whistleblowers of criminal offences Procl. 669/210 - Anti-corruption law provisions that were included in various laws have been identified and consolidated to the anti-corruption law - Law on protection of whistle-blowers and witnesses was drafted and enacted - Anti-corruption policy is drafted and provided to the executive for enactment - Anti-corruption law for the offences of the private sector under preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOF</td>
<td>- Consolidated National Budget and Federal Grant Allocation Formula</td>
<td>- Consolidated National Budget and Federal Grant Allocation Formula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPR</td>
<td>- Procedures, Guidelines and Manuals</td>
<td>- Procedures, Guidelines and Manuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBE</td>
<td>- Electoral Compendium, manuals and guidelines</td>
<td>- Electoral Compendium, manuals and guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAG</td>
<td>- Amended Duties and Responsibilities (Procl 669/2010)</td>
<td>- Amended Proclamation No. 669/2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As part of the firm establishment the IP’s into the institutional infrastructure of Ethiopia, each of the IP’s contributed to either the original drafting or revision of their founding legislation and/or participated in the preparation of other documents that formally established their current mandate, role and functions and secured approval/ratification from the legislature, thereby ensuring that their existence was fully institutionalised. (See Table 7 above and also the section on Institutional, Political and Economic Context.) In most instances, the legislation was not initiated by the IP’s but the staff of the IP’s contributed to draft versions.

CREATION OF AWARENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Awareness creation workshops and training of trainers courses conducted</th>
<th>Media programmes broadcast or transmitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- 15 minute radio programmes broadcast for 3 months; forum debates broadcast by radio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| EIO    | - 3,453,165 participated in workshop and forums from region to Kebele levels involving 3,457 TOTs (2,510 men & 947 women) - 2,682,860 (7,987,65 women and 1,884,095 men) participated in good governance training | - 48 spot announcements by ETV; 20 minute documentary on administrative complaints by ETV; -Talk shows by ETV on duties and responsibilities of
| **Multi-Donor Democratic Institutions Programme: Terminal Evaluation**
| **Main Evaluation Report** |

| **FEACC** | - Awareness raising sessions conducted using face-to-face, T.V., radio, and print with radio coverage of 94.2% of the country and T.V. 77.5% of the country
- Several hundred electronic media broadcasts
- Publication of several of articles in different newspaper and other major institutions' internal publications
- Billboards and banners disseminated and displayed publicly across the country |
| **HOF** | - International experience sharing and study tours conducted for staff
- Nations and nationalities day celebrated each year from local to federal levels
- The grant formula explained on Ethiopian TV and radio broadcasts and print media
- Nations and nationalities day celebration transmitted by all media
- Grant sharing formula (GSF); and Representative Tax System (RTS) finalized and disseminated |
| **HOPR** | - Training in parliamentary laws, procedures and manuals for parliamentarians
- Training on oversight and gender issues for parliamentarians
- Training in computer skills provided to parliamentarians
- 2,200 New MPs received three day training and 462 standing committee members received training on the role of standing committees
- Computer terminals and facilities established at 12 selected sites accessible to MPs |
| **NEBE** | - 4,500 copies of electoral compendium published and disseminated
- 85% voters covered with civic and voter education using regional, federal and private TV and radio broadcasts and print media
- 135 (122 men and 13 women) government communications personnel and journalists took one day workshop on election reporting |

| **EIO; rights of citizens; etc.** | - Impact survey involving a sample of 2,577; 62.5% ethical behaviour has is more prevalent; 53.5% believe that FEAC has served to reduce/prevent corruption
- Three surveys made of ethics education,
- 87.5% found to be in favour of face-to-face training
- 4,746,752 officials and government employees received sensitization training.
- TOTs increased; 131,035 ethics and anticorruption officers assigned in government and public institutions received TOT training.
- 230,308 ethics and anticorruption volunteers received training and engaged in advancing ethics and anticorruption campaigns
- 2,718,100 magazines, posters, brochures, flyers disseminated
- Radio and television programmes “reached millions” across the country |
| **HOF** | - 104 question and answer radio programmes in numerous local languages, 52 comics and animated cartoon films (TV magazine shows also translated into four languages)
- 20,000 TOT Training manuals on the constitution printed in three languages and distributed to schools and Regional State Education Bureaux
- HOF printed and distributed 703,000 copies of the FDRE Constitution in various local languages
- 2,000 constitutions printed and distributed in Braille to Federal and Regional educational institutions and libraries of Regional State Councils
- Weekly TV shows, radio programmes and SMS communication |
| **HOPR** | - Daily 1 hour TV and radio programmes
- 50% of DIP support allocated to regional councils - After 2nd year, annual transfers increased to 60 – 70%
- Parliamentary laws, procedures and manuals published and disseminated to regional councils
- 7,300 officials from local regional councils trained
- 2,441 trained on separation of power
- 3,000 trained in leadership skills |
| **NEBE** | - 4,000 copies of civic and voter education manual published and distributed in Amharic, English, Oromigna, Tigrigna, Sidamigna, Hadiyigna, Wolaitigna, Kambatigna, Kaffigna, Somaligna, Afarigna, Meetings and conferences involving a sample of 5,000; 60.5% believe that FEAC has served to reduce/prevent corruption
- Three surveys made of civic education
- 87.5% found to be in favour of face-to-face training
- 4,746,752 officials and government employees received sensitization training.
- TOTs increased; 131,035 ethics and anticorruption officers assigned in government and public institutions received TOT training.
- 230,308 ethics and anticorruption volunteers received training and engaged in advancing ethics and anticorruption campaigns
- 2,718,100 magazines, posters, brochures, flyers disseminated
- Radio and television programmes “reached millions” across the country |

**Page | 33**
Very significant resources have been accorded to raising the awareness of the public as well as government officials of the mandate, functions, responsibilities and services provided by the each of the IP’s. This assistance has also contributed to the sensitization of government officials and the public to concepts and principles underlying human rights and democracy. Broadly speaking, the following modalities have been used in the creation of awareness:

- Workshops conducted by the IP that target local communities, officials of government institutions or students at the secondary school level;
- Radio talk shows, question and answer sessions and public information spots;
- Television talk shows, question and answer sessions and public information spots;
- The publication of pamphlets, brochures and flyers;
- The placement of advertisements in newspapers and other publications;
- The publication or research reports and surveys; and
- Public addresses and speeches made by senior leaders of the IP’s that have subsequently been covered by the media.

It is unclear how effective these various modalities were, nor how successful a scattergun approach was to awareness raising. It is clear that radio broadcasts and the press have greater penetration than flyers, brochures, pamphlets, other publications and even TV talk shows and spots – particularly in rural Ethiopia. However, based on interviews with end-users or beneficiaries of the services of IP’s, it is clear that although radio programming is available, there is more than a little scepticism of what is viewed as government-sponsored programming. What is clear, however, is that most of the beneficiaries who actually turned to the IP’s for resolution of their cases, did so based on recommendations by word of mouth from friends and families and also based upon actual stories of successes in the printed press. For the latter, it is important to seek out private press rather than mass media organisations if the programme is to avoid generating scepticism. This may require a sea-change in the attitude and perspective of IP and other government personnel with respect to media sources that are not influenced by government concerns.

**CREATION OF CAPACITY AND THE EXTENSION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 9: ESTABLISHMENT OF OUTREACH CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IP</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEACC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outreach capacity of the IP’s has been built through the establishment of regional and municipal branches of the federal level offices of each IP (Table 9). Outreach capacity has been further extended through association of the each IP (federal or sub-national) with CSOs (Table 10). In the case of the EIO and EHRC, outreach has been extended through the establishment of 126 legal aid centres that are sponsored in part by the University, its law students and graduates and further supported by the DIP.

