Dagmar Kunzmann Briefel New York June 24, 2014

**FINAL REPORT**

**Assessment of UNDP’s Funding Mechanisms for Crisis Prevention and Recovery – trac 1.1.3 and thematic trust fund for crisis prevention and recovery**

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

BDP Bureau for Development Policy

BERA Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy

BPPS Bureau for Policy and Programme Support

BPAC BCPR Project Appraisal Committee

CERF Central Emergency Respond Fund (OCHA)

CPR TTF Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund

CHF Common Humanitarian Fund

CO Country Office

OROLSI Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

DPA Department of Political Affairs

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DIPECHO Disaster Preparedness European Community Humanitarian Office

DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

DPBSC Department for Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion

FSF Fragile States Facility (FSF) (The African Development Bank)

GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

IRRF Integrated Results and Resources Framework

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

RBM Results Based Management

RC Regional Centre

PBF Peacebuilding Fund (United Nations)

QCPR Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review

SOP Strategic Operating Procedures

SBF State Building Fund (World Bank)

SIDA Swedish International Development Agency

ToR Terms of Reference

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

USAID United States International Development

WB World Bank

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**Executive Summary**

This report provides an assessment of UNDP’s financing mechanisms Trac 1.1.3 and Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (herein referred to as CPR TTF) in terms of efficiency, relevance and sustainability in the context of the changing aid architecture since the Funds’ inception in 2000 to the end of 2013.

UNDP is currently undertaking a restructuring process which is significantly impacting BCPR. By the end of 2014, BCPR and the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) will cease to exist and a new Bureau for Policy and Program Support (BPPS) and the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) will be in place. During the time of writing of this report, the restructuring of BCPR into the new Bureau has been ongoing. For the purpose of this assessment, the assessor has taken note of the change process but has not reflected on the potential new structure per se. The report provides insights into the evolution of UNDP’s CPR TTF financing mechanism managed by BCPR up to 2013. It is hoped that the assessment and recommendations will make a valuable contribution to the future management of the CPR TTF.

The report includes a historical and financial overview of the development of BCPR, which has been acting as the CPR TTF manager, as set forth in the ToR. The primary source of information for the assessment is based on the feedback received from 20 Country Offices (COs) via an online survey, as well as telephone interviews conducted with selected COs. In addition, feedback on the relevance, efficiency and sustainability of the CPR TTF financing mechanism was sought from key donors and relevant UN partners. Further information was gathered through interviews undertaken with HQ staff and additional stakeholders and through an extensive desk review of available literature. The assessment did not provide for country visits. This may result in some gaps in the information gathered. To compensate, the assessor did touch upon the issue of delivery in the field, but a far more detailed review would be required to quantify or meaningfully consider the quality of or challenges related to delivery.

The assessor received overwhelmingly positive feedback from the COs, particularly with regards to the relevance and efficiency of the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 financing mechanism. The uniqueness of the CPR TTF and its accompanying technical support structure, were highlighted. A consistent message received by the assessor was that the funding would not be as effective without the extensive technical support provided through BCPR. Donor feedback has been mixed. BCPR was commended for its overall improvement in managing the CPR TTF, particularly after the recommendations of the Strategic Review of 2010 were implemented, for its highly knowledgeable staff and its satisfactory Results Based Framework. However, donors expressed concerns regarding a perceived lack of strategic direction in areas of UNDP’s CPR work, poor, if not unsatisfactory performance level in certain countries, and reporting which did not always link allocations to strategic outcomes.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The assessor considered the relevance, efficiency and sustainability of the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 financing mechanism while keeping in mind the initial purpose behind the establishment of the fund. The CPR TTF Annual Report 2002 outlines: “UNDP’s focus on the development dimensions of crisis prevention and recovery aims to address the root causes of conflict and put in place the enabling institutional, economic and social conditions to address them in the longer-term. To fulfill this role in a predictable manner and better respond to the urgent needs of countries in need of assistance for crisis prevention and recovery, UNDP established the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF) in March 2000. In its first two years, the Thematic Trust Fund has shown to be a modality flexible enough to address various crisis situations including conflict and natural disasters, whilst also contributing to more focus and streamlining in UNDP’s crisis programmes through the definition of service lines and strategic investment of non-earmarked contributions.”[[3]](#footnote-3) The assessor took into account the extremely difficult challenges faced by UNDP Country Offices that operate in conflict and disaster affected countries and other fragile environments. Staff often operate under extreme security threats and need to address significant capacity gaps often present among national and local partners.

The recommendations highlight the need for UNDP to provide clear guidance to the COs for CPR in its Integrated Results and Resources Framework (IRRF) linked to the outcomes outlined for CPR in the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017. The importance given to fragility, resilience and the focus on providing assistance to its government partners in the Management of Risks in 2015 and beyond provides the framework for an enhanced strategic direction of the projects supported by the CPR TTF. BCPR on behalf of the organization has acquired considerable expertise over the past 15 years to position UNDP as a strong provider of the necessary tools to assist its government partners with this task. This applies to Disaster Risk Reduction, Early Recovery and Conflict Prevention. Twelve years ago, the establishment of the CPR TTF was seen as an innovative approach to facilitate UNDP’s CPR work. However, with the emergence of other trust funds in this area it has lost some of its edge. UNDP needs to look into redefining the fund’s purpose and focus on strengthening its image in the areas where it does best.

The assessor reached the conclusion that UNDP’s flexible funding mechanisms, the CPR TTF and TRAC 1.1.3, together with the necessary professional fund management, administrative procedures and technical expertise, provide an effective architecture for supporting UNDP endeavors. Nevertheless, the assessor recommends that UNDP focus on the areas where allocations to the CPR trust fund have made the largest impact and provide the fund with a stronger and more distinct identity linked to these achievements. Under the new structure, UNDP should focus on positioning this funding tool at corporate level by highlighting its 15 years of achievement and branding it as a strong UNDP financing mechanism in support of UNDP’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery work.

**“The CPR TTF is the lifeline of UNDP Country Offices in immediate crisis situations”[[4]](#footnote-4)**

It is highlighted from the outset of this report that the management and administrative procedures of the CPR TTF were generally highly commended by those UNDP COs interviewed. All COs that replied to the online survey saw this support as the “Country Offices’ lifeline” in immediate crisis situations. The CPR TTF was even rated as the best UNDP internal trust fund in terms of efficiency of speed of releasing funds, ease of administrative procedures and provision of technical support. The funding channel was recognized as providing the necessary flexibility that has proven to be so essential when operating in post-crisis, fragile and transition contexts.

The findings suggest that the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 mechanisms have served the COs in their task to be proactive partners to governments after crises in terms of accessing assistance rapidly in order to get relevant programmes launched in a timely fashion. Donor interlocutors highlighted the fact that they are supportive of UNDP’s CPR work as it corresponds to their own countries priorities for support to fragile states and it is often perceived as the most important contribution to long-term development in fragile states. UNDP is perceived as a neutral partner on the ground, particularly in situations where no other development stakeholder operates and the CPR TTF funding mechanism was welcomed as a means to fund innovative initiatives and partnerships in fragile states. UNDP often remains one of the few agencies on the ground capable of assisting governments in fragile states in early recovery and long term development efforts.

**“Un-earmarked funding provides the necessary leverage to support a country office in unanticipated situations of crisis.”[[5]](#footnote-5)**

The funding mechanism has served UNDP’s objective to support its country offices in post crisis settings and feedback from country offices repeatedly underscores that both the “twinning” of resource allocation and technical support from BCPR has been invaluable. The assessor recognizes that un-earmarked funding to the CPR TTF provides the fund manager the essential range of flexibility it requires to act swiftly in relation to an unanticipated or a rapid onset crisis. For example, the catastrophic destruction of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines required immediate support to UNDP’s country office. For such unanticipated events, BCPR yearly sets aside a sum of un-earmarked funding from both Trac 1.1.3 and the CPR TTF. This allowed BCPR to send a SURGE team as well as financial program support to the Philippines. USD 1.3 million was approved for the SURGE plan and, in addition, USD 5.1 million un-earmarked funding was allocated in support of early recovery programmes. This is just one of numerous examples the assessor was given on how un-earmarked funding has made a difference to the operational capacity of COs. Other examples include how un-earmarked funding was supplemented by earmarked funding until such time as the CO managed to fundraise sufficient resources in-country to continue further implementation of a key project.

Although the CPR TTF has managed to attract approximately 30% of yearly flexible/un-earmarked funding over the past ten years[[6]](#footnote-6), according to recent indications, it is difficult to predict whether un-earmarked funding will continue to increase. Under these circumstances, it is recommended that UNDP undertake to mobilize thematically flexible funding for the CPR TTF, which still allows the fund manager to use the funds more flexibly than earmarked funding. Donors also consistently pointed out that they expected more CORE funding allocated to Trac 1.1.3 to underline the importance that UNDP has assigned to CPR.

The management and administration of the CPR TTF has improved significantly over the assessment period from 2000-2013. The assessor observed that over the past six years, the CPR TTF management has steadily worked towards balancing allocations and expenditures and, as a result, the CPR TTF now has a well-established system aligning the expected commitments and disbursements with the anticipated donor contributions. By 2012, the closing balance has declined significantly, which is an indication of how the planning and forecasting of the allocations has improved considerably.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Furthermore, measures have been taken to enhance implementation performance in the field. Discrepancies do, however, remain in terms of professional fund administration at headquarters and a lack of efficient implementation in the field. The assessor’s findings suggest that donors, as well as key staff at headquarters and in the field, were frustrated by problems encountered during implementation that could have been avoided with better strategic planning and overall UNDP guidance.

Although it is clear that in many settings the difficult post crisis context, the weakness or non-existence of reliable government partners and security issues combine to make project implementation very challenging, UNDP should, for example, undertake more detailed capacity assessments prior to the agreement to fund a certain project, to ascertain if the CO can effectively accomplish the tasks set out in the project document. The introduction of Strategic Framework Agreements with COs has been a step in the right direction, but the initiative has not been fully rolled out and feedback has been mixed. Moreover, the assessor was informed in some interviews that donors would appreciate better communication about difficulties at the outset of the implementation process, as well as timely consultation about necessary redesign and financial spending delays in order to avoid disappointment at the time of mid-term reviews.

 **“UNDP failed to provide a clear link of the allocations to the CPR TTF and its overall impact on mainstreaming CPR in UNDP.”[[8]](#footnote-8)**

Donors and other interlocutors pointed out that the CPR TTF’s allocations to projects often failed to be clearly linked to overall UNDP strategic outcomes and thus failed to mainstream CPR. This is also due to the fact that for many years UNDP did not identify clear outcomes for CPR. As a result, too often interventions were perceived as ad hoc and based on achieving outputs rather than outcomes. As one interlocutor explained: “The results frameworks of individual projects funded by the CPR TTF may need to be better linked with global results reporting across all countries and projects. This requires better knowledge of fund users on what the global results are and how individual projects can be better aligned to global results and results reporting. Communication and cooperation between fund providers at HQs and fund users (Country Offices) could be improved to better demonstrate the results. This may also require to measure results over a longer period and articulate milestones towards achieving long-term changes.”[[9]](#footnote-9)

There are many good examples which are highlighted throughout the report of how seed funding has had a catalytic effect but there are also many instances where no impact was achieved beyond reaching defined project outputs. Resource mobilization often remains challenging for COs and some do not manage to leverage funding beyond UNDP core resources.

Resources for the CPR TTF have been secured for the next two years with some donors keeping their commitments on hold until the CPR TTF’s future position and use is clarified by the end of 2014. Donor expectations for the future of the CPR TTF include a clear link to the outcomes formulated in the UNDP Strategic Review 2014-2017, accompanied by the Integrated Resource and Results Framework (IRRF). Although the CPR TTF was able to count on steady core donor support from 8-10 countries, some interlocutors also questioned if the CPR TTF could not have been more successful had it been advertised more prominently outside of UNDP.

**“Outside of UNDP, the CPR TTF missed the chance to develop a strong identity as funding mechanism for CPR.”[[10]](#footnote-10)**

The CPR TTF, being the first multi donor trust fund that was launched with the focus on Early Recovery, DRR and Conflict Prevention in 2000 has failed to develop a strong branding and thus the potential to become a major funding mechanism for UNDP in CPR has been missed. The CPR TTF is not well known as a funding source outside of UNDP. It has relied heavily on steady funding from a number of core donors. In contrast, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, Climate Funds as well as some of the prominent World Bank Funds have clearer and more prominent branding combined with narrower and more distinct mandates which makes it easier for donors to decide where to allocate resources. Although it might not have been the specific intention of the creator of the Fund to be a global Trust Fund for CPR, key stakeholders commented that the CPR TTF missed the chance to attract more funding through effective promotion, advertising more prominently where CPR TTF allocations have made a difference on the ground.

**“Don’t lose the professional level the administration and fund management of the CPR Thematic Trust Fund has achieved”.[[11]](#footnote-11)**

The assessor found that the CPR TTF was rated positively by COs and other interlocutors in terms of its management and administration in comparison to other UNDP trust funds. COs unanimously commended the efficiency of the CPR TTF in terms of speed of allocation and technical support. The combination of the following three components 1) fund design and administration, 2) fund operation and 3) fund implementation have reached a satisfactory level, particularly after the recommendations of the Strategic Review 2010 and the Portfolio Review 2012 were implemented. Although donors underlined that performance on the ground is not consistent, urging UNDP to address these concerns, the CPR TTF’s unique design, including the combination of funding, strong technical backstopping and financial accountability have made the CPR TTF a strong financing mechanism. One interlocutor cautioned that if one of the three components above is weakened in the future, this could negatively impact the performance of the entire Fund.[[12]](#footnote-12)

**“BCPR provides the best results framework within UNDP and it should be developed as best practice”[[13]](#footnote-13)**

The general finding of the assessor is that COs have benefited from the technical and financial support, particularly the immediate release of funds for assessments and coordination after a crisis (funds from Trac 1.1.3) but that for many years, donor requirements for professional, multi-year results based management and results based reporting have not been fulfilled. The improvement of the Results Based Framework, (RBF), the Multi-year Results Framework (MYRF) and the structural adjustments introduced after 2010, have resulted in more favorable donor response. Donor interviewees pointed out that, since 2012, reporting has significantly improved and that BCPR’s reporting on the MYRF rates highest among all of UNDP.

Donors that have committed allocations to the CPR TTF are expecting to see a continuation of the best practices, including on results reporting, and accountability achieved to date, regardless of where the Fund Management will be located within the new BPPS structure. UNDP has given the assurance that: “The allocations provided to the Fund will continue to be used strictly for the functions for which they were given and accountability back to the donors will continue as per previous practice.”[[14]](#footnote-14)

 **“Not only rapid access to funding but technical support from HQ and Regional Centres is important in post-crisis situations”[[15]](#footnote-15)**

Many COs highlighted that it was not only the funds provided by the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3, but also the access to knowledge management and support both from RC and HQ staff that was essential. In immediate post crisis situations, the SURGE mechanism, as well as programmatic support from HQ and Regional Centres provide the backbone of the CPR TTF and are rated positively by the COs included in this assessment. The delegation of a Chief Technical Advisor for a specific area a country office needed support for, often helped the office to enhance its performance in the given difficult situation. It was highlighted by several CO interlocutors that for the support to be mutually effective, SURGE missions should be short-term and experts need to be familiar with the context and ideally the local language. Although SURGE support was rated positively in general terms, there is room for enhancing the system in place that rates the performance of the individual SURGE personnel.

**“The CPR TTF provides an excellent financing mechanism for inter-agency cooperation and joint programmes”[[16]](#footnote-16)**

On behalf of UNDP, BCPR has taken a lead role in several inter agency working groups on early recovery, conflict and disaster prevention. Over the past ten years, BCPR has also worked with the EU and the World Bank as main partners in a number of projects on various issues including, DDR, Rule of Law and Mine Action. Various efforts are underway to strengthen joint funding options for UN/World Bank operations and EU-UN partnerships, i.e. the EU-UN Partnership Fund and the World Bank-UN Trust Fund. The UN and the World Bank have developed a Fiduciary Principles Accord for Crisis and Emergencies to enhance funding options to Fragile States.

Furthermore, on behalf of UNDP, BCPR oversees the Joint UNDP-DPA Program on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention since 2004. The programme supports concrete steps to develop and implement integrated conflict prevention strategies on the ground, including through the deployment of peace and development advisors (PDAs). SIDA, for example, chooses the CPR TTF as a flexible financing mechanism to support global programmes with DPKO and DPA. SIDA and UNDP have agreed upon monitoring and reporting modalities which facilitate cooperation agreements. The Dutch Government provides annual thematically earmarked funding through the CPR TTF to the Global Rule of Law Programme for the UNDP-DPKO Security Sector Reform activities.

UNDP’s joint programmes and cooperation with other key stakeholders are essential requirements for donors interviewed for this report. The CPR TTF provides a well-functioning mechanism for donors to support such joint efforts in fragile states. Donors commented that it is easier to develop individual financing agreements with UNDP than it is with the Secretariat. Several donors highlighted that these inter-agency programmes were welcome developments, mentioning, in particular, the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations (GFP). The Netherlands and Switzerland are, to date, the main supporters of the GFP.

**“If you don’t include gender, you won’t get funding”[[17]](#footnote-17)**

The results of many years of enhancing gender programming in CPR are mixed. Overall, the general awareness on gender has increased manifold. As one interlocutor emphasized: “Everyone knows by now that if we don’t include gender, we don’t get funding.” The Country Office in Honduras confirmed this statement by adding that the introduction of the 15% allocation to gender was catalytic in the sense that it resulted in discussions in the CO which led to an agreement with the regional centre in Panama to develop a strategy to mainstream gender.[[18]](#footnote-18) Implementation of gender components is still dependent on the extent of gender expertise within each CO combined with government willingness and capacity to implement gender components vigorously. COs were generally not aware of a special gender window of the CPR TTF but there was consensus that global gender projects and exchange of expertise are both useful and appreciated. The feedback received from interviews with stakeholders at the CO level and at HQ confirm that major shortcomings remain, namely, the qualitative monitoring and reporting of gender within non-gender specific projects.

Donors increasingly want to see gender mainstreamed across UNDP programs and in light of this development, BCPR should rethink its gender allocation and gender window. Instead of funding gender components on a project-by-project basis, which may only lead to piecemeal interventions, allocating 15% of the total CPR programme budget in each country would enable a more strategic approach to programming. Additionally, certain CPR TTF or TRAC 1.1.3 funds could be stipulated for global gender equality initiatives. COs recommended retaining the 15% minimum allocation, but equally important is the support during project design. It would be particularly useful to train senior staff on gender indicators and gender-responsive budgeting.

# **Introduction and background**

Over the past 13 years, the management and administration of the CPR TTF has undergone several structural reforms to adapt to a changing aid environment and to donor requests in order to continue to improve and mainstream UNDP’s crisis and prevention work in the field. This report includes a historical overview of the evolution of BCPR as trust fund manager as well as an analysis of the changing aid architecture in which it operates as defined in the ToR. This report does not seek to assess the outputs and outcomes of the programs per se and to this end, the level of CPR mainstreaming in UNDP’s country office programs and activities financed by the TTF and TRAC 1.1.3. This has been covered most recently in the BCPR Strategic Review of 2010[[19]](#footnote-19), the Portfolio Review for UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Feb 2012[[20]](#footnote-20). Further recommendations are found in the Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries in the Context of UN Peace Operations, Jan 2013[[21]](#footnote-21) and the Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery, UNDP Evaluation Office, December 2010[[22]](#footnote-22).

The focus of this assessment is on the CPR financing mechanisms of UNDP and its value added in comparison to other funding mechanisms. As set out in the Terms of Reference, the assessment covers the period from 2000-2013, focusing in particular on evaluating the value added of the use of the CPR TTF and TRAC 1.1.3 resources. It further assesses associated aspects, such as rapid receipt and allocation of funds to UNDP Country Offices for immediate responses to crisis; the use of specific thematic and country windows to channel donor contributions; the ability to generate lessons learned and take into account emerging challenges; and flexibility for adjusting the funding portfolio in response to evolving crisis prevention and recovery needs.

This assessment reviews how selected Country Offices perceive these mechanisms in terms of speed of response, relevance and flexibility and the extent to which funding opportunities from the CPRTTF and TRAC 3 have strengthened overall country portfolios and acted as a seed funding mechanism for mobilizing larger resources for CPR programs. The assessment focuses on identifying relevant lessons learned and best practices and on providing forward-looking recommendations to management for positioning and improving the CPRTTF/TRAC 1.1.3 mechanisms and processes in order to further strengthen the effectiveness of UNDP’s financial support to country offices in special development situations.

This assessment accords with the recommendation from the BCPR Strategic Review 2010 to assess and develop “adjustments to financial structures that engender longer term development, efficient resource allocation and better use of partnerships”.[[23]](#footnote-23) This report is intended for UNDP’s internal use at the outset of the new structure envisioned with the creation of the new Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS).

The specific objectives of this assessment are defined as follows:

* To assess the extent to which the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms have met their original objectives and whether they have been positioned to add value in responding to the needs and demands from high risk crisis countries in a fast and flexible manner that supports UNDP programmes;
* To assess the extent to which the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 allocations contributed to further mobilization of additional resources for CPR interventions by country offices;
* Assess the efficiency of the CPRTTF and TRAC 3 management processes and identify potential areas for improvement;
* To present key findings, draw lessons learned, and provide a set of clear and forward-looking options for improving provision of required financial assistance towards addressing CPR-related needs and challenges.

Pursuant to UNDP’s commitment to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (defined in the UNDP Eight Point Agenda on Women[[24]](#footnote-24)) the assessment pays particular attention to the issue of Gender Equality and Women as viable partners and beneficiaries in TRAC3 and TTF funded projects.

# **Approach and Methodology**

The assessment is based on a thorough desk review of relevant documents, accompanied by interviews with key personnel at BCPR and other relevant UN agencies and donor representatives either in person or per telephone. Data gathering from primary sources was undertaken via an anonymous online survey that was sent to COs and Regional Centres (see Annex 2). Seven COs were chosen for telephone interviews in addition to the online survey. The COs that were interviewed were carefully selected with the assistance of key staff at BCPR’s Planning and Policy Division, based on the following criteria:

* Geographical balance to the extent possible
* COs that received TRAC 3 for emergency response;
* COs that received un-earmarked contributions;
* COs that received a mix of earmarked and un-earmarked contributions

Selected COs included:

Africa: Burundi, Sierra Leone

Arab States: Yemen

Asia: East Timor, Pakistan

Europe and CIS: Kirgizstan

Latin America: Honduras

Information for the relevance of the funding mechanism CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 was mainly gathered from the COs, whereas efficiency and sustainability was discussed with all stakeholders. Various country documents, external reviews and annual reports have also been taken into consideration.

#  **Historical Evolution of the CPR TTF 2000-2013**

In the mid-1990s, UNDP decided that it was essential for long-term development programs to have a mechanism in place that could bridge the gap between humanitarian aid during crisis and long-term recovery. Thus, in 1996, UNDP committed to provide 6.6% of its core resources to fund Crisis Prevention and Recovery. It established the TRAC 1.1.3 (Target for Resources Assignment from the Core, also referred to as TRAC 3) mechanism allowing for rapid and flexible deployment of funds to UNDP COs in need. TRAC 3 resources are earmarked annually to finance initiatives that aim at crisis prevention, reducing the impact of a crisis, and also to support the UN Country Teams and the offices of Resident Coordinators in coordinating crisis response. In 2002, this amount was increased to 7.2% of total core resources, a level at which it has since remained.

The Emergency Response Division, created in 1996, was put in charge of managing these resources and providing technical advice to COs in crisis and post-conflict situations. Recognizing the increasingly important role UNDP played through its work in conflict affected countries, the current Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) replaced the Emergency Response Division in early 2000. Lifting the Division up to a Bureau level headed by a Director at the rank of Assistant Secretary–General, enabled BCPR to play a significantly more active and focused role in CPR at headquarters and at the country-level.

