

**THEMATIC CLUSTER EVALUATION:**

**UNDP LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY INTERVENTIONS FROM 2009 UNTIL 2012**

**FINAL EVALUATION REPORT**

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5 July 2014

*Note: The contents of this report only reflect the authors’ views and do not necessarily reflect those of the commissioning agency or its partners*

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## **Acronyms and abbreviations**

ABER : Area Based Early Recovery Project

ADR : Assessment of Development Results

AWP : Annual Work Plan

BCPR : Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

CBRD : Community Based Recovery and Development

CFP : Cash for Production

CFW : Cash for Work

CO : Country Office

CPAP : Country Programme Action Plan

CPD : Country Programme Document

DAC : Development Assistance Committee (OECD)

EO : Evaluation Office (UNDP)

ER : Early Recovery

FAO : Food and Agriculture Organisation

HDI : Human Development Index

HDI Myanmar : Human Development Initiative

HIMO : High Intensity Labour (Haute Intensité de Main d’Oeuvre)

ILO : International Labour Organisation

LER : Livelihoods and Economic recovery

LRG : Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group (BCPR NY)

MDG : Millennium Development Goals

MF : Micro-Finance

MFI : Micro-Finance Institutions

M&E : Monitoring and Evaluation

NGO : Non-Governmental Organisation

OECD-DAC : Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

SRG : Self-Reliance Groups

UN : United Nations

UNCDF : UN Capital Development Fund

UNDP : UN Development Programme

UNEG : UN Evaluation Group

RBM : Results-based management

RSLAC : Regional Service Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean

SP : Strategic Plan

WFP : World Food Programme

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

UNDP has been implementing Livelihoods and Economic Recovery (LER) interventions in a variety of post-conflict and post-disaster settings. The current thematic evaluation report has chosen a cluster of 12 countries where LER interventions have taken place from 2009 until the end of 2012. Findings and analysis show that:

1. LER plays a very important role in recovery situations, as LER interventions address directly some of the root causes of conflict (e.g. high youth unemployment, social exclusion and inequity, lack of livelihood opportunities and social services, etc.). Therefore LER can be a very good entry point as a tool for social stability and economic development.
2. LER interventions are highly relevant to each country’s priority objectives, and that of the country’s population. Relevance of the interventions is the criterion where UNDP scores the highest mark, with an overall average rating for the twelve countries reviewed of 4.33 out of 5 on a five-point scale. There can be no doubt about the recognised necessity of LER interventions across the spectrum of countries reviewed. At times, however, LER interventions were very relevant from a short-term perspective but less so in the context of long term development;
3. LER interventions have obtained results that vary from country to country. Globally, however, they have been a satisfactory level of effectiveness, with an overall average rating of 3.88 out of 5. Youth employment programmes have shown to leverage significant results in many countries where UNDP is implementing LER.
4. In terms of performance, countries globally score lower, although none fail to meet the average rating of 3.0. The overall rating is 3.58. When looking at performance a series of issues have been reviewed, such as targeting, capacity development, policy, implementation quality, and RBM and M&E. The knowledge and application of RBM and M&E were found to be largely inadequate in the majority of countries reviewed both in order to show evidence of results achieved and to communicate achievements. The M&E focus remains largely placed on the results of activities and not on the outcome level.
5. Sustainability is a very complex issue that has been addressed in the LER programming. This criterion obtains the lowest rating with an overall average of 3.13 (just above the average level of 3.0), but it is also the one most dependent on partnership strategies with the other actors and continued donor funding beyond the crisis. Firstly, most of the programmes had a very short time-frame of two to three years, something that is inconsistent with the objective of attaining sustainability of recovery and development programmes. Donor support should be ensured for at least a five-year time frame if commitment to sustainability is to be achieved. Secondly, national government and civil society partners are a necessary part of the sustainability strategy: therefore the manner in which UNDP leverages national ownership is key to sustainability of the benefits. Thirdly, closer synergies should be explored and ensured among the UN family (many UN organizations have livelihoods components) and UNDP programs; for that to happen the operational procedures of these agencies in the early recovery context should be made enabling and not too complex. Fourthly, sustainability is not defined in operational terms or given a clear time-frame (unlike early recovery that is operationally defined as the 18-24 months period after a crisis). As a result, it remains aspirational as no benchmark for sustainability has been established and there is no consensus on what is sustainable.
6. Among the important applications and concerns to develop sustainability, the rolling out of the 2009 UN policy on post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration in various programmes was an important effort in trying to make the linkages towards more sustainable benefits. UNDP further institutionalised this approach by developing a Guide on Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in Crisis and Post Crisis that laid out the three track approach in detail across all LER interventions in crisis and post crisis situations. Another key initiative is the 3x6 approach that was initially implemented in Burundi and subsequently in Yemen that allowed to actually integrate the three tracks approach of the 2009 UN Policy and the UNDP Guide on LER into the planning process. However, none of the countries reviewed have yet completed the last phase of the programming so there is not yet evidence of achieving sustainability.

The collective LER programmes have created over one million **temporary jobs** that included women (40%) and other vulnerable groups from 2010. The LER interventions have also contributed to **significantly improving the capacity for income generation of the target population** in a number of the countries reviewed, thus lowering their economic vulnerability and contributing to social stabilisation. MEDEP program in Nepal is one very successful example – with over 60,000 crisis affected people self or wage employed in the last three years. In some cases e.g. Myanmar, UNDP has been instrumental in **supporting linkages between the community and the micro-finance institutions,** an essential aspect of economic development. In Myanmar in 2010 over 400,000 beneficiaries were benefitting from microfinance support. The LER interventions have further **rehabilitated or constructed thousands of essential basic infrastructures** (health posts, schools, markets, roads) both as a means to provide temporary income through Cash for Work (CFW) approaches and in order to support the national governments to recover from the consequences of the crisis and develop national capacity. On annual basis beneficiaries for socioeconomic rehabilitation have surpassed three million.

It is important that a common vision be shared regarding LER across the network of UNDP offices worldwide. The creation of a Community of Practice on LER, this study as the first evaluation of LER interventions, and the new Strategic Plan 2014-2017 (particularly Outcome 6 and Outcome 1 – represented the three track approach that UNDP advocates for) are all steps in the right direction. However understanding at the country office levels is linked to the degree of expertise and experience of the staff in the subject matter, and varies greatly across country offices.

UNDP has mainstreamed gender in its programming strategy, including in LER interventions. Beyond the need to include women and vulnerable groups as programming targets, there is evidence that in some cases women empowerment was leveraged through UNDP LER programmes, such as in Haiti, where women participation in the traditional men-dominated activities (construction and rehabilitation) that lead to a change of attitudes, or the creation of Self-Reliance Groups (SRG) in Myanmar (90% women). But proper preparation and sensitisation at the community level is necessary to avoid backlashes and fuelling negative attitudes (e.g. in Somalia according to the EGER evaluation “some tensions were created by women participation in the planning process and allocation of quotes in the rehabilitation evidence”). Similarly in the SRG visited by the evaluation in Myanmar, only women composed the group, so village men were not as satisfied with the structure as the village women. The lesson here is that UNDP has to continue to support women empowerment, but quotas are not enough and proper preparation at the community level and with community leaders must be ensured to avoid doing any harm.

Yet another challenge UNDP faces is to be able to address economic development and its links to the private sector while ensuring the equity in the targeting of the beneficiaries. In various cases, the LER interventions that target the most vulnerable do not necessarily create the conditions leading to sustainability. Single-headed women households, disabled, youths, should all be included in the LER programmes. But certainly not all can become successful entrepreneurs. The issue of scalability remains a challenge, as well as the balance between how to include larger private-sector agents to contribute to the sustainability of community-based interventions. Few of the LER programmes were actually linked to national programmes or were replicated (as in Nepal) over a long time-frame by the government.

UNDP could equip itself better to address sustainable LER programme based on an agreed donor funding base over at least a five-year time frame. However this should be coupled with the capacity of UNDP to actually show evidence of results and report and communicate effectively on the outcomes of its programming. Such an objective is inevitably linked to institutional commitment to RBM and to a sturdy M&E system. At present only anecdotal evidence of results is being presented, but very few countries are able to provide a strong evidence base for reporting on results.

There is a clear need for specific measures for social cohesion and conflict prevention to be included in the design of the projects, rather than expecting peace to be a by-product of improved livelihoods. More efforts into understanding of and programming in conflict dynamics are necessary. This is also true for ensuring disaster risk sensitivity in programming of the LER interventions.

LER interventions are key elements that can contribute effectively to social cohesion, inclusive growth and sustainable development. Since peace building and inclusive sustainable growth are a wider unit of analyses and UNDP is certainly not able to contribute to peace building and inclusive growth on its own, something that requires concerted efforts from a large number of stakeholders and national partners. Therefore UNDP should be less ambitious in the wording of its programming and develop evaluable outcome statements for its programmes. But peacebuilding and inclusive sustainable economic growth are need in both post-conflict and post-disaster countries, and therefore should be the primary aims of the LER programmes undertaken by UNDP.

# **INTRODUCTION**

The present evaluation is a thematic cluster evaluation of the UNDP’s Livelihoods and Economic Recovery (LER) interventions from 2009 to 2012 in selected crisis and post crisis countries. As such, the evaluation focuses on the **relevance, performance, effectiveness and sustainability** of the interventions reviewed, as well as their contribution to the programme outcomes. This is reported to be the first thematic cluster evaluation ever of the UNDP LER programming in crisis and post crisis settings and it is designed to provide accountability on the past interventions, particularly in order to know what works and why, and identify good practices and lessons for replication in light of UNDP’s new Strategic Plan -2014-17. At the time same, the evaluation is meant to provide credible evidence on the performance of the interventions, and constructive criticism and recommendations where constraints and difficulties have not allowed the interventions to obtain the projected results.

The UNDP Strategic Plan (SP) 2008-2011 (extended until 2013) provides the overall guiding framework against which the outcomes of the interventions were assessed. The evaluation researched whether individual country offices were able to follow the SP in the design and planning of the individual LER interventions.

**UNDP Livelihoods background**: In mid-2008 UNDP/BCPR developed a Livelihoods portfolio and specific technical expertise in the subject matter. This was followed by the setting up of a Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group at the Headquarters in New York in 2011. In 2009 a review of BCPR reporting was undertaken, which recommended complementing the Results Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) with the Multi Year Results Framework (MYRF). To ensure consistency in the type of information and reporting available, the evaluation will therefore start the analysis from 2009 in order to be able to capture results at the strategic level based on consistent reporting throughout the period under review.

The evaluation addresses two levels: the performance of the individual interventions (programmes and projects) in each of the selected countries, and their contribution to the programming outcomes.

The evaluation is thematic, meaning that the unit of analysis is focused on “livelihoods and economic recovery” interventions in early recovery (ER) situations. While there are other interventions taking place in ER situations (such as rule of law or governance interventions), these will not be directly assessed as they are outside the scope of the evaluation. However through the outcome analysis, the links and synergies between interventions (or lack thereof) are also addressed, in particular in regards to building the resilience of the affected population and institutions in crisis and post crisis situations. Therefore knowing what governance, rule of law, social cohesion, Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery interventions that were implemented from the humanitarian phase forward is important for this evaluation.

The evaluation is a “cluster” evaluation, meaning that a range of selected LER interventions have been chosen in a number of ER situations in twelve countries, but not all of the LER interventions in all countries are evaluated. The selection of countries and interventions was initially prepared by the Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group (LRG) and discussed with the evaluation team. From over 25 countries, the evaluation identified twelve countries for the evaluation.

**Country selection**: a purposive sampling was undertaken to choose the LER countries to be evaluated. A key requirement for the choice of countries was the availability of written documentation and materials. For the countries subject to field visit and in-depth analysis and triangulation, the criteria included the above but with additional requirements such as: accessibility, security situation, willingness of the country office to receive the mission, availability of the national stakeholders to meet the evaluation team. In the end only four of the planned six countries that were going to be subject to a field mission were able to take place. The countries subject to a field visit were:

Burundi, Liberia, Myanmar and Nepal. The evaluation could not visit Lebanon due to security situation in that country.

The other countries covered through documentary analysis only were:

Georgia – Haiti – Kenya - Lebanon – Sierra Leone – Somalia – Sri Lanka - Yemen

# **METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation submitted the final inception report on 8th January 2014 that laid out the approach, tools and mechanisms that would be used in the evaluation process. The evaluation used a multi-methods approach that included several phases.

1. Attendance to the Global Community of Practice Workshop on Livelihoods and Economic Recovery in Addis Ababa in November 2013;
2. Review and analysis of available documentation to inform the inception report;
3. Meeting with the LRG team in New York to review the inception report, define the country selection and the methodologies that would be used in the approach, and undertaking ten Key Informant interviews with UNDP (BCPR and BDP) advisors and managers in New York;
4. Review and analyse the documentation from the countries that are chosen to be included in the thematic cluster LER evaluations;
5. Design a survey instrument for countries that are not subject to field visits;
6. Undertake the field mission to the four selected countries;
7. In each country where a field mission was undertaken, provide a debriefing to the country office through support of a power point presentation, that was also submitted to the LRG team in New York;
8. Review and analyse the country level information and prepare the country notes;
9. Consolidate data and information and coding, prepare data tables, cross validation; and,
10. Analysis and elaboration of the draft evaluation report.

The approach used was transparent and participatory in the different countries subject to field work.

Data collection and interview methods

The preparation phase (phase 2. and phase 4. above) consisted of documentary review and analysis of the data and information provided by the LRG team in New York. A Dropbox link was created to contain all the available data for the twelve selected countries.

Field visit countries completed the documentary review and analysis through a combination of semi-structured interviews with key informants and respondents, and focus group discussions with beneficiaries, in addition to obtaining additional documentary evidence and data. On-site observation also provided an additional source of information.

Each field country visit included the preparation of an agenda to facilitate interviews and field visits.

An interview protocol was used for ensuring consistency of the questions across the countries and stakeholders interviewed, structure around the key evaluation questions and the evaluation criteria.

