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UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

AFGHANISTAN SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME PHASE II

JANUARY 2010 – DECEMEBR 2014

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report represents the final evaluation of the Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP), which was undertaken by a team of three evaluators over a period of 25 working days from 13 March to 5 May 2014.

The evaluation methodology included a review of official United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) programme files, project files and relevant government policies and reports; primary data collection through semi-structured interviews with project stakeholders, visits to two provinces – Herat and Mazar, and debrief of preliminary findings to UNDP and ASGP staff. This report incorporates their comments. The process also faced several limitations, the major ones of which included insufficient time, particularly for the primary data collection, which coincided with several national holidays and security challenges associated with the national elections that were due within a few days of the data collection exercise.

Overall, the ASGP filled a critical capacity gap and need in Afghanistan subnational governance, and addressed an officially endorsed national priority for building capacity at subnational level. There was overwhelming evidence that the project was considered both necessary and timely at all levels, including at central government, provincial and district level, as well as municipalities. The evaluation made the following 16 findings.

- The project lacks a clearly defined pathway to change.
- UNDP failed to seize the strategic opportunity for developing holistic subnational governance system in Afghanistan.
- The project is relevant to national priorities in Afghanistan.
- The project is aligned to UNDP priorities in Afghanistan.
- The project is relevant to human development in Afghanistan.
- There was limited progress towards the overall objective to localise public service delivery and management of public affairs.
- Although some output indicators were achieved, no outputs were fully achieved.
- While coordination at regional level was strengthened by establishment of Regional Offices, project structure needs streamlining.
- Communication between the three main players – UNDP, Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and ASGP – is weak.
- Strategic Governance and Oversight by the Project Board is weak.
- The project appears to have weak financial reporting capacity.
- Budget expenditures consistently increased every year but did not seem to reflect increased levels of output delivery.
- While the overall budget delivery was satisfactory, delivery on substantive outputs was low.

- The project developed some good partnerships, but collaboration with other UNDP projects can be strengthened.
- The project's implementation framework does not engender national ownership.
- The project lacks a comprehensive exit strategy and sustainability plan

As an implementation mechanism, ASGP was working reasonably well, albeit with a few challenges and weaknesses here and there. Its most significant weaknesses was about its huge management infrastructure which did not reflect its technical advisory and capacity building character, and also weak communication and coordination with key partners, including the IDLG and the UNDP country office.

However, while the ASGP rationale and overall objective was not in doubt, UNDP did not take a strategic approach in its support for subnational governance in Afghanistan; and did not leverage on its knowledge of global best practices to influence the form and content of subnational governance in Afghanistan.

In the evaluators' opinion, effective subnational governance can consolidate peace, security and create the conditions for sustainable human development in Afghanistan, and UNDP should continue its support. In future design and implementation of such programmes, UNDP may consider the following eight specific recommendations, three of them at strategic programme design level and five at operational and implementation level.

Recommendation 1. Advocacy and support for enactment and implementation of comprehensive subnational governance legislation and policy framework.

UNDP should develop appropriate strategies to engage the key drivers of change in the legislative arena as well as providing support to civil society to strengthen their capacity to lobby for comprehensive subnational governance reform.

Recommendation 2. Integrate local economic development and basic service delivery as part of local governance

UNDP should leverage on its comparative advantage in pro-poor economic development to develop local government capacities in local economic development linked to subnational governance.

Recommendation 3: Target specific geographic regions or specific local government levels

UNDP should consider developing a targeted approach in which it either (a) targets a specific region or province, or (b) targets specific local government level, e.g. provincial government level, or municipal level. This approach enables UNDP to be more strategically focused and enhances the visibility of its results.

Recommendation 4: Develop effective partnerships and collaboration with other projects

UNDP should leverage its unique position to develop strategic partnership around specific project outcomes with other UN agencies that have appropriate mandates and technical skills in different areas of local governance and local economic development.

Recommendation 5: Promote effective national ownership by aligning project processes with national systems

Some project activities such as public sector planning and budgeting, have profound legal and policy implications. UNDP should therefore identify the relevant national counterparts for its activities and support their capacity. This will enhance the implementation effectiveness, while also generating commitment and national ownership. UNDP should also adopt a strategic approach that promotes progression towards national implementation.

Recommendation 6: Develop plan to hand over the Letter of Agreement (LoA) positions to national civil service

UNDP should undertake a gradual downsizing and eventual abolition of the LoA positions through a carefully designed handover to tashkeel staff recruited under the merit-based system.

Recommendation 7: Reorient project structure to reflect greater technical advisory function

The project structure should reflect the capacity building nature of the project, and move towards streamlining project management in favour of technical expertise collocated with national counterparts to provide hands-own advisory services and mentoring.

Recommendation 8: Plan for project exit during the design stage

UNDP should, as a matter of good practice develop an exit strategy and sustainability plan as part of its project design.

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C. ACRONYMS

ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ASGP	Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme
AusAid	Australian Agency for International development
CP	Country Programme
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organization(s)
DCC	District Coordination Council
DDP(s)	District Development Plan(s)
DfID	Department for International Development
DGO(s)	District Governance Office(s)
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
GIRoA	Government of Independent Republic of Afghanistan
HDI	Human Development Index
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
MAB(s)	Municipal Advisory Board(s)
MCDP	Municipal Capacity Development Plan
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MDG(s)	Millennium Development Goal(s)
MoEc	Ministry of Economy
MoF	Ministry of Finance
NPP(s)	National Priority Programme(s)
NPPLG	National Prority Programme for Local Governance
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PDP	Provincial Development Plans
PFM	Public Financial Management
PGOs	Provincial Governance Office(s)
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SNGE	Subnational Governance Entity
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people's lives. UNDP defines an outcome-level result as "the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups".[1]

2. This report represents the final evaluation of the Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP). The evaluation was commissioned by UNDP to support accountability to national stakeholders and its partners, as well as serving as a means of quality assurance and lessons learning. The evaluation was undertaken by a team of three evaluators over a period of 25 working days from 13 March to 5 May 2014.

3. The report is presented in seven chapters. The introduction of the report is contained in the first chapter, which also includes discussion on the evaluation methodology. Chapter 2 contains a description of the development challenge in Afghanistan in the context of the overall national and subnational governance systems, including an overview of the government's priorities and strategies. Chapter 3 describes the ASGP project and a discussion of UNDP interventions in the area of subnational governance. Chapter 4 contains the evaluation findings. The remaining chapters 5, 6 and 7 contain the lessons learned; conclusions and recommendations, respectively.

1.1. Purpose and Objectives of the evaluation

4. The purpose of the evaluation is to support UNDP's accountability to national stakeholders and its partners, as well as serving as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level while also contributing to learning at corporate, regional and country levels. The findings and recommendations will be used to inform UNDP's future strategies and approaches in programme development and policy advisory support in the area of subnational governance and public service delivery during and beyond the country's transition period.

5. The specific objectives of the evaluation were:

[1] UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3.

a) To assess the programme performance, achieved outputs and the progress that made towards the achievement of the overall programme objectives;
b) To assess the extent to which the progress made has contributed to the intended outcomes to strengthen subnational governance and improve service delivery; and
c) To generate lessons learned from the programme and develop recommendations related to best approaches for future subnational governance interventions in Afghanistan.

1.2. Scope of the Evaluation

6. The evaluation will cover an assessment of all interventions undertaken by the programme at the central government and provincial government levels from January 2010 up to March 2014.

7. The evaluation will be based on the five criteria as defined below.

Box 1: Evaluation Criteria

Relevance: The extent to which the intervention is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.

Effectiveness: A measure of the extent to which a development intervention attains its objectives.

Efficiency: The extent to which development aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.

Impact: The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Sustainability: The probability that the benefits of an intervention will be likely to continue after the project cycle.

1.3. Evaluation Methodology

1.3.1. Overall Approach

8. The methodology was agreed with UNDP as the commissioners of the evaluation, based on the inception report. The terms of reference specified five evaluation criteria – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The evaluation was participatory, with UNDP availed opportunity to provide inputs and guidance through comments of the presentation of preliminary findings and draft report. The final version of this report incorporates UNDP comments from these processes.

9. The following four-step approach was adopted.

a) **Secondary data collection**. Desk review official project documents, including quarterly and annual reports, annual work plans (AWP), and official government reports and

publications. The desk review culminated with a draft inception report, outlining the evaluation plan and methodology, which was reviewed and approved by UNDP. The list of documents reviewed is at Annex 1 to this report.

b) **Primary data collection**. A data collection mission to Afghanistan was undertaken from 19 – 31 March 2014. In Kabul, the evaluators conducted individual and group interviews with UNDP senior management and programme staff, project staff, donor representatives, and government officials from the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) as well as Ministry of Finance (MoF). The evaluators also visited Herat and Mazar provinces and conducted meetings and interviews with the regional managers, provincial and district governors, municipal mayors, provincial council members, donors and civil society representatives. The list of individuals interviewed is at Annex 2 to this report.

c) **Data analysis**. Qualitative analysis of the data was undertaken to extract information linked to the evaluation questions outlined in the terms of reference and inception report. Preliminary findings were presented to UNDP for comments as part of triangulation and validation of information. This report incorporates their comments.

1.4. Limitations

10. The evaluation mission faced a number of critical challenges and limitations, of which the major ones are outlined below.

a) The data collection mission to Afghanistan was undertaken at the onset of national and provincial council elections. This period was characterized by a heightened security environment, which limited the evaluators' access to most of the provinces. The term of office of the Provincial Councils had expired and its members were preoccupied with the election campaign.

b) The evaluation team had one day for the field visits to each of the two regions that were accessible. This time was insufficient to cover more than one province in the region. In addition, the project's three components could not be comprehensively covered in one day.

c) There was a restriction of movement in Kabul for most of the time, which limited the team's ability to meet and conduct interviews as per plan.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

2.1. Country Overview

11. Afghanistan (Box 2) is a semi-arid, land-locked and mountainous country of approximately 652,000 square kilometers, sharing borders with China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and a sector of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir that is controlled by Pakistan. In 2000, the United Nations Population Fund estimated the population of Afghanistan at some 22.7 million. The major languages are Pashto and Dari/Farsi.

Box 2: Map of Afghanistan

2.2. Governance and public administration

12. Afghanistan's government consists of three branches - executive, legislative and judicial. The Head of State, who is also the President, is the head of the executive branch. The legislative branch comprises the National Assembly, which has two chambers - the House of the People and the House of Elders; while the judicial is headed by a Chief Justice who also leads the Supreme Court.

13. The country is administratively divided into 34 provinces (*wilayats*), with each province having its own capital and a provincial administration. The provinces are further divided into about 398 smaller provincial districts, each of which normally covers a city or a number of villages. Each district is represented by a district governor.

14. The provincial governors are appointed by the President of Afghanistan. As representatives of central government they are responsible for all provincial administration and management issues. There are also Provincial Councils which are elected through direct and general elections for a period of four years. While Provincial Councils provide recommendations and ultimate approval of budgets prior to submission to central government, their oversight role has remained unclear.

15. According to article 140 of the constitution and the presidential decree on electoral law, mayors of cities should be elected through free and direct elections for a four-year term. However, mayoral and municipal elections have never been held. Instead, mayors have been appointed by the government, while for the capital city of Kabul, the mayor is appointed by the President.

2.3. Development context

16. According to the Human Development Index (HDI 2012), Afghanistan is ranked 175th among 187 United Nations member states and it has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world, at 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births. Regionally, the country ranks lowest on the HDI.[2]

17. Afghanistan officially adopted the MDGs during the post-Taliban era, almost five years after the Millennium Declaration. As a result, Afghanistan's timeline to reach official targets was extended from 2015 to 2020. In addition, to reflect the critical role played by the security context in achieving socio-economic development, security was added as the 9th goal for Afghanistan, while other targets had to be tailored to reflect the country's specific conditions. Afghanistan has fully integrated MDGs objectives into its National Development Strategy (ANDS) 2008-2013.[3]

18. The country faces difficulty in compiling reliable data due to the ongoing insurgence and inaccessibility of some parts of the country. However, Afghanistan still faces a myriad of challenges to achieve the MDGs. Data on Goal 1 on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger was surveyed in 2011/12 and was found not to have changed significantly from the last National Risk and Vulnerability Survey (NRVS 2007-08), which had estimated that 36% of the population lived below the absolute poverty line. For Goal 2 on universal education, the data available for 2012 indicated the net enrollment ratio was 77% and progress toward the 82% target set for 2015 was on track.

