Final Report

Mid-Term Evaluation for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Program

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1. Summary of key findings

a. In the sample sites selected for the evaluation, there have been intractable conflicts that claimed the lives of many people, causing huge property damage and displacements of inhabitants. In fact, the intractable conflict in some of the project sites existed for well over 30 years. Prior to the implementation of the project, some of these Woredas have been in serious crises. The findings of the evaluation revealed that the relevance of the project in terms of addressing real needs on the ground is beyond any shadow of doubt.

b. The evaluation team tried to figure out issues of participation in the project at two levels- the planning and implementation. Hence, the team tried to figure out the issue of participation in the project at two levels. Despite the claim for participation of different stakeholder in the project development process, the team could not trace supportive documents indicating the involvement of the targeted woredas and by extension inhabitants living in the conflict prone areas. On the other hand the team observed that at the implementation level communities’ involvement in conflict prevention and resolution activities has been encouraging.

c. One of the necessary steps to cascade capacities at local level is trainings for local practitioners. In the project sites assessed, local institutions on conflict prevention are relatively strengthened towards the level of preparedness to respond to early signal of violence. There are signs where trained practitioners diffused the capacity gained locally in the form of knowledge and skills. There are also signs indicating that the quality of services delivered through conflict prevention and resolution initiatives has not only improved but also reached out to the appropriate beneficiaries.

d. The findings of the evaluation show that the immediate results of the interventions include among other things, organizing skill training, and conferences, establishment of different community structures such as peace committees at different levels, schools and universities peace clubs(that facilitated the reconciliation processes, consolidated the achievements gained as well as promoted peace in conflict prone areas) and the creation of multi-stakeholder steering mechanisms at the national and local levels. The effective utilization of, militia and community police in ensuring peace in the area could also be cited as another immediate result of the project intervention.

e. Findings also show that there are encouraging signs of success at the outcome level including but not limited to establishment of basic capacity for CEWRRN and the consequent availability of strengthened local capacity for preventing and resolving conflict, responsiveness of established government structures’ to conflict, significant reduction in frequency and magnitude of conflict incidences, the prevalence of relative peace and stability in many of the intervention areas, the ongoing development activities underway in the conflict prone Woredas and the resumption of markets are identified as outcomes of the intervention.

f. Regardless of the obvious disparity in terms of the level of involvement, strength and commitments, the mechanisms/ structures that are in place including peace committees, peace clubs and joint committees of elders and religious leaders just to mention a few are guarantors for the sustainability of the peace building process. The evaluation team also
observed that despite regional disparities, the initiation of joint development schemes in adjoining conflict prone woredas, notably, Belowjiganføy Woreda (Benshangul-Gumuz Region) with Sasiga (Oromia Region) as well as Jille Timuga (Amhara regional state) with Hadellela Woreda (Afara –regional state) are additional evidences that mark the sustainability of the peace building process.

g. The findings shade light on some of the good practices including identifying and harnessing shared values and beliefs of communities locked into violent conflict; establishing a structure and assigning a process owner entrusted with the responsibility of implementing conflict prevention and peace building activities; mainstreaming conflict prevention and peace building activities as cross-cutting issue and thereby integrating it into the works of all offices and control over armament in market places are good practices to draw on.

h. Lack of consistent and continuous coordination, visible capacity gaps among regions in terms of understanding how to monitor conflict incidences and situations relating to violence, glaring differences among regions in terms of cascading the structures of conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response are identified as some of the aspects of the project that need redesigning and reshaping.

2. Summary of recommendations

The evaluation team proposes the following:

The trainings organized by MoFA had considerable contribution in imparting knowledge and enhancing the skills of local experts. Due to the high turnover of trained officer many woredas are plagued by shortage of skilled personnel in conflict Management and Prevention.

To address the problem of staff turnover, MoFA in collaboration with the Regional Administration and Security Bureaus should organize Training of Trainers (ToT) Program to regional experts who in turn organize actual and refresher training to local experts from time to time as well as train other peace actors with the view to developing pool of experts (who can immediately feel vacant posts) to address the high staff turnover.

MoFA should also organize;

- ToT for experts drawn from the University faculty and administration who train not only new leaderships of university peace clubs succeeding the outgoing crew but also campus-wide sensitization workshops for the university community on conflict prevention and resolution;
• Joint training program to members of grassroots structures;
• People to people conferences from time to time and
• Training on dialogue facilitation skills vital for moderating peace conferences and reconciliation processes for religious leaders, elders even for those who hold public offices

There are capacity gaps in terms of monitoring conflict incidences, identifying situations sustaining violence, verifying and ensuring information quality, making sound analysis and preparing report. Consequently, taking into account these capacity gaps, MoFA should organize tailor made training for field monitors on skills such as tracking conflict signal, collecting and sifting relevant information from the irrelevant ones, and how to record, document data and prepare report.

Obviously there are differences among regional states in terms of cascading the structures of conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response. In some intervention areas, encouraging results have been achieved. On the other hand, the conflict ignited in Moyale in 2012 caused huge devastations, is suggestive of the Early Warning Systems in-place are dysfunctional. Therefore, MoFA should;

• Revisit the existing blueprint of the early warning mechanisms to come up with well-designed system with adequate, well trained and motivated professional staff equipped with state of the art technology.

• Utilizing modern communication technology is central for the effective functioning of CEWRR. The evaluation team realized the pressing needs for putting these facilities in place. In addition, the team noted that technological requirements particularly for processing and relaying information are different in regional contexts. A communication option which may work in a certain area may not prove to be working in other areas. Therefore, the communication options need to be context dependent.

The single most important area to be considered in future intervention is the creation of strong bond among communities living in conflict prone woredas through infrastructural development like building schools where the children of different ethnic groups learn, establishing health
centers whereby communities locked into conflict access services, constructing commonly used roads as well as small scale irrigation dams so and so forth. Attempts made by local government to implement joint development have been plagued by lack of realistic plan as well as adequate resources and skills. Thus MoFA should;

- Help local governments in identifying and prioritizing joint projects that can be achieved within the capacity of local governments;
- Lobby regional and federal governments to allocate adequate resource to implement joint projects; and
- Lobby other bilateral and multilateral donors to fund joint projects.

There are common markets operating in conflict prone areas. The markets are life blood to all communities who are trapped by vicious cycle of conflict. Equally, if markets are appropriately used, they are vital instruments to bring about economic integration among different communities and they can serve as a platform to promote peace culture, tolerance and bring durable peace. MoFA should explore how to creatively use local markets to promote the culture of peace among different ethnic groups as well as economic integration and by extension advance the cause of peace.

For the last several years, it has been witnessed that numerous events organized by the federal government and regional states alike have recognized and awarded successful farmers, entrepreneurs, professionals, etc. It is a pity for it has never been heard of any state or non-state actors’ initiative aiming at recognizing and awarding efforts in the area of peace building, a crucial factor for ensuring sustained economic development and building prosperous democratic society. Recognition and award while motivating winners to keep up their achievements, stimulate others to follow suit and thereby contribute to improving the situation in conflict prone areas. The evaluation team suggests the project holders and funders to consider, the designing of an activity that awards the most successful peace building initiative in conflict prone areas. The award ceremony should be presided by top political leadership, preferably by the Prime Minster to show, among other things, the paramount importance of peace for development, the government’s commitment for ensuring durable peace as well as cross the message violent conflict is a menace that can wipe out years of development efforts in a few days unless properly addressed.
Broadcasting the program in Amharic language as opposed to their local languages, poor transmission quality in remote areas and being oblivious of the program transmission time (by many people) contributed to the ineffectiveness of the radio program sponsored by MoFA. Radio program is an effective means to reach far and wide provided that the program is carefully designed with the view to reaching the target audience. The evaluation team suggest that MoFA to:

- Conduct evaluation of the program to identify what is working and what is not working in the radio program,
- Use community radio or educational radio stations to transmit its program,
- Produce and transmit programs through vernacular languages; and
- draw experience from successful radio programs in the area of HIV/AIDS, gender to determine contents and mode of deliver.

Documenting good practices both electronically and in print media is an end in itself and a means to promote peace. Documentation helps researchers, state and none state actors to draw on readily available information so that they save resources, time and energy in searching for data/information on what has already been accomplished in the past. Added to this, it can also be a resource material for public awareness camping. The documentary footage produced on Jile Timufga and Adlella Woredas by MoFA and transmitted through ETV several months back is a case in point. The evaluation team suggests that documenting good practices both electronically and in print media be incorporated as one activity in the second phase of the project.