**TABLE 9: ESTABLISHMENT OF OUTREACH CAPACITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Approved Branches</th>
<th>Branches Actually Established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOF</td>
<td>Regional Council of Nationalities in SNPPR is independent</td>
<td>- Only in SNPPR; functions are same as national HOF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- HOF and CSOs forum created for conflict resolution with 200 members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Budget and grant sharing formula produced in collaboration with international experts, regions and HOF staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPR</td>
<td>Regional Councils are independent</td>
<td>-Established by regional constitutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-All office furniture and facilities funded by DIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2,400 MPs of HOPR and RCs received information kit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-112 PCs; 94 printers purchased and disseminated to RECs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-11 vehicles purchased and distributed to RECs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBE</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-11 established according to regional and municipal structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Printing machine with capacity of 60,000 copies per hour procured and in use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAG</td>
<td>Regional offices are independent</td>
<td>OAGs established by regional governments but OFAG delegates functions and responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 10: EXTENSION OF SERVICES THROUGH CSOs AND RESEARCH PRODUCTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Number of clubs or legal aid centres established</th>
<th>Number of research and assessment reports produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EHR</td>
<td>126 legal aid centres established, but unclear how many remain functional post-DIP; almost all centres were dependent entirely on DIP funding.</td>
<td>- National Human Rights Action Plan produced, published and disseminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Human Rights Situation Report Produced and submitted to Global Human Rights Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Human Rights of Minority Ethnic groups assessed and under process of publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Human Rights situation of the &quot;Villagization&quot; Programme of the government conducted and 10 published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Human rights situation in prisons assessed and report produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-EHRC is undergoing accreditation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIO</td>
<td>- Three experts hired and worked until DIP stopped</td>
<td>- East African Regional Ombudsman Forum organised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Developed public organizations supervision guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Established grievance hearing bodies at lower levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Guidelines and manuals for compliance, FIO reporting, Training on FIO Act, PR’s FIO implementation developed and in use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Online case registry and compliant lodging facility designed to become operational from experience gained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEAC</td>
<td>- Local experience sharing visits and training focused on corruption investigation and prosecution</td>
<td>- Procedures and practices of institutions vulnerable to corruption assessed and reports published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Online training facility established and extended training focused on forensic and investigative auditing, public procurement and supply management; leadership and transformational leadership; communication skills, basic journalism, and change management; Ethiopian financial system, government accounting practices, taxation and customs policies; project planning and monitoring and evaluation; gender and</td>
<td>-Public opinion surveys conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-BPR of the FEA assessed and redesigned its work processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Case management system for FEACC designed and introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Report produced on corruption prevention in the justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Customers satisfaction surveys, general public satisfaction survey on the performance of the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 10: EXTENSION OF SERVICES THROUGH CSOs AND RESEARCH PRODUCTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Number of clubs or legal aid centres established</th>
<th>Number of research and assessment reports produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>development; advanced computer skills, forensic auditing, resource management. -Leadership training for FEACC staff.</td>
<td>commission designed, level of ethics education awareness and coverage, customer’s satisfaction survey on the strategic areas, corruption risk in the water Sector in Ethiopia -239 assessments made on procedures and possible flaws, 65 indicative assessments made based on whistle-blowers from public institutions; -192 public institutions were supported of follow up on the implementation of recommendations; -132 public organizations were coached during implementation of recommendations -Assessments are underway on various ethics and anticorruption laws for rooms of amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOF</td>
<td>-Nations and nationalities forums established; nations and nationalities date celebrated each year with various activities (from local to federal levels) -Documentation of the HOF improved by improved furniture and IT facility -</td>
<td>-Budget and grant allocation formula formulated -Common nations and nationalities values assessed -Conflict mapping conducted -80% of MPs and 90% of secretariat staff received training -All standing committee members training fiscal federalism and managing diversity -Conflict resolution strategy produced -Constitutional Interpretation Manual Produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPR</td>
<td>-Oversight and public accounts committee established unto kebele level -Capacity building strategy developed and disseminated -Study tours to Brazil, India, Germany and Mexico -Gender budgeting training for 750 participants -100 up-to-dated books purchased -Frequency of oversight visit increased after DIP support</td>
<td>-Parliamentary procedures developed, published and disseminated -23 experts paid for post-graduate distance learning -Workshops on gender mainstreaming, climate change, HIV/AIDS, and economic analysis provided to MPs - 400 MPs got three month training on legislative drafting, language and computer skills -2,500 MPs got training on MDGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBE</td>
<td>-Professionals are exposed to experience sharing visits and trainings abroad -Experts were hired and worked for the NEBE until the DIP fund stopped</td>
<td>-Post-2010 election evaluation report produced, published and disseminated -Election compendium produced, published and disseminated -Election code of conduct produced, published and disseminated -Civic and Voter Education Manual produced, published and disseminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAG</td>
<td>-Local and external experience sharing and study visits conducted -Certified consultants hired and worked until DIP support stopped; -Audit professionals are in long-term education and training paid by the DIP</td>
<td>-92% of public organizations audited and report produced and present to parliament -Audit reports of Higher education institutions published and deliberated in parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Physical access for the public to each of the IP’s – particularly those that base an important part of their work on the receipt of claims and complaints from the public (EIO, EHRC, FEACC, NEBE and OFAG), is of critical importance. It was noted that both in Addis Ababa and at the regional level, the IP’s (with the exception of HOPR and HOF and their equivalents in the SNNPR) are scattered in different and sometimes obscure, hard-to-reach locations, dependent on the availability of government-provided premises. It is likely that despite the increased awareness of the existence and role of the democratic institutions, the inconvenience of their locations is probably a detriment to their full utilisation by the public. In some instances it was indicated to the evaluation team that an IP would refer complainants to other IP’s served by the DIP based on jurisdiction. Although quantitative data is unavailable, the prospect of having to locate and access yet another IP’s premises serves as a determining detriment and the cases were not lodged. It is likely too that physical location was an even greater barrier for the access of women to the IP’s. Consideration could be given to the co-location of IP’s in a House of Democracy in Addis Ababa and in the regional capitals to provide greater ease of access, to raise user friendliness, to build economies of scale for some equipment (not least IT connectivity) and leases, and to render referrals more efficient and effective.

Legal Aid – “Instant Court” in Hawassa

In collaboration with the University of Ethiopia School of Law, the EIO and HRC have supported the establishment of legal aid centres in Hawassa using DIP resources. The centres provide pro bono paralegal services and in a more limited number of cases, legal representation in court for women, vulnerable groups and the indigent, engaging 4th and 5th year law student and law graduates. The centres have also been used by the HRC to raise awareness of human rights through campaigns in Hawassa, with a particular emphasis on women’s rights. The centre has also been dealing with labour disputes and land disputes especially in cases that affect women. The centres have provided training to prison administrations on human rights issues on behalf of the EHRC. A total of 3000-5000 persons have been trained using DIP resources. The centre employed 120 paralegals in total, 20-30 lawyers and also had access to the services on a pro bono basis of 5-6 private lawyers. In 2012, the legal centre disposed of a total of 25 cases. The legal centre operated on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding with the EHRC and received a total of EB382, 750 (approximately US$21,000). In practice, this amount had to be stretched out over a period of two years. The resources were used to establish basic (rudimentary) office facilities, provide some practical training to their own staff, and prepare reports and legal briefs. Numerous delays were experienced largely due to unclear guidelines on how to report. A total of 10 legal aid centres were established in the region, with 2 embedded within prisons. In light of the lack of funds from DIP, the total number of functioning centres has been reduced to 2. The remaining centres are currently operating without funds, with the staff using their own resources to continue functioning in a rudimentary manner. It is apparent that the legal centres are likely to be a casualty of the termination of DIP as well as an illustration of the lack of sustainability of some aspects of the DIP model.

ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Number of reports presented to parliament and debated and other achievements</th>
<th>Number of publications, research and assessment reports produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>- Prior to the establishment of the EHCHR, Ethiopia was several years in arrears with respect to its international treaty and convention reporting obligations. Ethiopia is now fully up to date in this regard.</td>
<td>- Human rights situation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The most recent flagship product of the EHRC is the National Human Rights Action Plan which was launched by the Government in October 2013.</td>
<td>- National Human Rights Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Assessment report on the human rights situation of minority ethnic groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Villagization and human rights assessment report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Periodic reports on human rights conditions in prisons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Human rights forums conducted annually to share experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIO</td>
<td>- Bi-annual reports presented to parliament and debated</td>
<td>- Magazines - 15,000 copies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 5 research reports and assessments on various topics</td>
<td>- Brochures 16,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Evaluation Report

Page | 37
### TABLE 11: ACHIEVEMENTS OF EACH INSTITUTIONAL PARTNER THAT SERVE TO ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Number of reports presented to parliament and debated and other achievements</th>
<th>Number of publications, research and assessment reports produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| FEAC | - 2,526 complaints lodged with EIO in 2012 across the country (1,083 outside EIO’s of jurisdiction; 60 resolved by mediation; 988 complaints investigated; 351 cases found not maladministration; 44 found maladministration and recommendations issued.  
  -Trends in complaints increased except in 2010/11 (67 in 2004/5; 363 in 2005/6; 633 in 2006/7; 1677 in 2007/8; 1732 in 2008/9; 2252 in 2009/10; 521 in 2010/11; 2,526 in 2011/12)  
  -Regional distribution of complaints: 51.43% from Addis Ababa; 11.82% from Oromia; 11.15% from Amhara; 6.63% from SNNPR; 6.1% from Tigray; 6.91% in Dire Dawa; 4.72% in Federal Organizations. Others range from 0.1% in Gambella to 0.48% in Beneshangul Gumuz regions.  
  -Types of frequent complaints: pension payment, compensation payment, denial of education credentials, problem in mechanisms of service delivery, problems in job transfer and promotion, problems in job assignments, land and house ownership requests.  
  -Confiscated and returned to public treasury; 2 billion Birr  
  -Confiscated and returned to public land bank; 1,623,284 Birr  
  -Confiscated and returned to government ownership; 103 vehicles; 125 houses; 40 companies  
  -368 organized public anti-corruption movements (from youth, women, teachers, etc.) joined anti-corruption movement  
  -Five religious organizations reached 22 million;  
  -31 universities in the country joined the anti-corruption movement  
  -13 ethics and anti-corruption forums established across the country  
  -Public opinion of satisfaction with FEAC increased from 62% in 2009 to 87% in 2012  
  -Co-workers developed in public, private and public organizations in the country  
  -Whistle-blowing and investigation of cases increased dramatically; | - Ethical behaviour and preventing corruption deepened in the public  
  -Ethics education and awareness coverage enhanced;  
  -4,746,752 officials and government employees got awareness creation training  
  -TOTs increased; 131,035 ethics and anticorruption officers assigned in government institutions and public endowments got TOT training  
  -230,308 ethics and anticorruption volunteers got training and engaged in advancing ethics and anticorruption campaigns  
  -TV & radio and print increased.  
  -76% of the country covered  
  -Out of 22,000 public officials, parliamentarians and high civil servant position holders planned to undergo their assets registered, 17,555 registered their assets and properties  
  -Gender strategy; communication strategy; and monitoring and evaluation system developed, published and disseminated  
  -Anti-corruption focal persons placed in each public institution from federal to local levels of government  
  -2,255 corruption cases undergone investigation; 612 convicted 3 – 21 years in prison |
| HOF  | -Budget and grant formula finalized and implemented.  
  -Nationalities increased to from 85 at outset of DIP to 138  
  -965 cases appealing the interpretation of constitutional provisions submitted to the House (354 by women); 106 pending; others solved or decided as unconstitutional  
  -Most cases are from Addis Ababa, Oromia and SNNPR (in SNNPR, most of the cases pertain to identity)  
  -Expanded structures: 121 to 138 members, 22 of them women, 11 constitutional inquiry and interpretation body, 81 secretariat experts and personnel, 3 standing committees (legal, regions and revenue) | -Nations and nationalities day celebrated each year  
  -Budget and grant sharing formula finalized  
  -Conflict mapping finalized – solved conflict between Amhara and Beneshangul Gumuz regions; and Oromia and Somali regions by assessment and then conducting referendum |
| HOPR | - Frequency of oversight visits increased | - Overall oversight function of RECs and |

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**Multi-Donor Democratic Institutions Programme: Terminal Evaluation**

**Main Evaluation Report**

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**Page | 38**
TABLE 11: ACHIEVEMENTS OF EACH INSTITUTIONAL PARTNER THAT SERVE TO ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Number of reports presented to parliament and debated and other achievements</th>
<th>Number of publications, research and assessment reports produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- IT and digital facilities connect the RECs with HOPR such as video-</td>
<td>CCS reached 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conferencing</td>
<td>- HOPR and CCs improved from 30 to 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Report on the status of ICT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Speakers forum institutionalized as forum of experience sharing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Numerous training manuals on gender issues (mainstreaming, budgeting,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>monitoring, impact assessment) issued.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBE</td>
<td>- Post-2005 election evaluation report</td>
<td>- Post-2005 election evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Election compendium</td>
<td>- Election compendium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAG</td>
<td>- Audit coverage increased</td>
<td>- Coverage increased from 32% to above 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Professional and expert capacity improved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Public trust improved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 above attempts to summarise the major achievements of the each of the IP’s, which have to be considered quite considerable in such a short period of time.

DIP AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR POLICY DIALOGUE

Although the use of the DIP as a springboard for policy dialogue was never an explicit objective, it should be recognized that there have been a great number of outputs produced by each IP that are of considerable policy importance. These (captured in Table 11 in the foregoing section) include:

- Draft enabling legislation;
- Strategies and action plans;
- Manuals and guidelines for the operation of IP’s;
- Periodic situation reports; and
- One-off assessment reports.

The extent that such products have been used to generate substantive dialogue among a wide array of stakeholders varies considerably. While some discussion around these products has been conducted in the HOPR, discussions could have been organised on their implications in wider forums involving a larger array of stakeholders and partners – including interested donors. There is room for such dialogue to be organised more systematically to the ultimate benefit of the government and the IP’s this may best be arranged by establishing a more effective substantive coordination mechanism in parallel to existing administrative and financial coordination forums.

IV. PROMOTING THE ROLE OF WOMEN

TABLE 12: PRESENCE OF WOMEN IN EACH OF THE DIP INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Total Staff</th>
<th>Women Staff</th>
<th>Women Leaders</th>
<th>Gender strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>2 (1 Deputy Commissioner, 1 Director)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIO</td>
<td>126 – staff</td>
<td>64; slightly above 50%</td>
<td>4 (1 chief &amp; 2 deputies 50%)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEAC</td>
<td>351 total staff</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes; also gender sensitive communication strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOF</td>
<td>120 – Secretariat staff</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPR</td>
<td>350 – Secretariat staff</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>4 (One deputy speaker; 4</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Under the DIP, IP’s have been encouraged – with varying degrees of success to promote women’s access to democratic institutions and to address women’s issues by:

- Ensuring a gender sensitive interface with the public: primarily through a significant number of women in the rank and file of their organisations where there is maximum interface with the public;
- Ensuring that women’s issues are taken into account at the policy-making level through the representation of senior leaders in each IP;
- The development of gender sensitive policy documents including gender strategies, gender sensitive communication strategies, manuals that take into special account the needs of women; and
- Gender sensitivity training for staff of the IP.

Success in ensuring that women are included in the work of IP’s would perhaps best be measured by tracking the number of women who are served by the IP’s, but with the exception of NEBE, where 49% of the electorate is women, insufficient data was available to the evaluation team to quantify success in this regard.

The evaluation team has sought to summarise the level of success achieved so far under DIP in the promotion of the role of women using the data in Table 12. In terms of representation of women in leadership positions, the highest level of representation has been achieved in the EIO and the EHRC. Women are relatively well represented among the staff of the IP’s, ranging from a low of 25% to a high of over 50% (at the EIO). Gender strategies have been prepared at all except (perhaps not surprisingly), the two houses of parliament and OFAG. It should be noted, however, that OFAG staff have received gender sensitivity training. Data was not available for the evaluation team to be able to assess the retention rate of female staff and whether it was any different from rates for men.

A “gender audit” was carried out in April 2013 with a view to assessing the effectiveness with which gender has been mainstreamed under the DIP. The following are (paraphrased) the key areas required for improvement. These include the need to:

- Develop a performance measurement framework, with fully integrated gender mainstreaming criteria and the collection of gender-disaggregated monitoring data;
- Provide (continue to provide) targeted training for leadership/management in guiding and supporting gender mainstreaming;
- Strengthen systems of stakeholder consultation, particularly with female and vulnerable stakeholders, to inform the strategic planning and monitoring of each IP;
- Revise or develop new human resource development policies with clearly defined gender provisions that are linked to strategies and the strategic vision for the IP as a whole;
- Ensuring gender issues are fully integrated in any business practice re-engineering to ensure that gender concerns are addressed.

Broadly speaking, the same concerns continue to hold true and are endorsed by the evaluation team.

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V. EFFICIENCY

WHAT MODALITIES DID THE PROGRAMME APPLY AND WHAT IMPLICATIONS DID THEY HAVE FOR EFFICIENCY?