19. On gender equality (MDG 3), the target to improve ratio of girls to boys in primary education to 83% is off track, with 2012 data showing progress of 71%. However, ratio of girls to boys in secondary education had steadily improved from a dismal 30% to 57% in 2012, although the target of 80% was still out of reach. Similarly in tertiary education, the targets were off track, with 36% ratio of girls to boys in universities and other higher learning institutions.

20. For Goal 4, both targets for under-5 mortality and infant mortality rates were on track, based on 2012 data, which showed reduction from 257 to 102 deaths per 1,000 live births for under-5; and reduction from 165 to 74 deaths per 1,000 live births for infant mortality rate. The latest data available for maternal mortality was that of 2010, when the number of maternal mortality recorded was 327 reduced from its base year (2003) value of 1,600 mortality rate per 100, 000 live births. The target for 2015 which is the maternal mortality rate reduced to 320 was therefore likely already achieved or would certainly be achieved before 2015.

21. The MDG Progress reports shows that no general survey to determine the percentage of people suffering from HIV/AIDS was ever done in Afghanistan, although its prevalence among blood donors had decreased constantly from 0.13% in 2005 to 0.01% in 2012. Similarly, progress to reduce malaria and tuberculosis was reported from an estimated number of 46 malaria related

[2] Afghanistan Human Development Report 2012.
[3] Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Report 2013.

deaths in 2008 to 36 reported in 2012. However, the target to reduce the number of malaria and TB related deaths to 5 by 2015 was considered difficult to achieve. Under MDG 7, the proportion of people having access to an improved water source and improved sanitation was reported to have increased slightly, but the progress was marginal and targets for this goal were precariously behind schedule.

2.4. Government policies and strategies

22. The Government of Afghanistan merged the functions related to subnational governance in the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), Secretariat of Ministers of Council (SMC) under the Office of President and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to establish the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) by the presidential decree No. 72 of 30th August 2007.[4] The decree thus created an independent organization directly reporting to the President, with a mandate to support subnational governance entities (SNGEs) and leading the policy and programmatic issues related to subnational governance. The IDLG therefore assumed the functions of administrative and budgetary sub-units, and supervision of municipalities previously undertaken by the Civil Administration Division of the Ministry of Interior. The function for support to Provincial Councils was also transferred from the OAA to IDLG. The Director-General of IDLG was elevated to Ministerial status and the deputies to deputy Ministerial status.

23. In pursuit of its mandate, the IDLG developed the draft subnational governance (SNG) policy in 2008, which was subsequently approved in the same year.[5] Following on this, a draft Implementation Plan was also developed in 2012 and approved.[6] The Implementation Framework establishes the enabling modalities for provincial government entities to develop their respective development plans and budgets as inputs to the national development plan and budget. Project execution and implementation is vested with sector ministries and line departments located at the provincial level. Provincial Governors are charged with the coordination role, to coordinate both planning and implementation of service delivery, while Provincial Councils have oversight and accountability responsibilities.

24. The Implementation Framework empowers Municipalities to generate their own revenues and implement their own service delivery programmes, thus giving them a degree of autonomy and independence compared to other SNGEs. However, the Provincial Governor can exercise some coordinating role with respect to municipal affairs falling within their spatial jurisdiction. Figure 1 below illustrates the schematic of the SNG system as articulated in the SNG policy.

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[4] Sofia Dahiya and Yama, M.N.; IDLG as an Organisation: Its rationale at the time of formation and now,

[5] Sub-National Governance Policy, September 2008.

[6] Sub-National Governance Policy, Implementation Framework; Revised Draft, July 2012.

FIGURE 1: Schematic of the Subnational Governance System



Source: Subnational Governance Policy of the Government of Afghanistan, Revised Draft, July 2012

25. As an interim solution before District Council elections, an agreement was made between IDLG and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) to cooperate in the establishment of, and support to District Coordination Councils (DCCs), as the sole mandated representative body. The policy, operations manual and a roadmap were developed by both ministries, with the DCC policy was endorsed by Cabinet in December 2013.

III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

26. The ASGP is a multi-donor assisted programme that supports the Government of Afghanistan to address and implement its subnational governance policies and strategies since 2006. Now in its second phase (2010 – 2014), the ASGP is involved in institutional development and capacity building of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), and also works at lower levels to support the provincial and district governors' offices, provincial councils and municipalities. Support to the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was discontinued in 2011.

27. The ASGP II is implemented by UNDP with the IDLG as the major national partner. The programme aims to scale up existing interventions in policy development and implementation, national capacity building of IDLG, assistance to provincial, district and municipal administrations and respective councils; and support to local coordination mechanisms at the provincial and district levels. Its overall objective was to contribute to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Outcomes 2 and 3 and UNDP Country Programme Outcome 3 as shown in the Table 1 below.

Table 1: Contribution of Project Outputs to UNDP CP

UNDAF Outcome 2 UNDAF Outcome 3	Government capacity to deliver services to the poor and vulnerable is enhanced. The institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation
CP Outcome 3	The State has improved ability to deliver services to foster human development and elected bodies have greater oversight capacity.
Expected CP Outputs	3.1. Inclusive legislation, policies and programmes are in place and government institutions are strengthened to improve the quality of service delivery. 3.2. Improved capacity of elected bodies to provide effective oversight.
ASGP Outputs[7]	National systems, procedures and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor subnational governance are in place
	Provincial and district governors' offices have the capacity to lead, develop, and implement strategies for improving governance, development and security as per the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)
	Municipalities improve institutional and organizational framework and capacity to collect increasing revenue and deliver basic public services

28. The programme has total approved budget of US$ 95,633,704 and total allocated resources of $69,151,463 funded as follows (Table 2):

Table 2: Project Budget by Source of Funds

Donor	Commitment	Revenue Collected	Receivable
European Union	16,026,169	15,810,203	215,966
Italy	2,565,924	2,565,924	-
Japan	6,989,196	6,989,196	-
DFID	9,600,000	9,600,000	-
SDC (Switzerland)	3,835,636	3,835,636	-
Sweden (SIDA)	17,277,644	10,643,062	6,634,582
UNDP (CCF)	4,132,110	4,132,110	0
UNDP (Core Fund)	2,846,330	2,846,330	-
Finland	681,130	669,389	11,741
France	405,551	405,551	-
SDC (Switzerland)	4,207,054	4,207,054	-

[7] The ASGP Outputs were revised at the end of 2012 from 5 to 3 substantive outputs and a fourth one on management.

Donor	Commitment	Revenue Collected	Receivable
AusAid	1,000,000	1,000,000	-
Denmark	320,000	320,000	-
Estonia	475,543	475,543	-
Korea	8,000,000	5,000,000	3,000,000
UK	656,000	651,466	4,534
Grand Total	**79,018,287**	**69,151,463.47**	**9,866,823.25**

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

29. This section presents the evaluation findings based on the evaluators' analysis of the data and information obtained from document reviews and interviews with project stakeholders. A summary of the findings based on the evaluation criteria elaborated during the evaluation inception phase is at Annex 3 to this report.

4.1. Project Theory of Change

Finding One: The project lacks a clearly defined pathway to change

30. The concept of sub-national governance (Box 3) implies going beyond vertical deconcentration of power, resources and responsibility from the central government. It entails a different way of exercising local power, based on principles such as participation, transparency and accountability. It also involves a wide range of institutional innovations, such as the introduction of participatory budget processes to promote sustainable local development processes, with a strong focus on developing the local economy; it places local governments as 'catalysts' in fuelling collaboration between local actors and in defending local interests at higher levels of governance; it introduces the notion of local planning, which makes it possible to take into account potential social and economic synergies between urban and rural localities.

Box 3: Subnational governance defined
Subnational governance refers to a restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity. Based on this principle, functions (or tasks) are transferred to the lowest institutional or social level that is capable (or potentially capable) of completing them. Subnational governance relates to the role of and the relationship between central and sub-national institutions**. (UNDP (2004) Decentralised Governance for Development: A Combined Practice Note on Decentralisation, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development)**

31. The ASGP project was designed with a view to support the national objectives as articulated in the ANDS. However, the project lacked a clear logic model, which derives from exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of the strategic implications and interpretation of the Government's

agenda. A key weakness in this regard was UNDP's failure to take into account the government's model of deconcentration, and the key drivers of change in an environment where public services at lower levels of governance are provided by line departments who are directly accountable to the sector ministries at central government. As a result, the project did not engage the key service delivery ministries at all levels. Consequently, the Department of Economy, which has a responsibility for planning and monitoring development projects at provincial level did not consider ASGP outputs to fall in the ambit of its mandate.

32. At central level, the project did not sufficiently engage with the Ministry of Economy (MoEc) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). While the IDLG has supervisory role of SNGE, it does not have the mandate to implement nor oversight many of the intended project outputs such as planning, provincial budget and public financial management. These are functions that fall under the mandates of the MoEc and MoF respectively. In addition, there exists within the MoF a Municipality Budgeting Unit, which has the mandate to implement government policy on municipal revenues, but the project did not provide direct support to this Unit. Some of the Municipality Mayors interviewed noted that their ability to implement projects from own-source revenues was constrained by complex procurement laws, for example. This is an issue that requires to institutionalize transfer system for municipalities. In the present architecture, this is done through IDLG, but there is no code in the chart of accounts which is managed and maintained by MoF in order to operationalize the system. One of the key success factors for the project therefore, is to ensure alignment with government and national systems, so that the desired change is not only acceptable to the relevant institutions, but is actually driven by those institutions that have the mandate to instigate the change.

Finding Two. Strategic opportunity for developing holistic subnational governance system in Afghanistan was lost

33. As noted above, the government's model for subnational governance was based on deconcentrating, or transferring the delivery of selected public services and functions from the central government to lower level field offices of central government line agencies. The major benefit for deconcentration is therefore manifest mainly in improved administrative and managerial efficiency in public service delivery. However, in the context of Afghanistan, given the security challenges and lack of basic services in the provinces, naturally the biggest challenge is lack of capacity – individual, organizational and institutional – at the local level.

34. In a deconcentration model, local governments generally rely on central skills and resources in order to function. One of the key success factors for administrative deconcentration is therefore civil service reform and building robust monitoring and evaluation capacity at central level, because the local institutions to which tasks are transferred are not based on political representation controlled from below.

35. At the time of project design, UNDP had rightly recognized this and identified the IARCSC as one of the key implementing partners. This was essentially aimed at enhancing the system of staff recruitment and retention at lower levels in order to ensure sustainability of the project processes and results. However, in 2011, UNDP decided to disengage from the IARCSC, and thereby lost the strategic opportunity to effectively influence and monitor policy and implementation progress on the civil service reforms in Afghanistan.

36. UNDP also lost the opportunity to leverage on its comparative advantage (Box 4) as a trusted partner and its global knowledge of best practices to sufficiently influence government thinking and policy on subnational governance. The notion of Provincial Councils, elected mayors and municipal assemblies gives a sense that the decentralisation process in Afghanistan will be driven by a model in which local government administration will be accountable to the locally elected provincial, district and municipal councils. By implication therefore, the role of central sector ministries is also expected to shift towards policy formulation, guidance, standard-setting, monitoring and supervision.

Box 4. UNDP comparative advantage

UNDP enjoys mutual trust by all partners. Many interviewees stressed that UNDP was a welcome partner which was not considered as a foreign donor. The Government also appreciated the fact that UNDP did not impose an external political agenda. Both donors and government expressed a desire to continue to work with UNDP in the long term.

37. By engaging at appropriate levels, UNDP could have seized the opportunity to influence the model for subnational governance in Afghanistan. UNDP's global experience acknowledges that decentralization is a long-term and gradual process, which involves three dimensions – administrative, fiscal and political. Given the complexity (and sensitivity) of introducing decentralisation, a more effective local governance approach to local development and poverty reduction could have been introduced through a pilot programme. The pilot programme would include for example, participatory mechanisms for public sector planning, and testing budget transfer and public expenditure models in targeted local government entities and provinces. By demonstrating the feasibility and benefits of a holistic local governance approach to local development, UNDP would have created a conducive environment to develop a 'demand-side pull factor' by strengthening civil society constituencies to demand for genuine decentralisation.