An essential aspect of the countries subject to field work was obtaining the point of view of the national counterparts, government and NGOs, as well as donors in certain countries, in order to triangulate the findings (e.g. having three separate sources confirming the finding). This adds to the credibility and accountability of the evaluation, since the countries that are only desk reviewed offer a single source of information – largely UNDP documents. Few countries had evaluation reports for LER interventions but this evaluation used those reports as mentioned in the country notes.

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# **Limitations**

The inception report originally foresaw the use of a survey for those countries that would not be subject to field work. Such a survey needed to be handled by an appointed resource person in the LRG in New York, but the person was not identified. A survey format was developed by the team leader because the time frame did not allow including the survey in the two consultants’ schedules, and an additional person was needed. The survey was therefore implicitly dropped from the methodology.

The major constraint however was the lack of comprehensive and standardized information for the documentary reviews of the twelve countries selected as cluster for LER interventions. It was agreed and accepted that the LRG would provide all relevant documentation to the evaluation consultants, and a link through the Dropbox was made supposed to contain all relevant information. However the information was neither structured, consistent nor complete. The consultants had to spend additional time on the internet to try to find information, as basic documents, such as CPDs and UNDAF, and project documents, were not available for the period under review by the evaluation.

In the countries subject to field visit, additional documentary information was obtained – in most cases – to complement the existing documents. This affected the evaluation’s work in the field as in various cases time was needed to identify and understand what LER projects actually took place – something that should have been addressed during the preparation phase.

It is also important to underline that country offices did not have any prepared tables of LER interventions, and that country offices do not structure their programming along those lines. It proved challenging to identify some LER interventions, particularly for those projects that were outside the main area of practice and depended on other units of the UNDP country office.

During the field visit, not all stakeholders were met or interviewed. Time and lack of adequate preparations in some cases led to inconsistent stakeholders interviews (particularly as regards to donors). However in all field countries it proved possible to have interviews with government counterparts and national partners and NGOs.

Another challenge was the time needed for identifying the countries that would be subject to field visit. Initially each of the two consultants was to undertake 3 field visits. However given various difficulties and late responses in the end only four countries were subject to a field visit. To make up for a small sample, it was agreed to count Haiti, a country where the evaluation team leader had just completed in November 2013 an outcome evaluation of ER interventions on behalf of the country office, as a field-work country.

However it should be clear that the countries subject to only a documentary review have in some cases very little supporting documentation and this proved a challenge to actually be able to appraise the results. Given this constraint, the results are divided into two separate sections: those regarding the countries where field work was carried out, versus those that had only the documentary review phase.

# **Quick overview of country results–a coloured view**

The evaluation as mentioned in the inception report used a matrix for rating the four evaluation criteria of relevance, performance, effectiveness and sustainability on five-point scale. The minimum is a 1 and the maximum is a 5 out of 5, with 3 being the mathematical average (1= no progress, 2= insufficient, 3= average, 4 = good, 5= excellent). Each consultant rated six countries using the same scale and the same criteria. Each country note contains the evidence base for the ratings. The primary difference between the countries that were subject to a field visit versus those that were desk reviewed only was the possibility of triangulating the findings with the national stakeholders, providing therefore a stronger evidence base to sustain the ratings for countries that had the field visit. The colours are based on the traffic light system of Green for good progress, Yellow for mixed results, and Red for insufficient. Darker shades also indicate better results, in line with the ratings received.

The results are are presented below:

LER rating results per country – countries in **bold** were subject to field visits – *source: country notes established by the evaluation team.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| **Burundi** | **5** | **4** | **3,5** | **3** |
| Georgia | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3,5 |
| **Haiti** | **5** | **3,5** | **4** | **3,5** |
| Kenya | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3,5 |
| Lebanon | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3,5 |
| **Liberia** | **2** | **3** | **3** | **1,5** |
| **Myanmar** | **5** | **4** | **4,5** | **3,5** |
| **Nepal** | **4** | **3** | **4** | **3,5** |
| Sierra Leone | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3,5 |
| Somalia | 5 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 2 |
| Sri Lanka | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3,5 |
| Yemen | 5 | 3,5 | 4 | 3 |
| *average* | *4,33* | *3,58* | *3,88* | *3,13* |

From the table above, it is interesting to note that UNDP’s LER interventions are generally very relevant. Half of the countries obtain a maximum rating of 5, and the overall average is high with 4,3. Only one country is under the average rating of 3.0: Liberia with a 2.

To explain the low grade given to Liberia, it is necessary use the definition given by the OECD-[DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance](http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/50584880.pdf),[[1]](#footnote-2) that are also those used by the UNEG, as follows:

**“Relevance**: The extent to which the aid intervention is consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.”

While the Liberia interventions are certainly responsive to government’s priorities, they directly fail to recognize the enormous needs of the beneficiaries for a comprehensive livelihoods programme and do not address directly the employment needs of the population.

**“Performance: T**he degree to which a development intervention or a development partner operates according to specific criteria/standards/guidelines or achieves results in accordance with stated goals or plans”

When looking at the global performance, it is positive to note that none of the countries are underperforming, with three countries being just at the average level, and another four just slightly above average. There is no maximum rating in this criterion, but six countries obtain a “good” rating of 4. When analysing *performance* the evaluation addressed issues such as the targeting, capacity development, policy, time frames, implementation quality, M&E, and synergies (See country note for details). The overall average of 3,5 is somewhat above average for the twelve countries.

**“Effectiveness**: A measure of the extent to which a development aid intervention has attained its objectives.”

Interestingly, UNDP is globally better at achieving its objectives than at performance. Only one country has an average rating, and two slightly above average. 9 countries have a good rating of 4, and one very good 4.5. The overall average is 3,9 near the mark of 4 that is considered as good.

**“Sustainability**: Assessing the probability that the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after the programme cycle.”

UNDP has still to make efforts in ensuring the sustainability of its LER interventions. Two countries are below average (insufficient), two are at the average level, and 8 are somewhat above average. The global average of 3.1 is just above average, indicating that more must be done as regards to contributing to sustainability.

# **FINDINGS OF THE THEMATIC CLUSTER EVALUATION**

**Country overview - Summary of country notes (full notes included as annex) – presentation of country LER programme and ratings according to the evaluation criteria for all twelve countries included as part of this thematic cluster evaluation – only a brief summary, please refer to individual country notes for details and basis for ratings as the full country notes form an integral part of the evaluation report and contain the evidence base for the ratings as well as the indication of the results obtained.**

## 4. MYANMAR

## Myanmar is a country that is highly disaster-prone. According to the “Hazard Profile of Myanmar” no less than 35 cyclones have hit the country between 1947 and 2008. The most devastating cyclone was Nargis which caused widespread death and destruction in 2008. Two years later another cyclone, Giri, hit other parts of the country. In addition floods and rains affected various areas of Rakhine State, requiring early recovery interventions. The political situation led UNDP to have a special mandate to work directly with the communities under the Human Development Initiative (HDI) until the end of 2012. Since 2013 UNDP started post-conflict interventions focussing on social cohesion in Kachin and Rakhine states in addition to other key focuses on local governance; climate change, environment and disaster risk reduction; and democratic governance and development effectiveness.

## The LER interventions were for the most part responding to various disasters. Nonetheless in 2012 started developing post-conflict social cohesion interventions involving livelihoods. The period of 2009-2012 is marked by four main LER programmes, three of which are based on post-disaster early recovery response, and one in post-conflict settings:

* **Post Cyclone Nargis Response:**  A number of interventions were undertaken under the aegis of the Human Development Initiative, through the Integrated Community Development Programme (ICDP), from which a specific intervention was designed for a two year time-frame until December 2010: the **Integrated Community Early Recovery Component (ICERC)** that focused on the most affected communities in 509 villages of the Ayeyarwady Delta. After 2010 UNDP continued support to the communities with an extension of the coverage to 95 new villages until August 2011. As the ICERC finished, additional support through the regular ICDP programme was provided particularly with a view to ensuring sustainability.
* **Post Cyclone Giri response:**  various interventions were undertaken in Northern and Eastern Rakhine state from October 2010 to 2012. While the extent of the damage was more limited than in the case of Cyclone Nargis, the affected area (Rakhine State) was also suffering from heavy floods in June 2010, and the response was underfunded.
* **NRS (Northern Rakhine State) flood response:** From June 2010 to May 2011 UNDP also undertook ER responses in three townships of NRS.
* **Post conflict Livelihood and Economic Recovery (LER) Programme implemented** in Rakhine State (since June 2012) and Kachin State (since June 2011). Assistance to both Rakhine and Kachin states is on-going with varying levels of intensity.

### ICERC

The ICERC is an **integrated community based early recovery model** that is based on community mobilisation and development through a series of mutually reinforcing components divided in four categories: 1) coordination arrangements for implementation and monitoring of early recovery projects, 2) livelihood restoration and community infrastructure rehabilitation, 3) revival and strengthening of community level mechanisms to support recovery, and 4) disaster preparedness and risk reduction. The programme was designed for a two-year time frame, with the first year set on early recovery efforts, and the second in order to consider transition from early recovery to community development, in 509 villages. It was used as part of the wider ICDP programme in the Delta region in the Nargis affected areas. The programme emphasized an integrated approach wherein sector support was provided through community-based organisations, in a mutually reinforcing way. For example, the programme aimed at restoration of livelihoods of the affected communitities and renovation/construction of critical community infrastructure creating better living conditions at community level while also providing short-term employment to landless households. A key component was the establishment of the Self Reliance Group (SRG) in the villages. These groups play a critical role at the village level to improve the village economy and develop micro-finance activities. The composition of the SRG is mostly feminine and thousands of SRGs have been established throughout the country (both under ICERC and ICDP). Additional funding for a year was provided to cover another 95 villages, of which two were visited by the evaluation mission.

### Post Giri Response

The response to Cyclone Giri was undertaken through various interventions from September 2010 to December 2012, under the *Community Development for Remote Townships (CDRT) component of the HDI*. This approach puts people first by targeting the most vulnerable and the poorest, and builds on community based livelihood opportunities. Since both the ICDP and the CDRT are part of the HDI, the approach is similar to that of the ICERC in the types of interventions and activities undertaken. Poor and vulnerable households are the primary targets, and community based recovery mechanisms are activated both through livelihoods assets replacement, infrastructure rehabilitation and the development of livelihood opportunities.

### Northern Rakhine State Flood Response

UNDP initially undertook a response to the NRS flood of June 2010 by launching a response in September 2010. NRS response was undertaken under the CDRT Project as a part of their regular programme using the same approach of community driven recovery.

### Rakhine State and Kachin State recovery Programme

Another type of programming involving livelihoods and economic recovery has been used in post conflict environments in two states of Myanmar. Kachin state, north of Myanmar, has experienced social unrest in 2011 that led to population displacement, as a result of a long standing political dispute between the Government of Myanmar and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). In 2012 UNDP undertook targeted interventions to support livelihoods in 95 camps covering over 19,000 IDPs (3882 families) between April and Dec 2012.

In Rakhine State, a conflict exists between the Rakhine population and the Muslim Rohingyas. Violent incidents continued throughout 2012 starting since June 2012, leading to population displacement of some 76,000 persons. Livelihood sector assessments were undertaken by UNDP in July 2012 and again in February 2013. The interventions have been thwarted by the low level of funding received and the resurgence of violence in October 2012. In addition, Rakhine State is one of the poorest states in the country and was also the province affected by floods and cyclone Giri in 2010.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Myanmar Disaster | **5** | **4** | **4,5** | **3,5** |
| Myanmar Conflict | **3,5** | **N/A** | **N/A** | **N/A** |

**6. GEORGIA

Georgia has two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, The protracted internal displacement of some 250,000 persons in Georgia, the result of the 1992-3 and 2008 conflicts, has severely affected the country’s development and stability.

* The conflict, which took place in Abkhazia between 1992-1993, resulted in thousands of deaths, displacement of hundreds of thousands of people and widespread devastation. The following conflict in August 2008 has brought the sore relationship between the conflict areas and the Georgian Government to an absolute standstill. As result of the conflict, the socio-economic situation and living standards in several areas of Abkhazia are poor. UNDP has been present in Abkhazia for more than a decade. Activities have included capacity building of civil society and infrastructure rehabilitation.
* The communities in other parts of Georgia, which were the main recipients of IDPs from these two regions, were also put under great stress.

The main LER interventions covered in this country note include:

a) 3 ***projects in Abkhazia,*** namely:

* Abkhazia Livelihood Improvement and Recovery (**ALIR**) Programme, 2005-2007
* Economic Rehabilitation and Confidence Building in Abkhazia (**ERCBA**) project, 2010-2013
* Abkhazia Community Revitalization (**ACR**), 2010-2013

b) *1* ***project targeting the areas with large IDP population***, namely:

* Human Security Through Community Participation Integration Programme (**HUS CO**) 2006-2010

#### Projects in Abkhazia

**Abkhazia Livelihood and Recovery Programme (ALIR, 2005-2007**), an area-based development programme implemented by UNDP had an overall goal of improving livelihoods through **rehabilitation activities and thereby promoting peace and reconciliation in the region**. ALIR targeted three districts of Gali, Ochamchira and Tkvarcheli in Abkhazia region and Zugdidi district in Samagrelo. The objectives of the programme were to: (i) **improve the physical and** **operational infrastructure through rehabilitation of the water supply systems** both for drinking water and irrigation, and the capacity building of the water and electrical system staff; (ii) enhance the d**elivery of and access to social services** through the provision of equipment to hospitals, and capacity building of hospital and district healthcare staff’; (iii) reduce the vulnerability of the rural population through the **delivery of agricultural inputs, improved technical skills and support to farmer groups**; (iv) improve local and district **governance structures** through **capacity building** activities for village councils and district level stakeholders in agriculture, water and sanitation; and (v) provide **information support to humanitarian and development actors in the region.**

**Economic Rehabilitation and Confidence Building in Abkhazia, ERCBA** (2010-2013) project aimed to improve the socio-economic situation for local population in Abkhazia through: (1) establishment of learning-friendly environment in **targeted schools through** **infrastructure rehabilitation** and provision of proper school equipment and capacity strengthening of teaching and administrative staff; (2) improved access of local population to adequate health care through **infrastructure rehabilitation of medical facilitie**s, provision of proper equipment and capacity strengthening of health care and administrative staff; (3). improved access of local population to safe potable water through **infrastructure rehabilitation of water supply**, provision of proper equipment and capacity strengthening of water operators and administrative staff in community utility departments; and (4) r**estored confidence between various communities**.