The entire programme was under National Implementation. A financial analysis of the programme by component demonstrates a heavy emphasis on national staff and consultants as well as local procurement, rather than international expertise and procurement of equipment and supplies from abroad. Despite the considerably higher unit costs involved, total expenditures on international consultants and international project staff over the lifetime of DIP constituted approximately half of total expenditures on national consultants and national staff (Figure 8 and Figure 9). In addition to rendering the programme more cost-efficient, this emphasis is also an illustration of the programme’s emphasis on facilitating the effective use of national capacities with a view to maximising national ownership.

Figure 8: National procurement and cost-efficiency

In addition, it should be noted that the majority of project personnel under the programme were fielded either as National UN Volunteers or on service contracts, further increasing cost efficiency of the programme. It should be noted that personnel on service contracts do not receive the full range of benefits of a staff member.
Figure 9 provides a clearer understanding of the actual breakdown of expenditures between components of the programme. The breakdown quite vividly and appropriately reflects the fact that this support so far has gone towards laying the foundations for new and important institutions; expenditures on training, promotional costs (to raise awareness of the role, functions and responsibilities of each of the IP’s) and equipment alone amount to 70% of the total budget.

**TIMELINESS AND RESPONSIVENESS**

IP’s have informed the evaluation team that the UNDP, applying National Implementation, was highly responsive to their needs. Indeed, it would appear that as long as activities proposed and planned by the IP’s fell within the broad objectives and appeared to contribute to the expected outcomes of the programme, they were approved by UNDP and the requested funds advanced. When reviewing the activities in general, it can indeed be said that overall they were fully in line with the objectives of the programme, although some IP’s may have prioritized activities based on less clear criteria than others (see for instance, the analysis in this report of staff training topics).

Delivery rates were consistently high, and above 80%. Officials interviewed at the IP’s have consistently praised the UNDP for being flexible and rapid in its response to their needs. It was pointed out that the UNDP’s system of issuing quarterly advances based on approved work plans was more efficient and responsive than the mechanism than that experienced with other donors and indeed with the government budget. Yet, there were also some considerable delays experienced in the first two years of implementation as IP staff had to familiarise themselves with the procedures and records required to substantiate claims for payment.

**WHAT EFFECTS DID THE MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE ON EFFICIENCY?**

Several of the insiders interviewed suggested that the administrative arrangements for the programme introduced too many layers in the management process, implying that it led, at the very least, to delays and inefficiencies. The evaluation team was unable to uncover any quantitative information to verify this suggestion. It is, however, clear that the system introduced additional levels of checks regarding
administration and financial procedures that served to ensure compliance with government and UNDP rules and regulations and were probably necessary during the period that the newly formed IP’s were in the process of familiarising themselves with processes and procedures.

VI. SUSTAINABILITY

One of the persistent problems faced by all of the IP’s is staff turnover due to the uncompetitive nature of salaries paid by Government in comparison to remuneration in the private sector and salaries paid by international NGOs and aid agencies to Ethiopian staff. In recognition of this, and the sensitive nature of their functions, the government has created special salary scales for most of the IP’s included in the DIP. As can be seen from Table 13, however, these salary scales are not uniform or consistent. FEACC, perhaps unsurprisingly, has the highest salaries consistently across all categories of personnel. New recruits at several of the IP’s, on the other hand, earn salaries consistent with standard government starting salaries (viz. HOF, HOPR). In the case of the other IP’s, while new recruits are compensated above the levels of professional entrants to the civil service, at the middle- to higher-levels (Director) they appear to become less competitive than their counterparts in the civil service. Salaries generally rise significantly again at the level of the heads of the IP’s where they are compensated at levels equivalent to (OFAG and NEBE), or above that of Minister (EHRC, HOF, HOPR, FEACC EIO) in the executive branch of government.

While salary levels cannot in themselves be increased to a level that is truly competitive with trends in the private sector, high salaries and status are generally viewed internationally as incentives to attract and importantly, retain, competent personnel, thereby also boosting the credibility of the institutions concerned in the eyes of the public. The evaluation team notes that the salary scales of several IP’s were established a long time ago (see remarks in Table 13) and are inconsistent between the IP’s. Consideration should be given by the government to reviewing the salary scales and compression ratios in the institutions that fall under the DIP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Monthly Salary in Ethiopian Birr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>HOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td>7290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>4933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process owner</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recruit</td>
<td>2100 (all fields)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Scale in place after national civil servants pay raise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the outset of the programme, many of the senior and more junior staff were funded by DIP. Over time, many of these staff were transferred to posts funded from the national budget. However, several, and in some cases, critically important, positions were still being funded from the DIP when the DIP itself was terminated. Table 14 provides a list of staff and their posts that were left without funding. Several of these staff have had to seek alternative employment while a few others who are in particularly high demand at their IP’s, have continued to perform their functions since June 2013 without any pay pending approval of bridge funding. The latter was still being negotiated at the time of this evaluation, but appeared to be close to approval.

In order to reduce dependence on external funding and the DIP, for the 2013 budget and beyond, MOFED has increased allotments to the IP’s. The increase over 2012 is illustrated in Table 15. The total increase of the national budget varies between single digits for the HOPR and FEACC, to as much as 76% and 69% for EHRC and NEBE respectively. This may reflect current government priorities, but it may also be based on the current baseline of salaries and past increases to the budget. Interviews with each of the IP’s consistently suggest that there is no clear equivalency between funds administered under DIP and those derived from the national budget. The principal differences pertain to the fact that the IP’s do not have the ability to allocate funds from the national budget to institutions that are not strictly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>2013/US$*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>Mr. Abrahm Ayalew</td>
<td>Programme Officer (SC)</td>
<td>18,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman</td>
<td>Ms. Seblework Tariku</td>
<td>Child rights officer (NUNV)</td>
<td>12,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Tadesse Gezu</td>
<td>Planning Officer (NUNV)</td>
<td>12,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Solomon Mengesha</td>
<td>Good Governance Officer (SC)</td>
<td>14,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms. Ejig Elefachew</td>
<td>Finance Officer (NUNV)</td>
<td>12,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
<td>Mr. Terefe Degeti</td>
<td>Capacity Building Expert (SC)</td>
<td>22,880.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Hailu Berhe</td>
<td>Technical Expert (NUNV)</td>
<td>11,440.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Federation</td>
<td>Ms. Metkel Kebede</td>
<td>Program Assistant (NUNV)</td>
<td>10,300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Peoples Representatives</td>
<td>Mr. Solomon Damena</td>
<td>Finance Officer (SC)</td>
<td>18,666.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Afework Fekadu</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (SC)</td>
<td>18,668.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Electoral Board of Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ms. Hiwot Tadesse</td>
<td>Programme Officer (SC)</td>
<td>16,012.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms. Meseret Mengistu</td>
<td>Finance Officer (NUNV)</td>
<td>6,096.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms. Meseret Ayenew</td>
<td>Gender Officer (NUNV)</td>
<td>6,096.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Auditors General</td>
<td>Mr. Desta Woldemariam</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (SC)</td>
<td>18,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Befekadu Ayele</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (SC)</td>
<td>18,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Gebremedhin Gebremichael</td>
<td>Programme Officer (SC)</td>
<td>18,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Adera Bekele</td>
<td>Programme Officer (SC)</td>
<td>18,750.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Six-Month Total Cost $241,718.00

*Based on actual expenditure on salary and benefits, Jan-Jun 2013 multiplied by 2.

Source: UNDP Governance Unit. Extracted from DIP AWP (Jan-June 2013)
speaking governmental in nature, undermining the partnership’s and outreach capacity that they have created to date with CSOs and that the procedures for the allocation of resources are not as flexible as decisions have to be made at the beginning of the fiscal year and are not easily adjusted to meet new requirements or to adjust for unexpected delays or even the completion of planned results earlier than expected. In the case of UNDP administered funds, on the other hand, arrangements are in place for the regular review of expenditures and requirements on at least a quarterly basis based on an overall annual work plan reviewed and approved at the end of the prior year. This has according to senior officials interviewed at each of the IP’s, led without exception, to significant cutbacks in the operational activities.

