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EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION SIERRA LEONE

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Independent Evaluation Office, August 2014
United Nations Development Programme

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FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to present the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in the Republic of Sierra Leone. This is the first ADR assessment of UNDP's contribution to Sierra Leone and covers the period 2008-2012. Specifically, the ADR focused on the previous 2008-2010 Country Programme Document (CPD) (which was extended by the UNDP Executive Board until 2012), and covered as much as possible of the ongoing 2013-2014 CPD. The findings and recommendations of the ADR were discussed at a stakeholder workshop held in Freetown on 8 July 2014 attended by almost 70 stakeholders who shared their comments on the report and provided feedback on the role and future potential contribution of UNDP in the context of the next country programme.

Sierra Leone has gone through significant transition and change since the cessation of the brutal civil war in 1999. Since then, UNDP's programme in Sierra Leone has been closely aligned with national plans and priorities and also with UN peacekeeping support activities. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was set up to assist in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In 2008, its mandate was revised to establish the first United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL), led by the Secretary-General's Executive Representative. In March 2014, UNIPSIL completed its Security Council mandate and transferred responsibility to the UN Country Team of 19 agencies, funds and programmes, based on the UN Development Assistance Framework.

The ADR assessment found that UNDP has had a high profile especially in the transition from post-conflict to development. It has been a key player in supporting the Government and UNIPSIL in nurturing a strong, coordinated UN system response to national needs in the first integrated UN mission of its kind. The ADR also concluded that during the period of assessment UNDP had provided crucial support to the development of democratic institutions: the conduct of the 2012 elections was one salient example that was uniformly recognized as a key milestone. In addition, UNDP has made a seminal contribution through the creation of a number of new institutions, support for human rights law and strengthening the institutional architecture for improved decentralization. The ADR noted further that UNDP implementation of CPD priorities has been driven by availability of donor funds which has led UNDP to implement programmes ranging from disaster mitigation, environmental protection and sustainable development to HIV prevention and awareness-raising. This has inevitably led to the programme spreading its capacity and resources into areas that were not central to the transition. UNDP is also recognized for having provided operational support crucial during early post-conflict recovery. However, there has not been a marked evolution towards higher level technical assistance.

The ADR concludes with eight recommendations that focus on future UNDP programming. These range from suggesting that UNDP should take on a lead role in the governance and security sector reform areas as an integral part of the One UN team, to cautioning that UNDP should prioritize carefully and not spread itself too thinly. The ADR also notes that UNDP should pay particular attention to transitioning from a programme that has provided operational support appropriate to addressing post-conflict needs, to one that focuses on the transfer and exchange of expertise and technology. Furthermore, it suggests that the Resident Representative and the Country Director should take on higher profile advisory roles that were previously filled by the Executive Repre-

sentative of the Secretary-General. The ADR recommends that the Country Office should have access to a team of senior advisers for this purpose. Detailed recommendations are also made in the body of the report in terms of future UNDP programming support in the justice, youth employment and local governance sectors. The ADR concludes with the recommendation that in future programming, UNDP should articulate and implement a clear internal policy that spells out measures to improve programme design, monitoring and evaluation.

It is my pleasure to make this ADR available for the Executive Board's consideration as it reviews the next Country Programme for Sierra Leone at the Executive Board meeting in September 2014. I trust that these assessments and recommendations will be of value during this process.



Indran A. Naidoo
Director
Independent Evaluation Office

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Assessment of Development Results
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIDS	acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
APC	All People's Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
BDS	Business Development Service
CAJ	Commission on Administrative Justice
CBO	community-based organization
CCA	Community Conservation Area
CDTF	Community Development Trust Fund
CFCU	Coastal Forest Conservation Unit
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPD	Country Programme Document
CO	Country Office, UNDP
CSO	civil society organization
DFID	Department for International Development
DIM	direct implementation modality
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DRR	disaster recovery and risk reduction
DYC	District Youth Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMB	election management bodies
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ERSG	Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
ESCR	Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
FSU	Family Support Unit
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GIPA	Greater Involvement of People living with HIV/AIDS
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HRBA	human rights-based approach
IMC	Independent Media Commission
IP	implementing partner
JP	Joint Programme
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDAs	ministries, departments and agencies
MDG	Millennium Development Goal

MOFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MTP	medium-term plan
MYA	Ministry of Youth Affairs
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NAYCOM	National Youth Commission
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIM	national implementation modality
ODA	official development assistance
ODS	ozone-depleting substances
PACO	Parliamentary Assistance Coordination Office
PEI	Poverty Environment Initiative
POPs	persistent organic pollutants
PPP	public-private partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PS	Parliamentary Service
RBA	Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP
ROAR	Results Oriented Annual Report
SABI	Sierra Leone Agri-Business Initiative
SGBV	sexual- and gender-based violence
SLBC	Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation
SLIEPA	Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SPU	Strategic Policy Unit
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNJV	United Nations Joint Vision
UNTJV	United Nations Transitional Joint Vision
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The Independent Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) undertook an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Sierra Leone in 2013. The ADR is an independent country-level evaluation aimed at capturing and demonstrating evaluative evidence of UNDP's contribution to development results and its strategic positioning in the country. It provides stakeholders with an objective assessment of UNDP's work and evaluates the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP support to national priorities and programmes. More specifically, the purpose of an ADR is to:

- provide substantive support to the UNDP Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board;
- support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country; and
- contribute to learning at country, regional and corporate levels.

Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961. It has gone through significant transition in the past 14 years, recovering from the brutal and devastating civil war that ravaged the country from 1991 to 2002. UN peacekeeping support began in 1999 with the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to assist in disarmament, demoblization and reintegration. In 2005, the Security Council established the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) to help further peace and accelerate sustainable economic growth. In 2008 the mandate was revised once more to establish the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL), led by the Secretary-General's Executive Representative.

In March 2014, UNIPSIL completed its Security Council mandate and transferred responsibility to the UN Country Team of 19 agencies, funds and programmes, based on the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). This transition is also indicative of the fact that Sierra Leone has moved beyond the threshold for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (CPIA Score of 3.3, World Bank 2012). As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon noted in the ceremonies that marked this transition, Sierra Leone had hosted many 'firsts': the first multidimensional peacekeeping operation with political, security, humanitarian and national recovery mandates, and the first-ever UN Peacebuilding Commission visit. In addition, the first UN Deputy Special Representative who also served as head of UNDP, UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, was appointed to Sierra Leone, thereby underscoring the links among peace, human rights and development. The appointment of the Secretary-General's first Executive Representative (ERSG) heading the political and development presence further ensured an integrated approach to supporting the Government's peacebuilding efforts.

UNDP PROGRAMME IN SIERRA LEONE

This ADR, the first conducted in Sierra Leone, coincided with preparations of the new country programme in 2013 during a critical time of transition from UNIPSIL. In terms of design and content, the UNDP programme in Sierra Leone was distinctive in helping the transition from peacekeeping, through peacebuilding to development and reflected UNDP's particular niche in governance-reflected activities in a post-conflict setting.

The ADR was carried out with support of the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), national

stakeholders, and the UNDP Sierra Leone Country Office and Regional Bureau of Africa (RBA). The focus was on the previous 2008-2010 Country Programme Document (CPD), which was extended by the UNDP Executive Board until 2012. The evaluation assesses UNDP's programme performance against six outcomes derived from the CPDs and Country Programme Action Plans and Results and Resources Frameworks covering the period 2008-2012. These outcome areas as adapted for the ADR assessment are:

- support to democratic institutions
- public sector reform, local governance and service delivery
- access to justice and human rights
- youth development and employment
- finance for development
- environmental cooperation for peacebuilding.

UNDP expenditure for the period under review totalled approximately $162,356,894 of which 35.9 percent was for support to democratic institutions, 29.2 percent for public sector reform, local governance and service delivery, 14.5 percent for youth development and employment, 9.5 percent for access to justice and human rights, 7.4 percent for finance for development, and 3.5 percent for environment.

Preliminary findings and conclusions from the ADR were available for consideration by the Country Office as it reflected on lessons learned during the design of the new country programme, which is to be presented to the UNDP Executive Board in September 2014. The ADR report will be available for consideration by the Members of the Board at that time as well.

FINDINGS

SUPPORT TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

UNDP support in this outcome area has been directed to two distinct but interlinked components of strengthening (a) elections and (b) parliament. In addition, UNDP has supported interventions to improve the role of the media (with particular focus on its role in the electoral cycle). UNDP has also facilitated Sierra Leone's participation in the regional initiative known as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

Overall, UNDP interventions have been of crucial relevance to promoting democratic governance in Sierra Leone and have correspondingly commanded the largest share (35.9 percent) of resources during the period under review. Support to elections has been central and sustained, with the 2012 election setting a standard for peaceful, fair, transparent and credible elections that needs to be maintained. UNDP support to Parliament buttressed these gains and filled basic capacity gaps. In terms of media support, the relevance of UNDP intervention was clear but progress was mixed. The APRM process has provided a comprehensive benchmark for further development in terms of governance in Sierra Leone.

In terms of effectiveness, the elections programme performed well in delivering a logistically complex election at the presidential, parliamentary, local council and mayoral levels, which was a notable contribution to the success of 2012 elections. However, Sierra Leone has yet to fully develop the capacity of national institutions to manage elections independently.

PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM, LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY

The UNDP programme of support to public sector reform and local governance focused on achieving the two broad outcomes of (1) supporting national, regional and local levels of governance to expand their capacities to reduce conflict and manage the equitable delivery of public services, and (2) enhancing the capacity of local councils to improve service delivery and development management. The public sector reform initiative has supported the review, rationalizing and updating of civil service positions, which were reduced from 17,560 to 13,631 over a two-year period. UNDP has also played a cen-

tral role in introducing a performance appraisal system and a modernized payroll system and supporting the capacity development of the Sierra Leone Civil Service Training College. At the local government level, UNDP (with the support of United Nations Capital Development Fund, or UNCDF) has supported fiscal decentralization, local level service delivery and the implementation of a cadastral programme to enable the more systematic application of property taxes.

UNDP was the first donor partner to engage in the complex area of public administration reform and local development and devoted 29 percent of resources to programming in support of this outcome. This early support by UNDP has encouraged others to enter but the ADR found that a clear, more strategic and cohesive approach would have enhanced programme effectiveness.

JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

UNDP focused on supporting a broad spectrum of activities to develop the justice sector. This support involved the passage of key laws, strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, and assistance to specialized units of the Sierra Leone Police, as well as civil society actors, to address and prosecute cases of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV). The support to the Human Rights Commission, work on women's property rights and the passage of the 2012 Sexual Offences Act are among the indicators of key contributions and relevance of UNDP's support to the development of fair justice system and respect for human rights.

UNDP established a track record of undertaking the first generation of projects which were then adopted, adapted and funded by other donors. One example is the establishment of Sierra Leone's first Legal Aid Scheme, which informed the development of a National Legal Aid Scheme and Legal Aid Act 2012. In 2011, the DFID-funded Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) took over responsibility for supporting the Pilot National Legal Aid Scheme. It should be noted that the legal aid programme provides legal advice but no actual representation for defendants in court. Another example of UNDP's catalytic efforts is the mobile court system. Magistrates are supported by the UNDP to travel to neighbouring districts for a limited number of days per month and their salaries are topped up through UNDP funding throughout the country.

Since 2010, UNDP's access to justice programme has prioritized legal support to the victims of SGBV. It promoted innovative approaches to dealing with gender-based violence by involving civil society organizations (CSOs) as implementing partners in programmes targeting SGBV prevention and protection. Special 'Saturday Courts' were introduced in 2011 specifically mandated to consider SGBV cases. UNDP has also provided support to the Family Support Unit of the Sierra Leone Police with guidelines and training on SGBV case management. The passage of the 2012 Sexual Offences Act is also seen as a positive landmark for victims of SGBV and UNDP provided capacity-building support for parliamentarians, seconded drafting experts to the Ministry of Justice and conducted significant advocacy efforts to ensure the Act was passed. The number of reported cases of SGBV has risen by 23 percent in the past three years. This could be seen as an increase of confidence in the justice system on the part of victims as well as improved access. Overall, the evidence suggests that UNDP has been effective in the careful design of its programming using an innovative and multifaceted approach to addressing the issue of support for victims of SGBV. It should be noted, however, that UNDP's support has almost exclusively targeted the prosecution side of SGBV cases. There appears to be an underlying assumption among aid agencies that cases of rape and sexual and gender-based assault tend to be legitimate and that the accused are generally guilty. UNDP assistance, therefore, has been geared to supporting the victim rather than ensuring the free and fair application of due process. This issue appears to merit attention in any future programming.

The sustainability of UNDP's programmes also constitutes a significant problem. UNDP has

been paying for supplies and recurrent costs in the law offices and in the courts, and has also been topping up salaries in the law offices. Until recently, it has been paying actual salaries as well. Incentives continue to be paid in order to staunch the flow of trained lawyers into private practice. UNDP programmes have tended to minimize the recruitment of foreign consultants and experts in favour of national consultants. In general, this has reduced average unit costs, making UNDP's assistance relatively cost-effective and contributing to increased national ownership of the programmes.

YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT

The youth of Sierra Leone were centrally important as soldiers during the civil war and youth employment is seen as a critical ingredient to the continuation of peace in the country. One of the measures to address the devastating efforts of the war has been to define 'youth' as those who fall between the ages of 15 and 35 as a means of including ex-combatants who lost educational and employment opportunities. More than 75 percent of the nearly six million Sierra Leonean are below the age of 35 (2011 figures), and an estimated 60-70 percent of this population is under-employed or unemployed and 80 percent live below the poverty line of $2 per day.

Overall, while the ADR found UNDP activities relevant, the first-generation projects were scattered in approach and poorly implemented. By 2010, this had changed and the focus has increasingly sharpened from being employability-focused (i.e., skills training) to better linking training with business development and self-employment through five Business Development Service Centres. The outreach to non-governmental implementing partners, such as microfinance institutions, has also been innovative. However, the ADR found a need to monitor how different partners are implementing their programmes through different modalities (e.g. different microfinance interest rates) or how groups are stratified (e.g. by income or nature of microfinance support). Increased attention to documenting and assessing the effectiveness of these different modalities, and learning from other development agencies active in the same sector, are essential to measure progress and results and consider whether there is scope for replication and upscaling of these innovations.

UNDP support has helped the Government of Sierra Leone streamline its youth-oriented architecture and contributed to the policy discourse. First, it has provided capacity development to the Ministry of Youth Affairs (MYA) and the National Youth Commission (NAYCOM) and, second, it has provided technical advice for policy development for the National Employment Policy, the Youth Employment Strategy and the 2012 Youth Report—the first of its kind. While the policy outcome remains at its early stages since NAYCOM's 2011 operationalization, UNDP positioned itself as a relevant and reliable strategic partner in youth policymaking. However, in terms of effectiveness, UNDP's performance has had a very limited impact on job creation given the scale of the needs in Sierra Leone.

FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

UNDP's involvement under this general outcome has commanded limited resources (7.4 percent), and is quite fragmented and varied. This is reflected in the framing and presentation of UNDP's programme for the period of the ADR assessment. The lack of coherence is apparent in the analysis of the key UNDP documents starting from CPD 2008-2012, the CPAP document and matrix for 2011-2012. Furthermore, while the outcome includes a number of UNDP projects and programmes identified later in this report, activities in the area of finance for development involves the work of the Resident Representative functioning in the capacity of Resident Coordinator of the UN and as ERSG and head of UNIPSIL. The fragmented nature of this outcome area has posed concomitant problems in terms of framing of the assessment by the ADR team.

In general, UNDP appears to have contributed to some degree to the development of coordination capacity. UNDP has taken on the role of administrator of funds when sectors are fragile and

capacities are weak and other donors are reluctant to take on the exposure, and has demonstrated its contribution providing fiduciary services to other donors. This has been seen in terms of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to support the Agenda for Change, the Electoral Support Basket Fund and the Constitutional Review Basket Fund. It has performed less effectively in other areas—most notably in the development of a pro-poor private sector through better regulation, business advice and microfinance that targets the poor. Even less has been achieved in terms of support to the mineral sector and improvements in trade regimes with particular benefits to micro, small and medium enterprises. Assistance in these areas has been sporadic, with the facilitation of workshops or meetings with the payment of operational costs, but with relatively little systematic strategy or policy development involved.

ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION FOR PEACEBUILDING

UNDP's response to the UN Joint Vision priority of 'Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding' has been very modest, particularly relative to other outcome areas of the CPDs covering the 2008-2012 period, and amounted to 3.5 percent of delivery. The strategy adopted by UNDP was to implement a number of projects with finance from the GEF, Montreal Protocol, TRAC (Target for Resource Assignment from the Core), the Peacebuilding Fund and other donors. They were designed to achieve the global outcome of strengthened national capacities to mainstream environmental concerns into national development plans and cope with natural disasters, with full participation of women. Sustainable environment considerations were a cross-cutting priority under the Sierra Leone UNDAF (2008-2010) and the CPD (2008-2010, extended to 2012) to be addressed by building national capacities for disaster response and risk reduction (DRR), waste management, deforestation, flood and erosion control and climate change. UNDP collaborated specifically with the GEF, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN-Habitat to support action plans; address issues of biodiversity, land management, renewable energy and conservation; and tackle the nexus between housing and poverty. While the portfolio of projects is relevant in that it addresses one of the pillars of Sierra Leone's national development strategy, this is clearly an area that will require more concentrated and cohesive programming in the future, should there be a decision to continue support to this sector in the new CPD.

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1. Over the past decade, UNDP has been a dependable and responsive partner supporting Sierra Leone in crucial sectors as it recovered from the aftermath of a prolonged and brutal civil war.

Conclusion 2. UNDP has had a high profile and played a central role in the transition from post-conflict to development phase. It has been a key player in supporting the Government and UNIPSIL in nurturing a strong, coordinated UN system response to national needs in the first integrated UN mission of its kind.

Conclusion 3. Along with crucial support to the conduct of the 2012 elections, the success of which was uniformly recognized as a key milestone, UNDP has made a seminal contribution through the creation of a number of new institutions, support for human rights law and strengthening the institutional architecture for improved decentralization.

Conclusion 4. UNDP implementation of CPD priorities has been driven by availability of donor funds. This has led UNDP to implement programmes ranging from disaster mitigation, environmental protection and sustainable development to HIV prevention and awareness-raising. This range of engagement subject to fund availability has inevitably led to the programme spreading its capacity and resources into areas that were not central to the transition. The 2013-2014 CPAP prioritized and narrowed UNDP's programmatic focus and this effort augurs well for the next CPD.

Conclusion 5. UNDP is recognized for having provided operational support (salaries and incentives, supplies, printing, as well as basic physical rehabilitation of facilities for institutions) crucial during early post-conflict recovery. However, there has not been a marked evolution towards higher level technical assistance. UNDP must be alert to the risks that could make it difficult to move beyond operational assistance since continuation of such support could diminish UNDP's substantive role. Dominance of operational support in UNDP's programmes has led to some stakeholders' opinion that UNDP has lacked in substantive guidance, discussion and policy content. Therefore, in the context of the next country programme, UNDP will need to acquire additional capacity to engage in sustained policy dialogue with the Government in priority areas.

Conclusion 6. The lack of good design and regular monitoring was an area of weakness affecting programme quality during the period under review. There appeared to be erratic attention paid to careful programme and project design involving needs analysis, and capacity assessment which would have ensured more relevant, targeted inputs in terms of capacity-building (e.g. elections support and the diaspora project). Monitoring also appeared to be spotty (except for high-profile programmes such as elections).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. In the context of the transition taking place within Sierra Leone with the departure of UNIPSIL, and given its track record and demonstrated results, UNDP should take on a lead role in the governance and security sector reform areas as an integral part of the One UN team.

Recommendation 2. UNDP should also prioritize carefully and not spread itself too thinly. It should pay particular attention to transitioning from a programme that has provided operational support appropriate to addressing post-conflict needs, to one which focuses on the transfer and exchange of expertise and technology. This shift will strengthen the substance of UNDP's contribution in support of Sierra Leone's development challenges.

Recommendation 3. The Resident Representative and the Country Director should take on higher profile advisory roles that were previously filled by the ERSG. The Country Office should have access to a team of senior advisers for this purpose.

Recommendation 4. UNDP needs to urgently undertake an internal strategic analysis and review of the current situation in Sierra Leone with a view to determining the key areas that are most likely to present threats to stability in the medium term and help devise preventive development interventions that can be funded and approved during the course of 2014-2015.

Recommendation 5. In the access to justice sector, it is strongly recommended that UNDP supplement its current heavy emphasis on the prosecution of SGBV to improve access to justice more generally, thereby ensuring due process with sufficient and trained representation for both plaintiffs and defendants and increasing the pool of trained members of the judiciary.

Recommendation 6. In the critical area of youth employment, UNDP should collaborate closely with ILO and other partners, and work on bringing together potential employers (particularly large multinationals with investments in Sierra Leone), the World Bank and African Development Bank as well as key ministries and commissions, to develop a more systematic and coherent strategy for the creation of jobs in the country while ensuring safety and standards.

Recommendation 7. In order to consolidate peace and stability, UNDP should encourage the Government to further strengthen local governance and consider extending the pilot activities throughout the country.

Recommendation 8. For future programming, UNDP should articulate and implement a clear internal Country Office policy that spells out measures to improve programme design, monitoring and evaluation.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted a country-level evaluation, an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Sierra Leone in 2013. The ADR is an independent evaluation aimed at capturing and demonstrating evaluative evidence of UNDP's contribution to development results and its strategic positioning in the country. The purpose of an ADR is to:

- provide substantive support to the UNDP Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board;
- support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country; and
- contribute to learning at country, regional and corporate levels.

This is the first ADR conducted in Sierra Leone, which was carried out with support of the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), various other national stakeholders, the UNDP Sierra Leone Country Office and Regional Bureau of Africa (RBA).

1.2 SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The ADR examined the Sierra Leone country programme over the 2008-2012 period in accordance with the evaluation's terms of reference (Annex 1). The focus was on the previous 2008-2010 Country Programme Document (CPD), which was extended by the UNDP Executive Board until 2012, and covered as much as possible of the ongoing 2013-2014 CPD. Projects from previous 2004-2007 CPD that were active or completed during the following programme were included in the evaluation. The evaluation assesses UNDP's programme performance against six outcomes derived from the Results and Resources Frameworks included in the CPDs and CPAPs.

1.3 TEAM, METHODOLOGY AND APPROACHES

The evaluation was carried out by a team comprising the IEO evaluation manager and two independent external experts, including one consultant from Sierra Leone who covered the disaster and environment management portfolio. The mission was supported by a research assistant who travelled to the country as part of the data collection mission. An outcome evaluation of the electoral support programme was scheduled to be conducted at the same time as the ADR exercise. Therefore, the evaluation team coordinated with the international consultant recruited for this exercise in terms of coverage of the elections component of the UNDP programme. In addition, the ADR was conducted in parallel with a Country Portfolio Study commissioned by the Independent Evaluation Office of the Global Environment Facility, which had the benefit of broadening coverage and the basis of comparison in the assessment of the environment sector. The national consultant on the UNDP ADR also conducted the GEF portfolio study.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND CRITERIA

An overview of evaluation questions and criteria, data collection and analysis and the evaluation process and management is presented below.

The present report has two main analytical components:

i. UNDP's contribution to development results through programmatic areas: The six intended outcomes were analysed according to the following criteria:

   - Relevance to national and UN priorities;
   - Effectiveness of UNDP interventions in terms of achieving stated goals;
   - Efficiency of UNDP interventions in terms of use of human and financial resources;
   - Sustainability of the results to which UNDP contributes.

ii. UNDP's contribution through its strategic positioning: Based on the organization's mandate and Sierra Leone's development needs and priorities as well as the particular context of UNDP's prominent role in an integrated UN peacekeeping mission, the ADR examined UNDP's position and niche with respect to:

   - Relevance and promotion of UN values;
   - Use of networks and South-South cooperation.

In assessing the above, attention was paid to the identification of factors influencing UNDP's performance, including: integration of gender equality and human rights into programming; focus on capacity development; implementation modalities; promotion of South-South cooperation; use of appropriate partnerships for development; support for coordination of UN and other development assistance; and, the degree of national ownership, as well as at the local level, following the launch of the country's devolution system.

The evaluation criteria noted above form the basis of the ADR methodological process. The evaluation team generated findings within the scope of the ADR and used the criteria to make assessments. The factual findings and assessments were then examined to identify a broad set of conclusions and recommendations. An outcome paper was developed for each of the outcomes contained in the CPD. Each outcome paper examined the progress towards the stated objectives and the assumptions about a programme's desired change based on a theory-of-change approach, and was prepared according to a standard template to facilitate the synthesis and the identification of conclusions. An outcome evaluation report prepared by an independent consultant was used to gather insights on the electoral assistance programme. The findings and conclusions from each of these outcome papers and the outcome evaluation were then synthesized by the evaluation manager into the overall ADR report.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The evaluation used a mix of data-collection methods, including desk reviews of reference material, interviews (face-to-face and telephone) and field visits. A list of reference materials included programme- and policy-related papers and reports, statistics as well as past evaluation reports is found in Annex 3. Numerous reference materials were collected throughout the evaluation by the IEO and with support of the Country Office. Interviews were conducted with relevant stakeholders, including UNDP staff members, government officials, beneficiaries, donors and development partners. Field visits were carried out at key project sites. The full list of people consulted during the evaluation is attached to the report (Annex 2).

Data and information collected during the data collection phase were used for the analysis and synthesis of findings for the final presentation of conclusions and recommendations. Results of interviews and observations from field visits were summarized and content-analysed after the data collection phase. During the analysis, data from various sources were triangulated and cross-examined.

EVALUATION PROCESS AND MANAGEMENT

A preparatory mission to Sierra Leone was conducted by the evaluation manager and associate evaluation manager at the IEO in April

2013, after which the terms of reference were developed. Following the recruitment of external experts, the evaluation team conducted a three-week field-based data collection mission in October 2013. Following the mission, team members conducted follow-up activities needed and prepared their respective outcome reports as a basis for the final report. In December 2013, a note on preliminary findings and conclusions (excluding the electoral programme) was prepared by the evaluation team and shared with the Country Office as input into country programme formulation exercise. The ADR report was then prepared based on outcome reports as well as the final outcome evaluation report for the electoral component, which was finalized during the first quarter of 2014. The draft ADR report was reviewed internally by the IEO peers and then shared with the Country Office and RBA for their initial feedback. The revision process was completed when the final comments from the Country Office were received. The stakeholder workshop was then held in Freetown in July 2014 where comments from national counterparts and other stakeholders were solicited and used in the finalization of the report.

1.4 LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

The evaluation was constrained in its geographical and project selection due to access limitations in the country. Primary data gathering and field interviews were heavily biased towards ongoing projects due to the high rate of both staff turnover and project closure over the 2008-2012 period under evaluation. The lack of availability of project documentation and data including both programme baseline and monitoring data, presented a major challenge in gathering basic information on programme design and delivery, notably for projects now closed. The lack of data at the country level in a number of sectors also limited the evaluation team's ability to collect indicators on progress towards expected results at the outcome level. Furthermore, synchronization of efforts with the consultant undertaking the evaluation of UNDP electoral support as well as with the environment consultant proved challenging and led to the need to arrange separate meetings and field visits. It also led to delays in report drafting and processing, given that three reports were being produced separately during the same period.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report comprises six chapters. Following the present introduction, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the country's development context and challenges, national responses to those challenges, as well as the development environment in which UNDP has operated. Chapter 3 presents the structure and nature of UNDP's response and strategy in addressing national development needs. Chapter 4 presents the assessment of UNDP contribution in the six major outcome areas, and Chapter 5 covers UNDP's strategic positioning in the country. Finally, Chapter 6 presents a list of conclusions and recommendations, drawing on findings and evidence presented in the previous chapters.

Chapter 2

DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES

This chapter provides a brief overview of the country context in which UNDP operated in Sierra Leone in terms of political context, United Nations mandates and milestones, government systems and subnational governance and decentralization reforms. It summarizes the key development challenges faced by Sierra Leone over the period being examined, in the sectors of security, justice, human rights, human development and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and development cooperation, and the national response in terms of strategies, policies and priorities.

2.1 COUNTRY CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

Sierra Leone gained independence in April 1961 and was declared a Republic in 1971. The country experienced a devastating civil war from 1991 to 2002 during which GDP growth contracted on average by 2.7 percent and human development plunged.[1] In the post-conflict period, there have been significant progress and reforms in government institutions. Sierra Leone has consolidated peace and security and strengthened democracy through three national elections held in 2002, 2007 and 2012. The most recent election—the first self-administered election since the civil war—was achieved peacefully and considered transparent and fair by international observers with an 87.4 percent voter turnout. President Ernest Koroma received 59 percent of votes with the ruling party All People's Congress (APC) maintaining a narrow parliamentary majority with 67 of 112 seats.

Sierra Leone has entered a period of transition with the consolidation of public security through a restructured security sector and extended state authority since its civil war.[2] Several issues nonetheless hamper the country's progress towards a stable developmental path, including a north-south ethno-regional polarization of politics, lack of transparency and accountability for state resource management, and weak legal system.[3] The outbreak of political violence in March 2009, which ended in the adoption of an UN-brokered Joint Communiqué, underlined the country's fragile peace.

2.2 SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE AND MILESTONES

On 22 October 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to cooperate with the GoSL and the other parties in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. The Security Council revised UNAMSIL's mandate and expanded its size before its successful completion in December 2005. Thereafter, the Security Council established the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) to help further consolidate peace in the country and accelerate sustainable economic growth.[4]

In August 2008, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1829 to establish the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone

1 World Bank, 'World Development Indicators, 2013'.

2 UN Department of Political Affairs, Sierra Leone: <www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/sierra_leone> (last accessed 20 June 2013).

3 UNDP, Conflict Prevention Project Document, 2013.

4 United Nations, 'Resolution 1620 Adopted by the Security Council, S/RES/1620 (2005)', 31 August 2005.

(UNIPSIL) led by the Secretary-General's Executive Representative (ERSG). As a field mission managed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UNIPSIL brings together the political, development and humanitarian mandates of the UN family in Sierra Leone to provide an integrated support to the GoSL in fostering peace and stability and advancing social and economic development. The ERSG was also the UNDP Resident Representative and UN Resident Coordinator.

UNIPSIL led the formulation of the 2009-2012 UN Joint Vision (UNJV) for Sierra Leone as an integrated strategic framework for peacebuilding outlining common priority areas as well as joint UN operational and logistics arrangements.[5] In 2009, the Integration Steering Committee confirmed that Sierra Leone was the only country to date that meets integrated mission standards and endorsed the UNJV as a strategic document of UN integration.[6] Following its completion, a UN Transitional Joint Vision (UNTJV) was established in 2013-2014.

In 2007, the Peacebuilding Commission entered into the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework with the GoSL based on the underlying principles of national ownership, mutual accountability and sustained engagement.[7] The UN Secretary-General initially announced a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) for Sierra Leone of $35 million, which was expanded by an additional $7 million in 2010.[8] Sierra Leone has received the second largest PBF project funding after Burundi with $47 million. The PBF targeted the following five priority areas: (i) youth empowerment and employment, (ii) democracy and good governance; (iii) justice and security; (iv) capacity-building of public administration; and (v) support to increased energy. Despite attempts to mobilize resources centrally, development partners did not provide commitments to the UNJV and opted to fund initiatives one-by-one through UN agencies.[9] As a result, there was a substantial funding shortfall in Sierra Leone for the agreed UNJV peacebuilding effort over the 2009-2012 period with approximately $174.9 million gap of the estimated $381.3 million cost.[10] Consequently, individual agencies such as UNDP required extensive resource mobilization to secure funding for projects and programmes.

The Security Council mandated the closure of UNIPSIL in March 2014.[11] The UN Country Team has adopted a standard Resident Coordinator system[12] configuration and UN agencies have assumed residual UNIPSIL programme responsibilities, including three programmes launched in 2013: the constitutional review, security sector reforms, and conflict prevention programme. The constitutional review process is a $4.2 million UN-GoSL project managed by UNDP, which aims to ensure a transparent and fully inclusive process leading to a constitution.[13] The review

5 United Nations, Department of Political Affairs, Sierra Leone: <www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/sierra_leone> (last accessed 20 June 2013).

6 UNDP, Office of Audit and Investigations, Regional Audit Centre for West and Central Africa, 'Audit of UNDP Country Office in Sierra Leone', Report No. 695, April 2010.

7 United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, 'Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, PBC/2/SLE/1', 3 December 2007.

8 United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, Sierra Leone: <www.unpbf.org/countries/sierra-leone/>.

9 United Nations, 'Report of Final Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Programme in Sierra Leone,' UN Peacebuilding Fund, February 2011.

10 United Nations, Peacebuilding Support Office, 'Supporting the Implementation of the United Nations Joint Vision for Sierra Leone', 2011.

11 United Nations, 'Resolution 2097 Adopted by the Security Council, S/RES/2097 (2013)', 26 March 2013.

12 The Resident Coordinator system is the UN family's standard coordination mechanism in all countries without a special Security Council mandate.

13 United Nations, 'Eleventh report of the Secretary-General [to the Security Council] on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, S/2013/547', 12 September 2013.

process is widely regarded as an important opportunity to address structural issues threatening long-term stability. Concurrently, the Security Council mandated the PBC to review its engagement with Sierra Leone to scale down its role while continuing to support the GoSL and UN transition. A full UNDAF will be launched for 2015-2018.

2.3 GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS AND GOVERNANCE

Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with three branches of government based on its 1991 Constitution: executive, judicial and legislative.[14] There are two major political parties, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and incumbent All People's Congress (APC). Key institutional reform has largely put into place appropriate structures, laws, policies and processes to facilitate development. The critical challenge for Sierra Leone going forward relates to the development of the systems and skills to enable these structures to work as intended.[15] The 2012 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report identified weak public sector capacity, and limited access to justice among the key challenges facing the country. These shortcomings are due to a number of factors including an inadequate implementation of the system of separation of powers enshrined in the constitution as well as low public service salaries.

Corruption is a threat to good governance across all sectors. The country ranked 123 of 174 on Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index.[16] In 2013, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) indicted public officials from the Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), National Revenue Authority (NRA), Sierra Leone Commercial Bank, and Ministry of Health and Sanitation.[17] While some worry the cases are a sign of the problem's enormous scale, others note the ACC's increasing watchdog capacity.

There is no constitutional provision for local government, and therefore the 2004 Local Government Act serves as the main legislation to provide a legal framework for local councils. The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) is responsible for implementing decentralization and local governance reforms. There are 19 local councils made up of five city councils and one municipal council in the urban areas, and 13 district councils in the predominantly rural areas. The Local Government Act gives local councils and chiefdom councils the powers to raise revenue including local taxes, property rates, licences, fees and charges, mining revenues, interest and dividends.

Transfers from central government include recurrent and development components. There are three broad types of transfers: administrative grants, grants for devolved functions, and local government development grants. Under the Local Government Act, 80 central government functions were devolved to local councils.[18] The devolution process has been reported as slow, with only 56 of the planned 80 functions decentralized to date. In recognition of the outstanding task, four key ministries agreed in July 2013 to devolve all outstanding functions to local councils by the

14 Its unicameral legislature consists of 124 members of Parliament, 12 who are appointed by each district's paramount chiefs and 112 who are directly elected by district constituents.

15 Government of Sierra Leone, 'Fragility Assessment: Summary of Results,' Development Assistance Coordination Office, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Freetown, 2013.

16 The GoSL has since contested the validity of Transparency International's ranking based on statistical technicalities. Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012' (last accessed 20 June 2013); see also S/2013/547.

17 Government of Sierra Leone, Anti-Corruption Commission, Press Releases (last accessed 07 November 2013): <www.anticorruption.gov.sl/all_news.php?p=0&pn=Press Release&nt=Press Release>.

18 Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF), 'Country Profile: Sierra Leone' in *Commonwealth Local Government Handbook*, 2009.

end of 2013.[19] A devolution committee has been established and discussions are being held with the ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that have not started the devolution process.

2.4 SECURITY, JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Sierra Leone is often referred to as an exemplary case of security sector reform (SSR), having transitioned from conflict to re-establish functional security institutions accountable to civilian authorities.[20] There are decreasing cases of criminal violence and effective regional security partnerships with ECOWAS and the Mano River Union.[21] The UN and GoSL established the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002 with a mandate to prosecute those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law committed during the civil war.[22] It convicted and upheld a 50-year jail sentence for former Liberian President Charles Taylor on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.[23]

In recognition of gender-based violence, the country has passed sexual offences and domestic violence laws and established a Family Support Unit (FSU) within the police tasked with investigating sexual crimes. The number of reported cases of SGBV has risen in the last three years, which suggests an increase in confidence in the justice system on the part of victims as well as improved access. The 2012 APRM report underlines that many structural issues constitute persistent risks of violence, including the ethno-regional divide that feeds into mutual fear, antagonism, and winner-take-all electoral politics.

2.5 ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

The country's 1991-2002 civil war crippled the economy with persistent negative growth through 2001. Since then, the economy has averaged a 7.9 percent GDP growth rate. The strong post-conflict economic performance has been heavily dependent on aid, with about 50 percent of public investment programmes financed by external resources.[24] An extractives industry boom is bringing significant economic windfall with increased iron-ore exports as well as recent oil and gas discoveries. Mineral depletion is projected to rise from 0.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to as high as 21 percent in 2015.[25] While institutional and regulatory frameworks to manage the potentially important injection of mineral wealth are being put in place, they will need to be tested.