**Abkhazia Community Revitalization, ACR (2010- 2013) project** also aimed at contributing to the improvement of socio-economic situation for local population in Abkhazia through three core components: **(1) Improvement of the Healthcare System; (2) Expanding Opportunities for Youth;** and **(3) Enhancing Community Participation.**

#### HUS-CO

**The Georgia Human Security through Community Participation Integration Program (HUS-CO)** was initiated with the aim to respond to the long term development needs of the country’s IDP communities which have suffered most from several political and economic shocks over the past 19 years, and most recently from the combined effects of the economic crisis and the conflict of August 2008. It was initially prompted by the need to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the 127.000 IDPs following the conflict in South Ossetia, but then was eventually formulated as **an integrated response to Georgia’s chronic IDP challenge** dating back to 1992, covering over 220000 long standing IDPs and an estimated 30000 IDPs who had no immediate prospect of being able to return to their homes after the conflict of August 2008. The program **targeted therefore 3 regions with the largest (except Tbilisi) IDP population**, namely, Samagrelo, Imereti and Shida Khartli. The **Program made a strategic transition from recovery efforts to long term development, ostensibly focusing on building the human capabilities of IDPs to improve their integration into social live as well as develop their livelihood**s.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Georgia | **4.5** | **4** | **4** | **3.5** |

## 7. KENYA

Although generally regarded as a stable country a midst a troubled region, Kenya has in the past and in recent times experienced violent conflicts. Some are low level and often incessant conflicts, driven by competition for scarce natural resources, and some are high intensity violent conflicts related to ethnic-based political competition for state control and public resources. These types of conflicts largely follow the 5 years electoral cycles and have been witnessed in 1991/2, 1997/8 and recently during the 2007/8 cycle. The effects of the conflicts in Kenya include: a divided and polarized society along ethnic and regional identities as opposed to shared national identities, common values and aspirations; exclusion and marginalisation of certain sections of society from state governance and economic development, especially ethnic minorities, women and the youth; slow economic growth and opportunities for meaningful employment of large sections of the population especially the youth standing at 75% of the total population, etc. Kenya is highly vulnerable to natural disasters mostly drought, floods and landslides. Recurrent disasters in Kenya have caused severe food shortages and eroded the effectiveness of the livelihood systems of the poor. With every disaster, many poor households lose shelter, crops, food, income opportunities, household items, productive assets and are also at risk of communicable diseases brought by disasters. Disasters have resulted in secondary effects that hinder the prospects of full, sustainable recovery, especially when exacerbated by stresses such as HIV and AIDS, insecurity and widespread poverty.

The LER interventions reviewed in this note include 2 areas/programs: Consolidating the Peace Processes and establishing foundations for a successful political transition in Kenya: 2010-2013; and DRR portfolio with 3 projects

Consolidating the Peace Processes and establishing foundations for a successful political transition in Kenya: 2010-2013

This is a three-year national programme with an overall objective of **strengthening the capacities of both state and non-state actors** at the national and local levels in **conflict prevention**, **management** and **resolution**. Strategic objectives include: strengthening national capacity for conflict prevention; expanding the coverage of District Peace Councils; supporting Civil Society Organizations’ (CSOs) activities to prevent and manage violence around the elections; responding to the challenges posed by the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs); deepening national cohesion and integration; strengthening political dialogue; and mainstreaming the role of youth and women in peace building. Accordingly the program targeted several outputs: Strengthening political leadership, national cohesion and Integration; Control and management of SALWs; Peace Dividend Projects in Pastoralist Areas; Youth in peace building; Women leadership in peace building; and capacity building of CSOs to promote state and non-state interactions in peace building. Partnership for Peace (PfP), the platform for Kenya’s CSOs working in the area of peace and security, was supported through (a) capacity building bringing together CSOs’ initiatives in peace building, and (b) other activities, e.g. thematic *state of security* seminars and national colloquiums on topical issues to inform policy.

#### DRR. 3 main projects fall into this portfolio, namely:

* **Drought Recovery project** (in Turkana and Garissa). The project, implemented over a period of 15 months (March 2012 – May 2013), focused on mitigating the impact of the 2010/2011 drought in the affected areas of Turkana and Garissa in northern Kenya. It was primarily designed to ensure recovery of livelihoods from the drought impact and enhance

resilience capacities at community, county, and national levels with a specific emphasis on women and youth. The project sought to realize two outputs, namely (a) Restoration and protection of livelihoods and productive assets for sustainable recovery and development of drought affected communities and displaced population; and (b) Governance for early recovery and disaster risk reduction including climate change awareness enhanced.

* **Post Elections Violence (PEV) Livelihoods Recovery project** (in Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret, and Kitale): the overall objective of this project was to contribute to post election violence recovery and integration process through the restoration of livelihoods in affected areas. 2 Outputs were planned: (a) enhanced livelihoods restoration and recovery for social economic recovery for affected communities and (b) expanded livelihood opportunities and linkage to ongoing national livelihood programs
* **Disaster Management project** (nationwide) Disaster Risk Management in Kenya was implemented to enhance the capacities of the state and non-state

actors. “Strengthening Early Recovery and Preparedness Coordination Mechanism in Kenya project was complementary to this one. The aim of these projects was investing in people and reducing poverty and vulnerability – in particular regarding disaster management.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Kenya | **4** | **4** | **4** | **3.5** |

## 8. SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of USD 2,836 in 2011 is a country in the lower bracket of the middle-income countries. Based on a tradition of policies to ensure the spread of social welfare, Sri Lanka has achieved higher levels of health and education services than expected of countries with a similar level. Sri Lanka is on track to achieving the targets in respect of most of the MDG indicators. And still, this was a highly eventful decade for the country and it still has structural problems and faces a number of human development challenges. The most impactful events that affected the development of the country and the life of its people were those related to the prolonged civil war that had started in the late 1970s. In May 2009, the Government of Sri Lanka declared victory and the end of the war created hopes of peace and stability. Post-conflict regions still face reconstruction and rehabilitation challenges and structural issues still need to be addressed to meet the demands of a rapidly growing and transforming economy.

The following LER interventions are reviewed in the note:

* Transition and Recovery Programme (TRP), 2008-2011;
* IPECAC, Integrated Programme for Empowering Conflict-Affected Communities to Rebuild their Lives in North and East Sri Lanka (2009-2013);
* Local Governance Project (LoGoPro)/Governance for Local Economic Development (G-LED); and
* Mine Action

#### Transition and Recovery Programme (TRP), 2008-2011.

**The TRP 2008-2011** takes an **integrated approach to social cohesion and livelihoods to effectively support the rehabilitation of crisis-affected and risk-prone communities and IDPs**. The TRP implemented activities to provide immediate relief for recovery, resettlement, and recommencement and stabilization of livelihoods. The programme was implemented through components that focused on six areas: Sustainable livelihoods; micro-credit schemes and skills training for small and medium-size enterprise (SME) development; Housing; Rehabilitation and improvements of basic community infrastructure; Building equitable and inclusive community networks; and mainstreaming environment management and disaster risk reduction into the recovery process

#### **Support to Mine Action Project.**

Since 2002, UNDP Sri Lanka has been providing key support to the Government of Sri Lanka to strengthen national capacities to manage, implement and coordinate mine action activities in support to the National Mine Action Programme, working in close partnership with the National Steering Committee for Mine Action, headed by the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure Development, and from 2010 the Ministry of Economic Development. This project consisted of two sub-components: (a) support to field operations in support of the resettlement and recovery of conflict affected communities, in particular, the coordination and management of mine-action through UNDP-staffed Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAOs); and (b) support to the institutionalization and capacity development of the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) with a view to gradually handing over mine action coordination and management responsibilities to the Government.

#### IPECAC: Integrated Programme for Empowering Conflict-Affected Communities to Rebuild their Lives in North and East Sri Lanka (2009-2013).

With funding through the UN Human Security Trust Fund, UNDP, UNICEF and the ILO implemented IPECAC. With a comprehensive response to addressing vulnerabilities among women and children, it focused on strengthening the capacities of key institutions for protection, as well as working with communities to increase access to services and build sustainable livelihoods. UNDP’s component of support under this project was provided through the Equal Access to Justice Project (Phase II).

#### Local Governance Project (LoGoPro)/Governance for Local Economic Development (G-LED).

**LoGoPro** was designed to serve as an umbrella framework on local governance to ensure coherent approaches and synergies both at the thematic and geographic level, and to set out local governance strategies to address priority needs in a holistic manner. Norway has been a major funding partner in this area of work. Post-tsunami rehabilitation by local governments was funded through flash appeals supported in large part by Norway and Germany.

**Governance for Local Economic Development (GLED)**

**GLED** is UNDP Sri Lanka’s new flagship programme for strengthening local governance capacities and improving socio-economic opportunities in vulnerable regions in the country. GLED builds on and carries forward the programmatic thrusts, approaches, results, networks,best practices of and lessons learnt from both the Local Governance Programme (LoGoPro) and Transition Recovery Programme (TRP), and integrates both these programmes under UNDP’s new country programme cycle that commenced in 2013. Broadly, GLED focuses on increasing the capacity of sub-national level governance institutions, civil society, the private sector and communities in order to foster access to enhanced public sector service delivery, socioeconomic development, and social cohesion across the whole country, with a focus on the lagging regions of Sri Lanka, including the former conflict-affected regions of the country. There will be a focus on the engagement with the private sector to increase the sustainability of livelihoods initiatives.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Sri Lanka | **4** | **3.5** | **4** | **3** |

## 9. SIERRA LEONE

## The Sierra Leone Civil War (1991–2002) began on 23 March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with support from the special forces of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), intervened in Sierra Leone in an attempt to overthrow the Joseph Momoh government. The resulting civil war lasted 11 years, enveloped the country, and left over 50,000 dead In January 1999, world leaders intervened diplomatically to promote negotiations between the RUF and the government. The Lome Peace Accord, signed on 27 March 1999, gave Foday Sankoh, the commander of the RUF, the vice presidency and control of Sierra Leone's diamond mines in return for a cessation of the fighting and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to monitor the disarmament process. RUF compliance with the disarmament process was inconsistent and sluggish, and by May 2000, the conflict resumed. It was only on 18 January 2002, when the President Kabbah declared the Sierra Leone Civil War over. The Lome Peace Accord called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations during the conflict to tell their stories and facilitate healing. Subsequently, the Sierra Leonean government asked the UN to help set up a Special Court for Sierra Leone. Both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court began operating in the summer of 2002.

This note covers the following LER interventions:

* **Youth employment programs administered by UNDP/GoSL** and funded by the Peace-building Fund (PBF), Irish Aid, and the Government of Norway
* **Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme (YEEP), 2010-2014**
* **The Local Governance and Economic Development Joint Programme (LGED-JP), 2011-2014.**

#### Youth employment programs administered by UNDP/GoSL

17 youth employment programs administered by UNDP/GoSL and funded by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), Irish Aid, and the Government of Norway.

#### Youth Employment and Empowerment Programme (YEEP)

**Stage 1: 2010-2011/2012** and **Stage 2: 2013-2014.** The purpose of YEEP was to generate greater market-driven employment opportunities for youth through opportunity mapping, the conduct of youth research and support to the establishment of a National Youth Commission (NAYCOM) and its functionality through the development of systems and strategies. The project also aimed to assist youth in their transition from school to work. Apart from skills development, the programme is also aimed at increasing entrepreneurship as a way of employment opportunity. In line with the UN Joint Vision for Sierra Leone, the Programme was guided by the Joint Vision benchmark of the ‘Economic & Social Integration of Youth’. Currently the program is in its 2nd stage, YEEP 2, 2013-2014, responding to the Government’s view of youth employment as a core outcome of the National Economic Development Strategy (*the Agenda for Prosperity prioritizes agriculture, infrastructure/transport, energy and human development as strategic sectors with the private sector as the engine for growth*) and makes strides in improving the environment for investment and private sector development and strengthening the NAYCOM. Private sector development is central to Sierra Leone’s national development strategy. Large investments on infrastructure related job creation efforts have been led by the Government and the World Bank before. Employing the young women and men has been the priority for these organizations and their programmes. There was, however, the emerging urgent need to focus on the urban areas, specifically targeting more women and ensuring that innovative partnerships and PPPs are built with the private sector in Sierra Leone.

The Local Governance and Economic Development Joint Programme (LGED-JP), 2011-2014.The decentralization process has enabled Sierra Leoneans to participate in many aspects of local affairs and drive forward development programmes and projects in their areas. However, while Local Councils (LCs) are active and have made some progress in extending services, they are often constrained by poor organisation and inadequately trained personnel. The inherited weaknesses of the old administrative system are slow to change and there are huge gaps in all areas of infrastructure that constrain progress. The link between the newly decentralised governance structures and the traditional government is yet to be fully forged. **The LGED-JP, jointly implemented by the UNDP and UNCDF**, aims to help each LC to formulate and implement development policies and plans that are based on natural resources and local business opportunities, and to build the capacity of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) at the national level to effectively deliver on its rural development and decentralized governance mandate. The LGED-JP also aims at strengthening the capacity of traditional leaders and chiefdom councils to play and effective role in local governance seek to clarify the rights, roles and responsibilities of the LCs as well as the chiefdom councils. **The overall objective of the LGED-JP is to increase Local Economic Development (LED) activities including infrastructure development and service provision through the local districts and town councils**.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Sierra Leone | **4** | **4** | **4** | **3** |

## 10. LEBANON

While not precisely a country at war, nor exactly at peace, Lebanon is best described as a country continuously shaped by a pendulum of never-ending political tussles and conflicts. Since gaining independence from the French mandating authorities in 1943, conflicts have shaped the modern history of Lebanon starting with a short-lived Civil War in 1958, a second and devastating Civil War between 1975 and 1990, and the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon 1978-2000. The post civil war era (1991 and on and especially as of 2004) has seen a series of violent incidents that jeopardized the finely balanced peaceful co-existence, including the July War between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 that was followed by the Nahr El Bared War between the Lebanese Army and Fateh El Islam armed group in North Lebanon in 2007, the armed hostilities between the affiliates of the 14 March and 8 March coalitions in 2008, reaching the recent clashes between Sunni and Alawites communities in Tripoli, North Lebanon.