4.2. Relevance

Finding Three: The project relevant to national priorities in Afghanistan

38. The provisions in the Constitution are the primary pillars underpinning all government policy and law. The Constitution laid down the basic principles sub national governance in Afghanistan (Annex 4). The project is relevant to the national priorities of the Government of Afghanistan as articulated in the ANDS. In May 2008, the President signed a Decree (No. 2008/1047) establishing a process for drafting and reviewing the government's sub-national

government policy. The decree states that the Policy Drafting Committee and the Policy Review Committee will develop a sub-national governance policy that aims at concurrent progress in social, economic and security sectors and a policy which creates a unified framework for sub-national governance entities and thereby improving coordination among these entities. The Subnational Governance Policy and its Implementation Framework were developed in 2008 and 2012 respectively, with ASGP support.

39. In the Afghanistan Compact the Government also pledged to "*rapidly expand its [the Government's] capacity to provide basic services to the population throughout the country. It will recruit competent and credible professionals to public service on the basis of merit; establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration at all levels of government; and implement measurable improvements in fighting corruption, upholding justice, the rule of law and promoting respect for human rights of all Afghans. The Afghan government will give priority to the coordinated establishment in each province of functional institutions including civil administration. These institutions will have appropriate legal frameworks and appointment procedures; trained staff; and adequate remuneration, infrastructure and auditing capacity."* [8]

The Government also endorsed the ANDS Governance Sector Strategy and committed to:

- Provide good governance, by establishing and strengthening government institutions at the central and sub-national levels that provide open and transparent, accountable, participative, effective, coherent, gender sensitive and inclusive governance based on consensus, democracy and rule of law
- Achieve measurable improvements in the delivery of services and the protection of rights of all citizens through people's participation in governance
- Establish a modern, responsive, democratic, gender sensitive, transparent and accountable public administration enabled to manage public resources efficiently and effectively for improved service delivery in a fair and equitable manner
- Eliminate discrimination against women, develop their human capital and promote their participation and leadership leading to their full and equal participation in all aspects of life
- Create an inclusive Afghan society, in which the human rights of all citizens are realized, protected, respected and extended

[8] Draft Sub-National Governance Policy, 10 September 2008.

- Eliminate corruption in the public and private sector in order to improve the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of government, and to create an environment conducive to investment.

Finding Four: The project is aligned to UNDP priorities in Afghanistan

40. The UNDP website states that "UNDP supports the Government of Afghanistan in achieving a number of development benchmarks of the ANDS in the field of security and the rule of law, civil service reform, transparency and accountability, **local governance**, civil society empowerment, youth, gender equality, human rights, environment and rural energy, the reintegration of former combatants into society, as well as rural development and private sector development".[9]

41. The project is therefore aligned to the UNDAF Outcome 2 and 3 and contributes to Outcomes 3 of the UNDP Country Programme for Afghanistan (Section 3).

Finding Five: The project is relevant to human development in Afghanistan

42. It is generally recognised that substantial improvement in the provision and access to basic public services such as health, education and safe water is central to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The global trend therefore, has gravitated towards the development of elected forms of local government that have, in addition to their vertical accountability, a strong public service delivery role and direct accountability to its citizens.

43. The project purpose therefore constitutes an appropriate response to human development needs. However, the extent of the response and is directly correlated to how comprehensive the decentralisation process is, because this also has an impact on the capacity of the subnational governments to deliver public services. It is generally acknowledged that local governments are well-situated, but need to be more empowered to make a significant contribution to the achievement of the MDGs through effective public service delivery. However, if local governments are the conduits for delivery of public services, local governance is the 'software' needed to ensure local government performance.

44. The two main notions that are central in the concept of local governance are; (i) responsive and accountable local governments as key development actors and focal points for the coordination of other players, and (ii) a vibrant civil society (including the private sector), that is enabled to play its dual role as partner in development and as countervailing force (with the capacity to demand rights, transparency and accountability). The project's response in these two areas was not sufficiently comprehensive to deliver the desired impact. A local governance model that is relevant and responsive to human development needs should therefore combine two

[9] http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home

elements: (a) a system to enhance local government financial and public administration capacity, and management of public resources, and (b) establishing appropriate institutional and organisational local governance process with adequate check-and-balance mechanism for public accountability, including an elected representative body and empowered civil society.

4.3. EFFECTIVENESS

4.3.1. Contribution to CP Outcomes and Outputs

Finding Six: There was limited progress towards the overall objective to localise public service delivery and management of public affairs

45. Despite the project having directly supported both the IDLG at central level and SNGEs at the local level, there has been no significant transfer of authority or resources from the central government to lower levels. IDLG has not effectively demonstrated any capacity and results to fulfill its mandate to advocate for, and coordinate formulation and implementation of policies for subnational governance. As at the time of writing, the major enabling laws for subnational governance were still pending approval, almost two years after their drafting.[10] At the start of project implementation, a Legal Advisor was seconded to IDLG, but this position has been vacant for the past 18 months.

46. The Provincial Budgeting Policy is still in draft stage pending approval and implementation, and therefore PGOs do not have any control over the budget process. More importantly, there is no clear system for financial awards to the provinces. Some of the provincial governors have expressed concern that the system that is in place is not equitable, and it does not reflect the contribution of individual provinces to the national fiscus.

47. The recruitment and staffing process at local level is still largely under the control of IDLG, which is considered by SNGEs as a limitation to their ability and capacity to effectively manage and monitor performance. Project supported technical advisers and experts through a Letter of Agreement modality to build capacity of the SNGEs. However, a general observation and concern by the SNGEs is that most of the capacity development advisors are recent graduates with limited or no expertise in governance or public administration. Consequently, the technical advisors have not been able to do any meaningful capacity development, coaching or mentoring of the national civil service staff (tashkeel). In the provinces visited, the evaluators observed cases where technical advisors were not working with tashkeel counterparts.

48. At district level, project implementation is managed and monitored by provincial level line departments. Some of the district governors observed that project implementation was often done outside their district development plans (DDPs), hence the full impact of localized public

[10] The three major enabling laws for subnational governance were identified as Local Administration Law, Provincial Council Law, and Municipalities Law.

service delivery was never realized. At organizational and institutional level, there was still inadequate capacity for service delivery. In Herat province, for example, 2012 funds were returned to central government leading to a budget reduction for the 2013 financial year.

49. Furthermore, the project document as part of the overall project objective support to SNGEs to enhance their capacity in improving stability and security in their local areas. No specific activities were developed, or any results reported with regards to this objective.

Finding Seven: Although some output indicators were achieved, no outputs were fully achieved

50. UNDP evaluation guidelines define outputs as results for which the project has direct accountability for delivery (in contrast to outcomes, for which projects can only contribute).[11] Based on this definition therefore, the evaluation found that all the project outputs have not been achieved, although some of the indicators were achieved. With regards to the indicators however, the evaluation also found that many of them did not adequately nor appropriately measure specifically the extent of desired results. The example above (Box 5) illustrates a quantitative indicator, which although it may be reported as achieved, has limited value-added as a measure of results achievement.

Box 5: Indicator 2.3

Percentage of Tshkeel staff who have received training (any kind of structured training for any duration) on the office manual in PGOs and DGOs. (Source: APR 2013)

51. Overall however, the project made some notable achievements as the rallying point for subnational governance in Afghanistan (Box 6). Particularly noteworthy, the capacities of PGOs and municipalities have increased remarkably, especially where ASGP regional offices were located. Some of the most notable highlights of the project's successes are outlined below.

- ☺ By March 2014, the number of donors had increased from 4 at the end of 2011 to 12, thereby providing US$42 million in new funding support.
- ☺ ASGP was officially endorsed by the Government to address the national priority programme (NPP) to develop subnational governance capacity and reforms across Afghanistan.

Box 6: IDLG Deputy Minister, Farid Mamundzay speaking at the ASGP Project Board meeting in April 2013

"ASGP is the best single partner that IDLG has had. ASGP support is, in my opinion, the main reason why capacities in PGOs have increased so much in the last few years".

- ☺ The project supported IDLG to provide inputs on the Provincial Budgeting Policy, which outlines the roles of Provincial Councils, PGOs and provincial line departments in the budget cycle and budget monitoring process. The policy is yet to get Cabinet approval.
- ☺ Through project collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and

[11] UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators, 2002.

Development (MRRD), the policy for District Coordinating Councils as the single representative body for district governance was established and approved in December 2013.

- ☺ Thirty-three provincial Development Plans (PDPs) and 7 Provincial Strategic Plans (PSPs) were completed in 2013.
- ☺ Through project support, IDLG became the first (and at the time, the only) organizational entity in Afghanistan to develop "Anti-Harassment Policy Guidelines" for its employees to prevent gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace.
- ☺ An Office Procedures Manual was developed for PGOs and DGOs, and tashkeel staff were provided training in its application.
- ☺ By end of 2013, five PGOs had set up Citizen Service Centers to facilitate civic participation in decision-making and for line departments to receive public petitions and grievances.
- ☺ Municipality Capacity Development Plans (MCDPs) were developed and implemented in 17 municipalities out of a targeted 19 municipalities.
- ☺ Out of the project's targeted 19 municipalities, 17 had developed revenue enhancement plans by end of 2013, out of which 14 reported increasing their own-source revenues by an average 37%.
- ☺ Municipal Advisory Boards (MABs) were established in 13 municipalities, with membership from civil society, including women's and youth groups.
- ☺ Four municipalities had established minimum service standards by end of 2013, thereby providing a service charter by which citizens can measure their performance and hold them to account.

52. Notwithstanding the above successes and achievements, the expected project outputs were not fully achieved. Among some of the factors that contributed to this, is the fact that the quality of the outputs was not always sufficiently measured. For example, even though MABs were established, the level of their understanding of their role and function was not evident during interviews with some of the municipal board members. Some of the municipal information and service centers that were established (for example in Mazar) were not quite operational, and the funding of the PDPs was low, estimated at between 10% - 40% by different respondents in Herat province. Moreover, although the projects are funded from the national budget, it was quite interesting to note that many provinces had construction of mosques among the priorities that were funded. While the evaluators do not wish to imply that these are not important priorities, clearly such projects are unlikely to have a huge impact on the MDGs or the HDI for Afghanistan.

53. Table 3 below shows the status of the output achievements by indicator.

Table 3: Status of Project Results by Output and Indicators

OUTPUT 1: National systems, procedures, and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate, and monitor subnational governance policy are in place		
Baseline	**Indicator**	**Status of Indicators as at March 2014**
(2009) Following Initial drafts prepared: - Provincial Council Law - District Council Law - Local Government Law No rules of procedures or regulations in place.	**Indicator 1.1:** Number of Laws and regulations drafted and approved	All three laws, deemed the major enabling laws for subnational governance were drafted since 2012, but are yet to be approved by Cabinet. IDLG has demonstrably lacked capacity to champion legislative reforms through the national processes.
(2009) Not assessed	**Indicator 1.2:** Strength of the organization and management systems for IDLG	Although no baseline was established against which to measure progress. Project capacity assessments show that IDLG institutional capacity averaged 2.25 points out of a possible high of 5 points, below the optimum level.
None specified.	**Indicator 1.3:** Regular monitoring of the deliverables achieved via the National Technical Assistance (NTA) positions; support via central LOA ensured; and alignment of these deliverables with ASGP and NPPLG ensured.	In results-based management terms, the statement represents a planned activity and not a measurable indicator. None the less, the LOA have been subject to controversy, even resulting in withdrawal of provincial bank accounts. By any measure, not much progress can be reported against this activity.
OUTPUT 2: Provincial Governors Offices and District Governors Offices have capacity to lead, develop, and implement strategies for improving governance, development and security in accordance with ANDS		
Baseline	**Indicator**	**Status of Indicators as at March 2014**
(2009) Average staffing level at provincial level is 60%.	**Indicator 2.1**: Percentage of tashkeel staff positions filled in the PGOs and DGOs	Target for PGO – 90%; Actual - 87%. Target for DGO – 80%: Actual – 83%.
None specified.	**Indicator 2.2:** Percentage of female tashkeel staff out of all currently employed tashkeel staff in the PGOs and DGOs	Target for PGO – 5%; Actual – 3%. Target for DGO – 1%; Actual – 1.8%. Project missed opportunity to impact on these results by disengaging with the IARCSC.
The Office Manual was not in existence at the baseline period.	**Indicator 2.3**: Percentage of tashkeel staff who have received training on the Office Manual in the PGOs and DGOs.	While the project reported that the indicator was achieved quantitatively, a better performance measure would have been to assess proficiency in application of office procedures.
None specified.	**Indicator 2.4**: Number of PGOs and DGOs with a separate toilet facility for female staff.	By end of 2013, nine PGOs and four DGOs had separate facilities for women. Even with baseline and targets not specified, the progress is minimal given the number of PGOs and DGOs covered by the project.