Despite the country's strong macroeconomic performance, the average Sierra Leonean faces high inflation and consequently high prices for fuel and food. Inflation rose to above 16 percent in 2011 but has since fallen slightly thanks to improved domestic agricultural production, the introduction of the new goods and services tax (GST) and the slower rate of currency depreciation.[26] Following capital investments in the mining sector, the current account deficit grew to 55.7 percent of GDP in 2011, owing to a rise

19 *Awareness Times*, 'In Sierra Leone, Decentralization Stakeholders Agree On Deadline To Complete Devolution Process: The Hill Valley Declaration', 10 July 2013.

20 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Security Sector Reform Unit, 'The United Nations SSR Perspective', 2012.

21 Government of Sierra Leone, 'Fragility Assessment: Summary of Results,' Development Assistance Coordination Office, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Freetown, 2013.

22 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statute, Article 1 (Competence of the Special Court), 16 January 2002.

23 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Press Release: 'Appeals Chamber Upholds Charles Taylor's Conviction, 50 Year Sentence', 26 September 2013.

24 UNDP, Sierra Leone Country Programme Document, 2013-2014.

25 World Bank, 'Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone for the Period FY10-FY13', 12 July 2012.

26 African Development Bank, 'African Economic Outlook, Sierra Leone Country Note', 2012.

Figure 1. GDP Per Capita (PPP) and Annual GDP Growth, 2003-2012



Source: World Bank (2013)

in imports of machinery for the mining sector. The country was ranked as one of the world's top reformers by the 2012 World Bank's Doing Business index due to strong reforms aimed at reducing corruption, providing free health care and improving the poor infrastructure (transport, power and public health).[27]

2.6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Sierra Leone has made progress in improving socio-economic conditions towards achieving the MDGs, including a reduction in overall poverty from 66.4 percent in 2003 to 52.9 percent in 2011.[28] Sierra Leone shows the second-highest HDI improvement in the world since 2000.[29] Stark regional disparities in poverty levels persist. Rural areas made the largest headcount reduction over this period, but remain over 20 percent poorer on average than the urbanized Western region. Growth for per capita expenditure over the period has been pro-poor with the growth highest for the lowest decile.[30]

The country is, however, unlikely to achieve most of the goals by the 2015 target date. Significant constraints impeding progress are poor infrastructure, lack of reliable electricity supply and weaknesses in social services delivery.[31] Life expectancy remains one of the lowest in the world despite having increased from 39 years in 2000 to 48 years in 2011; the under-five mortality rate remains the highest in the world at 185 per 1000 live births.[32] Adult literacy is estimated

27 World Bank, Sierra Leone Overview: <www.worldbank.org/en/country/sierraleone/overview> (last accessed 7 November 2013).

28 World Bank and Statistics Sierra Leone, 'A Poverty Profile of Sierra Leone,' June 2013.

29 UNDP, 'Human Development Report 2013: Rise of the Global South', see Press Release: <hdr.undp.org/en/media/PR7-RBAregional-2013HDR-ENG.pdf>.

30 World Bank and Statistics Sierra Leone, 'A Poverty Profile of Sierra Leone,' June 2013.

31 Government of Sierra Leone, 'MDG Progress Report', 2010.

32 World Development Indicators, 2011.

Table 1. Progress Towards Millennium Development Goals			
MDG Goals and Selected Indicators	**2000**	**2005**	**2011**
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger			
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)	—	*53*	52
Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	*42.5*	—	*29.4*
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education			
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	—	—	74
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women			
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)	9	15	*12.4*
Ratio of female to male primary enrolment (%)	89	—	93
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality			
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	241	214	*181.6*
Goal 5: Improve maternal health			
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	146	144	112
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	42	43	*63*
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)	4	5	*11*
Maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	1,300	1,000	*890*
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases			
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	377	509	723
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	0.8	1.4	1.6
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability			
Forest area (% of land area)	40.8	39.4	37.8
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	11	12	12.9
Improved water source (% of population with access)	46	51	57.5
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development			
Internet users (per 100 people)	0.1	0.2	*1.3*
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	0	*14*	36

Source: Data compiled from World Development Indicators (2012) and UN MDG Database (2013); figures in italics refer to periods other than those specified.

at only 39 percent.[33] The GoSL has passed a series of laws to protect women's rights and made high-level appointments to the Supreme Court and National Electoral Commission (NEC). However, it ranks in the bottom ten countries in the 2012 Gender Inequality Index with a value of 0.643.[34] The ratio of women to men reaching at least secondary education is 0.465, and 12.4 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women.[35]

The consequences of Sierra Leone's conflict continue to be evident in the high number of unemployed youth, who constitute 1.9 million of the country's 5.6 million people.[36] As an under-

33 Government of Sierra Leone, MDG Progress Report, 2010.

34 UNDP, 2012 Human Development Report.

35 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Sierra Leone, online: <www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2281_A.htm> (last accessed 13 December 2013).

36 African Peer Review Mechanism, 'Country Review Report of the Republic Of Sierra Leone', January 2012.

educated and economically marginalized demographic group, youth represent a vital segment of the population and creating productive jobs is one of Sierra Leone's most pressing challenges in consolidating peace. Moreover, the risk of 'jobless economic growth' characteristic of resource-rich countries is significant in Sierra Leone. The GoSL has stressed youth employment as a top priority and accordingly has set up government and parastatal institutions dedicated to the issue.

In the area of public health, malaria accounts for about 50 percent of outpatient morbidity and is presently the leading cause of morbidity and mortality among children under five years of age, with mortality attributed to malaria estimated to be 38 percent among this age group and 25 percent for all ages.[37] Challenges to a sustainable environment are enormous. Sierra Leone ranked at the bottom of the 2010 environmental performance index out of 163 countries with a dependence on energy consumption of biomass, vulnerability to disaster, and other environmental degradation.[38]

2.7 DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The GoSL has been a proactive member within international forums regarding aid reform initiatives specific to conflict-affected states. Sierra Leone is one of the founding members of the g7+ and a signatory of the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States.[39] As a New Deal pilot country, GoSL completed a Fragility Assessment in 2013 outlining key challenges to moving the country out of its fragile status. Assessment results provided key inputs into the current Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper III, thereby fulfilling the 'one vision, one plan' focus of the New Deal within the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Sierra Leone is also one of seven pilot countries in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding forum.[40] [41]

Among bilateral donors, the most active development partners in Sierra Leone have been the Governments of Ireland, Germany, Japan, US and UK, which cumulatively provided 36 percent of total official development assistance (ODA) from 2008 to 2011.[42] Multilateral ODA accounted for the largest proportion of total ODA over the same period, 56 percent, which was most attributable to contributions from the European Union (EU), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank supports policy reforms and macroeconomic management through budget support, and in the areas of human development, infrastructure, productive sectors, and governance. The World Bank is also focused on strengthening country systems, including support to decentralized services and public finance management and helping to build the demand for good governance.[43]

Sierra Leone has a weak investment climate and private sector. Despite being a top reformer, the country ranked 150th of 155 in the 2012 Logistics Performance Index regarding trade infrastructure.[44] The mining sector has driven

37 Government of Sierra Leone, 'Outpatient Morbidity Statistics', Ministry of Health and Sanitation, Freetown, 2009.

38 UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, 'Country Programme Action Plan, 2013-2014,' Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and UNDP, 21 February 2013.

39 g7+ is an association of countries affected by conflict with an objective to share experiences and advocate for reforms vis-à-vis the international community's engagement in conflict-affected states. See: <www.g7plus.org/>.

40 United Nations, 'Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General [to the Security Council] on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, S/2013/547', 12 September 2013.

41 Interview data.

42 $622.19 million of $1.72 billion (current prices); OECD Statistics (2013).

43 World Bank, Sierra Leone Overview: Economic Context: <www.worldbank.org/en/country/sierraleone/overview> (last accessed 20 June 2013).

44 World Bank, 'LPI ranking and scores', 2012.

Figure 2. ODA Flows to Sierra Leone, 2008-2011



Source: OECD (2013); IMF contributions denote Concessional Trust Fund

private sector activity with the country as a top global exporter of diamonds and richly endowed in iron ore. In 2012, exports grew by a record 147 percent due largely to the resumption of two iron ore mining company operations, African Minerals Limited and London Mining Limited.[45] Although agriculture is the biggest contributor to GDP, domestic production generally remains non-commercialized.

Investment from the Global South will substantially increase in the coming years based on emerging deals with China to finance infrastructure for the agricultural and mineral sectors. Following President Koroma's visit to China in 2013, the two countries signed a series of investment deals. In the agribusiness sector, a $1.5 billion rubber plantation project is projected to produce 200,000 tonnes of rubber per year.[46] One of China's largest privately owned energy companies, China Kingho Energy Group, will spend a minimum $6 billion on infrastructure projects over the next five years as part of its iron ore production.[47]

45 Government of Sierra Leone, 'Agenda for Prosperity, 2013-2018'.

46 Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Investments worth US$8bn announced following China visit', 12 July 2013.

47 Reuters, 'China Kingho may spend up to $10 bln in Sierra Leone', 17 May 2013.

Chapter 3

UNDP'S RESPONSE AND STRATEGY

This chapter provides details of the national planning context within which UNDP has developed its programmes. It contains a summary of the key elements of integration in terms of the national Joint Vision, Poverty Reduction Strategy and the UNDP country programme outcomes in relation to the scope of the ADR. It then describes the features of the UNDP country programmes, programme expenditure and management arrangements and the coordination between UNDP and the UN system during the review period.

3.1 NATIONAL STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS UNDERPINNING UNDP PROGRAMME

This section provides information on the overarching national priorities developed during the period 2008-2013. This context is important for a deeper understanding of UNDP's response, which was in close alignment with national strategies and integrated mission priorities of UNIPSIL. The period covers two generations of government Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The PRSP II, or the 'Agenda for Change' (2008-2012), prioritized economic growth through a strong emphasis on agriculture, energy and the development of road infrastructure, all critically underpinned by human development.[48]

The PRSP III, or the 'Agenda for Prosperity' (2013-2018), was introduced as a road map towards becoming an "inclusive, green, middle-income country" by 2035 with 80 percent of the population above the poverty line.[49] While recognizing the country's progress in reducing poverty, the PRSP III sets out to complete residual PRSP II projects to address pervasive challenges through diversified economic growth, effective natural resource management, and strengthened infrastructure. Together with its development partners, the country also launched a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) to jointly monitor PRSP III progress.[50]

The United Nations Joint Vision Strategy (2009-2012) aligned assistance with the PRSP II and served as the strategic document for the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Office and the UN Country Team (UNCT). The consolidation of planning frameworks was seen as a key achievement aimed at strengthening internal cohesion within the UNCT and facilitating engagement with the GoSL. Coordinated by UNIPSIL under the ERSG, the strategy built upon the preceding 2004-2007 UNDAF's shift from post-conflict recovery to peacebuilding programmes.[51] The UNJV focused its implementation capitalizing upon UNCT's comparative strengths and potential developmental impact.[52] It consisted of five priority pillars[53] and 21 programme areas for implementing agencies to cluster projects.

48 Government of Sierra Leone, 'Agenda for Change', 2008-2012.

49 Government of Sierra Leone, 'Agenda for Prosperity', 2013-2018.

50 Mutual Accountability Framework, DEPAC Meeting, Freetown, October 2013.

51 United Nations, 'Sierra Leone UNDAF: Peace, Recovery and Development (2004-2007)', March 2003.

52 UNIPSIL, 'Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations Family (2009-2012)', 30 May 2009.

53 The five areas include: (i) Consolidation of peace and stability; (ii) Integration of rural areas into the national economy; (iii) Economic and social integration of the youth; (iv) Equitable and affordable health services; and (v) Accessible and credible public services.

The current UNTJV (2013-2014) represents a transitional consolidated strategy through the end of the UNIPSIL mission before a return to a full UNDAF beginning in 2015. The UNTJV was developed before the launch of the PRSP III, and as a result was designed to be flexible in adapting to sector-specific strategies of MDAs.[54] The strategy is built on the following five pillars: (i) cross-cutting issues such as capacity development; (ii) natural resource management; (iii) human development; (iv) competitiveness; and (v) employment and social protection.

3.2 UNDP PROGRAMME FRAMEWORKS, PROGRAMME RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

UNDP has been a partner of Sierra Leone since 1965 with the role of providing development assistance and building the capacity of national institutions. The 1998-2002 Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) was halted in 1999 when the civil war spread to Freetown, forced the evacuation of staff, and led to the destruction of the material resources of the organization. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in May 2002. The first post-conflict CPD was submitted to the Executive Board in June 2003 covering the period 2004-2007 and focused on: (i) national recovery and peacebuilding, (ii) governance and democratic development, and (iii) poverty reduction and human development. During this CPD period, UNDP support to the rehabilitation of community infrastructure and civil administrative structures was instrumental in the implementation of the 2004 Local Government Act.[55] In addition, UNDP's elections support enabled the first peaceful democratic transition of power since the conflict's end.

Table 2 provides a summary of the key elements of integration in terms of UNDP's programme with the UN Joint Vision and the national poverty reduction strategy, in relation to the

Table 2. Relationship between PRSP II, UN Joint Vision, UNDP CPAP and ADR Scope

PRSP II (2008-2012) *National priorities*	**UNJV (2009-2012)** *Programmes*	**UNDP CPD/CPAP (2011-2012)** *Expected outcomes*	**ADR Focus Areas**
Democracy and Good Governance	Democratic Elections and Political Dialogue	Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)	Support to Democratic Institutions (Elections, Parliament and Media)
	Support to Democratic Institutions	Parliament and other national institutions assisted to implement their individual mandate in a participatory, transparent and accountable manner	
Building Capacities for Implementation	Public Sector Reform	National levels of governance expand their capacities to reduce conflict and manage the equitable delivery of public services	Public Sector Reform, Local Governance and Service Delivery
Local Governance and Decentralization	Local Governance and Decentralization	Enhanced capacity of local councils to improve service delivery and development management	
Equitable and Affordable Justice and Human Rights	Access to Justice and Human Rights	Effective, responsive, accessible and fair justice systems promote the rule of law, including both formal and informal processes, with due consideration on the rights of the poor, women and vulnerable groups	Justice and Human Rights

54 UNIPSIL, 'Transitional Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations Family (2013-2014)', 23 March 2012.

55 UNDP, Sierra Leone Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), 2008-2010.

Table 2. Relationship between PRSP II, UN Joint Vision, UNDP CPAP and ADR Scope (continued)

PRSP II (2008-2012) *National priorities*	UNJV (2009-2012) *Programmes*	UNDP CPD/CPAP (2011-2012) *Expected outcomes*	ADR Focus Areas
Youth Employment and Empowerment	Youth Development and Employment	Jobs opportunities and livelihoods created by the youth through micro and small business run by youth	Youth Employment
Effective Management of Resources	Finance for Development	The resource base available for development increased through strengthened abilities to expand and efficiently leverage aid, private investment and trade opportunities	Finance for Development
Managing the Environment	Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding	Strengthened national capacities to mainstream environmental concerns into national development plans and implementation systems	Environment

Source: UNDP Independent Evaluation Office

framework used for the ADR analysis in terms of expected outcomes.

CPD AND CPAP 2008-2012

The 2008-2010 CPD comprised three programmes adapted in the 2008-2010 CPAP to the following areas: (i) fostering democratic governance; (ii) preventive development and peace consolidation; (iii) poverty reduction and human development. The CPAP aimed to assist in the achievement of the MDGs with linkages to global goals of international conventions, agreements and instruments.[56] During this period, UNDP sought to more explicitly promote sustainable human development through a human rights-based approach addressing gender and youth empowerment concerns as cross-cutting issues. In line with the Regional Bureau for Africa's strategy focusing on Capacity Development for Pro-poor Growth and Accountability, the strategy also focused on assessing and strengthening national institutional capacity. The 2011-2012 CPAP continued under an extended 2008-2010 CPD[57] with a modified programme strategy aligned with the UNJV (see Table 2). As a result, UNDP addressed eight of the total 21 UNJV programmes, each of which had specific objectives, outputs, activities and funding requirements as a 'unit' for donor reporting. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the CPAP was designed to be aligned with the UNJV results matrix and M&E plan.

CPD AND CPAP 2013-2014

The current CPD and CPAP, like its predecessors, are aligned with the corresponding national development plan (PRSP III) and integrated UN strategy (UNTJV). UNDP strategies were developed before the PRSP III's finalization and decision on UNIPSIL's drawdown. The 2013-2014 CPAP aimed to consolidate the Country Office's portfolio with fewer but more strategic projects and programmes built on two clusters: (i) improved governance and risk management—focused on democratic institutions, access to justice, and public sector reform; and (ii) inclusive growth and management of natural resources and disasters—focused on youth employment, local decentralization and economic development, and private and financial sector development.[58]

56 The CPAP includes: (i) the PRSP; (ii) the 2008-2010 UNDAF; (iii) Peace Consolidation Strategy; (iv) Priority Plans for Peacebuilding Fund; (v) Paris Declaration on the Aid Effectiveness; (vi) South-South cooperation; (vii) common funding mechanisms such as HIV/AIDS Global Fund, GEF, and Montreal Protocol.

57 UNDP Executive Board, DP/2010/25

58 UNDP, Sierra Leone Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), 2013-2014.

Figure 3. Programme Expenditure by Outcome Area, 2008-2012



	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Youth Employment	7,891	845	5,888	1,385	2,599
Environment and DRR	627	1,516	1,615	708	848
Justice and Human Rights	3,498	3,374	2,953	2,053	1,600
Local Governance	8,350	6,031	3,665	812	1,157
Parliament and Media	387	649	1,745	1,430	680
PSR and Service Delivery	1,116	2,377	1,951	1,328	1,263
Finance for Development	3,331	2,220	1,765	1,412	1,594
Elections	14,030	3,633	1,078	11,642	22,634

Source: Atlas Snapshot (2013); total expenditure US$133.6 million

PROGRAMME RESOURCES

Programme expenditure across eight outcome areas in the 2011-2012 CPAP was heavily concentrated towards elections (see Figure 3), notably leading up to the election cycles in 2007/2008 and 2012.[59] Over the 2008-2012 period, UNDP expenditure on elections amount to $53 million or 40 percent of the total expenditure.

UNDP was funded primarily through non-core resources, which constituted on average 81 percent of the total programme budget over the 2008-2012 period. As a result, there was a high dependence on external sources for funding which affected the Country Office's ability to conduct medium or long-term planning. For example, the 2011-2012 CPAP estimates in several outcome areas only the projected 2011 budget. Sector-based strategies, such as for youth employment, are consequently constrained to fund projects on a year-to-year basis with a higher uncertainty about the sustainability of programmes and support to partners.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Country Office, located in Freetown, currently has 37 staff members with a portfolio of 15 projects.[60] UNDP has aimed to make a gradual transition from a majority of direct implementation modality (DIM) to national implementation modality (NIM) projects through micro-assessments of national partners in addition to capacity-building. Over the 2007-2012 period, the Country Office has implemented a large majority

59 Expenditure data is derived from Atlas Snapshot project-level data (April 2013) for each 2011-2012 CPAP outcome area, and as a result the total expenditure is about $5 million less than the aggregate Atlas Snapshot data (i.e., $138.6 million) due to the exclusion of certain projects not assessed in the ADR exercise.

60 UNDP, Office of Audit and Investigations, Regional Audit Centre for West and Central Africa, 'Audit of UNDP Country Office in Sierra Leone (Draft)', Report No. 1187, 2013.

Figure 4. Programme Budget by Core and Non-Core Resources, 2008-2012



	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Non-core resources	39,282	37,779	19,284	21,343	30,914
Core resources	6,637	6,944	6,133	6,431	6,074

Source: Atlas Snapshot (2013)

Table 3. Projects by Implementation Mode, 2007-2013

Project start date	DIM	NIM
2007	12	1
2008	23	8
2009	15	—
2010	6	—
2011	4	—
2012	—	2
2013	—	1
Total	60	12

Source: Atlas Snapshot (2013)

of DIM projects under the overall coordination of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED). The Country Office has nonetheless introduced three NIM projects out of three newly launched projects over 2012-2013.

Issues over the 2007-2009 period in the Country Office's management and financial reporting placed a strain on its partnerships and weakened its ability to achieve programmatic objectives.[61] A large influx of donor funding, notably through PBF programmes, placed pressure on UNDP's ability to manage multi-donor basket funds. UNDP staff lacked sector-specific expertise and a sustainable workforce, especially national officers. As a result, UNDP saw a loss in donor and GoSL confidence with an associated risk that donors would withhold or withdraw funding if management practices were not improved. Beginning in 2008, the Country Office introduced a series of measures to improve programme management. An extensive 'financial reconciliation' effort of its trust fund and cost-sharing resources was launched to correct errors relating to income and expenditure for projects, many of which were post-conflict in nature but not closed after several years of inactivity.[62]

61 UNDP, Office of Audit and Investigations, Regional Audit Centre for West and Central Africa, 'Audit of UNDP Country Office in Sierra Leone', Report No. 695, April 2010.

62 Ibid.

The Country Office formally adopted the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) in January 2010, which in Sierra Leone is called the Direct Programme Support (DiPS) process. DiPS intends to promote national ownership of the development process by using a simplified and harmonized framework for funding support and programme implementation between the UN and GoSL.[63] In addition, it created a Business Development and Oversight Unit (BDOU) charged with results management and quality assurance.[64] In cooperation with other UN partners, UNDP performed micro-assessments to identify capacity constraints and risks with respect to implementing partners (IPs).

The Country Office programme delivery rate (i.e., programme expenditure to programme budget) was on average 71 percent over 2008-2012. Since falling to 55 percent in 2009, delivery improved to 80 percent in 2011 and 92 percent in 2012. The Country Office's management efficiency ratio (i.e., total management expenditure to management and programme expenditure) has been below the target over the last two available years, evidencing an improved financial efficiency since 2010.[65]

The use of outcome and project management monitoring boards has historically been inconsistent, including during the 2008-2010 period[66] as well as during the recent 2011-2012 period[67]. In addition, the Country Office did not systematically conduct a review of its strategic frameworks and outcome areas. Out of 34 financially and operationally closed projects since 2009, there have been 11 project or programme evaluations completed.[68] As a result, the Country Office's ability to monitor and oversee the country programme's progress towards intended outcomes was weakened.

3.3 COORDINATION BETWEEN UNDP AND UN SYSTEM

The integrated nature of the UN presence in Sierra Leone has influenced the role that UNDP has played in coordination. The ERSG's position as UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative has promoted UNDP's central role in the transition and lent additional prominence in key working groups for PRSP preparation, sector-based coordination and joint programme implementation. The complexity of the coordination arrangements of the integrated mission is evident in Table 4.

Out of the 21 UNJV programme areas over 2009-2012, UNDP acted as the lead agency in eight areas and was a participating agency in an additional six areas.[69] UNDP's role within the integrated mission has given it greater authority in its policy dialogue with the Government, resulting largely from the importance accorded to

63 Seppo, Mia, Speech (Former UNDP Sierra Leone Country Director), UNDP CPAP 2011-2012 Validation Meeting, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 2012.

64 The Country Office closed the BDOU during the 2012-2013 period.

65 In 2012, the Country Office had a 12.5 percent management efficiency ratio below the 16.6 percent target. See: UNDP, Country Office Balanced Scorecard, Sierra Leone, 2004-2011.

66 The 2008-2010 CPAP Mid-term Review found that three levels of monitoring boards created during the programme design were not operational, only some project boards or steering committees held meetings on a regular basis, the country programme board met only once, and the outcome boards never met.

67 UNDP, Office of Audit and Investigations, 'Audit of UNDP Country Office in Sierra Leone (Draft)', Report No. 1187, 2013.

68 The 34 projects do not include PBF projects as they were evaluated by the PBSO, and considers multiple projects clustered under one 'programme' as one 'project'. Source: Atlas (2013) and UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre.

69 UNDP ran joint programming with, inter alia, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM now UN Women), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). UNDP, Sierra Leone Country Programme Document (CPD), 2008-2010.

relevant Security Council resolutions pertaining to Sierra Leone.

UNDP has played a facilitative role as a fiduciary delivery mechanism for development assistance in sensitive areas on behalf of the principal donors in a range of sectors that are of central importance to the transition. UNDP has taken the lead in the management of the second largest country recipient of PBF support as well as multi-donor trust funds for UNJV implementation. UNDP assumed leadership in administering multi-donor funded projects in the areas of finance for development, public sector reform, justice, democratic institutions and youth employment. The most visible area where UNDP acted as a custodian of donor resources was under the 2012 Elections Multi-Donors Basket Fund with $42 million budgeted for the development of capacity, security, management oversight and implementation of two electoral cycles in Sierra Leone.

Table 4. UN in Sierra Leone Integrated Management Structure

Coordination Platform	UN Country Team (UNCT)	Deputies Group (programme)	Operations Management Team	DIPS[70] Task Force	Senior Management Meeting
Membership	All heads of UN agencies, WB, IMF, AfDB, IOM, ERSG, DHM, CSA, COS	UNCT deputy reps/ programme managers, chaired by UNICEF	UNCT operations managers, chaired by UNDP	Operations and programme technical UNCT staff, chaired by UNFPA	ERSG, Mission Heads of Sections
Objective	Policy-level discussions and decision and information sharing	ISF/UNDAF implementation coordination and M&E, MPTF reporting, country analysis*	Surveys (DSA, hardship, and salary) and common services (clinic, security, garage, joint field offices)*	Joint partner assessments, trainings and monitoring visits*	Internal mission structure: policy, decision and information sharing
Frequency	Weekly	On a needs basis (about bi-monthly)	Monthly normally	Quarterly/ bi-monthly normally	Weekly
Role of the Mission	ERSG chairs, DHM gives political brief, CSA gives security brief, the Strategic Planning Unit (SPU) provides technical and secretarial support	UNIPSIL programme managers have participated, SPU provides technical and secretarial support	CMS plays a key role because of the mission's importance for operations (e.g. clinic, helicopter, security, field offices)	Mission programme staff participated in staff training on operational harmonization, otherwise not part of this group	Internal mission structure

Source: UNIPSIL (2013); *Subsidiary to the UNCT

70 Direct Programme Support (DiPS), an adaptation of the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) system.

Chapter 4

UNDP'S CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

This chapter contains an assessment framed by the six major outcome areas as adapted for the ADR assessment process covering the period 2008-2012. The assessment of each outcome area begins with an analysis of national context and strategy and then presents UNDP's strategy to support these national efforts to contribute to the achievement of the outcomes. Specific programmatic and project interventions are then identified together with an assessment by the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the outcome level. Finally, for each outcome area, relevant factors that explain the level of performance are identified.

The major outcome areas are:

- support to democratic institutions
- public sector reform, local governance and service delivery
- access to justice and human rights
- youth development and employment
- finance for development
- environmental cooperation for peacebuilding.

The following contains a summary of the ADR focus areas in relation to the programmatic con-

Table 5. ADR Thematic Areas, UN/UNDP Strategic Frameworks, and Programme Resources

ADR Focus Areas	UNJV (2009-2012) *Programmes*	UNDP CPAP (2011-2012) *Expected outcomes*	Total Budget[71]	Total Expenditure[72]	% of total expenditure
Support to Democratic Institutions (Elections, Parliament and Media)	Democratic Elections and Political Dialogue	Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)	$64,331,085	$53,442,232	32.9%
	Support to Democratic Institutions	Parliament and other national institutions assisted to implement their individual mandate in a participatory, transparent and accountable manner	$6,234,166	$4,951,738	3.0%
Public Sector Reform, Local Governance and Service Delivery	Public Sector Reform	National levels of governance expand their capacities to reduce conflict and manage the equitable delivery of public services	$26,002,351	$19,220,964	11.8%
	Local Governance and Decentralization	Enhanced capacity of local councils to improve service delivery and development management	$40,855,905	$28,312,837	17.4%

71 Cumulative budget of projects active since 2008 over entire project lifecycle; Atlas (2013).

72 Cumulative expenditure of projects active since 2008 over entire project lifecycle; Atlas (2013).

Table 5. ADR Thematic Areas, UN/UNDP Strategic Frameworks, and Programme Resources (continued)

ADR Focus Areas	UNJV (2009-2012) *Programmes*	UNDP CPAP (2011-2012) *Expected outcomes*	Total Budget	Total Expenditure	% of total expenditure
Access to Justice and Human Rights	Access to Justice and Human Rights	Respect for Human Rights. Effective, responsive, accessible and fair justice systems promote the rule of law, including both formal and informal processes, with due consideration on the rights of the poor, women and vulnerable groups.	$20,106,628	$15,287,878	9.5%
Youth Employment	Youth Development and Employment	Jobs opportunities and livelihoods created by the youth through micro and small business run by youth	$41,879,074	$23,523,246	14.5%
Finance for Development	Finance for Development	The resource base available for development increased through strengthened abilities to expand and efficiently leverage aid, private investment and trade opportunities	$15,620,920	$11,952,779	7.4%
Environment	Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding	Strengthened national capacities to mainstream environment concerns into national development plans and implementation systems	$12,797,856	$5,665,220	3.5%

text together with respective budget and expenditure, which provide a snapshot of UNDP's contribution to each area.

4.1 SUPPORT TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Promoting free and fair elections and deepening democratic institutions have been the cornerstones of Sierra Leone's post-civil war governance reform agenda. The 2012 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance places Sierra Leone 30th of 52 African countries across all indicators, and in the World Bank's Governance Indicators, Sierra Leone ranks in the bottom decile of the aggregated indicator for Government Effectiveness.[73] The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks Sierra Leone 123rd of 176[74], and according to the 2013 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, 53 percent of respondents in Sierra Leone found the parliament or legislature was corrupt or extremely corrupt.[75] Women currently hold 12.4 percent of seats in Sierra Leone's Parliament,[76] which falls below the world average of 20.8 percent.[77] This places Sierra Leone 103rd of 141 countries ranked according to the pro-

73 World Bank, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators, Country Data Report for Sierra Leone: 1996-2011', 2012, online: <info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c196.pdf>.

74 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, online: <www.transparency.org/country - SLE_DataResearch _SurveysIndices>.

75 Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, 2013, online: <www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=sierra_leone>.

76 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), PARLINE database, online: <www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2281_A.htm>.

77 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), World Average for Single or Lower House, online: <www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm>.

portion of women in parliament.[78] The 2012 APRM report also flagged persistent challenges in the area of democracy and good political governance in spite of progress since the civil war's end. Prominent among these challenges is "capacity issues affecting the legislature in its oversight and investigative roles".[79]

Efforts to address these challenges and promote good governance are key features in national strategic documents since the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (June 2005). PRSP II ('Agenda for Change' 2008-2012) outlined several actions for "Integrating Parliament into the good governance objective of effective civic monitoring and oversight" with a focus on developing Parliament's capacity for oversight and scrutiny instead of a 'rubber stamp' existence. The 2007 Parliamentary Service Commission Act provided the legal framework for improving the efficiency of Parliament in carrying out this function. The PRSP III ('Agenda for Prosperity') similarly sets out to integrate Parliament into "effective civic monitoring" through training, capacity development of subcommittees, and establishment of resource centres.[80]

UNDP support has been directed to two distinct but interlinked components of strengthening (a) elections and (b) parliament. In addition, UNDP has supported interventions to improve the role of the media (with particular focus on its role in the electoral cycle. UNDP has also facilitated Sierra Leone's participation in the regional initiative known as the African Peer Review process.

The ADR has assessed these areas as two separate outcomes that have focused on capacity-building activities in support of governance. Overall, 37 percent of UNDP expenditure during the period 2008-2012 (source: Atlas data) has been devoted to promoting governance and supporting democratic institutions.

UNDP STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMES

Outcome: Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support)

UNDP and its partners have supported the Sierra Leonean National Electoral Commission since 2004. The overall aim of the support programme has been to build Sierra Leone's capacity to increasingly take on independent responsibility to administer and hold free and fair elections that met international norms. The first elections in 2002 were undertaken with supervision and logistical support from UN peacekeepers. The next election in 2007 was conducted with less external supervision but with major logistical support from the international community. The 2012 elections were the first to "be led by the National Electoral Commission" [81], built on the experience of 2007 and continued the process of building internal capacity with the objective that eventually the NEC will not require any external technical assistance. It was funded by a four-year, multi-donor basket funding mechanism (European Commission, DFID/UK, Japan, Germany, Irish Aid/Ireland, Peacebuilding Commission and UNDP) amounting to $42 million.

The UNDP programme adopted the 'electoral cycle' support (as distinct from 'event driven' support which targets a particular need) and promoted a holistic approach to creating an inclusive and participatory electoral process. It concentrated on three areas of (1) institutional strengthening, (2) inclusive participation, and (3) conflict management and electoral security. In terms of increased capacity of the electoral institutions to administer technically sound and credible elections, the assessment is that "the very top of impacts is to have meaningfully

78 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), World classification for women the lower or single house, online: <www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>.

79 Sierra Leone, APRM, January 2012, p.44.

80 PRSP III, p.112.

81 EU Observation Report, p.7.

contributed to the collective memory, [of] a peaceful, fair and transparent and credible elections, which present and [future] generations can refer to as a standard".[82] This assessment is noteworthy given the unique complexity of the election which involved the simultaneous conduct of elections at four levels—presidential, parliamentary, local council and mayoral. The NEC administered 9,000 polling stations, 526 different types of ballot papers, 2.6 million voter registrations, and 10,500 trained security staff in addition to other technical staff. The EU observation mission, while noting that the "political environment was extremely polarized", judged that "the NEC acted in an overall independent and impartial manner and an introduction of a biometric voter registration (BVR) is a notable achievement"[83].

While acknowledging these forward strides and even though the 2012 election was supported by 16 international advisers as compared to 145 in 2007, the outcome evaluation notes that there are significant capacity gaps which lead to the conclusion that the NEC is not yet in a position to conduct elections independent of international support. Conducting a thorough needs assessment, improving strategic planning capacities, introduction of more participative management techniques to ensure that "capacities developed [are] duly absorbed and assimilated by them so that they become autonomous" are among the areas requiring continued attention.

UNDP support was also directed towards the Political Party Registration Commission (PPRC) first through several Peacebuilding Fund projects totalling $1 million fielded in response to the 2009 political violence, aimed to ensure political reconciliation and professionalization, bolster media capacity and better standards. The PPRC held multiparty talks at district headquarters and regional capitals to foster political dialogue and conflict resolution.[84] Other trust-building activities produced a peace video and song, organized workshops for youth and religious leaders, and refurbished the opposition party SLPP's headquarters in line with the 2009 Joint Communiqué agreements. The electoral support programme built on this initial work through the provision of equipment, website development, technical training and the opening of four regional offices. It also set up district code of conduct monitoring committees with party representatives, civil society representatives and other stakeholders in 14 districts that held regular sessions and helped defuse tension and act as early warning mechanisms. All 10 registered political parties were supported through workshops that addressed issues on the revised electoral bill and internal party governance. Study trips were funded to Ghana and the UNDP programme also supported the setting of inter-party youth associations and women's association as part of peacebuilding initiatives. The programme was judged strong in terms maintaining dialogue among political parties and promoting constructive participation in the electoral process. Nevertheless, the review of the policies and constitutions of political parties and the legal reform of PPRC status (its ability to sanction violations of the code of conduct) remain unresolved issues.

Improvement in public confidence and participation in the electoral process through engagement with civil society was also addressed through Peacebuilding Fund and DFID funding. Overall achievement of this output was 'high' with the Civil Society Engagement Process (CSEEP) coordinating activities in this sector. The National Election Watch (NEW) observed polling stations and regional tallying centres, and operated a situation room reporting on facts from the field. A women's situation room was also supported with funds from UN Women and UNDP. Civic education was being carried

82 Outcome Evaluation, p.52.

83 EU Observation report p.7.

84 PBF JC, Annual Report, 2009.

out nationally by the National Commission for Democracy and an outreach campaign covering all 112 constituencies. Messages referring to national unity and cohesion, tolerance, gender parity, youth participation and cooperation were voiced in the five Sierra Leonean languages.

The youth and women's wings of the parties were also heavily supported through this programme, with over 2,000 party agents being trained and the All Political Parties Women's Association (APPWA) coming into operation. The APPWA presented a gender equality bill to parties, appealing for a minimum 30-percent quota representation for women in the 2012 elections. In spite of these efforts and the commitments by political parties' to affirmative action within their nominations, there were "no female candidates for the office of president, [and] only four female running-mates for the office of vice-president. The 65 women nominated as candidates in the parliamentary elections represented 11 percent of candidates, mirroring exactly the same figure as 2007. The only exception to national trends was in Kailahun by the Kailahun Women Governance Network, which offered training and financial support to female candidates from all parties [which] resulted in the election of over 40 percent of women to the local council".[85]

Support to the National Security Council (NSC) was also key with operational support and capacity-building training of 10,500 security forces. Political parties and civil society organizations were brought together to see security as a matter of mutual concern. One indicator was that in contrast to 2007, security staff conducted themselves professionally and without any visible personal reactions to the release of election results in 2012.

The programme also supported the strengthening of electoral dispute resolution mechanisms through training of some 200 police prosecutors, investigators and law officers in the Public Elections Act and related issues. While the track record of these Electoral Offences Courts in terms of settling 94 cases is satisfactory, opposition members have questioned the independence of these non-permanent courts since in most of the cases, decisions were made against them. The two output areas that were not carried out were the formulation of crisis management plans for electoral disputes and a NEC-led public education campaign on the role of the courts.