Lebanon has experienced many waves of refugees throughout recent history. Lebanon has more refugees, as a percentage of the population, than any other country. And this trend continues to increase following the 2011 Syrian crisis, with over one million Syrian refugees registered already by early 2014. Lebanon has a substantial Palestinian refugee community, and a relatively small Iraqi refugee population.

UNDP CO in Lebanon has many projects which in one way or another include a livelihoods component. The projects listed below and reviewed under this evaluation are the most significant ones

* **MDGF: Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon (**MDGF program hereafter**).** Participating UN agencies: ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNRWA
* **Post-War Socio-Economic Rehabilitation Programme in Beirut Southern Suburbs (**BSS program hereafter)
* **Recovery in surrounding communities of NBC (LRF), 2009-2013**
* **UNDP support to mine action in Lebanon\**
* **Lebanon Host Community Support Programme (LHSP)**

MDGF: Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon

The main objective of the programme Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon (02 Sep 2009 - 31 Aug 2012) was to mitigate the risk of relapse into violent conflict through promotion of socioeconomic development and peace building in conflict prone communities. Its specific objectives were: **(1**) identification and promotion of sustainable conflict prevention tools to facilitate resolution of inter-and intra-communal tensions between the Palestinian and Lebanese communities; **(2)** implementation of equitable socio-economic development interventions decreasing the divide amongst the communities; and **(3)** promotion of youth and women’s active participation in local level development.

Post-War Socio-Economic Rehabilitation Programme in Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS)

The UNDP has played an active lead role in the recovery and development of the area right after the conflict. The project started late 2006.

* ***Early Recovery phase***

UNRC regional office in BSS was established to coordinate and maintain the coherence and a plan of recovery actions was launched, starting with an emergency program (removing rubble from the streets in the area, rehabilitation of infrastructure), with the contribution from BCPR prioritized by the communities. This quick starting-high impact early recovery project concentrated on restoring the capacity of cash-strapped local municipalities to provide a number of critical services immediately following the war. This was followed by many early recovery projects (e.g. small grants provided to municipalities, provision of Solar Water Heaters were provided in Beirut Southern Suburbs to local community facilities such as public clinics and schools), This initiative, in addition to clearing the areas from rubble in an environmentally sound manner, also provided local employment opportunities.

.***Recovery and restoration of lives and livelihoods (RRLL)***

The RRLL project included support to the war affected communities in terms of provision of new equipment, support to youth through vocational training programs, support to the war disabled community, and special support to unemployed women and others affected by the war, support to Small and Medium Enterprises to restoration of economic activities of fishermen, in addition to other infrastructure restoration. The total budget was around $1.5 million USD (funded by SIDA, ECHO, and Austria).

* ***Current Phase: 01 May 2011 - 01 December 2013****.*

Vulnerable groups in the BSS are the focus of this project. The project’s strategy envisioned linking grassroots institutions to local government and national structures, and strengthening the relationship between the residents and their relevant local authorities. BSS was prioritized for conflict and crisis prevention through a community development approach. This includes capacity development initiatives to support the stability of communities and provision of socio-economic development projects aiming at restoring the lives. Expected Results include: Youth at risk in BSS mobilized for reduced inter-communal tensions and empowered for peace and development initiatives; livelihoods of vulnerable population with special focus on women, fishermen, war-injured persons and former detainees improved and socio-economic opportunities increased for peace and development; and Local Governance structures strengthened for inclusive socio-economic development and enhanced inter-communal dialogue.

#### Recovery in surrounding communities of NBC (LRF), 2009-2013

In response to the summer 2007 NBC conflict between Fatah Al Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNDP in January 2008 launched a recovery project “Early recovery of Nahr El Bared surrounding municipalities” focusing on the 6 municipalities surrounding the NBC area, later expanded to include a further 22 municipalities The main objective of the project was to promote the social cohesion through restoring and improving livelihoods, capacity building and local level dialogue. It was designed to restore livelihoods of 2,000 vulnerable households (13,400 individuals). In addition, the project aims to provide a solid platform for development efforts in the area, by increasing local capacities of participatory planning, management and implementation of development programmes, as well as, promoting local level dialogue.

#### UNDP support to mine action in Lebanon

The Mine Action programme in Lebanon is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. It is executed through the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC). The mine action centre is staffed with army personnel assigned to the mine action program from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Civilian personnel are made available through UNDP support to cover shortfall and ensure transfer of competencies. In addition, UNDP provided from 2001 until 2010 technical expertise through the assignment of a Chief Technical Adviser

*Lebanon Host Community Support Programme (LHSP)*

In response to the growing influx of refugees from Syria, which had surpassed one million registered as of April 2014, and the immense pressures on Lebanese host communities in the absence of formal refugee camps, UNDP together with the Minister of Social Affairs launched the Lebanon Host Community Support programme in 2013 to help stabilize the most affected communities in terms of basic services, social cohesion/conflict prevention and livelihoods, including cash for work and other income generating activities. This partnership in turn resulted from initial collaboration between BCPR and the CO from 2012 and initial seed funding within the project “***Support to economic recovery, community security and social cohesion in Lebanese communities affected by the Syrian Crisis (2013-2014)”***

Of particular note, the initial BCPR investment layed the groundwork for the eventual development of a large scale resilience/stabilization programme, with solid post-crisi prospects for sustainability in that it build on successful pre-crisis ART Gold and other area-based programming platforms. As of mid 2014, the Lebanon Host Community Support Programme had successfully mobilized over USD 18 million from over ten donor countries for host communities, including livelihoods interventions.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Lebanon | **4.5** | **4** | **4** | **3.5** |

## 11. SOMALIA

Following the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia has failed to regain peace and stability. Over the past two decades, large parts of Somalia have been affected by recurrent political turmoil that led to the creation of three de facto zones within the country. IN addition, recurrent and frequent natural disasters (droughts and floods), the overexploitation of natural resources (forests, rangelands, and water), an increased number of internally displaced people as a result of the ongoing conflict, drought, and limited livelihood/employment opportunities, have aggravated the situation and led to increased tension, conflict and human suffering.

With an approximate population of 9 million, of which 63% are rural dwellers and 37% urban, Somalia is comprised of 18 regions divided into three territories with de-facto autonomous political powers, largely along clan lines. These territories have existed since 1991 when the military regime collapsed and civil war among clan militias broke out. Despite the fact that Somalis share a unified ethnic, linguistic and religious culture, the Somali inter-clan rivalries have proven to be one of the principal sources of conflict. Conversely, clan leaders have also been the prime means for conflict resolution. Puntland and Somaliland enjoy a degree of autonomy with greater stability, and nascent, yet weakly capacitated government institutions. South Central Somalia still suffers from immense difficulties characterized by ongoing humanitarian crises, as part of the TFG has not been able to establish a broad national support base with proper institutional capacities and has lacked the ability to extend control or protection over the population in much of the capital and elsewhere.

As a result of war and insecurity, Somali institutions have generally witnessed great deterioration in their performance mainly due to weak institutional capacities, inadequate and untrained human resources coupled with brain drain, and insufficient financial resources. The regulatory framework that governs resource management and livelihood activities is non-existent, incomplete and/or weakly enforced.

Poverty is very high with 73% of the population living under the US$ 2 per day poverty line, and 53% living on less than US$ 1 per day in rural and nomadic areas, versus 23% in urban areas. Somalia has some of the worst social security indicators in the worlds, including the second lowest immunization rates in the world, only 29% of the population having access to safe drinking water, 31% primary school enrolment (and only 22% in South Central Somalia), high infant mortality, etc..

Not ranked in the 2013 Human Development Report, Somalia appears amongst the poorest countries in the world. It ranks 99th out of 104 countries analysed in the Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index (MPI). Among the Arab States, Somalia has the highest MPI value (51%).

A Country Programme Document was established for the period 2011 – 2015 based on four specified outcomes: 1) peace building and conflict management, 2) people-centred governance and law, 3) Economic recovery and environmental management, and 4) protection and empowerment of women. The wording of outcome three is “Somali women and men benefit from increased sustainable livelihood opportunities and improved natural resource management”. As Somalia is not a CPAP country, UNDP has established a programme document for the period 2011-2015 with a total budget of US$ 69 million under the title of “Poverty Reduction and Environment Protection” (PREP) that guides LER interventions.

Based on the available documentation two main LER projects appear to form part of the LER interventions under what was called the Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods programme (RLS) that was established in 2007 and is understood to have transformed into the PREP, namely:

1. **Employment Generation for Early Recovery (EGER)** that started end of 2008, with the objective to address the need for income generation and job creation in Somalia through community based approaches., and
2. **Area Based Early Recovery project (ABER)** also started in 2008 and had the overall objective to support the recovery of Somali communities in regions affected by conflict, hazards, disasters and the movement of populations.

#### EGER (Employment Generation for Early Recovery)

The project was started at the end of 2008 and has been implemented through 2012 covering three regions of Somalia: South Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. Initially designed over a 24 months’ time-frame and a total budget of US 12.5 million, the EGER had three specific expected outputs to support the CPD 2008-2010 outcome of “vulnerable communities have increased income from equitable and sustainable employment opportunities and are better able to manage resources” as mentioned in the project document :

1. Employment and income generated through rehabilitation of public and social infrastructure;
2. Job creation initiatives are designed and implemented;
3. Capacities developed and vocational skills enhanced.

#### ABER (Area Based Early Recovery)

The project started end of 2008 and it sought to ensure a tangible increase in the income levels within the vulnerable communities through equitable and sustainable employment and income generation opportunities. Its initial geographical area of focus was Bay and Middle Shabelle regions in South Central Somalia, and eventually it was expanded to other regions of SCS, in addition to Puntland and Somaliland. The project aims to rehabilitate social and productive types of infrastructure (agriculture improvement, livestock of other community economic opportunities mainly natural resource based) using labour intensive employment generation. The project also seeks to improve skills and knowledge in advocacy and in initiating ownership and participatory planning at the district and regional level. A specific focus is given to promoting the role of women in recovery. The projects provided skills training, assets, tools and grants to vulnerable individual and groups with special focus on women and IDPs.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Somalia | **5** | **3,5** | **3,5** | **2** |

## 12. YEMEN

Ranked 133 out of 169 countries in the *Human Development Report 2010,* Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab region and faces multiple development challenges, which have been compounded by conflicts. Nearly half the population is below 15 years of age. Unemployment among the 15-24 age group is 52.9 per cent and 44-4 per cent among the 25-29 years group. About 41.8 per cent of Yemenis live below the national poverty line, and 84 per cent are dispersed over 133,000 small rural settlements, resulting in a higher proportion of rural poor. Yemen ranks lowest on the Global Gender Equality Index and according to a Central Statistical Organization and World Food Programme study about 31.5 per cent of the population lack food security. Chronic poverty and inequity are root causes and triggers for conflict, internal wars and insurgencies. These include: six rounds of war in the Sa’ada Governorate since 2004, a separatist movement in the southern governorates, and the active presence of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. The security situation hinders the provision of humanitarian as well as development assistance to vulnerable groups, especially in remote areas. The Fourth Five-year Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (DPPR 2011-2015) – approved in February 2011 – recognized the crisis and the importance of job creation for the first time. Based on the priorities of the fourth DPRR and the United Nations common country assessment (CCA), the 2012-2015 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) was prepared taking into consideration the root causes of the chronic development failures, conflicts, humanitarian and political crises. Four priorities were identified: i) Inclusive and diversified economic growth with a social dividend; ii) sustainable and equitable access to quality basic social services to accelerate progress on the MDGs; iii) women and youth employment; and iv) good governance and social cohesion. The programming strategies for LER are found in two different areas of practice:

1. **Youth employment** under the poverty reduction area of practice. UNDP has developed a specific intervention, which is inspired by previous experience in Burundi through the 3x6 approach, targeting youth employment and economic empowerment as an entry point to social cohesion and conflict prevention. The **Yemen Youth Economic Empowerment Project (YEEP**) project started in 2012 and was originally funded until May 2013, with a target of 4,000 youth and women in three governorates over one year. As a pilot project is was successful in generating additional funding for scaling up for 2014-2017. One of the components was a US$ 20,000 grant to each of the sixteen youth entrepreneurs who won the “Youth Innovation and Creativity Award” and established businesses that created 85 additional jobs so far.
2. **Under the Crisis prevention and recovery (CPR)** area of practice, UNDP has been undertaking targeted interventions in Early Recovery and social cohesion, notably: **Integrated social cohesion and development project** **in Ibb and Abyan Governorates**, since 2011, and **Community Driven Early Recovery in Sa’ada,** since 2012.