None.	**Indicator 2.5:** M&E system for subnational governance established.	A more appropriate measure is in the implementation of M&E, which was found to be quite weak at all levels.
None specified.	**Indicator 2.6**: Number of Citizen Service Centres established and operational.	Five PGOs reported to have citizen service centers by end of 2013. However, the quality of utiisation was not defined in measurable terms
None specified.	**Indicator 2. 7**: Number of provinces with PDP and PSP completed	33 PDPs and 7 PSPs were completed; but the important issue is the extent of their funding and implementation.
None.	**Indicator 2.8**: Number of PGOs with 80% or more of LOA advances liquidated on time in each quarter	In 2013, no PGOs were able to liquidate advances on time, in part due to delays in work plans, and also due to errors in financial reporting.
None specified.	**Indicator 2.9:** The GDCLCA's page on the IDLG website with relevant information on all the PCs operational	This is yet another example of an indicator with limited utility. The actual measure (goggle tracking, for example) of site visits would provide much more useful information.
None specified.	**Indicator 2.10**: Number. of PCs holding monthly internal meetings following the rules and procedures	Project reports show aggregated number of meetings for all 34 PCs. The real issue should be on the quality of meetings for each PC and whether the meetings led to any behavior change on the part of service providers.
None specified.	**Indicator 2.11:** Number of PCs conducting oversight meetings completed with minutes/reports at least every quarter	Again, the improved compliance resulting from PC oversight is a better measure of result, than merely number of meetings.
OUTPUT 3: Municipalities have improved institutional and organizational framework and capacity to collect increasing revenue and deliver basic public services by 2014		
Baseline and targets	**Indicator**	**Status of Indicator as at March 2014**
No municipalities had CDPs. Target - 19	**Indicator 3.1**: 25 Municipalities with Capacity Development Plans (CDP) implemented	17 municipalities had developed and were implementing their CDPs.
Baseline - 0 Target – 33 municipalities	**Indicator 3.2**: Restructuring initiated in # of municipalities with female employees	11 Municipalities were restructeured. The M&E framework did not capture number of female employees.
Baseline - 0 Target – 33 provincial municipalities.	**Indicator 3.3**: Number of e-governance applications set up	General Directorate on Municipal Affairs still working on e-governance policy.
Baseline – 0 Target – 19 municipalities Revenue target - 20% increase	**Indicator 3.4**: Percent of municipalities with revenue enhancement plan and % of increase in municipal revenue from its own sources	17 municipalities developed and implemented revenue enhancement plans. 14 of them reported increasing revenues by average of 37%.
Baseline – 0 Service standards target – 10 Municipal boards target - 34	**Indicator 3.5:** Number of municipalities with minimum service standards and No. of GOs and MABs established.	4 municipalities established minimum service standards. 13 municipalities established MABs. USAID also worked in establishing MABs in 33 municipalities.

4.3.2. Implementing Effectiveness

Finding Eight: While coordination at regional level was strengthened by establishment of Regional Offices, project structure needs streamlining

54. ASGP established Regional Offices to coordinate implementation at provincial level The evaluation only visited two regional offices in Herat and Mazar provinces (see Section 2.2). From observations made in these two provinces, the regional managers had established effective lines of communication across the three project components. The project had sufficient visibility and all the key players – Provincial and District Governors, Mayors, members of Provincial Councils and MABs – were well aware of and familiar with project activities. Some of the regional managers had up to 8 provinces within their regions, and it was difficult for them to effectively cover all of them. This was further complicated by security challenges, which limited access to some of the remote provinces and districts. In particular, there are about 11 remote, underdeveloped and insecure provinces to which ASGP officials have had limited visits in the project life and have had to rely mostly on the contracted advisors who have little or no capacity development experience.

55. Based on the management structure provided to the evaluation team, the project has 94 staff positions, out of which 12 are international staff and 75 are national staff. About 40% of the total staff are based at head office in Kabul. It would appear that this structure is too heavy for managing a project, and also given the nature of project activities, more of the staff would be better utilized in the provinces. In this connection, the evaluation proposes a leaner structure with a project manager and operations team based in UNDP Kabul, a few technical expert advisors co-located at IDLG and the majority of staff based in the regions.

56. The project also appears to have faced difficulties in filling vacant positions. For example, the post of legal advisor at IDLG has remained vacant for more than 12 months, while that of team leader for the Municipality component has been vacant for over 18 months. While this obviously affects the project's effectiveness, more importantly, it could also affect staff morale when individuals are asked to perform in acting capacity for long periods of time without being confirmed for those positions.[12]

Finding Nine: Communication between the three main players – UNDP, IDLG and ASGP – is weak

57. There has not been effective communication between the three main players in the project. This has manifest in different ways, but the most significant has been the different views between UNDP and various counterparts, including IDLG, PGOs and municipalities regarding the

[12] ASGP management commented that these posts were abolished. If this is the case, then that information was not communicated to other ASGP personnel, who expressed concerns at those vacancies.

recruitment and pay scales for technical staff that are contracted through the Letter of Agreement (LoA).

58. The LoA system was initially devised to fill the capacity gaps in IDLG and provincial levels but has since been widely seen as capacity substitution and a major risk to sustainability. However, there has been no agreement on how the issue could be resolved without adversely affecting the operational effectiveness of IDLG. The government has adopted a policy to harmonise pay and grading for all technical staff positions supported by development partners through the National Technical Assistance (NTA) framework, but this has not provided a platform for consensus between the three main players. In fact, implementation of the NTA policy has stalled so much that even the ASGP annual work plan (AWP) for 2014 was delayed and not completed by end of first quarter. ASGP alleged that the switch to NTA actually increased the LoA salary bill by about $500 thousand across the board, and $87,000 in IDLG alone, even for the same number of staff.[13]

59. On the other hand, IDLG has seen the rapid implementation of the NTA policy as a risk to its staffing, which could potentially result in loss of skilled personnel. IDLG also alleges that the management structure of ASGP is too top heavy and gobbles up about half of the project resources for salaries and benefits of international staff, leaving only half of the funds for substantive activities.[14] IDLG also argues that the direct implementation modality (DIM) of the project by UNDP is inconsistent with principles of national ownership.

60. Clearly, these counter allegations do not provide a conducive environment for effective partnership and project implementation.

Finding Ten: Strategic Governance and Oversight by the Project Board is weak

61. A Project Board was established in accordance with the project design. Membership to the Project Board included representatives of the key partners with appropriate decision-making authority. However, the Board did not meet quarterly as per its terms of reference, but actually met once or twice a year. Moreover, the Board did not effectively address key strategic governance issues as evident from the discussion above. Instead, the Board appears to have concerned itself with trivial operational issues, thereby compromising its role as a strategic governance and oversight body.

62. One of the main weaknesses of the project has been its weak M&E system, which should have been an immediate red flag for the Project Board. The project document provides that M&E will be undertaken at the output and impact levels, but implementation has been weak. Although not mandatory, there was no mid-term evaluation for the project, which given its size and resources, would have been essential. Internal reviews are also prescribed in the project

[13] The evaluation team requested, but was unable to obtain the documentation on which this claim is based.

[14] The independent analysis of the budget by the evaluators does not seem to support this claim.

document to be undertaken every year, but these were never done. These internal reviews would have provided opportunity for project fine tuning and quality improvements. In addition, project reports do not seem to follow a consistent format, and the information therein is mainly about completion of activities rather than progress towards results.

63. One of the key manifestations of the weak strategic governance has been the lack of agreed position on the project implementation modality among the key players. Currently the project is implemented by UNDP under the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). IDLG prefers that the project should be implemented under National Implementation Modality (NIM) citing issues of national ownership and harmonization. In the evaluators' opinion, there are pros and cons under both modalities, but the key is to achieve an agreed position which ensures the eventual transfer of responsibility and sustainability to national partners. This, after all is consistent with UNDP corporate policy, and also consistent with the principles of capacity building as well as the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.

4.4. EFFICIENCY

4.4.1. Budget Expenditure

Finding Eleven: The project appears to have weak financial reporting capacity

64. There seem to be many inconsistences in the financial data reported by the project in its various reports; and the numbers do not always add up. The figures for project expenditure by output provided in the annual reports are different from the cumulative expenditure figures by donor. For example, the project annual report shows total 2012 expenditure of $17,081,921, but the disaggregated cumulative expenditure by donor is $17,026,481 for the same year.

65. In addition, the project was also not reporting financial expenditures by region. This was rather strange, especially given the fact that some donors were earmarking their funds to specific regions, and also since some of the regions had multiple provinces that were not accessible due to security challenges. In this regard, it would be a useful indicator of project effectiveness to actually measure the differences in service delivery between provinces based on total project investments in those regions.

Finding Twelve: Budget expenditures consistently increased every year but did not seem to reflect increased levels of output delivery.

66. Based on the project annual reports, expenditures increased from about $4 million in 2010 to $21 million in 2013 (Table 4). However, according to the same progress reports, the activity outputs show only minor incremental changes. Note, the expenditure figures for 2013

were extrapolated from the expenditure data obtained as at March 2014 by subtracting the prior years. However, using this method yields a negative expenditure for Output 4 in 2013, hence the expenditure data for 2012 was repeated in 2013.

Table 4: Output expenditure 2010 - 2013

	2010 ($)	2011 ($)	2012 ($)	2013 ($)
Output 1	453,474	2,458,503	3,949,260	4,361,902
Output 2	2,395,934	6,102,427	8,981,064	13,226,234
Output 3	421,982	1,286,828	2,739,613	3,879,246
Output 4	1,034,934	2,914,668	1,411,983	1,411,983*

* 2013 extrapolated from cumulative data provided which does not add up.

67. The expenditure data demonstrates a steady increase for all the outputs over the years 2010 to 2013 (Figure 2). However, taking the case for Output 1: progress on Indicator 1.1 remained unchanged during this period, and from year to year, the project has reported that the draft laws were ready to be submitted and debated through the legislative process before approval by Cabinet. For Indicator 1.2., the assessed capacity in IDLG has not changed at the same rate as the expenditures. In fact, IDLG average organizational capacity score was assessed at 2.9 in 2012.[15] However, based on the 2013 Quarterly Report (Q3), average capacity score for the Capacity and Institutional Development Directorate (CIDD) was 2.13 and for the Policy Directorate, it was 2.0. An analysis of the project's reported results for every output shows similar trend where expenditures have risen at a rate that is faster than the rate of progress for the output indicators.



68. Despite the increase in budget expenditure, a substantial number of planned activities were either not implemented or not yet completed. For example, the project has not had substantive presence in all 34 provinces as per the project document. According to the project document, it was planned that 153 provincial and district municipalities would be restructured and build their institutional capacity to increase revenue and improve service delivery, but the project was able to target only 20 provincial municipalities. Among the activities that have not been implemented or completed are: (a) support to the sub-national finance, (b) access to information, (c) sub-national web-sites, (d) public financial management, (e) records of the civil servants, and (f) municipal and district coordination council elections as well as support to majority of DGOs.