To further strengthen BCPR and to better respond to urgent needs at the country-level, UNDP created the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF) in March 2000. The CPR TTF provides a channel for donors for un-earmarked funding to UNDP for CPR and to fund thematic specific projects in response to crisis prevention and recovery needs in a particular country. It also provides a channel to fund global project initiatives. This funding mechanism is designed to support quick action recovery activities following a natural disaster or violent conflict and to assist the COs in their early recovery efforts. More recently, there has been a shift to increase focus on prevention and risk management to prevent conflict and to reduce disaster risk.

The Fund also envisages that BCPR’s integrated technical expertise and programmatic support are mobilized towards the delivery of the funds. Support to the development of programs is guided by a jointly agreed overall strategic direction between BCPR and the respective regional bureau in alignment with BCPR’s Multi Year Results Framework (MYRF) and the Eight Point Agenda on gender equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

BCPR is the fund manager for TRAC 1.1.3 and CPR TTF resources. The fund is unique in the sense that its management, administration and operation is located in one Bureau (as compared to other UNDP funds that are, for example, administered by the MDTF). BCPR has established the necessary accountability processes and procedures to ensure the proper and effective use of these resources in alignment with their intended objectives. [[25]](#footnote-25)

BCPR directly supports COs in developing CPR programs which meet the criteria for funding. The process is always initiated by a CO that requests either technical or financial support or both. By the end of 2003, the Fund had mobilized more than US$ 850 million[[26]](#footnote-26) and more than US$ 1.5 billion by the end of 2013. [[27]](#footnote-27)

## **3.1 Organizational change**

BPCR, acting as the fund manager, has undergone several structural adjustments over the past 13 years. Although demand from the COs by far outweighs supply, CPR TTF and TRAC 3 allocations have made a substantial contribution to addressing the needs in the immediate aftermath of a major crisis or for countries undergoing a transition process. The degree of successful mainstreaming of CPR programming in COs, set out as one of the objectives of the additional funding through the CPR TTF, varies from country to country. The country studies in chapter 5 highlight some of the more successful examples as well as the challenges.

The first change management process was undertaken in 2006. This seems to have been a turning point for the administration and management of the CPR TTF. The ad-hoc funding of projects along the service lines and intervention by technical support staff was gradually evolving into a professionally managed and administered Trust Fund, combined with highly knowledgeable technical support staff at HQ.

The Strategic Review in 2010 assessed the progress made based on the change management process in 2006 and took account of the changing circumstances in terms of the many new actors in the CPR arena. Within the context of the global financial crisis and decreasing core UNDP resources, the 2010 Review recommended streamlining and strengthening BCPR HQ within UNDP in New York to further optimize the alignment of CPR in UNDP’s Strategic Plan. It further called for the improvement of internal business processes to enhance the overall efficiency and transparency of the funding mechanism of BCPR, including the rapid release of funds and technical expertise, strengthened monitoring and streamlined reporting.

A new structure was proposed whereby the majority of the technical staff, administration and management would be located in New York with Geneva serving as a liaison office. The restructuring process started in the fall of 2011 and was completed by mid-2012. This process was made possible with the generous financial support of a few donor countries, particularly Sweden and the UK. In addition the BCPR Review recommended the creation of a position of Deputy Director for Program Development Support, the position of Chief of Staff to oversee external and donor relations and the creation of leadership teams. The new structure of BCPR in 2012 is shown in the organigram below:



To further enhance the capacity of the COs to respond quickly in the immediate aftermath of crisis, the capacity support mechanism called SURGE, was introduced in 2006. The support mechanism includes:

a) UNDP staff that can be sent to COs as advisors for short periods (7-10 days) for planning purposes or for longer deployments for up to 3 months to assist with Surge implementation.

b) CPR experienced consultants with extensive experience in their technical fields that can be deployed for 3 months or longer.

c) Early Recovery Working Group Mechanism that enables the sending of Advisors, Cluster Coordinators, Information Management Specialists and Needs Assessment Specialists. There is no time limit for their engagement.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), guidelines for the management of immediate crisis response were also introduced in 2006 and were approved in 2008. In addition, an online SURGE Toolkit was developed to facilitate knowledge exchange. The combination of a flexible, rapid finance mechanism together with the SURGE mechanism helped to optimize UNDP’s work for early recovery.

The BCPR Multi Year Strategic Framework (MYSF) from 2008-2013 spearheaded the process to enhance the strategic direction of BCPR programming, particularly after it was aligned with the 2011-2014 UNDP Multi Year Strategic Plan.[[28]](#footnote-28) However, the MYRF lacked an integrated resource management framework that would monitor the expenditures.

The 2014-2017 UNDP Multi Year Strategy highlights the importance of resilience and two of the outcomes are directly related to CPR:

Outcome 5: Countries are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict and lower the risk of natural disasters, including from climate change

Outcome 6: Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post conflict and post disaster settings[[29]](#footnote-29)

More emphasis is given to resilience in the context of fragility. Three of the key development issues identified by the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) are directly linked to CPR, including Resilience, Transition from Relief to Development and Gender Equality and Women Empowerment.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Resilience

Poverty Eradication Gender Equality and Women Empowerment

Transition from Relief Sustainable

to Development Development

This opens the possibility for CPR to be mainstreamed in UNDP programming to an even greater degree over the next four years. UNDP through its management of the CPR TTF should seize this opportunity and put particular effort into promoting the available funding mechanism to relevant stakeholders, both at the CO level and at HQ to enhance resource mobilization.

In the early years of the existence of the Fund, BCPR provided a degree of support to 100+ COs out of the 177 countries and territories where UNDP is present. Starting with the introduction of the SOP in 2006, and benefitting from a more strategic focus on priority countries and better use of available resources resulting from BCPR’s recent transformation, the list was gradually downsized to about 60+ countries in 2013. In 2012, the list still featured 76 countries (down from 83 in 2011) of which 24 were listed as non-priority, in the MYRF.[[31]](#footnote-31) The list for 2013 features 63 countries and no longer includes non-priority countries. In comparison, the Peace Building Fund is active in 23 countries and the World Bank State and Peace building Fund in 25 countries.[[32]](#footnote-32)

BCPR’s process for responding to a particular crisis is dependent on the level of the crisis. According to internally defined crisis criteria, a priority country list is defined every year. Level 1 countries require COs to manage the crisis with only ad hoc support from HQ. Level 2 signifies crisis in countries that require large-scale, day to day organizational support. Level 3 includes countries that are going through a major emergency and require the attention from top management and the entire organization. [[33]](#footnote-33)

The priority list is discussed and approved by senior managers and the team leaders at the commencement of each year according to a priority check list. 2013 marks the first year where an effort has been made to highlight “DRR only” countries and “Citizen Security only” countries.

Several interlocutors in the surveys highlighted the need for more regular sharing of information with COs and a greater shared understanding of how the selection process works. In this regard, it is important that the regional team focal points keep the COs up to date about this annual process, particularly if it includes a shift of priority or is the subject of downsizing. Some interlocutors raised the issue that the criteria for deciding on level 2 and 3 countries is not always applied equally across the board. Most projects approved for funding in 2013 are from Tier 2 countries. If resources are concentrated on fewer focus countries, the CPR TTF could provide the critical mass needed to ensure that projects are relevant and have a long term impact.

Overall, BCPR has undertaken several change management processes to enhance its performance, particularly after 2006. Even though the assessor identified and was assured promising processes, additional funding through the CPR TTF has not resulted in a satisfactory strategic alignment of CPR in UNDP and donors underlined that performance on the ground remains inconsistent.[[34]](#footnote-34) Although some COs show excellent individual results, overall, COs’ strategic focus and mainstreaming of CPR remains less than optimal. Nevertheless, based on the interviews with interlocutors, the assessor concludes that BCPR has satisfactorily met expectations based upon the recommendations of the Strategic Review 2010 and Portfolio Review 2012 and is on the right track to optimize its performance. As numerous interlocutors emphasized, “don’t change what is finally working well but continue to optimize initiated processes”.

## **3.2 Financial developments**

As outlined in the BCPR Annual Report 2012, “Crisis Prevention and Recovery accounted for 23.5 percent of all UNDP expenditure in 2012, roughly the same as the figure in 2011, which stood at 24 percent”.[[35]](#footnote-35) All UNDP expenditures spent on CPR between 2000 and 2013 amounted to approximately US$ 1.5 billion.

As noted above, the demand for funds from CPR after 1996 has significantly surpassed the resources available from TRAC 1.1.3. In the first year of the launch of the CPR TTF in 2000, an additional US$ 84,919,064 was raised for the CPR TTF, of which there was a one-off allocation of approximately USD 63 million by Italy. Gradually, BCPR has moved to a Multi-Year Results Framework (MYRF) but only since 2010, has the allocation of funds been strictly guided by the MYRF and the UNDP Strategic Plan.

UNDP’s global financial and project management system, Atlas, was launched in January 2004 giving the CPR TTF manager the tool to monitor programming and expenditures at the field level. Atlas facilitates the creation of analytical reports which help to identify financial problems at an early stage thereby allowing for an appropriate management response.[[36]](#footnote-36)

When the Fund was launched in 2000, funding windows were established for un-earmarked funding, earmarked contributions targeting individual programs and countries and earmarked contributions benefiting projects in seven service lines: 1) conflict prevention and peacebuilding; 2) Recovery; 3) security sector reform and transitional justice; 4) small arms reduction, disarmament and demobilization, 5) mine action; 6) natural disaster reduction and 7) special initiatives for countries in transitions. The structure and programmatic work were organized along the technical service lines.[[37]](#footnote-37) In the first few years after the CPR TTF was launched, it operated more or less on an ad hoc, needs based basis whereby all COs could apply for project funding.

Along with the development of the first BCPR Multi Year Strategic Framework 2008-2011, and in light of a need to align the Trac 1.1.3 and CPR TTF resources, measures were undertaken aimed at realigning the work of the Fund with this strategy. The organizational structure of BCPR was revised to reflect four new outcome areas and four thematic windows were created within the Fund to facilitate donor support of the new strategic framework.

The four thematic windows are: 1) Conflict Prevention and Recovery, 2) Early Recovery, 3) Disaster Risk Reduction and recovery and 4) Gender Equality. The previous seven service lines were incorporated into these windows. Donors continued to have the opportunity to fund individual programs in target countries. Financial reporting was no longer undertaken along the service lines. Some interlocutors commented that this has complicated tracking of individual fund allocations as per service line.

In 2009 a Strategic review of BCPR was undertaken, which recommended, among other things, to focus on implementing a comprehensive approach to planning and driving strategic focus; establishing funding strategies that provide an optimal balance between longer term sustainable funding and near term gaps and strengthening financial and operational efficiency and funding effectiveness.

The BCPR has implemented recommended strategies and undertaken change processes that included complementing the Results Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) with the Multi Year Results Framework (MYRF), establishing and funding strategies that provide an optimal balance between longer term sustainable funding and near term gaps, and strengthening donor relationships and managing future funding trends. [[38]](#footnote-38)

The following resource allocation mechanisms are available:

* For emergency grants up to US$ 100,000, a request is sent from the CO to the Chief, Resource Management Division through the Country Support Team. These funds can be released upon approval within 48 hours from TRAC 1.1.3 resources[[39]](#footnote-39) and generally include needs assessments, coordination support and project development support.
* Programme proposals need to be approved by the Bureau Project Appraisal Committee (BPAC) or Chief, Resource Management Division (for requests of less than $100,000) and need to comply with a strict set of criteria, for example, government partnership and ownership, and gender components. BPAC meetings are held monthly to consider proposals that come in on a rolling basis. BPAC is aware of a maximum spending limit for each country.
* Funds that are received through the country window of the CPR TTF are directly recorded against specific projects for which a contribution is received and neither of the above two processes is applied. As will be outlined in chapter 3.3, Resource Mobilization, country level earmarked funding is encouraged to be mobilized both at HQ and at the country-level.

Funding allocations are carried out on a yearly basis. If a project duration is longer than 12 months, the CO needs to provide results based reports, based on the Multi Year Results Framework to receive the next tranche of the agreed upon project funds.

The overview below shows the expenditures of TRAC 1.1.3 and CPR TTF from 2004-2013[[40]](#footnote-40):

In 2005, allocations and expenditures were exceptionally high due to the Tsunami in Asia and the Pakistan Earthquake. US$ 73 million was channeled through the CPR TTF for recovery activities of these two disasters. In addition, US$ 66 million was allocated in 2005 to DDR related projects in Afghanistan.[[41]](#footnote-41) Considering the worldwide impact of the financial crisis after 2009, the CPR TTF has managed relatively well to keep annual resource allocations to the TTF at the same level between US$ 80- 100 million. Rough projections of allocations to the CPR TTF for the years 2014 -2016 are USD 95 million for 2014 and USD 77 million for 2015/16.[[42]](#footnote-42)

The CPR TTF management has steadily worked towards balancing allocations and expenditures and, as a result, the CPR TTF today has a well-established system aligning the expected commitments and disbursements with anticipated donor contributions. For example, in 2008, “programming and expenditure continued against the unspent balance from prior years, resulting in a higher expenditure figure than the 2008 income”.[[43]](#footnote-43) By 2012, the closing balance has declined significantly, which is an indication of how the planning and forecasting of the allocations has considerably improved.[[44]](#footnote-44)

The following graph shows an overview of un-earmarked contributions in comparison to total CPR TTF contributions:

Mobilizing un-earmarked funding is difficult for any trust fund in the current development assistance financing framework. Against this background the CPR TTF has done relatively well in comparison to other UN Multi Donor Trust Funds.[[45]](#footnote-45) The continued flow of approximately 30% of un-earmarked funding in comparison to total contributions to the CPR TTF is a positive sign. BCPR noted in its Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013, that there is an overall trend away from un-earmarked funding. This trend has been noted in terms of the core and non-core contributions to UNDP.[[46]](#footnote-46)

Over the past ten years, the CPR TTF has used its thematic windows to accommodate a number of donors’ interests in support of UNDP’s CPR programmes. However, concerns continued about the lack of a clear strategic plan. Donor satisfaction increased considerably after the Results Based Framework based on the MYRF was introduced in 2011. As discussed in chapter 4, this has contributed to mobilizing resources for a range of projects, particularly in rule of law, that have a long-term development perspective. The development of the MYRF has strengthened BCPR’s results-focus, and has increasingly been used as the planning framework which is shared with the donors who provide un-earmarked funding. For example, the MYRF “was provided to Norway as the BCPR workplan, in response to their request to provide indicative information on how their un-earmarked funding will be spent”.[[47]](#footnote-47) Nevertheless, the assessor, in line with the recommendations made in the Strategic Review of 2010 and the Portfolio Review 2012, believes that a stronger identity and branding of the UNDP CPR TTF, together with enhanced reporting on the strategic use of un-earmarked funding, would have helped to increase the percentage of un-earmarked funding. UNDP needs to invest in a process to develop financial reporting guidelines for un-earmarked allocations that meet both donor expectations and at the same time adhere to the ToR of the CPR TTF for un-earmarked allocations. Furthermore, the Strategic Review of 2010 underlined the fact that a larger percentage of core UNDP resources would need to be allocated to TRAC 1.1.3 for CPR work to be more viable, deeper rooted and mainstreamed in UNDP’s work.[[48]](#footnote-48) This was also highlighted by several donor interlocutors during this assessment as outlined in chapters 3.3 Resource Mobilization and 4.1 Donor Perspectives.

The following graph shows the top 10 thematically flexible and un-earmarked donors in 2012:

The Netherlands also contributed USD 6.5million of flexible thematic funding.[[49]](#footnote-49)

Largest donors: ‘Friends of BCPR’

Over the 13 year span, the CPR TTF has attracted a core group of donors that have used the CPR TTF to support initiatives in fragile states that are in line with their countries’ aid development policies for transition countries and fragile states and supported the Fund’s change management processes. The ‘Friends of BCPR’ have continuously contributed un-earmarked funding in addition to earmarked funding and include donors such as the UK (DFID), Sweden (SIDA), the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Denmark and Switzerland. Some of the donors interviewed emphasized that BCPR should do more to keep the ‘Friends of BCPR’ informed about results and challenges, particularly highlighting the need to involve the Ministries of Foreign Affairs that are not located in New York.

The following graph 4 shows the top 8 donors from 2008-2013[[50]](#footnote-50):

Expenditures by region:

Expenditures by region have fluctuated over the years according to major disaster occurrences. Since 2006, after a strategic decision was made to focus on Africa[[51]](#footnote-51), approximately 30% of CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 funding is allocated to Africa every year. In 2005/6, a proportionately high amount was allocated to the Asia Pacific in the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake and the Asian tsunami. The Arab States saw an increase of funding after the Arab Spring 2011. The chart below shows a breakdown of regional allocations from 2004-2013:

Expenditures by thematic window:

Since 2006, conflict prevention and recovery has received the highest amount of thematic funding, followed by early recovery and disaster risk reduction (with the exceptions of years such as 2005 and the Tsunami in Asia). The window for gender equality is rarely used, and TRAC 1.1.3 resources are used at times to supplement projects in support of gender equality. This is further addressed in chapter 5.5 on Gender.

In the period 2004-2009, only 4 percent of total UNDP expenditures went to disaster prevention and recovery.[[52]](#footnote-52) For various reasons that will be explained in more detail in chapter 3, Resource Mobilization and Chapter 4, Overview of MDTFs and Donor Response to changing Aid Architecture, mobilizing thematic funding for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery has been less successful than for Conflict Prevention and Recovery. However, as various recently published reports confirm, an increase in DRR funding is forecasted for the post-2015 development area and the CPR TTF provides a suitable financing mechanism to support national DRR programs.

Focus on Rule of Law, Justice Reform and Security Sector Reform in Fragile States has been at the forefront of donor interest and Conflict Prevention and Recovery has thus received most thematic funding. A portion of the amount recorded under Early Recovery is allocated to DRR every year.

## **3.3 Resource Mobilization**

The overall accountability for resource mobilization is assigned to the Director. In order to facilitate the work of the Bureau, however, certain responsibilities are delegated to the Chief of Staff**,** who is supported by the External Relations Team, for day-to-day management of all aspects related to resource mobilization. The Chief of Staffis accountable for ensuring a coherent and coordinated approach to resource mobilization across all units in the Bureau.

The External Relations Teamtakes the lead for mobilizing un-earmarked funding. The Thematic Group leaders are responsible for mobilizing thematically earmarked funding in the areas of disaster risk reduction, rule of law and armed violence reduction, conflict prevention, post-crisis governance, gender equality and women’s empowerment, early recovery, and economic recovery and livelihoods. The Country Support Management Team is responsible for mobilizing funds for UNDP’s crisis response capacity. All resource mobilization activities are undertaken in coordination with and with the support of the External Relations Team.

Each Thematic Team has a responsibility to reach the agreed targets for thematically earmarked funding for their respective thematic area. This includes active outreach with donor counterparts, in coordination with the External Relations Team and in the overall context of the agreed Bureau-wide Resource Mobilization Strategy, so that thematic funding targets are reached.[[53]](#footnote-53)

Looking back, the CPR TTF has managed to keep a steady funding level. But the lack of a corporate decision to make the fund more visible and do more to promote and publicize it, has resulted in missed opportunities to attract more funding. Certainly the proliferation of ‘CPR-related’ Trust Funds over the past ten years is also an important factor to consider in the context of the relatively slow period of growth of the CPR TTF when considered against overall funds in its practice area. [[54]](#footnote-54)

The 2012 UNDP Integrated Resource Mobilization Strategy highlights the fact that: “Non-core resources tend to be highly concentrated in a number of recipient countries, for the most part crisis and post-crisis countries, reflecting that for many donors UNDP’s operational presence in fragile states is seen as a significant asset of the organization. More than 50 per cent of the total bilateral and multilateral non-core contributions are concentrated in 20 programme countries. Perceptions of the overall performance of UNDP are therefore strongly influenced by the performance in the relatively few countries that receive most non-core funding.”[[55]](#footnote-55)

As Graph 1 under financial development shows, BCPR has performed reasonably well as reflected by the fact that it has maintained a steady funding base over the past six years despite the financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the ensuing donor fatigue. Good relations with key donors have led to continuous flows of resources over the past three years and substantial funds have been promised for the next two years.

However, funding for the CPR TTF looks less positive considering that trends in OECD/DAC funding for ‘conflict, peace and security’ activities grew from USD 812 million in 2004 to over USD 3 billion in 2008. [[56]](#footnote-56) In the area of Disaster Risk Reduction, available resources have increased since 2010. The Copenhagen Accord of Dec 2009 contains a collective commitment by developed countries to provide new and additional resources for DRR for developing countries, approaching USD 100 billion until 2020. The commitment includes a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized to the most vulnerable countries and in 2009 funding commitments from France, Japan, the German Development Bank (KFW) and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) for climate change adaptation reached almost USD 4 billion.[[57]](#footnote-57)

A comprehensive BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy for 2011-213 and beyond was developed in 2010. The analysis in the strategy paper confirms that there are increasing opportunities for funding in the area of Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Related Risk Management in the context of increasing climate funding for adaptation. In addition, there are several recent publications available that underline the point that there are more opportunities to enhance resource mobilization for DRR for 2015 and beyond. As one report states: “The ultimate goal should be comprehensive national systems of preparedness capable of responding to the risks that countries face.” [[58]](#footnote-58) The report further suggests that UNDP’s CPR TTF provides the necessary funding mechanism to direct support to assist governments to develop comprehensive DRM plans. However, it further emphasized that the CPR TTF will not be a strong global fund for DRR as long as it does not provide opportunities for funding to other agencies. Recent examples such as the Rule of Law Global Focal Point should serve as examples for innovative initiatives in the area of DRR even if the CPR TTF’s primary recipient will remain UNDP and other UN offices.

In the future, UNDP should invest more into finding complementarities with other funding mechanisms such as DIPECHO (Disaster Preparedness European Community Humanitarian Office), although the majority of funding is made available for NGOs, UNDP has received funding in the past. Other mechanisms include GFDRR (World Bank), CERF, and the Climate Change Adaptation Fund. Particular attention should be given to see who funds regional programs.

With regards to early recovery, the analysis in the resource mobilization strategy further concludes: “In terms of humanitarian response, the Humanitarian Emergency Response review conducted by the UK has recognized the importance of placing more emphasis on ‘resilience’ and ‘funding recovery from day one’ and investing in national capacities for disaster preparedness. Currently, UNDP does not access enough funding from humanitarian funding streams to provide sufficient support to ‘early recovery’.”[[59]](#footnote-59)

Several interlocutors have confirmed the analysis made in the BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy that the main challenge all these funds face is to find a common approach on how to complement each other instead of competing for donor money. The PBF and PBSO, together with UNDP and the World Bank, are holding sporadic coordination meetings but concrete outcomes have yet to be determined. The coordination and administration of resources for DRR is in even more disarray.[[60]](#footnote-60)

With this array of funding options, feedback from the COs suggest that there is insufficient knowhow available at the country level regarding available funding channels. Resource mobilization through other MDTFs is made through individual contacts and expertise of UNDP RCs and Country Directors.

Furthermore, the interlocutor at the MPTF office confirmed that, in terms of financial sustainability, leveraging program financing at the country-level seems a far more viable option than getting non-traditional donors to contribute to the global CPR TTF. This observation seems to be confirmed by several of the interviewees. In rare cases, as feedback from the Pakistan and Burundi COs confirms, funding has been obtained from non-traditional sources at the country-level. COs further conveyed that they would like to enhance their own resource mobilization strategies and the assistance of HQ to see which funding channels make sense to pursue in the given context would be appreciated during the course of program implementation. This should even be part of the initial planning and design process in order to provide a long term perspective.

Fundraising is more difficult in some countries than others. For example, it is difficult to mobilize resources for India and Sri Lanka due to limited access to bilateral aid. Un-earmarked funding is essential for UNDP to allocate resources to these countries if necessary. Particularly in DRR, the funding situation needs to be carefully considered during the planning stages, taking into account the donor availability in a particular country. Climate change adaptation has not been significantly addressed in the BCPR MYRF in earlier years but has gained much more focus in both the current BCPR MYRF and the new UNDP Strategic Plan.

As highlighted by one donor and by staff at headquarters, trust in the leadership has been crucial in attracting and maintaining funding. Accountability has particularly improved under the current and previous directors. Several donors emphasized that they expected an increase in core UNDP contributions for CPR work over the years. However, the assessor appreciates that this has not been possible under the current budgetary constraints that UNDP has faced in relation to core contributions.