#### Pro-poor Youth Economic Empowerment in Yemen

The project was started in 2012 based on an approach previously used in Burundi that is known as the 3x6 approach. This approach was adapted to target 4,000 youths (ages 18-30) in three governorates (Sana’a, Taiz and Aden). As described in the Mid-term YEEP evaluation report of September 2013, the project concentrated “ on three key activities (KA): 1) introduce youth employment generation and access to finance through 3x6 approach, 2) security employment through a job placement scheme, and 3) promote youth entrepreneurship

|  |
| --- |
| **KA1 youth employment generation and access to finance**: divided into three phases  ***Phase 1: inclusiveness*** Income generation and building of capital by youth through rapid employment activities. During this phase (2 months), participants receive business development training twice a week in complement with their income-generating activity (e.g. public works, notably WASH). Two-thirds of the income will be saved and deposited into savings accounts at micro-finance institutions partnering with YEEP.  ***Phase 2: ownership*** Beginning during the period of temporary employment, individuals are encouraged to initiate a business plan, or to form a group with others via joint ventures for the implementation of a sustainable economic activity.  ***Phase 3: sustainability*** The individual’s/group’s saved capital is tripled through a grant from UNDP. A feasibility study will confirm that any proposed project ideas are economically viable and that access to a local market is ensured.  **KA2 employment opportunities created through job placement initiatives**  Are about conducting a basic labour demand survey to identify labour market requirements in terms of skills and qualifications, and then delivering training to unemployed youth based on the findings of the survey.  **KA3 promote youth entrepreneurship**  The Youth Innovation and Creativity Award aims to mobilize the ingenuity and dynamic potential of young Yemenis as well as to create employment”. The project awarded 16 grants of each US$ 20,000 for the youth entrepreneurs who won the award. |

In addition, YEEP supported social empowerment as youths felt more prepared for business with the opening of a bank account and trainings they received. The project and the 3x6 approach were used in the National Youth Employment Action Plan, thereby showing good national ownership.

#### Integrated social cohesion and development in Ibb and Abyan Governorates

Started in 2011, this project of US$ 708,434 aims to enable communities to address and transfer conflicts to development actions and demonstrate appropriate and sustainable approach to conflict transformation at the community level. Within the project components livelihoods, as one of the entry points to social cohesion and dialogue, play an important role: 99 livelihood activities listed by the NGO and CDCs have been implemented including: beekeeping, poultry farming, animal husbandry, recycling plastic waste, sewing, etc.. 26 CDC members were trained to enhance their capacity to conduct economic feasibility studies for livelihood activities. 18 feasibility studies were conducted and submitted. The project is on-going until December 2014. Over 1,000 people were trained in 18 vocational subjects, and 2828 trainees become interns in local businesses, of which 180 become permanently employed.

#### Community Driven Early Recovery in Sa’ada

Started in June 2012, the programme seeks to contribute to the government’s plan to stabilize the situation in Sa’ada and advance peace through initiating emergency action plans for reconstruction and recovery while at the same time laying the ground for a longer-term economic and social development agenda. The programme is designed to complement the efforts of the government through four components:

1. Livelihoods of affected people are stabilized through improved agricultural productivity and income generation;
2. Early local economic recovery through improve micro and small enterprises and key infrastructure rehabilitation;
3. Improved local government, CSO/NGO and communities’ capacity to plan, facilitate and execute recovery in Sa’ada, and;
4. Gender equality, women and youths socio-economic empowerment strengthened

The achievements to date include 1,750 farmers in 8 districts who were supported to re-establish their livelihoods; 600 hectares of land that were reseeded with an approximate yield of 1,800 metric tons; the rehabilitation of three health units, the distribution of 240 MT of fertilizer and 120 MT of seeds to the poorest and most vulnerable farmers in Sa’ada (2012), finalization of the work plan and budget for sustainable livelihoods project (July-December 2013); carry out capacity assessment for potential partners in Sa’ada, identify potential local partners, and start the process of livelihoods assessment. The budget for the project is US$ 1,266,000 for the period 2012-2013. The intervention is designed to continue until end of December 2014.

Evaluation rating results (scale of 1 minimum to 5 maximum – 3= average).

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Relevance** | **Performance** | **Effectiveness** | **Sustainability** |
| Yemen | **5** | **3,5** | **4** | **3** |

* 1. Triangulated findings from the four plus one field mission countries – Burundi, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal

#### ***4.1.1 Relevance***

With a total rating of **21 and an average of 4.2 for the five countries**, the relevance of LER interventions are high, with the exception of Liberia which is insufficient.

Burundi: rating 5. It has achieved a programme design that is able to address the longer-term issues in an early recovery phase taking into consideration the on-going population movements and fragility of the context in order to contribute to stability. The interventions, through the 3x6 approach described in the Burundi country notes, are entirely relevant to the national priorities (particularly the 2010 National Strategy for socio-economic reintegration of conflict affected populations) and in line with the second objective of the 2010-2014 integrated strategy of the United Nations: community recovery. See the Burundi country note for an explanation of the 3x6 approach.

Haiti: It has a maximum rating of 5 regarding the relevance. Due to the enormous needs identified in the post-disaster phase and the limited number of actors in early recovery interventions, UNDP’s programming was entirely relevant to national priorities and the needs of the population, both through the large-scale Cash for Work approach as well as through the Debris and the other interventions. It linked directly into the National Plan for Reconstruction and Development of Haiti (PARDH) that was developed as a result of the PDNA process and the UN integrated strategy.

Liberia: UNDP’s LER programming is in line with the national priorities and the PRS, but it does not address the huge gap between the national policies and the enormous deficit existing in livelihoods and employment creation. It is therefore largely disconnected from the needs of the population. Hence the rating of 2. (=insufficient) The term “livelihood” does not appear in the CPAP, and the planning is targeting “employment”, a different unit of analysis. See section 5. Analysis for a presentation of the key terms and uses made in countries.

Myanmar: UNDP’s specific mandate during the period under review led the office to have a large operational and field presence that made UNDP a key partner. Interventions after the various disasters, including cyclone Nargis, were entirely relevant to the needs of the communities and in line with the wider HDI programme. On the disaster side Myanmar scores a maximum rating of 5.

Nepal: with a good rating of 4, relevance is not at the maximum of 5 because 1) the peace building was approached more as a by-product of livelihoods programs with no specific initiatives designed, 2) claims from evaluations that the approach for the flagship microfinance MEDEP programme excludes the ultra-poor, and 3) because the UN policy on post-conflict employment creation was attempted but has taken a long time to rollout /apply.

#### ***4.1.2 Performance***

With a total of 17 and an average of **3.4 for the six countries**, the performance is above the average rating of 3. In all countries except Liberia, performance is lower than relevance, but none fall into the insufficient category, although two countries are just at the average.

Burundi: rating of 4. It has a comprehensive approach used in 3 of 4 interventions (3x6) and strengths in linkages of the components, looking at an integrated approach to community recovery, and working with various groups in new settlements/communities to build social cohesion. Burundi features a unique case in that the target groups rightly mix IDPs, returnees, ex-combatants, and resident population in an inclusive programming approach. But the initial quality of rehabilitation was mixed, difficulties with the capacity of some implementing partners (both local NGOs and government contractors), and the lack of explicit linkages established in Micro-finance and the short time-frame for phases 1 and 2 lower the rating to 4. Also the UNDP Cos supported six value chain assessments as part of the phase III, which formed the basis for the National Employment Policy in Burundi and was thus important for overall sustainability and ownership.

Haiti: It has an above average performance rating of 3.5 taking into consideration the context and situation of the country office, equally affected by the earthquake. The Cash for Work was a sound approach that was used widely in the affected area but lasted too long and took time to evolve into a more constructive modality of HIMO (High Intensity Labour) interventions: the Cash for Production (CFP) that can be a good example for replication to other situations. But it was not linked to any national programme.

The interventions that were undertaken in Leogane and Port-au-Prince (Debris, 16/6, Carmen) were useful and necessary and very innovative. Nonetheless timeliness was an issue, and national partners questioned the efficiency some of the UNDP interventions. UNDP engaged in some of the most difficult neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince, something that negatively affected implementation. Synergies across interventions did exist, but were not always positive when applied to joint interventions with other UN agencies.

Liberia: It has an average rating of 3. Importantly UNDP was able to undertake LER interventions in a number of counties to support decentralization efforts and develop local capacity through the CDCs. An important support was given through the micro-finance component (of UNCDF) with the creation of the Village Savings and Loans associations. A strong focus in line with national priorities for LER interventions was infrastructure rehabilitation. Hundreds of infrastructure were rehabilitated or built, but quality was at times a concern. Another issue was linked to slow implementation given that implementing partners in the counties were all from Monrovia capital and did not know the local social dynamics (in CBRD programme).

Myanmar: It has an above average rating of 3.5. A number of LER interventions were undertaken using the integrated community development approach, something that was also seen as positive by the government. Livelihoods were linked to the creation of village level committees and structures, the nexus of which were the Self-Reliance Groups (SRG). The SRGs were critical in supporting economic recovery and some were able to graduate and federate at the higher levels. Strong targeting skills for the poor. However linkages with those providing employment (larger scale farmers, etc.) were not made and the focus on the poor leads to a degree of exclusion of those who are providing employment in the communities.

Nepal: It has an average rating of 3. The MEDEP program was instrumental in increasing government’s capacity to develop microenterprise and hence livelihoods at both central and district level. MEDEP is now in its 15th year; in contrast some other projects (LRP), was too short for achieving all of the planned results. Some substantive support was given to specific target groups, traditionally excluded. Important policy documents including the Strategy for MED and the related draft Act, which, once passed by the Parliament will be important vehicles in promoting enabling environment for microenterprise development. The progress is hindered by external political environment. The overall implementation quality was high. However there was no big picture of livelihoods programming leading to lack of synergies across programmes. Specific difficulties were found when trying to link UNIRP and MEDEP. Strengths of specific programmes were not carried across the programming portfolio.

#### ***4.1.3 Effectiveness***

UNDP globally achieves a higher effectiveness rating, with **a 3.8 average and a total of 19**, near the high mark of 4. One country only has average rating, all others are above average to high. It is interesting to note that UNDP is better at achieving programme objectives than at programming performance.

Burundi: Burundi was successful in developing and piloting the 3x6 approach, to support a transition from the short-term humanitarian context towards longer-term planning. It was certainly successful in its contribution to conflict prevention and developing social cohesion in communities of return, but the fundamental reasons of success are insufficiently analysed and substantiated by empirical data. It was successful in providing income and engaging vulnerable and all categories of conflict affected populations (IDPs, returnees, ex-combatants, resident population) around a common productive goal and in implementing phases 1 and 2 of the 3x6 approach (Tracks A and B). The linkages with phase 3 of the UN policy on post-conflict employment creation and reintegration are not demonstrated as the phase is not yet started in Burundi, but requires a more comprehensive approach than 3x6 to lead to sustainability, although the value chain assessments undertaken and the support to developing the national data base, both of which fed into the national employment policy, were certainly positive results. The 3x6 is a good entry point, but not an end in itself. It is not yet known whether the initial successes will be maintained. Hence a rating of 3.5. Conscientious of the preliminary results of the 3x6 approach, and the challenge of ensuring the transition from community recovery to sustainable development the UNDP country office is currently launching the **P6 approach** (6 phases: Plurality, Participation, Production, Territorial Pact, Partnership and Public Policy).

Haiti: Effectiveness as regards to the outcome statement of improving the living condition of the affected population was high. UNDP made a change in people’s lives given the size of the Cash for Work interventions (165,000 persons reached) and in providing quickly income in a context of widespread poverty and limited opportunities. Rehabilitation interventions such as Debris also contributed to changing mind sets and empowering communities, including through small grants projects in the communities self-executed through participatory approaches. It directly contributed to the outcome through an innovative and comprehensive concept for debris management. However maybe not all interventions were required, as some did not have ownership from the government (e.g. Carmen) and in other cases, too much focus was placed on quick wins without thinking of longer-term implications of resettling populations in areas that remain highly vulnerable. The rating is 4.

Liberia: It obtained an average value of 3. But the scarce documentation available made it virtually impossible to verify and the absence of evaluation reports and external information was a challenge to assessing the effectiveness. The rating is based essentially on the stakeholders interviewed (UNDP staff, Government and Central Bank of Liberia (CBL), UN agencies, NGOs). UNDP contributed to community recovery but mainly through infrastructure rehabilitation, with no specific focus placed on the wider range of assets necessary. However a lesson is that focusing mainly on rebuilding physical capital (e.g. infrastructure) without extending the range of support to the six building blocks (e.g. financial, human, social, political and environmental capital) limits the results. Financial capital was undertaken through the UNCDF programme with UNDP administrative support and was implemented by the CBL.

Myanmar: Myanmar obtained a high effectiveness with a rating of 4. Evaluation reports highlighted interventions effectiveness (such as 71% of beneficiaries declaring that UNDP had noticeably improved their lives after Nargis). Effectiveness is partly built on the approach that was being rolled out since 1993 under the HDI, and UNDP and partners were experienced in community development, livelihood creation, and directly involved in the creation of community groups such as the SRGs that were the cornerstone of the community development strategy. The Nargis experience acquired proved useful to subsequently undertaking effective post-disaster responses (floods, Giri).

Nepal: Interventions were able to score a good 4 given results achieved, notably according to the Livelihoods Outcome Evaluation of 2011, which found that individual income increased nearly four times and household income more than doubled as a result of one of the two LER interventions (MEDEP). The other intervention was also successful in mobilising the target groups (the most marginalized) and in providing increased income. Policy related changes were difficult to achieve due to the lengthy periods when there was no effective government in the country.

#### ***4.1.4 Sustainability***

Despite the efforts to incorporate longer-term issues in the planning during early recovery phases, UNDP has not been able to show, to date, that it is able to reach sustainability in its programming in the various countries visited. With a total of 15, the rating gives an average of 3, with one country being clearly unable to contribute to sustainability. This is the lowest rating of the four evaluation criteria.

Burundi: Despite efforts to incorporate sustainability in the design of interventions, this has yet to be achieved. During the field work the Regional Conference on Local Economic Development that was hosted in Bujumbura showed sustainability requires a longer time-frame and an approach that is based on local economic development, as by itself 3x6 is not able to achieve sustainability, as it needs other programmes to build on or complement it. Rating is 3.