3. Introduction and background

3.1. Review of the Program Context
Conflict is a generic term that embraces variety of traits. Its nature and cause differs as well. Border conflict, conflict arising from natural resource competition, religious conflict and inter and intra ethnic conflicts are some of the most common types of conflicts seen in Ethiopia and other countries of the Horn of African Sub-region. The nature and causes of conflicts are multiple. For instance, in Ethiopia competition for resources such as land, pasture, and water; clashes due to livelihoods competition between sedentary farmers and pastoralists; heightened awareness of ethnic identity; and political issues such as language rights and perceptions of
disenfranchisement, and arguments on border delineation between regions and ethnicities are some among the causes of conflict.1

a. **Natural resources conflicts**

“Green War” otherwise dubbed Environmental scarcity theory contends that the diminution character of natural resources is the major cause for major violent conflicts. The theory identified factors that constitute not only environmental scarcity but also responsible for major violent conflicts including “supply induced scarcity”, “demand induced scarcity” and “structural scarcity”. While supply induced scarcity is associated with natural resource depletion and degradation, demand induced scarcity on the other hand is” linked with population growth and the consequent extra pressure on existing resources” 2 Likewise, Structural scarcity refers to “unequal distribution of resources concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individuals or social groups” (ibid)3. Gleditsch ( 2007), quoted in Yohanese (2010 P.246)4 suggested that erosion of the carrying capacity of the environment together with over utilization of natural resources trigger fierce resource competition that “ may break the norms of non-violent behavior”5.

In the same vein, Teshome 2010, p.183)6, citing Critchley and Terriff (1993:333), argued resources could be direct cause for conflict if (i) they “are becoming increasingly scarce in a region, (ii) they are essential for human survival, and (iii) the resource can be physically seized or controlled”( ibid)7 The study revealed that while “direct conflict over renewable resources” is a rare phenomenon, “competition over scarce resources will have a strong indirect effect on the propensity for conflict”( ibid )8 The study contends that “Limited availability of resources places

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1 UNDP, 2007
3 ibid
4 ibid
5 ibid
7 ibid
8 ibid
stress on society, which makes the society less stable and more conflict-prone” (ibid.)⁹. It is also worthwhile to note that most conflicts that occur among pastoralist communities and Agro-pastoralists, who are coming under increasing pressure from natural disasters such as drought and flooding…, are compounded by climate change. Population growth, increasing numbers of livestock produced for export, deforestation, environmental degradation, bush encroachment, and invasive species will further increase pressure and competition over shared and shrinking resources. These communities also have diverse settlement patterns inhabiting different ecological zones and, accordingly, practicing different production systems as well as having diverse livelihood basis. As a result, there is conflict between farmer and herder, farmer/herder versus forest users and rural versus urban dwellers. These conflicts are mostly informed by lack of properly implemented land use system and degradation of natural resources (UNDP 2012, p.8).¹⁰

b. Boundary conflicts

Assefa, (2006:136)¹¹, has keenly observed that “conflicts between ethnic communities over grazing land, water and other resources long predated the introduction of the federal system. But the post-1991 political changes have meant that, in many parts of the country, traditional enmities between different communities have been transformed into conflict between adjacent regional states. Examples include competing claims to the town of Babile by Oromia and Somolia Regional State; long-standing tension over access to resources between Borona and Gari, which is now redefined as a conflict between Oromia and Somali Regional State; similar tensions between the Afar of Afar Regional State and the Issa of Somali Regional State; and, finally between the Gedeo of the SNNPRS and the Guji Oromo of Oromia (Assefa, 2006:136).

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⁹ ibid
¹⁰ UNDP Ethiopia’s Development Brief Series: TOWAEDS COMPREHENSIVE PEACE POLICY BUILDING POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR ETHIOPIA No.4 2012

c. Ethnic conflict

Following the change of government in 1991, the Ethiopian state has been reconfigured along federal line. Observers, “by and large… agree that federalism is deemed perhaps one of the main conflict preventing models, among others. Different literatures reviewed… commend federalism from among Consensusualism, Hegemony, and Arbitration as a very important instrument in preventing ethnic conflict” (Abera 2010, p.27). Ethiopia too introduced federalism since early 1990s for the simple reason that the former “is presented as an instrument that could provide better conflict management mechanism that would lessen inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts” (Asnake 2004, p.56). In practice the adoption of ethnic federalism has produced tangible improvements in inter-group relations at national level” (ibid). On the other hand, subsequent to the coming into force of the federal arrangement, “there have certainly been considerable implementation problems and a proliferation of new conflicts on the ground” (ibid.) It is observed that “issues of identity and control of administrative structures have… led to interethnic tensions and conflicts in almost all of the multiple identity regional states” (ibid.).

d. Religious conflicts

Ethiopia is highly regarded for its secularism, mutual respect and religious tolerance. However, there is growing evidence of religious radicalization (New Business Ethiopia, 2011). Extremism in all its variants constitutes both a cause and a consequence of conflict; deepening mistrust within and between communities can contribute to outbreaks of violence and acts of terrorism. Evidence from other countries suggests religious radicalism might be symptomatic of deeper levels of political and socio-economic discontent (UNDP 2012, p.8).


14 ibid
15 ibid
16 ibid
17 UNDP (2012) UNDP Ethiopia’s Development Brief Series: TOWAEDS COMPREHENSIVE PEACE- POLICY BUILDING POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR ETHIOPIA No.4
3.2. Review of national conflict prevention and resolutions policy framework and strategies

3.2.1 Legal and policy frameworks

a. FDRE Constitution

Assefa argues that the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution by establishing “regional government whose boundaries coincide with at least some of the major nationalities… has served as a conflict-regulating device” (Assefa, 2006:132). The Constitution also bestowed powers and functions to different branches of governments with respect to conflict. For instance the House of the Federation (HoF) is empowered to deal with conflicts arising within the federation as well as among federal units. The HoF is mandated with duties to “…strive to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between (regional) States” (Article 62(6)). Currently HoF is undertaking a national conflict mapping programme which is also an input to the national CPR Strategy it sought to develop later.

Also Article 48 of the FDRE Constitution provides guidelines on State Border Changes. Sub-1 entails that “All State border disputes shall be settled by agreement of the concerned States. Where the concerned States fail to reach agreement, the House of the Federation shall decide such disputes on the basis of settlement patterns and the wishes of the peoples concerned.” Sub-2 of same provision provides “The House of Federation shall, within a period of two years, render a final decision on a dispute submitted to it pursuant to sub-Article 1 of this Article.”

One of the powers and Functions bestowed to the House of Peoples’ Representatives under Article 55 (16) of the FDRE Constitution is to request “on its own initiative,…a joint session of the House of the Federation and of the House of Peoples’ Representatives to take appropriate measures when State authorities are unable to arrest violations of human rights within their jurisdiction. It shall, on the basis of the joint decision of the House, give directives to the

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concerned State authorities.”

Moreover, Sub-14 of Article 51 of the Constitution that defines the Powers and Functions of the Federal Government stipulates that the latter “shall deploy, at the request of a state administration, Federal defense forces to arrest a deteriorating security situation within the requesting State when its authorities are unable to control it.”

b. The Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)

The Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan has set strategic direction and a number of goals with regard to preventing and resolving conflicts under its Capacity Building and Good Governance Pillar (Pillar/Chapter 7). In its strategic direction, the GTP indicated that “custom and tradition of peaceful resolution of disputes will be given special emphasis and will be applied” (International Monetary Fund 2011, p.101), during the strategic plan period. Likewise, the goals outlined in the GTP include: to promote the values of peace and tolerance and strengthen the capacity of resolving disputes peacefully, establish mechanisms to detect and prevent conflicts before they occur and implement same, resolve conflicts that have arisen before they result in harm; build the capacity of resolving conflicts permanently through research; take measures to enhance the values of tolerance and respect between religious institutions and their followers; by conducting research identify sensitive religious issues, seek solutions to religious conflicts and implement them; enhance the awareness of the leadership at all levels and that of the population on interstate relations and on federalism; and establish a system for permanent intergovernmental, institutional structure and process for the federal and regional state relations((International Monetary Fund 2011p.103)

b. Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA)

Provisions that deal with conflict situations are enshrined in the Criminal Code and sectoral policies such as the Ethiopian Water Policy, Environment Policy, Foreign Affairs and National

20 ibid

21 ibid.