Nevertheless, donors have pointed out that BCPR needs to show to donors that it will make optimal use of UNDP internal resources, even if this amounts to small funds. Donors have also been very clear that they are expecting major improvements under the new structure. The Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013 summarizes: “If we are to ensure that we generate funding to achieve the results going into the end of 2012 and beyond, it will be important to develop a full picture of the funding that is required to achieve the MYRF and to increasingly outreach to donors, in a coherent manner, and encourage them to provide thematically earmarked or multiple project funding toward the results in the MYRF, if they cannot provide un-earmarked funding.”[[61]](#footnote-61)

As an example of thematic flexible funding serves the Global Programme for the Rule of Law, that was launched in 2008. While UNDP had already a well-established engagement on access to justice, its engagement in crisis countries was ad-hoc and partial (with some exceptions i.e. Timor, Sudan, Haiti), lacking a more systematic and sustained engagement. As a result, UNDP put in place the Global Programme for Rule of Law which was intended to considerably expand its portfolio in support for the rule of law in 20 countries and to assert UNDP as a lead entity within the UN system. In the following years, the [Global Rule of Law Programme](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/2012ROLGlobalProgrammePhaseIIFINAL.pdf/) managed to both increase UNDP’s rule of law portfolio in crisis affected countries and to assume a UN system-wide leading role in this area. Since its inception, the Global Programme, which is managed through the CPR TTF, caught the attention of several donor countries that have provided thematic flexible funding for the Global Programme of Rule of Law since then. To date, UNDP has provided seed funding to over 40 countries to support the development of an overall rule of law portfolio. The total mobilized resources since 2008 through 2013 is over USD 130 million, of which USD 14 million were mobilized alone for 2013. The Global Programme provided the Framework for the Rule of Law, Justice & Security Team within BCPR to be more proactive, increasing both donor relationships at HQ but also leveraging seed money at the country level (see example of the Rule of Law Project in Malakand, chapter 5.1).

The Dutch Government has been the main donor partner with a multi-year contribution of EUR 7 million. The partnership with the Netherlands goes beyond financial contributions as they help UNDP on the ground to convene other donors and to gather political support in NY for the rule of law agenda. Other important political and financial partners are Switzerland and the US with which BCPR has global partnerships that have the potential to grow significantly. The CPR TTF’s well-established business processes, in combination with the technical support of BCPR’s thematic teams, have proven to be an efficient and reliable channel for the Global Programme.[[62]](#footnote-62)

In light of the pending restructuring process within UNDP, resource mobilization will be approached differently and will no longer be undertaken in a siloed approach but more centrally within BERA. BCPR’s lessons learned and forward looking resource mobilization strategy should be taken into consideration during this process.

Based on the interviews and desk review, the following recommendations should be considered by the future CPR TTF fund manager with regards to resource mobilization:

1. Develop a comprehensive resource mobilization strategy based on the IRRF for the projected funding needs for CPR for the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014 - 2017, feeding into the corporate UNDP-wide framework and building on the MYRF and expected country needs.
2. Focus on attracting more "thematic flexible" contributions to the CPR TTF to allow countries to support specific thematic areas but still giving UNDP BCPR the flexibility to act according to country needs.
3. A UNDP corporate decision is needed to further strengthen the Fund’s visibility and branding as a fast, flexible and professional UNDP CPR funding mechanism to support UNDP COs in crisis and post-crisis situations. The CPR TTF has been commended as UNDP’s best internal fund and the achieved standard of results reporting based on the MYRF should be maintained.
4. Develop branding and commercial materials on specific thematic areas of BCPR’s work to enhance donor support.
5. Hold annual donor briefings with Ministries of Foreign Affairs on the results achieved.
6. Increase attention to climate change and risk management related issues. This was already recommended in the Strategic Review of 2010. Even if only small funding can be accessed initially, these might lead to larger projects in the future. The resource mobilization strategy should also focus on the more recently established funding mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and other financing options for its DDR related work.
7. Ensure that, under the new structure, technical and any other relevant information requested from donors can be easily obtained. One donor particularly welcomed the highly professional technical information that can be accessed through BCPR at this time. This advantage should not be lost under the new structure.
8. Develop Standard Operating Procedures on resource mobilization roles and responsibilities in case of Level 2/Level 3 crisis and develop Resource Mobilization Guidance and tools/advice for resource mobilization which can be included in the guidance notes for signature products in post natural disaster
9. Ensure that the annual reports provide more details about the difficulties and challenges that have been faced during implementation. At the same time, UNDP should demonstrate evidence of results achieved in view of long term impact and attribute the results to the CPR TTF seed funding (see example of the 3x6 approach in Burundi). This could also include a chart that shows how much COs manage to leverage funding based on CPR TTF seed funding.

## **3.4 Partnerships and Leadership Role**

As a result of the Humanitarian Response Review 2005 commissioned by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, the UN-wide cluster system was established. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (ISAC) assigned the global and country level system wide coordination role for early recovery to UNDP. UNDP BCPR has since been responsible for the system-wide capacity of the Cluster Working Group Early Recovery (CWGER) to provide rapid, coordinated and efficient inter-agency support for early recovery in crisis affected countries. BCPR is taking a lead role in the inter agency framework team for Preventive Action, as well as for the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI).[[63]](#footnote-63) Over the past ten years, BCPR has undertaken several projects with the EU and the World Bank as main partners in DDR, Rule of Law and Mine Action. Various efforts are underway to strengthen joint funding options for UN/World Bank operations and EU-UN partnerships, i.e. the EU-UN Partnership Fund and the World Bank-UN Trust Fund. Although funding UN agencies has been difficult in the past through World Bank administered funds due to differing fiduciary and administrative requirements, a special window was created in this Trust Fund to facilitate funding to UN agencies. The UN and the World Bank have developed a Fiduciary Principle Accord for Crisis and Emergencies to enhance funding options to Fragile States.

Furthermore, on behalf of UNDP, BCPR executes the Joint UNDP-DPA Program on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention since 2004. The programme supports concrete steps to develop and implement integrated conflict prevention strategies on the ground, including through the deployment of peace and development advisors. Since the inception of the program, Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs) have been deployed in 33 countries.[[64]](#footnote-64) The effort has gained momentum with the introduction of the New Deal Framework that emphasizes that “processes of political dialogue have often failed due to lack of trust, inclusiveness, and leadership.”[[65]](#footnote-65) Switzerland is one of the contributors to this programme and the interlocutor at the Swiss Permanent Mission underlined that, with support to this programme, they further expect UNDP to strengthen the position of Resident Coordinators to fulfill the role as political advisor in crisis situations.[[66]](#footnote-66)

BCPR also co-chairs the Security Sector Reform Task Force together with SSRU/OROLSI. The Dutch Government provides annual earmarked funding of USD 1 million by way of CPR TTF to the Global Rule of Law Programme for the UNDP-DPKO Security Sector Reform activities.

UNDP’s joint programmes and cooperation with other key stakeholders are essential requirements for donors interviewed for this report. The CPR TTF provides a well-functioning mechanism for donors to support such joint efforts in fragile states. Several donors highlighted that these were welcome developments, mentioning, in particular, the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations (GFP), managed under the framework of the Global Programme for Rule of Law.

**The Global Focal Point for Rule of Law for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and other Crisis Situations**

In September 2012, the United Secretary-General designated the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UNDP as the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations (GFP)[[67]](#footnote-67). The GFP is a mechanism of support and assistance to the field focusing on “knowledge, people, and advice”, including the promotion and funding for joint programming on rule of law. It is a new innovative business model at UN Headquarters to ensure an integrated approach in strengthening national capacities in the areas of police, justice and corrections. Through the GFP, UNDP and DPKO have been reaching out to the rest of the United Nations system. UN Women has already co-located a representative within the GFP and OHCHR and UNODC are planning to do so.

Although it is still early days, this new arrangement has demonstrated the capacity to yield cost and operational benefits and improvements in relation to the provision of rule of law assistance. Since its inception, UNDP and DPKO have been actively working together to provide more coherent joint support to crisis affected countries that require rule of law assistance. The aim is to make the GFP into a qualitatively new, more targeted, cost effective, impact-oriented and agile platform. The early results of this approach are becoming increasingly visible, with new synergies and joint approaches for the delivery of country-specific rule of law assistance emerging.

From the planning of new missions to transitions; from peacekeeping settings to special political operations and to other crisis situations, DPKO and UNDP are working more closely than ever before to foster and institutionalize mutually supportive approaches, communications and collaboration between United Nations field presences and UN partners. The GFP arrangement has demonstrated its value in the context of both mission “start-up” and “drawdown”. In Somalia, jointly designed mission concepts have resulted in the co-location of rule of law capacities and the early development of joint programs. Sierra Leone is a good example of transition planning to ensure the smooth drawdown of UNSMIL in the area of policing.

A number of donors have been keen to support the GFP arrangement both at HQ and in the field. Although, decision-making and accountability for the use of GFP funds received from donors is the joint responsibility of DPKO and UNDP**, the CPR TTF has been deemed to be the most appropriate and flexible fund available for the receipt and management of funds provided by donors in support of GFP activities**. Although DPKO has been exploring possibilities to obtain reduced PSC rates to administer GFP funds in the future, to date this has not borne fruit. It remains unlikely that DPKO will be able to put in place equally flexible procedures to manage GFP funds.[[68]](#footnote-68)

GFP funding is received by the CPR TTF earmarked for the GFP.[[69]](#footnote-69) In addition, BCPR and OROLSI/DPKO have agreed and put in place, through the GFP Management Team (composed of DPKO/OROLSI and BCPR), “Procedures on the Management and Administration of GFP funds”.[[70]](#footnote-70) This recently finalized document sets out the guiding principles and procedures with respect to securing, allocating and using GFP funds as agreed by the GFP Management Team. It anticipates the triple approval of all expenditures by the Police Division and the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service of OROLSI/DPKO and by BCPR/UNDP based upon principles of equal decision-making authority, full access to data, shared visibility and equal division of resources. Through the CPR TTF, GFP funds may be used for a number of areas of GFP support including the rapid deployment of expertise, GFP joint assessments or technical support visits to the field, emergency or “catalytic” country level projects, and the development of GFP knowledge and management tools.

# **Overview of MDTFs and Donor Response to changing Aid Architecture**

Overseas development assistance (ODA) has seen drastic changes during the first decade of 2000. The period was marked by an increase in fragmentation, complexity and volatility of aid.[[71]](#footnote-71) Earmarking of funds has increased to control the expenditure of funds. At the same time, overall donor funding experienced a significant decrease. Funding declined from an average of $3 million in 1997 to $1.3million in 2009[[72]](#footnote-72). However, the World Bank reported in 2011 that “donor funding for Fragile Countries and Situations (FCS) has steadily increased and strong advocacy for greater attention to FCS has resulted in a commitment by the International Development Association (IDA)[[73]](#footnote-73) to raise its share of resources to fragile countries by about 50 percent over the next three years”.[[74]](#footnote-74)

ODA allocations to DRR over the past decade are in stark contrast to allocations for conflict prevention and recovery. Kellett and Sparks, in their briefing paper ‘Disaster Risk Reduction, Spending where it should count’ report that: “Out of a total of US$ 363 billion of ODA, only US$ 3.7 billion have been allocated to the top humanitarian recipients going to reduce disaster risk between 2000 and 2009”. [[75]](#footnote-75) By 2009 the top 40 recipients accounted for 92% of all humanitarian funding, with a similar figure reported in each of the previous six years.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Starting in the late 1990, donors and the World Bank increasingly resorted to pooled funding in order to deliver aid to fragile states. Donors were no longer supportive of traditional multilateral financing mechanisms, realizing that they had more influence through pooled funding mechanism versus bilateral aid.[[77]](#footnote-77) Multi Donor Trust Funds have become the preferred option for financing in fragile states as risk taking can be shared. Through steering boards, they also provide a chance to donors to provide direct inputs.

In order to fund major reconstruction programs, such as in Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2004, the creation of MDTFs have proliferated over the past 13 years. From 2000- 2010, the World Bank, for example, administered 1075 different Trust Funds[[78]](#footnote-78). To promote better management of increasing needs of aid for fragile states, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness laid the ground for new ways of financing aid, according to the five ‘Pillars of Aid Effectiveness’. This was reinforced in 2008 with the Accra Agenda for Action and in 2011, the latest attempt by the international community, the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held in Busan that resulted in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The main message that was endorsed by 34 countries and 6 international organizations[[79]](#footnote-79) in Busan included the commitment to take action in the following three areas: 1. Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (development partners define a new framework to facilitate attaining the MDGs in the fragile and conflict-affected countries) 2. Country Leadership and Ownership (aid recipients lead their own transitions out of fragility, playing a key role in agenda-setting and implementation) 3. Effective Resource Management and Results Alignment (development partners strive to improve transparency, use of country systems, national capacities, timeliness of aid delivery and predictability of funding).[[80]](#footnote-80)

UNDP has supported governments with fragility assessments but commitment to and understanding of the New Deal framework by governments remain mixed. Some countries like Liberia and Timor-Leste have shown strong government ownership (see case study on Timor-Leste) and completed their assessments. Others, such as Sierra Leone, show less government ownership as well as weaker donor support. BCPR reiterated in its MYRF Annual Report 2012 its commitment to support governments in the New Deal Agenda.[[81]](#footnote-81)

Within the framework of the UN reform, pooled funding has also taken precedence within the UN over the past 15 years. The UN set up the first UN multi-donor funding mechanism – the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq – in 2003. To support this Fund, a new office was created, which became operational in 2004, and was restructured into the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office in 2006. The office has since increased its capacity and services and, by 2013, manages 63 multi-donor trust funds and 40 joint programs. The main advantages of the pooled financing mechanism include a global reach by donor countries, proven implementation capacities, reduced operating costs, solid fiduciary and results-based management, multi accountability through collaborative decision-making and risk sharing.[[82]](#footnote-82)

Some of the most prominent and largest trust funds that channel funds to fragile and conflict affected States include: The World Bank’s State Building and Peace Building Fund (SBF), the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the African Development Bank’s Fragile States Facility (FSF). Although these funds all focus on post-conflict, fragile situations and post disaster, they have developed unique strategic thematic windows and priorities.[[83]](#footnote-83) The World Bank’s State and Peacebuilding Fund for Fragile States is its only multi donor trust fund that focuses on fragile states and was established in 2008. It currently supports 50 projects in 23 countries.[[84]](#footnote-84) Trust fund financing has been the World Bank’s sole or predominant engagement in fragile states.[[85]](#footnote-85) To step up its engagement in fragile states, the World Bank Group launched the Center on Conflict, Security and Development (CCSD) in February 2012 to strengthen the Bank’s work with fragile and conflict affected states, and leverage its years of experience working in these challenging environments. The chart below outlines the biggest trust funds for Conflict Prevention and Recovery and their funding capacities[[86]](#footnote-86):

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | World Bank SPF | CPR TTF | UN PBF | African Development Bank FSF |
| Year established | 2008 | 2000 | 2005 | 2008 |
| Annual programm amount | Annual averageFY09-13: $45.7mio | 2012: $90mio2011:$115mio2010: $105mio2009: $ 73mio | Target/y: $ 100mio2012: $42,46 mio2011: $87,43mio2010: $89.80mio | Cycles:2008-11: $998mio2011-2013: $1176m |
| Earmarking | Un-earmarked | Un-earmarked and earmarked | Un-earmarked | Un-earmarked and earmarked |
| Donor base | Few and traditional external donors | Primarily traditional donor base | Broad donor base including many non-traditional | Primarily traditional donor base |

UNDP is one of the main receivers of the UN PBF (45% of projects are currently assigned to UNDP). Funding from the African Development Bank and the World Bank’s SPF is however rarely received by UNDP. The various European funding instruments present a further major source of funding for UNDP. Although these funds cannot be obtained as un-earmarked, the BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013 emphasizes the importance of the EU-UNDP partnership.

In Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change, some of the main trust funds include: the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), the Climate Change Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) managed by the Global Environmental Facility (WB serves as Trustee), and the Climate Investment Fund Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR). The newest addition to Climate Funds is the Green Climate Fund (GCF) established in 2013 that was designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).[[87]](#footnote-87) : The Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF), Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) (small scale funding availability for NGOs), both managed by OCHA, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF, established 2006)[[88]](#footnote-88), also managed by OCHA, provide funding in all types of disaster situations.

Accessing funding from these Funds is not straightforward for UNDP. For example UNDP needs to continue to work with the World Bank’s Global Facility for DRR to amend its bylaws to allow funding to UNDP and through UNDP to the UN agencies, on PDNAs.[[89]](#footnote-89) The Climate Adaptation Fund and the CERF have different business models and tighter project timeframes, whereas the CPR TTF allows for greater flexibility. COs also face challenges in accessing funding from Climate Funds as funding is only available if a particular project proposal can outline the impact based on climate change. Only projects addressing the ‘additionality’ to climate change induced occurrences is funded by many Climate Change Funds, for example projects that address additional problems based on climate induced drought issues. The CPR TTF on the other hand, funds projects with regards to normal vulnerabilities such as regularly occurring droughts and floods. As one interlocutor commented: ‘It is important to develop a system that defines the compatibility of the two issues in order to enhance impact on the ground.”[[90]](#footnote-90)

This is reiterated by the observation made in the evaluation report of UNDP’s Contribution to DRR where the authors write: “Slow onset of disaster such as drought is not considered disaster risk reduction and sustainable environment support and is therefore not under the purview of disaster risk management. The impact of climate change is likely to blur the boundaries between slow- and rapid-onset disasters in the future, making measures to improve coordination among programme areas even more critical.[[91]](#footnote-91)

The Hyogo Framework for Action adopted in 2005 at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction provides the framework for government activities in DRR. UNDP contributes to implementing the Hyogo framework through its support to the International Strategy for Disaster reduction (ISDR). The system has overall responsibility for coordination and information sharing. UNDP has focused on supporting Governments at the national and subnational level to develop and implement comprehensive DRM plans.

The CPR TTF differs from these funds as it is not a traditional Multi Donor Trust Fund that channels funding to a variety of partners, but was designed as an internal UNDP funding mechanism that only provides funding to its country offices. The CPR TTF is unique in that it supports both conflict prevention and disaster relief. In addition, as outlined earlier, it also has the capability to fund joint global policy programmes such as the Global Focal Point for Rule of Law. UNDP should focus on compatibility and accessing funding from these sources in addition to bilateral donors when preparing resource mobilization strategies.

It is interesting to note that an Independent Evaluation for the World Bank highlights similar weaknesses with regards to results based reporting on trust funds than many UN managed trust funds. The World Bank’s evaluation report on Trust Fund Support for Development in 2011 states that it is hard to evaluate the outcomes of the Trust Fund allocated money as “trust funded programs tend to have either weak or non-existent results framework.”[[92]](#footnote-92) The report underlines that “outcomes have been much harder to come by and they had to rely on outputs which seem more successful generally”.[[93]](#footnote-93) Cooperation between the UN and World Bank is outlined as a common issue of concern over the past ten years, as well as weak capacity on the ground and differences with other aid agencies.[[94]](#footnote-94)

**4.1 Donor Perspectives**

One of the main reasons donors provide funding to the CPR TTF is UNDP’s presence and neutrality in fragile states. UNDP is often one of the only stakeholders providing assistance to governments in fragile states. The interlocutor at the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) further explained that Switzerland decided to increase its contribution to have a more prominent voice and more say in the assistance of UNDP to fragile states. CPR related activities in fragile states is a priority for DFID and Norway within UNDP.

As outlined in chapter 3.1, the most significant donors to the CPR TTF over the last 10 years have been the UK (DFID), Sweden (MFA and SIDA), the Netherlands, Norway, Japan, Germany, Canada, and the EU. Several other countries have increased their support in alignment with their foreign policy to increase support to fragile states. Denmark and Switzerland, for example, have both increased funding since 2012. Denmark has also taken a lead role in the discussions on risk management between like-minded donors and New York based multi-lateral agencies.[[95]](#footnote-95) Switzerland and Norway have provided funding to foster UN-World Bank relationships through the establishment of the UN-World Bank Trust Fund. Other donors have also used the CPR TTF to finance secondments to UNDP. In addition, Japan’s supportive role of UNDP’s CPR work at the country-level has been mentioned by several COs.

DFID has consistently been one of the largest donors (mainly un-earmarked funding) of the CPR TTF. The interlocutor highlighted that one of the reasons DFID supports the CPR TTF is to try and ensure that UNDP has the capacity and systems in place to work in fragile states, but he underlined that performance of UNDP at the country-level in fragile states needs to be more consistent. Support from both DFID and SIDA has been essential during the BCPR transformation process in 2010, particularly focusing on how to achieve better results at the country-level.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Norway has been providing un-earmarked funding to the CPR TTF in order to strengthen UNDP’s CPR work on the ground. Norway is the fifth biggest donor of non-core and thematic funding to UNDP. The Foreign Ministry also provides 15 percent of total UNDP core funding, therefore also 15 percent of Trac 1.1.3 funding. The low percentage of UNDP core funding allocated to Trac 3 is a significant concern to them. Norway, along with other donors would have hoped to see an increase from the 7.2% allocation over the years in line with the increase in the demand of CPR needs around the world. An increase in un-earmarked non-core funding from Norway to key areas like CPR is unlikely as they already are one of the main core donors. The interlocutors suggested that UNDP should explore the possibility of establishing new mechanisms allowing for softly earmarked thematic funding of the outcomes in the new Strategic Plan.

All the donors that were interviewed were supportive of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and the outcomes related to CPR. The Norwegian interlocutors recommend that, under the new structure, the CPR TTF should be linked to the relevant outcomes of the Strategic Plan 2014-2017. Donors would thus have the chance to provide *soft–earmarked or thematic funding* in support of specific outcomes in the Strategic Plan. They emphasized that it would increase the strategic perception of the CPR TTF if funding could be linked directly to an outcome of UNDP’s Strategic Plan. UNDP would need to define its CPR strength and comparative advantage and provide an integrated budget for the CPR TTF’s results framework.

They further reiterated that if Norway is going to negotiate new agreements for non-core allocations to the CPR TTF (or its successor), it will need to be based on the provision of a new budgeted results framework in clear alignment with the UNDP Strategic Plan and its Integrated Results and Resources Framework.

Enhancing UN inter-agency activities and joint programmes is a key concern for many donors. The interlocutor at SDC reiterated that the more recent and innovative establishment of the Global Focal Point for Rule of Law, which is supported by SDC with an annual earmarked contribution of USD 0.5 million over 3 years, has been very much welcomed. The CPR TTF has so far provided the best financing mechanism for this endeavor (see also chapter 3.3 on partnerships). She underlined that donors would like to see more innovative inter-agency cooperation.

In view of the restructuring process of UNDP, the Swiss interlocutors emphasized that they expect to see a continuation of concrete results on the ground that can be presented to the Swiss Parliament. In this regard, it was underlined that the new BPPS should not be a think-tank but should provide a link between policy and practice, and vice versa, with a strong link to country offices to enhance performance on the ground.

Some donor interlocutors conceded that they could make better decisions regarding funding by increasing cooperation between their own humanitarian and development departments. Several interlocutors mentioned that funding allocation commitments are made in different departments. SIDA has made progress in improving this cooperation by organizing teams of humanitarian and development staff and by looking for both humanitarian and development experience when filling staff positions in either department.

Several donors emphasized that BCPR provides the best results framework within UNDP and it should be developed as a best practice**.** Norway commended the fact that reporting had improved substantially since 2011. The 2012 MYRF Annual Results Report “Part 1: Narrative” was seen as a very good example for reporting on CPR activities, but they were surprised that this report was not publicly available. This narrative report provides an aggregate analysis of the detailed results info available in the MYRF, and describes progress according to targets and milestones. However, the tracking of funding or reporting on the efficiency of funding remains inadequate and the reporting is still insufficiently connected to outcomes (the MYRF report should include info on expenditure). The interlocutors believe that the Integrated Results and Resources Framework of the new Strategic Plan is also a good starting point for undertaking results-based budgeting and financial reporting.