Haiti: Efforts and concerns to plan for longer-term issues in a recovery phase were always at the heart of UNDP’s interventions. However the massive CFW/CFP did not have any linkages with any nationally-led programme of High Intensity Labour (HIMO), something UNDP should have considered supporting the government to establish. The systematization of the experiences under Debris programmes and their publication through various pamphlets and in the signature programmes did contribute to its use and replication beyond the context of Haiti. At the individual interventions level, some of the mechanisms created to work with communities, such as the community platforms, are of doubtful sustainability. Rating is 3.5

Liberia: Most interventions were designed with a short-time implementation mode and were not designed to be sustainable (CBRD). Those that attempted to be sustainable such as the Youth support interventions (Songhai, CLOHRY – both centres were visited by the evaluator during the in-country field work) were unable to obtain government ownership and funding after the end of the period of UNDP support and are now at stand-by. The evaluation found very high levels of expectations from the population regarding what the government should do to assist its people. Rating 1.5

Myanmar: A country where the tracks A and B of the UN policy on post-conflict employment creation were implemented in interventions, with the concern of moving to track C – but not quite being there yet. Mechanisms at the community level were created to link into longer-term sustainable interventions (such as SRGs, but only a fraction have federated and expanded). There was not cut-off point or benchmark to indicate when results were achieved, which impacted on scalability and sustainability. Rating 3.5

Nepal: The government has incorporated one of the UNDP programme as a national programme (MEDPA), which is a very positive sign of sustainability, and several institutions at grass root levels have been created that are thought to be able to operate in the future. There are more concerns about the sustainability of the other programme (LRP) particularly concerning the new cooperatives and youth clubs. Rating 3.5

* 1. Findings from the seven desk review countries

#### **4.2.1 Relevance to the needs**

All the countries under review had emerged from devastating conflicts or suffer the consequences of such conflicts. Most of the countries in addition suffer from natural disasters, and a number of countries face slow onset disasters such as drought.

**Income generation and early recovery**

At least at the early post conflict stages the LER interventions, with the focus on rebuilding infrastructure and income generation were very relevant to the needs: these activities not only supported the rehabilitation of the infrastructure vital to day-to-day-lives of people and communities, and helped the people affected by the conflict to earn even if limited money to start rebuilding their lives, but also allowed for some improvements of the inter- and intra-community relations and contribute to social cohesion. Examples here include

* **Georgia**: the earliest project, Abkhazia Livelihood Improvement and Recovery (ALIR) Programme (2005-2007)[[2]](#footnote-3) and Human Security Through Community Participation Integration Programme (HUS –CO, 2006-2010) in the regions with large IDP population;[[3]](#footnote-4)
* **Lebanon**: Recovery in surrounding communities of Nahr El Bared (NBC), funded through the Lebanon Recovery Fund (LRF), 2009-2013[[4]](#footnote-5).
* **Sri Lanka:** projects under each pillar of the Transition and Recovery Programme (2008-2011)[[5]](#footnote-6);
* **Yemen:** Pro-Poor Youth Economic Empowerment in Yemen – **YEEP,** started in 2012[[6]](#footnote-7);
* **Somalia:** Both projects, “**Employment Generation for Early Recovery (EGER)”,** and **the “Area Based Early Recovery project” (ABER).** Both project focused on cash for work interventions, mostly the rehabilitation of infrastructures such as schools, clinics, and water drainage or irrigation canals

Some interventions fall victim of the desire of “too Quick Impact” results, e.g. delivering seeds to the farmers while the true demand was in machinery in agriculture within the ALIR project in Abkhazia. While the early recovery interventions need to have quick impact on stabilizing livelihoods in the targeted communities, in these cases actions were not planned in the light of the sustainable livelihoods options in the areas of intervention.

As the emergency situation subsided, the relevance of the multi-component infrastructure rehabilitation projects became less relevant and there was a need to (a) move away from infrastructure projects to improvements in individual well-being through increased production and incomes with a more appropriate mix of policies combining access to inputs, including land, with access to markets, such that the benefits would accrue to both sides; and (b) incorporation of the infrastructure rehabilitation activities into local developments plans, with assistance focusing on the latter and targeted more at local administrations. Despite this recognition, at least in some countries, UNDP continued doing more of the same. This was the case for example, in **Abkhazia (Georgia),** of the two later projects, Economic Rehabilitation and Confidence Building in Abkhazia (**ERCBA**), 2010-2013, and Abkhazia Community Revitalization (**ACR**), 2010-2013.[[7]](#footnote-8) The picture in some countries, e.g. in **Sri Lanka** in this sense is mixed. According to Assessment of Development Results report (ADR Sri Lanka (2012)):

* The critical challenge during the decade - establishing and strengthening decentralized governance to bring new or expanded services to vulnerable groups- was well recognized and attempted to address. There were a number of notable initiatives that responded to this challenge, including mobile clinics to provide IDPs with documentation; in the South; strengthening the capacity of the local administrations (decentralized arms of the central government) for effective governance of recovery of tsunami-affected areas as well as re-building the capacity of local administration to play an effective role in disaster management; etc.
* Under the Local Governance Project (**LoGoPro**) however, there did not seem to be a move towards a coherent policy framework that integrated policies and programmes at both the national and local levels, and the supply and demand sides of service delivery; thus, in the absence of a national policy to inform strategies and programmes that address disparities between regions and groups, capacity development for fostering democratic governance remained fragmented at the institutional level

**Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)**

In all of the reviewed countries UNDP, apart from livelihoods recovery measures related to DRR (contributing to building back better (addressed earlier in this Section) and measures to increase disaster sensitivity of communities/ individuals, supports the government and works with other stakeholders to ensure that disaster impacts are effectively managed in order to protect and promote sustainable development. More often however, despite recurrent natural and human-induced hazards, disaster management remains largely reactive (emergency response), with weak coordination mechanisms, and inadequate capacity to monitor and assess disaster risks. An example here is Kenya, where the Government established the National Disaster Operation Centres (NDOC) and the Crisis Response Centre (CRC) among others, and at local level, Disaster Management Committees (DMC), and UNDP undertook the capacity building of these institutions. Hence there is a mismatch between genuine priorities for risk management and the response mode of government and sometimes UNDP assistance.

#### **Alignment with the Government programs**

The programs are mostly in line with the Government priorities. A few examples illustrate this:

* **Kenya**: the focus of most of the programs was appropriate and in line with Government policies, namely, with the emphasis on comprehensive management of conflicts and disasters as a critical part of overall national development;[[8]](#footnote-9) and
* **Yemen**: Employment creation (with a focus on youth) was identified as a key priority by the government in its Development plan (Development Plan for Poverty Reduction 2011-2015) given its direct relationship with instability and conflict dynamics.
* **Sierra \_Leone:** The *“Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations Family”* (*2009–2012*) strongly contributes to the implementation of theof Sierra Leone Government’s *“Agenda for Change”* (Second Poverty Reduction Strategy, PRSP II, 2008–2012). The Joint Vision document established the general framework for the United Nations’ cooperation with the GoSL and set out a number of joint planning, implementation and coordination mechanisms with the aim of enhancing the impact of United Nations assistance. Through the Joint Vision, the United Nations in Sierra Leone supported the Governments priorities in: Consolidating peace and stability, Economic integration of rural areas , Economic and social integration of youth, Equitable access to health services , and accessible and credible public service
* **Sri Lanka:** UNDP LER projects contribute strongly to the implementation of the national policy framework to pursue inclusive growth and development namely the ‘Vision for the Future: Government Development Policy Framework 2010 – 2016’
* **Lebanon:** UNDP LER projects supported the (a) Social Action Plan (SAP), a pillar of the economic reform plan submitted by the Government to the Lebanon Donors Conference (LDC) Paris III in 2007: SAP identified social reforms and outlined a variety of interventions such as safety net mechanisms, cash transfers and the overall reform of education and health services. However, although an inter-ministerial committee was established to oversee SAP’s implementation, the implementation was fractured***[[9]](#footnote-10)***; (b) MDG report 2008; and (c) National *Social* Development Strategy (2011-2013)
* **In Georgia** the LER Interventions were supporting the goals of the national IDP strategy and Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program (EDPRP) ; there was however a lacking engagement and partnership at the de facto Abkhaz Ministerial levels.

#### **Comprehensive needs assessments**

The programming in almost all countries suffered from the lack of comprehensive needs assessments and understanding of community dynamics. Examples include Abkhazia (Georgia),[[10]](#footnote-11) and Sierra Leone.[[11]](#footnote-12).A few of the reviewed countries present a more positive picture in this regard:

* **Lebanon:** For the Post-War Socio-Economic Rehabilitation Programme in Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS), UNDP ensured that the design of the activities was based on annual needs assessment and in close coordination with partner municipalities and communities;[[12]](#footnote-13)
* **Yemen:** YEEP was firmly based on adequate and realistic needs assessments, situation analysis and good problem identification;[[13]](#footnote-14)
* **Sri Lanka:** Within TRP, at the community level, decisions were jointly taken by UNDP, community members and relevant government officials and were designed to address the most urgently felt needs within the chosen communities[[14]](#footnote-15).

#### **Joint UN interagency projects**

Due to the complexity of the LER interventions in post conflict settings, the joint programming mode is likely to be more relevant in addressing all the needs, given the added value of the specialized UN agencies. In some countries joint programs were designed and successfully implemented. The best example comes from Sierra Leone: in 2009, the UN agencies agreed to combine their efforts and resources behind a joint vision supporting the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) to consolidate peace and promote sustainable development in the country through the *“****Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations Family”* (*2009–2012*).** The Joint Vision document established the general framework for the UN cooperation with the GoSL and set out a number of joint planning, implementation and coordination mechanisms with the aim of enhancing the impact of UN assistance.

Another positive example comes from Sri Lanka: the Integrated Program for Empowering Conflict Affected Communities in North East Sri Lanka **(IPECAC, 2009-2013),** according to the International Labour Organization (ILO)’s Evaluation, was highly relevant. In some other cases the joint nature of the projects was more in name and less in implementation (e.g. Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (**MDGF)** financed Joint Program (JP) on “Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon”).[[15]](#footnote-16)

Overall, with some exceptions, UNDP has organically grown a cohesive package of activities, managing to stay relevant. This has happened often against the odds (as mentioned above) however, since many projects did not benefit from a comprehensive needs and community assessment.

#### **4.2.2. Performance**

#### **Target group**

The focus on youth and especially the youth in the urban poor areas is typical in many countries: this is the case of **YEEP- Sierra Leone** for example, where this choice, coupled with the focus on the local governments, was well justified. Under **YEEP- Yemen**, the MTR notes that targeting would have benefitted from the involvement of actors who were in a better position to establish key selection criteria, such as the Social Welfare Fund (SDF), as some terms such as “youth at risk”, “vulnerable”, “jobless” needed to be clarified, justified and disaggregated into certain weighted score dimensions that could effectively be matched with the candidates).

Targeting communities based on the level of vulnerability is another common feature in many projects, although in some cases it is implicit, with no specific targeting strategy in the project documents. This is the case for instance for **EGER** in **Somalia**. In **Sri Lanka, TRP** projects targeted the most vulnerable, including *inter alia,* those needing support to re-establish or increase their primary source of income and particularly women headed households in crisis-affected communities, but here, under **IPECAC,** there was good coverage of also vulnerable communities from the different ethno-religious communities, which served to promote social integration. The MTR for YEEP –Yemen recommended moving away from community-based targeting on the grounds that the selection bias in Yemen was too large (here also a partnership with the SDF for targeting of youths was recommended.

Returning refugees are the key target group for many projects under the review, with the most vulnerable, i.e. women and children, being in the centre of this focus. In the countries with large refugee population, both IDPs and host communities often share common features, and it has been noted, for example in the case of **HUS-CO** in **Georgia** that a more focused vulnerability targeting would have been more appropriate.

#### **Capacity development**

Capacity building of local institutions is strongly present in all the main LER projects and programs. The extent of the capacity building activities varies from project to project however. Capacity building activities were extensive in Sri Lanka under TRP, where all the pillars of the project had elements for capacity-building (both individuals and organizations (e.g. microfinance institutions, Community Based Organizations)). In some other countries capacity building component in the LER projects was not so extensive. Capacity building activities were by and large well received. A few illustrative examples for these points are provided below:

* In **Georgia**, under **ALIR** the provision of technical short courses on a variety of subjects was considered very valuable and appreciated, along with the strengthening of the local level administrative capabilities through training on a variety of issues (such as public relations, gender awareness and legal framework of local government operations, and IT): these measures were adequately implemented and had noticeable positive impact; [[16]](#footnote-17)
* In **Lebanon**, according to **MDGF JP** evaluation (2012) the implementation of a number of activities at the local level has positively contributed to building the capacities of local partners;
* In **Sri Lanka**, **LoGoPro** was comprehensive in its focus on decentralization, and addressed both devolved (provincial councils and local government bodies) and de-concentrated arms of sub-national governance (district and divisional secretariats). Notably, with LoGoPro, the capacity development strategies were developed to match the specifics of the East and North, and elements of an integrated approach to governance mechanisms and practices have been piloted at the local level; at the national level, capacity development support was provided to build policies and programmes to address horizontal disparities between regions and communities.

Joint projects with specialized UN agencies have proved to bring an add-on value for the success: for example, under the **Recovery in surrounding communities of NBC** (LRF) project in **Lebanon** the technical training sessions on the use of the harvesters were provided to the Cooperatives members and specific tools and materials were developed for them to use in their businesses: here the role of the technical support from UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was very important

It is possible to trace certain specific focus areas for capacity building in given countries. For example:

* **Sri Lanka** presents a case whereby UNDP was able to identify several entry points to access ***peacebuilding stakeholders*** to provide capacity support, e.g. with the Ministry of National Languages and Social Integration - supporting language training efforts of the public sector through identification of entry points for improved curricula and training methods;
* In **Somalia,** the focus was on ***skills and vocational training*** and these were instrumental in allowing the beneficiaries to continue their efforts for achieving employment and income generation.

The problem seems to be more in the absorption capacity of the local institutions, which becomes a challenge given the short time frames of many of the projects: this was the case in Sierra- Leone for example.

#### **Policy**

In some countries, UNDP has kept a low profile with regards to upstream activities. For example:

* In **Lebanon**, while UNDP has been active in launching plans and strategy following the war in terms allocating pledges for the policy reforms and democratic governance (such as strengthening the electoral process in Lebanon, Capacity Development for Fiscal Reform and Management), as noted in the ***MDGF JP*** evaluation, the Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon project (**CPPB**) could have played a great transformative capacity, e.g. by stronger synergies with (a) the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), which has been engaged in preparations needed for legislative changes and awareness raising related to situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and (b) the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) scaling-up the experience of citizenships education in schools in Tripoli to be incorporated in the National Education Civic Programme;
* In **Yemen**, according to the MTR of **YEEP**, the project design did not tackle any institutional development for youth empowerment: this was thought to be better left to be addressed in a period of greater stability as an enabling policy was thought to be necessary to contribute to a more needs-based design and implementation of the projects. This approach was overly cautious however.
* At the same time in **Abkhazia (Georgia)** such opportunities were genuinely limited given the political situation and such an approach was justified;

In some other countries, the upstream level work (policy level) was quite extensive.