[15] Capacity Assessment for IDLG

Finding Thirteen: While the overall budget delivery was satisfactory, delivery on substantive outputs was low

69. Out of the total $69,151,463.47 available resources, 82.4% ($55,302,612) had been delivered by March 2014.

70. However, it would appear that the average delivery rate was constantly propped up by expenditures related to project management. Actual annual delivery on substantive activities (less management expenditures) were subdued in 2010 and 2011, but significantly improved in 2012 (Table 5).[16]

Table 5: Annual delivery rates by substantive outputs

Year	Delivery rate: Annual expenditures /AWP Budget			
	Output 1	Output 2	Output 3	Annual delivery
2010	453,474/2,103,763	2,395,934/3,896,828	421,982/964,472	3,274,390/6,965,063
	22%	61%	44%	47%
2011	2,458,533/3,098,321	6,102,427/23,560,300	1,286,828/7,232,779	9,847,838/33,891,400
	79%	26%	18%	29%
2012	3,949,260/3,560,098	8,981,064/13,205,317	2,739,613/3,933,852	15,669,937/20,699,267
	111%	68%	70%	76%
Output Total 2010 - 2012	**6,861,267/8,762,182**	**17,479,425/40,662,445**	**4,448,423/12,131,103**	**28,792,165/61,555,730**
	78%	**43%**	**37%**	**47%**

71. The above table shows that without including the management expenditures, the total average delivery rate for the period 2010 to 2012 was below 47%. Interestingly, only Output 1 had delivery rate above 50% during that period, even though it is the component where the delivery of outputs has had the least progress (paragraph 63).

4.4.2. Partnerships and Synergies

Finding Fourteen: The project developed some good partnerships, but collaboration with other UNDP projects can be strengthened

72. The project document outlined a partnership strategy, which has been implemented and resulted in ASGP collaborating with various partners in the context of relevant project outputs. The United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was a particularly consistent partner, providing logistical support that enabled project staff to visit some of the inaccessible provinces. In addition, many joint activities were undertaken with UNAMA, including joint workshops in Kunar and Laghman provinces on the role of civil society. In Herat provinces, donor coordinating meetings were also undertaken jointly.

[16] Relevant data to support this analysis for 2013 was not available.

73. ASGP also supported IDLG to build partnerships in the context of project outputs. In November 2012, the project provided support to the National Mayoral Conference, which culminated in IDLG signing a Memorandum of Understanding on urban management with the Ministry of Urban Development. Within its programme of activities, ASGP contributed to the development of policies and guidelines for creation of MABs. The project conducted orientation for the General Directorate of Municipal Affairs and other partners on how to create and actual MABs. While by end of 2013, ASGP had itself directly supported the establishment of 13 MABs, many more (34) were established with support of the USAID project RAMP UPs – bringing the total number of MABs to 47.

74. While these are examples of good partnership building, there is scope for developing more partnerships. Some of the stakeholders consulted as part of this evaluation noted for example, that UNDP had no ongoing collaboration with UN Habitat, which has much more comparative advantages and technical expertise in the area of urban management and development. Similarly in the area of collaboration and building synergy with other UNDP projects, more collaboration could enhance the project's effectiveness. Observations were made by various stakeholders that there was a certain level of duplication among various UNDP projects. For example, until about end of 2013, there was no institutionalized framework for collaboration with the Gender Equality Project or the National Institutions Building project, which are both UNDP projects.

75. Specifically with the GEP project, collaboration in the area of developing appropriate gender indicators for ASGP would improve the quality of results. At present many of the indicators relate merely to quantitative numbers of female employees or provincial council members, which by itself is not sufficient to empower women in the context of local governance.

4.5. Sustainability

Finding Fifteen: ***Project is not sufficiently aligned to the national legal and policy framework***

76. While the project's relevance to national laws, programmes and strategies is not in doubt, its implementation framework has not been fully aligned with national systems. The case was already made in section 5.1 that IDLG did not have the mandate for planning nor budgeting at any level. In order for the project processes and its results to continue after its completion, it is therefore necessary that the national institutions and entities that have the mandate are involved and also that their capacities are built accordingly.

77. It is instructive to note here that sustainability is about how national players interpret and implement their own laws and policies. For example, some key personnel in government noted that the Provincial Budgeting Policy was about decentralizing the financial system; not just the budget, but the entire public finance system, including revenue, budgeting, expenditure, auditing, etc. In this regard therefore, they argued that such a function cannot be legally

embedded in the PGO. They further observed that Article 136 of the Constitution from which IDLG draws its authority and mandate falls under the Chapter on Administration and not Finance. These are all critical legal and policy risks that have a huge impact on sustainability and have to be considered and addressed. UNDP has the comparative advantage to work across the entire system, and therefore can essentially help shape government thinking and policy, thereby ensuring sustainability of its development assistance programmes.

Finding Sixteen: Project's implementation framework does not engender national ownership

78. There is limited ownership of project process at all levels. At the provincial level, PGOs did not feel that they were sufficiently empowered because all major decisions were done by IDLG, including the recruitment of staff and fund management. ASGP had previously empowered PGOs to manage bank accounts on behalf of the project from which they could pay the salaries of LoA staff. However in one of the provinces, in 2013 one LoA member disappeared after withdrawing $41,000 purportedly for salaries. The project then closed all provincial bank accounts and reverted to direct payment by UNDP.

79. At the district level, projects are implemented by line departments which are based at provincial level, and therefore DGOs do not feel that they have ownership of the processes and outputs. In one of the districts visited by this evaluation team, one NGO was providing English language training in the communities, but the project paperwork, including planning, authorization, monitoring and coordination was done by the provincial line Department of Education.

80. At the central level, the issue of national ownership has taken center stage in the context of the disagreements between UNDP and IDLG (paragraph 54). IDLG is of the view that they have acquired sufficient capacity to be able to execute subnational governance programmes under the National Implementation Modality (NIM), and further note that this has worked well in other UNDP supported projects such as NABDP. Much of the discourse however has tended to center around control of the project resources as opposed to control of project activities. In this context, IDLG also do not understand, as they allege, why they are excluded from negotiations with donors.

81. There can be no question that national ownership is fundamental to sustainability. However, such ownership should include the dual dimensions of programmatic ownership as well as financial ownership. In the evaluators' opinion, national ownership is the *raison d'être* for capacity building and should therefore be a major goal of the programme with clearly defined risk management framework and timelines.

Finding Seventeen: ***The project lacks a comprehensive exit strategy and sustainability plan***

82. Sustainability involves planning and managing the 'what, by whom and how' of project processes. The project document somewhat alludes to the planned reforms and the expected

capacity-building outputs as the major platform for sustainability. However, the present reality has shown that there was no well-thought-out exit strategy. One of the key challenges evolve around the issue of LoA staff. Although the LoA staff are national Afghans, they were given salary scales that cannot be sustained by the government without external support.

83. Basic economic theory has always shown price as a function of demand and supply. In this connection, an effective way to bring down the high salaries of public administration staff (LoA) would be to ensure that there is a large supply pool that exceeds the demand. The establishment of a School of Public Administration could therefore in this context constitute the key building block for an exit strategy[17]. In essence, an exit strategy is about the legacy of the project – what does it leave behind, and how long will it continue to exist.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

84. Implementing a project such as ASGP is no mean task with its huge budget, a large number of donors and covering the whole country of 34 provinces and 398 districts but with limited national capacity at all levels. Many good practices were developed along the way, the major ones being (a) establishment of regional offices to coordinate activities at provincial level, (b) initial injection of technical capacity to mentor, coach and provide on-the-job training to the national civil service, and (c) establishment of a representative Project Board to provide strategic governance and oversight of the project. These have already been highlighted in the preceding discussion, including issues about their effectiveness as implementing mechanisms.

85. There have also been a number of emerging lessons, which UNDP may wish to consider in future design and implementation of similar programmes.

Lesson 1: High political intensity and sensitivity.

86. Decentralisation reforms involve the redistribution of power and access to resources as well as shifting lines of accountability. Such reforms therefore tend to be highly sensitive with a high level of uncertainty as positions and policies may change with changes in office bearers at different levels. An illustrative example for ASGP has been the stalled process for enacting the key legislation required for its enabling framework. Even at the provincial level, a change of the Provincial Governor has often meant a shift in priorities or at the very least varying degrees of accessibility by the regional manager to the center of decision-making. A comprehensive analysis to identify and engage the appropriate drivers of change is therefore a key success factor (Finding 1 and 2).

[17] UNDP noted that there is a Civil Service Institute supported by the Government of Korea, which the ASGP could support.

Lesson 2: Different levels of local government have diverse roles and responsibilities.

87. The diversity of SNG entities involved (province, district and municipality) compounds the complexity of defining roles and responsibilities at various levels. In the specific case of ASGP, municipalities are the only entities with revenue authority and therefore different capacity needs. In addition, the assignment of specific services to local governments differs from sector to sector. Public health and road services are examples of services that may be embedded at different levels of local government due to their respective characteristics. In Afghanistan, local planning processes have proven not to be aligned with central planning, and budgets are drawn up in different sector Ministries. A critical success factor is therefore not only should there be adequate legal and policy framework, but also that there is clarity and common understanding of the legal provisions by all the players (Finding 6).

Lesson 3: Strong presence of development partners and diverse actors and stakeholders.

88. At both central and local level, there is a variety of actors and stakeholders with different motives, expectations and sometimes competing or conflicting motives. In the case of ASGP, this manifested in earmarked funding to certain regions or provinces. In cases where different development partners have activities in the same location and targeting the same institutions, this may lead to conflicting methodologies or sometimes may fuel corruption through double-dipping. A broad-based coordination mechanism for development actors is therefore critical for ensuring coherence and harmonization – a role that UNDP is uniquely qualified to undertake because of its position as trusted partner with convening power (Finding 9).

Lesson 4: Developing clear rationale and legitimacy for local governance

89. Because of the limited capacity at the local level there is generally lack of public confidence that the newly established (or restructured) subnational governance entities will be able to take on the new responsibilities in a transparent and equitable manner. The challenge is therefore to demonstrate that local governments can deliver public goods and services effectively and more efficiently. In the design of capacity-building programmes, it is usually tempting (and easy) to assign quantitative performance indicators. However, improving capacity is about change of behaviour and practice. An effective M&E framework, with appropriate, adequate and sufficient qualitative indicators, as well as effective continuous monitoring is therefore a critical condition for building public confidence and generating the demand-side pull that is a prerequisite for comprehensive decentralisation reforms (Finding 7).

Lesson 5: Effective results can be achieved from a more targeted approach

90. The security challenges in Afghanistan affected project results to an extent that the achievements varied from province to province. Specifically, there was limited coverage and support at district level than was planned in the project design. Clearly, the idea that a single project could cover the whole country as extensive as Afghanistan, which is further compounded by inaccessibility of some areas due to security was overly ambitious. A targeted approach would have been much more effective and more importantly, capable of demonstrating much more clearly the benefits of subnational governance and further induce the demand for it (Finding 8).

Lesson 6: Projects without comprehensive exit strategy, face high sustainability risk

91. While capacity building is generally understood to be a long term process, external support from development partners invariably comes to an end at some point in time. The processes and results that were delivered by the project should therefore be continued and sustained by national partners using their own national systems. It is therefore critical that the project design and its implementation framework is, to the extent possible, aligned to national systems and national ownership is sufficiently integrated as one of the main project objectives. It is therefore critical that the process of planning and managing for sustainability and national ownership should be developed as part of the project's exit strategy (Finding 15 – 17).

VI. CONCLUSIONS

92. ASGP has filled a critical capacity gap and need in Afghanistan subnational governance. There was overwhelming evidence that the project was considered both necessary and timely at all levels, including at central government, provincial and district level, as well as municipalities. There is a general consensus that effective local governance can improve public service delivery, and thereby immensely contribute to human development and security in Afghanistan.

93. While the ASGP rationale and overall objective is not questioned, UNDP did not take strategic approach in its support for subnational governance in Afghanistan. Although it is imperative that development partners should work within the confines of national policies and strategies, UNDP failed to leverage on its knowledge of global best practices to influence the form and content of subnational governance in Afghanistan. The present architecture for subnational governance on one hand prescribes elected bodies at all levels, and also capacitates municipalities to exercise a degree of revenue autonomy. On the other hand, the insistence for administrative deconcentration as the primary approach to subnational governance presents complications for transparent and accountable governance.

94. The strategic design of the project therefore positioned ASGP for limited impact. This was further complicated by the clear discord that has been the hallmark of its implementation from the beginning, manifesting in differences of approach by the three main players – UNDP, IDLG and ASGP.