The overall conclusion is that, while a laudable result was achieved in terms of a credible 2012 election that met international norms and a three-year programme that delivered on a holistic approach to ensuring participation by all key segments of the Government and civil society, the goal of establishing self-sustaining election management bodies (EMBs) that will not require further support has yet to be achieved.

Outcome: Parliament and other democratic institutions [including the media] assisted to implement their individual mandate in a participatory, transparent and accountable manner

Along with playing a pivotal role in strengthening electoral management bodies, UNDP's strategy in Sierra Leone encompassed support to strengthening Parliament, support to the media and funding the APRM Secretariat.

Support to the Sierra Leone Parliament (2004-2013)[86] has focused on implementation of the Parliamentary Service Act (2007), which charges the Parliamentary Service (PS) with technical, administrative and advisory services to enable Parliament to execute its constitutional functions. UNDP provided operational and technical advisory support to the Parliament's administrative wing to strengthen and professionalize the functioning of the institution. This involved

85 EU Election Observation Mission, p.9.

86 UNDP, Atlas Snapshot, 2004-2013, Project ID 00059963.

setting up the PS institutional architecture, contributing to a meritocratic recruitment of highly qualified permanent PS staff.[87] Capacity-building activities have included training sessions for PS staff conducted by specialists from Ghana, internal training sessions, and a post-election briefing. UNDP helped to launch a mapping of development partner support to Parliament and contributed to the subsequent establishment of the Parliamentary Assistance Coordination Office (PACO).[88] In response to identified priority issues,[89] UNDP supported PACO's establishment to coordinate funding in alignment with the Parliament Strategic Plan.

To ensure financial and institutional sustainability, UNDP supported efforts in 2010-2011 to advocate with the Office of the President and Minister of Finance for an allocation in the national budget to hire PS staff who are now supported by a yearly budget and recognized as independent.[90] UNDP also supported a "multi-partner programme towards resource mobilization" for the Parliament with technical guidance to the PACO coordinator resulting in a $2.1 million four-year African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) programme (2013-2016), which has additional funded permanent staff dedicated to monitoring and evaluation and human resources.[91] UNDP's technical support contributed to the first PS newsletter and development of the parliamentary website, leading to a sense of ownership of the institution. At the policy level, UNDP provided advisory support regarding aid effectiveness for MPs to provide inputs for the Accra Agenda for Action.[92]

Overall, UNDP has been central to an improved parliamentary administrative capacity to provide basic technical support to MPs and committees. Through UNDP's efforts to finance, staff, and train the PS, legislators now have access to basic requisites to fulfil their functions, including regular recording of parliamentary debate. The number of professional PS staff increased from 8 to 30 to support 124 MPs.[93] As a result, the ratio of clerks per committee has improved and is currently at 2:1 compared with 4:1 previously. Furthermore, clerks indicate that they have been able to: activate previously defunct committees (i.e., Foreign Affairs); conduct better-organized meetings; and provide timely deliverables for committee activities.

While gains in capacity are evident at the parliamentary staff level, there is only limited evidence that parliamentary committees themselves are able to fulfil more effectively their oversight role in line with UNDP's outcome. Survey respondents noted that committees struggle with agenda setting, procedural rules and processes, and lack of adequate logistical provisions to conduct oversight activities. The most commonly cited measures to address weak committee capacities are increased funding and training for MPs.[94] UNDP has not

87 Including by: (i) finalizing an organogram and ToR of PS staff members; (ii) recruiting PS staff as a non-voting member in the PS recruitment panel and; (iii) finalizing salary scales and conditions of service for the PS; and (iv) preparing Parliament's 2012-2014 national budget submission to MOFED.

88 The mapping exercise indicated that MPs and Parliament staff engage with more than 70 development partners with small, fragmented, short-term and unsustainable assistance unaligned with the Parliament's Strategic Plan (2009-2013). Interview.

89 Issues arising from development partner support to the Parliament, such as 'conditionalities' tied to disbursement and donor-funded project staff, were seen as weakening Parliament's oversight role and institutional capacity. See: UNDP, Support to Parliament 2011 Annual Report.

90 Interview data.

91 UNDP, 'Results Oriented Annual Report 2012, Outcome 5A', 2012.

92 UNDP advocated for improved Parliamentary oversight of mutual assessment reviews in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda for Action, which led to initial Parliamentary scrutiny of the 2011 joint progress report on the Agenda for Change (PRSP-II).

93 UNDP, 'Results Oriented Annual Report 2012, Outcome 5A', 2012; Interview.

94 According to the NDI 2013 survey, these roles include *inter alia*: initiating bills, proposing amendments, organizing hearings, inviting member of the executive to testify, mobilizing citizens and civil society in support of bills, building support networks within parties.

Table 6. Women Nominated and Elected to Office in Sierra Leone, 2007-2012			
Body	No. of women (%)		% change
	2007/2008	2012	
1. Women Nominated for Office			
Parliament	64/566 (11%)	75/598 (13%)	+17%
Local Councils	224/1,321 (17%)	337/1,626 (21%)	+50%
2. Women Elected to Office			
Parliament	16/124 (13%)	15/124 (12%)	-6%
Local Councils	86/456 (19%)	88/456 (19%)	+2%

Source: National Democratic Institute, 'Women's Participation in Parliament in Sierra Leone' (2013)

conducted extensive MP trainings other than an ad-hoc post-election induction training in 2012. Most remaining active donors directly fund parliamentary committees,[95] while UNDP's focus has been on support to parliamentary staff who support the committees.

With UN Women, UNDP provided support to the Sierra Leone Female Parliamentary Caucus (SLEFPAC) to, inter alia, develop a strategic plan for strengthening inclusive and representative democratic systems and institutions.[96] Previously comprised of 27 members (17 women and 10 honorary men MPs), SLEFPAC regrouped since the 2012 elections after electoral changeovers.[97] Although the proportion of women in Parliament has dropped, observers note that overall the 2012 election cycle resulted in modest gains for women when taking into account women's increased access to political leadership positions.[98] Within the parliamentary staff, recruitment brought on board over 30 percent women of the currently recruited staff.[99] UNDP also supported South-South exchanges through several initiatives, including an international conference in Ghana.

Support to the media sector included projects with several media institutions, including as part of elections support.

First, UNDP and UNIPSIL jointly supported the transition process in 2010 from UN Radio and Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), a government-run broadcaster, to the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC). Following the outbreak of political violence in 2009, Parliament created the independent public service broadcaster, only the second in Africa. The UN handed over all physical assets and staff from a UN radio station to the SLBC.[100] [101] The SLBC was designed with a mission to provide inclusive, balanced and diverse programmes. UNDP provided administrative support in proj-

95 As of 10 December 2013, this includes: UNICEF, UNFPA, CPA–UK, 50:50 Group, World Bank, UN Women, IPAS, and Democracy Sierra Leone (CSO).

96 UNDP, 'Results Oriented Annual Report 2010, Outcome 21', 2010.

97 Skype interview data.

98 Women were elected for the first time as mayor, local council chairperson, and minority leader in Parliament; see National Democratic Institute, 'Women's Participation in Parliament in Sierra Leone', 2013.

99 UNDP, 'Results Oriented Annual Report 2011, Outcome 5A', 2011.

100 Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, Executive Representative of the Secretary General, UNIPSIL, 'Speech: SLBC Stakeholders Validation of Draft Guidelines on Elections', 28 June 2013.

101 Programme cumulative budget $3 million with $2.4 million spent over 2010-2012. UNDP, Atlas Snapshot, Project IDs 00079418, 00075936 and 00072652.

ect management processes for the implementation of the SLBC programme in cooperation with UNIPSIL with funding, including staff salaries, refurbishment, IT, office and broadcasting equipment. Key inputs delivered over 2010-2012 include:

- Eight radio transmission sites, three broadcast studios, building renovation, and electrical generator;
- Recruitment of management personnel and 167 staff; development of institutional policies for human resources and financial management; salary support to 160 temporary staff during a transition;[102]
- Financial sustainability advisory support, including technical assistance and capacity-building;[103]
- 2012 Elections Guideline for SLBC media coverage adopted by all political parties with a workshop attended by representatives from registered political parties, democratic institutions, and CSOs.[104]

In assessing progress towards achieving the outcome of discharging "its mandate in a participatory, transparent and accountable manner", the ADR notes several issues of concern. The SLBC's institutional development has been characterized by financial mismanagement, and a general lack of public credibility and sustainability.[105] It has increased its dependence on the GoSL for its day-to-day operations, relying on government-funded salaries for its 300 staff,[106] which has been one factor compromising its editorial independence[107]. The SLBC was not able to shed this image, despite merging with UN Radio, as a government mouthpiece and continues to be associated with the predecessor SLBS.[108] The EU Election Observation Mission stated that the SLBC played a role in setting an 'unequal playing field' during the campaign season with 'biased coverage' in favour of the incumbent APC party.[109] [110] Observers point to several lessons learned, particularly related to a flawed transition process where the SLBC may have prematurely assumed the status of public service broadcaster without fulfilling prerequisite criteria. Poor coordination between UNIPSIL and UNDP to transition staff from the former SLBS was also cited.[111]

The second area of UNDP support was for the Independent Media Commission (IMC)[112] and Cotton Tree News (CTN), which were subsumed

102 Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund Consolidated Report, 2012.

103 Areas include: (i) marketing and sales, leasing, corporate branding, programme sponsorship and investment in order; and (ii) strategic plans for income and resource generation for the SLBC Commercial Department, including a draft five-year business plan with a financial management plan and resource mobilization strategy. United Nations, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, 'Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund Consolidated Report', 2012.

104 UNDP, 'Support to Governance Programme Achievements Brief (2008-2012)', 2012.

105 A 2011 non-financial audit initially questioned SLBC credibility and pointed to serious structural flaws, including at the management level, which "led to almost total paralysis" in pushing forward the SLBC reform agenda for public service is broadcasting. See: Elizabeth Smith, 'Capacity Assessment Exercise: Non-Financial Capacity Audit of SLBC', December 2011.

106 Despite UN transitional funding, SLBC was not able to meet operational costs and turned to the GoSL for a larger proportion of funding. Interview.

107 Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund Consolidated Report, 2012.

108 Interview data.

109 European Union, 'Peaceful and Well-Conducted Elections Represent an Important Step Towards Consolidation of Democracy, Despite Unequal Playing Field', Election Observation Mission—Sierra Leone 2012, 19 November 2012, online: <www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/eueom-sierra-leone-press-release-19112012_en.pdf>.

110 In response, the SLBC argues that it could not shirk its mandate to cover GoSL activities despite elections, thus leading to a perceived bias. Interview.

111 Interview data.

112 UNDP, Atlas Snapshot, Project ID 00076260 [Budget: $1,260,529] and 00077588 [Budget: $446,828].

into the Electoral Cycle Project from 2011.[113] The IMC's mandate is to promote pluralistic media and sanction cases of abuse by media institutions, and UN support sought to prevent violence—including election-related incidents—through media monitoring and improved reporting standards.[114] UNDP provided capacity-building activities,[115] staffing[116] and infrastructural development[117]. During the elections cycle, the IMC produced quarterly bulletins providing analysis of media performance.[118] IMC nationwide trainings on Sierra Leone's Media Code of Practice for radio editors and managers on electoral coverage contributed to "enhanced capacities…to provide professional and unbiased coverage of the 2012 election".[119] UNDP support focused on project and financial management while UNIPSIL provided technical and media management advisory services.

The IMC's two regional offices facilitated constructive local media dialogue as well as localized compliance with the Media Code of Practice.[120] The IMC's performance of its core roles to monitor and sanction media outlets has improved but remains hindered by a weak legal mandate and enforcement capacity. For example, the 2012 Elections Code was not given the force of law and as a result, several Freetown-based media outlets flouted the code by covering candidates and campaigns twenty-four hours before the election with no legal repercussions.[121] Low compliance in Freetown where private media firms were able to circumvent court rulings has consequently decreased the IMC's credibility.

With funding from the Government of Germany, CTN established regional elections reporting teams, which put together radio programmes collectively with community stations to provide voter education, including regarding female candidates and election-related tensions.[122] The European Union Elections Observer Mission recognized CTN's positive contribution to the elections. CTN, together with the Independent Radio Network, BBC Media Action and Search for Common Ground, established a network of radio stations that covered the elections especially from the eve of polling day to the announcement of the certified results by the NEC.

Major challenges persist in a media climate characterized by unprofessional behaviour, with biased institutions closely allied to political parties and media institutions bankrolled by party interests.[123]

113 As a result, UNDP support to the IMC also falls under the Elections outcome since 2011.

114 UNDP, 'Final Programme Narrative Report, Support to Capacity Development of the Independent Media Commission', October 2012.

115 Training exercises in Freetown and districts in ethics, legal norms, the media regulatory framework, as well as media monitoring and reporting tools. 2011 IMC Annual Report.

116 Resident director hired for internal restructuring, four-year strategic plan, and the Monitoring, Research and Project Unit. See: UNDP, 'Final Programme Narrative Report, Support to Capacity Development of the Independent Media Commission', October 2012.

117 Two satellite offices established in the Northern district of Makeni in 2010 and Southern district of Bo in 2009 to increase IMC monitoring capacity; Installation of monitoring software in 2011 to assist the IMC to monitor 64 radio stations; See: UNDP, 'Final Programme Narrative Report, Support to Capacity Development of the Independent Media Commission', October 2012; and UNDP, 'Annual Progress Report, Support to the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone (2010-2014)', February 2012.

118 UNDP, 'Annual Report, Sierra Leone', 2011.

119 UNDP, 'Final Programme Narrative Report, Support to Capacity Development of the Independent Media Commission', October 2012.

120 The Bo City IMC Office was able to settle all media complaints out of court.

121 The Ministry of Information reportedly did not take the proposed Elections Code through to Parliament. Interview.

122 Support to community radio stations through CTN focused on strengthening 26 stations across the country, which enabled 24 hour broadcasting throughout the country for voter education and reporting standards.

123 UNDP, 'Results Oriented Annual Report 2012, Outcome 5A', 2012; UNDP, 'Annual Progress Report, Support to the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone (2010-2014)', February 2012.

The EU noted that the ruling APC party used "state resources to its advantage, including heightened media coverage".[124] Although the IMC fined and suspended the licenses of three newspapers for one month in September 2012, only one newspaper has complied with the ruling.[125] UNDP's support to the IMC met delays in sourcing, procuring and installing electronic media monitoring software due to "lengthy national procurement regulations".[126] In addition, IMC systems are capable of monitoring media 24/7 but infrastructural problems hamper its implementation; it currently can monitor 15 stations and selected 10 printed papers.[127]

Lastly, UNDP's ongoing media-related intervention[128] for 2013-2014 aims to assess the media environment for a comprehensive restructuring of its support to the sector. Based on the UNESCO Media Development Indicators (MDIs), UNDP is providing capacity development to six key institutions[129] based on an assessment and needs of the media landscape in contrast to UNDP's previous scattershot approach in media development.[130] This entails the design of a two-year Media Development Strategy, a review of the media regulatory framework, and capacity assessments of key media institutions.

The APRM (2009-2012)[131] process aims to foster the adoption of governance policies, standards and practices through experience sharing and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessment of requirements for capacity-building. Since Sierra Leone joined the APRM in 2004, UNDP supported the process in collaboration with the African Development Bank (AfDB), UNDP Regional Office, and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). UNDP covered logistics and administrative costs for the Secretariat,[132] and recruited research institutions to draft the Country Self-Assessment Report and National Programme of Action (NPOA). UNDP provided consultants for advisory and oversight support to the APRM Secretariat and National Governing Council in the collection, management, and analysis of data from a scientific survey and broad consultations.[133] A Sierra Leone delegation for the APRM[134] attended the APR Forum in Addis Ababa (January 2011) where 'knowledge and expertise' were exchanged.[135] A lack of implementation mechanisms was identified following the NPOA with a mission to Ghana, and UNDP is designing a training component for parliamentary committees to follow, monitor and document progress with the ongoing APRM processes. The APRM project nonetheless has remained a peripheral

124 IREX 2012 Media Sustainability Index, online: <www.irex.org/resource/sierra-leone-media-sustainability-index-msi>.

125 In the case of fines penalizing the *Awareness Times* paper, the case was thrown out and the editor was appointed to a position in the new government. Interview.

126 UNDP, 'Final Programme Narrative Report, Support to Capacity Development of the Independent Media Commission', October 2012.

127 Interview data.

128 UNDP, Atlas Snapshot, Project ID 00085842 [Budget: $260,000].

129 IMC, Sierra Leone Association of Journalists, Cotton Tree News, Women in the Media in Sierra Leone, Guild of Editors, and Independent Radio Network. Interview.

130 Support to Media Development, Annual Work Plan, 2013.

131 UNDP Atlas Snapshot, Project ID 00059795 [Budget: $544,722].

132 $480,000 in expenditure, including cost-sharing with RBA in the amount of $30,000 in 2010 and $60,000 in 2011. Interview data.

133 Mid-term Review of the UN Joint Vision for Sierra Leone 2009-2010 (2011).

134 Consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Minister of Political and Public Affairs, and Chairman of the APRM National Governing Council.

135 UNDP, 'Results Oriented Annual Report 2011, Outcome 5A', 2011.

intervention according to stakeholders despite its high-level status within the overall country developmental agenda.[136] In this respect, the project has performed well in achieving its yearly work plan benchmarks but it may be premature to assess how effectively it has contributed to enhancing "the quality of national development policy".[137]

Most recently two UNDP projects supported preparation of the Gender Equality Bill 2012 and the Constitutional Review process. The Gender Bill received UNDP support that helped facilitate consultations in the four regional capital towns with UNDP support: in Western Area in Freetown in June and July 2012 with 59 participants (32 male/27 female); in Bo, 30 participants (15 male/15 female); in Kenema, 31 participants (13 male/18 female); and in Makeni, 46 participants (30 male/16 female). The objective was to ensure the process was consultative, inclusive and participatory to secure the buy-in of relevant stakeholders across the country. Salient issues that emerged were forwarded as additional input for inclusion and for a final consolidation of the Act. There was consensus that a Gender Equality Commission should be established to lead implementation of the Act. There were various recommendations as to the constitution of the commission and proposals to ensure that powers given to the Minister and President in the appointment of members of the commission reflected a consultative process before recommendations are forwarded to the President.

In terms of the Constitutional Review, UNDP is the manager of a basket fund of approximately $4.2 million for the work of the Constitutional Review Committee (with contributions from the Government, DFID and the EU). UNDP has provided funds for the recruitment of a chief technical adviser. The Committee has yet to begin its work as it has faced disagreements pertaining to its rules and procedures and the prioritization of its work. The donors have also baulked at the cost of activities.

ASSESSMENT BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

Overall, UNDP interventions have been of crucial **relevance** to promoting democratic governance in Sierra Leone and have correspondingly commanded the largest share (36 percent) of resources during the period under review. Support to elections has been central and sustained with the 2012 election setting a standard for peaceful, fair, transparent and credible elections that needs to be maintained. UNDP support to Parliament buttressed these gains and filled basic capacity gaps. In terms of the media, the relevance of UNDP support was clear but progress was mixed. The APRM process has provided a comprehensive benchmark for further development in terms of governance in Sierra Leone. **While these UNDP interventions represent a generally coherent strategy in terms of promoting democratic governance at key levels, UNDP initiatives were weakened because they did not consistently carry out detailed needs assessments to identify the most effective areas of support. There is a lack of assessments for capacity-building to both identify gaps and feed into the programme design process.**[138]

In terms of **effectiveness,** the elections programme performed well in delivering a logistically complex election at the presidential, parliamentary, local council and mayoral levels, which contributed notably to the success of the 2012 elections. Prominent among the outputs delivered were support to a biometric voter registration; planning and running the electoral operational agenda; capacity development processes; access of actors to professional equipment; improvement of confidence and participation in the electoral process; and addressing security issues. However, **the programme's success has**

136 Interview data.

137 APRM 2012 AWP.

138 Two notable exceptions include the parliamentary support's initial mapping exercise in 2009, as well as the current media programme.

been primarily at the output level and it has yet to achieve the outcome relating to developing the capacity of EMBs sufficiently to run elections independently or with less involvement of the international community. Therefore, the assessment is that while the support ensured a visible result and promoted conditions that increased national ownership, the outcome of setting in place sustainable national capacity that is not reliant on international support will continue to require attention.

UNDP has been crucial to an improved parliamentary administrative capacity to provide support to MPs and committees, and as a result contributed to gains in the efficient functioning of Parliament. UNDP has made important contributions to the institutional development of targeted democratic institutions within both Parliament and the media sector in operationalizing: (1) PACO and PS departments, (2) IMC regional offices; (3) the SLBC; and (4) the APRM Secretariat and Governing Council. As a result, these institutions have built greater technical, staff and strategic capacity to meet their respective intended objectives. During the 2012 elections period, support to the media contributed to greater professionalism and as a result decreased likelihood of violence. **Progress has been slow to reach the outcome-level expectation of increased participatory, transparent and accountable functioning of targeted democratic institutions. Media institutions have had limited results in enabling the SLBC and IMC to, respectively, provide unbiased public information and act as a media watchdog**.

In terms of **efficiency,** there are **mixed results**. The elections project achieved very reasonable levels of efficiency: budget expenditure totalled $39,780,104 for the 2011-2012 period and had an overall execution rate of close to 81 percent. The overall management costs for delivering the elections programme has been calculated at 14 percent with the Programme Management Unit accounting for 5 percent and 9 percent for UNDP overhead costs. Implementation of media and parliamentary projects has occurred within their cost estimates with an average execution rate of 83 percent, and projects were implemented within projected award durations as reflected in Atlas.[139] Several projects experienced significant delays in recruitment, procurement and infrastructural development, which is attributable in part to poor management and lengthy national procurement regulations.

UNDP's strategic alignment with the Joint Vision facilitated coordination with UNIPSIL and UN Women. UNDP played a key role in linking media institutions with electoral preparations across programmes. For example, UNDP built upon its media programmes in the post-2009 political violence to integrate elections-specific objectives such as community-level monitoring. As a recipient agent, UNDP was unable to efficiently meet the needs of PBF projects in the first and second waves of funding, which caused frustration with the PBSO Joint Steering Committee (JSC) and GoSL partners such as the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). This led to programmatic inefficiencies due to the JSC's decision to consequently withhold funding to UNDP in the third wave of funding for certain project activities. The PBF selected the IOM as a recipient agent for Parliament, which provided small inputs that were not aligned with UNDP's larger-scale project for Parliament.[140] National partners also complained that UNDP and UN partners opted for inefficient procurement of external consultants.[141] In terms of **sustainability**, the election programme itself will require further support to enhance decision-making processes within the NEC and complete the institutionalization of the election programme's innovations.

139 With the exception of Support to Parliament, which was extended into the current 2013-2014 CPD.

140 United Nations, Peace Building Fund Programme in Sierra Leone, 'Report of Final Evaluation', February 2011.

141 SLBC rejected a group of trainers for their high quoted prices. Interview.

Media and parliamentary projects have facilitated long-term institutional change by implementing national legislation,[142] but financial sustainability remains mixed. Projects have developed sustainability strategies and appropriate policies—such as business development strategies or strategic plans—but have struggled in their implementation. UNDP supported strategy development for the outcome's relevant government bodies.[143] UNDP's support to the SLBC was stopped in 2012, and the SLBC is considered more dependent on the Government and donors than previously.[144] As a result, the formulation of strategies has led to limited results in terms of resource mobilization and financial viability.

UNDP was instrumental in achieving requisite financial and institutional sustainability of Parliament's administrative staff, which represents arguably a notable achievement in this outcome area. UNDP's Parliament chief technical adviser (CTA) conducted advocacy in 2011 with the Office of the President and Minister of Finance that led to a key permanent budgetary allocation for staff. UNDP also negotiated to close IOM contracts with external consultants to be moved to permanent posts for national PS staff. As almost all projects in the outcome were DIM, project strategies within the outcome integrate exit strategies in theory through a phased institutional development approach. Certain parliamentary institutions, namely its administrative bodies in the PS and PACO, may at this stage be capable of continuing independently without further development assistance.

Overall, while each institution's strategy is designed to enhance its capacity to both mobilize funds and assume full responsibility following the completion of UNDP support, heavy donor dependency of the supported institutions is recognized as an ongoing concern.

4.2 PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM, LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY

After 2002 and the cessation of the civil war, the focus of public sector reform has been on addressing the acute shortages of capacity in the public service at both the central and local government level. The second PRSP reiterated the need to build capacity through public sector reform and strengthening decentralization and stressed the need for coordinated efforts to ensure an efficient, effective and accountable public service across government. At the central level, attention was paid to buttressing public service (through involvement of the diaspora) and updating the public service practices and infrastructure. The focus was on expanding the capacities of national levels of governance to reduce conflict and manage the equitable delivery of public services through the introduction of performance and results-based management, modernized e-governance systems, information and communication technology (ICT) platforms and processes, training for civil servants.

The 1991 constitution had made no provision for local government and it was not until 2004 that the enactment of the Local Government Act gave local councils and chiefdom councils the right to raise and administer revenue including local taxes, property taxes, licenses, fees and other charges, mining revenues, interest and dividends. Eighty functions were designated for devolution to local councils in the 2004 act. Local elections were held in 2004, 2008 and 2012. The elections in 2004 were the first held in 32 years. Based on the Local Government Act of 2004, local government includes local councils and chiefdom councils. There are 19 local councils—five city councils, one municipal council and 13 district councils.

142 Including the SLBC Act in 2010 establishing the country's public broadcaster, the Parliamentary Service Act of 2007 establishing the PS, and IMC Act of 2007 (Amendment).

143 Including: (i) Parliament's strategic plan (2009-2013); (ii) a SLEFPAC strategic plan; (iii) a five-year SLBC business plan; (iv) and four-year IMC strategic plan.

144 Atlas Snapshot project progress reports.

By the end of 2010, 46 of the 80 had been devolved in practice and the remaining functions were to be devolved by end-2012. The 46 currently devolved include primary and secondary health care, primary and junior-secondary education, environment, agriculture, extension services, rural water supply, solid waste management registration of births and deaths, civil marriages, and community development. Some city councils have established a metropolitan police force, particularly to support collection of revenue and compliance with bylaws. Yet, local government's contribution to GDP constitutes just 0.7 percent.

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) has responsibility for implementing decentralization and local governance reforms including specifying functions to be assigned to local councils and coordination and implementation of the programme of devolution from central government to local councils. It is responsible for monitoring and inspecting the activities of local councils to ensure that they conform to legislation.

There is an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Decentralization, chaired by the vice-president and comprising the minister responsible for local government, the ministers for finance and development, education, health and sanitation, works and agriculture and the attorney general. Representatives of local councils are elected on a rotational basis to participate. In each of the three provinces, provincial coordination committees (PCCs), chaired by the resident minister of the province, are responsible for coordinating the activities of local councils and review and coordinate the provision of public services in the province. A national coordination committee, co-chaired by the deputy ministers of MOFED and MLGRD and composed of line ministries, meets on a quarterly basis to review the delivery of centrally funded activities at the local level. The Local Government Act of 2004 requires consultation with residents before councils review or approve development plans. Ward committees and councillors play a role in monitoring the delivery of devolved services and the operation of ministries, departments and agencies with respect to the services they provide. Council documents, budgets and accounts as well as development plans are required to be published and available to the public. Monthly council meetings are held and are rotated between the wards in most cases.

Paramount chieftaincies remain a real locus of power and influence at the local level, are established in accordance with customary law, and are recognized in section 72 of the Constitution. The MLGRD also oversees chiefdom councils including paramount chief elections, chiefdom councils and chiefdom police, and tribal headmen in the Western Area. Chiefdoms are subdivided into sections, consisting of a number of towns and villages and headed by a section chief or subchief. The paramount chief has jurisdiction over all sections within the chiefdom. Administration of each chiefdom is undertaken by a chiefdom committee presided over by a paramount chief. It serves as an executive body for the chiefdom council comprising all the subchiefs and chiefdom councillors. The Chieftaincy Act of 2009 provides for the election of paramount chiefs and subchiefs. Candidates must belong to one of the ruling houses recognized at independence in 1961. Paramount chiefs are elected by councillors of the chiefdom. The Electoral Commission supervises polling. Paramount chiefs are elected for life, though 'gross misconduct' can result in them being removed by the President.

UNDP STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMES

The UNDP programme of support to public sector reform and local governance was heavily centred on capacity development, with the objective of improving service delivery and the effective and efficient performance of mandated functions by central ministries and government agencies as well as subnational levels of government. In this respect, the programme focused on achieving the following broad outcomes:

Outcome: National, regional and local levels of governance expand their capacities to reduce conflict and manage the equitable delivery of public service

Outcome: Enhanced capacity of local councils to improve service delivery and development management

Better defining the core functions of central government agencies of the executive branch, the placement of competent personnel in largely technical positions through the diaspora project, training for other personnel, the development of systems for work planning and capacity and performance appraisal were core elements of the Public Sector Reform Programme supported by UNDP through the diaspora project, the public sector reform programme and the Sierra Leone Civil Service Training College.

In terms of local development, UNDP support has primarily been through programming which has also involved funds and technical support from UNCDF for assistance to fiscal decentralization both at the centre and at subnational level. The assumption underpinning these interventions is that devolution of functions particularly with respect to service delivery in an accountable manner as close to the community level as possible would be more effective. This approach seems pertinent since one of the most significant reasons for conflict in Sierra Leone has been the extent to which decision-making was removed from the diverse population at the local level.

Public Sector Reform—In terms of public sector capacity development, UNDP's diaspora project, formally known as the 'Delivering Results and Accelerating Public Sector Reform with Diaspora Resources and Experts from the South' project was in effect for two years—from September 2008 to August 2010. Many of the country's best-educated, experienced and successful professionals lived (and still live) abroad. Indeed, at the outset of the project, it was estimated that well over 30 percent of the country's professional and educated nationals had left the country and that more than 500,000 Sierra Leoneans resided in the US and UK alone.

The project was initially designed for one year with the dual objective of establishing a management unit for diaspora personnel and placing at least 35 short-term diaspora experts in MDAs. The project time-frame, which was patently unrealistic[145], was then extended at no additional cost for two years. The project supported the President's public sector reform agenda by providing the services of at least 35 experts over a one-year period. In the event, only 20 were recruited for 11 MDAs. The project also had an ambitious plan for attracting diaspora remittances to priority areas for development. This component of the programme, however, appears not to have been implemented. The first year was intended as a pilot, with the possibility of extension based on experience gained. The project, which responded to the need to fill critical capacity gaps in the MDAs, but the programme "was not strategically designed, implemented or managed"[146].

The result is that little remains of the diaspora project. Unfortunately, the Sierra Leone Diaspora programme does not appear to have drawn on the experience gained under numerous relevant projects that have been implemented by UNDP around the world (Turkey, India, China, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Liberia) and have been evaluated extensively.

Longer term UNDP support to civil service reform, which is still ongoing, supports the Gov-

145 With a one-year pilot, estimating six months for Diaspora Unit set up, staff recruitment, establishment and implementation of expert recruitment, only six months remained for expert contracts. Yet the project sought to recruit experts for a one-year minimum, putting project implementation in a permanent state of seeking extensions from the beginning.

146 UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, 'Evaluation of the Delivering Results and Accelerating Public Sector Reform with Diaspora Resources and Experts from the South Project: Final Report', by Maria McLaughlin and Hindowa Momah, 3 February, 2011.

ernment's comprehensive Public Sector Reform initiative. Overall, this programme has been responsible for the review, rationalizing and updating of civil service positions with the following results: in 2010, job descriptions for all civil service positions were reviewed and updated. Civil service size was reduced from 17,560 in 2007/2008 to 13,631 in March 2010. It increased to 15,703 in May 2010 due to additional recruitment of public officers in support of the Free Healthcare Initiative.

In terms of modernizing civil service performance, UNDP has played a central role in the introduction of a performance appraisal system that is currently being rolled out across all central government ministries and is also being introduced at the subnational level. Performance contracts are drawn up between the President and each of his Ministers and Vice-Ministers, and it is likely that such a system will provide an additional means for the President to manage his cabinet more effectively. It is too early to determine what the effect of the system will be on performance. UNDP assistance has included a payroll management system with a comprehensive, biometric system for the registration of all civil servants. Introduction of the biometric system will eliminate phantom workers and double counting of personnel. However, recurrent costs are expected to be high and create a dependence on the database storage facilities and advanced computer systems for biometric analysis located in Brussels.

A third area of UNDP support has been to the Sierra Leone Civil Service Training College (CSTC). With initial UNDP support in the form of basic equipment and facilities, the CSTC got up and running with the facility fast becoming the venue of choice for civil service training programmes. Aside from training, UNDP also supported the post of the principal for the CSTC who assumed duties from 1 June 2012.

Local Governance and Service Delivery—Local government structures in Sierra Leone include the traditional and the modern. The traditional structures consist of 149 chiefdoms ruled by paramount chiefs, who are elected for life from among members of the ruling families, with eligibility to vote restricted to members of an electoral college. The modern local government structure comprises 19 local councils, established under the Local Government Act of 2004.

In select municipalities such as Bo, UNDP support has enabled progressive administrators to experiment successfully with semi-privatized service delivery mechanisms that have raised the efficiency of service delivery while reducing the cost to government and creating spin-off enterprises that have created jobs for unemployed youth. In such instances, the operational costs of the local government continue to be contributed by UNDP.

UNDP began its assistance to fiscal decentralization in 2004, working on the prospect of devolving set functions to the local councils. One of its key pilot programmes has been the Kenema District Recovery Programme using UNCDF funding in which a local development fund was established, planned and managed by the local council to support the creation of revenue-generating ventures that could be used to broaden the revenue base of the local council itself.

UNDP supported the Government in implementing a cadastral programme with a view to making the application of property taxes, one of the principal sources of local government financing, more systematic. In this respect, Bo City is cited as the best example of effective implementation of the cadastral programme and the raising of revenue for service delivery by the local government.

With respect to the Kenema City Recovery Programme, results appear to have been distinctly mixed. The UNDP/UNCDF programme supported the building and establishment of a guesthouse and a day care centre to raise revenue for the city council. Construction of both was begun in 2010 and the day care centre was also intended to empower working mothers. It is understood that the guesthouse is still not

functioning, as it has faced problems under the subcontract as well as issues with the electrical system to be installed. Records of revenue raised from the guesthouse and day care centre were not available for the ADR team's inspection. With respect to the Kenema district council, the ADR team was able to visit a market established with UNCDF support with the idea of sharing the market dues received from traders with the local community. It was noted, however, that the dues charged were relatively high and that several traders had not been able to sustain their businesses despite the fact that the marketing conditions were significantly better with proper shelter, storage and protection from the elements.

UNDP together with UNCDF supported 11 capacity-building interventions to promote local governance and service delivery ranging from training of ward committee members and administrators in the concepts and roles and responsibilities associated with decentralization, system to monitor and assess local council performance, the preparation and dissemination of a Chiefdom Policy. Prominent among these activities was the national launch of local economic development (LED) model involving government, local councils, private sector organizations with LED then being piloted in four local councils to undertake a Local Economic Assessment (LEA). The forum aimed at assessing and identifying areas of economic investments with high potentials of income generation, employment opportunities for men and women, and attractive to private sector investors. Particular attention was paid to ensuring women's participation during the forums and that projects identified are also gender sensitive in terms of providing opportunities for women. The successful completion of this exercise enabled UNDP and UNCDF to engage with them financially by considering the possibility of transferring the LED funds into their bank account to finance their LED projects in 2012. The feasibility studies undertaken for the LED investment projects had an important component on environment impact assessment.

ASSESSMENT BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

Support to this sector addresses one of the key issues underlying the conflict in Sierra Leone, namely control over decision-making. **UNDP interventions in support of public sector reform and local development are considered relevant and targeted in rebuilding and modernizing the basic fabric of institutions at the central, regional and local levels. UNDP was the first donor partner to engage in the complex area of public administration reform and local development, and devoted 29 percent of resources to programming in support of this outcome. This early support by UNDP has encouraged others to enter—most notably the EU and the World Bank with a $17 million grant.**

The presence of follow-up donor financing also demonstrates the **effectiveness** of the UNDP programmes thus far, though it is clear **that a more strategic and cohesive approach would have enhanced programme effectiveness. The diaspora project is one example of a programme that required much more attention and missed the opportunity to exploit learned lessons from similar programmes that filled capacity gaps in other post-conflict and capacity-building situations**.

As regards **efficiency, with its heavy emphasis on local procurement of personnel, equipment and supplies, it is likely that UNDP's programmes are relatively cost effective—particularly in comparison with the projects and programmes of most other donor agencies. However, in terms of the timeliness of implementation, delays experienced were mainly due to difficulties in securing sufficient quality in the preparation of specifications or requests for proposal and supporting documentation for payments where payments were to be issued directly by UNDP.** Some delays were also experienced in the preparation and approval of annual workplans due to limited capacity on the part of counterpart institutions. It is understood that such delays have become less frequent as the requirements have become better understood and familiarity with the requirement processes and

systems has set in. Delivery rates are relatively meaningless as they reflect expenditures against the budgets agreed to through negotiation and entered into the system rather than expected expenditures and planned budgets. (While the ADR team did not have sufficient time to inspect the programme in detail at the district and municipal level, the LED programme seemed to present some problems pertaining to poor design, monitoring and cost overruns.)