23 ibid
Security Strategy, Rural and Agricultural Development Policy and Strategy and even the functions of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the purpose of this review, the evaluation team exclusively focuses on the powers and functions vested in the Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) by Proclamation No.691/2010\(^{24}\) a Proclamation to Provide for the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Pursuant to Article 14 of Proclamation No.691/2010, Ministry of Federal Affairs is conferred with the following power and functions with respect to conflict: a) cooperate with concerned federal and regional state organs in maintaining public order; b) without prejudice to the provisions of Article 48 and 62(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, facilitate the resolution of disputes arising between regional states; c) without prejudice to the provisions of the relevant laws and upon requests of regional states, devise and implement sustainable political solutions for disputes and conflicts that may arise within regional states; d) coordinate the implementation of decisions authorizing the intervention of the federal government in the affairs of regional states; h) work in collaboration with pertinent government organs, religious institutions and other organs to ensure that peace and mutual respect will prevail among followers of different religions and beliefs, and to be able to prevent conflicts; register religious organizations and associations; and with the view to preventing conflict (j) issue permit for the possession or use of arms, firearms and explosives; determine conditions applicable for the selling of explosives; issue permits for the selling and repairing of arms and fire arms.

**d. Strategies**

The Ministry of Federal Affairs has a Draft Strategy of Conflict Prevention and Resolution (in short CPR Strategy) which is now an operational framework guiding all the interventions of the ministry, the regional counterparts and its other partners. Donor-partners of the Ministry are also basically supporting this strategy as a process. The strategy in a nutshell can be explained around its four major pillars which are:

\(^{24}\) Proclamation No. 691/2010, a Proclamation to provide Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation, 17th Year No. 1 ADDIS ABABA 27th October, 2010
• Preventing conflicts through the promotion of Culture of Peace in our communities;
• Reduce vulnerability of our population from violent conflicts through putting an effective Mechanism of Conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response in place;
• Proper management and resolution of ongoing conflicts through various mechanisms of conflict handling; and
• Working towards sustainable solutions for deep-rooted conflicts (particularly those conflicts which are protracted for long and have their roots deep in problems of natural resource scarcities and underdevelopment).

3.3. **Project Background**

3.3.1 **The project and its objectives**
For more than a decade now, the Ethiopian economy has witnessed a remarkable consecutive growth which is also reflected in the sphere of social development such as education, reducing child mortality and fighting diseases. Consequently, incidence of poverty has been showing a decline with high level of social expenditure which is complemented by investment in building institution, decentralizing administrative power and expanding infrastructure. However, the project document identified areas of concern that have been challenging these economic and social gains which Ethiopia has to address to ensure a sustainable and peaceful long term development. These are cycle of drought and conflicts spilling across boundaries with its neighbors or among its diverse groups over scarce natural resources, land and water. The project document has also appreciated the need for a strong system both at the national and local levels to mediate and effectively resolve competing claims over natural resources and along ethnic lines.

Cognizant of these challenges, the Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and UNDP Ethiopia have signed a three-year (2010-2013) program called “Strengthening National capacities for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building”. The overall objective of the program was to build the capacity of national and local government

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25 Strengthening National capacities for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Project Document signed between UNDP and MoFA; (2010 to 2013); p. 3
institutions and local communities to prevent, resolve and transform violent conflicts in some selected parts of the country. Specifically, the project aims to:

- Create permanent local and national mechanisms, systems, structures and capacities for the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts in Ethiopia;
- Promote a culture of peace, management of violent conflict in the country;
- Establish early warning and conflict analysis mechanism; and
- Promote women participation in peace building efforts.

3.3.2. Project Output

As an immediate output, the project document envisages that “national and local systems for the prevention, mitigation, resolution and transformation of conflicts strengthened or established.” From this, it can be inferred that the project targeted two results; strengthening existing systems or establishing new ones in their absence. Consequently, the project has been set out to strengthen the existing conflict prevention and peace building mechanisms operating at the national, regional and local levels including the capacity of Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) to develop national system for conflict prevention. The UNDP supported the project not only to further the initiatives implemented by other actors but also scale up these activities at the local, regional and national levels. Specifically, the following have been indicated as intended outputs of the project:

a. Institutional and technical capacities for development and implementation of conflict prevention initiatives acquired and sustained by key project partners;

b. National conflict prevention architecture (including an analysis, early warning and response system incorporating internal mediation capacities at the federal, regional and local levels), established and sustained on the basis of consultation with relevant stakeholders;

c. Elements of a national “culture for peace” identified through facilitated consultative process at national, regional and local levels, and subsequently implemented through media, educational institutions, and civic organizations;

d. Capacity gaps in implementation of local level peace building efforts, and in the work of local peace committees and councils identified through rigorous assessment of current agreements and concrete steps implemented to address gaps;
e. Detailed assessments conducted of women’s current and potential roles in peace-building and of capacity gaps in relevant institutions in engaging with impact of violent conflict on women, concrete measures implemented to enhance women’s roles in peace building, and to ensure their sustained protection;

f. Mediation and negotiation capacities for senior leaders and officials built and sustained, including through training and TOT for individuals drawn from ranks of government and other key sectors; integration of curricula on constructive negotiation and mediation into the syllabus of public training institutions and training on mediation and constructive negotiation for senior managers and staff of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3.3.3. Beneficiaries
The Project Document has clearly identified the intended beneficiaries which include MoFA and regional states. As a national architecture for ensuring coordinated, timely and effective support to all pertinent actors, a significant element of the program was designed to involve assistance for MoFA and its key interlocutors at the regional and local levels.

3.3.4. Strategies
Towards achieving the stated objectives, the project document provides four strategies which involve:

a. starting small, building experience and up-scaling interventions that work well;

b. promoting institutional collaboration for skills and resource complementarities and synergy building, in particular with existing conflict prevention initiatives by other national and international partners;

c. Basing interventions on evidence and participative assessment and prioritization including gender balance, and building national, regional and local ownership of projects activities and ensuring stakeholders commitment and contribution to enhance sustainability.

3.3.5. Intervention Areas
The project document has identified the following as areas of engagement to achieve the objectives of the project;
• Strengthening of local capacities for peace and social cohesion amongst local government and communities including sustainable capacities for conflict analysis and early civil response;
• Strengthening of the human and institutional capacities of the federal government towards conflict prevention, and towards the promotion of peaceful co-existence;
• Establishment and implementation of a national architecture for anticipation and responding to emerging tensions before they lead to violence including by capitalizing on resources and initiatives already present at the local level;
• Initiation and sustaining of activities to enhance trust, and build confidence between the federal government, and groups and communities at the regional and local levels with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes including through the promotion of a “culture of peace”; and
• Systematically encourage and ensure the increased participation of women in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts at the local, regional and national levels, and ensure that the general public and civic institutions at all levels are required to engage with and address issues relating to gender and conflict.

4. Methodology and approach

4.1. Scope and Objectives
The main objective of the mid-term evaluation is to conduct a comprehensive, systematic and participatory assessment and reflection on the process and outcomes of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Building project. To achieve this objective, the evaluation team was expected to:

• Collect and analyze relevant data and background information on conflict prevention and peace building project through desk review and interviews;
• Undertake research and prepare a background report on Government strategies and program on conflict prevention and resolving;
• Assess achievements, successes challenges, and lessons of the conflict prevention and resolving project;
• Draw up recommendations based on the review of achievements, successes, challenges, lessons of the conflict prevention and resolving project;
• Based on the review, propose and develop an extension plan to extend the project;
• Undertake field assessment missions to the project sites to gather information from local project beneficiaries and explore the particular contributions of the program to its beneficiaries. It is an essential step since the opinion of the community at grassroots and their participation is at the core of the review session; and

• Conduct report validation workshop to gather feedbacks on the draft report.

4.2. Methodology
The methodology employed for conducting the evaluation combined both primary and secondary sources of research, and the following data collection methods were used to collect the required information from beneficiaries and other stakeholders;

Desk Review: The evaluation team reviewed relevant documents available at MoFA and UNDP which include the Project Document signed between UNDP and MoFA, Annual Work Plan (AWP), the FDRE Constitution, relevant legislations, GTP, reports, etc.

Key informant interview: The team has conducted interviews with key Government officials at MoFA, Regional, Zonal, Woreda and community levels.