Donor interlocutors pointed out that UNDP should provide more results based reporting on the use of un-earmarked funding in order to increase trust in un-earmarked funding in fragile and transition states. A Transition Financing Study Report by DFID and SIDA concludes: “If UN agencies can demonstrate that they allocate significant un-earmarked funding to transition activities, the donor may be able to increase the flexibility of their funding instruments by providing more un-earmarked funding to UN agencies for transition activities.”[[96]](#footnote-96) The CPR TTF Fund Manager should adjust the narrative and financial reporting on un-earmarked funding to the extent possible.

More detailed summaries of the interviews with donors can be found in Annex 3. The main feedback from donors interviewed for this assessment include:

* Donors appreciate UNDP’s presence and capacities in fragile states and the CPR TTF provides a financial mechanism to support Governments of fragile states.
* Donors expected an increase of UNDP core resources to Trac 1.1.3 in line with the increase in the demand of CPR needs around the world.
* Donors would like UNDP to provide an overview of how all UNDP Trust Funds function and how they should be adapted to the Strategic Plan 2014-2017.
* Although CPR has been featured in the previous UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2013, there has been an insufficient alignment of many CPR TTF funded projects with the UNDP Strategic Plan on the ground. Expectations are high that this will change in light of the new UNDP Strategy 2014-2017 that clearly links two of its outcomes to CPR.
* Some donors report that further funding will be dependent upon the approval of the new Integrated Results Framework (IRRF) that accompanies the Strategic Plan as well as satisfactory performance on the ground in 2013/2014.
* Donors are generally satisfied with the structural changes that were made based on recommendations of the Strategic Review 2010. They also expressed favorable views of the MYRF 2012 narrative report that was shared with donors. Reporting has improved substantially and the Results Framework is seen as best practice in UNDP.
* Annual meetings with core donors to present and discuss BCPR results would have been appreciated and are expected in the future. One donor commented that it would be appreciated if BCPR could improve its strategic communication with their capital.
* One donor highlighted that the current structure facilitates easy access to the technical and any other information the donor requires. The resource mobilization team (the main contact of the donor) and country teams are easily accessible and always in the position to access information swiftly from colleagues. Concerns were expressed that this may be lost under the new structure.

## **4.2 Perspectives of other UN agencies**

UN Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF) Office

The interlocutors at the UNDP Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) underlined that a trust fund is only as good as its programs. Having a clear financing strategy in place is very important to run successful programs. The CPR TTF is a single agency trust fund (money is only allocated to UNDP) and even though she acknowledges that the CPR TTF’s main mission is to support UNDP’s COs in crisis situations, she underlined that a single agency fund does not bring in the same amount of coordination and strategic orientation as multi agency trust funds, where MDTF partners and governments are included in decision making processes. It has to be clearly communicated that the money is seed funding and that a strategy has to be in place to achieve long term goals. Furthermore, UNDP is still struggling to overcome the perception of being a direct implementing agency. UNDP has to be “more deliberate” in its efforts to sustain government ownership although this is bound to be a challenge in fragile states where there is rarely an accountable government partner. Programmes are most successful where government ownership has been strong from the design to the implementation of a project (for example, assistance to DRM plans in Pakistan or Indonesia). The New Deal Framework aims to assist governments with the task to outline who should support what during the process from transition to development. But governments have to take charge in driving the process, otherwise the process is “doomed to fail”. This often entails a longer process which runs counter to donor expectations to receive swift performance results on the ground.

The interlocutors commended BCPR’s improvement as a fund manager and confirmed that the CPR TTF is the most successful fund of all UNDP trust funds. The MPTF Office recommends that resource mobilization at the CO level should be enhanced through the provision of BCPR or BERA guidance. COs could benefit from updated resource mobilization strategies including an outline of what finance streams are available and how to access them. The interlocutor highlighted that there were now far more financing streams available and this makes it more challenging for COs to understand the availability of funding resources.

Peace Building Support Office (PBSO)

The Peace Building Fund (PBF) was established in 2005[[97]](#footnote-97) with the mandate to enhance the capacity of the UN system in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. In its first few years, the PBF channeled most of its funds to UNDP COs, due to the fact that UNDP already had established presence and expertise in post-conflict settings. The PBF has, however, sought to diversify its implementing agencies and by 2013, 45% of funds are allocated to UNDP COs, with the remaining funds distributed to other UN offices. Similarly to the CPR TTF, the PBF has a fast track funding tool, the ‘Immediate Response Facility’ and the ‘Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility’ that are designed to support a more structured peacebuilding process.[[98]](#footnote-98) In an effort to support One UN, it is the RC coordinator, together with the national government, that submits projects to the Peace Building Support Office (BPSO).

The PBSO aims to fundraise USD 100 million every year and, to that end, has developed a 3 year resource mobilization strategy. According to the interlocutor at the PBSO, in terms of resource mobilization for both funds, a still underused source of long term funding are the development banks, i.e the African and European Development Banks.

The PBF has a distinct mandate and thus clearly differs from the CPR TTF, which provides much broader support to UNDP country offices in CPR. The interlocutor also pointed out that the PBF seeks to be catalytic in its own way and is thus not enthusiastic to finance BCPR pilot projects that need to be scaled-up. The PBF has therefore added a question in its proposal application forms that requests the applicant to verify if the CPR TTF has contributed to the project. It does not follow that the PBF would refuse funding, but it helps to identify any overlap of interest. The interlocutor highlighted that there is a need to coordinate capacities and priorities on the ground that would result in a better use of available resources. This would increase the impact of the resources allocated through the various trust funds. In this regard, a recent independent review of UNDP implementation of PBF projects reiterated: “One of the more novel recommendations of this report is to facilitate a more substantive and strategic discussion between UNDP and PBSO to identify countries in which the PBF and accompanying peace building architecture at the country level will truly add value.”[[99]](#footnote-99) As a positive example, the interlocutor mentioned that the PBSO approached BCPR in support of a project proposal provided by a Government that was not in the mandate of the PBF but seemed essential for the stability in the country (i.e. bonuses for retired soldiers to avert renewed recruiting). This was deemed important and funding was made possible through the CPR TTF.

# **Assessment of BCPR Funding Mechanisms – Feedback received from Country Offices through interviews and the on-line survey**

Telephone conferences with seven selected COs provided further insight into the perception of the relevance, efficiency and sustainability of the BCPR funding mechanism at the recipient end. This section provides an overview of the perceptions of these COs of the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 financing mechanism, as well as BCPR’s technical support. The assessor received consistent feedback that funding alone would not have the same impact without the technical support provided by BCPR.

The assessor further acknowledges the results of the UNDP Headquarters Products and Services Surveys conducted in 2009 and 2012. In 2009, BCPR received relatively positive feedback for timely fund allocation, timely delivery of services such as SURGE and actual contribution to development results. [[100]](#footnote-100) The fund management has received above 70% ratings of good and excellent for all the questions provided in the survey. The BCPR practice network was given particularly high ratings above 75%[[101]](#footnote-101) . The global staff survey conducted in late 2012 reconfirmed these results with an even higher percentage for accountability and transparency and for trust in senior management (15 percent above UNDP average). The annual MYRF report 2012 further notes that “ratings for working effectively with Country Offices exceed even external benchmarks by more than 15 percentage points.”[[102]](#footnote-102)

Chapter 5.2-5.4 summarizes the key responses from the online survey. The assessment is based on seven CO interviews and 14 surveys that were received. Information received during HQ interviews were also taken into account. The feedback on gender related questions are separately outlined in Chapter 5.5.

## **5.1 Case studies**

**Timor-Leste**

The interlocutor at the CO commended the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 funding mechanism’s flexibility and rapid response. The CPR TTF is mostly used as seed funding or for projects that needed to make a quick impact for the CO to position itself as an effective partner to the Government. The administrative procedures are regarded as extremely efficient. The interlocutor emphasized that the CPR TTF clearly stands out in comparison to other internal UNDP trust funds where processes are less streamlined and more bureaucratic.

Timor-Leste has undergone a difficult transition phase after violence erupted again in April 2006, leaving more people displaced. This outbreak of violence marked a significant setback after independence from Indonesia was gained in 1999. The funds from BCPR became particularly relevant in the period after the 2006 crisis and then again in 2012 when the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) came to an end. Support to the CO’s CPR programming capacity has been essential to pave the way for longer term development programming. CPR TTF funding has been provided both for Conflict Prevention and Disaster Risk Reduction.

The Government has managed to develop a relatively stable political environment over the past four years. A BCPR mission in 2010 nevertheless recommended: “that UNDP Timor-Leste should build on the excellent foundational work in social cohesion and community level peace building but that this should be up-scaled and up-streamed so that it contributes to institutionalize peace building within government and helps build capacity in disaster risk management and contributes to “risk-sensitive” development. This will require a strategic shift in UNDP programming in the area of peace building and disaster risks reduction.” [[103]](#footnote-103)

As of 2013, Timor-Leste has remained in the Tier 2 of the BCPR priority list. The interlocutor at the Country Office highlighted the following four interventions where BCPR funding and technical support was crucial to develop longer term development strategies, particularly at times when resource mobilization for projects was difficult and involved a lengthy and time consuming process:

1. In the justice sector, the initial ‘Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste” Program (JSP) was launched in 2003 by the national authorities of the newly independent Timor-Leste and UNDP, together with UN system partners and other key stakeholders.[[104]](#footnote-104) Since 2003, the JSP raised more than USD 35 million from multiple donors for this comprehensive justice sector program. UNDP was asked to step up its engagement in the justice sector during the winding down process of UNMIT (closure of UNMIT on Dec 31, 2012) and the resulting decrease of funding. In addition to core UNDP funding, BCPR provided USD 1 million of CPR TTF funds in 2009 for the third phase of the JSP. BCPR provided a total of USD 4.5 million from 2009-2014 (CPR TTF funds USD 2.8 million, Trac 1.1.3 USD 2.7 million), including increased technical assistance to the CO in support of the role UNDP took on after the end of UNMIT’s mandate. Even though the third phase of the JSP has had positive results, the JSP mid-term evaluation strongly recommended focusing on addressing the key challenges, including the continuing dependence on international advisors and inadequate national capacities.[[105]](#footnote-105) BCPR continues to fund this process in 2014 with USD 500’000 (USD 250’000 CPR TTF). [[106]](#footnote-106).
2. Timor-Leste has played a key role in leading fragile states to advocate for reforms in the way international actors engage in fragile states, resulting in the G7+ group to develop the New Deal Agreement for Fragile States. As part of the New Deal implementation, Timor-Leste conducted a fragility assessment in 2012.[[107]](#footnote-107) Social cohesion and resilience building was highlighted among the key challenges the country faces. Along these lines, BCPR funded projects on the reintegration of IDPs (Dialogue Project, Small Grants and SERC 2008-2011) have already had a significant impact.The experience gained from these projects has helped to convince the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) to institutionalize peacebuilding in the form of establishing the Department for Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion (DPBSC). The Government, with financial and technical support from UNDP, formally established the DPBSC in December 2010. The Department’s focus is on institutionalizing peace-building within the National Government, strengthening conflict resolution mechanisms at the community level, and ensuring women’s active participation in the peace process. BCPR funding and technical support has been crucial in the setup of this new initiative. The current ‘Timor-Leste Resilience and Social Cohesion Project 2014-2017’ financed by BCPR and the Japanese Government, aims to consolidate DPBSC capacities and assist the Ministry in achieving a paradigm shift from peacebuilding to resilience building and social cohesion. UNDP has further allocated USD 14,000 under this project in support of the New Deal for the collaborative work between DPBSC/MSS and the G7+ group.
3. Another example the interlocutor highlighted is how the CO benefited from the fast CPR TTF allocation to keep momentum going for the comprehensive Disaster Risk Management Plan of Timor-Leste in 2011. The allocation, in the form of seed funding, helped to promote partnerships and kept UNDP at the forefront of a follow-up initiative on Disaster Risk Management. UNDP has been a prominent partner to the Government in Disaster Risk Management since 2007 but the urgency increased in 2008 when a “higher than normal incidence of localised disasters associated with the wet season brought issues of disaster risk management to the attention of the Council of Ministers. In particular, the need was identified for the development of institutional and operational systems and procedures and for improving the provision of services to community members and the link between the centre and the district.”[[108]](#footnote-108) UNDP thus implemented the CPR TTF financed project ‘Disaster Risk Management Institutional and Operational Systems Development in Timor-Leste Project’, co-financed by ECHO in 2009, in close collaboration with another project on Disaster Risk Management implemented by (AusAID/IOM). The results of this project were positive although the evaluation recommended the need for follow up initiatives to strengthen the capacities of local counterparts.

Resource mobilization was difficult at that stage and the initial BCPR funding of USD 500’000 in 2011 was used to facilitate discussions and outline a framework with the Government and other stakeholders on Disaster Risk Management. The project design focused on providing support for the development of systems and tools that are essential for a well-functioning government-led Disaster Risk Management (DRM). This initiative resulted in the mobilization of USD 8.8 million including major cooperation with the World Bank from 2014-2018. This is the first joint UNDP World Bank cooperation in Timor-Leste.[[109]](#footnote-109) UNDP received funding from the GEF and LDCF amounting to UDS 5.2 million and the World Bank contributes US 3.6 million (from Japan/PHRD and GFDRR).[[110]](#footnote-110) Thus, the CPR TTF funding mechanism has supported the CO to leverage funding for an important strategic development process in DRM.

1. As part of its long lasting history of support to the National Police Force of Timor-Leste (PNTL), and following the departure of UNPOL at the end of UNMIT’s mandate, UNDP commenced a new project with the PNTL to strengthen police capacity in 2013.[[111]](#footnote-111) While the initially calculated project costs were USD 2.5 million and initial funds of USD 1.3 million were raised (BCPR $500,000, BCPR Netherlands $250’000, RBAP $500’000 and TRAC1 $100,000), further funds were attracted once the project had started from the following donors: the Australian Federal Police (US$ 1.4 million) and the Government of Japan ($985,000). The total budget of USD 3.7 million allows for an expansion of activities and extended timeframe to complete the project.

These examples highlight the relevance and importance of the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 funding mechanism, in combination with the technical support provided by BCPR, in the context of transition, namely the closure of a UN peace operation in a fragile state. The examples further underscore the catalytic effects of BCPR seed funding.

The interlocutor stated that the CO has the capacity to fundraise locally but resource mobilization has been more difficult over the past few years. It is not common practice to communicate to other stakeholders that funding for a particular project is provided by the CPR TTF. The interlocutor underlined the importance of the relationship HQ maintains with the permanent missions in New York in attracting funding and resource mobilization efforts for the CPR TTF. According to her experience, fundraising is most successful if it is undertaken both at HQ and at the country-level. Some funding sources are not accessible to the CO but HQ can be helpful in developing resource mobilization strategies and to mobilize funding.

**Pakistan**

The interlocutor at the Pakistan Country Office praised the flexibility and trust BCPR extends to the CO. The funding mechanism is highly appreciated because it is less bureaucratic in comparison to other funding mechanisms due to its UNDP internal structure. However, regardless of funding, successful cooperation between the CO and the Government is key to developing mechanisms for long term recovery. This is the case in Pakistan, where the CO puts a high level of emphasis on enhancing Government ownership of the recovery process.

A good example in Pakistan is the close cooperation UNDP has managed to develop since 2007 with the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).[[112]](#footnote-112) BCPR support in DRM has been crucial to establish UNDP as a trustworthy partner. Pakistan has developed a comprehensive Disaster Risk Management Plan (ONE DRM). The challenge that the country faces is to facilitate and implement the DRM plans at the sub-national level. UNDP plays a key role in this endeavor. The interlocutor acknowledged that this work is easier in countries with adequately functioning governments as opposed to countries with weak government structures, thereby enabling a government-led strategic process to achieve the defined outputs.

Although overall the CO interlocutor spoke positively about the CPR TTF and related HQ support, a few weaknesses were emphasized: 1) The CO would like to see stronger emphasis on monitoring of government ownership of the funds that are allocated from the TTF. The project proposals must always include a specific letter from the government asking for the funds. There was an experience in Balochistan, where the Government was not particularly enthusiastic about taking on a project but was overwhelmed by the desire of BCPR to have a presence in the region. A project that is launched under such circumstances has little chance of achieving government ownership.

2) Based on the experience the CO had with SURGE experts over the past years, it was further recommended that there should be clearer guidance and regulations for the engagement of UNDP staff specialists. Short-term BCPR technical advisors are highly appreciated but their support in-country should not be for more than a few weeks. If there is a need for a long term specialist, there should be an increased effort to engage local consultants. Care needs to me taken not to spend a disproportionate percentage of the funding on international consultants, particularly for the long term. Wherever possible local/national consultants should be used. “A national SURGE roster should be established and the CO should be in the position to choose the consultant it needs. In the past, too much time and effort needed to be invested in training international experts, albeit many with technical expertise, to understand the local context.”[[113]](#footnote-113)

Funds obtained from BCPR have resulted in longer term engagements in cases where the design of the project was carefully undertaken in close cooperation with the relevant government and other stakeholders to achieve a holistic project design. Successful project negotiations are time-consuming and the engagement of the RC and UNDP country team is crucial in securing a positive outcome. A successful example is the Rule of Law Support Program Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan:

**Rule of Law Support Program Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan**

This Rule of Law program in Pakistan was developed in the post-crisis situation of 2009 after a military intervention against Taliban advances in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that left many thousands of people displaced. The project consists of two components. The first component, the ‘Strengthening Rule of Law in Malakand (SRLM)’ project has been designed for a duration of three years (2011- 2014) and geographically focuses on seven districts of Malakand Division. SRLM interventions are related to judiciary, police, prosecution, alternate dispute resolution, access to justice, and free legal aid is undertaken in close collaboration with relevant agencies at district levels under the guidance and strategic direction of the Peshawar High Court, the Home Affairs Ministry, the Planning and Development Ministry, the Local Government, Law, Police and Prosecution Departments. The project further entails a strong engagement with community based organizations. The community is engaged with the aim to empower and enhance demand articulation of the vulnerable while impoverished communities are creating strong liaisons between the state and the citizens. [[114]](#footnote-114)

The second component, the Adal-o-Insaf project (AIP) 2014-2017 aims to promote an enabling environment, which will deepen the on-going efforts under the SRLM to secure peace and stabilization. Strong linkages will be maintained with the SRLM seeking to replicate its successful models and processes related to project implementation .Under this project, assistance will be provided for institutional and capacity development to the rule of law institutions to ensure effective security services and the speedy provision of justice services.

This project is particularly interesting as it serves as an example of how important government ownership is for successful, long term reconstruction and development processes. Unlike other instances, where governments were almost pressured into accepting a project, the local government partner was proactive to getting the project off the ground. BCPR initially provided USD 1million seed funding but it was difficult to mobilize additional funding for this multi-year, USD 15 million project in this fragile, but geo-strategically important region. **BCPR thus sent a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) in 2012 with the mission to revise the initial project document and to help re-position UNDP in the justice sector. Essential emphasis was given to enhance government ownership and ensure the project involves all the key stakeholders. The intervention proved highly successful, resulting in the commitment of the Provincial Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to provide USD 3.7 million of funding**. Acting in a respectful and supportive manner to the local government partners, UNDP has managed to position itself as a trustworthy partner and remains the only multilateral international organization approved and authorized by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to engage with the Federal Judicial Academy (FJA), Islamabad for training and capacity building purposes.

**Based on the government’s commitment, the CO mobilized USD 11 Million including contributions from the Provincial Government (USD 3.75 Million), the Netherlands (USD 2 Million), Switzerland (3.8 Million) and USD 1 Million from the UNDP Regional Bureau Asia Pacific (scale up funding**). The CPR TTF continues to fund the project on a smaller scale and provides technical assistance to the CO.

Currently UNDP and the EU are in the final stages of agreement over a EUR 10 million commitment for the second component of the project. Initially the project budget was USD 15 Million and covered only a specific geographical area (Malakand). The EU funding is deemed crucial in response to the demand by the Government to expand this project to cover additional districts.

The financial support by the Government is 25% of the initial project costs, which is a solid indication of Government ownership. From a programmatic perspective, all project activities are undertaken in consultation with the Government and, as far as possible, duplication and overlap have been avoided. Asked about the key to successful project implementation, the Country Office specialist for rule of law explained: “We have always managed to work within the existing frameworks and tried to fix the bottle necks by creating new tools/mechanisms and sustainability and exit strategies are considered at the beginning of each initiative”.[[115]](#footnote-115)

All interviewees in the CO and BCPR headquarters emphasized how important to success a conflict sensitive approach to project implementation is. The BCPR CTA that was funded by the CPR TFF provided the necessary, context-specific support that eventually led to a successful implementation process. As was further pointed out, there unfortunately remains a high level of competition between different international stakeholders but cooperation and synergies are key to a comprehensive national conflict prevention and recovery assistance program. In October 2013, the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa thereby released a Partnership Development Strategy that should enhance international stakeholder cooperation. [[116]](#footnote-116)

**Kyrgyzstan**

The interlocutors at the CO emphasized that the technical support from BCPR has been key to successful implementation of projects and was therefore highly appreciated. CPR TTF allocations have been catalytic, allowing UNDP Kyrgyzstan to initiate new interventions for which the Country Office could later mobilize additional funds from other sources. It has enabled the CO to respond quickly to emerging events and Government requests. It also helps sustain important interventions for which no other funding would have been available. The introduction of Multi-Year Results Frameworks (MYRFs) has enhanced linkages between different practice areas (e.g. rule of law, conflict prevention, management of natural resources, disaster risk reduction), ensuring that CPR TFF-funded projects in different areas complement each other and that funds are used to enhance synergies.

With the critical seed funding from BCPR, in 2012-14 the Disaster Risk Management Programme of UNDP (DRMP) strengthened the organizational arrangement of the National DRR Platform (NP DRR) under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) to enable further capacity building activities. BCPR seed funding has also helped to support the NP DRR in assessing governance capacities in 10 interrelated dimensions important from the DRR perspective both at national and local levels and, with BCPR’s support, MES created a thematic group on “Information, education and early warning”, which is specifically dedicated to the improvement of information management and risk assessment.

Kyrgyzstan is prone to natural disasters with more than 300 emergencies reported each year. BCPR has provided crucial technical support to the Government in order to sustain the implementation of the Hyogo Action Protocol. The interlocutors highlighted that the CO ensures that the Government is in the lead on all projects. In the area of disaster risk management, a project entitled: “Effective Disaster Risk Management for Sustainable Development and Human Security is being implemented by UNDP CO Kyrgyzstan in close collaboration with the MES. In 2012-13, with financial support received from BCPR in the cumulative amount of 813,000 USD, resources were mobilized by Japan (USD 2.3 million) and ECHO (USD) 1.3 million. UNDP, in accordance with the 2012 Annual Work Plan and the Project Document, has been able to achieve a number of key results that were critical in the context of disaster risk management. This would not have been possible without the CPR TTF. The fund allocations timely met the critical needs of the office.

In the area of rule of law, CPR TTF funding enabled the Country Office to implement several important rule of law activities in Kyrgyzstan that will potentially have long-term and catalytic effects. These activities include on-going support to the development of the legal framework for an independent and effective judiciary in Kyrgyzstan; conducting two surveys on 1) the status of Rule of Law in Kyrgyzstan and 2) a survey on the identification of “roadblocks” to effective enforcement of judgments. The survey results were presented to the public and are important analytical instruments for decision-makers and CSOs for guidance, serving as a sound basis for drafting the national strategic plan for implementation of rule of law policies.

The CO further commented that the CPR TTF has proved crucial in funding projects that are looking into new technology trends, such as information management in disaster risk management. One interviewee stated that “aspects of crisis governance could be further strengthened to address gaps that may not be fully covered through other funds within (or managed by) UNDP. Additionally the CPR TTF should be able to help to strengthen Government capacity in planning and implementing which is critical for the sustainability of the state and for proper donor coordination”.

The CO interlocutor underlined that the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 funding allocation mechanisms are very efficient. “This was especially important during the post-crisis phase when the Country Office had to quickly respond to new programmatic challenges in the area of reconciliation and rule of law and justice issues. Quick allocation of BCPR resources helped the UNDP CO to support the initial steps of judicial reforms in the country. It brought international expertise through the funding of the Rule of Law Chief Technical Advisor post in the CO and helped attract additional funds from other donors”.