Under this outcome, as with others, UNDP has facilitated implementation by applying its funding to the payment of recurrent and operational costs, supplies, fuel, generators, essential office equipment etc., which calls into question the sustainability of these programmes. Generally, counterparts have emphasized to the evaluation team that this practice has empowered them and provided them with the flexibility to implement programmes according to their own priorities. They have also indicated that as a result of this approach, UNDP support is better aligned with national priorities and is characterized by far greater national ownership than other donor programmes. It is, however, an inherently unsustainable approach if it is not integrated with an active and credible phasing out period during which external funding of operations and recurrent costs is progressively substituted with funds from the national budget or other nationally sourced funding.

The long-term sustainability of capacity development programmes in Sierra Leone has been further negatively affected by the following practices that are common to most, if not all of the donors. More specifically, the following practices are responsible for skewing priorities, and reducing the likelihood of staff retention upon the completion of external assistance:

- The creation of project implementation units within MDAs under external project funding with the mandate of driving the implementation of donor-funded projects;
- The payment of the salaries of national staff of beneficiary institutions or the payment of salary supplements in order to render government salaries competitive;
- The payment of other incentives such as travel allowances, transportation costs, etc.

Failure to pay such incentives has, in the past, resulted in the loss of staff to other donor-funded projects and programmes, and as a result, UNDP has had to comply with common practice. A coordinated approach among donors, the Government and NGOs is required if such practices are to be eliminated or scaled down in order to reduce their negative impact on sustainability.

Attempts were made in Sierra Leone to adapt and roll out the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers, adopted in 2007 by the funds and programmes of the UN system with application not just to the UN but all donors in the country. The new 'harmonized approach' rolled out by UNDP and GoSL was geared to harmonizing donor approaches to capacity-building with a view to raising sustainability. Following the adoption and roll-out of the new harmonized approach, the UNDP Sierra Leone Country Office formed a task force comprised of all UN agencies to oversee the implementation of the HACT process. In addition, the entire UN task force in collaboration with the Government of Sierra Leone has developed a capacity development guide on HACT. This framework provided guidance on ways to address capacity gaps identified during the micro assessment. The Country Office is in the process of developing Assurance and Audit plan and a joint Assurance and Audit plan by ExCom agencies has been initiated. It is hoped that this will all be finalized by end-2013.

In the meantime, unsustainable practices continue. Most commonly, UNDP's payment of recurrent and operational costs continues to be the most persistent issue. Over time, the GoSL has applied a strategy of taking over the funding of salaries of essential civil servants, while still allowing UNDP funds to continue to be applied to the payment of recurrent and operational costs.

4.3 JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Like many African countries, Sierra Leone has a dual legal system of formal and customary law. The formal justice system is based on case law and citizens engage with this system through three main institutions—the judiciary, police and prisons.[147] The judiciary is comprised of district level Magistrate Courts and a High Court that is based in Freetown but visits the provincial capitals. The chiefdoms, which remain an important force, are governed by paramount chiefs, traditional rulers elected for life by an electoral college of chiefdom elders. The Chief Justice is the head of Sierra Leone's judiciary, which has jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal. The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the High Court, the Magistrate Courts and the local courts. Local courts are linked to traditional systems of justice and fall under the paramount chief, or his or her representative. Although the infrastructure of the judiciary was badly damaged during the war, Magistrate Courts have resumed sitting nationwide with government and donor funding.

Public defenders do not yet exist in Sierra Leone. Private attorneys sometimes provide pro bono services to defendants through the Barristers Association. To facilitate the work of the judiciary, Justices of the Peace, individuals without legal degrees or formal legal education, but with standing in the local community, have been appointed and trained across the country[148], some with UNDP funding. Legal aid is available through a number of local non-governmental organizations, but this is in the form of paralegal assistance, primarily case preparation and general legal advice. Legal aid workers, however, do not have the legal standing to be able to defend their clients in court.

Customary courts (known as 'local courts') administer customary law, which, under the Constitution, is part of Sierra Leone common law. Customary by-laws are set at chiefdom level and vary widely between chiefdoms. In the local courts, cases are heard by a Court Chairman who is assisted by four court members (usually senior members of the community), all of whom are appointed by the paramount chief. There are also chiefdom police who work for the chief and local courts. Local courts are regulated by the Local Court Act and are overseen by a Customary Law Officer who reports to the Ministry of Justice. In addition to these formally recognized local courts, there are a range of informal institutions through which people seek justice at community level, including ad hoc processes run by chiefs, elders and secret societies. It is estimated that local courts and informal mechanisms are used by the vast majority of the population as they are physically closer to people; are based on cultural norms and therefore appear relevant and understandable; place an emphasis on mediation; operate in local languages; are swift in dispensing justice; and are perceived as cheaper than formal courts.

In March 2005, Sierra Leone embarked on a five-year Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP). The goal is improved safety, security and access to justice through development of an effective and accountable justice sector capable of meeting the needs of the people, particularly the poor, the vulnerable and the marginalized. In 2007, under the JSDP, the Government published a Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan I which sets out "a platform for a coherent, prioritized and sequenced set of activities to reform the operations of the justice system in Sierra Leone".[149] Recognizing that the formal justice system is inaccessible to the vast majority of the population, the strategy priori-

147 The formal justice system is comprised of the following institutions: Police, Prison Service, Judiciary, Law Reform Commission, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local Government and Community Development, and Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs. However, most citizens do not interact with the majority of these institutions when engaging with the justice system.

148 Sierra Leone Encyclopedia 2007, Sierra Leone Information System, DACO, 2007.

149 Government of Sierra Leone, 'Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan, 2008-2010', December 2007.

tizes strengthening primary justice through four overarching goals: i) safer communities through strengthened police; ii) better access to justice through the strengthening of local courts and provision of paralegal services; iii) strengthened rule of law by addressing corruption and maladministration; and iv) improved justice service delivery by improving the performance of justice institutions. Implementation of the strategy is overseen by a leadership group of ministers and the Chief Justice and is coordinated by the JSCO. There are also technical working groups and cross-institutional target task forces working to implement the strategy. The strategy includes an investment plan of $30 million over three years and provides a single framework for funding the justice sector that the Government wants donors to align with and support through basket funding. A British Council-led consortium manages the programme.

DFID is the largest, and probably most influential, donor to the justice sector. Its support to the JSDP subsumes a number of justice sector projects, notably the Law and Development Project and the Community Safety and Security Project. The other major partners are the World Bank and UNDP.

The World Bank's Justice for the Poor programme's current activities link the justice sector to broader public administration reform and focuses on: (a) **Accountability for Services Under Decentralized Service Delivery Programme:** which provides technical assistance on the implementation of accountability mechanisms for the service delivery by decentralized government; (b) **Extractives Governance:** Building on research and pilots, advice to communities and Bank operations (for example the Extractives Industries Technical Assistance Project) on strengthening the regulatory framework to improve community-investor relations, address inequities, improve durability of agreements and prevent conflict; and (c) **Linking Social Accountability and Legal Empowerment**, which assists in the scaling-up of community-based paralegals, advising on legal-aid policy, standardized mechanisms for training, supervision, monitoring and evaluation, and exploring means of linking paralegals with accountability for government services.

UNDP STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME

Outcomes: (1) Respect for human rights and peace consolidation. (2) Effective, responsive, accessible and fair justice systems promote the rule of law, including both formal and informal processes, with due consideration for the rights of the poor, women and vulnerable group

Under the 2008-2010 country programme, UNDP's strategy in support of outcomes in the justice and human rights areas focused on establishing the institutional framework and capacities to secure peace and improve human rights. The focus in the last few years has been on building improved access to justice, the use of innovative legal approaches to dealing with gender-based violence and involving civil society organizations (CSOs) as implementing partners in programmes targeting SGBV prevention and protection. It is important to note that UNDP's support has focused heavily on addressing SGBV issues and on the prosecution of SGBV cases in particular. Its assistance has not focused on more general access or ensuring due process for defendants as well as for plaintiffs. These outcomes have framed the ADR team's assessment of UNDP strategy and results, which has also drawn on an independent mid-term review conducted in late 2010.[150]

In terms of support to the judiciary, UNDP has supported three key projects (1) the Independent Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL) (2) mobile courts and (3) the promotion of legal aid.

The HRCSL was one of the core institutions weakened by the war and UNDP provided fund management and implementation services for

150 Mid Term Review (MTR) report. The MTR (evaluation) team conducted its mission from 10-14 October 2010.

a multiparty effort. UNDP provided capacity-building support through UN Peacebuilding Support Funds, UNDP funds as well as with support from Irish Aid for several years. At the time of the Commission's establishment, funds were provided for core infrastructure and logistics. In recent years Irish Aid's support has involved a partnership with the Irish Human Rights Commission and UNDP in building the technical capacity of the Commission to achieve its strategic goals. UNIPSIL also provides considerable technical and substantive support to the HRCSL and coordination and partnership between all sides has contributed to the Commission's achievements.

Results from the capacity-building support to the Human Rights Commission can be seen by the Commission's designation as a 'Category A'-status independent national human rights institution by the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions. As an example of progress within the Commission, the Directorate of Complaints, Investigations and Legal Services showcased its progress recently with the Bumbuna Inquiry Report, which is regarded as an important and independent investigation about violence linked to the extractives industry. UNDP's support in 2011 was instrumental in the Human Rights Commission's seminal quasi-judicial investigation, public hearing and decision in favour of 235 ex-soldiers who had been discharged and denied end-of-service benefits.[151] The Commission has requested further support in 2013/2014 from UNDP in strengthening its investigation capacity further. While the HRCSL is committed to building its capacity and improving the standard of professionalism within the Commission, it is important to provide technical advice in order to maintain cohesion with overall strategic plans and agreed priorities.

The mobile courts programme is as an effort to improve access to justice at High Court and Magistrate Court level in the southern region[152] of the country. Since September 2010, more than 979 cases have been registered and more than 565 cases resolved.[153] Importantly, on an average monthly basis, the number of cases being registered has grown from 32.5 originally to 52.4 by June 2012; it is clear that through the growth in case numbers, mobile courts are bringing increased justice to rural communities and promoting the rule of law.[154]

Two major sustainability challenges with support for mobile courts are the lack of appointed magistrates and High Court judges as well as the longer-term viability of such courts given the relative high costs involved with travel for justice officials. Although salaries for judges and magistrates have been improved recently, it is difficult for the judiciary to attract qualified lawyers into its ranks and even more difficult to post staff to duty stations outside the main cities. Due to the lack of staff, mobile courts have not been able to travel to all areas of the country on a consistent and regular basis. Until they do so, it will be difficult for people to rely on the formal system. In 2012, for example, the High Court in Bo went to Moyamba on circuit only once despite the legal obligation to visit at least four times annually. UNDP is actively working with the judiciary to advocate for greater resources from the Government in order to open more judicial positions. The judiciary has received commitment from the Government in the draft Agenda for Prosperity

151 In this decision, the commission upheld the constitutional provisions providing the right to privacy and protection against discrimination.

152 Based on an inter-agency arrangement GIZ has been funding mobile courts for the east of the country, and DfID in the North. This arrangement, depending upon ongoing review of results and impact, is likely to continue into 2013 and after.

153 Numbers based upon court returns from September 2010 until end of June 2012.

154 In early 2013 UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery conducted an independent assessment of the impact of mobile courts globally with Sierra Leone chosen as a case-study (report still being drafted).

(PRSP II) to cover the costs of mobile courts in their core budget rather than rely on donors; however, it may take some time before this commitment is realized.

UNDP's access to justice programme supported the establishment of Sierra Leone's first Legal Aid Scheme with national reach from 2009 until 2011. In the two years of implementation, the scheme reached 953 indigent citizens and lessons from its operations informed the development of a National Legal Aid Scheme and Legal Aid Act 2012. In 2011, the DFID-funded Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) took over responsibility for supporting the Pilot National Legal Aid Scheme and its successor programme, the Access to Security and Justice Programme (ASJP), is likely to provide support for implementation of the Legal Aid Act. GIZ also provides support for legal aid on a smaller scale and the World Bank has worked on the institutionalization of legal aid within the justice system.

Since 2010, UNDP's access to justice programme has prioritized legal support to the victims of SGBV. This support, provided through CSO paralegals and lawyers as well as the Bar Association, is deemed necessary as most SGBV cases are prosecuted in court by untrained police prosecutors resulting in poor conviction rates due to procedural flaws in the case presentation and numerous delays in trials. Continuing impunity for SGBV, which was used as an instrument of war, was also viewed as a critical obstacle to surmounting the legacy of conflict. As the capacity of the Law Officer's Department rises through an increase in prosecutors[155] as well as targeted training on SGBV, UNDP may be able to phase out or adapt the legal support it currently provides to SGBV victims.

Special 'Saturday Courts', consisting of magistrates and high courts specifically mandated to consider SGBV cases, were introduced in February 2011. Saturday Courts currently meet three to four weeks per month. Part of the objective was to speed up the processing and management of cases. UNDP has been perhaps the principal supporter of this system, paying all operational costs including transportation, stipends for judges and court staff, recurrent costs such as office supplies, fuel, generators, etc. UNDP has supported SGBV Saturday Courts in Freetown since February 2011. In October 2012, the SGBV Saturday Courts were expanded to the southern provincial capital of Bo and in January 2013, the judiciary expanded to Kenema in the east. These courts, at Magistrate and High Court level, are aimed at providing a victim-friendly environment on Saturdays (when no other courts are sitting) and at ensuring that SGBV cases are dealt with as expediently as possible. Up to end of January 2013 at Magistrate Court level, 1,223 SGBV cases were registered, with 606 disposed of, including 122 convictions. At the High Court level, 168 cases were registered, with 104 disposed of and 56 convictions made. In total, 178 convictions were obtained. Since then, the entire backlog of SGBV cases has been eliminated and the Magistrate and High Courts are current with their caseload. The SGBV courts have also succeeded in reducing the time line from the lodging of police complaints to the hearing of cases to two to three weeks from several months to even sometimes years. SGBV Saturday Courts are an integral part of UNDP's work to combat SGBV alongside activities to establish prevention mechanisms, provide victim support, legal assistance and build capacity of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) to investigate crimes. Customary law courts have now been brought under the judiciary in the new Local Courts Act of 2011, making them an integral part of the formal court system. However, no systematic work has been undertaken to study and codify customary law practices that vary considerably nationwide. While the conviction rate is relatively low, there are indications that, through gradual increased capacity of the SLP to investigate cases of SGBV and enhanced capacity of CSOs to raise legal awareness and assist victims, the number of

155 The Solicitor-General confirmed in November 2012 that they were in the process of recruiting 20 more prosecutors.

cases being reported and resulting in conviction is increasing. A key challenge will be ensuring the judiciary subsumes the cost of Saturday Courts into its regular budget. UNDP's engagement with the judiciary has been under the clear premise that donor support will gradually have to be phased out as the Government takes responsibility for these court sittings.

UNDP has provided consistent support to the Family Support Unit (FSU) of the Sierra Leone Police with regular training provided to staff on SGBV issues. UNDP strives to institutionalize capacity-building support, rather than provide consultant driven ad-hoc training. In 2010, the FSU Directorate and the UNDP access to justice programme, in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Police Legal and Justice Support Department and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), developed the guidelines on SGBV case management. Training was provided on the manual for all FSU staff, which has become a part of core training. In 2013, UNDP in collaboration with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) supported the review of the guidelines, with specific reference to the Sexual Offences Act 2012. The guidelines and training have enhanced the professionalism of FSU officers. Consequently, the standard of case files sent forward for prosecution has improved, resulting in a better chance of a conviction being obtained.[156] The IRC also developed standard operating procedures (SOP) for the FSUs at the same time, and although complementary, more coordination in the development stage may have enhanced both products. In early 2013, UNDP joined forces with the IRC to support the review and updating of both the case management guidelines and the SOP with a draft ready for validation by-mid April 2013.

A major challenge of providing capacity development support to the FSU, and other SLP units such as Police Prosecutors, is the poor educational standard of most police officers upon entry to the force as well as the fact that many police officers transition through departments quickly with little time to utilize capacity-building training they receive.[157] These challenges are often reported by other donors supporting the police and efforts are being made to support the SLP to adopt working practices to ensure that support to the police leads to actual improvements in services and practices. Another issue is the large number of donors providing various kinds of assistance to the FSU. In the past, much of this assistance has been uncoordinated, ad hoc and not based on the expressed needs of the SLP and FSU. A vital component of any UNDP support to the FSU in the future will ensure that support is based on needs clearly agreed with the SLP, as well as ensuring that training programmes are integrated into SLP training structures and all activities are properly coordinated through existing coordination mechanisms.

Since late 2009, UNDP has supported CSOs nationwide through SGBV Grants in order to raise awareness of SGBV, promote community level prevention mechanisms and provide legal and practical protection to victims. The support provided to CSOs through these SGBV Grants falls directly within the first three outputs of SiLNAP (national policy dealing with the prevention, protection and prosecution of SGBV cases) and is a vital component of the Government's strategy to eliminate violence against women. From September 2011 to December 2012, 309 victims of SGBV received medical attention, counselling, shelter and legal assistance and 82 SGBV convictions were obtained through the selected CSOs. Through engagement with rural communities on issues of SGBV and the promotion of legal awareness on women's rights, 220 SGBV referral mechanisms (135 in 38 communities) have been

156 Reported by head of the FSU in August 2012.

157 SLP senior staff informed UNDP in October 2012 that although all applicants for the police are supposed to have finished high school, at the minimum, this rule is rarely observed during recruitment and consequentially many recruits have literacy problems.

established and SGBV-related by-laws formulated in eight communities. These efforts link closely with UNDP activities to support the FSU to conduct community awareness programmes.

On the prevention side, CSOs conduct comprehensive awareness-raising activities throughout their communities with a focus on traditional leaders, community groups as well as schools. A vital component of awareness-raising work is the initiative where CSOs bring district-level FSU staff to schools and community leaders to explain how to protect women and girls from SGBV and establish local partnerships for effective action. This pilot activity in late 2012 included 54 schools across 46 communities with a total number of 8,022 students, teachers and traditional leaders sensitized on issues of SGBV, sexual exploitation and harassment in schools, early marriage and harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation/cutting. Impact of this awareness-raising is being monitored through surveys of targeted communities as well as more broad-based national-level perception surveys. This activity, which creates a vital link between communities and the FSU, is an important part of UNDP's SGBV awareness-raising work and SGBV prevention in particular and has been enhanced for 2013-2014 in order to reach more communities. In addition, CSOs provide victims of SGBV with medical attention, counselling, shelter, paralegal assistance and arrange for transport to district FSUs and courts to ensure that cases are properly investigated and prosecuted.

An important lesson learned from 2012 is the benefit of using implementing partner CSOs to monitor the performance of justice sector institutions, particularly outside of Freetown. Due to the difficulty in obtaining reliable quantitative and qualitative data on justice service provision in the country, it is necessary for all development programmes to come up with innovative ways of gathering information. Moreover, there is a need to combine support for institutional capacity-building in M&E with building CSO capacity to monitor and report on the quality of justice services. CSOs based in the field can be used to collect case statistics, conduct court user satisfaction surveys and focus groups, interview and report on justice staff capacity levels, as well as perform random case sampling in order to identify and monitor trends. Under the SGBV Grants, UNDP supports 10 CSOs whose work covers seven districts and 49 chiefdoms, which makes these CSOs an excellent source of field information, aside from the already crucial work they conduct supporting victims of SGBV. This is in addition to the many other CSOs supported under the CSO court monitoring activity covering large areas of the country. Considerable data on the quality of justice services has been received from these CSO partners. However, much of it is ad hoc and based on local case scenarios. In future programming UNDP will ensure that more support is given to these CSOs to gather consistent and useful M&E data in the areas they work in order to inform strategic decision-making.

In early 2012, UNDP piloted a three-month Court Monitoring Programme supporting a wide group of CSOs in monitoring court cases at all levels. In August 2012, after careful analysis of the methodology and results, a second phase of support was rolled out until the end of 2012. The aim is to build CSO capacity to report on the standards observed and respect shown for human rights in judicial proceedings, with a focus on gathering disaggregated data on cases involving women. Basic paralegal assistance is also provided to victims of SGBV. All 83 CSOs, many of them very small local organizations, are supported for these activities with coordination from four CSO cluster heads in each region of the country. In order that they receive the requisite capacity-building training and have the opportunity to share their experiences and develop sustainable partnerships, UNDP has held regular workshops with these CSOs and conducts regular field visits to monitor activities. During these workshops, CSOs contributed to the development of, and were trained by UNDP in the use of, a court monitoring and reporting tool.

During the pilot activity, 119 local courts were monitored, and 130 women received legal assis-

tance including in domestic violence, divorce and property cases. The implementing CSOs prepared and submitted 405 case reports. In addition, 16 Magistrate Courts and five High Courts were covered by monitors, with 134 case reports prepared and submitted. In the second phase, the number of cases monitored has increased exponentially, with the quality of reports vastly improved.[158]

Because of difficulty in obtaining accurate statistics on case processing times and numbers, UNDP plans to use the CSO court monitoring activity to gather relevant M&E information from reports received, including through the use of random case sampling (to track average processing times, respect for procedural rules), court user satisfaction surveys and monitoring trends including disaggregated data on types of cases. The presence of trained monitors in court proceedings should have a positive influence on the judiciary in these areas, because of higher expectations of due process and respect for human rights from the public. These CSOs, along with those supported by the SGBV grants, are expected to be a vital component in the programme's M&E activities in the future.

The passing of the 2012 Sexual Offences Act is a positive landmark for victims of SGBV in the country. This Act was the culmination of considerable advocacy by the international community within Sierra Leone. UNDP provided capacity-building support for parliamentarians, seconded drafting experts to the MOJ, and conducted significant advocacy efforts to ensure the Act was passed. The Act prohibits child marriage and provides for strong punishments against would-be SGBV offenders as well as providing an overall solid framework for the investigation and prosecution of SGBV cases. This achievement highlighted the value of working with both national institutions and CSOs in order to bring about change. Programme activities for 2013-2014 will place a priority on ensuring the full and speedy implementation of the Sexual Offences Act.

Although it remains low overall based on in-country engagement, public legal awareness on SGBV issues is rising. UNDP's support to developing a 'Media Handbook for Reporting on SGBV Cases', as well as provision of comprehensive training of journalists on the handbook has, along with advocacy work through CSOs, contributed to this change. Although journalistic standards can improve, particularly in terms of accuracy and editorial restraint, it is significant that reporting on SGBV cases is now regular in all major newspapers. In 2012, UNDP focused mainly on support to media organizations and journalists. UNDP feels greater impact may be made on SGBV prevention through broad advocacy programmes in the popular media, including TV dramas and radio shows bringing issues of SGBV and gender inequality into regular public discussion.[159]

In 2012, UNDP's access to justice programme expanded support to the area of women's land and property rights. While the issue is intrinsically linked to SGBV and overall gender equality, the issue of women's economic and social rights in Sierra Leone is often ignored. Given that 54 percent of the total population is female and up to 80 percent of females are agricultural workers it is clear that women's land and property rights is a fundamental rights issue. Added impetus has been given by the recent expansion of international commercial mining and agricultural companies in the country with a significant effect

158 Humanist Watch Salone, the cluster head for CSOs in Kenema, Kono and Kailahun, in October 2012 reported that cluster members monitored a total of 615 cases in 17 different chiefdoms including 145 at local court level, 309 at Magistrate Court level and 161 at High Court level.

159 In 2012 Advocaid (not funded by UNDP) supported the production and broadcasting on state television of 'Police Case', a four-part drama highlighting women's rights in the justice system. Although there is no system in place to measure viewing figures, the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Company reported that they received 96 text messages and 44 calls within 15 minutes of one show.

upon land use. The key finding from UNDP's engagement on women's land and property rights issues is that most women can only access, use or own land or property through their relationships with men, including their fathers, brothers or husbands. Once the relationship comes to an end through death, divorce or a breakup of the relationship, women are at serious risk of being deprived of their use of land or property.[160] The result of such legal disempowerment is a loss of economic resilience, rendering women more vulnerable to harm.

In 2012, UNDP activities focused on building capacity of women community groups to advocate for their rights and ensure that protection for these rights is included in the draft reformed National Land Policy. Partnering primarily with COOPI, 325 community women leaders throughout the country were trained on land rights, human rights, and advocacy and lobbying skills. These women leaders were supported to organize dialogue sessions with local authorities as well as to conduct a community mapping exercise in order to identify key problems and barriers women face in relation to property and land rights. After receiving specialized training in lobbying these community women representatives took part in a National Conference on Women's Property and Land held in June 2012, culminating in vital improvements to the Government draft land tenure reform policy. UNDP's access to justice programme also benefits from close work with UNDP's land policy expert, who is supporting the Government generally on land reform issues as well as more broadly through joint collaboration with other programmes within the Governance Unit and the Environment and Natural Disaster Management Unit (including on the linkage between securing land tenure and resilience to disaster). This internal coordination allows UNDP to connect civil society with policy reform issues and will ensure that gender issues are taken into account throughout the drafting and consultation phase of the new policy.

A vital lesson learned during 2012 is the need to combine grass-roots advocacy-level work with legal assistance to women with particularly serious cases. This legal assistance should take the form of paralegal assistance at the local level—including through support for mediation—and the assistance of lawyers in certain cases. Awareness of women's rights to land and property is very low throughout the country and will need targeted campaigns for the general public as well as women's groups and traditional and community leaders. With the draft land tenure reform policy likely to be adopted in 2013, significant efforts will be required to ensure that commitments made on women's rights are implemented.

ASSESSMENT BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

UNDP has supported a broader spectrum of activities to develop the justice sector, first, in the Ministry of Justice and, since 2010, with a focus on a multidimensional approach to supporting the passage of key laws, strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary and specialized units of the SLP as well as civil society actors to address and prosecute cases of SGBV. Overall, resources delivered in support of this outcome totalled $15 million over the period 2008-2012. **The support to the Human Rights Commission, work on women's property rights and the passage of the 2012 Sexual Offences Act are among the indicators of key contributions and relevance of UNDP's support to the development of a fair justice system and respect for human rights.**

The number of reported cases of SGBV has risen by 23 percent in the past three years, which suggests an increase of confidence in the justice system on the part of victims as well as improved access. UNDP has been effective in the design of its programming using a multifaceted approach to addressing the issue of support for victims of SGBV. On FSUs

160 A key finding from the UNDP-supported National Land Conference June 2012.

in police stations, UNDP has supported the development of a case management handbook and SOP for FSUs. A total of 80 staff assigned to three regions have been trained. Visits by the ADR team to the most advanced FSU in Freetown, however, would suggest a long way to go in developing sufficient capacity to handle SGBV cases in a systematic and consistent manner**. There was little evidence available of systems established with UNDP support to monitor the caseload of the FSUs and their outcomes. It is understood that there were problems with the consultant recruited for the process. For this reason, it was relatively difficult to assess the effectiveness of the support to the FSUs in terms of outcomes in a systematic manner.**

As for the work of the FSU and the prosecutors working on SGBV cases, Sierra Leone lacks forensic labs and evidence gathered for SGBV cases is based on eyewitness accounts and circumstantial in nature. Investigation by the police in FSUs and medical examinations of victims is therefore crucial. In this respect, the UNDP programme has provided motorcycles to three FSUs outside Freetown to enable them to investigate crime scenes. UNDP has also provided funds for medical examination and the medical and psychological treatment of victims.

It should also be noted that UNDP's support has almost exclusively targeted the prosecution side of SGBV cases. In most instances, defendants, unless they have sufficient means to pay for private lawyers, still do not have access to legal representation. For the most part, the only form of representation that they have access to (depending on limited availability) is paralegal assistance from civil society organizations. The Bar Association of Sierra Leone provides pro bono services to some defendants through qualified barristers who can represent their clients in court. But such assistance is extremely limited and may amount to less than a handful of cases per year as it is not funded by development agencies such as UNDP. Paralegals have the right to advise their clients and help with the preparation of their cases, but so far do not have the right to participate or represent their clients in court proceedings. This no doubt has a bearing on the growing conviction rate and the rapidity with which the backlog of SGBV cases before the courts has been eliminated. The ADR team did not have a chance to review the record of random court proceedings for quality to make the case definitively that defendants are being underserved. However, there appears to be an underlying assumption among aid agencies that cases of rape and sexual and gender-based assault tend to be legitimate and that the accused are generally guilty. UNDP assistance, therefore, has been geared to supporting the victim rather than ensuring the free and fair application of due process.

As discussed in the preceding section, UNDP has also supported civil society organizations in forming an active network with the mandate of monitoring the results of SGBV cases that are brought to court. The current network, started on a pilot basis, consists of 20 monitors, all operating in neighbouring districts in and around Kenema. They have so far monitored some 538 cases before local, magistrate, and high courts. The objective appears to be to ensure that court proceedings are handled in a manner that is transparent, accountable and fair to the victim. Although the ADR team requested copies of reports produced in order to get a sense of their level of professionalism, no reports were made available. It is also unclear how such reports are to be used and who their principal audience is.

Principal challenges that continue to be faced in SGBV cases are: i) the tendency of cases to be settled out of court, particularly in cases involving locally powerful figures; ii) delays faced in High Courts (recesses); iii) insufficient number of magistrates to handle the case load that comes before multiple districts; and iv) the absence of resident magistrates in most districts. With respect to the latter, magistrates are supported by UNDP through the mobile court system to travel to neighbouring districts for a limited number of days per month and their salaries are topped up through UNDP funding throughout the country.

More recently, Justices of the Peace (JPs) have substituted for magistrates, although because JPs require no law qualifications, it is unclear how satisfactory the experiment has been. UNDP has supported all of the courts in the South. UNDP provides operational costs for magistrates, clerks, prosecutors and prisoners. As a result of UNDP's success, other donors have now provided similar assistance; GIZ now supports courts in the East, and DFID courts in the North. According to the Registrar of the Supreme Court, at least 15 more magistrates are needed to reduce the current dependence on mobile courts.

The sustainability of UNDP's programmes constitutes a significant problem. Apart from paying for supplies and recurrent costs in the law offices and in the courts, UNDP has also been topping up salaries in the law offices and has, until recently, been paying actual salaries as well. Incentives continue to be paid in order to staunch the flow of trained lawyers into private practice. A more salutary example is to be found in UNDP support to the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission. Initially paying for salaries of the commissioners and their staff, the national budget now covers all salaries while UNDP has shifted its focus to supporting the quasi-judicial functions of the HRC, enabling it to prosecute cases of human rights violations in court.

Along with delivering budget support, it is also apparent that **UNDP programmes have tended to minimize the recruitment of foreign consultants and experts, opting instead in favour of national consultants. In general, this has contributed to efficiency by reduced average unit costs, making UNDP's assistance relatively cost-effective**. Although relevant statistics could not be obtained, several counterpart institutions complained about substantial delays in cases where UNDP managed payments directly. In general, it should be noted that UNDP handled payments directly when counterpart capacity was low. Most such delays occurred because sufficient or appropriate and acceptable supporting documentation for procurement actions had to be provided and were slow in coming from the counterpart institution. Such delays, according to interviewees, have become less frequent, as the counterpart agency staff have become more familiar with procedures.

4.4 YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT

The youth of Sierra Leone were centrally important as soldiers during the civil war. Youth unemployment is still described as the "singular issue that continues to preoccupy government officials and other national actors alike" as a critical threat to the continuation of peace in the country.[161] One measure to address the devastating effects of the civil way has been to define 'youth' as those who fall between the ages 15-35 as a means of including those who are ex-combatants and lost educational and employment opportunities because of the conflict. An estimated 60-70 percent of this segment of the population are unemployed or underemployed and 80 percent are living below the poverty line of $2 per day.[162] More than 75 percent of the nearly six million Sierra Leoneans were below the age of 35 in 2011.[163] Robust macroeconomic growth of 8.2 percent from 2008 to 2012[164] and an improvement in development indicators—such as the doubling of literacy rates from 2005 to 2010—have not been matched with a corresponding increase in remunerative employment opportunities[165].

161 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 'Report of the Visit of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone', February 2013.

162 Unemployment numbers are estimated according to the 'structural unemployment' definition, taking into account those that are unemployed and underemployed. UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, National Youth Commission and Ministry of Youth Employment and Sports, 'Sierra Leone Youth Report 2012', December 2012.

163 World Bank and Statistics Sierra Leone, 'A Poverty Profile of Sierra Leone', June 2013.

164 Government of Sierra Leone, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper III, 'Agenda for Prosperity', 2013, p.19.

165 UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, National Youth Commission and Ministry of Youth Employment and Sports, 'Sierra Leone Youth Report 2012', December 2012.

The GoSL has committed itself to address youth unemployment and accordingly advance the policy and the institutional framework. The National Youth Commission (NAYCOM) was established in 2009 as an Act of Parliament with the stated aim to "empower the youth to develop their potential, creativity and skills for national development", and District Youth Councils (DYCs) have been established as a mechanism to exchange information between the local and central levels. In addition, the Ministry of Youth Affairs (MYA) was created in 2013 by President Koroma to replace the Ministry of Youth Employment and Sports (MYES).[166]

Significant structural issues have impeded progress in job growth for the youth. The GoSL indicates in its PRSP III a lack of up-to-date labour market data, obsolete labour laws, and mismatched skills between those in demand and those produced by educational and training institutions.[167] The limited economic diversity in Sierra Leone—where natural resources and agriculture dominate the economy—is cited as a major factor in job-growth stagnation. There remains, according to the recent Sierra Leone Youth Report, a large under-skilled population and low labour market participation rates for both female and male youth. The GoSL, however, has taken measures to provide the institutional and policy framework for outcome achievement, including the creation and restructuring of its youth-centred associations and parastatals at the local and central levels.

As part of the PRSP III, the GoSL's labour and employment strategy targets youth as a prioritized segment of the eligible workforce by: improving skills development through training and education; providing access to financial services to the under-banked; promoting labour-intensive public works projects; strengthening legal and institutional frameworks for labour administration; and establishing a National Volunteer Service Corps for inexperienced youth. Addressing youth unemployment underpins most objectives in the PRSP III, and the GoSL has refined the state architecture in this area with the creation of a separate MYA to advocate youth issues and provide policy guidance to NAYCOM.[168]

GoSL expenditure in the youth sector in 2012 was approximately $1.7 million—almost double its projected amount—with 70 percent spent on international sports competitions.[169] Beyond the GoSL's national strategy, NAYCOM has developed a draft updated National Youth Policy after nationwide consultations, and reviewed the Youth Employment Strategy with the MYA to develop the National Youth Employment Action Plan (NYEAP) in 2012. Major development partners developed a 2010-2012 Joint Response to Youth Employment targeting six sectors and aiming to mobilize $46 million.[170]

The UN policy on post-conflict job creation provides additional system-wide strategic guidance.[171] The World Bank $20 million Youth Employment Support is the biggest project on youth employment, which addresses labour-intensive public

166 MYA in this report will henceforth refer to previous youth ministerial iterations, including the MYES and previous Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS).

167 Government of Sierra Leone, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper III, 'Agenda for Prosperity', 2013, p.100.

168 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 'Report of the Visit of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone', February 2013.

169 Figures converted from Leones to dollar (8 November 2013) based on: Government of Sierra Leone, 'Government Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies', Dr. Kaifala Marah, Minister of Finance and Economic Development, December 2012, p. 7.

170 United Nations, GTZ and World Bank, 'Joint Response to Youth Unemployment in Sierra Leone', 2010-2012, 2009.

171 United Nations, 'United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration', 2009.

works and employment support.[172] As of 2013, the World Bank Cash for Work (CfW) and skills training components had nearly 21,000 beneficiaries.[173] Preliminary results of an impact evaluation indicate that beneficiaries were able to participate in informal savings groups with increased expenditures on health, fuel and electricity.[174] GIZ's ongoing €17.2 million youth programme concentrates on agro-business jobs and sector planning and coordination in three rural districts.[175] The youth employment sector has been coordinated through joint funding mechanisms, including the PBF and the Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund (SL-MDTF) Programme 19 for Youth Development and Employment. The SL-MDTF spent $6.6 million for the 2010-2013 period with participating UN country team members implementing projects in areas of comparative advantage, including: ILO (business skills training); FAO (agricultural production); and UNIDO (industrial growth poles).[176]

UNDP STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMES

Outcome: Post-crisis socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated; crisis-affected groups returned and reintegrated (IWP 2009-2010)

Outcome: Job opportunities and livelihoods created through micro and small business run by youth (CPAP 2011-2012)

UNDP has been involved in youth-related activities aiming to improve the lives of youth who measure a significant proportion of the population as well as to consolidate peace.[177] In the first UNDP country programme, youth programming constituted a component of the 'recovery for development' practice area in the post-conflict phase. The 2008-2010 CPD then subsumed job creation under the larger goal to strengthen security and stability delivered through a mix of policy advisory support and downstream interventions to expand income opportunities. Under the corresponding 2008-2010 CPAP, the outcome had no specific indicators related to youth but was rather oriented toward macro-level indicators of policy development for a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and improved aid coordination which was a shortcoming.