* In **Somalia,** the **Poverty Reduction and Environment Protection programme (PREP)** specifically adopted the UN policy for post-conflict employment strategies, income generation and reintegration (2009) for the country office programming. More specifically, it identifies track level identification according to the specific areas. It is understood that PREP is now the current programming framework for the current Country Program Outcome (CPD) outcome 3.
* In **Sri Lanka** UNDP was able to identify several entry points to access peacebuilding stakeholders to provide policy level support: (a) first, UNDP provided support to the Ministry of Resettlement to formulate a national policy on the return, resettlement, relocation, integration and reintegration of IDPs (the project was suspended mid-stream, also at the request of the Government, reflecting the political sensitivities of IDP issues at the time); (b) at the end of the war, the reintegration of ex-combatants emerged as a major issue, and UNDP, in partnership with ILO, provided upstream policy support to the Government in the form of technical assistance for formulating a national action plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; (c) UNDP supported the design of instruments for the conduct of a national youth survey, concerning the issues and aspirations of youth in society, politics, culture and the economy; and (d) through the LoGoPro, the MDGs became a local framework to guarantee basic services to people which constituted a significant step towards providing a framework for a rights-based approach to social and economic services.

Often the capacity building and policy advice went hand in hand, e.g. in **Sierra Leone** capacity development of the Local Councils and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (**MLGRD**) was accompanied with the assistance to improve the local governance development related policies.

**Kenya** and **Lebanon** present examples with the opposite extremes of the level of engagement in policy level support, with corresponding results.

* In **Kenya**, according to COWI (2012) report[[17]](#footnote-18), after the Government recognized the need to establish an institutional, policy and legal framework to effectively manage disaster risk and preparedness, UNDP responded by assisting it at the policy level, e.g. with *Disaster Risk Response Coordination Database System*; development of *National Risk Hazard Vulnerability and Capacity assessment*, etc.).
* In **Lebanon**, however, in the Mine Action project, the lack of effective support at the policy level (inactivity) resulted in the lack of integration of mine action at the higher level policies, and missed opportunities to pool resources from other government sectors.

#### **Time frames**

The review of the programs indicates that very often the individual programs suffer from short term planning, which is inadequate compared to the ambitious goals and given the lack of local capacity. In some cases the follow ups are planned for existing projects which are then commenced without an evaluation of the preceding phases (in the case of YEEP- Sierra Leone for example).[[18]](#footnote-19) Better planning would allow for efficiencies in many ways. For example in Yemen, implementing the project in Sana’a first and then moving to Taiz and Aden caused the project to duplicate its efforts for phase 1 twice in two different governorates: it would have been more cost-efficient to maximize the utilisation of resources in implementing phase 1 in the three different governorates semi-concurrently, rather than implementing them sequentially.

#### **Implementation quality**

Some projects were too ambitious (e.g. HUS-CO in Georgia, with four separate components and multiple anticipated outputs and outcomes), resulting in the lack of integration and not well thought- through sequencing. The portfolio in Georgia presents one more noteworthy case to mention: in ALIR, the combined number of UN agencies, international and national NGOs and local administrative units entrusted with the task of implementing the different components of the programme added up to a total of nearly 37 implementing agencies (one International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO), 5 local NGOs and 31 other partners). In an environment steeped in mistrust and despondency the design of such programme, with so many actors and over such a short implementation period, was more an exercise in faith than experience. And while to the credit of programme management, implementation across all fronts has been commendable, this kind of set-up needs to be avoided.

An interesting and positive practice comes from **Kenya**. The **Peace Building and Conflict Prevention Unit (PBCPU)** since being established in 2008 has worked at the programme rather than the project level: the program targets political and civil society levels nationally and locally across various economic and social sectors. Also, procurement of services and items was made flexible by using three levels of procurement for the project, namely: national level - UNDP office, Government procurement system at the central and local level.

The implementation quality of the projects overall was high. For example:

* In **Sri Lanka**: in **TRP,** social transformation and conflict sensitivity initiatives were integrated into various sector interventions and projects, e.g. in a project for communities to learn new livelihood activities and business practices. There were also stand-alone social transformation initiatives such as pilot projects for social transformation in five communities, and a large number of school exchange visits of children among various regions of Sri Lanka. Under **LoGoPro**, to improve the performance of regional and local administrations in delivering services in a transparent and accountable manner, 2 sets of activities were implemented, targeting both the local governments and the Community Based Organizations (CBOs). This is an example of a good program design, as the transparency of the local governments could only be enhanced if the Civil Society Organization (CSOs)/CBOs (a) act as accountable and transparent service providers complementing government functions, and (b) represent public needs and monitor service delivery, so that people and communities are empowered as claim-holders participating in decision-making and accountability. In addition, the introduction of a rights-based approach implicitly (as a cross-cutting dimension) and explicitly (as specific initiatives focussing on capacity building of claim holders) addressed issues of marginalization and vulnerability arising from the war and poverty;
* In **Kenya**, according to COWI (2012) report, generally, the teams both at the national and district levels worked well and supported each other through National Drought Management Authority and Turkana and Garissa Rehabilitation Unit: this enhanced transparency and accountability across all the stakeholders and was found to have firmly contributed towards instilling ownership and commitment amongst the public officers and the beneficiaries, and promoted coordination and management of the implementation process;
* In **Lebanon,** under **BSS**, UNRC regional office in BSS was established to coordinate and maintain the coherence and a plan of recovery actions from the very start. Strong liaisons were maintained with the municipalities and the major stakeholders in the four most affected areas in BSS. This was done through providing support on both the institutional and local level. Because reconstruction assistance was often disbursed through municipalities and local community, UNDP’s presence in the area allowed it to make connections to residents, political parties, and other local groups. The UNRC hub office in the area was seemingly successful in sharing information and coordinating support activities, using its advantage, i.e. “neutrality”, while providing entry to UN agencies and NGOs that had not been active in this region previously. Despite all the challenges, especially related to political wrangling of different groups around the recovery related issues (and related to the fact that UNDP did not embrace Hezbollah, the dominant player in the area), UNDP was able to step in the area and initiate its emergency program immediately after the war and later extended it to the recovery of lives and livelihoods program. Working closely with local governments. UNDP had signed agreements with elected municipal heads; and those agreements enabled it to implement projects with the support of local community and local authority. While closely coordinating with the local communities at both grassroots and local authorities’ level, UNDP also built strong and trusting relationship with all concerned entities- an important achievement for a better understanding of their social, economic, cultural and political aspects, and thus making for better planning and serving the community
* Under **Yemen**, under **YEEP,** in parallel to the rapid income generation activity, the training sessions sharpened their notions of business and assisted them in crafting better business plans. YEEP also managed to develop close relationships with the private sector that supported the progress and project achievements.
* In **Somalia**, both **ABER** and **EGER** projects were managed using the remote management system. Essentially, the UNDP Project Manager operated from Kenya. The sub-projects design and implementation were contracted to carefully selected Somali NGOs. The NGOs were given the mandate to design a set of interventions with various communities, get the sub-project approved and carry out the interventions with community involvement. In parallel, a specialized private sector firm was given the mandate to monitor and evaluate the work of the NGOs. The remote management system has proved to be very efficient in the aid delivery, especially in the case of EGER with a value for money ratio exceeding 50%.[[19]](#footnote-20)

Some of the challenges include:

* In **Lebanon*:*** MDGF JP was the first joint experience for most partners and as such, it has been both a management challenge and an opportunity for institutions with different mandates and visions to discover new ways of working. According to MDGF (2012)[[20]](#footnote-21) joint work appeared to be minimal among agencies working within the JP with some reported cases of duplication. Agencies by and large continued to do their business as usual in terms of the nature and modality of implementing the activities within the context of the JP albeit under a "light‟ mechanism of coordination and joint reporting;
* In **Kenya,** no substantive consultations with communities where IDPs were being resettled had been undertaken by the Government leading to resistance and tension between these communities and IDPs in some locations;
* In **Sri Lanka**, in some instances, it was noted that livelihood activities did not always match larger market considerations or address issues of sustainability from the onset. Similarly, while micro credit programmes were very relevant, amounts have been too small, and were often used for subsistence rather than investments toward achieving true economic independence. Also, the integrated support was concentrated on one geographic area resulting in considerable inequities to neighbouring villages;
* In **Yemen,** while the flexible and decentralized approach to phase 1 of the 3x6 approach to business skills training and microenterprise development was a sound one, it lacked the components for self-employment promotion through career guidance and referral, as well as vocational skills training and development. Providing other options for youth who discontinued from the programme would have strengthened the position of the 3x6 cycle’s exit.

#### **Synergies**

In some countries, synergies with other UN agencies were very strong.

* This in particular the case in **Sierra Leone**, due to the fact that the UN agencies and programmes working in Sierra Leone combined their efforts and resources in 2009 behind the *“Joint Vision for Sierra Leone of the United Nations Family”, w*ith the overall aim to support the overarching priority of “peacebuilding” in the country and promote sustainable development. This has helped to benefit from opportunities stemming from closer cooperation and synergies: for example a **Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund (SL-**MDTF) was established to create a joint funding window to rapidly support key national priorities and enhance the coherence and efficiency of the UN programmes and projects at the country level;
* In **Lebanon** a number of projects mobilized important and successful partnerships with FAO and ILO;
* In **Sri Lanka** under IPECAC project UNDP reached out to vulnerable women and children, and linked these groups with UNICEF and the ILO.

In some other countries, this cooperation could have been stronger. For example in **Georgia**, under the **ERCBA** and **ACR** projects, the collaboration between UNDP and UNICEF was important in part concerning the health and educational facilities, but there was a lack of common strategy, compounded by the absence of collective strategic dialogue between donors, international organizations and civil society in Abkhazia;

As for the ***linkages with other programs within UNDP***, the picture is more of a mixed bag. There are some documented success stories, for example:

* In **Kenya,** linkages with other livelihood activities (e.g. support for irrigation schemes) have proved to be important for building effective synergies and sustainable businesses under Community Recovery Fund (CRF) activities (started in 2013); the linkages between livelihoods interventions and DRR as well as peacebuilding through PEV programme and Northern Kenya programme;
* In **Yemen**, there were some obvious synergies between the projects as the CPR intervention in community driven early recovery in Sana’a was incorporating the 3x6 approach used in the YEEP in its implementation.

However, in most of the countries, livelihoods activities are spread across many projects, often creating silo effects with challenges in coordination and lost synergies. In **Lebanon** for example, UNDP portfolio includes a very large number of projects that are complementary to the key LER interventions, and there is no evidence to claim that good operational linkages are built among them.[[21]](#footnote-22)

#### **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

In **Somalia** the CPD indicates a willingness to undertake strengthening of the M&E system in line with the past experience and recommendations from previous evaluations, including the 2010 ADR. Nonetheless the ABER and EGER project final evaluation states that “the weakest point of the projects was the management information system and more specifically the monitoring and evaluation system”: the main problem was the aggregation of information for different type of interventions in each sub-project, and the lack of follow up activities to measure the outcomes.

In **Yemen,** at the YEEP programme level, the jointly developed M&E strategy with the ILO came after having started the implementation: it would have been preferable to have the strategy before the implementation of the 3x6, and the absence of baseline, targets and timeframes made progress measurement difficult. In the absence of target indicators, the mid-term evaluation notes, “it is not clear what success should be measured against”. This is particularly important in view of defining what certain entrepreneurship development aspects of the project mean, since the target group is not homogeneous.

These seem to be common challenges for most of the projects.

#### **4.2.3. Effectiveness**

The discussion in this Section follows a typology identified during the review of the country notes

#### **Early recovery projects/project components**

Early recovery projects/project components have proved to be very effective, providing tangible results in the short term with notable impact in the livelihoods of the affected communities. This is true for example in:

* **Georgia**: in Abkhazia[[22]](#footnote-23), where the water supply component stood out as the most significant achievement with more than 20 thousand people benefitting;
* **Sri Lanka:** here infrastructure rehabilitation projects under TRP were rated the highest and were noted to have brought about visible improvement in the access to socio-economic services;
* **Lebanon:** UNDP‘s post war intervention in the BSS area allowed many people to recover, succeeded in supporting the local affected communities, empowering affected women and youths, reducing unemployment, enhancing socio-economic conditions, and contributed to balanced regional development, increased confidence among communities and local leadership.[[23]](#footnote-24)

High level of participation of the local population in digging, laying and repair of the pipes and canals as well as the substantial contribution of the local administrative authorities from their limited financial resources has been the most potent indicator of ownership and partnership in the population in many projects. Cash for work (often with a focus on the rehabilitation of socio-economic community infrastructure and debris management) was the primary mode of these of income generation for these programs. While many of the projects had a positive contribution to social cohesion and conflict prevention, impact on peace building is not as immediately observable. More details follow in the subsections below

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#### **Livelihoods and Resilience Building**

**Impact on livelihoods**

This type of projects/project components have also proved to be highly effective, with some challenges, the extent of which varied from project to project and from country to country. In particular:

* In **Abkhazia** (Georgia), according to the final evaluation of **ERCBA/ACR**, the projects jointly built a foundation from mobilized communities and an investment in infrastructure reconstruction, enabling changes/outcomes at the health, education and micro-project levels. These, in-turn have shown success – albeit at a small scale- with a target population of educators, healthcare workers, patients, youth, communities and District Administration;
* In **Sri Lanka: TRP**, according to “MTR of Outcome 7” (2011) was effective in helping people regain a sense of dignity, confidence and stability: this was particularly visible with former IDPs and women;
* In **Kenya**: **CRF groups** in ASAL areas of the country with a membership of about 20-30 youth and women were engaged in Livelihoods infrastructure rehabilitation (e.g. through the rehabilitation of the rainwater harvesting structures for farming); this, combined with a cash- for- work (CFW) programme enabled the Groups to accumulate savings and set up/expand their businesses. In collaboration with the Government of Kenya (GoK), UNDP implemented **recovery projects in Garissa and Turkana counties[[24]](#footnote-25)**. These projects sought to reduce the impact and risk of droughts (a major hazard in the country) through various interventions at the community level. At the communities’ level, the beneficiaries are now more aware of the disasters and the impacts of their repetitiveness, according to the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) results. The project contributed to resilience capacity building at the community, county, and national levels through DRR related activities. It also concurrently built the blocks for sustainable local long-term development. Some of the activities under these projects were aimed at reducing conflict through peace building, through various activities of CBOs and local administration, but their impact on peacebuilding is not so obvious;
* In **Somalia**: In the case of the **ABER** project, there were two objectives: to increase the income of vulnerable communities and to improve community management of natural resources and hazards/disasters. The final evaluation indicates that the first objective has been reached in a convincing fashion (4,000 people benefited of gainful employment; following training about a third of trainees secured a job or got a skills related attachments and a further 11.1% started skill related business) while it is doubtful that 2nd result had been achieved, with the task being narrowed down to rehabilitation of infrastructures. **EGER** project evaluation found that it was a success, with the probability of finding gainful employment doubling (from 18% to 38%) with net income increase of 102%, as compared with a 28% decrease in the control sites.