In order to increase the quality of results and management, the CO reported that the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM), incorporating simplified operational procedures, was introduced in the UNDP CO in Kyrgyzstan after the crisis of 2010. This enhanced the quality of results and their quick and effective delivery.

Following the revolution in April 2010 and the inter-ethnic violence in June 2010, Kyrgyzstan is going through a challenging transition process. The interviewees explained that the complex challenges related to the transition process have increased the demand for CPR TTF funding. While many of the CPR challenges remain, the funding from other donors has declined since the period immediately after the 2010 crisis. This makes it critical to have funding sources such as CPR TTF that are accessible when the interest of donors is waning. The CO emphasized that it would be very helpful if “BCPR would also provide information and expertise on potential donors and their priorities and plans that could be used to seek additional funding for thematic areas supported by the CPR TTF”. It was further recommended that relevant UNDP staff at the CO receive training on fundraising-related issues.

Resource mobilization has proved to be a challenge at the country-level and the interlocutors commented that the CO needs to focus on developing resource mobilization strategies, including an analysis of funding needs and available resources. Asked about its average fund raising success based on CPR TTF investments, the CO estimates that, on average, it is able to mobilize at least 3 USD for each 1 USD of CPR TTF/Trac 1.1.3 funding. As mentioned above, BCPR funding allocated for the period 2012-13 stimulated resource mobilization from the Government of Japan to the amount of 204 million Japanese Yen (USD 2.3 million) and ECHO (US 1.3 million). The objective of the Japanese project aims to raise technical preparedness (i.e. procurement of hardware) of national risk assessment and early warning infrastructure and facilitate increased regional dialogue in Central Asia on DRR. The CO further received funding from the “Delivering as One” Funding Window to the amount of USD132,720.00 to strengthen local level risk management. The interviewees highlighted that “the continuous support of BCPR’s regional team has served as a solid foundation for the UNDP CO in Kyrgyzstan to mobilize resources from the above sources”. Other donors include Finland, the EU and the Peacebuilding Fund. The US, Norway and Switzerland are currently considering possible project funding. All these partnership arrangements will contribute to the priorities and achievement of the results identified with BCPR assistance.

Asked about the cooperation with the World Bank and other donors, one interlocutor explained that in the area of disaster risk management, UNDP has been able to forge a solid partnership with the World Bank in DRR risk assessment and information management. “The idea is to catalyze upon work already undertaken in these areas, in order to ensure greater coordination with the goal to avoid possible overlap and duplication of work”. However, it was also pointed out that, in other cases, cooperation has been rather frustrating, as it did not produce results in terms of collaboration and securing World Bank funding.

**Honduras**

Honduras has received funding for DRR, Conflict Prevention and Early Recovery. In 2006/7 the CO received strong technical support from BCPR that helped to develop the programmatic approach for CPR in the country. The CO has had positive experiences with the fast and flexible CPR financing mechanism, particularly after the political crisis in 2009. During 2008-2009 the CO did not receive substantial BCPR support. This lack of support was emphasized by the CO. The CO has been faced with numerous staffing challenges over the past few years which, in conjunction with the difficult political context, has impacted CO delivery performance. The interlocutors emphasized the importance of the technical support both from HQ and the Regional Centre in Panama during these challenging times. The CO in Honduras has very close cooperation with the CPR staff at the Regional Centre which has been invaluable. A Peace Development Advisor has recently been deployed to support the work of the CO.

Towards the end of 2009 and thereafter, in response to the Coup d-Etat, BCPR once again stepped in and provided essential programmatic and administrative support. Most recently, the focus of BCPR support has been in the areas of DRR, citizen security and support to electoral processes. Honduras was also chosen as the Latin American Caribbean (LAC)-pilot country for the implementation of the UNDP policy on early recovery (2009-2012) after the Coup d’Etat of 2009.

With UNDP assistance, legislation for the National Risk Management System was developed in 2009. The law requires further institutional reform and capacity building programmes at the national and sub-national level are needed in order to enable implementation of the law. The financial mechanisms available to the Government on DRR are weak and there are limited funding sources for prevention and recovery. UNDP has therefore assisted the Government to develop a comprehensive DRR support programme. Based on CPR TTF seed funding, the CO has managed to leverage funding to the amount of USD 8 million for DRR since 2012. Honduras is one of the few UNDP countries to receive funding from the Climate Adaptation Fund (USD 5 million) Funding was also mobilized from DIPECHO (approximately USD 2 million) and SDC (USD 1 million) The interlocutors commented that it will be crucial in the post-election transition phase in 2013 and beyond to ensure that the achievements and progress made so far are not lost.

The CO has undertaken great strides to develop gender sensitive DRR programmes and plans. A toolkit has been developed that outlines how to integrate a gender perspective in the early recovery, development and adaptation planning processes. The dissemination of these tools, as part of the CPR strategy, will be an opportunity for mainstreaming gender in the planning processes at the national and local level.

Political instability is hampering sustainable results in Honduras and the Government recognizes its lack of capacity to oversee the police and implement its National Security Policy. In this respect, UNDP assisted the Government to develop the 2011-2022 Comprehensive Coexistence and Citizen Security Policy that comprehensively addresses the interconnected security problems in Honduras. The policy was approved by the Council of Ministers under the current administration. The President requested UNDP, in 2013, to urgently establish the structures and capacities in the Secretary of Security to effectively execute the security sector reform programme financed with a USD 66 million loan from Inter-American Development Bank, USD 12 million loan from the World Bank and a 6 million Euro grant from COSUDE (Swiss Cooperation). BCPR seed funding of USD 1.2 million for human security and electoral processes over the past two years has also leveraged funding in the amount of USD 5.2 million (including USD 5 million from USAID, Spain, UN Volunteers, UN Women).[[117]](#footnote-117)

The interlocutor underlined that the support provided by BCPR to Honduras over the past four years has been important to help lay the foundation for Government-led processes and it has given the CO the opportunity to position itself as a reliable Government partner for democratic dialogue, electoral assistance, DRR and security and justice. The CO has managed to develop important partnerships with key stakeholders such as USAID, the World Bank, SDC, CIDA and others.

**Burundi**

UNDP Burundi appreciates the funding mechanism provided by the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3, particularly the fast track release of funds below USD 100,000 that is necessary to assess and coordinate early recovery immediately after crisis (i.e. recent floods in Burundi). This validates the role of UNDP in-country as being in the position to act quickly to respond to these types of emergencies.

For longer term processes, UNDP Burundi seems to manage well with core UNDP resources and has successfully managed to mobilize funding at the country-level. Burundi has been one of the main recipients of PBF funding and has recently entered a third phase of funding. The office has further managed to mobilize funds from China, Japan and European bilateral donors.

The interlocutor highlighted the notable catalytic effects based upon seed funding provided by the CPR TTF for the implementation of the “Community Reintegration and Recovery” project 2011-2014. This programme is well aligned within UNDAF, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Strategic Peace Building Framework (SPF) and has multiple funding partners. BCPR played a crucial role to get this project off the ground by injecting USD 2.5million in 2010. Acknowledging that community recovery is a long term process, BCPR decided to step in again in 2011 to fund specific thematic funding gaps within the project.

The first phase of this project launched the 3x6 community recovery approach that is now considered as a best practice in this field. BCPR has taken charge to manage the institutionalization of this approach, document it and make it available as a best practice for other countries. It is suggested that BCPR should undertake this type of work more rigorously and regularly. Further details are provided in the case study below.

The CO also just completed a workshop with colleagues working in eight different fragile/ transition states around the Great Lakes, and included representatives from Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina to discuss and exchange best practices on the process from early recovery to the transition phase. BCPR could play an important role to support this ongoing process financially and through its technical expertise. BCPR should do more fundraising at HQ level along these lines to support knowledge exchange and drawing together best practices. This would highlight the expertise UNDP has in this field and enhance its perception as an innovative actor and fund manager.

The interlocutor commented that gender issues cannot be measured in numbers but needs to be addressed in terms of qualitative processes. Burundi has done well to increase the number of women in government. The UN’s support to women’s political participation in Burundi’s parliamentary, legislative and presidential elections in 2010 has resulted in a 30% quota of female parliamentarians at the national and local level. This has been an important achievement, particularly at the local level.[[118]](#footnote-118)However, the quality and effectiveness of female representatives is not strong enough to make a significant difference. Technical expertise is needed to enhance gender performance in general. UNDP Burundi is in the process of developing a joint program under the lead of UN Women addressing gender-based violence. Generally, BCPR support for resource mobilization for gender programming and to fund gender experts is appreciated.

**Best practice example of catalytic effects of BCPR seed funding:**

The 3x6 approach[[119]](#footnote-119) to Community Reintegration and Recovery was developed in 2009 as a model to support the roll-out of the UN Policy for Post-conflict Reintegration, Income Generation and Reintegration. The approach was developed by UNDP in Burundi, in close collaboration with the Burundi Government and with the technical and financial support of UNDP BCPR. CPR TTF un-earmarked seed funding in 2010 constituted US$ 2.5million, in addition to US$1.3 million PBF funding and US$ 0.5million UNDP Core funding. The 3x6 approach was specifically developed to support the reintegration of displaced population groups, including returning refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants. To achieve this goal, rapid employment projects, largely focused on the rehabilitation of socio-economic community infrastructure for 3-6 months during which time one third of the salary was saved each month into a financial institution. Based on business plans developed by beneficiaries, this amount was then matched three to one by UNDP, providing the opportunity to use their savings to form joint ventures, producer associations or a small business after the initial cash for work period. The program approach of encouraging beneficiaries to work through associations has promoted social cohesion and improved overall quality of life through increased incomes per household. By the end of 2013, 14,975 people were self-employed (47% women) and 271 producer organizations were created.[[120]](#footnote-120) In 2013, the 3x6 approach was also used for additional reintegration projects in Burundi, supported by other donors, particularly the PBF during its second phase of funding.

This project has shown some remarkable results. The catalytic effects of the seed funding provided by the CPR TTF and PBF include several years of continued donor support and enhanced government ownership. Japan has provided US$ 3.5 million and Australia, (using the CPR TTF as its funding channel) US$ 750,000 over a two year period. For 2014, the Government of Burundi committed a financial contribution to the 3x6 reintegration project. Most importantly, the Government of Burundi adopted the approach under its National Employment Policy. An important aspect of this are the six value chain assessments that were carried out in Phase III of the project in a collaboration between UNDP and ILO, which provided critical information for the selection of sectors with high potential for employment creation for the Government as a basis for this policy. In addition, UNDP provided support to the development and maintenance of a data base. [[121]](#footnote-121)

Further to the positive results achieved to date in Burundi, there is an increasing interest in the implementation of the 3x6 approach in other post-crisis contexts. The interest is expressed by UNDP country offices, regional bureau as well as by key donors, including Japan. The 3x6 approach is currently implemented in three countries (Burundi, Yemen- with scale up in 2014- and Mali) and three countries where the implementation of the approach will start soon based on funded proposals (DRC and Jordan). In addition, the use of this approach is under consideration for livelihoods and reintegration projects in Syria, Libya, CAR and PAPP. A further example that demonstrates the catalytic effects of the seed funding is that the 3x6 approach, applied in Yemen for the implementation of the Youth Employment and Empowerment Project, has been adopted by the Government to form the basis of the recently adopted national Youth Employment Action Plan and that the approach will be scaled up from 2014 onwards under amongst others the YEEP II.

In light of the expanded use of this approach, UNDP BCPR is currently working on global quality assurance and monitoring and evaluation of results and impact. In support of knowledge exchange and management, BCPR is also developing a global UNDP toolkit for the 3x6 approach, providing strategic and operational guidance, including how the approach can be adjusted to different contexts.[[122]](#footnote-122) Un-earmarked funding to the CPR TTF has been essential to initiate the above-mentioned initiatives, including necessary travel and facilitation of knowledge exchange.

**Yemen**

The interlocutor in the CO in Yemen commended the CPR TTF funding modality due to its relevance, rapid release and support at short notice. The CO’s experience with the administrative procedures have been mainly positive and it was noted that transaction costs have been low in comparison to other funding modalities. BCPR funded SURGE missions to Yemen aimed at providing technical help in key areas were highly appreciated by the CO. In the years following the Arab Spring, these missions have proved very helpful to support efforts to develop programs in collaboration with the Government. The interviewee highlighted the fact that the seed money provided by BCPR has been vital to initiate programs in a number of sensitive areas such as Transitional Justice, Governance and Livelihoods and Economic Recovery, where other donors were hesitant to get engaged. Furthermore, as mentioned in the case study for Burundi, the 3x6 approach was adapted to Yemen under the Youth Employment and Empowerment Project I (YEEP I) with the additional financial support of Japanese, Korean, The Netherlands, Core UNDP and SILATECH funding.

In 2013, BCPR provided critical seed funding to the amount of US$ 300,000 and technical support for a Multi-dimensional Livelihoods Assessment that no donor was willing to fund. Yemen is the first country globally to have undertaken such an assessment. The livelihoods assessment was carried out in collaboration with the Yemeni Central Statistics Office and launched by the Prime Minister’s Office in February 2014

The objective of the Livelihoods Assessment was to provide a comprehensive understanding of livelihoods needs and opportunities for the most vulnerable population groups in conflict affected governorates in Yemen, at household and community levels. Data from the assessment will contribute to the base-line development required for sound project monitoring, decision making, policy development and program design relevant to current needs. The results of the Assessment will also provide the evidence base for design and monitoring of Resilience Building programs, of which Livelihoods and Local Economic Recovery will be a core component.

The assessment in Yemen was carried out on behalf of the working group on Sustainable Livelihoods and Employment Creation[[123]](#footnote-123) and provided a critical basis for programming and resource mobilization. This included mobilization of funding from the PBF of US$4.8million, of which the scale up of the 3x6 is an integral part, as well as the EU who has invited UNDP to lead the development of a full programme proposal for a total of US$45 million from the EU Resilience Fund for 2015-2018. The Government has further asked for the assessment to be carried out at the national level in the remaining governorates.

In contribution to knowledge management and exchange, the methodology developed for the assessment will serve as a basis for the development of a global UNDP Guide for Livelihoods Assessment in post-crisis settings. Again, this example shows how BCPR seed funding has led to a comprehensive process reaching beyond UNDP’s Yemen Country Program.

**Sierra Leone**

BCPR support to Sierra Leone has been substantive since the end of the civil war in 2004 and the CO has accessed both Trac 1.1.3 and CPR TTF funding. The CO commends the timely support, efficiency and technical expertise that is provided by BCPR. From 2005-2009 major funding was available, particularly for projects focusing on access of justice, youth and employment. BPCR earmarked funding was provided through the Global Justice Programme. UNDP in Sierra Leone experienced extensive problems in the initial phase after the civil war came to an end. Due to a lack of capacity on the ground and the challenging political context, UNDP performance was poor. A few donors withdrew their support completely (i.e. SIDA and USAID).

Overall funding has decreased substantially since 2011. Nevertheless, the CO has made substantial improvements over the past few years, particularly due to technical support from BCPR. UNDP was given the management to implement the Support to the Electoral Cycle Program in 2011 in support of the national elections held in 2012 funded by DFID, EU, Irish Aid, Germany and BCPR. A Chief Technical Advisor position was funded through the CPR TTF (seed funding of USD 500,000) with the aim to enhance the capacity of the CO and to position it as a trustworthy and reliable partner to the Government. The CO has managed to regain its reputation and attract donor funding. The interlocutor highlighted two projects that yielded positive improvements: The Security Sector Reform Project managed to leverage USD 3 million additional funding and the Constitutional Review Program raised an additional USD 5 million. The interlocutor underlined that this would not have been possible without the support of the CTA. BCPR also currently has a mission in Sierra Leone to help position UNDP in the Framework of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, of which Sierra Leone has been chosen as a pilot country in 2012. The Government has, however, been slow in getting the New Deal off the ground.

With regards to gender, the CO has had very weak gender capacity and has asked BCPR specifically for support to strengthen its gender programming. The advisor should provide knowhow on gender programming but also be versed to adapt to the difficult political context.

The CO relies on BCPR for fundraising. The interlocutor explains that few donors are in the country that provide funding for the programs that UNDP works on. PBF and some bilateral funding (i.e. from Nigeria and Ireland) has been mobilized by the CO, but a resource mobilization strategy for the CO would be highly appreciated. Private donor partnerships are slowly developing but the CO has to be very careful choosing its partners, particularly in the mining and natural resource industry.

## **5.2 Relevance of TTF and TRAC 3 funding modalities**

The majority of the COs underline that support from the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 mechanism are highly relevant and essential in meeting the needs of country offices. The UNDP CPR funding mechanism is perceived as most relevant in situations of immediate crisis when no other funding is available. This has given UNDP the necessary authority to position itself as a consistent, fast responding agency in crisis and transition situations. The availability of the Trac 1.1.3 resources below USD 100,000 has assisted many countries in their endeavors to coordinate post-conflict and disaster relief interventions. A few of the responses, however, point out that funding is not regularly available and that funding for 3-5 years would better yield “sustainable impact to consolidate gains and generate lessons learned”.

COs highlighted the need for greater transparency in creating the country priority lists and clearer communication about available funding. This confusion is also based on the historical evolution of the CPR TTF, as funds were originally distributed in an ad hoc fashion during its first few years of existence. COs commented that DRR issues have become increasingly more critical and that Trac 1.1.3 and TTF funding is very suited to addressing these issues in a timely manner. One CO commented that “the funds have proved useful in positioning UNDP in the DRR field as one of the lead agencies in the country”. Along with the more established areas of rule of law, security sector reform, DDR, livelihoods and mine action, COs highlighted that, more recently, un-earmarked and earmarked CPR TTF funds have been essential to set up disaster risk frameworks with partner governments.

The demand for CPR TTF funding has increased for all the COs that responded. One CO replied: “While the number of BPAC submissions are roughly the same, the amount requested has increased”. Another underlined that “the demand has increased manifold, however funding has not been available to meet the growing demands of the country”.

COs pointed out the following main strengths of the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 mechanism: “Support is tailored to the needs of the CO; the flexibility of use of the funds; the fund manager accepts UN-reports in cases where “Delivering as One modality” applies; the availability of technical expertise and the splendid networks BCPR provides”. Another CO commends the “quick turnaround of country office requests and ability to fund strategic interventions for which no other funds are available. In terms of DRM, BCPR funding is regarded to be catalytic to conduct work in legislative and policy areas in disaster risk reduction and related areas, which, once enacted legislatively, serve as a firm foundation for UNDP’s programme interventions on the ground in the area of DRM”. This interviewee further stated that the CO appreciates BCPR’s ability to “quickly send experts to the countries to assist UNDP COs with initial assessments and the identification of potential entry points in the justice area”.

COs also outlined the mechanism’s main weaknesses. One interviewee described in detail that “the results frameworks of individual projects funded by the CPR TTF may need to be better linked with global results reporting across all countries and projects. This requires better knowledge of fund users on what the global results are and how individual projects can be better aligned to global results and results reporting”. It was further observed that communication between fund providers at HQs and the COs could be improved to better demonstrate the results on the ground. In terms of reporting on sustainability, the interviewee concluded that it may require to measure results over a longer period and to articulate milestones towards achieving long-term changes.

Another CO commented that the main weakness is the lack of transparency of the availability of CPR TTF resources. Other COs commented that the role of BCPR at HQ and the role of the CO is confusing if a donor is present at the country-level. Another CO highlighted that awareness about the CPR TTF among governments should be strengthened.

## **5.3 Effectiveness of TTF and TRAC 3 funding modalities**

Significantly, all 20 COs involved in this assessment agreed that BCPR’s funding modalities are generally efficient and processes at HQ are very smooth. One interlocutor emphasized that the CPR TTF clearly stands out in comparison to other UNDP trust funds where processes are less streamlined and more bureaucratic. None of the COs that replied to the survey perceived any bottlenecks in receiving and managing the funds from the TTF. Administrative processes were rated positively throughout. One interlocutor commented that the “carry-over of Trac 1.1.3 allocations into successive years might not be “in the spirit of the allocation”. The assessor was informed that allocations and progress of project implementation are discussed at quarterly delivery meetings led by the Country Support Management Team, Resource Management Team and External Relations Team. Based on this review, a CO might be asked to return unused funds at a given time.

Asked what measures were taken in the past to assure the quality of the results and management practices, COs emphasized the review of reports by BCPR before they are sent to donors and regular monitoring of progress of implementation as well as regular contact with the BCPR focal point through Skype. It was further highlighted that UNDP undertakes “quarterly progress monitoring, physical spot checks and UN-wide bi-annual reviews, in terms of both substance as well as financial delivery”. One CO replied that the shift to the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) immediately after the political crisis in the country helped to ensure the quality of results and quick delivery. Although this might be an efficient short term solution it has been pointed out in previous evaluation reports that DIM is detrimental to strengthening government capacities and ownership in the long term.

Previous evaluations for UNDP’s conflict and disaster programmes have also emphasized the lack of specific indicators and benchmarks to measure UNDP’s progress in CPR. A further drawback is the inconsistency for setting baselines at the outset of country-based projects in order to track progress. Several COs confirmed that they receive support from regional centres and HQ in order to develop indicators. Monitoring does not seem to be a problem for small projects but can pose a challenge for large projects.

COs appeared to be generally satisfied in relation to the efficiency with which risks and problems are addressed by HQ or the Regional Centre. Replies vary from “always at our disposal, good technical support” to “relatively efficient, to “the CO works closely with the Regional Centre”. Furthermore, Regional Bureaus were commended as supportive in communicating financial constraints and or priorities to BCPR. All COs replied that there is enough financial management knowhow in the COs.

Levels of efficiency and sustainability of the projects financed by the CPR TTF depend on several factors but national government ownership and capacity, as well as the capacity of the CO are essential. One interlocutor at HQ pointed out that it is critical to invest in a systemic capacity analysis of the CO and the government partners at the outset of a project design. The CO needs to clearly define what capacity and knowhow it requires to deliver to a high standard and what it expects from BCPR HQ or the regional centres. Based on the interlocutor’s experience, otherwise BCPR needs to spend a disproportionate amount of time and resources on SURGE and HQ time to support a given project. The Strategic Partnership Frameworks are a step into the right direction but they have not been fully rolled out and are not applied consistently. Positive examples were highlighted by interlocutors and referred to in several evaluations, particularly the DRM projects in Indonesia, Honduras and Pakistan. In Indonesia, for example, BCPR seed funding of USD 1.9 million to the ‘Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction’ project (including the provision of a National Disaster Reduction Advisor) set off a process that helped the Government to change its DRM policy in order to achieve specific Hyogo Framework Agreements by 2015.[[124]](#footnote-124) Thus, UNDP support to the Government that resulted in better planning and developing of national strategies to mainstream DRR at national and subnational level.

## **5.4 The Sustainability of TTF and TRAC 3 funding modalities**

In terms of sustainability, a common observation contained in a number of evaluation reports reviewed by the assessor highlight that UNDP support to disaster and conflict recovery often lacks a strategic focus and has not been used effectively enough to strengthen national ownership and national capacity. For example, the Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery in 2010 reports: “While explicit links are made between disaster risk reduction and poverty, environment and climate change adaptation, there are no operational frameworks for integrating such cross-cutting issues into UNDP programme areas, both in terms of planning and implementation”.[[125]](#footnote-125) Several evaluation reports stress that, often, COs determine their programming according to the availability of funds.

The level of sustainability of UNDP’s CPR work very much depends on the country context and level of government ownership. Most COs that replied to the survey mentioned that fundraising know how could be improved at the CO. Apart from core UNDP funding, COs manage to mobilize funding for CPR projects from bilateral donors, of which Japan, Australia Aid, the Netherlands, DFID and SIDA were mentioned most prominently. The PBF is the most prominent other Trust Fund. Partnership with the EU is also very important to UNDP and the EU funding mechanisms for fragile states are an important factor in UNDP’s resource mobilization.