Donors and UN partners recognized beginning in 2009-2010 that employment strategies in Sierra Leone had been supply-focused by predominantly providing capacity-building activities. Accordingly, the UNDP programme outlined a strategic shift to better balance supply (of skills), demand (for jobs) and matching (to ensure supply is demand-driven and skilled people find employment). In alignment with the UN Joint Vision for Sierra Leone, the 2011-2012 UNDP approach indicates a two-prong strategy to first support "youth to create job opportunities and livelihoods through micro

172 The programme seeks to address constraints on the demand and supply side of the labour market namely: (i) to improve technical capacity and promote creation and/or expansion of small youth-owned enterprises in economically viable activities; (ii) to improve skills base of young people to make them more employable; and (iii) to provide a safety net and income supplement for the most vulnerable youth through public works. See: World Bank, Implementation Status & Results, Sierra Leone Youth Employment Support (P121052), 24 June 2013.

173 Ibid.

174 On average, the total value of reported cash and in-kind payments received by household for work increased by 34 percent. See: Government of Sierra Leone, 'Experiences from Sierra Leone in Youth Employment', National Youth Commission, Commissioner Anthony Koroma, Youth Employment Workshop, Abuja Nigeria, 23 July 2013.

175 Figure derived from: GIZ, 'Interim Evaluation 2010: Brief Report Employment Promotion Programme (EPP), Sierra Leone, May 2011. See also GIZ website (accessed 31 Oct 2013): <www.giz.de/themen/en/15272.htm>.

176 Other partners include UNAIDS, UN Women, and UNFPA. See: United Nations Joint Vision for Sierra Leone, Programme 19, 2009-2012.

177 UNDP, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study, Sierra Leone, Evaluation Office, New York, NY, 2006.

and small business" with $1.1 million budget for 2011,[178] and, secondly, to provide support to government agencies responsible for youth (NAYCOM and MYA) through conducting a feasibility study on creating a national youth service; field-level youth employment projects; youth-employment services. The 2013-2014 CPD document builds upon this shift by pledging to work with NAYCOM to implement the employment policy, as well as provide increased access to start-up capital. Within its consolidated two-cluster programme of the 2013-2014 CPAP, youth employment has a two-year budget of $5 million. The strategy aims principally at enhancing the capacity of NAYCOM and providing youth job opportunity through four components: (i) Business Development Service (BDS) centres; (ii) technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems; (iii) school-to-work transition; and (iv) the agricultural sector.[179]

Overall, during the period under review, UNDP budgeted $43.6 million and delivered $23.7 million for 15 projects. Prominent among these is the ongoing Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme (YEEP) and its constituent components.

Following the civil war, a cluster of projects, Post-Conflict Reintegration and Transition Projects (2002-2009), focused on providing young women and ex-combatants with alternative livelihoods. With $5.9 million in expenditure from 2005 to 2009, the Transition Initiative Fund aimed to support a smooth transition from humanitarian aid by providing support to the GoSL with needs-based planning, enhanced data, and population resettlement. This was approached through capacity-building of local authorities, NGO partners, and infrastructural development. By 2009, it had become clear that there was a need to address shortcomings in UNDP's implementation and financial management of this cluster and UNDP undertook a review and financial reconciliation of inactive but unclosed projects during the 2008-2009 and closed over 30 projects.[180]

The Reintegration of Ex-combatants project was the first-generation youth-centric programme with $1.7 million in expenditure from 2007 to 2009. It provided a range of services for ex-combatants, including vocational skills training, formal education, income-generating activities (e.g., shelter construction and agricultural activities), and awareness-raising on human rights. According to UNDP's internal reporting mechanism: 4,000 youths with access to credit for private sector activities; 400 young women engaged in income-generating activities in palm kernel cracking and oil processing businesses; and 500 youth participated in 11 reforestation initiatives. An impact assessment of the fuel wood reforestation initiative indicated that public awareness may have improved but beneficiaries saw no "tangible increase in income".[181] Other issues point to flaws in planning and implementation: the programme lacked a proper results framework, including baseline indicators.[182]

The Rural Education and Agriculture Programmes (2008-2012)[183] were another series of projects in which UNDP focused on educational activities in rural agricultural areas. The UNDP Rural Community Empowerment proj-

178 The Resources and Results Framework does not indicate the notional 2012 budget. See 2011-2012 CPAP.

179 UNDP, 'Consolidated Briefs—Inclusive Growth and Risk Management', Sierra Leone, 2013.

180 Interview data.

181 UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, 'Fuel Wood Programme for Youth Empowerment and the Sustainable Management of the Western Area Peninsula Forest: Implementation, Impact and Lessons Learnt', Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, 2009.

182 Ibid.

183 Projects include: Rural Community Empowerment #00075969; Community Literacy Programme #00060062; Support to Enterprise Development #00081627.

ect aimed to contribute to the country's Education Development Plan (2007-2015), which looked to improve the quality of senior secondary education nationwide through a number of interventions. The project delivered almost exclusively technology inputs aligned with the plan (i.e., TVs, DVD players, solar panels, and satellites) with $380,000 in expenditure from 2010-2011.

Based on previous programmes, illiteracy was highlighted as an inhibitor of food security and civic engagement. With $360,000 in expenditure from 2008 to 2009, the Community Literacy Programme responded with two objectives: (i) to empower citizen engagement with the local councils and accelerate devolution of adult education services; and (ii) to develop the Agricultural Business Centres (ABCs) already participating in decentralization. The programme trained 3,000 people in literacy, numeric and business skills to allow farmers to be more financially successful in future growing seasons. One hundred and twenty farmers (75 percent women) graduated in the western rural district from the farmer field school who were given $7,000 start-up kits. A reported lack of proper training facilities, low local government capacity, and limited budget constrained further project influence on literacy.[184]

UNDP established the Sierra Leone Agri-Business Initiative (SABI) Centre to support agricultural entrepreneurship, which has been included under a range of different projects.[185] SABI started in 2010 through the rehabilitation of a former training farm outside Freetown with the underlying objective to enhance agricultural productivity and entrepreneurship while also creating jobs along integrated agri-value chains. Premised on the Benin-based Songhai integrated rural development model, SABI provides education in agro-technical and business practice while striving for self-sufficiency.[186] Training programmes currently partner with ABCs, which are local cooperatives aimed at providing technical, operational and marketing services to smallholder farmers organized into village-level farmer-based organizations.[187] The National Agricultural Development Plan (2010-2030) indicates that these farmer associations provide a participatory approach to increasing use of improved technologies and crop commercialization.[188] UNDP has provided equipment, materials and infrastructure,[189] and salaries and stipends, which has enabled the centre to become operational with, cumulatively, about $1.3 million[190] UNDP sent 15 experts to Benin for training on the Songhai model to open the SABI Centre.[191] The SABI Centre began agricultural production in June 2012 to produce 2,250 litres of palm oil, harvest six hectares of maize, and cultivate one hectare of pineapples.[192]

184 Final Report, Community Literacy Programme, 2010.

185 SABI was included under the following three projects: (i) Community Literacy Programme (2010-2011), (ii) Enterprise Development Initiative (2012), and (iii) the Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme (2013-2014).

186 The model incorporates training and technological innovation with production, mechanization, agro-processing, marketing, recycling and services provision under a unified management and operation; 2012 SABI Annual Work Plan.

187 Expected services include: access to input supplies; technical support to processing/value addition and post-harvest storage; promoting marketing including market information systems; enhancing linkages to microfinance, communications. Government of Sierra Leone, 'National Sustainable Agriculture Development Plan: Smallholder Commercialization Programme', Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security, May 2010.

188 Ibid.

189 Including: an administrative centre, student hostel, canteen, telecentre and internet café, mechanical workshop, piggery and poultry farm, inland valley services unit, market garden unit, maize farm, cassava farm, pineapple farm and palm oil processing unit. See UNDP website, SABI Centre (last accessed 10 December 2013).

190 Atlas Progress Report, 2012.

191 Atlas Progress Report, 2009.

192 See UNDP website, SABI Centre (last accessed 10 December 2013).

The Multi-Donor Youth Development Programme[193] (2007-2011) covers a more comprehensive, multistakeholder youth programme with a $21.3 million budget to be managed by UNDP under two streams: (i) the Basket Fund pooling money from Norway, Sweden, Ireland, TRAC and the World Bank; and (ii) the PBF programme. Each programme component had a separate strategy.[194]

UNDP's initial focus under these programmes was on improving youth employability with a series of skills-building and training initiatives. Under PBF support, UNDP initiated a TVET assessment in cooperation with ILO, which found that training institutions were weakly equipped with poor curriculum and human resources. As a result, UNDP focused on support to nine of 33 total government technical institutes. UNDP support has lead to other development partner projects supporting projects such as the GIZ 'Mines to Minds' project at the St. Joseph Institute[195] in partnership with London Mining Company.[196] In parallel, an enabling environment was created for youth employment and empowerment which provided the opportunity for 17,751 youths to access finance for small enterprise development activities, skills development and agriculture through on-the-job training in trades (e.g., shoe-making/repairing, carpentry, auto mechanics, tailoring, masonry and hair-dressing).[197] These Youth Enterprise Development-supported projects between 2007 and 2009 have been seen by national partners as having had a 'substantial effect' on the lives of the 10,300 youth involved with increases in food security, income (by over 197 percent on average), and the ability to afford school fees and other household expenses.[198] The results found employment interventions to be a strong entry point to reorganize and operationalize local development structures, as well as promote behaviour change from an individual orientation to a group approach to strengthen social entrepreneurship and local business development.[199] Challenges reported by the 17 selected IPs pointed to delays in the rainy season preventing substantial rainfall for crops and disrupting programme implementation of some IPs.[200] Of the 17 IPs, several were identified to carry over into the ongoing UNDP programme based on their vision, partnership and previous performance.[201]

As noted above, UNDP's second area of focus was building institutional capacity. It supported the Youth Employment Secretariat (YES), which coordinated the National Youth Employment Strategy as a Programme Management Unit (PMU) under the Youth Ministry.[202] Figure 5 summarizes the evolution of the institutions devoted to youth affairs.

The YES Secretariat was responsible for the overall strategic development, monitoring, research and development of innovative approaches. In 2011, NAYCOM absorbed the YES PMU with a mandate to ensure policy coherence and provide services such as management of labour market information and data on youth employment. UNDP acted as the primary partner to establish NAYCOM with its central Freetown office and regional offices in

193 UNDP programmes include: PBF Award #00047304; Basket Fund Award #00045821.

194 Interview data.

195 Ibrahim Jaffa Condeh, 'London Mining, GIZ Launch 'Mines to Minds' Project", *Concord Times* (Freetown), 25 September 2013, online: <allafrica.com/stories/201309260280.html>.

196 Interview data.

197 ROAR 2009-2010.

198 UNDP, 'Impact Assessment, Youth Employment Programmes in Sierra Leone (2007-2009)', January 2011.

199 United Nations, 'Programme 19: Youth Employment and Employment Programme, Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund', 2012.

200 UNDP, 'Youth Employment and Empowerment, Third Quarter Progress Report', Sierra Leone, 2009.

201 Interview data.

202 YERP ProDoc, 2009.

Figure 5. Evolution of the Sierra Leone Youth Institutional Architecture



Bo, Makeni and Kenema. UNDP has also helped with policy and research support leading to several outputs namely, the NAYCOM Strategic Plan (2013-2018), the NAYCOM monitoring and evaluation system, National Youth Employment Action Plan (NYEAP) and the Sierra Leone Youth Report 2012.

UNDP also provided capacity-building for NAYCOM, the MYA, District Youth Councils, and youth CSOs through: (i) training workshops in human resources, organizational management, leadership, business development services and M&E; and (ii) equipment provision such as ICT infrastructure, transport, office materials. However, UNDP-supported DYCs appear weakly linked with local development initiatives, and are perceived by youth in their decision-making role as tokenistic.[203] According to DYC officers, expected inputs into local planning were not available and there was no relationship in practice between the DYC and Kenema City Council. Most youth at the district level are unaware of their purported representative organizations, including the DYCs and Chiefdom Youth Councils.[204] Implementing partners of ongoing UNDP youth programmes indicate that DYCs are involved informally in design or monitoring of certain programmes, but coordination needs to be strengthened.

The Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme (YEEP)[205] aims to enhance government and UN interventions in reducing unemployment and consolidating peacebuilding efforts, building on previous post-conflict youth projects. In its initial 2008-2010 phase under the multi-donor programme, its specific objectives were to: (i) provide rapid employment opportunities and income-

Box 1. Business Development Service (BDS) Centre Model

The BDS centre concept originated from UNDP's previous involvement in the Youth Enterprise Development programme from 2007 to 2010, in which a focus on micro-business development was identified as a best performing programme feature.

There are currently five BDS centres in Bo, Freetown, Kenema, Makeni and Newton that provide entrepreneurial services aimed at strengthening micro, small and medium enterprises in order to encourage self-employment and job creation. The five centres:

- Provide training and entrepreneurial services. Training covers business plan development, market information management, coaching and mentoring, ICT in business capacitating, business and financial management skills provision.
- Act as a hub for market information and financial services. The microfinance component provides seed capital to the start-up or expand business.

Source: UNDP Sierra Leone

203 Interview data.

204 Restless Development, 'Young People in Sierra Leone Today: Challenges, Aspirations, Experiences', May 2012.

205 Projects include: #00075965 (2010); #00057571 (2008-2011); #00077781 (2011-2013).

generating activities for young people; (ii) strengthen the capacity of the Youth Ministry; and (iii) promote and facilitate the participation of young people in decision-making and the development of youth interest initiatives. YEEP continued under the MDTF Programme 19 framework in 2010 to implement the donor shift from supply-driven to demand-driven support by matching youth skills with the demands of the Sierra Leonean marketplace.[206] Support includes strategy development, research, and services such as career advice and business development support. Multiple funding and programmatic streams contributed to certain components, including the operationalization of NAYCOM in 2011 through the YEEP and YERP programmes supported by Delivering as One (DaO), Government of Spain and Government of Ireland.[207]

UNDP supported the implementation of downstream youth employment projects. Through upgraded equipment at nine TECVOC institutions, 4,329 youths received skills development.[208] Beneficiaries were able to earn in 2010 on average 40,000 Leones or $10 per week although this did not necessarily indicate consistent income. In addition, 6,350 youths were supported in agriculture by seven NGOs in five districts.[209] UNDP facilitated training on District-Based Opportunity Mapping (DOM) of Youth District Officers in five pilot districts conducted by MOFED to lead to Employment Opportunity Networks (EONs).[210] After training youth to collect survey data, DOMs were produced in 2011 and used to inform sector programme and strategy, including training curriculum.

By 2012, the project produced a lessons-learned document outlining good practices in youth employment and empowerment projects to help NAYCOM engage in its strategic mapping process. UNDP assisted NAYCOM in its coordinating and monitoring role as chair of the technical working group of youth organizations and strategy to ensure standardized and coherence approach in youth programming. As noted earlier, the Status of the Youth Report was also completed with NAYCOM and the MYA in 2012, which represents the first of its kind. In addition, UNDP developed a draft framework for a National Youth Service in late 2012.[211]

UNDP's support in skills development involved the establishment of five Business Development Service (BDS) centres[212] in the country and two Career Advisory and Placement Service (CAPS)[213] centres in universities and tertiary institutions. CAPS centres provide students with career guidance through professional seminars and job fairs with participating private and public sector organizations. UNDP provides the CAPS centres with IT and infrastructure equipment. In 2012, the BDS centres contributed to:[214]

- 192 jobs created in the agricultural and business sector

206 United Nations, 'Youth Employment and Employment Programme Final Report', SL Multi-Donor Trust Fund, December 2012.

207 Ibid.

208 UNDP, 'Country Programme Performance Summary: 2008-2011', Sierra Leone, 2012.

209 Information derived from both Atlas Progress Report and the United Nations, 'Youth Employment and Employment Programme Final Report', SL Multi-Donor Trust Fund, December 2012.

210 An EON is a database for youth to access information on employment opportunities in their local district.

211 UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, 'A Framework for a National Youth Service in Sierra Leone,' National Youth Commission, November 2012.

212 IPs and location include: Hands Empowering the Less Privileged (HELP-SL) – Bo; Africa Foundation for Development (AFFORD-SL) – Makeni; Advocacy Initiative for Development (AID-SL) – Freetown; Restless Development (RD-SL) – Freetown; Community Empowerment for Peace and Agricultural Development (CEPAD) – Bo.

213 Located at Fourah Bay, Njala University.

214 UNDP, 'Annual Report on BDS Centres', UNDP Sierra Leone, 2012; UNDP, 'YEEP Progress Report, Quarter IV', UNDP Sierra Leone, 2012.

- 396 businesses expanded through microfinance
- 850 youth businesses trained in entrepreneurial skills development
- 108 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) established and registered with the GoSL.

BDS centres face operational and funding constraints with a large demand from youth for services. The Obasanjo Skill Centre[215] relies on a generator provided by UNDP, but like many facilities, it does not have Internet access.[216]

BDS centres have integrated microfinance components targeting youth to start or expand a business. In Sierra Leone, UNDP has previously supported finance and credit schemes through multi-donor projects such as the Microfinance Investment and Technical Assistance Facility (MITAF).[217] However, as noted in the final evaluation conducted by UNCDF, the initiatives confronted an array of structural constraints to providing services to micro-entrepreneurs, and as a result serious problems in portfolio quality with 23 percent of non-performing loans in the commercial banking sector in 2008 at MITAF's closing. The project's ambitious outreach targets led to serving nearly 120,000 clients from 2004 to 2009, but had an unintended negative impact on the sector as a whole with microcredit markets saturated with multiple lending practices and usury rates being applied.[218] The current follow-on project MITAF II has consequently focused on supporting a competitive and sustainable inclusive financial sector.

The Graduates Internship Programme (GIP) began in 2012 and benefited student graduates with a three-month internship placement. GIP responds to a gap in work experience for educated job seekers by placing qualified graduates into the formal sector through internship programmes. The IP—Restless Development—placed 142 interns within 18 private, public and nongovernmental institutions throughout Sierra Leone for three-month internships.[219]

ASSESSMENT BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

UNDP activities in youth employment are closely aligned with and relevant to a key national priority objectives and strategies regarding youth employment as entry points for pro-poor growth and peacebuilding. However, the first-generation projects during the post-crisis period were scattered in approach and poorly implemented. By 2010, this had changed and the focus has increasingly sharpened from being employability-focused (i.e., skills training) to better linking training with business development and self-employment. The outreach to non-governmental implementing partners has also been innovative. This shift has been accompanied by support that has helped the GoSL streamline its own youth-oriented architecture and has demonstrated UNDP's adaptive capacity and willingness to stay the course in terms of providing capacity-building activities. One indicator of the relevance of the second-generation programmes can be found in the number of applicants to skill-building projects. This also provides an indication of a gap that UNDP is helping to fill in employment and skills-building opportunities: the GIP project received 1,023 application for 150 internship positions in 2012[220], and the CAPS centres similarly cannot meet the high demand for professional development workshops.[221]

UNDP support has filled a key role in support of national level policymaking for youth

215 The centre, built in 2005 by the Government of Nigeria, was vandalized in 2008-2009.

216 Interview data.

217 MITAF was headed by UNCDF in cooperation with UNDP, Cordaid, KfW and the GoSL.

218 See: UNCDF, Final MITAF Evaluation, 2009.

219 Graduate Internship Programme End of Project Report, Submitted by Restless Development to UNDP, March 2013.

220 Ibid.

221 Interview data.

employment at two levels. First, it has provided capacity development to the MYA and notably NAYCOM in advancing their institutional architecture and strategies for policy implementation, including NAYCOM's Strategic Plan (2013-2018) and M&E systems. Second, it has provided technical advice for policy development such as the 2012 Youth Report, draft National Employment Policy, and Youth Employment Strategy. While the policy outcome remains at its early stages since NAYCOM's 2011 operationalization, UNDP has as a result positioned itself as a relevant and reliable strategic partner in youth policymaking.[222]

UNDP has focused its strategic approach and narrowed its partnership base to fewer IPs while maintaining scope for innovation with variation in implementation modalities. Lessons from the previous multi-donor basket funds (2007-2010) informed the ongoing programme design. Compared to 17 IPs involved in a wide array of activities during the previous 2007-2010 phase of youth programming, several IPs were identified to carry over the most successful components of the programme and are now involved in the BDS centres responding to a government priority in "innovative market-oriented entrepreneurship programmes".[223]

In certain areas of youth programming, however, notably agricultural-focused initiatives, the relevance of UNDP is not yet established as it has remained a fringe development actor with weak linkages to other UN partners and government entities. UNDP supported the SABI Centre with $1.3 million through 2012 with operational contributions, and has scaled down support significantly to $150,000 in 2013.[224] In contrast, the issue of job creation in the agricultural sector—where about 75 percent of the population is employed—requires large-scale and coordinated intervention with government and development partners.[225] The Country Office has not acquired in-house expertise in the sector nor does the project have an explicit youth-focused strategy other than small-scale trainings for youths. Overall, UNDP risks a reduced potential impact in the youth sector given funding shortfalls. Since the completion of PBF projects, funding to youth employment has fallen significantly from a cumulative budget of $16 million in 2009-2010 to $4.7 million in 2011-2012.[226] The SABI project requires a clearer linkage to the youth demographic—termed 'young agro entrepreneurs'[227]. There will need to be a much more comprehensive strategy adopted in this respect should UNDP support continue in the next programmatic phase.

In terms of effectiveness, UNDP's performance has had a limited measurable impact on job creation. While UNDP has played a catalytic role in the youth sector through policy support and institutional development, these activities and outputs have not been rigorously tracked to support measurement of the degree of outcome-level change. Based on the 2011-2012 CPAP outcome indicators, UNDP has partially met its targets (see Table 7). The outcome contains four outputs that were partially achieved.[228] UNDP's effectiveness can be summarized according to two primary areas across the period of assessment's multiple strategic frameworks: (i) institutional

222 Interview data.

223 PRSP III, p.101.

224 See UNDP website, SABI Centre (last accessed 10 December 2013).

225 This claim should be caveated with the fact that UN partners were not reportedly able to mobilize the intended programme resources for the SABI centre, and therefore UNDP was apportioned a greater burden of project implementation costs.

226 Atlas (2013).

227 SABI Project Proposal, 2010, p.6.

228 Outputs include: (i): youth employment initiatives are effective and well-coordinated at national district level; (ii) employment opportunities increased through best practice initiatives and SME development; (iii) un- and semi-skilled youth enabled to improve skills through quality monitored apprenticeship programmes; (iv) strengthened youth representation and empowerment.

Table 7. Progress on 2011-2012 CPAP 19.1 Outcome Indicators

CPAP Outcome	Outcome Indicators	Baseline 2010	Actual 2013[230]
19.1 Job opportunities and livelihoods created by the youth through micro and small business run by youth	Youth policy update; employment policy developed and disseminated	Youth employment strategy not formalized in employment policy; no MDA coherence; fledgling donor coordination	GoSL youth strategies updated and integrated into employment frameworks; intra-governmental harmonization; formal donor coordination established.
	High employment success record reported by youth employment projects	[Unidentified in CPAP Framework]	UNDP-supported projects do not define 'success'. BDS centres contributed to 192 jobs created.
	5 BDS centres operational	No BDS centre	5 BDS centre operational
	8 CAPS centres operational	2 CAPS centres under development	2 CAPS centre operational
	National Youth Service Pilot is operational	No Youth Service has been designed and implemented	Youth Service proposal finalized and identified in PRSP III as priority, but not operational

capacity-building for policy and coordination; and (ii) job creation through skills training, entrepreneurial services, and apprenticeship.[229]

In terms of effectiveness in institutional capacity-building for policy and coordination, UNDP has contributed to advancing the youth agenda from a post-conflict transition period to the developmental stage of inclusive growth. Operational support and capacity-development for NAYCOM and evolving state youth entities (i.e., MYES, MEYS and MYA) were fundamental to mainstreaming youth institutions as recommended initially by the TRC in 2004 and long-running GoSL reforms. In this respect, the role of integrating youth into decision-making institutions constitutes an important step in peacebuilding by addressing an identified root cause of Sierra Leone's conflict.

At the national level, UNDP provided key inputs into formulating youth employment policy documents, including contracting the technical expertise to produce the Sierra Leone Youth Report 2012 and the National Youth Employment Action Plan (NYEAP). As the key partner since the YES Secretariat's establishment through its absorption into NAYCOM, UNDP helped build the monitoring and evaluation systems and strategic plan through technical support. While not operational, a youth service framework has been designed with UNDP support and comprises a government development priority for piloting.

Progress at the district level has been slower to create representative structures for the youth. As of 2013, there were 10 of 14 DYCs established country-wide,[231] which provide the conduit for youth concerns to be communicated to decision-making bodies such as the district councils. UNDP has provided NAYCOM and DYCs with operational support (i.e., motorcycles, laptop computers, and modems) and training in project management.[232] Decentralized youth groups remain highly dependent on government funding and lack sufficient resources to carry out basic activities.[233] DYC visibility, legitimacy and formal linkages with local council development programmes

229 These two areas reflect the ongoing 2013-2014 CPAP's two primary outputs.

230 Based on project-level data and data collection mission through October 2013.

231 Interview data.

232 UNDP, 'YEEP Progress Report, Quarter IV', UNDP Sierra Leone, 2012.

233 Restless Development, 'A Baseline Assessment of District Youth Councils in Sierra Leone', Freetown, 2012.

are weak.[234] The proliferation of youth institutions carries heightened expectations for inclusivity in decision-making that yield results in employment and socio-economic conditions. As documented by the UNDP-supported 2012 Youth Report:

> The establishment of NAYCOM and decentralized youth structures at [the] grassroots level in the form of District Youth Advisory Committees, District Youth Councils (DYCs) and Chiefdom/Zonal Youth Councils are steps in the right direction. However, these structures, from national to decentralized levels, need to be followed up with provision of tangible support involving functional or effective public private partnerships. Heavy dependence on existing limited annual government budgetary allocation and on financial resources of a few international development partners may not be adequate to implement a comprehensive youth support programme and may not be sustained in the long term.[235]

Available survey data indicate "a significant level of dissatisfaction with government services" among the youth, particularly in rural zones.[236] If this demographic continues to perceive its representative bodies as purely tokenistic, there is a risk that the gap between youth expectations and reality could precipitate wider disenfranchisement. Although an associated threat of violence is uncertain, groups could feasibly leverage discontentment for political gain.

There is evidence of catalytic effects of UNDP's support to GIP and BDS centres through NAYCOM in terms of job creation through skills training, entrepreneurial services, and apprenticeship. The initial BDS model implemented under the UN-led YED programme in 2007-2010 with several IPs has grown in several districts with the support of other development partners such as the World Bank. Interviews indicate that UNDP has positioned itself as a valuable government partner at the nexus between NAYCOM, DYCs, and BDS centres. The delivery of financial and skills training services for youth in its BDS centres could create further ancillary financial service businesses. UNDP has facilitated entry into the formal sector with GIP by placing 142 interns within 18 private, public and non-governmental institutions.[237] UNDP support has had a limited measurable effect on actual sustainable job creation. During the 2009-2010 period, UNDP administered large-scale multi-donor support and carried out an impact assessment evidencing its contribution to an average increase in income of over 197 percent of 10,300 youth beneficiaries.[238] Sixty percent of project beneficiaries indicated that increased income translated into employment.[239] Outcome indicators for 2011-2012 were partially achieved in operationalizing all BDS centres and several CAPs centres. In 2012, BDS centres led to the creation of 192 jobs, 396 expanded business, and nearly 850 youths trained.[240] Progress may further improve in 2013 with the operationalization of five BDS centres.

UNDP reporting focuses overwhelmingly on outputs, such as the number of trained entrepreneurs, registered SMEs, and financed businesses. As a result, UNDP's ability to demonstrate results and continue to adapt its youth programme has been weakened. Capacity development activities, such as training and operational support to NAYCOM and MYA, are

234 Interview data.

235 UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, 'Sierra Leone Youth Report 2012', National Youth Commission and Ministry of Youth Employment and Sports, December 2012.

236 Ibid.

237 Restless Development, 'GIP End of Programme Report', March 2013.

238 UNDP, 'Impact Assessment, Youth Employment Programmes in Sierra Leone (2007-2009)', January 2011.

239 This is not further elaborated by the impact assessment, and therefore it is unclear what type of employment was generated.

240 UNDP, 'Annual Report on BDS Centres', UNDP Sierra Leone, 2012; UNDP, 'YEEP Progress Report, Quarter IV,' UNDP Sierra Leone, 2012.

weakly linked to intended outcomes.[241] Results monitoring for project components, such as CAPS, equally focus on outputs (e.g., workshop trainees or job fair attendees) without examining post-intervention effects.[242] The Fourbay College CAPS centre has demonstrated with testimonials successful cases of job attainment and changes in previously negative perceptions of certain employers, such as the police. Surveys are conducted yearly with the support of NAYCOM, but to date the information has not been analysed to inform future programme design.[243]

The structural constraints to job growth in Sierra Leone negatively affect UNDP's contribution to achieving the outcome, including *inter alia*: (i) the formal sector's absorption of only 9 percent of the labour force; (ii) the high levels of illiterate and uneducated; and (iii) the lack of available labour market information.[244] In addition, UNDP's recent programming has opted for a modality oriented towards longer-term entrepreneurial job creation, rather than quick-impact cash-for-work projects. Benefits could, therefore, take more time to demonstrate primary and secondary effects on a larger youth population base, which renders results monitoring ever more central to assessing progress.

The main project beneficiaries are generally, as anticipated, youth between 15 and 35. Given the carryover of SABI programmes into the youth portfolio, the youth demographic does not appear well-targeted in its most recent project iteration under YEEP. It is also clear that other structural issues, such as access to land, affect all small-scale farmers and need to be addressed. As a cross-cutting issue, this area of land access is a potentially strong entry-point for UNDP into agriculture and rural development given its close relationship with conflict prevention, human rights, and local development, as well as its nominal inclusion in key issues to be addressed by the recently launched UNDP-managed constitutional review and conflict prevention programmes.

In terms of efficiency, UNDP has improved financial management of the youth portfolio but has lacked a results management system to continue to learn from pilot programmes and this has probably had a knock-on effect in terms of improvements in programme effectiveness. UNDP has been more efficiently managing its youth portfolio finances (see Figure 6). First, it has decreased the proportion of overhead from 22 percent (2008-2010) to 9 percent (2011-2012). Second, it has improved its delivery rate from an average of 56 percent (2008-2010)[245] to 83 percent (2011-2012). Overall, these gains reflect a normalization of management following the increase in multi-donor funding from 2007-2010 and associated issues in delivery and reporting that led to donor criticism.

UNDP has continued to fill a gap in state institutional capacity through operational support. Government and NGO IPs noted a continual need for logistical and equipment support, notably given the 2011 NAYCOM's establishment. Indeed, financial expenditure data indicates that nearly a third of youth programme expenditure in 2012 was for operational support with a sig-

241 For example, YEEP reporting throughout 2012 focuses on output level indicators with no follow-up on how intended changes were actualized, including: (i) installation of logistical IT (intended change to improve NAYCOM coordination and oversight); (ii) research and data management (ostensible intended change to increase organisational efficiency); and (iii) logistical support to DYCs (intended change to empower youth). This gap can be attributed to both the results framework design and monitoring.

242 The Fourbah CAPS centre was unable to cite instances of successful job attainment as an outcome of students attending the four job fairs in Freetown to date.

243 Interview data.

244 UNDP and Government of Sierra Leone, 'Sierra Leone Youth Report 2012', National Youth Commission and Ministry of Youth Employment and Sports, December 2012.

245 Note that this period was significantly impacted by the 8 percent delivery rate in 2009 during the financial reconciliation and donor crisis.

Figure 6. Youth Portfolio Expenditure, 2008-2012



	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Travel	236,534	36,154	104,356	75,824	35,645
Training		41,302		130,520	165,850
Service Contractors	2,818,798	-3,690	1,484,724	135,211	212,947
Salary	580,700	128,082	48,491	357,005	247,502
Overhead	493,827	223,367	148,202	213,912	90,962
Miscellaneous	170,803	-835,631	79,401	36,918	155,800
Grants	819,950	749,821	34,777		792,076
Operational Support*	-222,374	29,903	1,679,834	408,958	653,794
Consultant	598,541	62,115	25,569	50,755	154,118

Source: UNDP Sierra Leone; total expenditure US$13.5 million *Operational support = equipment/supplies and materials/goods

nificant proportion of salary allocations going to IPs for BDS centres. This represents a shift away from a financial portfolio previously dominated by service contractors (see Figure 6 for 2008 and 2010), and an opportunity to increase capacity of national partners.

Projects in the portfolio were all implemented directly by UNDP (i.e., DIM). IPs favourably viewed UNDP's ability to efficiently manage projects within deadlines cost estimates. UNDP also demonstrated flexibility in shifting away from its previous employability-focused approach based on evidence from long-running interventions. Three project and programme evaluations were carried out according to evaluation plans with monitoring performed according to the respective AWPs as well as multi-donor reporting. An evaluation plan for 2011-2012 is however not publicly available, and was apparently not updated following the Executive Board's decision to renew the 2009-2010 CPD until 2012.[246] The 2011-2012 CPAP planned to synchronize UNDP monitoring and evaluation with the UN Joint Vision framework, and YEEP was reviewed jointly by the MDTF although not formally.[247]

Challenges that affected project implementation noted by IPs include delays in funding caused by UNDP and government budget approval administrative processes.[248] This was further compounded by short time-frames of UNDP

246 UNDP, 'Extensions of Country Programmes: Note of the Administrator,' Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, Annual Session 2010, DP/2010/25, 21 April 2010.

247 There was no evaluation of the 2011-2012 YEEP period, and multidonor reporting used reporting data provided by the Country Office.

248 Interview data.

funding of sometimes one year,[249] which made medium to long-term strategic planning more difficult. UNDP staff noted the lack of capacity of IPs within both government and NGO partners to carry out agreed project monitoring and reporting tasks.[250]

Programmatic efficiency was weakened by poor results monitoring and evaluation. For its BDS centres, the Country Office is not collecting information to best exploit innovative components in order to test and identify effective programmatic configurations. There may also be room from learning from other development partners who are active in the same sector, and in the case of the World Bank, using the same IPs.[251] IP capacity varied widely between and within projects, and in some cases severely constrained efficient results monitoring. UNDP's monitoring and reporting systems do not indicate how different IPs are implementing programmes through varying modalities (e.g., different microfinance interest rates and approaches) or how groups are stratified (e.g., according to income or nature of microfinance support).[252]

Five IPs are running the five BDS centres and each is applying varying modalities to target youth groups for business start-up and expansion (see Table 8). Some of these IPs partner with Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), including BRAC which has been active in Sierra Leone since 2008, and others lend money through in-house financing with interest rates fluctuating being 5 and 25 percent.[253] This variation provides an opportunity to test and further scale-up the most effective approaches, and will require more rigorous tracking and evaluation. UNDP should act upon its project commitment to "identify best practices through systematic evaluations and research"[254] by institutionalizing methods that collect detailed programme data for evaluation. While IPs conduct informal follow-up with loan beneficiaries, there is no minimum standards set by UNDP. In addition,

Table 8. Youth-Focused Microfinance Business Development Pilots

	HELP (Bo)	**Restless** (Freetown-Rural)	**CEPAD** (Kenema)	**AID** (Freetown-Urban)
Use of loan	Group loan for start-up or expansion	Business start-up or expansion	Business start-up or expansion	Business start-up or expansion
Loan term	1 Year	1 Year	1 year, 3 months grace period	10 Months
Loan size	$1,000- $1,200	$800-$2,000	$700-$800	$700-$4,000
Interest rates* (loan quantity)	12-18%	5% (10) 25% (15)	5% (10)	5% (12)
Other partners	World Bank, FAO	BRAC	ILO	FAO

Source: UNDP Evaluation Office (2013) based on field interviews

*Rates are indicative and do not nominally include payments, fees, and collateral deposits, and are not corrected for local inflation[255]

249 Interview data.

250 Interview data.

251 The ongoing World Bank Youth Employment Support (YES) project is implemented by HELP-SL in Bo City and elsewhere.

252 Based upon Independent Evaluation Office analysis of the UNDP Sierra Leone Annual BDS Centre Report (2013) and Implementing Partner Reporting Template (2013).

253 BRAC Annual Report, Sierra Leone, 2012.

254 UNDP, 'YEEP Project Document (2011-2012)', UNDP Sierra Leone, 2010.

255 Table based on: Charles Waterfield, 'Designing Microfinance Loan Products', MFI Solutions, LLC, 2001.

there is no systematic follow-up of BDS training graduates who do not receive loans, who account for the vast majority of project beneficiaries.

SABI provides an example of a one-off UNDP intervention lacking a strategic approach and follow-up mechanisms to assess proper effectiveness. The project is not tracking intended outcomes based on its results frameworks, notably enhanced agricultural productivity and capacity nor job creation.[256] Reporting does not indicate how jobs have been promoted or created through the programme other than small-scale production of foodstuffs. SABI staff also indicated delays in UNDP-paid contractors unable to deliver expected construction.[257] While UNDP claims that proceeds from sales have contributed to the sustainability, SABI is facing financial sustainability challenges.[258] Previous project reporting cited low local government capacity and limited budget among critical constraints to project implementation. While these issues remain relevant, UNDP has not provided SABI the technical expertise nor allocated sufficient resources to address them. Finally, the project's inclusion into the youth portfolio appears to be driven by the Country Office's willingness to continue support rather than a defined youth programmatic approach.[259]

UNDP has contributed to the institutionalization of youth programmes by facilitating the GoSL's assumption of previously UNDP-managed project components into nascent state institutions and this has improved prospects for sustainability. UNDP's youth programmes have shown innovative approaches in piloting and upscaling. The YES Secretariat, previously a project management unit set up by UNDP, was absorbed into the GoSL with the establishment of NAYCOM in 2011. The GoSL provided NAYCOM the infrastructural facility and regular budget. Certain BDS centres have operational budgets covered by NAYCOM while UNDP covers programme expenses.[260] UNDP's long-running partnership with the GoSL and concurrent institutional change that UNDP has helped catalyse in youth programming.