Field work: The following project areas and key local institutions were selected by the evaluation team, in consultation with MoFA; Belowjiganfoy and Sasiga Woredas from Benshangul-Gumuz regional state, Jile Timuga Woreda from Amhara regional state, Adelela from Afar regional state as well as Boset Woreda from Oromia regional state. Adama University and other relevant offices in the respective regions and federal government offices have also been involved in the evaluation exercise. In line with this, the Mid-term evaluation has assessed the achievements, challenges and gaps of the just completed phase of the program which gave UNDP and MoFA the opportunity to measure the performance of the project in terms of achieving its intended results, draw lessons and gain insights for the new program to be launched soon, and upscale good practices to improve the implementation of the new program.

4.3. Evaluation Criteria
The evaluation as provided in the ToR will address the following questions, measuring activities at national and local level works:
Relevance

- Had the project targeted the most appropriate beneficiaries? Who are the beneficiaries? Was the selection all inclusive?
- To what extent the project was relevant under the existing socio-economic and political context of Ethiopia?
- Was the project located in the most suitable and appropriate counterpart?
- To what extent do the overall and specific outcomes contribute towards the attainment of conflict management, peace and ensuring sustainable development?
- What types of conflicts are addressed by the project? How socially relevant are the conflicts MoFA was able to prevent and manage? Was the response strategy by the project relevant?

Design

- Were the project included appropriate activities towards specified outcomes?
- How fare was the project included feasible assumptions and sound analysis of the context?
- Were instruments and tools essential for the project identified from the very outset of the project?
- How were project sites selected?

Efficiency

- How efficient was the project in terms of proper resource utilization, delivery and timeliness?
- Was the project participatory in all its aspects?
- How was the overall partnership between UNDP and the MoFA? And how does this impact efficiency? (positive or negative)
- How was the project managed to achieve agreed results?
- Was the management arrangement included various stakeholders? If so, how did this facilitate efficiency and result orientation of the project?

Result

- What were the core results attained by the project? Had the project contributed for the overall improvement of the MoFA’s in conflict management and resolving capacity?
What have been changed as a result of the introduction and implementation of this project at Federal, Region and community level?

Were situations improved in the project areas?

What local mechanisms and systems have been put in place as a result of the project? What are their eventual contributions to conflict management and peace building?

Redesign and reconsideration

Best practices for future considerations by the project?

Aspects of the project that need redesigning and reshaping?

New result areas to be considered?

Project instruments and tools for consideration?

5. Key findings
   a. Relevance of the program

In the sample sites selected for the evaluation, there have been intractable conflicts that claimed the lives of many people, causing huge property damage and displacements of inhabitants. Community discussion participants from Jile Timuga Woreda remarked that in fact the intractable conflict in the area existed for well over 30 years. The participants further remarked, prior to the implementation of the Project (2001) the woreda had been in a persistent conflict situations. The woreda administrator depicted the gravity of the problem when he says,

Prior to 2001 the situation has been tragic as people were killed on a daily basis. There were occasions whereby 15 people were murdered on both sides in a single day. The ghost of death has been haunting every household... In the past the number of casualties per annum reached 70 on both sides; from Jile Timuga and Afar. In a single incident up to 200 camels, goats and donkeys were rustled. If we add up the loots that took place each year we may find staggering figure. Nowadays the number of livestock being looted annually may not exceed five or six (Muhe Omar Abdela Jile Timuga Woreda Administrator).

One of the community discussion participants elicited how the ghost of death had been haunting each household by pinpointing to some of the discussion participants.

This man lost his brother due to ethnic conflict. That guy over there has survived after being shot with 11 bullets. So many people perished due to the senseless fighting (Chairperson of the Woreda Peace committee).
Likewise, an interviewee from Belowjiganfoy Woreda in Benishangul-Gumuz indicated that conflict was rife in the area that inflicted death, injury and property damage although they could not substantiate the exact figure.

“There were many conflicts which caused loss of life and large amount of materials damage especially in 2008.” (Getaneh Senbeta, Head, Justice and Administration Standing Committee of Belowjiganfoy Woreda Council)

One participant drawn from Benshangul-Gumuz Regional sate who was asked whether the intervention is relevant remarked,

The intervention is very relevant. This project works on early warning. As the project works on cross border and within the border, it has been possible to prevent conflicts. The project supports conflict prevention and resolution activities at Belowjiganfoy and other woredas. So it has contributed a lot (Commander Worku, Regional Office Conflict Early Warning Expert).

Another participant also witnessed that

The project enabled the regional government bodies to prevent and resolve conflicts on their own. For example, the region was able to resolve conflicts happening between Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia regions which were triggered by competition for grazing land along the border of the two regions. The regions have been able to identify causes of conflicts and resolve them using the trainings and other support provided by the project. Some of the conflicts believed to have been caused by power differences were found to be rooted in competition for grazing land (Dinsa Beyene Head, Regional Security and Administration).

As described by the review participants, prior to the intervention violent conflicts have been widespread calming the lives of scores of people, causing loss of property and displacements of people. The team found out the context in the assessed project sites in general and the situation in the Jile Timuga and Adelela Woredas in particular has significantly improved ever since the implementation of the project intervention. Hence, the project is relevant in terms of addressing the violent conflicts which were wreaking havoc in the sites reviewed.

a. Design

UNDAF outcomes (2007-2011) under its humanitarian response section states, “strengthened capacities of Government, communities and other relevant stakeholders to respond to situations that threaten the lives of a significant proportion of a population which require rapid and appropriate action to ensure their survival, care, protection and recovery while enhancing their resilience to shocks and leading to food security and sustainable livelihoods.” Likewise, the
project Strengthening National Capacities for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building” too
commits to work towards implementation of policies, strategies and fully developed
coordination mechanisms to lead to improved food and nutrition security and sustainable
livelihoods; protection of vulnerable populations and their physical, human and social assets
ensuring a smooth transition between humanitarian responses and long-term development. Under
its output level, the Project Document also states that national and local systems for the
prevention, mitigation, resolution and transformation of conflicts strengthened or established.
The project outcomes and outputs have identified the factors to ensure peace and stability which
are important factors to being resilient to shocks and to lead to food security and sustainable
livelihoods. The evaluation team observed that the outcomes of the “Strengthening National
Capacities for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Project is adopted verbatim from
UNIDAF outcomes.

The main activities incorporated in the project document include strengthening local capacities
for peace as well as the human and institutional capacities of the federal government,
establishment and implementation of a national architecture for anticipation and responding to
emerging tensions. enhancing trust, and building confidence between the federal government,
and groups and communities at the regional and local levels as well as encouraging and ensuring
the increased participation of women in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts at the
local, regional and national levels. The evaluation team is of the opinion that the planned
activities are appropriate for achieving the outcomes envisioned in the project document. Never
the less, the team saw while some activities grabbed the attention of MoFA during
implementation period, others such as women in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts
have been sidelined. Moreover, the team also learned that in the course of implementation new
areas of interventions that need to be considered have also emerged.

The evaluation team observed that the project is anchored on two reasonable and interconnected
assumptions. The first assumption underpins absence of communications and coordination is the
culprit impeding the early identifications of tensions and the consequent provision of a well-
timed support to conflicted parties to resolve their differences peacefully and thereby open
leeway for tensions to degenerate into violent conflict. If we strengthen communication and
coordination among states and non state actors, it is possible to prevent the occurrence of violent
conflict. The second and equally important assumption is the presence of local law enforcement authorities or elders or civic groups on the ground prevent the occurrence of violent conflict provided that they are intact with the requisite knowledge and skills for diffusing tensions and negotiating effective solution. The thinking behind this assumption is that mere presence of state and non-state actors on the ground devoid of proper training, knowledge and skill serve little in deterring the flaring-up of violent conflict. The evaluation team found out the assumptions is realistic and in line with the actual needs on the ground. Although it is not exhaustive, the project document identified and fairly assessed sources of conflicts, (pasture, water points, land claims, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts, political disenfranchisement, territorial right, displacement, incursion from neighboring countries), actors involved in conflict as well as conflict prone areas to give insights about the context.

b. Participation
Evaluation participants drawn from Benshangul Gumuz regional offices, as well as Belowjiganfoy and Sasiga Woredas are of the opinion that either they have no idea about it or feel that the participation was minimal. One participant from Benshangul-Gumuz regional police had to say;

We cannot say that the project is very much participatory. Participation in project design seems non-existent. It (participation) plays a crucial role in increasing or decreasing the effectiveness and efficiency of project implementation. When a project is participatory, it increases implementation effectiveness and efficiency (Commander Andualem Eneyew, Regional Police Bureau Security and Good Governance Expert).