Small contributions also come from other UN MPTFs. None of the survey replies mentioned the World Bank Funds as a major contributor to UNDP funding at the country-level. Exceptions are the programs that are specifically implemented via funding through the WB-UN Trust Fund. Interlocutors mentioned that fundraising at the country level sometimes results in non-traditional donor engagement (as in the case of Burundi (China) or Pakistan (Saudi Arabia) but generally, support in developing resource mobilization strategies would be appreciated. Several interviewees also mentioned that the fund raising at HQ and communication with permanent missions is equally important for resource mobilization.

The role of the CPR TTF’s funding for CPR was perceived as ‘seed funding’ by all COs however, they emphasized that catalytic effects were not always achieved. The case studies highlight some programmes that have been successful in achieving a catalytic effect and it can be assumed that there are many more. However, as one CO pointed out, “although sometimes allocations were intended as seed funding, no additional funding could be mobilized”. Other COs replied that CPR TTF funding has both been used as seed funding but also to fund activities that otherwise would not have received support. In this regard, the Portfolio Review 2012 stated in one of its Lesson learned: “Seed funding for projects without integration of a long term funding strategy leads to eventual closure of projects but no long term impact can be measured”.

Asked how much COs manage to leverage funding at the country-level, responses ranged from 3-5 times the amount of the seed funding, to 20% of seed funding. There are also several projects that have developed into major long-term government led programmes with a multiple funding source (for example rule of law projects and justice sector reform in PAPP, Pakistan, Somalia and DRM programmes in Indonesia, Honduras or Timor-Leste).

The assessor also sought to obtain some insight into the co-operation with the World Bank and other UN agencies. COs have had very mixed experiences. In general, cooperation with other UN agencies seems to have improved, particularly when linkages through the UN's ‘Delivering as One’ modality facilitates joint multi-year strategies and annual work plans. One response highlights that joint programmes have resulted in increased cooperation but that the main obstacle still related to the “fact that some UN Agencies are still reluctant to operate in basket fund modality and each of them wants to have its own visibility”.

The cooperation with the World Bank has been more limited and several COs commented that even if regular coordination of activities and information sharing takes place, “it has also been frustrating, as it did not produce results in terms of fruitful collaboration and securing World Bank funding”. One CO had a more positive experience in the area of DRM, where UNDP has been able to forge a solid partnership with the World Bank in order to catalyze upon already achieved results and avoid duplication of work. Another CO replied that they work closely with the World Bank in various forums that were established by the national Government, but that they have never received funding from the World Bank. The general consensus is that there remains considerable room for improved collaboration.

## **5.5 The Gender component of the CPR TTF and Trac 3 financing mechanism**

In 2006, BCPR initiated the development of the Eight Point Agenda for Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery based on the result of the ‘Forward Looking Review’ on gender mainstreaming in crisis prevention and recovery. The UNDP Eight Point Agenda for Women in Crisis Prevention and Recovery was subsequently launched in January 2007. In order to implement this agenda, BCPR developed a three year action plan “which mapped out human resources, funding, programming, and monitoring and evaluation needs. In addition, BCPR launched a USD 10million donor proposal for 2008-2009 on gender programming. This proposal presented a set of global and regional programmes for Gender equality in crisis prevention and recovery.”[[126]](#footnote-126)

Internally, BCPR adjusted its structure to address gender issues more effectively by devoting at least 15% of all its funding allocations to gender –specific projects. In addition, BCPR dedicated 15% of its work plan budget and staff time to women’s issues. The bureau hired two senior gender advisors in order to a) enhance BCPR’s support to UNDP country offices and b) promote the Eight Point Agenda as a UNDP wide initiative. In 2007, BCPR also recruited a policy specialist to implement and monitor the M/E strategy with special focus on gender. BCPR continues to finance a Senior Gender Specialist and gender program officer at headquarters. In addition, a gender specialist was engaged in both Conflict Prevention and Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction in 2013. A gender justice expert has also recently been co-located by UN Women within the Global Focal Point for Rule of Law.

The results of many years of enhancing gender programming in CPR are mixed. Overall, the general awareness on gender has increased manifold. As one interlocutor emphasized: “Everyone knows by now that if we don’t include gender, we don’t get funding!” The Country Office in Honduras confirmed this statement by adding that the introduction of the 15% allocation to gender was catalytic in the sense that it stipulated discussions in the CO which led to an agreement with the Regional Centre in Panama to develop a strategy to mainstream gender.[[127]](#footnote-127) Equally important are achievements the CO has made to work with the Government on the inclusion of gender in the National Disaster Risk Reduction Plan in Honduras. All the chapters of this DRR Plan where reviewed with a gender focus and were gender mainstreamed.[[128]](#footnote-128) This is an encouraging sign that the gender allocation can make a difference in integrating gender concerns in policy and Government programming.

The feedback received from interviews with stakeholders at the CO level and at HQ confirm that major shortcomings remain, namely, the qualitative monitoring and reporting of gender within non-gender specific projects. This was also a significant shortcoming highlighted in the External Evaluation of PBF funded projects in Burundi, where the UNDP implemented 3x6 project could not provide gender disaggregated data.[[129]](#footnote-129) This holds true for many of UNDP implemented projects.

Feedback from COs on gender is generally divided along two lines: Either there is a strong management who emphasizes the urgency of including the gender based approach in all programming or it is based on the requirements defined in the project application by BCPR. One interlocutor, for example, stated that the CO would benefit from advice on implementing and monitoring gender components but also made it clear that the CO does not need someone who would get involved in the ‘politics’ of gender. The CO in Kyrgyzstan has focused on improving its gender programming this year. Thus, UNDP Kyrgyzstan has invested resources in a Country Programme Gender Coordinator at the level of the Programme Management Unit (PMU). The M&E Officer at the Country Office additionally covers gender aspects to ensure quality gender mainstreaming., BCPR also fielded a gender support mission in early 2014 that was perceived as very helpful, not only for CPR TFF-funded projects.

Most COs highlighted that it can be challenging to explain gender programming to the Government partners. Making the inclusion of a gender based approach a condition for funding is an important tool to convince Government partners to include a gender specific component in projects. Informing the Government about this approach is also more time-consuming and discussions need to take place with government counterparts at the outset of the project design, particularly in cases where it is not a project that specifically focuses on women. For example, “in Pakistan it is traditionally not possible that a man facilitates a training that addresses women. Women can train women and this needs to be clearly defined at the outset of the project”.[[130]](#footnote-130)

Both Trac 1.1.3 and the CPR TTF channel funds for gender components or projects to country offices. BCPR’s initiative to systemize the 15% gender allocation is perceived as very positive by all COs who replied to the survey. However, some responses suggest that this remains insufficient to make a difference in mainstreaming gender. Knowledge about the availability of gender specific project funding seems to be low. If a country office submits a project proposal to BPAC with a very strong gender component, linked across the COs portfolio, BCPR could allocate more money from 1.1.3 and from the gender window.[[131]](#footnote-131) But this does not seem to be widely applied.

There still appears to be a gap in understanding of what gender means in project design and implementation. It should not only be a commitment that 50% of project staff or beneficiaries will be female but also how women and girls will benefit qualitatively from the projects. Thus, funding alone does not make a difference, but a coordinated approach within the CO and monitoring qualitative indicators based on the 15% allocations would enhance the knowledge of the impact of the gender allocation. The CO in Honduras explained that the 15% required allocation is an excellent tool to make programme teams think about how gender equality can be promoted through programming. They further commented: “While there is no convincing methodology to assess the percentage of funds used to promote gender equality objectively, the fact that it has become a requirement is important to trigger discussion on this issue. it is important that aspects of promoting gender equality are included in the very initial phase of project design, and not when the project is completed and one looks at how we can still meet the 15% targeted. HQ support at an early stage of programme development may proof critical in this regard.”

Since 2010, it is a UNDP requirement that every project is gender marked. The gender marker is a UNDP corporate tool that enables project managers to capture the overall project contribution to gender from a scale of 0 to 3. It does not, however, provide disaggregated gender data according to the 15% funding allocated to the project. The gender specialist interviewed for this assessment raised the concern that the 15% of funding that is allocated to gender as per the BPAC checklist is not monitored in a qualitative way. She reasoned that “the gender marker remains subjective and only provides information on the percentage of funds UNDP’s projects allocate to or spend on gender. The gender marker does not give a good perspective of what is happening in UNDP country offices.” For example, the project appraisal form that is assessed by BPAC contains a gender relevant question that is cross checked with the UNDP Eight Point Agenda for the Enhancement of Gender Equality and asks for available gender aggregated data, but fails to demand a link to existing gender programs or cross-cutting gender issues in the CO. However, the major shortcoming remains the qualitative monitoring and reporting of gender within non-gender specific projects. The BCPR gender team is currently working to address this issue and establish a system that can improve monitoring of the development impact of gender allocations.

Donors increasingly want to see gender mainstreamed across UNDP programs and in light of this development, BCPR should rethink its gender allocation and gender window. Instead of funding gender components on a project-by-project basis, which may only lead to piecemeal interventions, allocating 15% of the total CPR programme budget in each country would enable a more strategic approach to programming. Additionally, certain CPR TTF or TRAC 1.1.3 funds could be stipulated for global gender equality initiatives. Mandatory training on gender programming and gender-responsive budgeting for all senior staff and programme managers would further ensure better use of gender allocations.[[132]](#footnote-132)

# **Main Findings and Recommendations**

Based on the positive feedback from the COs, the numerous staff and donor interviews, the assessor concludes that there is unanimous agreement on continuing the CPR TTF as an essential tool to support UNDP’s work in CPR. The assessor hopes that the following findings and recommendations will be useful to the new BPPS management to further optimize the CPR TTF under the new management structure.

## **6.1 Main Findings**

*Relevance*

The Trac 1.1.3 and CPR TTF funding mechanism is perceived as most relevant in situations of immediate crisis, at a time when no other funding is available. This has given UNDP the necessary authority to position itself as a consistent, fast responding agency on the ground, particularly in fragile states. The findings highlight that the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 mechanisms have served the COs in their task to be proactive partners to governments in the aftermath of crises in terms of getting assistance and programs off the ground. Quick access to Trac 1.1.3 funds below USD 100,000 for assessments and coordination after a crisis were emphasized as being most relevant. Disaster Risk Reduction was highlighted as increasingly in need of funding due to the increase in floods, droughts and other climate related issues. Funding for regular occurring disasters is limited and COs have highlighted the need to both invest in short term relief and long term disaster management plans.

Un-earmarked funding to the CPR TTF has given the fund manager the essential range of flexibility it needs to act expeditiously in terms of unanticipated crisis. For example, the unanticipated catastrophic destruction of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines required immediate support to UNDP’s Country Office. For such unanticipated events, BCPR yearly sets aside a sum of un-earmarked funding from both Trac 1.1.3 and the CPR TTF. This allowed BCPR to send a SURGE team in addition to financial program support to the Philippines. USD 1.3 million was approved for the SURGE plan and in addition, USD 5.1 million un-earmarked funding was allocated in support of early recovery programmes. This is just one of many examples of how un-earmarked funding has made a difference to the operational capacity of COs. Other examples include how un-earmarked funding was supplemented by earmarked funding until the CO managed to secure enough in-country funding to implement the proposed project. This sometimes entailed sending a SURGE specialist to enhance the technical knowhow that was otherwise missing in the CO.

Donor interlocutors highlighted the fact that they are supportive of UNDP’s CPR work as it corresponds to their own countries’ priorities for support to fragile states and it is often perceived as the most important contribution to long term development in fragile states. UNDP is perceived as a neutral partner on the ground, particularly in situations where no other development stakeholder operates and the CPR TTF funding mechanism was welcomed as a means to fund innovative initiatives and partnerships in fragile states. UNDP should however focus on the CPR work where it distinguished itself from others, such as legislative work with governments, starting in the early recovery phase. Factoring enough time to enable national ownership to be in place from the outset of support to national governments was emphasized.

Donor requirements for professional, multi-year results based management and results based reporting have not been fulfilled satisfactorily for many years due to the failure to provide a clear link of projects to UNDP’s overall Strategic Plan. Donors also expressed concerns regarding poor, if not unsatisfactory performance level in certain countries and they repeatedly pointed out that they expected more UNDP Core funding allocated to Trac 1.1.3 to underline the importance UNDP assigned to CPR. The improvement of the Results Based Framework, (RBF), the Multi-year Results Framework (MYRF) and the structural adjustments introduced after 2010, have resulted in more favorable donor response. Donor interviewees pointed out that, since 2012, reporting has improved substantially and BCPR’s reporting on the MYRF rates highest among all of UNDP. BCPRs Results Framework was rated as a best practice among UNDP.

Donors that have committed allocations to the CPR TTF are expecting to see a continuation of this best practice and the accountability achieved to date, regardless of where the Fund Management will be located within the new BPPS structure. UNDP has given the assurance that: “the allocations provided to the Fund will continue to be used strictly for the functions for which they were given and accountability back to the donors will continue as per previous practice.”[[133]](#footnote-133)

UNDP’s joint programmes and interagency-cooperation with other key stakeholders are essential requirements for donors interviewed for this report. The CPR TTF provides a well-functioning mechanism for donors to support such joint efforts in fragile states. Donors commented that it is easier to develop individual financing agreements with UNDP than with the Secretariat. Several donors highlighted that these inter-agency programmes were welcome developments, mentioning in particular, the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations (GFP) under the Global Programme for Rule of Law.

The results of many years of enhancing gender programming in CPR are mixed. Overall, general awareness on gender has increased manifold. As one interlocutor emphasized: “Everyone knows by now that if we don’t include gender, we don’t get funding.” The Country Office in Honduras confirmed this statement by adding that the introduction of the 15% allocation to gender was catalytic in the sense that it enabled discussions in the CO which led to an agreement with the Regional Centre in Panama to develop a strategy to mainstream gender.[[134]](#footnote-134) Implementation of gender components is still dependent on the availability of gender expertise in each CO and government willingness and capacity to implement gender components vigorously. COs were not aware of a special gender window within the CPR TTF but there was general consensus that global gender projects and exchange of expertise are useful and appreciated.

The feedback received from interviews with stakeholders at the CO level and at HQ confirm that major shortcomings remain, namely, the qualitative monitoring and reporting of gender within non-gender specific projects. Donors increasingly want to see gender mainstreamed across UNDP programs. In light of this development, BCPR should rethink its gender allocation and gender window. Instead of funding gender components on a project-by-project basis, which may only lead to piecemeal interventions, allocating 15% of the total CPR programme budget in each country would enable a more strategic approach to programming. Additionally, certain CPR TTF or TRAC 1.1.3 funds could be stipulated for global gender equality initiatives. COs recommended retaining the 15% minimum allocation or even increasing it to 20%, but equally important is the support during the project design.

The CPR TTF funding mechanism has allowed for a wide range of projects to be accommodated under its four thematic windows. This has, on the one side, served donor interest to fund specific projects that were negotiated between the thematic groups and donors, but has also resulted in the perception that the CPR TTF is a funding mechanism that covers too broad a range of issues. This has proved detrimental to efforts to give the Fund a stronger identity and profile when compared to the PBF, the World Bank’s Peace and State Building Fund or the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDDRR). CO replies to the survey highlight that they are often not aware of the thematic windows but that it is important for them to have access to funding for a variety of issues that arise in post conflict and post crisis situations. The assessor concludes that the CPR TTF is highly relevant in providing timely support to COs for CPR, but that its relevance is diminished by the lack of long term strategic alignment with the UNDP Strategic Plan.

*Efficiency*

The CO interviews and replies to the online survey have revealed that the beneficiaries of the CPR TTF were satisfied with the efficiency of the funding modalities of the Trac 1.1.3 and CPR TTF. It works as it was intended to, namely to be a fast response mechanism that allows the COs a significant amount of flexibility. The CPR TTF was rated superior in comparison to other UNDP trust funds where processes are less streamlined and more bureaucratic. None of the COs that replied to the survey perceived any major bottlenecks in receiving and managing the funds from the TTF. Administrative processes have been rated positively throughout. The implementation of the recommendations of the Strategic Review of 2010 and the Portfolio Review of 2012 specifically have had a positive impact in terms of improving the efficiency of administrative processes. The assessor notes the positive feedback received in relation to the technical support aspect of the CPR TTF mechanism. The Fund would not have achieved the same high level of efficiency and effectiveness without this technical support.

Although donors underlined that performance on the ground is not consistent and that UNDP has been urged to address these concerns, the CPR TTF’s unique design, including the combination of funding, strong technical backstopping and financial accountability have made the CPR TTF a strong financing mechanism. The CPR TTF’s three components 1) fund design and administration, 2) fund operation and 3) fund implementation have reached a satisfactory level. One interlocutor cautioned that if one of the three components above is weakened in the future, it could negatively impact the performance of the entire Fund.[[135]](#footnote-135)

The SURGE mechanism, as well as programmatic support from HQ and Regional Centres, provide the backbone of the CPR TTF and are rated positively by COs included in this assessment. The delegation of a Chief Technical Advisor for a specific thematic area a country office needed support for, often helped the office to enhance its performance in a given difficult situation. It was highlighted by several CO interlocutors that for the support to be mutually effective, short term experts need to be familiar with the context and ideally the language. It was also emphasized by several interlocutors that even though SURGE support was rated as positive in general terms, there is room for enhancing the system in place that rates the performance of the individual SURGE personnel.

Although it is clear that in difficult post crisis contexts, the weakness or non-existence of reliable government partners and security issues combine to make project implementation very challenging, UNDP should assess, prior to the agreement to fund a certain project, if the CO has the necessary capacity to effectively accomplish the tasks set out in the project document. The introduction of Strategic Framework Agreements with COs has been a step in the right direction, but the initiative has not been fully rolled out and feedback has been mixed. Donor interviewees highlighted that they would appreciate better communication about any difficulties and challenges at the outset of the implementation process, as well as timely consultation about any necessary redesign and financial spending delays in order to avoid disappointment at the time of mid-term reviews.

UNDP has been more selective regarding the countries that receive support from the CPR TTF and the list of priority countries has been downsized from over 100 countries to currently 63. Most of the support is going to the top 20 countries on the list. In order to provide the best possible impact, UNDP should further consider reducing the priority list based on a broad consultation process. For greater transparency, the list should be divided into counties that are facing conflict, disaster, or both. This should be undertaken in cooperation with other key stakeholders in order to optimize resources spent on the ground (i.e coordination with the PBF and World Bank). UNDP should continue to provide technical assistance to all its offices and facilitate access to its knowledge management system. There is also a need for greater transparency in creating the priority list.

The assessor has further observed that over the past six years, the CPR TTF management has steadily worked towards balancing allocations and expenditures and, as a result, the CPR TTF now has a well-established system aligning the expected commitments and disbursements with the anticipated donor contributions. By 2012, the closing balance has declined significantly, which is an indication of how the planning and forecasting of the allocations has improved considerably.[[136]](#footnote-136)

*Sustainability*

Looking back, the CPR TTF has managed to keep a steady funding level over the past 13 years. But the lack of a corporate decision to make the fund more visible and invest more resources to promote and advertise it has resulted in missed opportunities to attract more funding. The CPR TTF, being the first multi donor trust fund with a focus on Early Recovery, DRR and Conflict Prevention, has failed to develop strong branding and thus the potential, since its launch in 2000, to become a major funding mechanism for UNDP in CPR has been missed. In contrast, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, Climate Funds as well as some of the prominent World Bank Funds have clearer and more prominent branding combined with narrower and more distinct mandates which makes it easier for donors to decide where to allocate resources. After 2011, greater emphasis was put to inform key donors of the main differences of funding options, stressing the advantages of channeling funds to countries in crisis affected areas via the CPR TTF. Although it might not have been the specific intention of the creators of the Fund to be a global trust fund for CPR, key stakeholders commented that the CPR TTF missed the chance to attract more funding by failing to adequately advertise more prominently how CPR TTF allocations have made a difference on the ground.

As mentioned earlier, donors and other interlocutors made the point that the CPR TTF’s allocations to projects often failed to be clearly linked to overall UNDP strategic outcomes and thus failed to mainstream CPR. This is also due to the fact that for many years UNDP did not identify clear outcomes for CPR. As a result, too often interventions were perceived as ad hoc and based on achieving outputs rather than outcomes. As one interlocutor put it: “The results frameworks of individual projects funded by the CPR TTF may need to be better linked with global results reporting across all countries and projects. This requires better knowledge of fund users on what the global results are and how individual projects can be better aligned to global results and results reporting.”[[137]](#footnote-137)

Although CPR has been featured in the previous UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2013, there has been insufficient alignment of many CPR TTF funded projects with the UNDP Strategic Plan on the ground. Expectations are high that this will change in accordance with the new UNDP Strategy 2014-2017 that clearly links two of its outcomes to CPR. Resources for the CPR TTF have been secured for the next two years with some donors keeping their commitments on hold until the CPR TTF’s future position and use is clarified at the end of 2014. Donor expectations for the future of the CPR TTF include a clear link to the outcomes formulated in the UNDP Strategic Review 2014-2017, accompanied by the Integrated Resource and Results Framework (IRRF).

One donor highlighted that the current structure facilitates easy access to the technical information the donor requires. The Resource Mobilization Team (the main contact of the donor) and country teams are easily accessible and always in a position to access information swiftly from technical colleagues. Concerns were expressed that this may be lost under the new structure. Annual meetings with core donors to present and discuss CPR results would have been appreciated and are expected in the future.[[138]](#footnote-138) One donor commented that it would be appreciated if BCPR could improve its strategic communication with its capital. Although the CPR TTF was able to count on steady core donor support from 8-10 countries, some interlocutors questioned if the CPR TTF could not have been more successful had it been advertised and promoted far more prominently outside of UNDP.

The level of sustainability of projects where seed money was provided very much depends on the capacity on the ground, context and degree of national ownership. Most of the COs that replied to the survey mentioned that, apart from core UNDP funding, they manage to mobilize funding for CPR projects from bilateral donors and the PBF. Government sources are rarely mentioned, however catalytic effects are seen in countries were the Governments have taken the lead in reform processes. Small contributions also emanate from other UN MPTFs. None of the survey replies mentioned the World Bank Funds as a major contributor to UNDP funding at the country-level and cooperation with the World Bank was still rated insufficient. Exceptions are the programs that are specifically implemented by funding through the WB-UN Trust Fund and the EU-UNDP Trust Fund. Interlocutors mentioned that fundraising at the country level sometimes results in non-traditional donor engagement, as in the case of Burundi (China) or Pakistan (Saudi Arabia), but in general, COs rely on UNDP Core allocations and traditional bilateral donors for funding. More support in developing resource mobilization strategies and information about available funding sources would be appreciated. Several interviewees also highlighted that fund raising at HQ and communication with permanent missions and foreign offices is equally important for resource mobilization.

Although The CPR TTF has managed to attract approximately 30% of yearly un-earmarked funding over the past ten years, according to recent indications from donors it is unlikely that un-earmarked funding will increase. Under these circumstances, the CPR TTF is best advised to try and mobilize thematically flexible funding, which will still permit the fund manager to use the funds more flexibly than earmarked funding. The thematic teams, in close cooperation with the External Relations team, have played a vital role in mobilizing thematic flexible funding.

The availability of un-earmarked funding was highlighted as having a major impact in directing the programming toward country-based needs. It is also very relevant in cases where seed funding needs to be provided in order to leverage funding. The assessor notes that at the receiving end, there is no perceived difference between the CPR TTF and Trac 1.1.3 mechanism for un-earmarked funding, although, as highlighted above, the quick access to Trac.1.1.3 funds below USD 100,000 was particularly emphasized. The assessor concludes that there are mixed results in terms of sustainability but that there is a specific need to better inform and highlight achievements made in relation to catalytic effects at country and regional level, including from un-earmarked funding.