95. As an implementation mechanism, the ASGP project has been quite effective, given its operational environment characterised by lack of adequate legislation and policy provisions, unavailability of sufficient technical skills and security concerns. In addition, the idea that the project could achieve national coverage under such circumstances was probably ill considered. However, as a project designed primarily for capacity-building, which implies the eventual transfer of programmatic and resource management functions to national counterparts, ASGP had an unnecessarily huge structure.

96. In the evaluators' overall opinion, the project requires substantial strategic overhaul to rethink its strategies from a development programming perspective and not merely as a conduit for delivery of donor funds. This may include limiting the target area or even the scope of interventions to focus more on those areas that can produce visible impact and whet the national appetite for comprehensive subnational governance reform.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

97. Despite the limitations faced during the evaluation (Section 2.2), the evaluators feel that the recommendations are based on generally agreed lessons learned and can effectively contribute towards development and planning of any follow up projects on subnational governance in Afghanistan. At the very least, the evaluators hope that the recommendations will be used as a basis for a broader policy dialogue on subnational governance by all stakeholders at the national and subnational levels, including government, development partners and donors.

98. In view of the foregoing analysis and lessons learned, the evaluation was of the opinion that support to subnational governance would significantly strengthen peace, security and human development in Afghanistan. UNDP should therefore build on the results of its prior work through ASGP I and II to continue promoting and supporting the evolving subnational governance process in Afghanistan.

99. The evaluation recommends that UNDP should adopt a more strategic approach in its engagement in the area of subnational governance. Such strategic approach should leverage upon UNDP's comparative advantage as trusted development partner, its knowledge of global best practices in subnational governance, and its convening power to not only support the ongoing process, but also to advocate, shape and influence government policies and strategies in subnational governance.

100. Going forward, eight specific recommendations are made for UNDP's consideration. The recommendations are grouped into two clusters (a) strategic programme design, and (b) operational and implementation issues.

7.1. Recommendations for strategic programme design

Recommendation 1. Advocacy and support for enactment and implementation of comprehensive subnational governance legislation and policy framework.

101. ***Issues to be addressed***. Essential legislation for effective implementation of local governance systems have remained in limbo for a long period, raising doubts about the government's commitment to implement subnational governance. UNDP should develop appropriate strategies to engage the key drivers of change in the legislative arena as well as providing support to civil society to strengthen their capacity to lobby for comprehensive subnational governance reform. The critical gap between provincial planning and national budgeting processes should be addressed not only at policy level, but also at legislative level. This includes advocacy for legislative reforms giving sufficient levels of financial and administrative authority at appropriate levels and strengthening the accountability mechanism of elected bodies at subnational level. Particularly important in the context of equitable development and national peace building, focus and support should also be given to developing a transparent and inclusive system of financial awards to the provinces.

Recommendation 2. Integrate local economic development and basic service delivery as part of local governance.

102. **Issues to be addressed**. Effective local governance is much bigger than merely the vertical shifting of political, financial and administrative authority from the center to local levels. It also encompasses the local economic development paradigm, where local actors join forces in order to promote sustainable local development processes. Local governments can play an important role as 'catalysts' by establishing appropriate legal regulatory framework for local economic development, including business investment climate, investment in infrastructure, and generally promoting employment-based export growth. UNDP should leverage on its comparative advantage in pro-poor economic development to develop local government capacities in local economic development linked to subnational governance. This will also provide a tangible dividend for civic engagement and participation in local governance as well as improve the provision and access to basic services. UNDP should consider piloting this approach in a specifically targeted province in order to provide demonstrable evidence of the benefits, and also to customize its global experience to the context in Afghanistan.

Recommendation 3: Target specific geographic regions or specific local government levels

103. The context of Afghanistan makes it difficult to achieve a national coverage. Some of the regions face extreme insurgence situations that make access virtually impossible. Also structurally, the diversity of roles and functions of the different local governance levels (provincial, district, municipality) make it difficult to develop and implement uniform project activities across the board. This may be further compounded if (or maybe even when) donor funding is eventually reduced. UNDP should consider developing a targeted approach in which it either (a) targets a specific region or province, or (b) targets specific local government level, e.g. provincial government level, or municipal level. This approach enables UNDP to be more strategically focused and enhances the visibility of its results.

7.2. Recommendations for effective implementation and operational management

Recommendation 4: Develop effective partnerships and collaboration with other projects.

104. One of the major comparative advantages that UNDP enjoys is its global reputation as a trusted partner by national counterparts and the development community. This gives UNDP a unique capability to develop strategic partnership around specific project outcomes. Such partnerships should include collaboration with other UN agencies with appropriate mandates and technical skills in different areas of local governance; such as UN Habitat in urban development, UNCDF and UNICEF in local government development and basic service delivery respectively, and UN Women in gender responsive budgeting. Similarly, UNDP should strengthen collaboration between its projects across programme units, including through joint activities in such areas as gender equality and capacity building.

Recommendation 5: Promote effective national ownership by aligning project processes with national systems

105. Project processes that are established outside the national implementation framework face a greater risk of sustainability. Activities that are routinely undertaken by different line ministries at central or provincial level should, as much as possible be supported in that same framework. This is particularly so for activities such as public sector planning and budgeting, which have profound legal and policy implications. UNDP should therefore identify the relevant national counterparts for its activities and support their capacity. This will enhance the implementation effectiveness, while also generating commitment and national ownership.

106. In addition, while acknowledging the capacity challenges in Afghanistan, UNDP should adopt a strategic approach that acknowledges the inevitability of national implementation in the

long term and deliberately nurtures conditions that lead towards national implementation. This approach may include support to establishment of a school of public administration to develop a pool of expertise in public administration. UNDP may also consider developing and agree with IDLG, specific criteria and plan with timeline and risk mitigation strategy for moving towards national implementation.

Recommendation 6: Develop plan to hand over the LoA position to national civil service

107. In the context of the NTA strategy, UNDP should undertake a gradual downsizing and eventual abolition of the LoA positions through a carefully designed handover to tashkeel staff recruited under the merit-based system. This handover should be effectively coordinated with the Capacity Development directorate of IDLG and the Civil Service Commission to ensure that the recruited tashkeel have appropriate functional skills.

Recommendation 7: Reorient project structure to reflect greater technical advisory function

108. The project structure should reflect the capacity building nature of the project. This entails reduction of the project management footprint based at the UNDP country office in favour of technical experts collocated with national counterparts to provide hands-own advisory services and mentoring.

Recommendation 8: Plan for project exit during the design stage

109. ASGP II faces a variety of sustainability challenges that seemingly were not anticipated at the time of project design. The most significant of these challenges is about the institutional sustainability of IDLG if it lost the capacity provided through the LoA position. UNDP should, as a matter of good practice develop an exit strategy and sustainability plan as part of its project design. This entails undertaking a comprehensive swot (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis to identify assumptions that underpin project success and its potential risks. The exit strategy should be accompanied by a specific implementation plan which should be executed and monitored concurrently with substantive project activities to ensure that at the end of the project cycle, the necessary conditions for its sustainability are well established and functioning.

Annex 1: Documents Reviewed

1. UNDP (2014); Concept Note, Programmatic Intervention on Subnational Governance and Development in Afghanistan.
2. UNDP (2014); Final Evaluation report, Country Programme Outcome 3.
3. UNDP (2014); Assessment of Development Results, 2009 – 2013.
4. UNDP (2013); Final Draft, Strategy for Subnational Governance and Development.
5. UNDP (2013); Annual Progress Report, ASGP II.
6. UNDP (2013); Annual Progress Report, NADBP.
7. ASGP (2013); Municipality Report, Third Quarter.
8. ASGP (2013); IDLG Individual Capacity Assessment Report.
9. Government of Afghanistan (2013); Provincial Budgeting Policy, Draft.
10. Afghanistan Research Unit (AREU 2013); A Guide to Government in Afghanistan.
11. UNDP (2013); Afghanistan MDGs Progress Report.
12. IDLG (2013); Annual report 2013, Draft.
13. IDLG (2013); Customer Satisfaction Survey Report.
14. IDLG (2013); M&E Framework.
15. Government of Afghanistan (2012); SNG Implementation Framework, Draft.
16. UNDP (2012); Annual Progress Report, ASGP II.
17. ASGP (2012); Banyam Capacity development Plan.
18. UNDP (2011); Afghanistan National Human Development Report.
19. UNDP (2011); Annual Progress Report, ASGP II.
20. UNDP (2010); Project Document, Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme Ph II.
21. UNDP (2010); Annual Progress Report, ASGP II.
22. IDLG (2010); Schools Municipal Committee Concept.
23. Government of Afghanistan (2008); Subnational Governance Policy, Draft.
24. ASGP Quarterly Reports – various quarters.
25. Mazar Municipality Revenue Report.

Annex 2: Individuals Interviewed

UNDP, ASGP and UNAMA

1.	Abdelgadir, N	Reporting Management Specialist	UNDP
2.	Baqiri, S.M.	Head, SMSU	UNDP
3.	Carter, C.	Chief Technical Advisor	ASGP
4.	Cozman, A.	Civil Affairs Unit	UNAMA
5.	Dahiya, S.	Capacity Development Specialist	ASGP
6.	Djusaeva, S.	Gender Specialist	UNDP
7.	Goxhabashi, A.	Regional Manager, North East	ASGP
8.	Jorgo, M.	Operations Manager	ASGP
9.	Wilson, K.D.	Communications Specialist	ASGP
10.	MacGregor, A.	Head, Western Region	UNAMA
11.	Meyer, R.	DCD Programmes	UNDP
12.	Pradhanang, Y.	Regional Manager, Northern	ASGP
13.	Roderiguez, A.	Country Director	UNDP
14.	Rohullah, M.	A/Head, Cross Practice Unit	UNDP
15.	Salehzada, N.A.	A/Team Leader, Municipal Unit	ASGP
16.	Sediqi, A.S.	Performance and Evaluation Officer	ASGP Herat
17.	Shekhar, A.	Regional Manager, West Region	ASGP
18.	Timory, S.	Head, SNG Unit	UNDP
19.	Timori, M.B.	Finance and Budget Analyst	SMSU
20.	Van Kempen, M.	Coordinator, Rule of Law	UNDP
21.	Yamin, S.	Programme Officer, SNG	UNDP

Central Government Level

22.	Afghani, H.	Senior Programme Advisor	IDLG
23.	Mamundzay, F	Deputy Minister, Policy	IDLG
24.	Momin, A.	Head, Financing and Budgeting	MoF
25.	Noorani, D.	Advisor, Human Resources and CD	IDLG
26.	Sabir, B.	Advisor, Governance	IDLG
27.	Tokhi, H.	Advisor	IDLG

Local Government Level

28.	Afzali, F.	Gender Specialist (LoA)	Herat Province
29.	Akhtary, Z.	Head, Sectoral Services	PGO, Balkh
30.	Asoodi, A.N.	Director, Economic Affairs	Herat Province
31.	Faqiryar, A.A.	Acting Mayor	Herat Municipality

32.	Ghoryani, B.A.	District Governor	Enjeel District, Herat
33.	Hadid, A.	Chair, Provincial Council	Mazar Province
34.	Haidarzada, N.A.	Deputy Chair, Provincial Council	Herat Province
35.	Hijran, H.	SNG Specialist (LoA)	Herat Province
36.	Jafari, F.	Member, Provincial Council	Herat Province
37.	Jamshidi, A.W.	Governance Specialist	Herat Province
38.	Jani, A.	Assistant Governor	Herat Province
39.	Mahaki, A.	Director, Women Support Group	PC Member, Herat
40.	Poya, M.(+37 others)	Chair, MAB	Herat Municipality
41.	Poyesh, E.	Infrastructure Specialist (LoA)	Herat Province
42.	Wahidi, S.F.	Governor	Herat Province
43.	Younas, M.	Mayor	Mazar Municipality

Development Partners

44.	Barientos, B	Programme Officer	SIDA
45.	Roscio, V.	Director, International Development	Italian Cooperation
46.	Schiwa, H.	National Programme Officer	SIDA
47.	Sharif Amiri, M.	Project Manager	European Union
48.	Westerlund, J.	Head, transition Support Team	Swedish Embassy