VII. PARTNERSHIP’S

As a multi-donor funded programme, the DIP constitutes an important and very interesting experiment in partnership between donors, international organisations, different branches of the state, key democratic institutions and even civil society organisations. It is an experiment that in itself is complex and puts together a wide array of experiences and approaches to participation, accountability and transparency. For the most part a considerable amount has been achieved under the DIP despite these inherent complexities. All of the IP’s have been established and institutionalised within the political and institutional fabric of the FDRE and have gained substantial credibility in the eyes of the public as their presence and their professional services and role has been extended at the national and increasingly at the sub-national level.

Yet, in recent years, the partnership undergone some strains resulting in part because of arrangements within the DIP, but also because of considerations beyond the confines of the DIP. It is the assessment of the evaluation team that the concerns and strains that have plagued the DIP in recent years can be addressed relatively easily by common acknowledgement of:

- The important role already being played by the IP’s;
- The considerable achievements under the DIP;
- The fact that the DIP has to date served to lay a relatively sound foundation each of the IP’s and that achievements can only accelerate from here onwards;
- The need for an incremental approach to broader political change while encouraging and accelerating the core (“technical”) elements of democracy;
- The need for better mutual understanding between donors and government of the constraints that each are working under and the needs of their respective constituencies;
- Adjustment of current coordination and management arrangements to ensure that donors do not have a sense (justified or otherwise) of exclusion;
- The fact that all partners bring considerably more to the table than has been used to date;
- The importance of better utilising and exploiting the inherent value added of international collaboration in an effective way in support of national priorities and adapting them effectively to Ethiopian conditions;
- The need to focus on the core technical achievements of the IP’s in terms of creating an institutional framework for public participation in decisions, increased accountability of state institutions, and increased transparency of public decision-making to the Ethiopian public; and
- Perhaps most importantly leadership of the DIP PCU by a CTA who has a sound understanding of the broad policy issues involved under the DIP and an ability to retain the confidence of all parties concerned by keeping the flow of information regular, consistent and ensuring that concerns and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012 (EFY 2005)/Birr</th>
<th>2013 (EFY 2006)/Birr</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOPR</td>
<td>101,730,000</td>
<td>103,878,170</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOF</td>
<td>14,044,880</td>
<td>15,736,000</td>
<td>12.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>15,564,350</td>
<td>27,425,600</td>
<td>76.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIO</td>
<td>19,949,740</td>
<td>30,146,931</td>
<td>51.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAG</td>
<td>18,687,730</td>
<td>21,433,850</td>
<td>14.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEACC</td>
<td>37,891,290</td>
<td>39,994,790</td>
<td>5.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEBE</td>
<td>19,832,210</td>
<td>33,515,100</td>
<td>68.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>227,700,200</td>
<td>272,130,441</td>
<td>19.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
perceptions are addressed rapidly and in a manner that is understood and accepted by all concerned.

VIII. MANAGEMENT ISSUES

A COMPLEX MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The management structure for this programme is complex and multi-layered (Figure: 10) and involves the coordination of state entities that fall either under the purview of the Legislative or of the Executive branch. Funds are channelled from the multiple donors involved through UNDP to the programme. A national coordinating entity, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) oversees and coordinates the seven “implementing partners” (viz, the HOPR, the HOF, the CHR, the FEACC, the EIO, NEBE and OFAG).

Figure 10: Management Structure of the DIP

Substantive review, programme oversight and guidance is provided to the programme through the DIP Coordinating Committee (later called the Steering Committee) and the DIP Technical Committee. The Steering Committee is co-chaired by the State Minister of Finance and Economic Development and the Resident Representative of UNDP/Resident Coordinator of the UN. Participation by the donors in the Steering Committee is limited to the largest donors in agreement with the other partners. The Technical Committee, on the other hand, is chaired by the Director of Multilateral Cooperation at MOFED and includes representatives from each of the IP’s and all of the participating donors.
Each sub-programme also has a steering committee at the IP level consisting of the national coordinator designated at the IP itself and all of those designated as project staff at the IP.

Special substantive coordination forums have also been created by some of the IP’s. For instance, a “Speakers’ Forum” has been created consisting of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers of the HOPR, the Chairpersons of the Standing Committees, Chairperson of the Women’s Caucus, Director of the Secretariat of the HOPR, Director of the Secretariat of the HOF, the Speakers of each of 9 regional councils and 2 municipal/city councils. The latter meet on a semi-annual basis and discuss priority issues before their legislative bodies, parliamentary procedures and practice, share experience and best practice.

Similarly, the EIO, the ECHR and FEACC meet at the senior level on a periodic basis to exchange ideas to discuss issues of jurisdiction pertaining to specific claims and to transfer them appropriately.

It is unclear whether either of the above two special forums would have been created in the absence of an overarching DIP programme (principals argue that they were created independently of DIP), but the meetings of both forums are funded by DIP.

In some of the interviews conducted by the evaluation team, it was suggested that the Technical Committee was too large to facilitate the type of detailed discussion required and as a result was sometimes less than satisfactory. It was also noted that the Steering Committee was often not attended by all of the principals. It is also noted that the coordination of the DIP was almost exclusively in the hands of MOFED across both committees. A future approach could include co-leadership of the Steering Committee or its equivalent by the Head of one of the key IP’s in order to guarantee that at least one of the two major committees is focused on the substantive, policy-level issues pertaining to implementation to the programme. One option would be to ensure that the Steering Committee or its equivalent is served by a secretariat consisting of the staff of the IP selected as co-chair along with the DIP CPU while the technical committee is served by the Department of Multilateral Cooperation of MOFED and the DIP CPU as it is now. Such an arrangement would serve to help differentiate the roles of the two committees and strengthen substantive coordination.

The DIP Programme Coordination Unit was headed by a Chief Technical Adviser at a P4 and was housed at the UNDP and devoted a large portion of its time to reviewing and certifying expenditures and advances to the IP’s. A lot of tie was also spent advising IP staff on procedures and processes. Less time was spent on communicating and discussing substantive issues and concerns with all of the partners (including donors). This led to a marked loss in confidence among the partners. It is clear that the role of the DIP CPU needs to be changed and raised to a more substantive level in any future collaboration to facilitate substantive exchanges.
What Value Added Does The Umbrella Structure Provide?
The interviews with IP staff and leaders would suggest that the principal value added of the DIP umbrella programme structure is administrative and not substantive; the unique channel to the donors and the collaboration among donors under the DIP has resulted in reduced transaction costs for the IP’s because of the unified reporting requirements. All reports – financial and narrative – are submitted to the donors through a single channel consisting of MOFED and UNDP.

What Value Added Does UNDP Provide?
The View of Donors: The donors appear to view the potential value added of UNDP as follows: an independent, multilateral body that is considered independent, has a strong relationship with government especially in the context of a sensitive programme, has relatively transparent and systematic procedures, is an entity with a greater complement of staff capacity to manage such a large and labour intensive programme, and has strong and relatively transparent administrative procedures as well as reporting requirements for collaborating with donors in the form of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA).

This is the theory. In practice, the donors have found UNDP to have reported irregularly and without sufficient granularity or detail – both in financial and narrative terms. The evaluation team could only locate a limited number of progress reports and 6 terminal reports from the IP’s. It was also argued that the UNDP’s financial reporting did not provide sufficient granularity to fulfil the reporting requirements of some donors. Donors interviewed suggested that this was not just a problem of the DIP programme in Ethiopia, but a problem that they had experienced with UNDP elsewhere. Several donors also implied that there was insufficient separation between the UNDP and the government; that the UNDP did not demonstrate the requisite independence from the DIP Coordination Unit to hold them accountable. This perception was hardened as the Programme Manager on occasion represented the UNDP in coordination and oversight meetings with donors and government. Donors also suggested that UNDP also played a role that created too much of a buffer between the IP’s and the donors and that as comments, requests and suggestions were channelled through the UNDP via MOFED to the IP’s and vice versa, a filtration system was at work. It was difficult to verify the latter. Some IP’s (see below) had quite a contrary view – that UNDP represented donor views too strongly to them) neither provided clear examples. It was admitted by some that part of the problem might have been personality-based.

The View of IP’s: In practice, the IP’s view UNDP as a relatively flexible and reliable manager of funds that has a system that, in line with DAC principles, supports the IP’s priorities, maximises national ownership by giving them regular advances that empower them to implement their own programmes based on annual and quarterly work plans and is flexible enough to accommodate changes in short term priorities and plans. In the latter respect, the IP’s interviewed repeatedly suggested that the UNDP was more flexible and realistic about operational realities than government, which is less flexible with its allocations.