Community consultation participant from Belowjiganfoy Woreda opined that “(There was) no satisfactory participation of different sections of the communities,” (Dinsa Amente, Head, Belowjiganfoy Woreda Administration). Another participant seems to suggest that actors that play critical role in preventing conflict and promoting peace were not involved when he says, “police, militia, political leaders, security, religious leaders, elders, and other should be involved in the management and implementation of the project,” (Commander Worku). On the other hand, in Jile Timuga Woreda, the involvement of state and non-stat actors in implementing the project has been robust.

There are advisory councils at the woreda and kebele levels. Peace committees working to prevent conflict exist at the Woreda and kebele levels. These structures
facilitate dialogues whenever ethnic conflict occurs in their localities... Religious leaders are also involved in building peace. At the woreda level there are religious leaders and elders that work jointly with us (Deputy Inspector Mohammed Ali in charge of the secretariat of Jelle Timuga Woreda Police).

The Woreda Administrator further remarked that “The peace committee consists of five members. There are also school peace committees as well. We used all these structures to bring about peace in the woreda” (Muhe Omar Abdela Jile Timuga Woeda Administrator). Similarly community discussion participants affirmed the active involvement of the general public in project implementation.

The people shared expenses for food as well as the burden of logistics necessary for organizing the conferences. This suggests that the people are the owner of their own peace. They are the ones along with investors that contributed their resources to organize the conferences.

An Interviewee from MoFA Attempts on his part said,

Attempts were made to ensure the participation of state and non state actors at different stages of the project. While conducting the baseline study MoFA’s experts teamed up with local experts. Also relevant state actors beginning from Keble administration all the way to the regional states were involved in the process. Communities residing in conflict prone areas were given a chance to identify their problems, harms inflicted on them and recommend solutions to address the problem through interviews, and consultative workshops. Local actors were also involved in identifying conflict prone areas as well. Of course, NGOs were not involved in the process simply because the Charities and Societies Proclamation bar them from conflict related activities (Atkilt ).

He also added,

During the development of strategies, regional stakeholders, more specifically Administration and Security bureaus of all regions including the chartered cities, the House of the Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (they did not attend), Councils of Nationalities from SNNR, GIZ, UND, USAID (UND assigned expatriate advisor, USAID assigned, local consultant, GIZ local advisor) They participated in the consultative workshops during the drafting process.

The evaluation team tried to figure out the issue of participation in the project at two levels, at the planning and implementation levels. Despite the claim for participation of different stakeholder in the process of the project development, the team could not trace supportive documents showing the involvement of the targeted woredas and by extension inhabitants
living in the conflict prone areas. On the other hand the team observed that at the implementation level communities’ involvement in conflict prevention and resolution activities has been encouraging.

c. Capacity Building – Framework

Interviewees involved in the review exercise are of the opinion that the capacity building component of the project has been useful. Emphasizing the value of the capacity building training in the reconciliation and peace building process, the Jile Timuga Woreda administrator remarked that,

_The training given by MoFA has been effective. The trainings were one among the contributing factors for the prevailing peace in the woreda. I would say the success stories I told you earlier on are the results of the training given. It helped us in creating awareness among the people. We funded a lot of awareness creation trainings. Equally, the training manuals are also useful resource materials. We are wondering why on earth such useful trainings are no longer given._

The administrator however pointed out the need for more skill training for professionals as well as for illiterates to effectively utilize the existing community structures.

_The structures that exist on the ground are sufficient to carry out the peace building endeavor. But they need skill enhancement trainings. Support and follow up is also imperative from time to time. It is noteworthy that those people who are working in these structures are pastoralists and cultivators and they do not read plans to discharge their responsibilities. So we can support their efforts through discussions and performance evaluations. Dissemination of conflict prevention efforts needs to be reinforced. Documenting success stories and good practices electronically and through print media will contribute to sustaining the peace achieved._

An interviewee from Benshangul Gumuz Regione on his part suggested that the training by and large has been vital. According to him,

_It is helpful in terms of building the capacity of the regional and local actors... For example, after beneficiaries got capacity building training, they have been able to resolve the conflicts between Gumuz and Oromo ethnic groups triggered by competition for grazing land. Before... we thought the cause of the conflict was Oromos superiority feelings, but the findings of the study showed us otherwise, .i.e., the cause was competition for grazing land. Now, the two ethnic groups agreed to commonly use the grazing land and they are using the resources peacefully. The capacity created by the project enabled us to resolve the conflict without the intervention of other government bodies. Now, if a thief steals cattle from one_
region and hides in another region, the region surrenders the thief to the other region based on formal communication between the regions. We have been able to empower elders to play a role in stabilising the area and they did a very good job in this regard. We also empowered the public about popular participation, (Dinsa Amente, Head Belowjiganfoy Woreda Administration)

One more respondents remarked that the “training, and experience sharing among regions helped resolve conflicts caused by border, ethnicity, and resources disputes and thereby resulting in the prevalence of relative peace and resumption of different development activities” (Commander Worku). This same interviewee, however, suggested that since “there were some discontinuity in capacity building as well as in implementing planned activities the support should be continuous until the area develops the necessary capacity in this regard” (Commander Worku). The interviewee further noted, “The capacity building activities should be sustained and there should be regular monitoring and evaluation” (Commander Worku).

Equally, the Report on “Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Strategy of MoFA-CPRD in the Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia” conducted, in 2013, in six regional states, sixteen woredas, sixteen kebeles, sixteen schools and four universities made public that among the participants involved in the review, “a large number of the respondents (69%) found the trainings (offered by MoFA) to be very instrumental in assisting the promotion of the culture of peace in their areas” (p.21). The report indicated that the trainings were commendable notwithstanding the limitations of “cascading down the training to reach more people, lack of comprehensiveness of the trainings” in terms of equipping trainees “with skills that they could impart to others… high turnover of officers” (p.21).

Likewise, as part of the capacity building endeavor, a study tour to the Republic of Ghana has also been organized for persons who were in charge of conflict prevention and peace building in regions and within MoFA alike. Participants claimed that they have drawn useful lessons for their work from the training on institutional arrangements for peace-building, conflict early warning and rapid response mechanisms, intervention approaches, peace culture, mediation just to mention a few of the courses that enlightened them how a well-structured and integrated peace architecture plays a pivotal role in conflict prevention and resolution. In this regard, one informant from Benishangul-Gumuz Regional Office also highlighted the relevance of the capacity building components of the project when he says,
The project assisted us to a great extent through capacity building training and experience sharing. For instance, I was sent to Ghana for experience sharing visit on how to prevent, resolve and transform conflicts. I cascaded the experience I gained from the visit to the regional office, zone and woreda offices including the regional president and his office (Dinsa Beyene Head, Regional Security and Administration).

It can be argued, many of the result areas are focused on creating and strengthening capacities for conflict prevention and resolution at the local and national levels. Training for practitioners, peace conferences and multi-stakeholder consultative sessions were among the key activities set out to strengthening local peace building interventions.

One of the necessary steps to cascade capacities at local levels is conducting trainings to local practitioners. The evaluation team found out the training conducted by MoFA to different state and non state actors involved in CPR improved the capacities of trainees in terms of analyzing their situation and take actions to prevent the occurrence of violent conflict and manage conflict if at all unfolds. There are signs where trained practitioners diffused the capacity gained in the form of knowledge and skills in their respective localities. Findings also show regardless of regional disparities conflict prevention mechanisms are relatively strengthened towards the level of preparedness to respond to early signal of violence. Moreover, the trainings furnished trainees with relevant information to pass on the message of peace to the general public and thereby nurture the culture of peace. The availability of the training manual can also be seen as another positive outcome of the trainings simply because it not only serves trainees as reference to refresh their memories as well as a resource material to conduct training in their localities. Although quantifiable indicators are not available, we can surmise the quality of services delivered through conflict prevention and resolution initiatives has improved as the result of the training.