Since beginning youth support, UNDP built upon its ongoing programmes to identify key gaps in the employment sector and create programmes to address them. The GIP is beginning the second year of implementation and attempting to meet the high demand for internships by doubling the number of offered positions to 300.[261] Strong links with the private sector in programme design could also pay dividends in promoting sustainability. Returns from microloan activities of BDS centres could generate funds for greater financial independence of IPs, but it is unclear as the current programmes began in 2012. In addition, the CAPS centre at Fourah Bay College has partnered with the Africa Innovation Prize,[262] and future resource mobilization is projected on its ability to mobilize private partnerships with employers to pay registration fees for job fairs. For these project components, UNDP could consider quantifying targets for IP financial sustainability in its future programmes.

Youth projects will continue to experience high demand from the target population, but sustainability is threatened by a lack of government and

256 SABI 2011 Annual Report; SABI Annual Work Plan.

257 Interview data.

258 Interview data.

259 In its current iteration, SABI has trained 96 youth on the operation and maintenance of farming machinery and equipment.

260 While this is the case for certain BDS centres, such as at the Obasanjo Skills Center in Newtown, at other BDS centres UNDP continues to fund operational budgets.

261 UNDP Sierra Leone, 'DEX Quarterly Report', October-December 2012.

262 Alpha Bedoh Kamara, 'FBC students win African Innovation Prize,' *Africa Young Voices*, 20 May 2013, online: <africayoungvoices.com/2013/05/fbc-students-win-african-innovation-prize/>.

NGO IP capacity and financial resources. IPs cited shortages in operational and programme budgets with implications on basic programme implementation. As an illustrative example of the challenges in communication between UNDP and its partners, the Minister of Youth appointed in 2012 was without email for one year.[263] NAYCOM partners have expected more from UNDP staff than envisioned in cooperative agreements, and are slow to perform basic reporting procedures. UNDP staff suggested introducing training for national IP counterparts on UNDP procedures, including financial processes, as well as its substantive support in the youth sector. Similar trainings given to partner NGOs were cited as positive.[264]

4.5 FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

The period under review is covered in the second PRSP for Sierra Leone, the 'Agenda for Change' (2008-2102) and prioritizes the following sectors in terms of finance for development: power supply and energy, agriculture and fisheries, the national transportation network and improved social services with particular emphasis on health and education. It emphasizes the importance of the effective coordination of ODA because of its central importance to Sierra Leone's development and recognizes the importance of attracting private sector resources for development. The importance of private sector participation is also stressed through the mobilization of investment for small and medium enterprises, microfinance and the development of public-private partnerships for a range of activities with particular attention to energy and infrastructure projects. The 'Agenda for Change' also highlights the importance of regulating the mining and extractive industries, ensuring that revenue collected contributes to local development and greater attendant benefits to the local populations. The latter is viewed as essential to preventing the recurrence of conflict.

Domestic revenue accounted for 65 percent of total tax revenue in 2009. External budgetary support fell from 24.4 percent of total revenue and grants in 2009 to 17.1 percent in 2010. Domestic revenue increased from 8.9 percent of the budget in 2007 to 11.5 percent in 2011. The improvement was due to implementation of reforms to improve tax administration and broaden the tax base. For example, the GST was introduced, an Automated System of Customs Data (ASYCUDA) was installed at the Customs and Excise Department; and the Domestic Tax Department was established, integrating the Income Tax Department and the Goods and Services Tax Department. Revenues reached 12.2 percent of GDP in 2012 reflecting higher tax payments from the extractive sector including signature bonuses from oil exploration and personal income taxes and royalties from mining companies. Total government expenditure increased from 16.5 percent of GDP in 2008 to 22 percent of GDP in 2012. The growth mainly reflected the scaling up of capital expenditures, including those funded from domestic revenues: capital expenditure funded from domestic resources increased from 0.8 percent of GDP in 2007 to an estimated 3.0 percent of GDP in 2012.

Sierra Leone is heavily dependent on ODA, which constitutes over 60 percent of annual resources available to the Government for development and recurrent costs. Aid therefore needs to be effectively coordinated and all available resources programmed in line with national priorities in a transparent and accountable manner. National plans, national budgets and their respective preparation processes need to be structured in a manner to enable this. To be sustainable, these processes need to be led by national institutions and capacity needs to be created for the purpose. Greater sustainability and economic growth will only come if Sierra Leone manages to wean itself off its current dependence on aid and external sources of financing. Tax enforcement and revenue col-

263 Interview data.

264 Interview data.

lection have in the past been weak and lacking in transparency. The real wealth of Sierra Leone, and the greatest potential source of revenue, lies in its mineral and mining sector, but this has been seen as being managed in a non-transparent manner. Foreign multinational corporations possess the technological and managerial capacity to exploit the mineral sector and have extensive and asymmetrical legal capacity to negotiate favourable contracts. Consequently, the income generated from the mineral sector has not widely benefited the local population. It is understood that with a better regulatory environment, improved national capacity to negotiate contracts, greater transparency and accountability in the procurement and negotiation processes, and better distribution of the revenue retained within country through taxation and agreements regarding developmentally beneficial public-private partnerships (PPPs), the overall revenue base will be expanded and dependence on foreign aid reduced.

Another obstacle to economic growth is structural unemployment. It is estimated that over 50 percent of the population is unemployed and 70 percent of Sierra Leone's youth (accounting for 34 percent of the population) do not have jobs.[265] More than 80 percent of the country's youth lives on under $2 per day. In Sierra Leone today, youth face a daunting challenge of securing decent employment in a context in which job opportunities are scarce. A range of other issues further exacerbates the low demand for labour including the limited work experience and educational levels of many youth. Furthermore, the 11-year civil war greatly disrupted livelihoods and education and exposed many youth to violence from a young age. There is also extensive underemployment as over 95 percent of Sierra Leone's economy is informal. If inroads are to be made into unemployment, the principal source of new jobs is likely to be the micro and small and medium-sized enterprise sector. Growth of this sector has suffered from regulatory uncertainties, the lack of access to credit as well as access to effective and efficient courts.

Finally, corruption has been citied as a key problem facing small businesses. The World Bank's 'Doing Business' index consists of the ranking of the simple average of its percentile ranking of each country in each of 10 topics: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. Between 2012 and 2013, Sierra Leone progressed from a ranking of 148/185 to 140/185[266], moving above its neighbours, Liberia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Among the 10 topics, getting electricity, dealing with construction permits, registering property, resolving insolvency and contract enforcement and trading across border were seen as the most severe constraints on small business. Between 2005 and 2013, Sierra Leone has shown least progress in the areas of contract enforcement, resolving insolvency and trading across borders in comparison with the other 184 countries in the pool.

UNDP STRATEGY AND PROGRAMMES

Outcome: The resource base available for development increased through strengthened abilities to expand and efficiently leverage aid, private investment and trade opportunities

Outcome: Policies, strategies and partnerships established to promote public-private sector collaboration and private-sector and market development that benefits the poor and ensures that low-income households and small enterprises have access to a broad range of financial and legal services

Outcome: MDG-based national development strategies promote growth and employment, and reduce economic, gender and social inequalities

265 Statistics Sierra Leone and UNICEF, 'Sierra Leone Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey', 2010.

266 IFC/World Bank, 'Economy Profile: Sierra Leone, Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises', 10th Edition, The IBRD/World Bank, Washington D.C., 2013.

UNDP's involvement under this general outcome is quite fragmented and varied and this is reflected in the framing and presentation of UNDP's programme for the period of the ADR assessment. The lack of coherence is apparent in the following analysis of the key UNDP documents starting from the CPD 2008-2012, the CPAP document and matrix for 2011-2012. Another factor to be considered in this analysis is that while the outcome includes a number of UNDP projects and programmes identified below, activities in the area of finance for development involves the work of the Resident Representative functioning in the capacity of Resident Coordinator of the UN and as ERSG and head of UNIPSIL. The fragmented nature of this outcome area has posed concomitant problems in terms of framing of the assessment by the ADR team.

The 2008-2010 CPD identified the following activities/outcome areas of relevance to this outcome under the rubric of 'poverty reduction and human development'[267]:

- Disaster risk management,
- Market based solutions for women's economic empowerment and youth employment,
- Monitoring of overall aid effectiveness,
- Strengthening of MDG-based planning,
- Responding to HIV/AIDS.

In the subsequent CPAP, 2011-2012, on the other hand, the resources outcome added several ambitious areas of endeavour and was defined in the context of the UN Joint Vision Programme (JVP) as follows:

Support to Aid Policy Coordination

- Support to implementation of the aid policy,
- Establishment of a nationally owned coordination mechanism at national, sectoral and district levels,
- Analysis of aid flows to justify division of labour, SWAPs and harmonization of modalities,
- Raise accountability for aid effectiveness.

Private Sector Support

- Capacity to negotiate beneficial terms on medium and large-scale investments (e.g. PPP and industrial mining),
- Transparency around revenue collection and use (Extractive Transparency Initiative),
- Improvement of the business environment,
- Promotion of the participation of women and youth in agri-business through establishment of the national agri-business centre.

Development of Sustainable Pro-Poor Financial Sector

- Development of a competitive and sustainable inclusive microfinance sector targeting "poor and low income people" focused on SMEs in rural areas,
- Mainstreaming of informal microfinance into the financial system.

The document also included 'Mineral Sector Support', which was not broken down into specific activities and projects, although UNDP was to host workshops and provide some support to contract negotiations. In its matrix, on the other hand, the CPAP 2011-2012 document defines targets and indicators for the outcome largely in terms of programme outputs and notably does not mention several areas identified above.

In very broad terms, the change envisaged is to move beyond the current dependence on the government budget and ODA alone as the principal

267 UNDP, 'Draft Country Programme Document for Sierra Leone, 2008-2010,' Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, Annual Session 2007, DP/DCP/SLE/1, 26 April 2007.

engine for growth. Creation of an enabling environment and the generation of well-regulated and targeted private sector investment is to be used as an increasingly important engine for growth. Large-scale investments in critical infrastructure are envisaged through private-public partnerships that leverage private sector resources in strategically important aspects of development that can serve to generate broader, more inclusive growth. Effective management of private investment, including in the mineral sector, is expected to generate employment and through well-structured lease agreements and contracts, resources for local development that can benefit local populations, supplementing government and ODA resources and generating development that is pro-poor and contributes to the achievement of the MDGs.

Given the considerable importance of ODA to the national budget, the level of risk perceived by a number of donors to Sierra Leone—including some of the largest—and their attendant reluctance to release pledged funds in the absence of credible capacity on the ground to monitor and manage the assistance, UNDP has established itself as an administrator and a facilitator of ODA on behalf of other donors through a variety of basket funds and trust funds. The objective is to raise effectiveness in the application of ODA to key national priorities in a manner that is coherent, coordinated and aligned with national priorities with strong national ownership. The value added, or at least the rationale, provided by UNDP for its involvement in this respect, lies in the robustness and transparency of its procedures as well as the accountability built into them. In this respect, UNDP has not been the only option available as administrator of trust funds. The World Bank has also served in several instances as administrator of basket funds and trust funds including, for instance, the GoSL's Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project.

However, UNDP has set itself apart as the forerunner, taking on the role of administrator of funds when sectors are fragile and capacities weak, when other donors are reluctant to take on the exposure involved and remain risk averse. In such instances, as an integral part of the UN peacebuilding operation, UNDP has tended to blaze the trail, providing fiduciary services to other donor agencies in thematic and sectoral areas that are considered central to the international effort to support the nation's transition to peace, stability and growth. In this respect, UNDP has served as the administrator and manager of three basket and trust funds that have been assessed in the following sections.

The Multi-Donor Trust Fund: The Joint Vision for Sierra Leone is the current framework document developed by the UN agencies for their coordinated, if not integrated programme of assistance to Sierra Leone in support of the Government's Agenda for Change (the second PRSP for the nation). Through the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone, the ERSG has led the UN system in defining the common priorities that guide its activities and outline a set of underlying criteria and comparative advantages that have shaped its programmes and projects through a conflict-sensitive approach. In the Joint Vision, the UN system agreed to combine its efforts behind the overarching priority of consolidating peace in the country through four programmatic priorities: i) the economic integration of rural areas; ii) the economic and social integration of youth; iii) equitable access to health services; and iv) an accessible and credible public service. The Joint Vision sets out a number of joint planning, implementation and coordination mechanisms with the aim of enhancing the impact of the United Nations' assistance as part of the international communities' efforts of consolidating peace and promoting sustainable development in Sierra Leone. With the Joint Vision, the UN intended to put into practice the main principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness under the leadership of the Government and covered the period 2009-2012 with a total estimated budget of $349 million, of which $204 million (59 percent) was required as new funding. A Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was established for the purpose, creat-

ing a joint funding window that corresponded to and supported the programmatic integration that the UN was seeking to accomplish under the Joint Vision. The Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) of UNDP administers the Sierra Leone MDTF on behalf of the UN system, the donors and the Government in accordance with its financial regulations and rules. Yet the MDTF remains woefully under-funded, managing a mere $31 million in total resources.

Electoral Support Basket Fund: The fund has a total budget of $25 million from nine donors and is administered by UNDP. The principal reasons for channelling funds through UNDP is purportedly because of the political exposure involved, because of UNDP's close relationship with UNIPSIL, and because of UNDP's extensive past experience with similar electoral support programmes in other countries in the process of transition. The first section of the ADR report contains a detailed assessment of this fund.

The Constitutional Review Basket Fund: A constitutional review was called for in the 1991 Lomé Peace Agreement and has been a long time coming to fruition because of the obvious political complexities involved. Launched formally by the President in July 2013, with a total budget of $4,600,000, a basket fund was established under the UNDP with $1,100,000 of the total funded from the Government's own national budget and $300,000 from the UNDP/UN Peacebuilding Support Fund. It is understood that a total of $4,000,000 has been secured to date. The review is entrusted to a Constitutional Review Committee consisting of as many as 80 persons drawn from the central government, parliament, local government, chiefdom councils, academia and civil society. The structure and composition of the committee has been highly controversial, with women's groups charging that women's concerns are under represented. Civil society organizations claim that the political parties, which have taken 36/80 seats, dominate the committee, with the two principal parties, the APC and SLPP taking six seats each and the next eight largest parties taking three seats each. Lack of agreement among participants has prevented further meetings of the Constitutional Review Committee since the launch by the President and has also resulted in parallel meetings being held by the paramount chiefs who have established their own caucus, drawing on chiefdoms that are not directly represented on the Committee. The latter have met at least twice since the launch to discuss issues pertaining to their substantive positions concerning the constitutional review. UNDP and the UN's Peacebuilding Fund have funded their meetings.

ASSESSMENT BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

This set of outcomes addresses development problems that are among the main underlying causes of the conflict and instability in Sierra Leone, and as such are all highly relevant to both the long-term development of the nation and the more immediate peacebuilding objectives of the UN system and the Government. **In general, UNDP appears to have contributed to some degree to the development of coordination capacity. It has performed less effectively in other areas—most notably in the development of a pro-poor private sector through better regulation, business advice and microfinance that targets the poor. Even less has been achieved in terms of support to the mineral sector and improvements in trade regimes with particular benefits to micro, small and medium enterprises. Assistance in these areas has been sporadic, with the facilitation of workshops or meetings with the payment of operational costs, but with relatively little systematic strategy or policy development involved.**

In terms of the relevance and effectiveness of the overall aid coordination and the mobilization of ODA, the integrated nature of the UN presence in Sierra Leone has greatly influenced the role that UNDP has played in coordination as well as its ability to mobilize resources. The fact that the ERSG is simultaneously the Resident Coordinator of the UN and the Resident Representative of UNDP has ensured that UNDP has played a central role in the transition. It has also given

UNDP additional prominence in key working groups involved in the preparation of the PRSPs. UNDP's involvement in local governance at the regional, provincial and district levels has helped it widen the consultations with stakeholders in the preparation of the PRSP. Delegations, nominated by councils at the subnational level supported by UNDP, have been brought to Freetown to participate in consultations during the preparation of the PRSP.

UNDP supported formulation of PRSP II (Agenda for Change) and PRSP III (Agenda for Prosperity). The support included enhancing analytical capacity and studies and data that are indispensable instruments for sound economic decision-making processes and national development planning. Improved data capture and dissemination will also facilitate tracking of progress made by Sierra Leone towards achievement of the MDGs. The UNDP senior economist participated in the core team for the formulation of PRSP III throughout 2012. The World Bank was not represented on the core team because of its oversight responsibilities. Through the development partner coordination group, UNDP contributed by defining partner engagement in the process. UNDP was entrusted with the role of representing partners on the core team. Lead partners were designated to represent the development partner group in the technical pillar working groups in order not to jeopardize national ownership of the process. UNDP provided an interface between development partners and the PRSP formulation process and presented consolidated partner comments on behalf of the development partners group to the Development Partners Coordination Group chaired by the Minister of Finance, WB Country Manager and the ERSG 4/10/12. In addition, UNDP provided assistance for specific technical support including analysis of the household poverty data.

The UN Joint Vision provided an easy to understand, coherent programme for UN support to the Agenda for Change, or PRSP II. The UNJV was structured along 21 Joint Programmes (UNJVP), each with an agreed lead agency. The UNJV was approved by the RDT to replace the UNDAF and the Joint Vision benefited from funding from the Delivering as One Fund. The UNJVP 2 on Access to Justice and Human Rights is a good example of successful cooperation in the framework of the UNCT. Strong partnership was established between UNDP, UN Women, UNAIDS, UNHCHR and UNICEF including regular consultations and joint publications. An example of successful coordination was the joint activity in 2012 between UNICEF, UNHCHR, and UNDP to support the SLP in developing a new training manual for new police recruits with modules focusing on human rights, gender, SGBV, child justice and community policing. The new curricula was developed by the end of 2012 and is expected to be validated and in use by 2013. The coordinated process involved detailed planning and budgeting among UNIPSIL/UNHCHR, UNDP and UNICEF as well as joint technical meetings to support a jointly funded consultant to prepare the curricula in coordination with the SLP. A further example of how joint coordination through the UNJVP2 led to substantive results is the passing of the Sexual Offences Act 2012. UNJVP2 members jointly supported human rights and gender training for parliamentarians with a specific focus on preparing the way for the passage of the Sexual Offences Bill. The Act became law in mid-2012 and has been described, including by the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission, as a progressive and modern piece of legislation which will strongly enhance women's rights in the country.

Coordination under the integrated mission strengthened the overall UN contribution in governance considerably. Under the election programme, the division of work under a coordinated approach ensured that the technical work led by UNDP was informed by the political work done by the mission, which strengthened the UN's overall contribution to ensuring successful elections. For example, UNDP ensured a technically solid biometric voter registration process and worked with the mission to ensure political party observers had full access to the process. Political party observers in a joint report confirmed

that the voter registration process was of high standards, which ensured that this critical part of the elections was not cast under doubt. On Parliament, coordination ensured that UNDP was entrusted with both the technical support role and the monitoring of parliamentary work that the mission had done in the past. This ensured a more coherent interface with the Parliament while allowing the mission to focus on other areas in which UNDP is not operating. Although less easily measured in quantitative terms, UNDP's role within the integrated mission has given it greater authority in its policy dialogue with the Government, resulting largely from the importance accorded to relevant Security Council resolutions pertaining to Sierra Leone.

In the capacity of ERSG and UN RC, the UNDP Resident Represent currently co-chairs the Development Partnership Committee (DEPAC) along with the Minister of Economy and Finance and the World Bank Resident Representative. The DEPAC, to which a number of sectoral working groups report, has spearheaded the development of the 'mutual accountability framework', a statement of common objectives for development with roles and responsibilities established between key partners in each sector. This framework is bolstered by the establishment of a 'dashboard' that provides broad, national programme level indicators for each of the main thematic areas of focus of the overall national plan that is based on the PRSP process. It is expected that the dashboard will serve to focus attention on progress or lack thereof in the implementation of the PRSP. The mutual accountability framework and the dashboard have just been rolled out. Resources are being mobilized for the new PRSP. It is too early to determine whether the dashboard will prove an effective tool for coordinated if not joint monitoring by the Government and other stakeholders or whether, as a tool based on the highest aggregation of indicators, it will serve mainly as window dressing.

UNDP's own programming in Sierra Leone has been entirely Joint Vision based. A new UNDAF was completed at the end of 2013, and although it was not formally among the pilot countries, Sierra Leone was a self-starter for One UN beginning in 2010, mobilizing $35 million for joint UN programmes. In line with their mandates that are more closely aligned with the transition process, five UN agencies, including UNDP, were responsible for 91 percent of the delivery of resources under the UNDAF. In practice, few resources were delivered under joint programmes, opting instead for parallel programming. UN integration has also no doubt influenced the positioning of UNDP as the funds administrator of several multipartner donor supported trust funds—a form of basket support that has been administered outside the national budget (examples noted in the previous section). A large proportion of the funds administered by UNDP is therefore non-core in nature.

UNDP has also been involved in a number of interventions in support of Mineral Sector Development and Pro-Poor Private Sector Development. Sierra Leone's conflicts have arisen in large part over the distribution and control over resources generated from the mineral sector. In the past, income from mining and minerals has tended to accrue to those in the senior reaches of government and has not benefited the population at large in a manner commensurate with the size of the industry and the volume of resources it has generated. Contracts have tended to be negotiated in the absence of public scrutiny and have tended to be one-sided, benefiting foreign private companies disproportionately. Profits have tended to be sent out of the country and both tax laws and their enforcement have been weak. There is therefore a need to regulate the sector, to ensure greater transparency and accountability and to ensure that resources are set aside to enhance the social and economic needs of local communities In the context of relevance, the outcome evaluation for Private Sector Development and Inclusive Markets concluded:

> Based on available information, it can be concluded that the UNDP-supported PSD initiative has been well aligned with PRSP II, An Agenda for Change. It addresses a

key priority in PSD, seeking to mainstream the trade issue, focusing on strengthening of the country's international competiveness.

The sub-outcome related to the overall outcome on development of inclusive market: 'Increased access to productive employment and equal opportunities for sustainable livelihoods, especially for vulnerable groups and in consideration of conflict factors' has remained valid and appropriate in the Sierra Leonean development context.[268]

In 2008, the President established a task force to lead a process of review and renegotiations for mining agreements and requested UN support for its work, since the specialized capacities required are in short supply in the country. This support has been provided by UNDP in the form of international legal and mineral specialists provided through the RBA/UNOPS Regional Project for Capacity Development for Negotiating and Regulating Investment Contracts, which sourced lawyers pro bono from major US firms. In this respect, negotiations with the main diamond mining company Koidu Holdings were concluded in September 2010 with the signature of an improved agreement that brought it in line with the new law, raising royalty rates from 5 percent to 6.5 percent, quadrupled the mining lease and reduced a variety of tax exemptions.

The legal and regulatory framework for the minerals sector was substantially strengthened in December 2009 with the introduction of a new Minerals Law. Just before the law's entry into force, however, a new and controversial agreement was signed with iron ore company London Mining. After strong opposition from local civil society groups as well as international partners, the Government decided to renegotiate this agreement. UNDP provided initial technical support to the negotiating team in November 2010.

UNDP implemented a DFID-funded project to establish a computerized cadastre system (2005-2008), after which the MMR put the cadastre to use in Freetown as well as in the main mining district of Kono. A post-project assessment was conducted in early 2009, which identified further scope for improvement and led to a second phase of support (funded by UNDP alone) to complete the development of the system and its integration into the formal work processes surrounding minerals licenses in all parts of the country. The support was channelled through the Norwegian NGO Revenue Development Foundation, which designed the initial system.

Successor projects have established a comprehensive licence management system that combines basic licence information with the digitization of supporting documents, extensive administrative functions, advanced mapping technology (GIS) and online access to information. Far beyond a simple database, the system has fundamentally changed the processes around the approval and management of licences by locking them down to the exact steps stipulated by law, with requirements on supporting documentation and digital signatures along the way that cannot be skipped or circumvented. As a result, it effectively ensures that the processes defined in the governing legislative framework are adhered to and substantially reduces the scope for arbitrary or undocumented approvals.

UNDP recruited a Private Sector Development Adviser (PSDA) in the Office of the President to maintain momentum and coordination around key business reforms and keep the Presidency informed of progress.[269] The PSDA and the Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA), an agency under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, have collaborated closely on the production of the 2009 national Private Sector Development Strategy and an outreach

268 UNDP, 'Outcome Evaluation: Inclusive Private Sector Development', 31 October 2012, p.8.

269 UNDP has supported the PSDA since Q4 2008, mainly in the form of salary, office equipment and vehicle for the PSDA himself as well as funding overseas investment promotion trips and legal advice to negotiations of investment agreements.

campaign towards investors in Europe, Asia and Latin America culminating in the Trade and Investment Forum held in connection with the Consultative Group meeting of the IBRD in London in November 2009.

These efforts have yielded some success, as reflected for instance in Sierra Leone's rank in the World Bank Doing Business Index rising from 160 in 2008 to 143 in 2011. Investment promotion trips and events—in particular the Trade and Investment Forum—have more than tripled the number of active investor queries, of which a full third has led to site visits. The formulation of a National Export Strategy and dedicated strategies for sugar and oil palm sectors have resulted in interest from some of the world's most experienced companies.

UNDP has for some time been the in-country donor facilitator for the Integrated Framework (IF), a global initiative with technical assistance projects to LDCs to take part in and benefit from international trade for which UNDP was the global trust fund manager. The Country Office's role essentially amounted to supporting the National Focal Point (the MTI Permanent Secretary) and the National Steering Committee (NSC) in ensuring that Sierra Leone formulates and implements projects that put the IF resources to good use.

Other activities covered by this budget include hosting a Renewable Energy Forum and launches of both the Energy Policy and the Culture Policy. In addition:

- A particularly successful deliverable was the Sierra Leone Trade and Investor Forum in London coinciding with the CG in November 2009. Organized by a broad set of partners but with very significant input from SLIEPA and the PSDA, the event was widely acclaimed as a success and generated great interest in the country: the number of investor queries more than tripled following the forum and many of these have led on to site visits, MOUs and deals.
- The Private Sector Development Strategy 'Unleashing the talent of our people' was published by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and financed by DFID but was produced collaboratively with significant input from the PSDA.

Another major output is the successful negotiations with Swiss biofuel company Addax around their $400 million investment into a sugarcane plantation outside Makeni. The PSDA led the discussions, which have been partially successful in setting the tone for future large investments.

After final review and resubmission of the of the draft PPP Act into the legislative pipeline an extensive two-day workshop was organized by UNDP for top and senior Governmental officials. Participants included most of Ministers and Deputy Ministers as well as other senior officials. Building on South-South cooperation principles, several key presentations were made by senior PPP professionals from Nigeria and South Africa. UNDP also continued its support to the set-up of the institutional entity for consolidating PPP experience in Sierra Leone—the PPP Unit. Support in formation of units strategy, positioning and staff selection was provided. In addition to these activities, continued technical assistance was provided to the Government officials on building their capacities during ongoing negotiations on several major PPP transactions, particularly improving access to energy. It is envisaged that these activities will strengthen capacity of the Government in negotiating and concluding major public and private partnership transactions, reduce poverty, create employment opportunities, as well as expand revenue mobilization for the Government.

Despite these efforts, overall dependence on ODA remains very high, with about 50 percent of public investment programmes financed from external ODA sources. The estimated real GDP growth in 2012 was around 21 percent and is expected to decline slightly to a forecast 15 percent in 2013, both years reflecting commencement of iron ore production. Responding to weakening fiscal discipline in 2011, the Govern-

ment took corrective measures in the first half of 2012. Inflation moderated slightly but remained in double digits in 2012, easing from 16.9 percent to 11.7 percent over the year to November. Non-iron ore real GDP expanded at a respectable 6 percent in 2012.

The Government's smallholder commercialization programme has been instrumental in stimulating agricultural production, and increased spending on infrastructure development has provided a boost to the construction and services sectors. In 2012, the trade deficit was estimated at $589 million and is forecast to narrow dramatically to about $120 million in 2013.

Due to the lack of agreement between the Bank of Sierra Leone and the main donor, KfW, on implementation arrangements for the MITAF project and the selection of the technical service provider, KfW withdrew from the initiative. In order to continue the activities, UNDP and the Bank of Sierra Leone agreed to the deployment of a CTA funded by UNDP. The position has been advertised and the recruitment is expected to be finalized before end of October. The broad functions of the financial sector development adviser are:

- To assist with strategic running of the FSDP-S by working with staff of the secretariat to coordinate various programmes with activities at the policy level as well as build the capacity of the secretariat to lead and coordinate the various reform activities within the framework of the FSDP;
- To support increase in access to finance by broadening its outreach, strengthening microfinance and rural credit governance and supervision, and addressing the community banks' structural issues; and
- To support capacity-building of the research department of the Bank of Sierra Leone so that the department provides analytical support throughout the Bank, publishes macroeconomic and financial analyses and contributes to scientific research.

The Integrated Framework (IF), is a global initiative to provide technical assistance to Less Developed Countries (LDCs) so that they can benefit from international trade. UNDP is the global Trust Fund Manager and the Country Office's role has been to support the national focal point, in the Ministry of Trade, and the National Steering Committee (NSC) to ensure that Sierra Leone formulates and implements projects that put the IF resources to good use.

UNDP executed two projects under the IF, focused respectively on developing trade and tourism. The trade project (60188) was implemented by UNCTAD and the International Trade Centre and on paper delivered a sizeable portion of outputs, including setting up a trade information centre at SLIEPA and giving training to a broad set of trade stakeholders. The project, however, is reported to have encountered severe challenges, partly due to the restructuring of the in-country counterpart, SLIEPA, and partly due to the non-resident nature of partners. The initiatives include those supported by the IFC, the World Bank, the European Commission, GIZ, the United States Agency for International Development, DFID, and other UN agencies such as UNIDO, FAO, IFAD and others. Funding was released to UNDP Country Office in 2008 but none of the funds were spent. After doing virtually nothing for the first year and half, the project finally managed to deliver some outputs in the final two months, including establishment of a Trade Information Centre at SLIEBA and providing training to a broad range of trade stakeholders. The project also aimed to set up a national trade information network and formulate national priorities for Economic Partnership Agreement and World Trade Organization negotiations, objectives that were only achieved to a very limited extent, if at all.

The tourism project, on the other hand, appears to have been relatively efficient and produced outputs in line with the workplan and targets. The tourism project (57978), at the National Tourist Board, delivered a seven-year strategy

for revitalizing tourism, a marketing plan and high-quality marketing materials, a tour guide training programme with 60 guides certified by the Minister of Tourism and Cultural Affairs, a hospitality staff training programme with 120 front office workers from hotels and restaurants across the country trained and certified.

In terms of **sustainability**, UNDP has provided assistance to create capacity within the Government's coordination unit, the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO)—first located in the Vice-President's Office and now within the Ministry of Finance—paying the Director's post as well as that of three national UN volunteers. UNDP support to DACO has enabled it to effectively chair the PRSP preparation process and to monitor its implementation. Over time, the Government has substituted UNDP resources in the funding of posts.

In an effort to strengthen strategic planning for transition and for development, UNDP has also engaged in strengthening capacity in the Office of the President, developing a strategic planning function in the form of a dedicated unit as well as a public-private partnership unit in the same office. This function is in support of the Government's effort to associate the private sector with service delivery and as a means of expanding and deepening its own revenue base. The overall aid coordination function, originally housed in the Office of the Vice-President, has now been moved to the Ministry of Finance and is administered by a dedicated division within the ministry, a move that should be viewed as positive and one sign of normalization as the capacity of line ministries is strengthened.

The continued growth of both the SPU and the PPP unit in the Office of the President, on the other hand, is being seen as running contrary to this general policy and raises the spectre of recentralization of a lot of decision-making. Indeed, some have indicated that, in an environment of limited institutional capacity, the Office of the President now runs the risk of overly centralizing the management and implementation of national plans. It is noted in this respect, that the signal achievement of the UNDP-supported public administration and civil service reform programme is the ongoing rollout of the performance appraisal system for the Government (covered more extensively in section 4.2 of this chapter) that began with the establishment of performance contracts between the President and each of his Ministers and Vice-Ministers. In practice, it would appear that the monitoring of these contracts will be in the hands of the Office of the President and could further centralize the management of implementation.

The Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) is a follow-up to the Integrated Framework Trust Fund which closed on 31 December 2010. The EIF calls for the establishment of a National Implementation Unit (NIU), placing greater emphasis on national ownership in both formulation and implementation. The NIU has been established in the Ministry of Trade and Industry and is capably facilitating the EIF process. Besides participating in the quarterly NSC meetings, UNDP interacts with the NIU on a regular basis and aims to ensure that proposals move forward to approval and implementation.

An ecotourism project proposal, built on the previous IF tourism project, is understood to be at an advanced stage of preparation. The issue of national ownership has taken centre-stage, as emphasized in the EIF methodology. The Country Office position on this needs to be clearer, in particular with advice, which tends to contradict national ownership. UNDP has also facilitated the preparation of a proposal in support of the Sierra Leone Standards Bureau (SLSB), an agency under the MTI. The proposal sought to strengthen the national quality system and get the country ready for a switch to the metric system, which was due in January 2012. Another proposal developed by the British Standards Institute initially contracted by the European Commission (EC) to assess the SLSB experienced severe delays. No progress was recorded in two other projects, first, for the fisheries sector, where there was a proposal

supposedly being developed by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, and, second, on regional growth centres being developed by MTI and UNIDO. Observations have been made on the relative capacities of the National Tourist Board and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The non-resident agencies adopted a 'touch-and-go approach' and were not able to follow-up in a timely manner on critical issues and decisions, resulting in limited progress being achieved.[270] The status of the proposals could not be verified.

In most other ways, UNDP assistance under this outcome is quite similar to that in other areas. While, as noted above, some positions have been transferred to the national budget, for the most part, UNDP assistance continues to be used for budget support covering operational and recurrent costs that enable and facilitate the functioning of the units concerned. In the absence of external funding, it is likely, therefore, that the units will be forced to scale back activities extensively. Sustainability, therefore, remains a critical constraint to the development of long-term capacity.

National revenue collection has risen in the past three years, increasing the potential for gradual independence from ODA. This increase in the national budget based on revenue mobilization and the enforcement of taxes has resulted in somewhat reduced dependence on ODA on the part of the Government for payment of its wage bill and some other recurrent expenditures. Continued emphasis on operational support noted above has not precluded a gradual transition to reduced dependence on external funding. Most programmes in which salaries of government officials depended on UNDP funds now draw such funding from the national budget, with UNDP restricting operational support to other recurrent costs, However, UNDP assistance continued for salary supplements and incentives in some sectors (e.g. in the case of magistrates and their staff for Saturday and itinerant or mobile courts). This transition, however, has not been problem-free. The ADR team was informed repeatedly that government staff on the national budget had not been paid and that staff salaries are often delayed by several months.

UNDP has generally resisted the temptation of establishing project implementation units, but the sustainability of its programmes is still reduced by the continued emphasis on the payment of operational costs as well as salary supplements and incentives. Almost all UNDP programmes that have emphasized the development of national capacity, have been affected by the turnover of trained national personnel who have tended to circulate into the private sector or get recruited by other donors or well funded NGOs where salaries are more attractive and on the rise. Significant increases in the salaries and pay scales of government officials by as much as 200 percent in some instances, have not managed to significantly boost retention and are unlikely to do so in the absence of a broader, donor community-wide, coordinated approach to the problem.

According to the interviews conducted, efficiency has been affected by numerous delays experienced in procurement and payments. This is due in part to the lack of capacity of counterpart institutions, but also to the overall slowness and complexity of UNDP's procedures that could surely be simplified and streamlined. Problems faced in management and audits have further contributed to caution and maximum stringency in the application of processes, procedures and substantiating documents, all of which have tended to slow the processes down. In general, however, unit costs of international expertise have been lower than that of most bilateral and other multilateral donors. Moreover, the emphasis on national experts and consultants has also increased the cost effectiveness of projects in general.

270 Interview data.

4.6 ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AND PEACEBUILDING

The Government of Sierra Leone strategy to address environmental and disaster management concerns are nested in Pillar 2—Managing Natural Resources, of the country's Agenda for Prosperity (AfP), the third PRSP. The AfP Vision relies heavily on use of Sierra Leone's rich natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, to be the initial driver for rapid growth. Their exploitation, particularly which of minerals and probably petroleum, has the potential to generate significant revenues, but also to distort development in various ways if not properly planned.

The environment faces challenges from ongoing activities, such as land degradation from subsistence agriculture, forest exploitation, and unplanned urban development. Preservation of the rich environment and natural resources is a high AfP priority, to combat challenges in a wide range of sectors.

Important strategy issues that are specific to individual sectors important in sustainable management of the environment are:

Water resource management. Sierra Leone has rich water resources, but water is not available where and when needed. Sound policy is needed to ensure that water resources are used in an integrated manner, addressing human needs, ecosystems, and conservation, and responding sustainably to the needs of society and the economy.

Land management. Strategies include a legal framework for land ownership; developing land-use planning; creating sustainable infrastructure for social improvement and economic growth; training farmers in sustainable land and water practices.