## **6.2 Recommendations**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Recommendation** | **Comments** |
| 1 | In the new structure, continue the CPR TTF and improve linkages to the relevant CPR outcomes of the Strategic Plan 2014-2017. This would enable donors to provide *soft–earmarked or thematic funding* in support of the following specific outcomes contained in the Strategic Plan:Outcome 5: Countries are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict and lower the risk of natural disasters, including from climate change and Outcome 6: Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post conflict and post disaster settings | Several donors emphasized that new agreements for non-core allocations to the CPR TTF will need to be based on the provision of a new budgeted results framework in clear alignment with the UNDP Strategic Plan and its Integrated Results and Resources Framework. |
| 2 | Ensure the "one stop shop" (CPR Management Unit) exists within the new structure, with dedicated human resources to facilitate easy communication and timely reporting to key donors and other partners. | Several donors highlighted that BCPR staff in New York was easily accessible and information was readily provided upon request.  |
| 3 | While it is important for the fund to continue receiving un-earmarked funding, greater emphasis needs to be placed on mobilizing "thematic flexible" contributions to the CPR TTF to allow countries to support specific thematic areas under outcome 5 and 6 such as Livelihoods, Early Recovery, Rule of Law and DRR but still giving UNDP the flexibility to act according to country needs. | The CPR TTF structure that allows for thematic resource mobilization along the lines of the Global Programme for Rule of Law and other inter-agency cooperation should be maintained and extended to other areas.There is also considerable potential to enhance UNDP’s strategic programming for DRR and Climate Change and to access untapped funding possibilities. The positioning of the crisis and climate teams in one unit in the future Bureau for Policy and Programme Support opens the potential for better funding strategies for both areas, particularly for adaptation. |
| 4 | Assess and enhance reporting for un-earmarked contributions and track long term regional and global impact of results, including catalytic effects based on knowledge exchange.  | The Knowledge Management and Practice Unit should systematically track the long term impact of CPR TTF seed funding. The assessor further recommends that annual reports prominently demonstrate how much funding was leveraged each year based on TTF and Trac 3 investments.Transparency and accountatbility on the use of un-earmarked funding should be maintained, including detailed information for donors on planning and disbursement processes and how un-earmarked and earmarked funding lead to different transaction costs.  |
| 5 | Maintain the quality of narrative reporting as per MYRF 2012 and improve communication with officials in donor capitals including more regular meetings and reporting.  | The CPR TTF has been commended as UNDP’s best internal fund and the achieved standard of reporting based on the last MYRF ’1 narrative report’ should be maintained.BCPR has good individual consultations with donors and with the permanent missions in NY, but donor interlocutors highlighted that UNDP needs to enhance this open dialogue with all donors including in their respective capitals. The new BPPS should consult with its main donors collectively on how the priorities will be set in the future and how they are planning to fund them. |
| 6 | Develop Standard Operating Procedures on resource mobilization roles and responsibilities in case of Level 2/Level 3 crisis and develop resource mobilization guidance, tools and advice for resource mobilization which can be included in the guidance notes for signature products in post natural disaster situations.  | This will have to be developed in cooperation with BERA, Regional Bureaux and BOM. |
| 7 | Continue to focus the CPR TTF on a principle of priority countries, but retain flexibility through broad consultation processes. The country priority list should clearly identify which countries are affected by conflicts, including human security, by disasters and also countries facing both conflict and disaster risks. | The applied selection criteria needs to be made transparent and communicated widely. Technical expertise should remain accessible to every CO. Continue cooperation with other partners such as the World Bank and PBF to consolidate efforts made in specific areas. |
| 8 | Enhance the system to monitor and evaluate SURGE performances and keep SURGE missions short term.  | Although SURGE support was rated positively in general terms, there is room for enhancing the system in place that rates the performance of the individual SURGE personnel. |
| 9 | Allocate 15% of the total CPR programme budget in each country to gender and /or stipulate certain CPR TTF or TRAC 1.1.3 funds for gender equality initiatives linked to outcome 4 of the Strategic Plan and establish a system to track gender results linked to CPR TTF Atlas allocations.  | Benchmarks and indicators need to be developed to track all gender components equally. |
| 10 | Undertake more consistent efforts on promoting the CPR TTF as a fast, flexible and catalytic funding mechanism supporting UNDP’s work in crisis prevention and recovery and develop a branding strategy to clearly outline the CPR TTF’s added benefit to UNDP in the context of other global funds.  | UNDP needs to define its strength and comparative advantage for CPR on the ground and provide a solid IRRF for CPR along with the Strategic Plan. The desk review and interviews with COs have revealed that UNDP’s strength in DRM is to support governments with its legislative work and implementation of DRM plans at the national and subnational level. In conflict prevention and recovery, its comprehensive rule of law, security and livelihoods programs are a best practice. UNDP is also advised to refrain from short-term interventions that do not yield a long-term strategy. |
| 11 | Greater emphasis should be given by the CPR TTF manager to fundraise in support of knowledge exchange and drawing together best practices, including provisions in the new South –South strategy.  | Experiences from COs suggest that this is an essential area that should be facilitated further in order to enhance sustainability. |

# **ANNEXES**

* Annex 1: List of documents reviewed
* Annex 2: Questions in the online survey
* Annex 3: Summary of donor interviews
* Annex 4: List of persons consulted
* Annex 5: ToR of the Assessment

## **Annex 1 Documents consulted**

* UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017
* UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and Integrated Results and Resources Framework, September 2013
* ToR Assessment of Funding Mechanisms of BCPR
* BCPR Strategic Review Final Report March 10, 2010
* Portfolio review for UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP Feb 2012
* BCPR Results Framework 2012
* BCPR Output Review Report, Status of Results Delivery July 2013
* BCPR Report on Global Partnerships, 2010
* Overview of CPR TTF contributions 2000-2012
* Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries in the Context of UN Peace Operations, Jan 2013
* UNDP CPR Thematic Trust Fund Overview, August 2007
* BCPR Business Processes-Program Development Support
* BCPR Business Processes -Resource Allocation
* BCPR Business Processes-Immediate Crisis Response
* BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013
* Information Note for the Committee on Budgetary Control of the European Parliament on Multidonor Trust Funds Supported by the European Community General Budget since 2003 (updated 30th June 2011) , European Commission
* Mapping of Transition Financing Procedures and Mechanisms, Commissioned by SIDA and DFID on behalf of the INCAF Task Team on Financing and Aid Architecture, June 2009
* DFID Note on Multilateral Aid: UNDP Performance Review (including BCPR) , February 2011
* IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011. *Trust Fund Support for Development: An Evaluation of the World Bank’s Trust Fund Portfolio*. Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank Group.
* Assessment of Development Results (ADR): [www.erc.undp.org](http://www.erc.undp.org)
* Annual Reports 2002-2011: Crisis Prevention and Recovery, published on the UNDP website:
* <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/overview.html>
* <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/about.shtml>
* <http://www.unpbf.org/>
* OECD (2012) International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD Publishing. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264168336-en>
* UNDP MPTF Office (2013) Financing development together: The role of pooled financing mechanisms in enhancing development effectiveness.
* Greenhill, R., and A. Ali ‘Paying for Progress: How will emerging post-2015 goals be financed in the new aid landscape?’ ODI Working Paper 366, 2013, UK.
* <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/aid-investments-in-disaster-risk-reduction-rhetoric-to-action>
* <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/disaster-risk-reduction-spending-where-it-should-count>
* Workstream Gobal Trends: Briefing Paper: Disaster Risk Reduction, Spending where it should count, Jan Kellett and Dan Sparks, March 2012
* ODI /GFDRR: Financing Disaster Risk Reduction, A 20 Years Story of International Aid, Ian Kellett and Alice Caravani, Sept 2013
* ODI: Dare to prepare. Taking Risk Seriously. Financing emergency preparedness. From fighting crisis to managing risk, Ian Kellett and Katie Peters, 2014,
* Project document: Strengthening Community Resilience to Climate Induced Natural Disasters in the Dili to Ainaro Road Development Corridor, Timor-Leste (DARDC
* Towards transformational change for women and girls in post-conflict settings, Case studies and lessons learned from a global UNDP initiative: An Independent Review of Development Practice, June 2012,Sarah Preston Hanssen
* From peace consolidation to sustainable economic recovery: securing a strong foundation for Burundi 20011-2014. UNDP Project Document, Community Reintegration and Recovery, 15 November 2011
* UNDP Integrated Resource Mobilization Strategy, *Version 5, last updated 23 February 2012*
* Independent Review of UNDP Implementation of PBF projects, Nov 2013
* Danish Note to the Foreign Ministry, 2013
* UNDP Knowledge Management Strategy Framework 2014-2017
* UNDP Program Brief, Rule of Law Support Program Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
* Independent External Evaluation, UN PBF Portfolio in Burundi 2007-2013, February 2014
* Reducing Vulnerabilities, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery, UNDP Evaluation Office, December 2010,
* *IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011*. Trust Fund Support for Development. An Evaluation of the World Banks’ Trust Fund Portfolio. Washington DC. Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank
* [www.web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS](http://www.web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS)

Independent UNDP Justice System Program (JSP) Midterm Evaluation, August 2011

Disaster Risk Management Institutional and Operational Systems Development in Timor-Leste Project, United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste, Final Evaluation Report (DRAFT), April 2010

## **Annex 2 Questions to Country Offices and Regional Centres**

**1. Relevance**

To what extent does the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR TTF) meet the needs of your country office?

Have the demands for CPR TTF funding in your CO increased over the past few years?

To what extent does the classification of the CPR TTF’s Thematic Windows respond to Crisis Prevention and Recovery priorities in your country?

Do you have any suggestions, or see a need to change the thematic windows?

What are the main strength of the BCPR TTF?

What are the main weaknesses of the BCPR TTF?

Where there any unanticipated events or constraints in your CO in receiving funding from the CPR TTF?

Do you have enough support from HQ for gender mainstreaming?

Is gender knowledge available in your CO to design and implement the CPR-related gender components successfully?

Is the thematic window for Gender Equality necessary and successful? What is your opinion on the CPR TTF’s requirement of the minimum 15% of each project budget to be allocated for gender-related activities?

**2. Efficiency**

How efficient is the TTF resource allocation in your experience?

Where to you perceive a bottleneck in receiving and managing funds from the TTF? Do you see a need for improvement of administrative processes?

Any suggestions for change?

What measures were taken in the past to assure the quality of results and management practices?

Do you have enough support with monitoring, developing indicators and following up on achievements? What are the main obstacles?

How efficient are risks and problems addressed by HQ or the Regional Centre?

Where the resources allocated sufficient to achieve the objectives on a yearly basis?

Does your Regional Bureau support you in communicating financial constraints/priorities to BCPR?

Is there enough financial management knowhow in the CO?

**3. Sustainability**

Is there enough fundraising knowhow in your CO?

How would you describe the role of the CPR TTF’s funding for CPR portfolio in your country – was it based on the principle of “seed funding”; were there any catalytic effects in mobilizing required resources; or did the CPR TTF mainly support projects that would otherwise not receive any financial support?

How much do you manage to fundraise for projects based on CPR TTF seed funding (in percentage/annually)?

Where does additional funding come from? Other MDTFs, i.e. the World Bank’s State and Peacebuilding Fund or UNDPs Peacebuilding Fund? UNDP core or bilateral donors? Were these partnership arrangement meant to ensure achievement of intended results?

In what area has resource mobilization been most successful?

How do you view cooperation with the World Bank and other UN agencies? What are the major changes over the past few years? What are the major obstacles?

Is your feedback to RC and HQ being taken into consideration?

## **Annex 3 Summaries of donor interviews**

The following section summarizes the interviews held with donors:

United Kingdom

DFID has consistently been one of the largest donors (mainly un-earmarked funding) of the CPR TTF. The interlocutor highlighted that one of the reasons DFID supports the CPR TTF is to try and ensure that UNDP has the capacity and systems in place to work in fragile states, but he underlined that performance of UNDP at the country-level in fragile states needs to be more consistent. DFID has sought to provide the impetus for BCPR to professionalize its planning, monitoring and reporting by insisting that the Results Framework and MYRF be significantly enhanced to reflect UNDP’s work in CPR. Since 2008, DFID’s core funding has been linked to a performance framework. DFID funding to the CPR TTF is based on a set of agreed upon targets and indicators covering achievements and progress on internal reform.

The UK commissioned a comprehensive Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) in 2011 that recognized UNDPs crucial role in fragile states. The MAR underlined that “UNDP has significant in-house capacity on working in fragile contexts and has a range of guidance, analytical tools and social safeguards which are improving the consideration of fragility in its programming”.[[139]](#footnote-139) It was, however, not particularly positive about UNDP’s capacity to deliver in fragile states. The 2013 update of the MAR further found that UNDP had made relatively slow progress against strengthening areas that the MAR had identified UNDP were weak at. However, in light of the restructuring process, DFID remains supportive of the CPR TTF through 2014.

The interlocutor acknowledged the fact that BCPR has made substantial improvements since the strategic review of 2010, particularly mentioning the structural change to become a ‘one stop shop’ including the focal points and the Executive Committee. He commended the fact that both the Strategic Review 2010 and the Portfolio Review of 2012 provided excellent recommendations that BCPR has been implementing over the past two years. He also underlined that DFID expected an increase of core funding to Trac 1.1.3 in order for UNDP to prove its commitment to CPR. The Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and the IRRF were viewed positively as two of the outcomes are linked to CPR.

On the donor side, the interlocutor commented that the donor has to be very clear of what it expects from UNDP and there should be an open and frank discussion regarding which trust fund is best suited to reach the defined goals. Ideally, UN funds should complement each other. However this is not currently the case.

Sweden (The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)

Sweden is one of the top three donors to the CPR TTF together with the UK and the Netherlands, with a total contribution of approximately USD 98 million from 2008 to 2013 provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIDA.

SIDA has provided crucial funding to the amount of USD 18.7 million for the implementation of the recommendations of the BCPR strategic review, as well as the joint UNDP-DPA programme building national capacities for conflict prevention for the period 2010 to 2012.[[140]](#footnote-140) Support from SIDA has been essential during the restructuring process in 2010, particularly focusing on how to achieve better results at the country-level. SIDA chooses the CPR TTF as a flexible financing mechanism to support global programmes with DPKO and DPA. SIDA and UNDP have agreed upon monitoring and reporting modalities which facilitate cooperation agreements.

The interlocutor at SIDA commented that BCPR was struggling to reach the defined goals but by 2013 its performance has improved to the satisfaction of the donor. However, results reporting is still more activity oriented and fails to portray how much impact has been achieved at the country- level. It was reiterated that the reporting on results and outcomes depends on the capacity at CO level. For example, too many early recovery projects (i.e. work for livelihood) are not adequately linked to long term programs with a focus on strengthening the peace dividend.

Norway

The interlocutors had been expecting a broader assessment to review the ways in which all UNDP Trust Funds function and how they should be adapted to the Strategic Plan 2014-2017. With regard to the CPR TTF, they highlighted the need to clarify its “identity” - what its role should be and how it could perform more effectively. They expect to receive information on how the CPR TTF will work in the future, including what role the CPR TTF could best fulfill and how this will be achieved under the new structure. They were assured that their feedback and recommendations would be reflected in this assessment report. They stated that they have voiced their concerns with BCPR several times before.

At the beginning of the interview both interlocutors outlined the main financial contributions of Norway to UNDP:

Norway provides 15 percent of total core funding, therefore also 15 percent of Trac 3. Norway is also the 5th biggest donor of non-core and thematic funding to UNDP. The low percentage of UNDP core funding allocated to Trac 3 is a significant concern to them. They would have hoped to see an increase from the 7.2% allocation over the years in line with the increase in the demand of CPR needs around the world. CPR related activities in fragile states is a priority for Norway within UNDP. Therefore, they provide un-earmarked funding to the TTF, in addition to the high level of core funding. However, an increase in un-earmarked non-core funding to key areas like CPR is not likely as they already are one of the main core donors. UNDP should look into the possibility of establishing new mechanisms allowing for softly earmarked thematic funding of the outcomes in the new Strategic Plan.

Concerns for Norway include 1) the lack of strategic direction of the CPR TTF, 2) inadequate reporting on financial allocations, and transaction costs related to un-earmarked versus earmarked contributions to the CPR TTF; and 3) room for improvement in the flow of communication.

1. The CPR TTF lacks a clear identity and strategic planning has not been communicated well. They have not received a clear picture of the overall achievements of the un-earmarked funds allocated to the CPR TTF. They explained that it remains easier for the Foreign Office to allocate funding to a Trust Fund with a clearer identity and narrower mandate, such as the PBF. Information on the achievements of UNDPs’ CPR TTF is either too detailed towards one particular output or too superficial. However, they do see the potential for improvement on the basis of the new Strategic Plan and the new structure.

They are very supportive of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and the outcomes related to CPR. They recommend that, under the new structure, the CPR TTF should be linked to the relevant outcomes of the Strategic Plan 2014-2017. Donors would thus have the chance to provide *soft–earmarked or thematic funding* in support of specific outcomes in the Strategic Plan.

They emphasized that it would increase the strategic perception of the CPR TTF if funding could be linked directly to an outcome of UNDPs strategic plan. UNDP would need to define its CPR strength and comparative advantage and provide an integrated budget for the CPR TTF’s results framework.

1. They emphasized that BCPR provides the best results framework within UNDP and it should be developed as a best practice**.** They commended the fact that reporting had improved substantially since 2011. The 2012 MYRF Annual Results Report “Part 1: Narrative” was seen as a very good example for reporting on CPR activities, but they were surprised that this report was not publicly available. This narrative report provides an aggregate analysis of the detailed results info available in the MYRF, and describes progress according to targets and milestones. However, the tracking of funding or reporting on the efficiency of funding remains inadequate and the reporting is still insufficiently connected to outcomes (the MYRF report should include info on expenditure). They believe that the Integrated Results and Resources Framework of the new Strategic Plan is a good starting point also for undertaking results-based budgeting and financial reporting. They also commented that financial data was not always accurate or consistent across the reports they receive. They further asked for greater specificity on how un-earmarked funding is planned and spent, and how un-earmarked and earmarked funding lead to different levels of transaction costs.
2. They were also critical of the communication flow and the dialogue with donors of un-earmarked funding. They recognize that BCPR makes an effort to communicate with the ‘friends of BCPR’, but these are usually contacts BCPR has in NY. They underlined that financial decisions are made in Norway and that it would be appreciated if BCPR could improve its strategic communication with their capital. BCPR has good individual consultations with donors, but they need to enhance the open dialogue with all donors. BCPR should consult with its main donors collectively on how the priorities will be set in the future and how they are planning to fund it as well as results achieved.

Looking forward, they expect major improvements with regards to the three issues above. They reiterated that if Norway is going to negotiate new agreements for non-core allocations to the CPR TTF (or its successor), it will need to be based on the provision of a new budgeted results framework in clear alignment with the UNDP Strategic Plan and its Integrated Results and Resources Framework.

Switzerland

Assistance to fragile states and states in transition has been a major focus of Swiss Development Assistance for several years and its Parliament approved an increase of funding to fragile states in 2013. Swiss foreign policy towards fragile states corresponds well with what BCPR is doing on the ground and the CPR TTF provides a suitable financing possibility. The main attraction for the Swiss to use UNDP in fragile states is its extensive presence, competences and the perception of neutrality of the UN.

Swiss interlocutors (Permanent mission and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)) explained that Switzerland decided to increase its contribution to have a more prominent voice and more say in the assistance of UNDP to fragile states, Switzerland wants to be a partner of UNDP in this field. The International Network of Conflict and Fragility, co-chaired by the director of BCPR, is viewed as an important forum to enable Switzerland to voice its views. It is important that UNDP works in countries were the New Deal Framework is implemented. Switzerland provides yearly earmarked and un-earmarked contributions and is currently committed over a 3 year period. The interlocutors further underlined that BCPR‘s reporting based on the MYRF has improved substantially.

The interlocutors commended staff at BCPR for its transparency, for sharing information and readiness to engage in open dialogue. The interlocutor at SDC also highlighted the ease of access to technical information either directly or by way of one stop shop within BCPR. The resource mobilization team, for example, is only one step away from direct information from BCPR’s technical staff. The interlocutors voiced concerns that this positive experience from the donor side may be affected by the restructuration and would like to keep this open communication flow between donors and the bureau. It was further emphasized that the more recent and innovative establishment of the Global Focal Point for Rule of Law, which is supported by SDC with an annual earmarked contribution of USD 0.5 million for 3 years, has been very much welcomed and has the potential to improve UN effectiveness in fragile situations.

Swiss interlocutors outlined Switzerland’s general expectations from UNDP, namely that the resident coordinators become more responsive to political tensions in countries and be proactive before the onset of crisis. In this regard, Switzerland supports the joint UNDP-DPA programme that facilitates the deployment of PDAs. Swiss interlocutors reiterated Switzerland’s expectations for enhanced UN Interagency Cooperation in order to maximize performance in the field. The CPR TTF has provided the funding channel to support these efforts. Switzerland, together with Norway, also supports a UN - World Bank’s Partnership Trust Fund for Fragile States, to support joint initiatives at institutional and operational level. In view of the restructuring process of BCPR, it was emphasized that they expect to see a continuation of concrete results on the ground that can be presented to the Swiss Parliament. In this regard, it was underlined that the new BPPS should not be a think-tank but should provide a link between policy and practice, and vice versa, with a strong link to country offices to enhance performance on the ground.

In line with other donors’ expectations, the interviewees underlined that it will be very important to see improvements in terms of strategic alignment of CPR TTF funded projects with the UNDP Strategy 2014-2017. In the 2008-2013 BCPR Strategic Plan, the Integrated Resources and Results Framework was missing. They commended the new UNDP Strategic Plan, particularly the fact that it finally incorporates a new system that links indicators with the allocation of needed resources. Expectations are high that the UNDP Integrated Results Framework will further improve the strategic alignment of CPR.

The interlocutors reiterated that BCPR has come a long way to improve its Results Based Reporting and Monitoring based on the MYRF. It was recommended that UNDP should consider BCPR’s reporting on the Results Based Framework as best practice.

Japan Unit, BERA

Japan used to channel funds through BCPR in the aftermath of major crises like Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2004. More recently, Japan has set up its own Japan-UNDP Partnership Fund that it now uses to finance projects at the country level. Japan now only provides earmarked, country specific funding. Much of Japan’s non-core funding to UNDP over the past years focused on CPR areas of practice. Japan is notably one of the top UNDP bilateral donors at the country level for CPR.

Japan still uses the CPR TTF to channel funds to the Peacekeeping Operations Centers in Africa. The interlocutor highlighted the fact that Japan acknowledges UNDP’s crucial presence and expertise in fragile countries. They are satisfied with the improvement of BCPR reporting in recent years. The Interlocutor at BERA commended the technical knowledge provided by BCPR.

Generally, Japan is not in favor of un-earmarked funding. Financial accountability and reporting per action line is important for their financial reporting structure. The interlocutor also underlined that Japan did not approve of the increase of General Management Services fees that was raised from 7% to 8% in 2013 (a decision made by majority vote of the UNDP Executive Board).

## **Annex 4 Interviews conducted for the assessment**

Interviews at BCPR HQ:

Mr. Serdar Bayriyev: M&E coordinator, BCPR Policy and Planning Division

Ms. Jelena Vladicic, External Relations Analyst, Resource Mobilization, donor relations

Mr. Jan Harfst, Division Chief, Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS, UNDP

Mr. Nazim Khizar, Operations Manager, Resource Management Division, BCPR, UNDP

Mr. Stan Nkwain, Chief, Policy and Planning Division, BCPR

Mr. George Khoury, Team Leader, Rapid Response Team, BCPR

Mr. Bruno Lemarquis, Chief, County Support Management Division, BCPR

Mr. Moises Venancio, Team Leader, Results Planning Team, BCPR

Ms. Shakirat Toktosunova, Programme Specialist, Europe and CIS Regional Team, BCPR

Ms. Awa Dabo, Team Leader, Regional Team for Africa, BCPR

Ms. Jelena Raketic, program officer

Ms. Sudha Srivastava, Chief of the Resource Management Division, BCPR

Mr. Jocelyn Mason, Chief of Staff

Ms. Hiroko Araki, Resource Mobilization Specialist, BCPR

Mr. Jo Scheuer, Global Coordinator, BCPR Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Unit

Mr. Kamal Kishore, Senior Programme Specialist, BCPR Disaster Risk and Recovery Unit

Ms. Rania El Azem, Policy Analyst (Gender), Results Planning Team, BCPR

Ms. Leontine Specker, Programme Specialist, Livelihoods and Recovery Group, BCPR NY

Ms. Shazzia Razaque, Programme Specialist, Rule of Law, Justice and Security Unit, BCPR NY

Mr. Devanand Ramiah, Team Leader, Regional Team for Asia Pacific, BCPR

Mr. Christian Lotz, Policy Planning, PBS Fund and World Bank relations

Ms. Henriette Keijzers, Deputy Executive Coordinator of MPTF

Ms. Fiona Bayat-Renoux, MPTF Portfolio Manager

Mr. Alejandro Alvarez, Team Leader, Rule of Law, Justice and Security Unit

Ms. Katy Thompson, Programme Specialist, Rule of Law, Justice and Security Unit

Donor Interviews:

Ms. Caroline Tissot, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

Ms. Beate Elsaesser, 1st Secretary of the Swiss Permanent Mission,

Ms. Bettina Etter, Assistance to 1st Secretary

Ms. Maria Lundberg, Program Manager Swedish International Development Agency

Mr. Alf Håvard Vestrheim, Senior Adviser, Section for Multilateral Development Finance and Global Economy, Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. Berit Fladby, Norwegian Ministry of Foregin Affairs, Policy Director for UN Development Activities

Mr. Adam Forbes, DFID Conflict Advisor

Mr. Naoki Nihei BERA, Japan Unit

Country Office representatives:

Pakistan: Ms. Rabia Khattak, Assistant Country Director

East Timor: Ms. Noura Hamladji, Country Director a.i.