Despite its positive contribution the training program leaves much to be desired. Findings revealed that the training lacked continuity. For instance, it ignored to incorporate critical skills for Field Monitors (techniques of sifting relevant information from the irrelevant ones, how to collect, record, document data/information and prepare report) as well as dialogue facilitation skills (for religious leaders, elders even for those who hold public offices) vital for moderating peace conferences and reconciliation processes. The training program also overlooked the
importance of developing pool of trainees to overcome the high staff turnover undermining local capacity for conflict prevention and management.

d. Effectiveness (immediate results/Achievements of the program)

1. Output Level
Acquiring and sustaining institutional and technical capacities for development and implementation of conflict prevention, establishing and sustaining national conflict prevention architecture; identifying and implementing elements of national culture of peace through media, educational institutions and civic organizations; identifying capacity gaps in implementing peace building at local level and in the activities of peace committees as well as measures taken to filling gaps; assessment undertaken to identify women’s current and potential role in peace building and capacity gaps in relevant institutions in engaging with impact of violent conflict on women together with measures taken to enhance women’s roles in peace building, as well as ensure their sustained protection; building and sustaining mediation and negotiation capacities of senior leaders and officials’; integration of constructive negotiation and mediation curricula into the syllable of public training institution; building and sustaining senior leaders and officials mediation and negotiation capacities and mediation and constructive negotiation training for senior managers and staff of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were the out puts spelled out in the project document.

For instance, the Jile Timuga Woreda administrator indicted the pivotal role played by community structures like peace committees, schools and university peace clubs in conflict prevention.

The peace committee consists of five members. There are also school peace clubs as well. We used all these structures to bring about peace in the woreda. The peace committees and kebele administrations focus on the preventive side. They probe worrying signals of conflicts and gives solution or report. They trail individuals exhibiting weird temperament and take action or report to the concerned authority. Reserve army, militia and community police are government structures operational at kebele level. They jointly work with peace committees (Muhe Omar Abdela Jile Timuga Woeda Administrator).
Likewise, interviewee from MoFA too noted that subsequent to the implementation of the project “peace committees have been established across the project sites that participate in conflict prevention and management” (Atakilt, UNDP Conflict Prevention Project Officer).

Though nascent the existence of conflict prevention system dubbed CEW can also be taken as one more immediate results envisioned by the project. Interviewees from Belowjganfoy and Sisga Woreda indicated that though the reporting is not consistent and coordinated, the woreda police submit a 24 hour situation report to the regional police office and the latter submits the consolidated report to the federal police. However, the participants indicated that for the early warning mechanism to properly function it should be adequately staffed with well trained personnel and furnished with equipments necessary for the service. Similarly, the Jile Timuga Woreda administrator explained the existence of Conflict Early Warning mechanism at the Woreda and how the system operates.

Weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual reporting system is in place. So Kebeles, report to Woredas, Woredas report to Zones, Zones to regions and regions report to federal government. There is also continuous communication through telephone. We report incidences on daily basis through telephone. The network for relaying information is also in place. This is good since there is no communication gap save problems created by individuals (Muhe Omar Abdela Jile Timuga Woreda Administrator).

The Report on “Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Strategy of MoFA-CPRD in the Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia” issued in 2013 spelled out the contributions of MoFA’s institutional capacity building intervention in making the CEW mechanism functional.

MoFA undertook different activities to ensure the functionality of the system through further training and provision of basic equipment support in the form of computers, faxes, and printers for regional Administration and security bureaus to facilitate the smooth flow of early warning information and data. An additional training was also delivered for woreda early warning experts and kebele level field monitors. Both the regional and the woreda level trainings introduced early warning data collection formats to trainees. (p.16)
Same evaluation Report further indicated MoFA not only receives and utilize data coming through the established Conflict Early Warning Channels within the state structures but also obtain weekly updates from the National Research Institute under the IGAD-CEWARN system. The Report also highlighted the CPR Directorate in MoFA “produces situation reports and weekly updates” (p.25).

Findings show that different structures including peace committees (at different levels), schools and universities, joint peace committees in adjoining Woredas, peace clubs at schools and universities, Conflict Early Warning (CEW) mechanisms and multi-stakeholder steering mechanisms have been established at different levels. Moreover, to enhance the knowledge and skills of members of peace committees and peace clubs trainings and conferences have also been organized.

Though nascent, the establishment of Conflict Early Warning mechanism in the project sites is a significant step towards institutionalizing conflict prevention mechanism. MoFA’s production of situation reports and weekly updates as well as the utilization of the data coming through CEW channel is another encouraging sign of progress. However, findings show that a host of problems plaguing CEW. One of the problems is that the CEW data collection is not supported with a well designed data collection formats and transmission technology. Coupled with this, there is a gap in regular, timely and fast flow of CEW data from Kebele to MoFA level due to lack of communication technology, poor network, and proper logistics which undermines the rapid response effort. Another limitation identified in the evaluation exercise is that in many areas due to limited skills in tracking conflict early warning signals and delay in the timely flow of Conflict Early Warning data “most data are received after the conflict have escalated into violence. This hampered the Directorate’s ability to provide rapid responses”(p.25). The evaluation team is of the opinion that MoFA has to go a long way in reinvigorating this mechanism and ensure regular, timely and fast flow of CEW by putting in place a well designed data collection format, staffing the system with well trained, motivated and adequate workforce as well as equipping it with state of the art in communication technology.
When it comes to peace culture, the findings show peace committees are established at the Kebele level. They are the vehicles for instilling the value of peace and the importance of amicable solution to disagreements via dialogue and communication in the minds of the general public. Ever since, established peace committees have been involved in facilitating reconciliations, conducting dialogues and promoting the values of peace and tolerance in peace conferences. The evaluation team, however, found out performance is inadequate compared to the enormous tasks entrusted to them. Similarly, peace clubs in schools and universities have accomplished some basic works with respect to the promotion of the culture of peace. University peace clubs in particular handle on-campus conflicts ranging from ethnic to religious to interpersonal conflicts. Be that as it may, findings indicate that some of the peace clubs encountered challenges in carrying out their mission due to lack of relevant knowledge and skills. In some universities, students who succeeded the outgoing leadership (often due to graduation) lack the necessary knowledge and skill to run the peace clubs and by extension to promote the culture of peace, prevent and manage conflict. What’s more, the clubs received material and training support from MoFA only during the establishment phase and no more afterwards. In some universities the clubs could not garner adequate resource and other support from university administrations.

On another note, the findings show that little has been achieved in utilizing electronic media in terms of promoting peace culture. Almost all informants involved in the evaluation confirmed either they have no idea about the radio program produced by MoFA or have never heard of even a single program. The Report on “Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Strategy of MoFA-CPRD in the Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia” released in 2013 came up with similar findings. According to this report “Respondents in nine woredas out of the sixteen said that its contribution was low while respondents in the other seven woredas said they did not know about the radio program at all”.(p.22). Broadcasting the program in Amharic language as opposed to their local languages, poor transmission quality in remote areas and being oblivious of the program transmission time (by many people) have been attributed to the ineffectiveness of the radio program.

The evaluation team is unable to trace evidence suggestive of efforts made to integrate constructive negotiation and mediation curricula into the syllable of public training institution.
Equally, the team could not find assessment undertaken to identify women’s current and potential role in peace building and capacity gaps in relevant institutions in engaging with impact of violent conflict on women either.

Concerning the establishment of multi-stakeholder steering mechanism, respondent from MoFA said,

_There is a quarterly multi-stakeholders meeting involving all stakeholders at local level. This same multi-stakeholders meeting is also convened annually at national level as well. The participants of the multi stakeholders at the national level include: National Security Advisor of the Prime Minister; Director of the Tax and Custom Authority; the Federal Police Commission and all regional states police commissions; Administration and Security Heads of all regions; and Religious leaders drawn from all faiths (Atkilt)._

According to this informant some of the activities performed by multi-stakeholder steering mechanism include contribution to the improvement of inter-governmental relations at regional levels, identification of emerging priorities in conflict prevention and resolution, drafting indicative plan of action as well as briefing stakeholders on the progress made on ongoing initiatives and reviewing the actions.