To What Extent Does The DIP Apply DAC Principles Contained in the Paris Declaration?
The DIP appears to attempt to apply DAC principles faithfully despite some shortcomings in actual implementation.

Ownership: It would appear, as discussed elsewhere, that the IP’s are allowed to identify their own priorities, devise their own plans, design their own activities and manage the use of funds.

Alignment: The programme involved applying a single common framework for managing, implementing and monitoring the programme. All individual donor procedures practices and reporting requirements were set aside in favour of a single common approach based on UNDP’s rules and regulations, under NIM – national implementation.
Harmonization: The Coordination Committee, Technical Committee and other donor meetings were used to establish common positions and to agree on policies. Early on in the life of the programme, the Netherlands and USAID chose not to pursue this common approach and pulled out of DIP.

Managing for results: Managing for results could have been substantially strengthened through the establishment of an outcome- and impact-based framework of indicators for the measurement of trends and achievements of the DIP, from the establishment of a baseline at the outset of implementation to the present.

Mutual Accountability: Mutual accountability in terms of the monitoring of activities, outputs and expenditures was reasonably good. It could have been substantially increased, however through an improved outcome-based monitoring mechanism, increased frequency of narrative reporting, more granularity (detail) in financial reporting, but equally importantly, through better communication of expectations, perspectives and plans.

On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being very poor and 10 being perfect, the evaluation team, based on interviews and the review of all of the documentation, grades the DIP’s achievement with respect to each Paris Principles as follows:

- Ownership: 9
- Alignment: 8
- Harmonisation: 8
- Managing for Results: 3
- Mutual Accountability: 5
ANNEX I: PERSONS MET

**Ministry of Finance and Economic Development**
Admasu, Nebebe, Director, UN Agencies and Regional Economic Cooperation
Dawit Ayele,

**House of the Peoples’ Representatives of the FDRE**
Hon. Shitaye Minale, Deputy Speaker of the HOPR
Hon. Tesfaye Daba Wakjira, Chairperson of the Standing Committee for Foreign, Defence and Security Affairs.
Eshet Gebre Kidanemariam, Director, Legislative Oversight and Professional Support, Secretariat of the HOPR
Afework Fekadu, DIP Focal Point

**House of Federation**
Debebe Barud, Head, Secretariat

**National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)**
Prof. Merga Bekana, Chairman
Addisu Gebre Egziabhier, Deputy Chairman
Nega Duffisa, Head of Secretariat
Mr. Yisma Jirru, Head of Public Relations

**Ethiopian Institutions of the Ombudsman**
Fojiya Amin, Chief Ombudsman
Ahmed Mohammed, Director, Children’s Women’s and Persons with Disability Affairs Directorate
Megerso Kumbi, Head of Planning, Procurement, Finance and Property Administration Department
Leol Seyoum, Head of Public Relations and Communications
Girma Tsegaye

**Ethiopian Human Rights Commission**
Amb. Tiruneh Zena, Chief Commissioner
Abraham Ayelew, DIP Focal Person

**Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission**
Ali Sulieman, Commissioner
Birhanu Kifetew, Director for Ethics Infrastructure
Berhanu, Assefa, Director for Ethics Education and Communication Affairs

**Office of the Federal Auditor General**
Gemechu Dubiso, Auditor General of Ethiopia
Shasho Mekonnen, Assistant to the Auditor General

**SNNPR Council**
Lemma Guzume, Speaker, Council of Nationalities
Chairpersons of Four Standing Committees
Gudeta Rasketo, Head, Secretariat of the Council of Nationalities

**SNNPR, Regional Council of Nationalities**
Mammo Godebo, Deputy Speaker, Council of the SNNPR
Herano Helebo, Head, Secretariat of the Council of the SNNPR
Regional Branch of EIO in the SNNPR
Ato Samuel, Head, Regional Branch Office

Regional Branch of EHRC in the SNNPR
Berhanu Ataro, Director, Regional Branch

Regional Branch of NEBE in the SNNPR
Abraham Gedebo, Director, Regional Branch

Regional Mass Media Organization, SNNPR
Yohannes…….. Head of Office

SNNPR Legal Aid Centres
Admasu Alemayehu, Volunteer Coordinator, Hawassa Legal Aid Centres

Beneficiaries of EIO Assistance in the SNNPR
Ms. Beleynesh, Successful in resolution of case lodged
OMF Employee  Successful resolution of case lodged
Bekele Jaido, Case dismissed by EIO after thorough investigation

Beneshangul Gumuz Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
Head of Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
Deputy Head of Bureau of Finance and Economic Development

Beneshangul Gumuz Regional Council
Fekadu Tadesse, Speaker
Ato Shehadin, Chairperson, Legal and Security Standing Committee
Bisetegn Mehuria, Chairperson, Social Affairs Standing Committee
Nasisa Wubete, Head of Secretariat
Ato Admasu, Ex-Head, Secretariat
Samuel Mamo, Head, Planning and Programmes

Beneshagul Gumuz Regional EAC
Regional Commissioner
Aweke Gebremichael, Expert, Training and Capacity Building

Beneshagul Gumuz Office of the Regional Auditor General
Fufa Biftu, Acting Head of Audit

Beneshagul Gumuz, Regional Election Board
Mr. Bezabih Aqgari, Head of Branch

United Nations Development Programme
Eugene Owusu, UN Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative, UNDP Ethiopia
Sam Mbwale, Country Director, UNDP Ethiopia
Bettina Woll, Deputy Country Director, UNDP Ethiopia
Chyrsantus Awengafec, Acting Head, Governance and Human Rights Unit
Dassa Bulcha, Programme Analyst, Governance and Human Rights Unit
Dirk Wagener, Team Leader, PartnershIP’s and Management Support Unit
Rachel Pell, Junior Professional Consultant, Monitoring and Evaluation
Seblewongel Mulushoa, Programme Assistant, Democratic Institutions Programme

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Samira Moaci, Human Rights Specialist
Embassy of Canada
Harriet Roos, First Secretary (Development)
Tomi Huszar, First Secretary, Development Cooperation
Shimelis Aseffa, Governance Adviser

Department for International Development (DFID, UK).
Bea Parkes, Governance Adviser
Gemechu Admassu, Governance Coordinator

Irish Aid
Bezuwork Ketete
Meron Gezahgun

Royal Norwegian Embassy:
Håvard Hoksnes, Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation
Petter Skjævaland, First Secretary
Ellen Fadnes

Embassy of Sweden
Izabella Eriksson, First Secretary, Human Rights and Democracy
Anneka Knutsson,
Selamawit Pawlos, National Programme Officer, Human Rights and Democracy

European Union
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ANNEX II: TERMS OF REFERENCE
ETHIOPIA has set itself a bold and ambitious development vision to become a middle income country by 2025. In elaborating this version, government has articulated the imperative and role of democratization in ensuring rapid, inclusive and equitable development, human and capital resource development for achieving the MDGs target by 2015. Since 1991 government has embarked on major transformative processes to reform the political/governance architecture, civil service and economic structure and orientation of the country. These reforms have gained momentum and led to significant demonstrable results. Ethiopia is the 3rd (second in Africa) fastest movers on human development. These impressive results have transformed Ethiopia to one that is growing, resilient and confident.

Set against this backdrop, the Democratic Institution Programme (DIP) is a capacity development intervention which aims at establishing well-structured and well-functioning democratic institutions. The strategic direction of developing the capacity of these institutions is to enhance wider participation, efficient and effective implementation of government policies. In this regard, the programme as a partnership and a mutual commitment between government and development partners to operationalize the various democratic institutions embodied in the constitution thereby ensuring “wider participation, accountability, transparency, human and political rights of citizens and peoples”.

The programme supported the following institutions both at federal and sub national levels: Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman (EIO), Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC), House of Federation (HoF), House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR), and the Office of the Auditor General. Development partners to the programme are Austrian Development Co-operation, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Denmark, the Department for International Development (DFID), Irish Aid, Italian Co-operation, the Netherlands, Norway, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), UNDP, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the European Commission (EC) that joined the programme in January 2010.

The programme structure included an umbrella document outlining the programmatic framework and seven separate sub-programme documents tailored to address the specific development needs of the institutions. The programme design process reflected the collaboration among GoE, Development partners and UNDP with various partners taking leadership in the design of various components of the programme.