Burundi: Mr. Xavier Michon, Country Director

Honduras: Ms. Dina Salinas, In charge of operations, management specialist

Mr. Sergio Membreño, Coordinator of Governance Unit

Mr. Juan Ferrando, Coordinator of the Environment, Energy and Risk Management Unit

Mr. Rafael Espinoza, Security Advisor

Kirgizstan: Mr. Erkin Kasybekov, Assistant Resident Representative (ARR)/ Programme

Mr. Lucio Valerio Sarandrea, CTA for ROL programe;

Mr. Daniar Ibragimov, Programme Analyst for DRR and Environment programmes;

Mr. Mukash Kaldarov, Project Manager, Disaster Reduction Management Programme (DRMP)

Yemen: Mr. Edward Christow, Project manager for Governance

Sierra Leone: Mr. Mohamed Abchir, Country Office Director

## **Annex 5 ToR of the Assessment**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

**Assessment of the UNDP’s Funding Mechanisms for Crisis Prevention and Recovery**

1. **BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT**

As part of its broader mission to enable sustainable social and economic development, and as elaborated in Executive Board document DP/2000/18, UNDP has received a clear mandate from the UN General Assembly to operate in special development situations. The UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is responsible for leading this mandate through supporting UNDP’s efforts to reduce the impact of natural disasters, prevent armed conflicts, and assist in recovery from crisis when it occurs. There are various funds available to UNDP Country Offices working in special development situations. These resources include utilization of Target for Resource Assignment from the Core (TRAC 1 & 2), direct cost sharing contributions at the country level, and external funding opportunities. In addition, UNDP has corporately assigned resources for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, managed by BCPR. These include the dedicated resource line in its programming arrangements for crisis response (TRAC 3) and the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF).

TRAC 3 resources are earmarked annually from the UNDP's Regular Resources to finance initiatives that aim at crisis prevention, reducing the impact of a crisis, and also to support the UN Country Teams and the offices of Resident Coordinators in coordinating crisis response.

The UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF) was established by UNDP in March 2000. Since its inception, the Fund has mobilized more than US$ 850 million and benefited more than 80 countries. BCPR serves as the Fund manager, responsible for both its fiduciary oversight and programmatic results. The CPR TTF provides a channel for the donors to fund specific projects in response to crisis prevention and recovery needs in a particular country. This funding mechanism is designed to support quick action recovery activities following a natural disaster or violent conflict, or when a unique opportunity arises to reduce disaster risk or prevent conflict. In addition to offering rapid allocation of funds to UNDP country offices, the CPR TTF provides the flexibility to refocus funding in response to evolving crisis prevention and recovery needs. The Fund also envisages that BCPR’s integrated technical expertise and programmatic support are mobilized towards the delivery of the funds.

The CPR TTF receives unearmarked contributions from donors which can be directed to crisis and other country office needs in CPR as they emerge, and which are allocated through a dedicated management mechanism. The CPR TTF has also established funding windows for earmarked contributions benefiting individual programme countries and specific programmatic interventions in key technical service lines (conflict prevention and peacebuilding; recovery; security sector reform and transitional justice; small arms reduction, disarmament, and demobilization; mine action; natural disaster reduction; and special initiatives for countries in transition).

1. **PURPOSE**

This assessment will focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of BCPR-managed mechanisms in ensuring deployment and effective use of necessary financial resources in special development situations. It will review how Country Offices perceive these mechanisms in terms of speed of response, relevance and flexibility and the extent to which funding opportunities from the CPRTTF and TRAC 3 have strengthened overall country portfolios and acted as a seed funding mechanism for mobilizing larger resources for CPR programmes. The assessment will focus on identifying relevant lessons learned and best practices and on providing forward-looking recommendations to the management for positioning and improving the CPRTTF/TRAC3 mechanisms and processes in order to further strengthen the effectiveness of UNDP’s financial support to country offices in special development situations.

1. **SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES**

The assessment will cover the period from 2000-2013, focusing in particular on evaluating the value added of the use of the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 resources, and associated specific aspects, such as rapid receipt and allocation of funds to UNDP Country Offices for immediate response to crises; use of specific thematic and country windows to channel donor contributions; ability to generate lessons learnt and take into account emerging challenges; and flexibility of adjusting the funding portfolio in response to evolving crisis prevention and recovery needs.

Specific objectives of this assessment are as follows:

* To assess the extent to which the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms have met their original objectives and whether they have been positioned to add value in responding to the needs and demands from high risk crisis countries in a fast and flexible manner that supports UNDP programmes;
* To assess the extent to which the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 allocations contributed to further mobilization of additional resources for CPR interventions by country offices;
* Assess the efficiency of the CPRTTF and TRAC 3 management processes and identify potential areas for improvement;
* To present key findings, draw lessons learned, and provide a set of clear and forward-looking options for improving provision of required financial assistance towards addressing CPR-related needs and challenges.
1. **KEY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS**

The assessment will use the suggested questions below that are to the following criteria: Relevance, Efficiency and Sustainability.

1. **Relevance**
* To what extent the original objectives of establishing the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms have been met, including any adjustments that were made to reflect corporate requirements and country needs.
* To what extent established CPR TTF thematic windows respond to crisis prevention and recovery priorities at the global, regional and country level?
* Were there any unanticipated events, opportunities or constraints in the process of managing the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms? Have associated risks been anticipated and addressed?
* To what extent implementing policies and practices applied in managing the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms have been consistent with specific contributing donor policies and requirements, as well as relevant country, regional and global priorities.
* Have gender mainstreaming and gender equality priorities been adequately addressed through the allocation and use of CPR TTF and TRAC 3 resources
* Have the CPRTTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms enabled further resource mobilization ?
1. **Efficiency**
* Have the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 funds and associated resources (human resources, time) been efficiently used to achieve its objectives?
* What effect did management and institutional arrangements have on the use of CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms as principal instruments of supporting programming, delivery and monitoring of implementation of CPR-related interventions at the regional level and at the country level?
* What measures and processes were applied by UNDP and partners to ensure greater accountability to key donors and partners for the effective use of the financial resources?
* What were the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches and strategies utilised in managing the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms?
* Were management capacities of the BCPR adequate to manage the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms in a timely and efficient manner? What could be done differently in the future?
* What measures were taken to assure the quality of results and management practices, both in relation to process and products, and to partnership strategies?
* How has the CPR TTF portfolio and its size evolved over time? Were these trends adequately aligned with the supply of resources (funds, human resources and time) and country demands?
* Were the resources allocated sufficient to achieve the objectives of the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms? Have appropriate resource mobilization strategies been developed and implemented to ensure achievement of these objectives?
* To what extent have the management mechanisms of the CPRTTF been able to ensure coherence, in priority setting and allocation criteria, with those of UNDP’s Regional Bureaus.
1. **Sustainability**
* To what extent were sustainability considerations taken into account in the design and implementation of CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms?
* What steps have been taken to ensure CPR TTF sustainability in light of the changing patterns of aid architecture and growing demands from UNDP country offices?
* How did the development of partnerships at the global, regional and national level contribute to sustainability of CPR TTF and TRAC 3 mechanisms?
* To what extent have the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 resources had a catalytic effect in terms of jumpstarting required programmes, delivering results and mobilizing required resources? How much additional funding was leveraged by the CPR TTF and TRAC 3 resources? What were main sources of additional funding?
* What are the prospects for future resource mobilization? Is there a need for re-alignment or adjustment of existing CPR TTF thematic windows and TRAC 3 categories or strategic repositioning of these funding mechanisms in light of current country demands and prospective sources of supply (funding opportunities)?
1. **METHODOLOGY**

Inception report: Based on the indicative questions listed in the above section, overall methodology and specific questions will be further developed by the Assessment Consultant in the inception report within the first week of the assignment. The inception report should contain a specific matrix displaying each of the assessment criteria and associated questions and sub-questions that the assessment will answer, and for each question, the primary and secondary data that will be collected.

The consultant will seek to obtain data from a range of sources, including desk reviews and document analyses, surveys and questionnaires for selected country offices along with relevant phone interviews and interviews with relevant personnel in NYHQ. The rationale for using a range of data sources (data, perceptions, evidence) is to triangulate findings and using different data sources to inform the analysis of specific issues. The consultant will provide empirical evidence to support all conclusions and recommendations, and the evidence will be validated from multiple sources. The questionnaires and phone interviews with selected country offices will represent an integral and crucial component of the assessment.

The representative list of country offices (5-7 countries) to be interviewed will be prepared by the Assessment Consultant based on the suggestions from BCPR, using the following criteria:

* Geographical balance to the extent possible
* Country offices that received TRAC 3 for emergency response;
* Country offices that received un-earmarked contributions;
* Country offices that received a mix of earmarked and un-earmarked contributions

In each case, an effort will be made to ensure selection of country offices that have received considerable assistance in each of the four areas of the criteria.

1. **DELIVERABLES**
* Inception report— detailing the Assessment Consultant’s understanding of what is being assessed and why, showing how each suggested question will be answered by way of: proposed methods, proposed sources of data and data collection procedures. The inception report will also include draft questionnaires and interview questions to be shared with country offices and a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables;
* Draft assessment report and presentation of key findings:
* Final assessment report.
1. **REQUIRED COMPETENCIES AND QUALIFICATIONS**

The Assessment Consultant will be externally recruited through UNDP’s regular recruitment procedure. He/she should be independent from any organizations that have been involved in designing, executing or advising any aspect of CPR TTF that is the subject of this assessment.

Competencies:

* Familiarity with the current global trends in international aid architecture
* Excellent writing, communication and presentation skills
* Strong interpersonal skills, communication and diplomatic skills, ability to work in a team

Qualifications:

* Masters in international development , political science , economics or relevant field
* At least 7 years of international development experience or well established and well-functioning organization with at least 5 years of experience in fund-raising, resource mobilization and project/programme management;
* Familiarity with standard UNDP policies and practices for engagement in crisis and special development situations;
* Background in strategic planning and previous experience in drafting or contributing to UN development documents;
* Significant experience in monitoring and evaluation, including hands-on experience in designing and undertaking evaluations of development interventions;
* Sound methodological skills and knowledge of evaluation methods and techniques.
1. **TIMEFRAME FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND PAYMENT SCHEDULE**

The duration of the assessment will be 40 working days spread over a period of 3 months.

The payments will be made on the basis of the terms, conditions and deliverables specified in the contract to be signed between the consultant and the UNDP. It is expected that the contract will be made on the basis of total lump-sum amount, and payments will be made upon UNDP acceptance of the following key deliverables:

* **20% of the total lump-sum amount – upon UNDP acceptance of the inception report;**
* **40% of the total lump-sum amount – upon UNDP acceptance of the draft assessment report and presentation of key findings;**
* **40% of the total lump-sum amount – upon UNDP acceptance of the final assessment report.**

**10. Duty Station**

This is Duty station is New York – USA and it is a home-based work. However the consultant will be required to be present at the UNDP/BCPR office in New York during the regular office working hours if he/she is called upon for interviews/discussions related to the assessment.

1. Author: Dagmar Kunzmann Briefel, d\_kunzmann@bluemail.ch [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This was highlighted by all donors that were interviewed [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. BCPR Annual Report 2002 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Emphasized by several of the interlocutors in country offices [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Remark from BCPR external relations team member [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. BCPR Annual Report 2012, p.70, the remainder are geographically earmarked contributions, benefitting individual programme countries or thematically earmarked contributions. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. BCPR Annual Report 2012: Contributions USD 132,248,717, Expenditures USD 131,197,515 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Donor response and desk review of previous evaluation reports [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Quote from interlocutor at Kirgizstan Country Office [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Donor interlocutors and UN partner interviews [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Interview with MPTFO officer [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Discussion about different types of fund management with the MPTF office [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Interview with Norwegian donor interlocutor. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Danish Note to the Foreign Ministry, 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Feedback from online survey [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Feedback from donor interviews [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Interviews with staff at HQ and CO in Honduras [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Skype conference call with CO in Honduras, March 12, 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. BCPR Strategic Review, Final Report March 10, 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Portfolio review for UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Feb 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries in the Context of UN Peace Operations, Jan 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Reducing Vulnerabilities, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery, UNDP Evaluation Office, December 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. BCPR Strategic Review 2010, Executive Summary Recommendations [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The Eight Point Agenda on Women states: 1) Strengthen women’s security in crisis, 2) Advance gender justice, 3) Expand women’s citizenship, participation and leadership, 4) Build peace with and for women, 5) Promote gender equality in disaster risk reduction, 6) Ensure gender responsive recovery, 7) Transform government to deliver for women, 8) Develop capacities for social change. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. BCPR was rated best performing unit in all of headquarters in terms of management of contribution income and assets by the UNDP Global Shared Service Center in Malaysia, Jan 2014 , email meeting note from Nazim Khazir, BCPR Operations Manager [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. BCPR Annual Report 2003 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. At the time of writing, the Annual Report 2013 has not yet been published. This calculation is therefore based on accessible data for 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Multiple donor interlocutors highlighted the improvements of BCPR reporting after 2011, when results based reporting based on the MYSF was introduced. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. 2012 MYRF Annual Report [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. At the end of June 2012, the SPF portfolio consisted of 50 projects (53 grants) for a total of $134.6 million. Of the 53 grants supported by the SPF, the majority are implemented in Africa (53 percent), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (15 percent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (10 percent). (http://web.worldbank.org) [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Information from Immediate Crisis Response fact sheet [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Interviews with interlocutors at HQ and donors [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. BCPR Annual Report 2012, Introduction [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. UNDP CPR Annual Report 2003, p 18 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. UNDP CPR Thematic Trust Fund Overview, August 2007 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Strategic Review of BCPR, Final Report, March 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. TRAC 1.1.3 Category II and V are set aside for needs in a sudden onset of crisis. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Data collected from Atlas [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. BCPR Annual Report 2006, p 9 [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. BCPR allocations control sheet 2013, projections for 2014-2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. BCPR Annual report 2008, financial summary [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. BCPR Annual Report 2012: Contributions USD 132,248,717, Expenditures USD 131,197,515 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Information gathered during interview with the UN Multi Donor Trust Fund Office [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013, p 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013, p 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Strategic Review 2010, executive summary [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. BCPR Annual Report 2012, p 72 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Data from BCPR Annual Reports as well as Atlas data for 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Annual Report 2006, Financial Summary [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Reducing Vulnerabilities, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery, UNDP Evaluation Office, December 2010, executive summary p.22 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. BCPR Business-Processes Resource Mobilization and Donor Partnership [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. UNDP Integrated Resource Mobilization Strategy, February 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. BCPR Strategic Review 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. ODI: Dare to prepare. Taking Risk Seriously. Financing emergency preparedness. From fighting crisis to managing risk, 2014, p 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy , updated Feb 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy 2011-2013, p 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Factsheet provided by the Rule of Law, Justice & Security team, June 18, 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. CADRI is an advocacy and capacity building platform partnering with the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR secretariat), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), bilateral donors and NGOs. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Report of the Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, April 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Other main contributors include: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. The Secretary-General’s Decision 2012/13 requires that UN field leadership “systematically and appropriately” consider joint programming on rule of law in all planning stages and processes, including the IMPP, ISFs and UNDAFs [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. The use of the Trust Fund for the GFP may be reviewed in 2015. At the time of writing an independent review of the GFP arrangement had been finalized by the Stimson Centre, Folke Bernadotte Academy and Cligendael. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Rule of law, being part of the thematic window Conflict Prevention and Recovery, security sector reform and transitional justice, opens a window for donors to support rule of law initiatives that are aligned with their priorities in this sector, including the promotion of Joint UN activities through the GFP [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. The “Procedures on the Management and Administration of GFP funds” were approved by the GFP Management team on 8 April 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Financing development together. The role of pooled financing mechanisms in enhancing development effectiveness. UNDP, Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTO) 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. World Bank, Finance for Development: Trends and opportunities in a Changing Landscape, Nov 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. IDA is the World Banks Fund for Fragile Countries and Situations [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Workstream Global Trends: Briefing Paper: Disaster Risk Reduction, Spending where it should count, Jan Kellett and Dan Sparks, March 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. *IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011*. Trust Fund Support for Development. An Evaluation of the World Banks’ Trust Fund Portfolio. Washington DC. Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Figure taken from www. web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Financing development together. The role of pooled financing mechanisms in enhancing development effectiveness. UNDP, Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTO) 2013, p 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. BCPR 2012 MYRF Annual Report, p 14 [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Financing development together. The role of pooled financing mechanisms in enhancing development effectiveness. UNDP, Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTO) 2013, p.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Draft Document: Analysis and comparison of Conflict- and Fragility-Focused Financing Instruments [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. *IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011*. Trust Fund Support for Development. An Evaluation of the World Banks’ Trust Fund Portfolio. Washington DC. Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank Ibid, p. 32 [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Draft paper complementarity analysis of conflict and fragility focused financing instruments, Resource mobilization Team, BCPR HQ [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. http://www.gcfund.org/home.html [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. While CERF can cover all countries affected by an emergency, CHFs and ERFs are country-based pooled funds that respond to specific humanitarian situations in currently 18 countries (www.ocha.org [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Interview with Senior Programme Specialist, BCPR Disaster Risk and Recovery Unit [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery, UNDP Evaluation Office, (Tony Vaux, Dennis Fenton, Sheila Reed, et. all), 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. , *IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011*. Trust Fund Support for Development. An Evaluation of the World Banks’ Trust Fund Portfolio. Washington DC. Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank. p. 25 [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Ibid, p.32 [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Ibid, p. 32 [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Danish Note on CPR support to the Foreign Ministry, 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Mapping of Transition Financing Procedures and Mechanisms, Commissioned by SIDA and DFID on behalf of the INCAF Task Team on Financing and Aid Architecture, June 2009, p 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. General Assembly decision A/63/8/8: The Secretary General has delegated overall management responsibility to the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The MPTF administers the Fund. The Peace Building Commission, consisting of 10 eminent persons from all regions provide advice and oversight of fund allocations. They also examine financial reports. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. www.unpbf.org [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Independent Review of UNDP Implementation of PBF projects, Nov 2013, p.30 [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. UNDP Products and Services Survey, Section on BCPR, Prepared by Globescan, Jan 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. The particular question states: “Does the network help save time on finding information to do your job”.p 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. 2012 MYRF Annual Report, p 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. BCPR mission report 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Independent UNDP Justice System Program (JSP) Midterm Evaluation, August 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Independent UNDP Justice System Program (JSP) Midterm Evaluation, August 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Fragility Assessment team at Ministry of Finance, “Summary Report “Fragility Assessment in Timor –Leste, Dili, Feb 26, 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Disaster Risk Management Institutional and Operational Systems Development in Timor-Leste Project, UNDP Timor-Leste, Final Evaluation Report (DRAFT) April 2010, p 11. National Partners include: Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management (MSA), Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Environment (MCIE), Ministry of Public Works (MPW) World Bank: Risk assessment and guideline/manual for Community-based DRM, US$900,000 (GFDRR) Strengthening Capacity for Planning and Delivering Community-Based Disaster Risk Management at sub-district level, US$500,000 (PHRD) Sub-district level DRM Plans and implementation of DRM measures, US$ 1,900,000 (PHRD). Information provided by theProject document: Strengthening Community Resilience to Climate Induced Natural Disasters in the Dili to Ainaro Road Development Corridor, Timor-Leste (DARDC) [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. National Partners include: Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management (MSA), Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Environment (MCIE), Ministry of Public Works (MPW) [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. The funds are allocated as follows: UNDP (GEF/LDCF):Knowledge and understanding of local drivers of climate induced natural disasters, US$850,000, Strengthened climate and disaster risk planning, budgeting and delivery at sub-national level, US$1,304,000, Watershed management plans and resilience measures to climate related natural disasters, US$2,886,000

World Bank: Risk assessment and guideline/manual for Community-based DRM, US$900,000 (GFDRR) Strengthening Capacity for Planning and Delivering Community-Based Disaster Risk Management at sub-district level, US$500,000 (PHRD) Sub-district level DRM Plans and implementation of DRM measures, US$ 1,900,000 (PHRD). [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. UNDP has supported the PNTL in various forms since 2003. This latest two-year project aims to build management and administrative capacity in strategic planning, human resources, asset management, public relations and database management. (UNDP Timor Leste website) [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. One DRM in Pakistan: Quarterly Progress Report Jan –March 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Interlocutor at the CO in Pakistan [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. UNDP Program Brief, Rule of Law Support Program Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Rule of Law project officer, CO Pakistan [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Interview with Programme Specialist, Rule of Law, Justice and Security, BCPR NY [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Review of internal country review document, 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. For detailed information see the case study Burundi in the Report TOWARDS TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS: Case studies and lessons learned from a global UNDP initiative: An Independent Review of Development Practice, Final Report June 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. The 3x6 is a good practice model available to implement the 3-track approach presented in the UN Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration (2009). The 3 track-approach is also the basis of the UNDP Guide on Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in post- crisis contexts (2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Based on information provided by the BCPR Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group, UNDP BCPR New York, April 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Based on information provided by the BCPR Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group, UNDP BCPR New York [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. A recent PBF evaluation in Burundi acknowledged the relative success of the 3x6 approach in terms of job creation for ex-combatants but also highlighted the fact that the peacebuilding component which is crucial for long term successful outcomes in conflict affected contexts was not integrated in the initial program design and no monitoring indicator was specifically attributed to the peacebuilding component. This should be taken into consideration during the development of further 3x6 projects in conflict affected countries. Independent External Evaluation, UN PBF Portfolio in Burundi 2007-2013, February 2014, p25. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. The group is co-chaired by UNDP and WFP and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. Members are the ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation, Fisheries, Technical and Vocational Training and Social Welfare and Labor , FAO, ILO, IFAD, IOM & UNHCR as members [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction (SC- DRR) in Development, EVALUATION REPORT, Prepared by Ben Hillman, Australian National University and

Saut Sagala, Bandung Institute of Technology [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery, UNDP Evaluation Office, (Tony Vaux, Dennis Fenton, Sheila Reed, et. all), 2010. Introduction [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Annual Report 2007, p. 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Skype conference call with CO in Honduras, March 12, 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. External Evaluation of the UN PBF country portfolio Burundi 2007-2013, p.24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Interview with the UNDP Pakistan Country Director a.i. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Information gathered during interview with the Chief of Resource Management Division [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Similar recommendations to BCPR have previously been provided in the report: TOWARDS TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS, Case studies and lessons learned from a global UNDP initiative: An Independent Review of Development Practice, June 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Danish Note to the Foreign Ministry, 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Skype conference call with CO in Honduras, March 12, 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Discussion about different types of fund management with the MPTF office [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. BCPR Annual Report 2012: Contributions USD 132,248,717, Expenditures USD 131,197,515 [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Quote from interlocutor at Kirgizstan Country Office [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Thematic teams have separately held annual meetings inviting its core donors, such as the annual meeting for the Global Programme for Rule of Law. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Multilateral Aid Review, DFID, 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. BCPR Resource Mobilization Strategy, p. 13 [↑](#footnote-ref-140)