What’s more, the evaluation team observed that despite regional disparities, the initiation of joint development schemes in adjoining conflict prone woredas; Belowjiganfoy Woreda (Benshangul-Gumuz Region) with Sasiga (Oromia Region) as well as Jille Timuga (Amhara regional state) with Hadellela Woreda (Afar –regional state) is one more output of the project intervention. Regarding the joint development cooperation agreement reached between Jille Timuga Woreda and the adjoining Adelela (Afar) and Efrata and Gidim Woredas the Jile Timuga Woeada administrator remarked,

_We have development and cooperation plan with Efrata and Gidim and Afar Woredas. The cooperation with Afar involves among other things experience sharing, technical support notably assigning professionals, constructing roads commonly used by the two woredas,, joint irrigation schemes, potable water, animal health, working jointly on natural resources. But it is not that strong. We work also with the Efrata and Gidim Woreda as well. (Muhe Omar Abdela Jile Timuga Woeda Administrator)._

The evaluation team is of the opinion that more often than not such kinds of interventions are bound to fail or yield little results for a number of reasons: First, the joint development and
cooperation plans are not informed by findings of a proper study that diagnosed the root cause of the problems. Equally, during the planning process little effort is made to ensure whether the proposed interventions are indeed an appropriate remedy to the root cause of the problem or whether they are viable. Although there are limited root cause studies both at the federal and regional levels, they may not be properly captured and articulated in the joint development plan. What’s more, most of the joint development programs require huge investment exceeding not only the jurisdiction of local governments but also entailing the involvement and decision of regional or federal governments or both which takes longer process and considerable time. Failure to implement according to plan and lack of continuity are additional factors that compromise results.

Although quantitative out puts are not enshrined in the project document, the evaluation team found out the following immediate results derived from the project intervention:

- On the job trainings and coaching was conducted to pools of practitioners drawn from 12 weredas in 3 clusters to enhance their peace-building and conflict prevention knowledge and skills;

- Training was conducted to 403 participants drawn from different conflict clusters in Jijiga, Babille and Diredawa towns that enhanced their knowledge and skills on conflict sensitivity as well as responsible handling of conflicts including proactive prevention;

- Field monitoring and support activities were carried out in 15 weredas in two clusters (Eastern Cluster and Southern Clusters);

- Training was conducted to 60 women at Matehara town to enhance the capacity of local associations and women’s sector bureaus of the Afar, Oromia, Somali and Amhara adjacent weredas;

- Mobilization and sensitization were conducted to 450 traditional leaders and respective stakeholders in three clusters and 29 Weredas to play active role in local peace processes;

- Two national consultative meetings were organized in Addis Ababa (at the federal police headquarters) and in Awassa as well as two local consultative conferences held that involved 16,747 elders, women, and youth;
• Peace conference was organized in Moyale town involving 350 participants that deliberated on issues such as conflict factors, rehabilitation needs, reconciliation and the need for joint responsibility; and

• Conflict prevention and peace building conference was organized by Adama University peace club that involved religious leaders, representatives from different ethnic groups, government officials and the University’s student communities.

2. Outcome Level
The project document envisaged the following outcomes: “strengthened capacities of Government, communities and other relevant stakeholders to respond to situations that threaten the lives of a significant proportion of a population which require rapid and appropriate action to ensure their survival, care, protection and recovery while enhancing their resilience to shocks and leading to food security and sustainable livelihoods.” The evaluation team found out the project has accomplished some remarkable results at an outcome level. Findings show that, there is consensus among interviewees with respect to the outcome of the intervention. An interview from MoFA outlined some of the outcomes achieved.

Peace committees, peace clubs in schools and universities are established and are strengthened. Local capacity for preventing and resolving conflict is now readily available. Basic capacity for CEWRRN is established. Government structures that respond to conflict are established, and their personnel are trained. Their understanding to conflict, conflict handling and their relation with the communities they serve has shown remarkable improvement. As a result failed local government structure is a thing of the past (Atakilt).

The interviewee further pointed out that “significant reduction of conflict in terms of frequency and magnitude has been achieved” (Atikilt). According to him, “following the establishment of peace clubs in the universities the recurrence of inter ethnic violence has also been reduced significantly” (Atikilt). In the same vein, Commander Worku, an interviewee from Benshanguel-Gumuz region Peace and Security Office, pointed out, “There is relative peace... and development activities are underway in the area.” The respondent further remarked, “conflict incidences have decreased and complaints are reduced as a result of the border demarcation and this should be strengthened” (Commander Worku). The response of one interviewee captures the views of other participants of the evaluation exercise. “Conflicts have been reduced significantly.
However, there are inter-personal conflicts triggered by individual economic and other interest” (Dinsa Amente). The respondent also indicated that the project has brought about “stabilization of the community and peace in the area. As a result, conducting business peacefully and practicing ones religion has resumed” (Disna Amente).

Similarly, the Jile Timuga Woreda administrator on his part noted, “doing away with conflicts, saving the lives of people and property from wanton destruction and promoting development are the achievements of the peace initiative” underway in the Woreda (Muhe Omar Abdela Jile Timuga Woreda Administrator). The administrator further said, “Regarding ethnicity, I would say there is no conflict. Individual cases triggered by dispute over land or women may occur” (Muhe Omar Abdela Jile Timuga Woreda Administrator). The community discussion participants from Jile Timuga Woreda described vividly the outcome of the intervention by comparing and contrasting the situation prior to the implementation of the project and afterwards.

*Ethnicity (ethnic animosity) was rife in the past. People on both sides were trigger happy. If the Afars see an Oromo, they just shoot him viciously. Similarly the Oromos kill whenever they see an Afar. This ethnic bias and the consequent senseless killings are now a thing of the past (participants of community discussion).*

The discussion participants also revealed that,

*The Senbete market was a joint market for the Afars and the Oromos. But it had been disrupted for quite some time due to the intractable conflict among the two communities. One of the successes of the initiative is that following the reconciliation, the market has been open to Afars. As a result, they come and conduct business. This in effect stimulated the economy of the town (participants of community discussion).*

During the community discussion the Jilie Timuga Woreda Peace committee chair person brought into the limelight several anecdotes about the outcome of the peace and reconciliation among the rival Afar and Jilie Timuga Oromos.

*One guy who lost his father in the conflict dined with a person who killed his father... One Oromo guy while assisting his Afar compatriots in washing their hands (by pouring water on their hands) suddenly bumped into an Afar guy who killed his son. The killer was so stunned by the coincidence collapsed. Later these two persons were advised to forget and forgive about the past and reconcile. So...*
the process helped to reconcile not only the two ethnic groups but also individuals who were victims of violence and perpetuators.

The Woreda peace Committee Chair Person shared to the evaluation team a palpable peace dividend obtained, at the outcome level, as the result of the project intervention.

In the past the Afar did not come to Senbete market. Whenever a Jile Oromo encounters an Afar guy shooting will begin. But now thanks to the successful reconciliation, the Afars are wondering in the street of Senbete town with no fear or anxiety of being shot. The two Weredas have also started joint development activities (The Woreda peace Committee chair person).

Discussants also remarked that,

The source of conflict was pasture, water and boundary. We reached agreement that pasture should be used commonly by the Oromos and Afars pastoralists. We also agreed water is the gift of Allah. So we decided to use the water communally as well. We share more in common. The community belongs to all of us. So we said we do not need any boundary. Since then we have been organizing conferences every year to trash-out problems. For the last four years there were no any ethnically motivated killings (community discussion participants.)

While acknowledging the improvement of the situation one respondent cautioned that,

There are still potential causes for conflict. Some systems on how to prevent and resolve conflicts are in place, but these are not well established. Now to a certain extent people tend to lodge their complaints to government bodies rather than resorting to violence whenever there is disagreement. Although it is not that much deepened, there is also a certain degree of awareness on conflict prevention and resolution among the community. Now Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia regions have started to negotiate and resolve conflict on their own (Commander Worku)

Findings show that there are encouraging signs of success at the outcome level including but not limited to establishment of basic capacity for CEWRRN and the consequent availability of strengthened local capacity for preventing and resolving conflict, responsiveness of established government structures’ to conflict, significant reduction in frequency and magnitude of conflict incidences, the prevalence of relative peace and stability in many of the intervention areas. The fact that there has been no record of ethnically motivated violent conflict ever since the implantation of the project in the Jile Timuga Woreda, notorious for intractable conflicts, is an excellent example for the project achievement at an outcome level. On the other hand, a prudent assessment of the situation indicates that the outcomes mentioned above are not achieved across
the project sites with the same degree. There is no guarantee for the sustainability of these structure and durability of peace in the long run. The Moyale incident is a case in point for this assertion. Moyale, one of the project sites, has been hit hard by violent conflict that caused the death of people, loss of property and displacement. This calls for pondering over issues why the strategy has been effective in some project sites while bearing little result in others. The The evaluation team feels that there is a lot to be done in the areas of Conflict Early Warning, sustainable solution to underlying causes of conflict, and coordination among state and non-state actors.