Forests. Redesigned institutional and policy frameworks will coordinate the forestry sector to address competing demands. Sustainable management can meet widely different objectives, of forest conservation, watershed regulation, traditional exploitation, economic development and job creation, eco-tourism, biodiversity and climate change.

UNDP STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME

Outcome: Strengthened national capacities to mainstream environment concerns into national development plans and implementation systems (**environmental management**)

Outcome: Strengthened national capacities, including the participation of women, to prevent, reduce, mitigate and cope with the impact of the systemic shocks from natural hazards (**disaster management**)

UNDP's response to the UN Joint Vision priority of 'environmental cooperation for peacebuilding' has been modest, particularly relative to other outcome areas of the CPD covering the 2008-2012 period and amounted to 3.5 percent of delivery. The strategy adopted by UNDP was to implement a number of projects with financing from the GEF, Montreal Protocol, TRAC, Peacebuilding Fund and other donors. They were designed to achieve the global outcome of strengthened national capacities to mainstream environment concerns into national development plans and cope with natural disasters, with full participation of women. Sustainable environment considerations were a cross-cutting priority under the Sierra Leone UNDAF (2008-2010) and the CPD (2008-2010, extended to 2012) to be addressed by building national capacities for DRR, waste management, deforestation, flood and erosion control and climate change. UNDP collaborated specifically with the GEF, UNEP and UN-Habitat to support action plans; address issues of biodiversity, land management, renewable energy and conservation; and tackle the nexus between housing and poverty.

Key activities can be gleaned from the CPAP Results Framework as follows: Sub-Outcome 3.3: Preventive Development, Disaster Management (Advance human security through strengthening of national capacities at all levels to prevent,

mitigate and recover from disasters) 2008 had specific targets for activities such as preparation of national disaster preparedness plan and knowledge building in the public and educational institutions; Hazard assessments were to be undertaken by districts and Community volunteer groups were to be formed and trained. 2009 saw the validation of the DRR and a capacity-building plan developed to strengthen staff and partners' capacity for effective disaster management and the promotion of processes to integrate DRR in development planning framework with support to MDAs to develop their disaster management plans in 2010 and 2011.

The sub-outcome devoted to environment management (Strengthened national capacities to achieve sustainable development through environmental management, adaptation to climate change and improved waste management at decentralized levels) involved targets on the preparation of national action plans on land degradation and sustainable solid waste management strategy implemented in five local councils. Other activities involved the revision of an environmental health policy and the targeting of 10 communities trained on sustainable land management (SLM) practices. For 2011, activities involved the description of national circumstances included in the second national communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developing and communicating a national inventory of green-house gases (GHGs); mitigation analysis report of five sectors developed and list of green technologies that can facilitate GoSL's drive to combat climate change, and a national plan of action on climate-change adaptation.

Projects undertaken under this programme were designed to:

- Conduct stock taking of the baseline situation on the country (human resource capacity, inventory of emissions of GHGs, level of production and consumption of persistent organic pollutants (POPs), emergency needs assessment, etc.
- Produce plans for future actions (the National Adaptation Programme of Action [NAPA]), the National Action Plan for Sustainable Land Management (NAP), HCFC Terminal Phase-out Management Plan, National Disaster Management Plan).
- Undertake some actions to improve the environment and cope with national disasters (sustainable land management, sustainable waste management, increased access to water and sanitation facilities, reductions in use of POPs and ozone depleting substances).

Project activities involved the strengthening of the capacities of key institutions in the environment and disaster management sectors, principal among which are:

- The Environmental Protection Agency, the main Government agency charged with implementation of environmental management policies
- Government Ministries (Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security; Lands, Country Planning & Environment; Water Resources; Transport & Communications)
- Universities and polytechnics (Njala University, Magburaka Polytechnic, etc)
- Non-governmental organizations (PAS-ACOFAS, Green Scenery)
- Local communities

Government, donors, and partners make the necessary investments. The following section references environment-oriented activities undertaken since 2002 which help trace the evolution of UNDP's support to the environment sector, which is small but geared to setting key foundations in terms of disaster preparedness and environmental management.

ASSESSMENT BY EVALUATION CRITERIA

The portfolio of projects is highly relevant addressing one of the pillars of Sierra Leone's national development strategy—natural resources management. In some areas, projects have been critical in initiating and maintaining important GoSL activities, and in other cases,

they have been catalytic and have laid the foundation for follow-up activities.

The enabling projects that supported the preparation of the first and second national communications to the UNFCCC have been catalytic in enabling Sierra Leone to move forward in preparation and execution of climate change activities. Sierra Leone ratified the UNFCCC in 1995. The UNFCCC requires that parties develop national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and their removal by sinks, as well as appropriate policies and measures to adapt to or mitigate climate change. These should be done while taking into account the common, but differential responsibilities of each party and their overall national development priorities. The capacity to undertake all these tasks did not exist in Sierra Leone, and no action was taken on implementation until the UNDP/GEF enabling projects in 2002 and 2007. Through the projects, national coordinators at the University of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Meteorological Department were empowered and worked with teams of local experts constituted into task forces, and assisted by external consultants, that collected the necessary information and presented them in the required format to the UNFCCC.

Sierra Leone is also a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, thus pledging political and practical commitment in the direction of sustainable development, while creating conditions to benefit from opportunities in this framework. Thus, following the example of LDC Parties to this Convention, Sierra Leone, as part of the preparation of the national communications under the two UNDP/GEF project, has developed and submitted its NAPA and is entitled to benefit from the LDC Fund for the implementation of priority measures identified in its NAPA. Based on the identified mitigation and adaptation measures in the preceding chapters of the national communications, the following strategy was developed for the future implementation of the UNFCCC in Sierra Leone. The following adaptation projects from the NAPA are ongoing or have been recently completed.

- **UNDP-GEF project—**Strengthening climate information and early warning systems in Africa for climate-resilient development and adaptation to climate change.
- **UNDP project** (completed in 2012)—Establishment of National Early Warning System.
- **Ongoing with UNDP—**Capacity-building of the Meteorological Department through training of personnel for the country's adaptation to climate change. Includes IFAD project on development of inland valley swamps for rice production in the Moyamba District.
- **Ongoing with UNDP, IFAD and AfDB—** Rehabilitation and reconstruction of meteorological/climate monitoring stations throughout the country.
- **Ongoing with UNDP and EU Project** Sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns on climate change impacts on women relating to the three conventions of biodiversity, desertification and UNFCCC.
- **Ongoing with UNDP—**Institutional strengthening of the water resources sector in Sierra Leone.

The projects currently being implemented by UNDP are one of the three top priority sectors in the NAPA. The water sector in Sierra Leone is undergoing revisions and sustainable water supply, which remains a major challenge to national development, is one of the major national priorities. Several climate-related challenges place significant constraints to sustainable water supply, both to Freetown as well as rural districts. The most significant is that during prolonged dry spells, provision of drinking water is problematic. Although sufficient water is available in the rainy season, during the dry season water shortage is pertinent. Other climate-related risks include: (i) water sources are tapped unsustainably, and water is mined beyond long-term capacities, and (ii) water infrastructure developments are planned without taking climate resilience into account.

The ozone-depleting substances (ODS) projects were also very relevant to achievement of Sierra

Leone's national obligations under the Montreal Protocol, i.e. the reduction and eventual phasing-out of the consumption of ODS. Under the projects Sierra Leone developed and is implementing a national HCFC Phase-out Management Plan (HPMP) under which it is projected to meet the Montreal Protocol's HCFC control targets, up to and including a 35 percent reduction by 2020, and phase out the remaining HCFC consumption by replacing and retrofitting equipment to natural refrigerants by 2030.

The POPs projects are also very relevant in enabling the country to meet its obligations under the Stockholm Convention. Under the projects, the Government has developed and is implementing a national implementation plan (NIP) to reduce or eliminate the Chemicals in Annexes A and B of the Stockholm Convention. Priority activities cover strengthening the legal and institutional framework for management of POPs and other agricultural and industrial chemicals, facility development for the disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls, establishment of coordinating mechanisms for the management of unintentionally produced POPs, establishment of better environmental practices to manage POPs pesticides, and creation of public information, awareness-raising and education tools and mechanisms for POPs.

The Sustainable Land Management project fits well within local needs due to fact that it addresses one of most pressing constraints in agriculture—the principal livelihood means for rural people—namely soil fertility and land degradation issues. It is part of the sustainable natural resources programme, which, as indicated earlier, is part of the priority areas in the Agenda for Prosperity covering land management. However, there has been meagre investment and the topic does not appear to be of high priority in the actual development agenda for agriculture. For example, annual public agricultural expenditure (of which expenditure on sustainable land management is a small proportion), as a percentage of total public expenditure has ranged between 1.5 percent and 2 percent since 1990, and was estimated at 1.7 percent in 2010 (ReSAKSS, based on national sources, IFPRI, IMF 2012, AUS 2008).[271]

Solid waste management has become a major public health and environmental concern in urban areas in the country, which contributes to the spread of water-borne diseases and malaria. According to the 2004 Local Government Act, local councils are mandated to implement: a) education and sensitization activities on health and environment issues, and b) provision of adequate drainage, sewage and solid waste disposal facilities. Local councils face considerable challenges to deliver services of solid waste management, mainly due to 1) weak revenue collection capacity of councils; 2) limited capacity to plan, deliver and monitor services; 3) insufficient public awareness on waste management matters and lack of a broad strategy; and 4) no functioning community-wide collection of garbage and no sustainable, cost-effective modality to store, transport, separate, treat, process, recycle and dispose of solid waste. By helping two of the major urban councils (Bo and Makeni) set up pilot waste management systems, the UNDP projects intervened in a priority area for local council development in Sierra Leone, so were highly relevant in addressing priority development issues in the country. UNDP continues to support the City Council in Makeni, building on lessons learned from previous results.

In terms of effectiveness, the enabling projects generally achieved their targets by producing plans for future activities and project designs, and the ODS and POPs projects achieved their objectives. However, the medium-sized projects only partially met their objectives, as planned outputs were mostly only partially achieved. Gender dimensions were generally not explicitly integrated in project design and therefore were not sufficiently addressed or monitored.

271 <www.resakss.org/region/sierra-leone/caadp-targets>.

There has been virtually no replication or scaling up. Consequently, the portfolio of projects is assessed as only partially effective in achieving the overall outcome objective, as detailed below.

The enabling projects to produce the first and second national communications to the UNFCCC successfully produced the NAPA and the National Appropriate Mitigation Action plans on time.

The basic objective of the ODS project was to help Sierra Leone to meet its Montreal Protocol obligations such as the phased reductions in ODS consumption as per agreed schedules. Legislation was enacted to ban use of HCFCs, awareness was raised on the damaging effect of HCFCs on the ozone layer, significant capacity-building took place (customs officers, retrofitting technicians, technical institutes, etc.) and the project achieved its targets with the country now zero CFCs.

The basic objective of the POPs project was to produce an inventory of the production and consumption of POPs in Sierra Leone and to prepare a NIP for the Stockholm Convention on POPs. The project achieved its targets. The process covered (a) establishment of a coordinating mechanism and process organization; (b) conduct of a POPs inventory and assessment of national infrastructure capacity; (c) priority assessment and objective setting; (d) formulation of the NIP; and (e) endorsement by the Government and submission to the Convention. The development of the NIP involved national technical experts drawn from government ministries and agencies, academic and research institutions, NGOs and CBOs. International experts from UNIDO and UNITAR carried out the training of experts in both compiling POPs inventories and developing action plans.

The Sustainable Land Management project did not meet most of its targets. The project was to build capacity for SLM in Sierra Leone by the removal of the key barriers and to mainstream SLM into laws, university and school curricula, and the national budget. The project was also to create sustainable capacity and ownership in Sierra Leone to mitigate land degradation and thereby meet the country's obligations under the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. The project prepared a draft national action plan, but it was not submitted for approval by Parliament as envisaged. However, work is continuing with UNEP support because UNCCD requires all draft NAPs to be aligned with its new 10-year plan. Mainstreaming of SLM principles did not take place as envisaged—a study identified gaps but did not get to drafting of required legislation as required. The SLM project was also to set up an integrated financing system for SLM activities by integrating into national budget process, but that was not achieved. TerreAfrique was engaged to do initial stock-taking and it provided some training to stakeholders in preparation of a Medium Term Investment Plan, but the project was unable to move forward as there was inadequate time for local staff to master the techniques.

The RSLMF Water and Sanitation project contributed to the objective of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, project targets were not met—rehabilitation of the water and sanitation systems in the main barracks was not completed due to unforeseen road construction that had not previously been communicated by the Government.

The pilot solid waste management programme run by the city councils of Bo and Makeni achieved most of its targets and has shown that it is possible to run a solid waste service at relatively low cost. The capital costs are under $3 per person and operational costs of under Leone 50,000 per resident per year (including capital depreciation). The programme was supported through a partnership between the two city councils, One World Link (under the Commonwealth Good Practices Scheme) and UNDP. One World Link supplied experts on solid waste management by local councils who were able to provide extensive technical support to the project. UNDP provided funding (TRAC) and overall project supervision and management. An Integrated Waste Management Plan for Makeni (IWMP) has been drafted that provides for monitoring and

evaluation, regular review of policies, plans and programmes to ensure timely delivery of services to citizens. It further provides for sectoral and cross-sectoral policy analysis in order to achieve compatibility among sectors and interest groups and exploit synergies among them. The policy document seeks to provide the framework for making fundamental changes that are needed to bring integrated waste management and environmental considerations into the mainstream of decision-making in Sierra Leone.

The activities to strengthen the capacity of the Meteorology Office were to make significant contributions to achievement of the outcome. However, targets were only partly met: while the digitization of climate data using Climosoft database system was completed, capacity development of the office in data collection and analysis was only partial; the envisaged land tenure policy that is supportive of sustainable natural resource management is certainly not operational. The process to reform the land tenure policy stalled several times since 2009, allegedly due to capacity challenges in the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment, which the project was unable to mitigate. However, efforts are continuing to finalize the process to reform the national land policy and start implementation of its five-year rollout plan.

The disaster management projects have allowed the Office of National Security (ONS) to get closer to local communities, so have made positive contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, most of the other targets were not met—the National Disaster Management Strategy was not completed as programmed although a draft was developed which is being presently finalized—an action plan and strategy for policy implementation are also presently being developed, and are expected to be tabled to Government by mid-2014. Although some sensitization on disaster risk reduction and response mechanisms has occurred, it cannot be said to be nationwide as envisaged; and support to MDAs to develop their disaster management plans has been much less than planned target.

On a scale of 1-10, the **efficiency** of UNDP can be ranked as 7, because, although partners regard administrative procedures as user friendly and monitoring and evaluation is adequate, the proportion of approved budgets utilized and timeliness in disbursement of funds remain issues.

All stakeholders reported that UNDP administrative procedures were manageable and they were mastered by national implementing agencies. UNDP provided the necessary financial controls and oversight to ensure effective project implementation. Where national agencies had difficulties UNDP managers were reported to be helpful and had a listening ear.

M&E activities by UNDP were welcome, although direct UNDP management of project is reported to be causing delays in fund release and therefore in project execution.

The overall percentage of approved budgets that was expended by the projects between 2004 and 2012 was 58 percent (This ranged from a low of 17 percent for the disaster management project to a high of 97 percent for the Terminal Phase-out of HCFC project. Delays in project execution due to delays in release of funds were cited by many. In a number of cases, there were delays in funding due to problems with the Atlas system.

The picture with regard to the **sustainability** of UNDP achievements in this outcome area is mixed. The enabling projects that have laid the ground for follow-up activities can be regarded as sustainable in the sense that the planned activities are being implemented or have good prospects to be implemented. The general evidence is that capacity created by the mid- or full-size projects in environment and disaster management during the review period is not sustainable after UNDP assistance. Projects implemented have been of too short a duration, with ineffective or non-existent exit strategies, and there is little evidence of the scaling up of pilot projects.

Because of the stand-alone nature of the national communications to the UNFCCC projects that produced the NAPA, and indications that projects identified are being developed and implemented, it can be said that capacity created by one set of climate change projects are sustainable after UNDP assistance.

There is evidence that capacity created in the ODS projects is sustainable after UNDP assistance. Equipment supplied to technical institutes and private-sector retrofitting centres are still in use, with indications that they will be replaced when necessary because of the relatively low cost; legislation banning imports of HFCC are being enforced by trained officials (customs, fire force); and technical institutes are using curricula developed under the project after its end.

UNDP involvement in water projects have been enabling activities - project design. The resulting project: Building Adaptive Capacity to Catalyse Active Public and Private Sector Participation to manage the Exposure and Sensitivity of Water Supply Services to Climate Change, has been funded by GEF and AfDB, so activities can be regarded as likely to be sustainable.

The main thrust of the capacity-building programme of the SLM project was to develop three pilot SLM sites (the CPAP target called for 10) where members of local communities were to be trained and capacitated. The sites were established and training took place on alternative livelihood activities, fire control, site management by local NGOs but all the gains are being eroded at project end with all activities ceased. It is clear that activities are not being sustained after project end in 2012. The communities hoping for a new replacement project for which there are hardly any prospects. There has been no replication of the activities or scaling up. In terms of sustainability therefore, the SLM project design was seriously flawed—its duration was too short for a Natural Resources Management project, and there was no exit strategy.

For solid waste management, there are indications that capacity created is not sustainable after UNDP assistance, despite the low cost of the pilot schemes. Equipment supplied under the two pilot local council programmes have virtually all broken down and the councils have not been able to keep the programme going with their own or substitute funding. Calculations produced with UNDP assistance claim that the waste management service can be financially sustained through the city council's own revenue. These figures show that it is possible for a city council to financially sustain the waste management service and even pay for the costs of replacement of the capital equipment. Yet the councils are seeking new externally funded projects to resuscitate the gains made under the UNDP pilot project. Therefore, ongoing efforts by UNDP may result in replacement projects. But these are not likely to result in sustainable solid waste management, as they may not provide solutions to the fundamental challenges detailed earlier.

Although there are some indications of sustainability after UNDP support to the Meteorology Office (e.g. additional weather stations provided under IFAD project) the general indications are that capacity created is not sustainable after UNDP assistance—weather stations set up cannot operate properly because of lack of funds to assure wireless connection to the base station; digitization of climate data was only 60 percent complete, and no funds are available to complete the activity after the end of the UNDP project.

The capacity created in the disaster management projects is not sustainable after UNDP assistance. The small-scale support to disaster management in ONS, while critical to its past effectiveness is not sustainable. There has been no scaling up or exit strategy. Disaster management interventions can only become sustainable if they enable the achievement of autonomous status for the DM Office, like the EPA, and lead to independent funding. UNDP should have worked towards this as an exit strategy for any future project.

Chapter 5

UNDP'S STRATEGIC POSITIONING

This chapter presents a brief analysis of the programme in Sierra Leone in terms of its strategic position, relevance and also responsiveness to the promotion of key UN values, namely gender mainstreaming, use of networks and South-South cooperation.

5.1 RELEVANCE AND PROMOTION OF UN VALUES

Strategic position is about achieving the most impact on human development goals and priorities of the country with the limited organizational capacity and resources of UNDP. It is, therefore, important to identify niches so that interlinkages and synergies are maximized. Judged from this perspective, it is clear that in Sierra Leone, UNDP has positioned itself optimally, with its operations closely integrated with key priorities of UNIPSIL (elections, media support, parliament and security sector reform) while also delivering on its traditional technical and capacity-building expertise in areas such as youth employment, decentralization, promotion of involvement of CSOs and gender-equality and empowerment. UNDP's heavy involvement in undertaking a facilitative role as fiduciary delivery mechanism for the use of basket funds for development assistance has also demonstrated UNDP's capacity to be a risk-taker and partner that is flexible and adaptable to changing needs. The willingness to also be a 'trailblazer' of sorts in areas such as youth employment has demonstrated UNDP's long-standing commitment to and track record of taking risks in responding to key needs of national importance. This has also been responsible for its willingness to take on operational cost provision, and service provision, which was appropriate in a context of immediate support after a devastating civil war but needs to be transitioned from after more than a decade of progress.

The UNDP programme clearly promotes UN values in its programming with visible component of support to addressing gender mainstreaming in its access to justice, support to parliament, and youth employment programming. Women are not represented in decision-making positions that affect the administration, operations and management of any of the democratic institutions under this review (Parliament, SLBC, the IMC) with the exception of PACO being headed by a woman.[272] Some progress has been made, including encouraging media coverage for female candidates resulting in increased visibility during the November 2012 elections. Within the media sector, to enhance visibility of female candidates, journalists were trained and provided professional coverage of the political activities of female candidates in the 2012 general elections. Female journalists have also established the organization Women in the Media-Sierra Leone.

Within parliamentary support, UNDP has provided SLEFPAC support in cooperation with UN Women and the GoSL to train female parliamentarians and support South-South exchanges. Evidence shows that UNDP support to the Parliament and other democratic institutions has attempted to promote gender-sensitive legislation, but the new Parliament has not passed the gender bill. UN support to the gender bill[273] has proven

272 UNDP, ROAR 2012.

273 Support is evidenced in the Evaluation of UNDP Support to the 2011-2014 Elections Cycle (2013), in which UNDP funded women's advocacy groups.

divisive regarding most notably the legislation's suggested quota of female representatives, and may represent an unintended backlash against female empowerment.[274] Moving forward, the constitutional review process will equally present an opportunity to address discriminatory clauses against women.[275] Gender marker data from UNDP attributes a rating of 1 (i.e., outputs expected to contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly) to three projects under the outcome area in 2012.[276]

The Women's Political Empowerment project involved a two-day training session in Freetown (21-22 August 2012) with UNDP support for women candidates aspiring to leadership positions in the 17 November 2012 general elections. A total of 70 candidates from various registered political parties attended the training that provided aspiring female candidates with knowledge on how to: deal with challenges that emerge during political campaigns; improve campaign skills; enhance public speaking abilities; relate with men; effectively mobilize women voters; and sharpen lobbying skills. The programme also encouraged the forging of bonds between women politicians transcending party loyalties. This has since translated into the establishment of a women's caucus in the Sierra Leonean Parliament that has strong bonds beyond party affiliations and which have served as a powerful force for decision-making.

The training was divided along the following three themes: the need for women's political participation; the role of Parliament and important steps to take before running for political office; and campaign planning and strategy. Critical issues came out in each subsession; the need for women's political participation and leadership skills and principles; and the 30 percent quota dominated most of the discussions, as did expressions of disappointment that the bill could not be enacted before the elections as initially intended. In the final analysis, there were major concerns over the process on the part of both political parties. According to one participant: "The APC has created an 'Electoral College' and the SLPP call theirs 'the Consensus Committee'; all these committees are made up of men. APPWA is not saying anything. They have left us at the mercy of the men". On campaign planning and strategy, the issue of fund limitations as a critical barrier to political aspirations and on women's ability to run successful campaigns was flagged as a central issue and a constraint to the success of women candidates. The widespread practice of buying votes was also cited as a further problem that has both prevented many women candidates from entering campaigns and has driven others to take out loans to distribute funds to their constituencies. The training encouraged participants to know the issues affecting their communities, master their messages, and not be pressured to take loans or buy votes.

5.2 UNDP USE OF NETWORKS AND SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

UNDP has exploited its comparative advantage in governance issues by taking the lead role in the Parliament, APRM and media projects oriented to improve democratic institutions. UNDP cooperation with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Sierra Leone at the country level, and its knowledge products such as the Global Parliamentary Report, demonstrate its strong comparative position to bring its global knowledge and partners on parliamentary issues to the country level.[277] Despite the proliferation of development actors supporting Parliament notably at the time of the mapping in 2010, UNDP demonstrated

274 Group interview.

275 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 'Report of the Visit of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone', February 2013.

276 GEN1 rating given to the APRM, Parliament, and SLBC projects. UNDP Gender Marker, Atlas, 2013.

277 UNDP and Inter-Parliamentary Union, 'Global Parliamentary Report: The changing nature of parliamentary representation,' April 2012.

a long-term embedded technical engagement in the sector rather than one-off projects as with most other donors.[278]

Strategic coordination and alignment within the UN system was strong and facilitated multi-donor funding to the sector. There was a common 'division of labour' where UNDP exploited its strength as a fiduciary agent in managing DaO and PBF funds through the SL-MDTF (i.e., to the SLBC, IMC, and Parliament) and UNIPSIL played a technical advisory role. UNDP management of SL-MDTF distributed funds for UN partners, consisting of approximately $31 million, aimed at an enhanced state of coherence and efficiency for UN programmes and projects out of which about $2 million was allocated to democratic institutions for the SLBC and IMC projects.[279] Reporting and monitoring through the SL-MDTF closure in 2012 was readily accessible and results-oriented.

UNDP worked closely with UNECA and AfDB in supporting the APRM process, including the 2010 Country Support Mission, as well as $30,000 in support from the UNDP Regional Office in supplementary funds for supporting the nationwide validation workshop exercise, and an additional $60,000 in 2011 to support the country review mission that took place in June 2011.[280]

The country context presented challenges for UNDP in coordinating with UNCT partners. UNDP experienced delays in the delivery of procurement in certain instances, particularly with the first and second tranches of PBF funds, which were partially attributable to lengthy national systems. The SLBC project provides an example of challenges in coordination due to a highly politicized context. UN partners differed on strategies during the transition process from SLBS to SLBC, with UNDP advising a shutdown of the former broadcaster altogether before transitioning, and UNIPSIL preferring to continue operations due to the project's political sensitivity.[281] Interviews indicate that stakeholders attribute responsibility for the SLBC's mismanaged transition to UNIPSIL, not UNDP, suggesting that the UN partnership was not the central disruptive issue despite its problems.

Through a combination of initiatives such as bringing in diaspora experts to provide surge capacity, sharing of knowledge and experiences in advancing key reforms, and targeted study tours, South-South cooperation became an important part of UNDP's support to Parliament and public sector reform in Sierra Leone.

These activities are funded largely under the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) trust fund. Successful examples include the sharing of experience on managing the extractive sector with South Africa; on PPPs with Nigeria; on centre-of-government coordination with Rwanda; on managing cabinet business processes with Ghana; and on performance management with Kenya. On the last, the exchange with Kenya has contributed to a better understanding of how MDAs plan, monitor and report on their results, showing how MDA and individual staff work plans are aligned, and thus laying the foundation for a holistic and integrated results-based management system in the civil service. Other benefits include an emerging twinning arrangement between the Sierra Leone Civil Service Training College and the Kenya School of Government as well as enhanced bilateral cooperation between Kenya and Sierra Leone through a joint commission of cooperation.

By facilitating pubic-private partnership between local councils and private sector operators, UNDP/UNCDF sought to ensure the efficient management of LED investments in order to

278 Interview.

279 <mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/SL100>

280 UNDP, 'Annual Progress Report, Support to African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)', 2011.

281 Interview.

raise revenue for local councils. While it is premature to declare any success in this endeavour, this is an interesting pilot which, if managed transparently and with accountability and if it generates a sufficient profit, could prove to be a model for local councils across the country that would deserve scaling up. The fiscal cadastre is also intended to establish an effective tax planning and collection mechanism along with transparency and accountability in the tax collection and revenue management system at the subnational level.

There were several cases of South-South cooperation between African national governments. Parliamentarians, including female representatives, conducted a site visit on an APRM mission to Ghana to participate in meetings and benefitted from headquarters support to participate in the Parliament and crisis prevention and recovery programme.[282] A Ghanaian delegation also conducted a visit to participate in a training with parliamentary clerks, which was deemed proportionally the most useful capacity-building activity out of respondents to the committee clerk survey A Sierra Leone delegation attended APRM Forum meetings in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with support from UNDP and contributed to knowledge sharing on leadership and organizational management.[283] There was no documented use of the UN's network to facilitate such exchanges for media-related projects.

282 UNDP, 'Parliamentary Development to Prevent and Recover from Crisis', UNDP Update, April 2011.

283 Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Minister of Political and Public Affairs and the Chairman of the APRM National Governing Council. See ROAR 2012.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The broader, programme-level conclusions and recommendations presented here are based on the detailed outcome level analysis and assessment contained in the previous chapters. These conclusions and recommendations have been framed to take into consideration the fact that as of March 2014, Sierra Leone enters a new post peacekeeping/building phase and UNDP Sierra Leone has an opportunity to strengthen its strategic position and enhance the coherence and quality of its new programme.

6.1 CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1. Over the past decade, UNDP has been a dependable and responsive partner supporting Sierra Leone in crucial sectors as it recovered from the aftermath of a prolonged and brutal civil war. The programme has evolved to keep pace with Sierra Leone's development needs and progress.

UNDP's support has centred on eight central priorities, namely elections, Parliament, security sector reform, rule of law, access to justice, youth employment, public service reform, decentralization. One measure of improvement is that the country has graduated beyond the threshold set for Fragile and Conflict Affected States[284]. Progress has also been made in terms of the Human Development Index: in 2011 Sierra Leone ranked 180 out of 187 and in 2012 it moved up to 177.

Conclusion 2. UNDP has had a high profile and played a central role in the transition from post-conflict to development phase. It has been a key player in supporting the Government and UNIPSIL in nurturing a strong, coordinated UN system response to national needs.

This role is particularly noted in the context of the formulation and implementation of the Agenda for Change (PRSP II), the Joint Vision and the Agenda for Prosperity (PRSP III). UNDP's contribution to these policy-level instruments has been uniformly acknowledged as being of high quality by all national and external stakeholders consulted by the ADR mission.

The integrated nature of the UN presence in Sierra Leone has greatly influenced the role that UNDP has played in coordination, in its performance as a basket-fund manager as well as in its ability to mobilize resources. The fact that the ERSG is simultaneously the Resident Coordinator of the UN and the Resident Representative of UNDP has also given UNDP additional prominence in key working groups involved in the preparation of the PRSPs. Out of the 21 Joint Vision programme areas, UNDP acted as the lead agency in eight areas and was a participating agency in an additional six areas. UNDP's role within the integrated mission has also given it greater authority in its policy dialogue with the Government, resulting largely from the importance accorded to relevant Security Council resolutions pertaining to Sierra Leone.

UNDP has played a facilitative role as a fiduciary delivery mechanism for development assistance in sensitive areas on behalf of the principal donors in a range of sectors that are of central

284 "Another sign of the country's recovery is the steady improvement in the CPIA scores—in 2011 with a score of 3.3, Sierra Leone has moved beyond the threshold of Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCS)" World Bank, 2012.

importance to the transition. While there was a brief period when UNDP's management of key basket funds was questioned and raised concern, UNDP's track record since then appears to have won the confidence of both the national and international partners.

UNDP has taken the lead in the management of the second largest country recipient of PBF support as well as multi-donor trust funds for the Joint Vision's implementation. UNDP has assumed leadership in administering multi-donor-funded projects in the areas of democratic institutions, finance for development, public sector reform, justice, and youth employment. This experience should be used to position itself in a new role as the departure of UNIPSIL ushers in a new era of development engagement in Sierra Leone.

Conclusion 3. Along with crucial support to the conduct of the 2012 elections, the success of which was uniformly recognized as a key milestone, UNDP has made a seminal contribution through the creation of a number of new institutions, support for human rights law and strengthening the institutional architecture for improved decentralization.

UNDP support to deepening democratic institutions, notably the National Election Commission, has been judiciously paced, technically targeted and promotes the progressive phasing out of external support. Other areas of achievement have been the setting up of the Human Rights Commission, the Independent Ombudsman, Anti-Corruption Commission and the National Youth Commission. UNDP has also contributed to the preparation of key laws such as the 2012 Gender Equality Act. It also supported the passage of the Sexual Offences Act, which was part of its multifaceted engagement to ensure SGBV and human rights issues are accorded priority and funding.

UNDP has also supported, at the subnational level, the creation and in some cases strengthening of district and municipal councils as well as youth councils each of which have some degree of overlap in jurisdiction at times, membership, among themselves and between themselves and the chiefdom councils. This overlap has resulted in friction over the allocation of land, resources and the imposition of taxes and penalties that should be addressed as a matter of priority.

In its elections, youth employment and SGBV programming, UNDP sought innovative engagement with civil society actors and non-governmental organizations. However, this important programming modality was pursued at the individual project level and was worthy of more strategic attention. This should be addressed during the next country programme.

Conclusion 4. UNDP implementation of CPD priorities has been driven by availability of donor funds. This has led UNDP to implement programmes ranging from disaster mitigation, environmental protection and sustainable development to HIV prevention and awareness-raising. This range of engagement subject to fund availability has inevitably led to the programme spreading its capacity and resources into areas that were not central to the transition. The 2013-2014 CPAP prioritized and narrowed UNDP's programmatic focus and this effort augurs well for the next CPD.

With an annual delivery rate averaging 85 percent, UNDP has demonstrated a willingness to take controlled risks in key areas (elections, youth employment, Parliament, President's Office) that has been greatly appreciated by donors and national counterparts alike and has built a level of trust with UNDP. It has also created a channel for donor funds into areas where bilateral agencies believe they either do not have access or do not have sufficient capacity on the ground to administer resources with confidence; UNDP's initial entry paved the way for other donors and this role of UNDP has been greatly appreciated by Government and donors alike (e.g. public administration and civil service reform, local governance, fiscal decentralization and youth employment).

Conclusion 5. UNDP is recognized for having provided operational support (salaries and

incentives, supplies, printing, as well as basic physical rehabilitation of facilities for institutions) crucial during early post-conflict recovery. However, there has not been a marked evolution towards higher level technical assistance. UNDP must be alert to the risks that could make it difficult to move beyond operational assistance since continuation of such assistance could diminish UNDP's substantive role. Dominance of operational support in UNDP's programmes has led to some stakeholders' opinion that UNDP has lacked in substantive guidance, discussion and policy content. Therefore, in the context of the next country programme, UNDP will need to acquire additional capacity to engage in sustained policy dialogue with the Government in priority areas.

UNDP has avoided setting up Project Implementation Units and most UNDP programmes have witnessed a transition from dependence on funds channelled through UNDP to pay for the salaries of government officials, to the payment of government salaries from the national budget. However, in some instances UNDP assistance has continued to be used for salary supplements and incentives in some sectors (e.g. in the case of magistrates and their staff for Saturday and itinerant or mobile courts). This transition, however, has not been problem-free. The ADR team was informed repeatedly that government staff on the national budget had not been paid and that staff salaries are often delayed by several months. Given that this is a critical period of reform in areas of the civil service, UNDP would also be wise to keep a close watch to ensure the exit strategies are in place with the phase-out of supplements since this compromises both national ownership and programme sustainability.

Conclusion 6. The lack of good design and regular monitoring was an area of weakness affecting programme quality during the period under review. There appeared to be erratic attention paid to careful programme and project design involving needs analysis, and capacity assessment which would have ensured more relevant, targeted inputs in terms of capacity-building (e.g. elections support and the diaspora project). Monitoring also appeared to be spotty (except for high-profile programmes such as elections).

More engaged monitoring and evaluation would have helped ensure better project documentation and data, and provide impartial, evidence-based information for use by the outcome boards monitoring progress in the delivery of country programme. Such programmatic oversight would have been particularly useful in areas such as tracking actual employment trends in youth employment and learning from the varying experience of implementing partners that are using different interest rates in their lending. The lack of project/programme oversight and project assurance controls was also flagged as requiring high priority attention by the UNDP Audit of 2013.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. In the context of the transition taking place within Sierra Leone with the departure of UNIPSIL, and given its track record and demonstrated results particularly in the area of governance, UNDP should take on a lead role in the governance, constitutional reform and security sector reform areas as an integral part of the One UN team.

Careful attention should be paid to ensuring that high-calibre capacity is made available to the Country Office to ensure it is able discharge these responsibilities.

Recommendation 2. UNDP should also prioritize carefully and not spread itself too thinly. It should pay particular attention to transitioning from a programme that has provided operational support appropriate to addressing post-conflict needs, to one which focuses on the transfer and exchange of expertise and technology. This shift will strengthen the substance of UNDP's contribution in support of Sierra Leone's development challenges.

The UNDP Country Office should take an inventory of current projects and programmes within

the next 12 months, review progress and ensure that exit strategies over the forthcoming 3-5 year period are well planned for and implemented.

UNDP's programme needs new emphasis on institutional sustainability. While operational support was vital in a post-conflict reconstruction context, the dependence it created is debilitating and should be phased out. Programming should focus on the transfer and exchange of expertise and technology while ensuring capacity-building and national ownership. In this connection it would be appropriate for UNDP to take a lead role in coordinating donor policies with respect to salary supplements and other incentives with the ultimate objective of raising the sustainability of the capacity created in key institutions and reducing dependence on ODA.

UNDP should also assess the various South-South interventions that were undertaken during the review period with the goal of documenting instructive practices and developing new areas of intervention for the upcoming country programme.

Recommendation 3. The Resident Representative and the Country Director should take on higher profile advisory roles that were previously filled by the ERSG. The Country Office should have access to a team of senior advisers for this purpose.

In this connection, it is recommended that, using programme funds, the UNDP Country Office constitute a team of seven senior advisers working in close proximity to the Country Director to undertake essential analysis, liaise with relevant officials in the ministries, judiciary and Parliament and provide policy advice to the Country Director and Resident Representative as necessary. These advisers would be expected to prepare concept notes, policy papers and advise on programme strategy on a regular basis and support UNDP's interventions in key policy forums. It is suggested that these advisers include the following: i) governance strategist (with a strong background in government finance, decentralization, democratization, human rights or other area of relevance); ii) security sector reform specialist; iii) employment generation and poverty alleviation specialist; iv) senior economist/MDG adviser; v) an adviser on gender issues and vi) an adviser on conflict issues. Provision should also be made for a resident evaluation adviser at least for the first two years of the new country programme, who could then return at key points during the mid-term and final reviews of the country programme implementation to ensure that the monitoring and evaluation activities are producing high quality evidence of results.