The programme commenced implementation in 2008 with five partners and two additional partners (OFAG and NEBE) joined in 2009. By June 2013, the programme would have been implemented for a period of five years. As a partnership, the programme’s orientation and objective is to reinforce national ownership and capacity by aligning the programme support to Ethiopia’s priorities as embodied in its national development plan. As such, the programme’s anticipated outcomes have slightly evolved over time as a result of the evolving needs of the country and the political economy context in which the programme is implemented. At the inception of the programme, in 2008, attention was on developing the organizational and operational capacities of these institutions as articulated in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) governance matrix and the Growth and Transformation Plan. However, the midterm review of the programme identified the need for further capacity development to help these institutions deliver on their mandate triggering the review and development of a new results framework in close discussion programme partners.

The management and structure of the programme is grounded in the principle of national ownership implemented though the National Implementation Modality (NIM), a standard modality developed in compliance with the UN General Assembly Resolution [47/199] of December 1992 on programme implementation in programme countries. As provided in the National Implementation Manual, MOFED is the Government coordinating body which assumes ultimate responsibility on behalf of the Government for overall management of programs and is ultimately accountable for resources and results.
In accordance with the stipulations of the DIP Programme Umbrella document, the Programme Steering Committee (initially Coordination Committee and the Technical Committee) which comprises of 5 donors, heads of the democratic institutions, UNDP and MOFED provides policy direction for the programme. The Coordination Unit (CU) located within UNDP is responsible for coordinating the programme, supporting implementation, tracking and reporting on programme implementation. At each democratic institution, substantive and management experts were placed to support implementation of approved plans as part of the overall strategic plan of the institutions.

The key objectives of the programme are: Enhancing the capacity of democratic institutions to be effective, sufficient and responsive in promoting and protecting the rights of citizens; Promoting human rights and good governance and empowering citizens to be active and effective participants in the democratic process as well as respect for the rights of others. The objectives are envisaged to be met through capacity development of the partner institutions.

The outcome level indicators measure the following:
1. Level of satisfaction of citizens of services rendered
2. Institutionalized systems of accountability, transparency and participation
3. Level of awareness of the people about their rights, corruption and ethical standards

Each Implementing Partner has an output which contributes to the overall outcome to deliver on with clear indicators as enumerated below:

**Ethiopia Human Rights Commission – Output 1**: Enhanced capacity of Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to promote, enforce and protect the rights of citizens, and to receive, investigate, follow-up on complaints related to human rights violations and abuses and periodically report on its work in the public domain.

**Indicators:**
- No. National Human Rights reports produced by the EHRC detailing human rights cases pursued, actions taken and results of investigations (status, thematic, monitoring reports)—this can be disaggregated by cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, PWDs
- Human Rights Action Plans prepared in an all-inclusive participatory manner, approved and implemented
- No. of EHRC outreach centres established and operational
- % decrease in number of outstanding state party reports of GoE to UN and African human rights treaty bodies
- % increase in the cases/complaints effectively resolved out of number submitted to the EHRC disaggregated by sex/social group/regions
- Proportionate increase in number of recommendations/advise/opinion provided to parliament on harmonization of laws with human rights standards
Ethiopia Institution of the Ombudsman – Output 2: Enhanced capacity of the Ethiopian Institution of Ombudsman (EIO) to receive, investigate and follow up on administrative complaints and for ensuring access by citizens to information (resulting in improved promotion, claiming and enforcement of both male and female citizens’ rights).

**Indicators**
- No. of maladministration complaints filed to EIO (disaggregated by sex of the complainant)
- % increase in the cases/complaints effectively resolved out of submitted to the EIO
- No. of EIO branch offices established
- No. of enforcement regulations passed
- No. of recommendation provided by EIO for review of administrative procedures and directives to reduce maladministration in the civil service
- Publicly available reports made by the Ombudsman


**Indicators:**
- No. of corruption cases investigated and successfully prosecuted out of number submitted to FEACC
- Status of extent and perception of corruption known
- Mechanisms in place and operational to deal with corruption in public sphere

House of Federation Output 4: Enhanced capacity of The House of Federation to discharge its mandates of functioning mechanisms for equitable federal grants allocation, interpretation of the constitution, increased awareness of citizens on their constitutional rights, resolution of issues regarding nationalities and nations, resolution and mediation of conflicts, maintenance of unity and economic balance.

**Indicators:**
- Regular review and approval of Grant Sharing Formula that equitably allocates Federal subsidies to regions
- % increase in number of constitutional breach cases received and resolved by HoF in line with the Constitution
- No. of policies and strategies in place for conflict resolution in consultation with stakeholders.


**Indicators:**
• No. of parliamentary rules and procedures put in place that foster constructive parliamentary deliberations and consensus building in committee and plenary discussions
• No. of MPs consultations and activities with constituencies
• No. of oversight functions carried out by standing committees
• % increase in number of women in parliamentary committees (at various levels, Federal, Regional)
• No. and level of participation of CSOs, political parties, other stakeholders in public hearings.

National Electoral Board of Ethiopia – Output 6: Enhanced capacity of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to organize free, peaceful and credible elections.

Indicators:
• % of Voter turnout at general elections proportionate to the registered voters disaggregated by sex
• % decrease in number of invalid votes at general elections
• No. of domestic and international observers accredited
• % of citizens exposed to Civic and Voter Education and electoral information proportionate to the number of registered voters
• No. of electoral complaints effectively resolved out of number submitted to NEBE
• No. of necessary revisions and subsequent translation into local languages made on electoral laws, regulations, directives and frameworks in order to align it with the FDRE Constitution and international standards
• No. of measures/mechanisms introduced to increase participation of women in electoral process and decision making

Office of Auditor Generals (OAGs) – Output 7: Office of Auditor Generals (OAGs) across Ethiopia appropriately trained and capacitated, allowing them to carry out their constitutional mandates in accordance with internationally recognized standards, and in an institutional framework where audit work is followed up by due parliamentary process and reported in the public domain, leading to greater accountability of the executive to the legislature and citizens.

Indicators:
• % increase in public sector performance and financial audit coverage of the country in accordance with international standards
• % increase in retention of professionally qualified staff in OAGs
• No. of joint OAG and PAC sessions on audit report
• No. of consultations held with RSCs for the establishment of Public Accounts Committees (PACs)
• No. of interactive sessions between OAGs and the media
• No. of audit backlogs cleared
• % increase in quality and uniformity of audit reports
II. EVALUATION

The programme is expected to undertake two main evaluations as provided in the umbrella document. These are the midterm evaluation and terminal evaluation. The midterm evaluation was conducted in 2010. This terminal evaluation is intended to assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact/outcome and sustainability of the programme. During the period of implementation, several other assessments were carried out. These include: 1) Institutional capacity assessment of DIP institutions (March 2010); 2) Gender Audit of DIP IP’s (March 2010); 3) Mid-term Evaluation (December, 2010); 4) Capacity assessment of regional democratic institutions (April 2011); 5) NEBE sub-programme external evaluation (June 2011); 6) EHRC Capacity assessment (2011); and 7) OFAG Capacity assessment (2010).

Purpose
The terminal evaluation is being conducted to provide evidence-based and qualitative information about the status of DIP programme implementation to ensure accountability for the delivery of results at the end of the programme. This would help to increase the stakeholders’ knowledge about the benefits and challenges encountered during programme implementation. As a capacity development intervention, the terminal evaluation would also assess the extent to which the programme addressed an integrated systemic approach to capacity development that incorporates all levels of capacity. An evidence based assessment of the programme performance will be carried out, anchored appropriately in the political economy context, the evolving nature of the programme and the expectations set out in the Programme Logical Framework (Annex 1).

Scope: The scope of the terminal evaluation will cover all democratic institutions at national and sub-national levels and activities undertaken in the framework of the programme. The evaluators will compare planned outputs of the programme to actual outputs and assess the actual results to determine their contribution to the attainment of the programme overall outcome. The evaluation will also look at the management and partnerships around the programme and its contribution/impact on programme performance. The terminal evaluation would cover as much as possible stakeholders involved directly or indirectly in the implementation of the programme. The stakeholders include but not limited to MoFED, the democratic institutions, UNDP and donors. Beneficiaries could include CSOs, coalitions, academic and research institutions and individual beneficiaries of the services of the democratic institutions.