**e. Sustainability**

As far as issue of sustainability is concerned the evaluation team learned that regardless of the obvious disparity in terms of level of involvement, strength and commitments, the mechanisms/structures that are in place including peace committees, peace clubs, elders, religious leaders just to mention a few are guarantors for the sustainability of the peace building process. In addition, the team also observed that despite regional disparities and inherent limitations the initiation of joint development schemes in adjoining conflict prone woredas; such as Belowjiganfey Woreda (Benshangul-Gumuz Region) with Sasiga (Oromia Region) as well as Jille Timuga (Amhara regional state) with Hadellela Woreda (Afar – regional state) is one more evidence that marks the sustainability of the peace building process. Availability of the training manual is also another indicator for the sustainability of the conflict prevention and resolution effort.

**f. Efficiency**

The criteria of efficient expenditure, human resource allocation, timeliness could not be assessed due to unavailability of relevant documents.

**6. Good practices for future considerations by the project**

The evaluation team found out activities that could be scaled up or replicated in other places. One among these good practices drawn from Jile Timuga and Afar (Hadelela) experience is identifying and harnessing shared values and belief of communities locked into violent conflict. The team observed that for a couple of reasons capitalizing on shared values and belief has been a crucial factor for the success of the intervention in the two Woredas. First, the Jile Oromo
and Afar are Muslims who exceptionally value their religion. Secondly, both communities not the highest regard to elderly people but also obey their instructions. These two factors hugely contributed to the success of the initiatives implemented in the Woreda. On top of this, the team also realized that “the commitment of the political and security leaderships of the two Woredas (Jile Timuga and Hadelelea) to distance themselves from the parochial partisanship and execute what they were supposed to do can also be cited as another successful approach that can contribute to ensuring peace in the area.

The evaluation team also found out the ban on carrying armament in market places as another good practice worth mentioning. “There are common markets in Senbete, Bite and Jewha. Police drawn from Jile Timuga and Afar are deployed in these places. No one including the political leadership is allowed to carry guns in these markets. Anyone who wishes to come to these markets has to register and surrender his rifle to the police and collect afterwards when he goes back home. This arrangement helps people to conduct their business with no fear or threat of violence. (Community discussion participants).

Establishing a structure and assign “a process owner entrusted with the responsibility of implementing conflict prevention and peace building activities…at the woreda office” (Musa Ajineni, Head, Boset Woreda Administration Secretariat) and assigning staffs responsible for implementation of conflict prevention and peace building at the kebele level as well as holding assignees at the Woreda and kebele levels accountable for the proper implementation of activities are deemed by the team additional good practices that can be drawn on.

One more good practice worth mentioning here is that the Boset woreda has taken conflict prevention and peace building activities as cross-cutting issue and thereby integrated it into the works of all sector offices. Moreover, conflict prevention and peace building activities are included in the job description of civil servants. What’s more, Also, staffs’ contribution /role for effective implementation of conflict prevention and peace building activities has become one criterion, among others, for annual performance evaluation across sectors in the woreda. The Head of the Woreda administration Secretariat further pointed out that a checklist of tasks due to be performed has also been provided to all civil servants in the woreda so that government employees know the tasks (related to conflict prevention and resolution) they are entrusted
and how to carry out these tasks. This approach enabled the Woreda put in place not only appropriate structure and tools for the implementation of activities identified by MoFA but also track who is doing what and hold staffs accountable for the task they are entrusted.

7. Recommendations

The evaluation team proposes the following:

The trainings organized by MoFA had considerable contribution in imparting knowledge and enhancing the skills of local experts. Due to the high turnover of trained officer many woredas are plagued by shortage of skilled personnel in conflict Management and Prevention. To address this problem of staff turn over MoFA in collaboration with the Regional Administration and Security Bureaus should organize trainers of Trainers (ToT) Program to regional experts who in turn organize actual and refresher training to local experts from time to time as well as train other peace actors with the view to developing pool of experts (who can immediately feel vacant posts) to address the high staff turnover.

MoFA should also organize:

- ToT for experts drawn from the University faculty and administration who train not only new leaderships of university peace clubs succeeding the outgoing crew but also campus-wide sensitization workshops for the university community on conflict prevention and resolution.
- Joint training program to members of grassroots structures;
- People to people conferences from time to time
- Training on dialogue facilitation skills vital for moderating peace conferences and reconciliation processes for religious leaders, elders even for those who hold public offices

There are capacity gaps in terms of monitoring conflict incidences, identifying situations sustaining violence, verifying and ensuring information quality, making sound analysis, and preparing report. Consequently, taking into account these capacity gaps MoFA should organize tailor made training for Field Monitors on skills such as tracking conflict signal, collecting and sifting relevant information from the irrelevant ones, how to, record, document data and prepare report.
Obviously there are differences among regional states in terms of cascading the Structures of conflict Early Warning and Rapid Response. In some intervention areas encouraging results have been achieved. On the other hand, the conflict ignited in Moyale in 2012 that caused huge devastations suggestive of the capacity difference among regions in preventing violent conflict is suggestive of early warning systems in-place are dysfunctional. MoFA should

- Revisit the existing blue print of the early warning mechanisms system to come up with well-designed system, adequately stuffed with well trained and motivate professionals equipped with state of the art technology.

- Utilizing modern communication technology is central for the effective functioning of CEWRR. The evaluation team realized the pressing needs for putting these facilities in place. In addition, the team notes technological requirements particularly for processing and relaying information are different in regional contexts. A communication option which may work in a certain area may not prove to be working in other area. The communication options needs to be context dependent.

The single most important area to be considered in future intervention is the creation of strong bond among communities living in conflict prone woredas through infrastructural development like building schools where the children of different ethnic groups learn, establishing health centers whereby communities locked into conflict access services, constructing commonly used roads as well as small scale irrigation dams so and so forth. Attempts made by local government to implement joint development have been plagued by lack of realistic plan as well as adequate resources, skills. MoFA should

- help local governments in identifying and prioritizing joint projects that can be achieved within the capacity of local governments;

- lobby regional and federal governments to allocate adequate resource to implement joint projects; and

- lobby other bilateral and multilateral donors to fund joint projects.
There are common markets operating in conflict prone areas. The markets are life blood to all communities who are trapped by vicious cycle of conflict. Equally, if we appropriately use those markets are vital instruments to bring about economic integration among different communities serve as a platform to promote peace culture tolerance and durable peace. MoFA should explore how to creatively use local markets to promote the culture of peace among different ethnic groups as well as economic integration and by extension advance the cause of peace.

For the last several years we have been witnessing numerous events organized by the federal government and regional states alike to recognize and award successful farmers, entrepreneurs, professionals, etc. It is a pity for we have never heard of any state or non-state actors’ initiative aiming at recognizing and awarding efforts in the area of peace building, a crucial factor for ensuring sustained economic development and building prosperous democratic society. Recognition and award while motivating winners to keep up their achievements, stimulate others to follow suit and thereby contribute to improving the situation in conflict prone areas. The evaluation team suggests that the project holders and funders to consider designing of an activity that award the most successful peace building initiative in conflict prone areas. The award ceremony should be presided by top political leadership, preferably by the Prime Minster to show, among other things, the paramount importance of peace for development, the government’s commitment for ensuring durable peace as well as cross the message violent conflict is a menace that can wipe out years of development efforts in a few days unless properly addressed.

Broadcasting the program in Amharic language as opposed to their local languages, poor transmission quality in remote areas and being oblivious of the program transmission time (by many people) contributed to the ineffectiveness of the radio program sponsored by MoFA.. Radio program is an effective means to reach far and wide provided that the program is carefully designed with the view to reaching the target audience. The evaluation team suggest that MoFA

- Conduct evaluation of the program to identify what is working and what is not working in the radio program,
- Use community radio or educational radio stations to transmit its program;
- Produce and transmit programs through vernacular languages;and
• Draw experience from successful radio programs in the area of HIV/AIDS, gender to determine program contents and mode of deliver.

Documenting good practices both electronically and in print media is an end in itself and a means to promote peace. Documentation helps researchers, state and none state actors to draw on readily available information so that they save resources, time and energy in searching for data / information on what has already been accomplished in the past. Added to this, it can also be a resource material for public awareness camping. The documentary footage produced on Jile Timufga and Adlella Woredas produced by MoFA and transmitted through Ethiopian Television (ETV) several months back is a case in point. The evaluation team suggests that documenting good practices both electronically and in print media is incorporated as one activity in the second phase of the project.