Recommendation 4. UNDP needs to urgently undertake an internal strategic analysis and review of the current situation in Sierra Leone with a view to determining the key areas that are most likely to present threats to stability in the medium term and help devise preventive development interventions that can be funded and approved during the course of 2014-2015.

For the new CPD programme, the ADR recommends that UNDP Sierra Leone build on the strategies of streamlining and focus that was initiated with the 2012-2013 CPD. In this regard, UNDP should carefully assess where it is best positioned to provide support in alignment with the directions contained in the new Strategic Plan of the organization. Governance and access to justice as well as poverty reduction activities that target youth employment in a more comprehensive manner, appear to hold promise. The environment portfolio, a key area of growing importance, was somewhat overshadowed by the more pressing priorities such as the conduct of elections, during the country programme for 2008-2014. Should UNDP decide to engage more comprehensively in this sector, it will need to ensure a longer-term commitment and deeper partnerships to ensure meaningful results.

Recommendation 5. In the access to justice sector, it is strongly recommended that UNDP supplement its current heavy emphasis on the prosecution of SGBV to improve access to justice more generally, thereby ensuring due pro-

cess with sufficient and trained representation for both plaintiffs and defendants and increasing the pool of trained members of the judiciary.

It is also recommended that UNDP support any proposals to: i) compile and analyse existing laws and cases in order to ensure at least one full set of laws and cases is available to the judiciary; and ii) any proposals to review and codify traditional law practices throughout the country.

Recommendation 6. In the critical area of youth employment, UNDP should collaborate closely with the ILO and other partners, and work on bringing together potential employers (particularly large multinationals with investments in Sierra Leone), the World Bank and African Development Bank as well as key ministries and commissions to develop a more systematic and coherent strategy for the creation of jobs in the country while ensuring safety and standards.

This should be accompanied by a systematic analysis of current practices and approaches to training, economic policies and involvement of the private sector with a view to propagating best practices that have been tried and tested in the country and regionally.

Recommendation 7. In order to consolidate peace and stability, UNDP should encourage the Government to further strengthen local governance and consider extending the pilot activities throughout the country.

In considering replication of the work on local governance and service delivery during the review period, particular attention should be paid to current issues pertaining to the overlap of mandates and roles of different bodies at the local level reviewed and ironed out as an integral part of the constitutional review process.

Recommendation 8. For future programming, UNDP should articulate and implement a clear internal Country Office policy that spells out measures to improve programme design, monitoring and evaluation.

This policy should emphasize needs assessments, formulation of theories of change, assess capacity gaps and clearly articulate counterpart commitments. Project appraisal committees should be revived which should inter alia ensure that programme and project designs, results and implementation arrangements are clearly articulated, and that good monitoring and evaluation systems are established and adequately funded. High-level attention from senior management—throughout the next CPD—will be vital. There may be a need to strengthen the Business Development and Oversight Unit of the Country Office for this purpose. Along with appointing a resident evaluation adviser as part of the Country Office team (see Recommendation 3), the Country Office should actively draw on resources available from all regional service centres, globally, for short-term project design, appraisal, monitoring and evaluation support.

Annex 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts country evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP's contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of UNDP's strategy in facilitating and leveraging national effort for achieving development results. The purpose of an ADR is to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board.
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country.
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level.
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

ADRs are independent evaluations carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.[285] The IEO is independent of UNDP management, headed by a Director who reports to the UNDP Executive Board through the UNDP Administrator. The responsibility of the IEO is two-fold: (a) provide the Executive Board with valid and credible information from evaluations for corporate accountability, decision-making and improvement; and (b) enhance the independence, credibility and utility of the evaluation function, and its coherence, harmonization and alignment in support of United Nations reform and national ownership. Based on the principle of national ownership, the IEO seeks to conduct ADRs in collaboration with the national Government.

This is the first ADR of UNDP's contribution to Sierra Leone and will be conducted in close collaboration with the Government of Sierra Leone through the Development Aid Coordination Office (DACO) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). It will assess UNDP programme results during the 2008-2012 period with a view to contributing to the preparation of the new UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD), which is to begin in 2015, as well as the forthcoming United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) scheduled to start in the same year.

2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

Sierra Leone gained independence in April 1961. The country's civil war from 1991 to 2002 created a serious setback to human development and virtually crippled the economy with persistent negative growth through 2001. Since, the economy has averaged a 7.9 percent GDP growth rate. The strong post-conflict economic performance has been heavily dependent on aid, with about 50 percent of public investment programmes financed by external resources.[286] An extractives industry boom could bring significant economic windfall with increased iron-ore

285 See UNDP Evaluation Policy: <www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf>. The ADR will also be conducted in adherence to the Norms and the Standards and the ethical Code of Conduct established by the United Nations Evaluation Group <www.uneval.org>.

286 UNDP, Sierra Leone Country Programme Document, 2013-2014.

exports as well as recent oil and gas discoveries. Mineral depletion is projected to rise from 0.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to as high as 21 percent in 2015.[287] However, Sierra Leone continues to rank among the lowest countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), receiving a value in 2012 of 0.359 that positions it 177 of 186.[288]

Sierra Leone has made considerable progress in consolidating peace and security and strengthening democracy through three national elections held in 2002, 2007 and 2012. The most recent 2012 general election—the first self-administered election since the end of the civil war—was achieved peacefully and considered transparent and fair by international observers with an 87.4 percent voter turnout. Yet a polarization of politics indicates the country's continued fragility in the post-conflict period. The 2012 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report for Sierra Leone underlines that an ethno-regional divide feeds into mutual fear, antagonism, and encourages winner-take-all electoral politics that constitute a serious risk of violence. In this respect, many root causes of conflict remain unresolved, including corruption of public officials, endemic poverty and identity-fuelled politics.

In the area of governance, the 2012 APRM identified corruption, weak public sector capacity, and limited access to justice among the key challenges facing the country. A number of factors have led to a system of patronage and rent-seeking within the public sector, including but not limited to an inadequate implementation of the system of separation of powers enshrined in the constitution as well as low public service salaries. Corruption is pervasive across all economic sectors, with the country ranking 123 of 174 on Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. As a result, access to basic public services and institutions such as health, education and the police is compromised.[289]

The consequences of Sierra Leone's conflict continue to be evident in the high number of unemployed youth (45.8 percent), who constitute 1.9 million of the country's 5.6 million people.[290] As an undereducated and economically marginalized demographic group, youth represent a vital segment of the population and creating productive jobs is one of Sierra Leone's most pressing challenges in consolidating peace. Towards this aim, the Government has put in place a Youth Employment Strategy (YES) and established in 2010 a Ministry of Youth Employment and Sports.

While Sierra Leone has made progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it is unlikely to achieve most of the goals by the 2015 target date. Significant constraints impeding progress are poor infrastructure, lack of reliable electricity supply and weaknesses in social services delivery.[291] Life expectancy remains one of the lowest in the world despite having increased from 39 years in 2000 to 48 years in 2011; the under-five mortality rate remains the highest in the world at 185 per 1000 live births.[292] An estimated 60 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line; adult literacy is estimated at only 39 percent.[293] The Government has passed a series of laws to protect women's

287 World Bank, 'Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report for the Republic of Sierra Leone for the Period FY10-FY13', 12 July 2012.

288 UNDP, 2012 Human Development Report.

289 Marie Chêne, 'Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Sierra Leone', Transparency International, 2010, online: <www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_sierra_leone>; Transparency International, 'Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012', online: <www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>.

290 Sierra Leone African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Report, January 2012.

291 Government of Sierra Leone, MDG Progress Report, 2010.

292 World Development Indicators, 2011.

293 Government of Sierra Leone, MDG Progress Report, 2010.

rights and made high-level appointments to the Supreme Court and National Electoral Commission (NEC). However, it ranks in the bottom ten countries in the 2012 Gender Inequality Index with a value of 0.643.[294] The ratio of women to men reaching at least secondary education is only 0.465, and only 14.8 percent of parliamentary seats are held by women.

3. UNDP IN SIERRA LEONE

UNDP has been a partner since 1965, providing development assistance and helping to build the capacity of a wide range of national institutions. The 1998-2002 Country Cooperation Framework was halted in 1999 when the civil war spread to Freetown, forced the evacuation of staff, and led to the destruction of the material resources of the organization. With the advent of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was formulated to cover the period 2001-2003. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in May 2002. The first post-conflict CPD was submitted to the Executive Board in June 2003 covering the period 2004-2007. The programme covered three main areas of (1) national recovery and peacebuilding, (2) governance and democratic development, and (3) poverty reduction and human development.

A CPD was formulated for the period 2008-2010 but later extended to 2012.[295] The previous cycle, 2009-2012, took place in the context of peace consolidation with the Agenda for Change (2008-2012)—PRSP II—guiding national priorities and the formulation of the United Nation Joint Vision in Sierra Leone document (2009-2012) aligning the United Nations response to the agenda.

The Joint Vision served as the strategy document for the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Office and the country team, replacing the United Nations Development Assistance Framework. The consolidation of planning frameworks was a key achievement strengthening internal cohesion and facilitating interaction with the Government. UNIPSIL is expected to be closed by March 2014 and preparations are under way for the country to move to complete a full UNDAF by January 2015.

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The standard ADR protocol has been to assess the ongoing and the previous country programme cycles. Accordingly, in Sierra Leone, this will cover as much as possible of the ongoing CPD 2013-2014 but will focus on the previous CPD 2008-2012. Although cumulatively this period is shorter than usual, including the prior 2004-2007 programme would make the timeframe too long. There will, however, be projects within the two programme periods under review that started during the 2004-2007 programme and consequently may be included in the ADR's analysis where appropriate.

The evaluation focuses on holding UNDP accountable to a set of outcomes and assessing UNDP's performance against these outcomes. In the case of Sierra Leone, the outcomes change over time. The CPD 2008-2012 contained a set that was used in the CPAP but in 2010, the list was changed to reflect the reality of evolving national priorities and availability of resources. Given this situation, during the scoping mission to Freetown during 22-26 April 2013, it was agreed that the following set of outcomes would be used as the framework for the evaluation. Summarized in Table A.1 are the eight outcomes that would be assessed through this exercise.

The ADR will assess UNDP contribution to the national effort in addressing its development challenges, encompassing social, economic and politi-

294 UNDP, 2012 Human Development Report.

295 UNDP Executive Board, DP/2010/25.

Table A.1. UNDP Sierra Leone CPD Outcomes*

CPD Outcome Area	Budget	Expenditure
1. **Elections:** Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections.	$64,331,085	$53,442,231
2. **Development Resources:** The resource base available for development increased through strengthened abilities to expand and efficiently leverage aid, private investment and trade opportunities.	$15,620,920	$11,952,779
3. **Service Delivery:** Civil service reform advanced and capacities of key institutions strengthened to manage the equitable delivery of public services.	$21,691,601	$15,263,244
4. **Parliament:** Parliament and other democratic institutions assisted to implement their individual mandate in a participatory, transparent and accountable manner.	$6,234,166	$4,951,738
5. **Local Governance:** Enhanced capacity of local councils to improve service delivery and development management.	$40,855,905	$28,312,837
6. **Justice:** Effective, responsive, accessible and fair justice systems promote the rule of law, including both formal and informal processes, with due consideration on the rights of the poor, women and vulnerable groups.	$24,417,379	$19,245,598
7. **Environment:** Strengthened national capacities to mainstream environment concerns into national development plans and implementation systems; disaster risk reduction.	$12,511,041	$5,615,199
8. **Livelihoods:** Job opportunities and livelihoods created through micro and small business run by youth; capacity-building of key institutions like the Youth Commission and the Ministry; improving government skills and access to experiences to negotiate PPP arrangements; work to improve transparency in revenue management; natural resource management and policy reform to assist in developing a new PRSP ('New Deal').	$46,345,979	$25,269,228

* Data is derived from Atlas Snapshot and reflect the cumulative project budget and expenditure for each outcome; figures therefore represent the entire project lifecycle including before the 2008-2012 period.

cal spheres. It will assess key results, specifically at the outcome level, and will cover UNDP assistance funded from both core and non-core resources. It will cover all UNDP activities in the country including non-project activities and engagement through regional and global initiatives.

5. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation has two main **components**: (a) the analysis of the UNDP's contribution to development results through its programme outcomes, and (b) the strategy it has taken. For each component, the ADR will present its findings and assessment according to the set criteria provided below.[296]

a) **UNDP's contribution by thematic/programmatic areas.** Analysis will be made on the contribution of UNDP to development results of Sierra Leone through its programme activities. The analysis will be presented by thematic/programme outcome areas and according to the following evaluation criteria:

1. Relevance of UNDP projects, outputs and outcomes;
2. Effectiveness of UNDP interventions in terms of achieving stated goals;
3. Efficiency of UNDP interventions in terms of use of human and financial resources;

296 Further elaboration of the criteria will be found in the 'UNDP Evaluation Office ADR Manual 2011', available on request.

4. Sustainability of the results to which UNDP contributes.

b) **UNDP's contribution through its positioning and strategies.** The positioning and strategies of UNDP are analysed both from the perspective of the organization's mandate[297] and the development needs and priorities in the country as agreed and as they emerged during the period 2008-2012. This will involve systematic analyses of UNDP's place and niche within the development and policy space in the country, as well as strategies used by UNDP to maximize its contribution through adopting relevant strategies and approaches. The following criteria will be applied:

   - Relevance and responsiveness of the country programme as a whole;
   - Exploiting comparative strengths;
   - Promoting UN values from a human development perspective.

The ADR will assess UNDP's performance in relation to its overall approaches, namely capacity development, gender equality, South-South cooperation, national ownership and UN partnerships. Specific attention will be paid to UNDP's support to furthering gender equality in Sierra Leone. The evaluation will systematically assess how gender is mainstreamed in UNDP's programme support, and advocacy efforts to further gender equality.

In addition to judgements made using the evaluation criteria above, the ADR process will also identify how various other factors (which focus on the *means* as distinct from *ends*) that have influenced UNDP's performance. The following lists the specific factors that will be addressed in this ADR:

- focus on capacity development, particularly in a post-conflict context such as Sierra Leone;
- use of partnerships for development;
- support for coordination of UN and other development assistance;
- the promotion of the aid effectiveness agenda.

The evaluation criteria form the basis of the ADR methodological process. Evaluators generate findings within the scope of the evaluation and use the criteria to make assessments. In turn, the factual findings and assessments are interpreted to identify the broad conclusions from the evaluation and to draw recommendations for future action.

An outcome paper will be developed for each outcome noted in Table A.1 and will examine progress towards the outcome and UNDP's contribution to that change. A theory of change (ToC)[298] approach will be used and developed by the evaluation team in consultation with UNDP and national stakeholders. Preparation of the ToC will focus on the assumptions made about a programme's desired change and causal linkages expected and these will form a basis for the data collection approach. The outcome papers will use the ToC approach to assess UNDP's contribution to the outcome using the evaluation criteria and identify the factors that have affected this contribution. Each outcome paper will be

297 For UNDP's Strategic Plan, see <www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp07-43Rev1.pdf>.

298 "Theory of change is an outcome-based approach which applies critical thinking to the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives and programmes intended to support change in their contexts. While there is no single definition and set methodology, at a critical minimum, theory of change is considered to encompass discussion of the following elements:

- **Context** for the inititative, including social, political and environmentsl conditions;
- **Long-term change** that the initative seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit;
- **Process/sequence of change** aniticpated to lead to the desired long-term outcome;
- **Assumptions** about how these changes might happen, as a check on whether the actitivities and outputs are appropriate for influencing change in the desired direction in this context;
- **Diagram and narrative summary** that captures the outcome of the discussion.

Source: Isabel Vogel, 'Review of the use of "Theory of Change" in International Development', DFID, April 2012.

prepared according to a standard template that will facilitate synthesis and the identification of conclusions. The findings and conclusions from each outcome paper will then be synthesized into the overall ADR report.

6. DATA COLLECTION

Assessment of existing data, data collection constraints and opportunities. An assessment was carried out for each outcome to ascertain the available information and identify data constraints, and to determine the data collection needs and method. The assessment outlined the level of evaluable data that is available.

The Sierra Leone Country Office has completed five evaluations during the period 2008-2012 and a further five are planned for 2013. Two of the outcomes will be addressed differently from the others:

- The elections outcome will be covered by an outcome evaluation commissioned by the Country Office in Sierra Leone. The IEO will support the evaluation and quality-assure the ToR design and draft report. It is expected that this evaluation will have completed most of its work by September/October 2013;
- The environment outcome will be examined in conjunction with a Global Environment Facility (GEF) portfolio study using the same consultant. The objective is to ensure that the ADR and GEF study inform each other, while also cost-sharing and synchronizing data collection.

Data collection methods. The outcome papers are at the core of the data collection process and link each of the criteria and related evaluation questions to data sources and data collection methods. In so doing they ensure a logical approach to using the evaluation criteria. The evaluation team will use a mixed-method approach that will include document reviews, workshops, group and individual interviews, project/field visits and surveys. The set of methods for each evaluation criteria and questions will be captured in the outcome papers to be prepared by the evaluation team after preliminary research. Nonetheless, the following two data collection methods will be used at a minimum:

- Document review is at the core of the data collection methods. National data will be collected to indicate the changes in the outcome status. UNDP self-reporting will indicate the inputs and outputs that have contributed to the outcome. Any self-reporting (i.e., Results-Oriented Annual Reports—ROARs) assessing the contribution will also be utilized as the starting point for independent validation.
- Stakeholder interviews will be used to fill gaps identified in the evaluation matrix. A strong participatory approach will be taken involving a broad range of stakeholders including those beyond UNDP's direct partners. These stakeholders would include government representatives of ministries/agencies, civil-society organizations, private-sector representatives, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and importantly, the beneficiaries of the programme. Furthermore, in order to identify key development challenges of the country, the evaluation team may conduct interviews and consultations beyond those involved directly or indirectly in UNDP country programme.

The evaluation team will use a variety of methods to ensure that the data is valid, including triangulation. All the findings must be supported by evidence and validated through consulting multiple sources of information. The evaluation team will review the findings and validate across sources. The data collection process will utilize data codification methods to facilitate analysis.

The evaluation team expects to undertake field trips for interviews, group discussions, surveys and/or project site observations. It is expected that a number of selected field trips will be undertaken to regions where UNDP has a concentration of field projects.

7. IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The evaluation process includes a wide range of stakeholders.

UNDP IEO. The IEO will conduct the ADR in collaboration with the Country Office and the Government of Sierra Leone. The IEO will set the ToR for the evaluation, prepare a ToR for each of the outcome papers that will be integrated into the final report, select the consultancy team (except for the elections consultant who will be recruited by the Country Office and the environment consultant who will be selected by GEF, in consultation with UNDP; the environment consultant will be contracted by both GEF and UNDP and will be managed by the GEF manager for the assessment of GEF projects, and by the UNDP evaluation manager for the assessment of the UNDP environment projects), lead the data collection team provide guidance, organize feedback sessions and a stakeholder meeting, prepare the first draft of the report, finalize the report and manage the review and follow-up processes. The IEO will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the ADR. It will liaise with the teams conducting the elections outcome evaluation and the GEF portfolio evaluation at key points during the conduct of these concurrent exercises.

The Sierra Leone Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). As the main counterpart of UNDP in Sierra Leone, DACO of the MoFED has agreed to collaborate with UNDP IEO in conducting the ADR. The Ministry will provide inputs to the ToR, particularly on key evaluation questions and to the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to be made by the team. It will facilitate the conduct of ADR by participating in the reference group, providing necessary access to information source within the Government of Sierra Leone, safeguarding the independence of the evaluation and jointly organizing the stakeholder meeting with the IEO. It will be responsible within the Government of Sierra Leone for the use and dissemination of the final outcomes of the ADR.

UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA). The RBA will support the evaluation through information sharing and will also participate in discussions on emerging conclusions and recommendations as well as in the in the stakeholder workshop.

UNDP Country Office (CO) in Sierra Leone. The CO will support the evaluation team in liaison with key partners and other stakeholders, make available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP's programmes, projects and activities in the country, and provide factual verifications of the draft report. The CO will participate in the reference group, provide the evaluation team support in kind (e.g. arranging meetings with project staff and beneficiaries; or assistance for the project site visits). CO staff will be also be interviewed by members of the evaluation team. However, to ensure the independence of the views expressed in interviews and meetings with stakeholders held for data collection purposes, the CO will not participate in these interviews.

Evaluation team. The IEO will establish an evaluation team to undertake the ADR. The team will constitute the following members:

- **Evaluation Manager (EM):** IEO staff member with overall responsibility for conducting the ADR, for managing the ADR consultants and for preparing and revising draft and final report, for facilitating the stakeholder workshop and providing any clarifications required by the Country Office as it prepares its management response which will be uploaded in the Evaluation Resource Centre along with the final ADR report
- **Associate Evaluation Manager (AEM):** IEO staff member with responsibility for providing in-depth substantive support, participating in country in the preparatory mission and in the data collection phase as well as providing quality assurance of the draft reports.
- **Research Assistant (RA):** will be involved in the desk review, in-country data collection phase and report writing phases of the evaluation.

- **Governance Specialist:** will be recruited as an independent consultant(s) managed by the EM. The expert selected will require in-depth understanding of how to assess UNDP operations in post-conflict settings, and will be responsible for drafting outcome reports and other papers that will be incorporated into the final report by the EM.
- **Elections Specialist:** will be recruited and managed by the UNDP Country Office and CTA.
- **Environment Specialists:** will be recruited in cooperation with GEF with two separate contracts to provide inputs to the ADR and GEF portfolio study. S/he will provide expertise in specific subject areas of the evaluation, and the evaluation report will be modified if necessary to cover areas included in the UNDP ADR outcome report template. S/he may also be called upon to produce other papers that will be incorporated into the final report by the EM.
- **National expertise:** where feasible the ADR will use the expertise of national consultants/companies to collect data, conduct surveys and interviews as required.

Evaluation Reference Group. An evaluation reference group will be established to discuss key outputs from the evaluation process and provide comments to the evaluation task manager. Co-chaired by the Director of DACO and the UNDP Deputy Country Director, the reference group will include representatives from:

- government stakeholders (DACO)
- national civil society, Sierra Leone Association of Non-governmental Organizations
- key international partners (DFID, EU)
- United Nations (UNDP, mission).

8. EVALUATION PROCESS

The evaluation will be conducted according to the approved IEO process guidance. The following represents a summary of key elements of the process. Four major phases provide a framework conducting the evaluation.

Phase 1: Preparation. The IEO will prepare background documentation with the support of the CO and get briefed by the regional and other headquarters bureaus. The EM and AEM have undertaken a week-long preparatory mission in April-May 2013 to the country and met with CO, Government and key national stakeholders. The objectives of the mission were to: i) ensure that key stakeholders understand the evaluation purpose, process and methodology; ii) obtain key stakeholder perspectives of any prominent issues to be covered in the evaluation; and iii) determine the scope of the evaluation, approaches, timeframe, and the parameters for the selection of the ADR evaluation team.

Table A.2. Evaluation Team Responsibilities for Outcome Reports

Outcome	Team member
1. Elections	EM (in conjunction with Outcome Evaluation Team)
2. Development Resources	Governance Specialist
3. Service Delivery	Governance Specialist
4. Parliament	EM and RA
5. Local Governance	EM (support from national consultants)
6. Justice	Governance Specialist
7. Environment	Environment Specialists
8. Livelihoods	EM (support from national consultants)

The mission led to the preparation of a draft ToR which was shared with key stakeholders for comment. Based on the finalized ToR, and in accordance with internal recruitment guidelines, the Independent Evaluation Office will recruit consultants who are experts in evaluation and thematic areas as required in the evaluation. An external reviewer, who will review the draft ADR report, will also be selected.

Phase 2: Data Collection and analysis. The objective is to undertake data collection activities in accordance with the ToR and to analyse data collected from various sources against evaluation criteria set out in section 6.

- Pre-mission activities: Evaluation team members conduct desk reviews of reference material, and prepare a draft outcome paper prior to the data collection mission. This paper will help identify the outcome-specific evaluation questions, identify gaps and issues that will require validation during the field-based phase of data collection.
- Data collection/validation mission: The evaluation team, including EM (and AEM if possible), undertake a mission to the country to engage in field-based data collection activities. The estimated duration of the mission is **three weeks from 30 September to 18 October 2013**.
- End-of-mission debriefing: The evaluation team holds a debriefing with CO and national counterparts at the end of their mission to discuss key findings. The team ensures that any factual inaccuracies and misinterpretation be corrected at this point.

Phase 3: Synthesis, Report Writing and Review. The objective is to synthesize across all the assessments (outcome papers) and consult relevant stakeholders to arrive at robust, evidence-based evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

- Synthesis process: After a review of the assessments by the EM/AEM, coding for the key criteria and factors will be performed. Once the synthesis process is complete, the EM and AEM will organize a teleconference with the CO, and a presentation to RB, to communicate results of the synthesis and the direction of recommendations.
- Report writing: Draft and final reports are developed in accordance with the ToR, the ADR Method Manual as well as quality standards set forth by the United Nations Evaluation Group.
- Review: For quality assurance, the 'zero' draft report is reviewed internally (IEO) and externally. The IEO ADR coordinator conducts a compliance review, after which the report will be submitted to the IEO Director/Deputy Director for clearance. For **stakeholder reviews**, the draft report is first sent to CO, RBA and other headquarters central offices as appropriate for factual verification and the identification of any errors or omission. Following the revision of the draft report, reflecting any changes made, the report is shared with national stakeholders (the Government and reference group). An 'audit trail' of comments and responses is prepared for all reviews.
- **Stakeholder workshop**: In close collaboration with CO, a meeting with key national stakeholders is organized to present the results of the evaluation and examine ways forward in the country. The workshop participants include IEO senior management and EM, representatives of RB, representatives from GEF as well as a wide range of national stakeholders. The main purpose of the meeting is to facilitate a greater national buy-in in taking forward the lessons and recommendations from the report and to strengthen the national ownership of development process and the necessary accountability of UNDP interventions at country level. The report is finalized after the completion of the workshop.

Phase 4: Production, dissemination and follow-up. The aim is to produce a user-friendly report that reaches a wide range of audiences. Following the production process of editing, translation,

and design, the final report is then uploaded to the IEO website, to ensure that results and lessons from the ADR report are fully considered for future operational improvement and to widely disseminate them to the public. The report is submitted to the UNDP Administrator, who requests formal responses to the evaluation from the CO/RB (a '**management response**'). The RB is responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions in the Evaluation Resource Centre.[299] The ADR report is widely disseminated/shared with internal and external audiences both in hard copy and electronic versions. Results of the evaluation are presented to RB senior management through a formal presentation. Discussions may be also held with other offices (e.g. other RBx, BDP, OPG) to facilitate organizational learning.

9. TIME-FRAME FOR SIERRA LEONE ADR PROCESS

The time-frame and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively as follows:

Table A.3. Tentative Time-frame

Activity	Responsible Party	Proposed Time-frame 2013-2014
Phase 1: Preparation		
ADR initiation and preparatory work	RA/EM	March/April 2013
Preparatory mission	EM/AEM	22-26 April
Draft ToR to RBA, CO, Government and reference group for comments	EM	June
ToR completed and approved by IEO Director	EM	Mid-July
Selection of other evaluation team members	EM/AEM	July-August
Phase 2: Data collection and analysis		
Methods/data collection	EO/consultants	June-August
Preliminary drafts of outcome papers	Consultants	20 September
Data collection mission to Sierra Leone	EM/AEM/RA/consultants	30 September- 18 October
Data analysis	EM/AEM/RA/consultants	September/October
Finalized Outcome papers	Consultants	1 November
Phase 3: Synthesis and report writing		
First draft for internal IEO clearance	EM/AEM	End November
First draft to RB/CO which forward it to the Government and reference group	CO	December
Submission of the second draft	EM	January 2014
Stakeholder Workshop in Sierra Leone		January/February
Submission of the final report	EM	February
Phase 4: Production and Follow-up		
Editing and formatting	EO	March
Issuance of the final report and evaluation brief	EO	April
Dissemination of the final report and evaluation brief and uploading on ERC of management response and report	EO, ERD & CO	April

299 <erc.undp.org/>.

Annex 2

PEOPLE CONSULTED

GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE

Alpha, Edward, Development Planning Officer, Bo City Council

Amara, Augustin, Deputy Chief Administrator, Bo City Council

Bah, Cherner (Hon.), Member of Parliament of Sierra Leone

Bangura, Kolleh, Director, Environmental Protection Agency

Bockari, Alpha, Acting Director, Meteorological Office, Ministry of Transport & Aviation

Brown, Patricia (Hon.), Member of Parliament of Sierra Leone

Combay, Alex, Procurement Officer, Bo City Council

Conteh, Richard, Chief of Staff, Office of the President

Davidson, Ogunlade (Prof.), University of Sierra Leone, National Coordinator, Climate Change Programme

Fraser, Finda, Director, Parliamentary Assistance Coordination Office

Gorenda, Mary, Parliamentary Assistance Coordination Office

Hamilton, Theodora, Head of Monitoring Research and Projects Unit, Independent Media Commission

Jalloh, Alie D., Head, Chemicals Control & Management, Environmental Protection Agency

Jallow, Haddijatou, Executive Chairperson, Environmental Protection Agency

Johnson, Raynold, University of Sierra Leone, National Coordinator, Climate Change Programme

Jusu, Steven Syril, Chief Environment Officer, Ministry of Lands, Country Planning & the Environment

Kai, Emma, Office Secretary, Independent Media Commission

Kaikai, Ansumana J. (Hon.), Member of Parliament of Sierra Leone

Kaloko, Abi (Hon.), Member of Parliament of Sierra Leone

Kamara, Abu, Director, Public-Private Partnerships Unit, Office of the President

Kamara, Mary Mye, Director Disaster Management, Office of National Security

Kamara, Yusuf, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, NAYCOM

Katta, Raymond, Deputy Executive Secretary, Human Rights Commission

Kebbay, Kawasu, Director, Development Assistance Coordination Office

Kebbie, Bryma V.S., Commissioner, Human Rights Commission

Keita, Lahai, Environment Officer, Project Manager SLM, Environment Protection Agency

Khalil Kallon, Director, Bo Regional Office, Independent Media Commission

Khence, Moses B. (Rev.), Chairman and Commissioner, Human Rights Commission

Koroma, Anthony, Director, NAYCOM

Kowa, Emma (Hon.), Member of Parliament of Sierra Leone

Kroma, Martina, Solicitor-General of Sierra Leone, Office of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice

Laffie, Mohamed, Deputy Clerk, Parliament of Sierra Leone

Laggah, Olayinka W., Programme Support Coordinator, Justice Sector Coordination Office

Lahai, Bernadette (Hon.), Member of Parliament of Sierra Leone

Mac-Johnson, Rod, Commissioner, Independent Media Commission

Olu-Williams, Daphne, Commissioner, Human Rights Commission

Phillips, Olayinka M.Y., Deputy Director, Justice Sector Coordination Office

Samdy, Ahmed, NAYCOM, Kenema City

Samoura, Mohamed, Member, Independent Media Commission

Sarkodie-Mensah, Julia (Hon. Justice), Consultant Master and Registrar, Registrar of the Supreme Court

Sawyerr, Victor H.O., Deputy Director, Environmental Protection Agency, National Ozone Officer

Sesay, Ibrahim (Hon.), Head Clerk, Parliament, Parliament of Sierra Leone

Sesay, Mark, NAYCOM, Kenema City

Sheriff, Mbrima A., Commissioner, Human Rights Commission

Smith, Cyril, Director, Public Relations, Parliament of Sierra Leone

Songe, Samuel M., Clerk, Hansard Dept.

Thorpe, Ebun F., Director of Finance and Administration, Human Rights Commission

Turay, Alie D., Head Chemical Controls & Management, Environmental Protection Agency

Wudie, Momodu, Programme Manager, NAYCOM

CIVIL SOCIETY

Aforo, Lola, Centre Manager, CAPS, University of Sierra Leone

Bah, Chernor Abass, Programme Manager, Business Development Centre, Bo City

Bangura Sorie, and Usman Bangura, Committee Members, Makari Site

Bangura, Abdulai and Pa Santigie Sesay, Abu Kargbo, Ayi Sesay, Kadie Bruyah, Miatta Kamara, and Moses Kargbo, Fire Guards, Makoth Site

Bangura, Sgt 249 Lansana, National Fire Force, Makeni

Barrie, Fatmata, Youth Council Officer, Kenema City Youth Council

Conteh, Abdul, Media Capacity Building Consultant

Conteh, Pa Abdulai, Headman, Makari Village

Conteh, Pa Sorie, Acting Paramount Chief, Makari-Gbanti Chiefdom

Daramy, Andrew R., Project Officer, AID-SL

Enoh-Tanyi, Elvis, Assistant Secretary-General, Barrister, Solicitor and Legal Consultant, Sierra Leone Bar Association

Fofanah, Alhaji S., District Youth Development Officer, Obasanjo Skills Centre, Newton

Gabbidon, Francis, Consultant, UNDP and Independent Media Commission

Gbla, Osman, Chair, Chair, African Peer Review Mechanism Governing Council, Sierra Leone

Hallowell, Elvis Gbanabom, Director-General, Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation

Jabbie, Ibrahim, Ministry of Youth Affairs, Kenema City

Jalloh, Kassim, Unit Head, Market Garden, Sierra Leone Agri-Business Initiative (SABI) Centre

Jalloh, Mohamed, Manager, Restless Development

James, Asmaa, President, Women in the Media Sierra Leone

Jobson, Siafa, Chief Executive, HELP Group, Business Development Service Centre, Bo City

Kallon, Yusuff A., Youth Council Officer, Kenema City Youth Council

Kamara, Abubakar, Project Coordinator, AID-SL

Kamara, Marbieu Y., Mechanical Head, SABI Centre

Kamara, Mohamed, Field Officer, Makoth Site, Green Scenery

Kamara, William, SLM Makari Site Land Owner

Kargbo, Moses A., Secretary-General, Sierra Leone Association of Journalists

Keikum, Francis A., Food Crop Unit, SABI Centre

Kufembeh, Francis G., Processing Coordinator, SABI Centre

Mansaray, Baba and John Kamara, Fire Guard, Makari Site

Massaquoi, Isaac, Mass Communications Department, Fourah Bay College

Massaquoi, Mohamed, President, Sierra Leone Reporters Union

Minaa, Joe, Project Coordinator, SABI Centre

Ngengu, Sahr K., Project Accountant, SABI Centre

Nicol, Joshua, Chief Editor, Cotton Tree News

Paramount Chief, Bombali-Sebora Chiefdom

Savoi, Oredola, Project Officer, AFFORD-SL

Sesay, Edie, Project Animator, Makoth Site, Green Scenery, Makeni

Sesay, Usman Wurie, Assistant Regional Coordinator, PASACOFAS

Theo-Harding, Donald, Chairman, Guild of Editors

Tucker, Christian, Production Coordinator, SABI Centre

Wright, Ransford, National Coordinator, Independent Radio Network

Young, Samuel J., Restless Development, Business Development Service Centre, Newton

UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND DONOR COMMUNITY

Ashwanden, Tom, Head of Governance and Institutional Support, European Union

Dive, Philip, Head of Unit, UN Strategic Planning Unit, UNIPSIL

Evans, Phil, Head of DFID, Sierra Leone and Liberia

Hayes, Lucy, Governance Adviser, DFID, Sierra Leone

Nega, Berhanmeskel, Deputy Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Political Peace Consolidation Section, UNIPSIL

Nwune, Chike, Chief Technical Adviser, International Labour Organization, Sierra Leone Office

Sesay-Foday, Sheikh, Macroeconomist, World Bank, Sierra Leone Office

Toyberg-Frandzen, Jens Anders, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, UNIPSIL

UNDP OFFICE, SIERRA LEONE

Abchir, Mohamed, Deputy Country Director

Alemu, Molla, Programme Manager, Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme

Benavent Herrero, Sara, Programme Analyst, Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme

Conteh, Hassan, Analyst, Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme

Conteh, Issa, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist

Jalloh, Hassan, Project Officer, Support to Media Institutions

Kamara, Edward, Programme Specialist, Governance Unit

Kooshak, Stephen, (former) Chief Technical Adviser, Support to Parliament

Krijgsman, Barbara-Anne, (former) Head of Bureau of Development and Oversight

Marijnissen, Saskia, Programme Manager, Environment

Massaquoi, Abu-Bakar S., National Coordinator, Small Grants Programme

Mukerjee, Sudipto, Country Director

Nunan, James, (former) Chief Technical Adviser, Access to Justice Programme

Pillai, Lakshmi, Chief Technical Adviser, Support to Parliament

Sartie, Marbey, Programme Officer, Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme

Seppo, Mia, (former) Country Director

Swarray, Mariatu, Portfolio Manager, Environment and Disaster Management

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Sheinberg, Diane, Programme Manager, Parliamentary Development, Democratic Governance Group, UNDP Bureau of Development Policy

Van Rijn, Natasha, Adviser, Regional Bureau of Africa

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