Geographic Coverage: The evaluation will look at progress made at federal level and at least four regions to be purposively selected. The evaluation team will be based in Addis Ababa and will travel to the selected regions for consultation, data gathering and validation. The evaluation will also look at the management and partnerships around the programme and its contribution/impact on programme performance.

Evaluation Criteria:
1. Assess the **relevance** of the programme: The extent to which the programme and its intended outputs and outcome are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of intended beneficiaries. The degree to which the programme has been justified and appropriate in relation to the country’s transformation agenda as outlined in the National Development Plan (PASDEP & GTP) Governance Pillar.

**Questions:**
- How relevant was the programme to the capacity needs of democratic institutions as defined in the National development Plan?
- How relevant was the programme outcome to the country, cognisance of its political economic context?

2. Assess the **effectiveness** of the programme: The extent to which the programme’s outcome has been achieved.

**Questions:**
- To what extent the expected outcomes and objectives of the project have been achieved?
- Which factors contributed to achieving (or not) intended outcomes?

3. Assess the **efficiency**: The analysis and the evaluation of the overall programme performance, the outputs in relation to the inputs, the financial management and the implementing timetable.

**Questions:**
- Review the extent to which the programme management arrangement facilitated efficient and effectiveness implementation of the programme
- To what extent did the partnershIP’s with relevant stakeholders contributed to the achievement of results of the programme?

4. Assess the **sustainability** of the programme: The extent to which results from the programme will continue or are likely to continue as the DIP support came to an end in December 2012.

**Questions:**
- The extent to which the programme addressed an integrated systematic approach to capacity development that incorporates all levels of capacity development

5. Impact:

**Questions**
To what extent have the programme outcomes directly or indirectly strengthened the capacity of democratic institutions?
III. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation should be a systematic, comprehensive and fully participatory process to ensure objectivity. The assessment should be grounded in evidence with triangulated information sources. The evaluation should provide as much gender disaggregated data as possible. Secondary data including assessments conducted by Democratic institutions will be used and triangulated with desk review of reports and key informant interviews to review progress in citizens/clients satisfaction and level of awareness. Where data is not available, proxy indicators will be used to identify progress. More specifically, the following or more methodologies shall be applicable:

- **Desk review of relevant documentation** – review of relevant documents including among others, programme and sub-programme documents, AWPs, bi-annual and annual reports, financial reports, midterm evaluation reports, sub-programme reports etc.
- **Key informant Interviews** – interview of programme stakeholders and direct and indirect beneficiaries;
- **Participatory consultations with key Stakeholders** – implementing partners, MoFED, development partners, UNDP and CSOs;
- **Observations** – ongoing activities/initiatives supported by the DIP such as the Children Parliament and Speakers’ Forum, activities of legal aid centres and branch offices.

Stakeholders that will be included but not limited to the following (annex 3):

- Ministry of Finance and Economic Development – UN Agencies and Regional Economic Cooperation’s Directorate
- Heads of All DIP implementing partners
- Management, Technical staff and experts of DIP institutions
- Regional office Management, Technical staff and experts
- Contributing donors: CIDA, DFID, SIDA, EC, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, UN OHCHR and UNDP.
- UNDP
- Governmental and non-governmental institutions such as CSOs and academic/research institutions

IV. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The key deliverable expected from this terminal evaluation is a comprehensive analytical, evidence based and high quality report in English that should follow an agreed outline. Report will be a stand-alone document that substantiates its conclusions. The following are the key deliverables expected from the Evaluation Team (ET):
1. **Inception report**: The Evaluation Team (ET) is expected to prepare an inception report before embarking on the full-fledged data collection exercise. The report needs to provide detailed information about the evaluators’ understanding of the ToRs. The evaluation inception report should contain an evaluation matrix that displays for each of the evaluation criteria, the questions and sub-questions that the evaluation will answer, and for each question, the data that will be collected to inform that question and the methods that will be used to collect such data. The inception report should make explicit the underlying theory or assumptions about how each data element will contribute to understanding the results—attrition, contribution, process, implementation and so forth—and the rationale for data collection, analysis and reporting methodologies selected. The inception report should also include a proposed outline of the report, schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables within the overall timeframe of the assignment.

2. **Draft evaluation report**: The Evaluation Team (ET) will produce a draft Report presenting preliminary findings of the evaluation based on the agreed outline and quality standards agreed during the inception phase.

3. **Presentation of draft report to stakeholders**: The draft terminal report would be presented to the stakeholders for discussion and input.

4. **Preparation of final report**: Inputs and comments received from the stakeholders would be incorporated in the final report and submitted as final output of the exercise.

**Outline of final evaluation report**: The Evaluation Team (ET) will deliver a final report with a maximum of 50 pages (excluding annexes) consisting of:

- Executive summary
- Background/Introduction (A brief description of the programme context, program including, key results, strategies, resources, partnerships, management, evolution of the programme etc)
- Objectives, scope, method and data sources
- Analysis of program progress (comparison of planned and achieved results and resources by sub program) – including relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and coordination.
- Challenges and opportunities (including assessment of the assumptions)
- Lessons learnt: The new knowledge gained from the initiative, context, outcome and evaluation methods which are applicable to and useful in other similar contexts. The lessons should highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design and implementation that affect performance, outcome and impact.
- Conclusion: reasoned judgment based on a synthesis of empirical findings corresponding to programme context circumstances
- Annexes (as appropriate)

### V. INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANCY

The task requires two highly qualified and experienced individual consultants – an international and one national that will be responsible to deliver on all aspects of the
evaluation. The applicant must be independent from both the policy-making process and the delivery and management of activities of the programme, i.e. he/she must not have participated in the preparation and/or implementation of the assessed programme and must not be in a conflict of interest with programme-related activities. The selected consultants would be required to present the following key competencies:

**Team Leader (International) responsible for the overall outcome of the evaluation**

**Required Skills and Experience:**

**Education:**
- Advanced University Degree in Law, Justice, Governance, political science, or related discipline;
- Ph. D. will have an added advantage;

**Experience:**
- Extensive knowledge in democratic governance programming, monitoring and evaluation;
- 20 years of senior level experience in the field, law, political science, democratic governance and democratic institutions capacity development;
- Demonstrated knowledge and experience of legal and judicial regulatory/institutional frameworks for protection of human rights, popular participation and transparency and accountability;
- Preferably have experiences in working with UN agencies/bi-lateral agencies including experience in evaluating multi-donor initiatives;
- Have a deep knowledge and understanding of the Ethiopian democratic governance context;
- Strong interpersonal skills, communication and diplomatic skills, ability to work in a team;
- Ability to plan and organize his/her work, efficient in meeting commitments, observing deadlines and achieving results;
- Ability to work under pressure and stressful situations;
- Strong analytical, reporting and writing abilities;

**National Consultant**

**Education:**
- Advanced University Degree in Law, Justice, Political Science, Human Rights, or related discipline;

**Experience:**
- Knowledge in democratic governance programming, monitoring and evaluation;
- At least 15-20 years experience in the field of human rights issues, law, political science, democratic governance and democratic institutions capacity development;
- Demonstrated knowledge and experience of legal and judicial regulatory/institutional frameworks for protection of human rights, popular participation and transparency and accountability;
• Preferably have experiences in working with UN agencies/bi-lateral agencies including experience in evaluating multi-donor initiatives;
• Have a deep knowledge of the Ethiopian democratic governance context;
• Strong interpersonal skills, communication and diplomatic skills, ability to work in a team;
• Ability to plan and organize his/her work, efficient in meeting commitments, observing deadlines and achieving results;
• Ability to work under pressure and stressful situations;
• Strong analytical, reporting and writing abilities;

Evaluation Guiding Principles

UNDP has Evaluation policy which is guided by the Executive Board. The policy was approved by the Board in 2006. The policy establishes the guiding principles and norms and explains key evaluation concepts, outlines the main organizational roles and responsibilities and defines types of evaluations covered. The policy has set the following guiding principles which are complied with in any type of evaluation in UNDP. The policy emphasizes that the evaluations must be utility focused and a learning tool that creates an opportunity to share insights and knowledge about what worked, what didn’t work and why, and supports UNDP and partners in managing for results.

Reporting:
The terminal evaluation would be guided and backstopped by UNDP. All DIP stakeholders would be actively involved in the process of the evaluation. The UNDP focal person for the evaluation is the Team Leader for the Democratic Governance and Capacity Development Unit.