Civil Society Organisations

49.	Parsa, K.	Network of Youth Associations	Herat Province
50.	Sharifi, W.	Manager, AWEC Women's Group	Herat Province

Annex 3: Findings based on the Evaluation Criteria

Focus Area	Sub-focus	Key Questions	Indicators	Evaluator's Comments
Project context	Internal context	- Is the project founded on sound situation analysis? - To what extent was there broad participation and consensus for the project by all stakeholders? - To what extent UNDP effectively applied lessons learned?	Ownership of the project processes and results by national partners at national and local government levels; and at community level	The project is based on dire need for SNG, improved service delivery and citizen's needs. The Project has a broad participation of stakeholders at national, provincial, district, municipality and donors levels. Key stakeholders are represented its review board/steering committee at the national level. UNDP's application of lessons learnt from the Project is weak. The project is completely owned by the UNDP and the donors. However, IDLG (being the nodal ministry for the Project at national level) considers the Project as UNDP's initiative being a DIM arrangement. However, the ownership of the Project at sub-national level varies from region to region and provinces to province and relates to ASGP's results and successes.
Relevance	Relevance to national priorities Relevance to UNDP priorities in Afghanistan	- Is program aligned with national strategies and is it consistent with human development needs and challenges in the country? - Are the approaches, resources, models, conceptual framework relevant to achieve the planned outcome?	Congruence between UNDP and stakeholder priorities Match of budget expenditures to local needs	Project is highly relevant to national priorities and strategies: - Constitution: Articles 136 to 141 address subnational governance - ANDS: National Priority Programme (NPP4), Governance Sector Strategy, SNG Policy and Implementation Framework Relevant to UNDP priorities in Afghanistan - UNDAF Outcomes 2 & 3 - CP Outcome 3 Relevant to human development needs in Afghanistan - MDG Progress Report 2012: Afghanistan off-track on most of the targets, therefore public and basic service delivery essential - HDI 2011: Afghanistan lowest in the region There is lack of consensus amongst the partners on definition of decentralization. The 'theory of change' is not clearly elaborated and unclear to the project management. The project is not fully aligned to Government priorities and structures (e.g. MoF role viz. PFM, local budgeting and policy frameworks, etc.) The Program approaches, resources, models, conceptual framework need to be fully aligned to national policy & priorities in order to achieve the planned outcome. Matching of budgets to local needs could not be ascertained at the national level ass the ASGP Kabul did not share financial data with the evaluators despite several requests. However, review of LoA funds utilization in North region reveals that the bulk of funds are not going where the "action" takes place and citizen's interaction takes place with the State. i.e. at the districts and municipalities.
	CP Outcomes and Outputs	- To what extent project accomplish its intended objectives and	Achievement of output indicators	Project accomplishments at the outcome and impact levels are unclear. Its major focus is on inputs and outputs level. Project achievements at

Focus Area	Sub-focus	Key Questions	Indicators	Evaluator's Comments
Effectiveness		planned results at the outcome level? At the output level? - Is there evidence that the produced outputs and outcomes *contributed* to the expected impacts? If so, how? (i.e. to what extent are identified changes in outcomes due to the project's contributions)?	Improvement in the delivery of services or planning methods	the output level are already narrated in the findings above. However, one documented change has been in the revenue generation and expenditures by municipalities. But their direct impact on livelihoods, delivery of services or planning methods could not be ascertained due to limited time available in the field and from the project reports. Some positive impact and quality services were observed in Mazar municipality.
	Upscaling	To what extent can the outcomes and outputs be upscaled, and especially in support of the decentralization strategies? If so, by whom? If not, what are the realistic prospects of doing so?	Implementation of interventions outside the target areas	Lessons learnt, good practices need to be properly documented before any scaling up by ASGP. These have to be based on quality & equity of service delivery, sustainability of the intervention and cost-effectiveness.
	Human rights based approach	To what extent has UNDP addressed the HRBA in the project?	Awareness of project processes at lower levels	Gender and HRBA seem to be the missing links in the project staffing, planning & implementation. Except some efforts by the North region office to integrate women and youth into their planning and review exercises. Awareness about project could not be ascertained from any women or youth groups, CSOs, private sector, media or academia.
	Gender equality	To what extent and in what ways has UNDP addressed Gender issues in the project?	Participation of women's groups	Missing links. As mentioned above
	Unintended results	What are the unintended results of the project (positive and negative outputs, outcome and impacts as available)?	Number and significance of unintended results.	Intended results can be stated: improved networking and quick response as a result of IT infrastructure in Govt. offices, improved response time, records and data management, increase in revenue generation and capacities to spend more budgets by a few municipalities in the North. However, their impact on human development cannot be measured nor interpreted for the entire Country. Unintended results: IDLG resentment of ASGP and UNDP's implementation approach and non-responsiveness to IDLG/government priorities.
Efficiency	Resource utilization	- Were resources focused on the set of activities that were expected to produce significant results?	Achievement and progress on indicators	Matching of budgets to local needs could not be ascertained at the national level ass the ASGP Kabul did not share financial data with the evaluators despite several requests. However, review of LoA funds utilization in North region reveals that the bulk of funds are not going where the "action" takes place and citizen's interaction takes place with the State. i.e. at the districts and municipalities. Few municipalities in North region were able to spend greater number of funds generated from their own resources. However, it could not be ascertained what portion of these funds were utilized as development expenditures and non-

Focus Area	Sub-focus	Key Questions	Indicators	Evaluator's Comments
				development budgets. Similarly, what sectors/projects were these funds utilized for.
	Implementation	- Were the projects Implemented within deadline and cost estimates?	Activity completion	There were several major delays in the implementation of ASGP: e.g. delays in LoA funds release due to lack of approvals of work plans, budgets, etc. PDP projects implementation in few regions has stared in 2012-13 and it was too early to ascertain if these project implementation was on schedule.
Sustainability	Local ownership	- To what extent are project results owned and local stakeholders (communities, mid or high level institutions) after the intervention is completed? - Does the project have an effective exit strategy?	Participation and awareness of local level stakeholders	Partners at all levels are highly motivated to take ownership and be part of the implementation, however, the challenge reported by them seems to be the ASGP and its current implementation modality. The project does not have an effective exit strategy.
	Institutional capacity	Did the project effectively develop adequate institutional capacities?	Establishment of relevant legislative and policy frameworks Improvement in outputs	No, the project has not effectively developed adequate institutional capacities at any level. There are major gaps in the legislative and policy frameworks which need to be filled. This is duly acknowledged by both ASGP & UNDP management. This is also backed by the partners continued demand/expressed need for capacity building by ASGP.
	Legal and policy context	To what extent does the country context support the continued sustainability of results?	Presence of policies and plans consistent with project processes	SNG policy and IDLG are two linchpins which can sustain project interventions. The gaps in legal frameworks, as identified in the narrative above, need to be filled. Presently, there is a lack of consistency at all levels.
Implementation management	Strategic Management	- To what extent does UNDP have effective planning, management, monitoring, evaluation and reporting practices in place?	Timely delivery of outputs	These are some of the weakest areas of ASGP/ UNDP which need immediate attention! Outputs are delayed due to lack of effective coordination, understanding and conducive working relationship with IDLG at the national level. This issue needs urgent UNDP's attention.
	Partnership Management	In what instances was UNDP most and least successful in *partnering with others* e.g. national and local governments, multilateral and bilateral organizations, civil society and private sector organization?		Linkages with IDLG, line ministries, donor assisted and other UN agencies programs at the national level; with CSOs, private sector, women & youth groups, media, academia, etc. are weak. IDLG has serious issues with ASGP management and with its implementation modality.
	Project management	To what extent does UNDP have effective systems in place to generate and sustain financial and other contributions resources from international donors and the private sector?	Partnership strategy and resourcing	UNDP has an effective strategy for resource generation and enjoys donors trust and confidence. SIDA & EU being two biggest contributors to ASGP are committed to continuing their support to UNDP and ASGP but with certain changes and greater focus on results.

Focus Area	Sub-focus	Key Questions	Indicators	Evaluator's Comments
Future directions	Lessons leaned	- What are the key lessons learned about the design and implementation of the Country Program emerging from this project? - What changes if any should be made in how UNDP designs and manage such projects in the future?		It is too early to ascertain any lessons learnt from ASGP. These are not being properly documented and shared with donors. However, the inroads Project has made in North region due to working closely with the partners, and in addressing their needs can be regarded as the way ahead for rest of the project! For greater government ownership, accountability, cost-effectiveness and better results, it is highly recommended that project modality be changed to "National implementation (NIM)". The Project must have a clear exit strategy. Strong M&E, communications and project management at national and regional levels is essential to the success of any project. Alignment to national priorities is necessary for national ownership.
	Recommendation	- What conclusions and recommendations should be drawn for the preparation of the next SNG program? - How can UNDP engineer itself to work better with local governments to bring better outcomes?		These are listed below.

Annex 4: Enabling Legal Framework: Extracts from the Constitution of Afghanistan

Article 136

"The Administration of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan shall be based on central and local administrative units in accordance with the law. The local administrative unit is a province. The number, area, parts, and structures of the provinces and the related administrations are regulated by law on the basis of population, social and economic conditions, and geographic location."

Article 137

"The government, while preserving the principle of centralism, shall delegate certain authorities to local administration units for the purpose of expediting and promoting economic, social, and cultural affairs, and increasing participation of people in the development of the nation."

Article 138

"In every province a provincial council is to be formed. Members of the provincial council are elected in proportion to the population by free, direct, secret ballot, and general elections by the residents of the providence for a period of four years in accordance with the law. The Provincial Council elects one of its members as Chairman."

Article 139

"The Provincial Council takes part in securing the developmental targets of the state and improving its affairs in a way stated in the law, and gives advice on important issues falling within the domain of the province. Provincial councils perform their duties in cooperation with the provincial administration."

Article 140

"*In order to organize activities involving people and provide them with the opportunity to actively participate in the local administration, Councils are set up in districts and villages in accordance with the provisions of the law. Members of these Councils are set up in districts and villages in accordance with the provisions of the law. Members of these Councils are elected by the local people through free, general, secret and direct elections for a period of three years. Participation of nomads in these councils is regulated by law."*

Article 141

"*Municipalities shall be set up in order to administer city affairs. The mayor and members of the municipal councils are elected by free, general, secret and direct elections. The affairs related to municipalities are regulated by law."*

Article 142

"For the purpose of the implementation of the provisions, and ensuring the values of this constitution, the state shall establish the required departments."

Annex 5. Evaluation Terms of Reference

1. Background

Developing sound and functional sub-national governance systems is a vital item on the Afghanistan development agenda. The first phase of the Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) was launched in October 2006 with the primary objective of working with the Afghanistan government to build institutional structures and capacities required for effective service delivery at the sub-national level. Based upon the lessons learnt from the implementation of the first phase of the programme i.e. ASGP-I, its successor, the second phase of the programme i.e. ASGP-II was launched in 2010. ASGP is a multi – donor assisted project implemented by UNDP in cooperation with its government partners, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), the Provincial Governor's Offices (PGOs), Provincial Councils (PCs) and Municipalities.

The current ASGP Phase – II (2010-2014) is demand – driven at the provincial level designed to support achievement of the goals and targets set out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), particularly its Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights Pillar. In its second phase, ASGP through its provincial approach has significantly scaled up existing programmes in policy development and implementation; national capacity building of IDLG; assistance to provincial, district and municipal administrations and respective councils to work in partnership to coordinate, lead and manage government services and development assistance; support to local coordination mechanisms at the provincial and district level, including provincial and district administrative assemblies, provincial development councils, district development assemblies and others to improve cooperation and aid efficiency for subnational socio-economic development; and municipal restructuring and revenue improvement.

ASGP outputs:

Output 1: National systems, procedures and legal frameworks to implement, coordinate and monitor the SNGP are in place
Output 2: PGOs/DGOs have capacity to lead and develop plan, programme and implement strategies for improving governance, development and security in accordance with ANDS
Output 3: Municipalities have improved institutional and organizational framework and capacity to collect increasing revenues and deliver basic public services by 2014.

The project was intended to contribute to outcome 3 of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan 2010-2013 "The state has improved ability to deliver services to foster human development and elected bodies have greater oversight capacity."

At the National level, support was provided to strengthen the capacity of the IDLG to own, plan and manage (i.e. to take the lead) in implementing the sub-national governance policy and to put in place sub-national governance and development policies and laws. This included support for sound policy analysis and development. IDLG was also supported to develop the human resource directorate, in training sub-national government and governance authorities and their staff.

Provincial level support was provided in capacity development of Provincial Governor Offices, Provincial Councils and District Governor Offices based on "provincial approach to implementation" through seven (7) Regional Offices (Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kunduz, Kandahar and Bamyan). These Regional offices are equipped with the staff to support the Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils to analyse, plan and implement their own capacity development plans, including through recruitment of their own staff and also to use their capacities to enhance participatory governance and development processes, including by providing them access to budget and financial resources. Support was also provided through competitive selection of the specialized staff imbedded in the PGO/PC/Municipality (lead and implemented by IDLG).

At the Municipal Level, support was provided as part of the provincial approach but more specifically adapted for municipalities in order that municipalities are able to analyse, plan and manage their own capacity development as well as implement governance and development processes. There are total 20 municipalities that have been supported with the financial resources as well as with the specialized skilled staff. The ASGP has a total planned budget of US$139 million the majority of which has been mobilized and despite being in the fourth year of implementation there has still not been a programmatic evaluation although there was an Independent Management Review (IMR) in 2011. During this time the project has evolved from a largely international run intervention focusing on specific geographical areas to a nationally led country wide intervention. In addition to the above the context in Afghanistan has also evolved and the current development agenda as part of the UNDP Sub-National Development Strategy is very much focused upon transition, 2014 and the subsequent transformation process that is envisaged. Given the evolving environment both internally and externally plus that fact ASGP II is nearing its end date in December 2014 the leadership of the project have decided to conduct a programmatic evaluation that will serve as an information platform of the planning and design of follow on interventions to ASGP III.

2. Purpose

The specific purpose of this assignment is twofold:

1. The first purpose is the evaluation of ASGP to assess if programme activities have been carried out and to see if programme outputs and objectives have been met. The standard UNDP evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability needs to be applied for the evaluation along with a special emphasis on Gender within each evaluation criteria.
2. Secondly, the evaluation will be providing recommendations and lessons learned to provide inputs for the design of a future SNG interventions once ASGP comes to an end in December 2014. In this regard an important reference document will be the UNDP Sub National Governance & Development (SNGD) strategy. Furthermore other cluster strategies that have been developed by the UNDP CO will be important reference documents, in particular those related to Gender and Capacity Development, and regionalization. Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) subnational governance policies and manuals are also very important reference documents, some of the key ones being: the National Priority Programme for Local Governance (NPPLG), developed by ASGP's Government partner the Independent Directorate of Local

Governance (IDLG), and the GoIRA's Subnational Governance Policy (SNGP). Other useful reference documents include UNDP/ASGP and IDLG joint policies, including the UNDP-IDLG agreement on provincial reforms, the UNDP/ASGP-IDLG Standard Operating Procedure for Provincial Letters of Agreement (LoA), and the ASGP-IDLG Personnel Manual.

3. Scope and objectives of the Evaluation

The evaluation will cover ASGP II activities carried out during the last 4 years (2010-2013) across Afghanistan. The main objectives of the evaluation are to assess ASGP programme and the results achieved so far towards meeting the overall programme objective. The evaluation will generate lessons learned; and best practices and will develop recommendations for future subnational governance interventions

To this end, the evaluation will assess programme results, the use of resources, approaches, strategies and partnership strategy. The evaluation is expected to examine the programme design, implementation, monitoring system and results achieved and the contributing factors and constraints.

The evaluation criteria, to be considered by the evaluation team, include relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact within the framework of the following guiding questions as outlined below.

4 Evaluation Questions

Relevance:

- Has UNDP been able to design the project relevant to UNDP's role as a development actor, and to the function and mandate of IDLG/PGO/PC/Municipalities as responsible parties of the ASGP and the situation in Afghanistan? The latter should take into account the time at which the original design took place as well as the current context. This task will be performed based on the original results framework and project document, and/or any subsequent amendments that were made to these documents.
- Has project's approach responded to the needs and demands of the beneficiaries/ benefiting institutions?
- Were the approaches, employed by ASGP relevant to achieve intended ASGP objectives and to contribute to the CPAP outcome?
- Were the tools / instruments / inputs applied by the project including the technical input relevant to Afghanistan context and the benefiting institutions?

Effectiveness:

- Have the ASGP programme's expected results (outputs) been achieved and what was the supporting or impeding factors?
- Have interventions been implemented with appropriate and effective partnership strategies? What has been the nature and added value of these partnerships? And were these reflected in the division of responsibilities between the implementing partner and responsible partners?

- Were UNDP's comparative advantages interpreted well to contribute to ASGP objectives?
- What monitoring and evaluation procedures were applied by UNDP and partners to ensure greater accountability? And were they effective?
- Have associated risks at the national and local level been anticipated and addressed?

Efficiency:

- Have the resources (funds, human resources, time, etc.) of ASGP been efficiently used to achieve the relevant outputs?
- Have the interventions been implemented within intended deadlines and cost estimates?

Sustainability and Impact:

- To what extent was sustainability considerations taken into account in the design and implementation of ASGPII interventions?
- Were exit strategies appropriately defined and/ or implemented? , and what steps have been taken to ensure sustainability of results?
- Are project results likely to be sustainable beyond the project's lifetime?
- Did or can the capacity development and the knowledge gained be usefully applied and used to further improve the delivery of public services at the subnational level? Is there clear evidencing of that?
- Based on the findings (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact) as well as taking into account new initiatives, recommend the extension modality of the project.
- To highlight the key lessons learned coming out of the programme and highlight both the positive ones as well as areas where design, implementation and oversight could have been better.

The consultants will be expected to report/ make recommendations on the following issues:

- Results of ASGP in terms of the above questions i.e. Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and sustainability.
- An analysis of the lessons learnt.
- Recommendations on the design and implementation modality of the next phase of future SNG programmes.

5. Methodology

Given the time constraints and large amount of work as well as geographical area that need to be covered the evaluation will be based upon review of documentation and discussion with key stakeholders and staff. All programme documentation will be made available including project documentation associated with the previous phase of ASGP. This will be complemented with field visits to some select projects sites (Evaluators will have to travel to a number of provinces and some selected districts). It is proposed that the following should make up a basis for the activities of the evaluation team. However the final work plan will be developed by the consultants themselves in the course of the first week as part of the inception report.

- Interviews with the key interlocutors in IDLG/PGO/PC/Municipalities and the Minister/Deputy Minister as well as other advisors and key individuals who have been involved with ASGP
- Interviews with key individuals at the UNDP Country Office including the Senior Deputy Country Director (Programme), the head of the Sub National Governance Unit, the Programme Officer, representatives from the Strategic Management Support Unit, representatives from the Compliance and Oversight Unit and representatives from the Cross Practice Unit .
- Interviews with key staff of the Project in the Programme Management including the CTA, Regional Project Managers, component managers/Unit Heads.
- Interviews with project donors
- Review project records to establish outputs and financial accountability.
- Meetings and interviews with the project beneficiaries. In addition documented feedback from the direct beneficiaries will be provided where it exists.
- For each output a review of the results achieved against the targets set as reflected in the Results Framework. (This specific tasks will require further explanation in the work plan and will be based on review of the documents and evidence available, interviews with staff and stakeholders and some specific site visits)

  All documents, materials, questionnaires, surveys or intermediate reports that might be established for the purpose of the mission should be submitted to UNDP.

6. Deliverables

The deliverables of the mission are comprised of:

- An inception report no later than seven days after the commencement of the mission. The inception report should outline the evaluation team's understanding of what is being evaluated and why, evaluation methodology including evaluation matrix outlining which data collection methodologies will be used to address each of the evaluation questions, a proposed schedule of tasks. This inception report will also provide the evaluation team with an opportunity to comment upon the ToR should it be deemed necessary.
- Presentation of preliminary findings including recommendations on the design of any future interventions;
- A draft report covering the issues outlined in the terms of reference including evaluation findings and conclusions, lessons and recommendations for review of all stakeholders;
- A final evaluation report(UNDP Evaluation Report Template to be used), incorporates the inputs resulting from the review of the draft report (i.e. incorporate corrections of factual errors and incomplete information contained in the draft report) to be approved by the UNDP Country Office;

7. Time Frame for the Evaluation Process

The evaluation is scheduled to start in December 2013 and to be completed by January 2014. A tentative time table is outlined below:

Item	Schedule / Days
Initial review of documents	5 days
Inception Report produced	2 days
Consultations with UNDP and key stakeholders in Kabul	5 days
Comprehensive desk review and through consultations including Field visits to selected project sites in the localities and beneficiary communities	10 days
Analysis of the information collected and preparation of a draft report	5 days
Debriefing to the project stakeholders (presenting the draft report)	Between Day 25 and Day 27 of the assignment
Draft shared for comment	By day same as debriefing.
Incorporating the comments and submission of final report	Day 30 of the assignment
Total work days	40 working days

8. Evaluation Team Composition and Required Competencies

It is envisaged there will be three members in the evaluation team that will be as follows: team leader with a strong background in managing evaluations, a local development/governance specialist and national governance specialist.

In addition staff from the project will assist the team in all issues such as arranging logistics and translation where necessary.

The specific requirements of each position are provided below

Team Leader /International Consultant (40 working days)

Education:

- Masters of Science in relevant disciplines (e.g. Urban or Regional Development, Economics, or Public Administration).

Experience:

- At least 15 years of international working experience in the field of Governance at national and sub-national level, preferably in conflict or post-conflict settings
- At least seven years of experience in programme evaluation and proven accomplishments in undertaking evaluation for international organizations, preferably including UNDP

- Experience in conducting at least four evaluations in related fields and with international organizations, at least two of which were as the team leader
- Deep knowledge of the political, cultural, and economic contexts of Afghanistan including prior working experience in the country
- Good analytical and strategic thinking skills
- Excellent inter-personal, communication, and teamwork skills
- Excellent written and spoken English and presentational capacities
- Extensive knowledge of qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods
- Ability to meet tight deadlines

Languages:

- Fluency in English language is required. Knowledge of local language i.e. Pashto and Dari is preferable but not required.

Local Development/Governance Specialist (30 working days)

Education:

- Advanced university degree relevant disciplines (e.g., Urban or Regional Development, Economics, or Public Administration)

Experience:

- At least 7 years of experience in working in the sub national governance/local development sphere in Afghanistan
- Deep knowledge of the political, cultural, and economic contexts of Afghanistan including prior working experience in the country
- Good knowledge and awareness of gender issues and how they impact upon men and women's roles in governance and community development
- Proven knowledge of evaluation methods
- Good analytical and English report writing skills
- Excellent inter-personal, communication, and teamwork skills
- Ability to meet tight deadlines

Languages:

- Fluency in English language is required. Knowledge of local language i.e. Pashto and Dari is preferable but not required.

National Governance Specialist (30 working days)

Education:

- Master's degree in political science, public policy, development studies, economics, sociology or a related social science

Experience:

- Minimum 5 years of research experience in, project evaluations, strategic planning, preferably in the areas of democratic governance;
- Sound knowledge of democracy and good governance;
- Prior evaluation experience would be an asset.

Language Requirements:

- Proficient in writing and communicating in English, in Dari and Pashtu. Ability to interpret to the international counterpart and also to translate necessary written documents to English

Applications

Individuals are encouraged to apply for one of the posts and should include the following information as part of their application

1. Clearly identify which of the posts they are applying for
2. An updated copy of their CV including references
3. A lump sum fee for the piece of work this should include
    - The daily fee
    - Travel costs to and from Afghanistan

Note: - While in Afghanistan DSA will be paid at standard UNDP rates and this will be more than enough to cover the cost of accommodation. In addition UNDP will take responsibility for the organization and cost of all travel within Afghanistan associated with the mission.

Companies who wish to apply with a team of individuals for the two posts are more than welcome however they should note than UNDP will retain the right to select the most competitive team. Thus they should structure their application in such a manner as to ready that just two or even one of the consultants is selected. In short the financial offer should be broken down per consultant.