A number of countries had initiated ***youth employment programs***, as a means to prevent violence and conflict by engaging the youth in productive activities. Several interesting insights could be learnt from these. In particular:

* In **Sierra Leone:** the impact study[[25]](#footnote-26) found that the youth-employment projects had a substantial effect on the lives of the youth involved (in 2 years). The assessment findings are based on four results: (a) the income of the 10,299 beneficiaries was increased, on average, by more than 197 %; (b) for over 70 % of beneficiaries the projects made a significant difference in their lives; only one percent of beneficiaries reported receiving no benefits at all; (c) almost all beneficiaries reported having more hope for the future; and (d) beneficiaries identified a range of secondary effects from the project activities (e.g. financial literacy) that improved their long-term development prospects[[26]](#footnote-27).
* In **Yemen, the success of the YEEP** interventions has been demonstrated at different levels, including: changing the mind set of youths through developing their skills and facilitating their inclusion in a more enabling environment; in providing income, business skills development and job placement opportunities; in developing the partnerships with NGOs and local partners, including the private sector organisations. Some of the shortfalls are linked to having insufficiently thought through 3x6 approach particularly in terms of the phase 3 (which is not yet reached), but requires more forward planning in the development of phases 1 and 2;
* In **Kenya,** the **Post-Election Violence (PEV) Livelihoods Recovery Project** supported livelihood and resilience building activities supported by UNDP contributed to the recovery and reintegration process of PEV IDPs and host communities: 92% of the youth had no gainful employment at baseline compared to around 50% at the end of the project. This was achieved through: establishment of 4 District Business Solution Centres (DBSC) to provide entrepreneurship trainings to both the IDPs and affected communities; provision of farm inputs (to more than 1800 families); participation of youth in various placement schemes (over 700 youths) and rehabilitation of community infrastructure.[[27]](#footnote-28)

UNDP has been at the forefront of bringing about a coordinated effort toward the goal of **mine clearance** and resettlement of communities in a number of countries. The results vary from project to project and from country to country. For example:

* In **Sri Lanka**, according to “MTR of Outcome 7” (2011), the project helped to set the foundation for the return and resettlement of an unprecedented number of IDPs in the Vanni region, making the release of land possible and suitable for resettlement;
* Less progress has been achieved **in Lebanon**: although 99% of contaminated land has been identified, surveyed and data verified, and this provides a solid basis on which LMAC can plan for complete land release, the actual clearance and release of land is protracted due to government inefficiencies (Lebanon Mince Action Centre (LMAC) post-clearance survey data confirms that 97% of released land is put into use within 3 months, however).

**Impact on Social Cohesion, peace building and conflict prevention (see Section 6. A for definitions of concepts)**

The impact on livelihoods of the LER interventions is by and large established for all projects (with varying degree of success). Many of the projects had a positive contribution to social cohesion and conflict prevention (e.g. in Sierra Leone), though impact on peace building is not less immediately observable. For example

* In **Abkhazia** (Georgia) for all three projects, the impact on peace building was not strong. The final evaluation of ALIR advocated for specifically designed interventions (rather than expecting for peace to be a by-product of enhanced livelihoods), but the following 2 projects, ERCBA/ACR, continued in the same fashion and the contribution of individual project initiatives to conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes was extremely limited;
* In **Kenya**, the Government was forced to shelve a planned resettlement of approximately 850 IDPs on Rose Farm in Mau Narok following resistance from the Masai Community and local leaders: the local community members claimed that the land was their ancestral land and they would not allow ‘outsiders’ in the name of IDPs to be resettled there;

Some other countries did register success:

* In **Sri Lanka**, under the TRP Programme social transformation (ST) projects have effectively increased interaction between diverse communities and in some instances transformed conflicts between groups such as host communities and IDPs as well as those from different ethnicities;
* In **Kenya,** under the “Youth and women involvement in peace building and conflict prevention” program, youth have increased their level of participation in peace meetings: some have formed social action groups to enable continuous engagement with peace processes and there were “*increased numbers of youth willing to adopt nonviolent means of dispute resolution*”. [[28]](#footnote-29) There was also a significant progress towards women participation in conflict and peace building efforts. The success was achieved through specific design elements, e.g.: placement of youth in different organizations to nurture them into useful and productive members of society; inter-community youth exchange visits, etc.;
* In **Lebanon** the “**Recovery in surrounding communities of NBC (LRF*)****”* project aimed to recover and enhance livelihoods of the 28 surrounding communities through an integrated approach (livelihoods, community infrastructure and peace building). By the end of 2011, along with the improvements in livelihoods (through micro loans to small business owners (87% of beneficiaries used their loans for business); grants to five municipalities, etc.) notable results were achieved in peace building. [[29]](#footnote-30) Namely, specifically facilitated contacts significantly contributed to perceptions of prejudice for both Lebanese and Palestinian youth (positive contact was the strongest predictor of prejudice reduction in both Lebanese and Palestinian youth). Also in Lebanon, according to **MDGF JP** Evaluation (2012) the implementation of a number of activities at the local level has positively contributed to lessening tension and re-normalizing social relations between “war‟ affected communities, especially the Lebanese and Palestinians post Nahr el Bared Camp (NBC).

#### **Impact on institutional changes and governance**

Impact on institutional changes, governance and community resilience has been somewhat uneven. The following examples illustrate the point:

* In **Abkhazia (Georgia**), under **HUS-CO project**, the participation of local communities in development planning was at the core of decentralization processes in Georgia, and the HUS-CO provided a vehicle to support this process in the Samegrelo region. In addition, positive outcomes were recorded in the access to justice and public awareness areas;
* In **Sri Lanka,** under **LoGoPro project,** accountability of local administration was promoted by the introduction of citizen’s charters, localized MDG plans and monitoring mechanisms. Together, these initiatives improved service delivery to meet needs and address vulnerabilities. Post-tsunami capacity-building under LoGoPro in its turn, improved the performance of regional and local level structures as duty-bearers to deliver services in a transparent and accountable manner;
* In **Sierra Leone** the YEEP 1&2 projects (2010-2012 and 2013-2014) targeted the establishment of National Youth Commission (NAYCOM’s) main office in Freetown and its regional offices, expanding the existing TECVOC Skills Development Programme previously supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Youth Basket Fund and then pursued the goal of linking community based support to private sector in Sierra Leone. The Local Governance and Economic Development Joint Programme (**LGED-JP**) by UNDP-UNCDF **(LGED- JP)**, in its turn targeted the capacity of the local government to promote pro-poor economic activities and initiate private-public investment in key productive sectors. According to “Consolidated Report on Projects Implemented under the Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund” (2013) report, LGED- JP contributed to strengthening the capacity of local government to enhance pro-poor Local Economic Development. This was achieved through a combination of national level activities (e.g. support to the development of National LED Agenda) and local (Council-level) activities.

The impact study commissioned for the various programs funded under the Peace-building Fund (PBF), Irish Aid, and the Government of Norway summarizes some of the valuable learning from Sierra Leone with regards to institutional impact.

* + Innovative projects used interventions to strengthen local decentralization committees and/or transform the mind-set of communities. The ***relief approach***, a ***continuation of the humanitarian relief modality from the war***, treated communities largely as beneficiaries and not development partners. The projects that adopted the ***new empowering approach*** did not simply supply inputs for communities but instead required communities to drive the process. In many cases they did not supply any inputs at all, working instead with groups to find resources within their social networks and only supplied new ideas for groups to pursue. .
  + *C****ommunity cooperatives* (**groups of beneficiaries that created community-based organizations) ***played an important role in the success and perception of individual beneficiaries*.** Implementing partners that used interventions to develop groups of youth into cooperatives did better on average than projects that treated beneficiaries as individuals. The most critical element of this collaboration was whether, and how, groups saved profits.

#### **4.2.4 SUSTAINABLITY**

#### **Early recovery**

Sustainability, irrespective of whether it was borne by beneficiaries or local authorities, appeared a **reasonable prospect with respect to infrastructure rehabilitation projects/project components.** This was the case for almost all the projects. As an illustrative example, this was the case for the projects in Abkhazia (Georgia), in relation to water supply component of the programme (with the exception of the large regional sanitation epidemiological station< in which case here were doubts); similarly, under the HUS-CO project in Georgia the investments in **community mobilization and infrastructure were more likely to be sustained.** As for the add-on elements of the projects, these seemed less likely to continue without external funding and support (e.g. contribution to the development of computer centres due to limited lifespan of investments).

#### **Livelihoods and Resilience Building**

Some interesting lessons come from **Kenya,** the main strategy applied to ensure sustainability focused on facilitating the process of ownership of the project outputs and outcomes by the beneficiary communities. This was promoted by:

* capacity building of the existing institutional structures;
* mainstreaming the policy of meaningful participation throughout the project cycle;
* putting in place *community project management committees* and empowered them to undertake cost recovery activities especially where physical infrastructure was established, etc.

Consequently, the communities took ownership of the projects once completed. At the local level once could observe the use of better technologies and improved business skills leading to more food availability and accessibility, reduced distances to water facilities, higher enrolment of school going children especially girls, peaceful coexistence among neighbouring communities and creation of temporary employment for the youth. However, continuity is likely to be affected if the government funding declined or was not made available.[[30]](#footnote-31)

In **Sierra Leone** the impact study indicated that the programs had good potential for sustainability, although the lack of affordable credit as well as high demands on the national and local institutions compared to their capacity and resources were some of the main concerns.[[31]](#footnote-32). The public partnership partnership practice developed for local economic infrastrutures by involving the private sector (bearing management risks) in ensures the sustainability of the productive investments. Also, while many of these programs were effective at improving income levels, the sustainability of these results seemed less secure given some sense of external reliance.

**Youth employment programs:**

**Yemen YEEP:** The 3x6 approach looks at sustainability from the onset, since it is designed in a way that phases 1 and 2 lead to phase 3 and the three phases are all interconnected. Phase 2 for instance is also critical in terms of sustainability, supporting the transition from emergency employment to SMEs. However the implementation period and the timing and sequence of the activities seem to be very much focused on the short-term for phase 1 and phase 2. As a pilot project with a one year time frame, it does not appear to be sufficiently comprehensive to guarantee improved sustainability for those that continue to phase 3. This conclusion is however from the MTR of the YEEP and there could have been changes since. Also it has to be acknowledged here that this is a 1 year pilot project: within that timeframe, important foundations have been built for Phase III, including policy level work as mentioned above and value chain assessments, amongst others. It is also important to mention that the 3x6 is incorporated by the Government in their national Youth Employment Action Plan.

In **Sierra Leone**, for **YEEP,** an assessment of over 30 TVET institutions throughout the country, identified the following key challenges to sustainability: (a) huge youth expectations on the Youth Commission to create job opportunities on the backdrop of inadequate resources; (b) youth employability being a challenge; (c) too small private sector to use innovative initiatives to increase youth employment; and (d) limited level of business development within the county due to lack of business support mechanism at the local and national level.[[32]](#footnote-33)

#### **Institutional changes, governance and community resilience**

Again, Kenya presents some of the good practices for the **national level**. Integrating project activities into the Government of Kenya (GoK) mainstream activities and regular plans was the key strategy. For example the Ministry of Trade has incorporated District Business Support Centres (DBSC) into its regular plans: this has helped to increase the likelihood of their sustainability. The establishment of the **National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) by the GoK**, which is represented also at the county level, created the requisite institutional capacity to increase the likelihood of the sustainability of UNDP efforts. To enhance the capacity of the beneficiaries, every activity was accompanied with a training component. Other sustainability measures taken by partner ministries were to require and assist the CRF Groups to register or sign agreements with various government departments to offer oversight in monitoring and reporting on their groups.

For such practices to succeed, one needs however the necessary national policy framework to pursue inclusive growth and development being in place or attempted: in Sri Lanka, for example, such national policy framework was yet to emerge for the projects under the review and hence, the programs were not able to address governance issues underpinning disparities in MDG attainments.

Achieving sustainability **at the local level** governments is more difficult and the success varied from project to project even in the same country. For example in **Sri Lanka,** according to ADR (2012), in the case of the pilot initiative to improve localized mechanisms for service delivery, a measure of sustainability was achieved by the ownership demonstrated by the districts and divisions in applying citizen charters and localized MDGs. At the same time, while the project interventions to strengthen local governance structures, whether in terms of service delivery, rights, or access to redress mechanisms have strengthened respective oversight institutions, sustainability requires transparency and accountability of regional and local level structures and access to redress mechanisms being pulled together into a governance framework that supports change in people’s wellbeing and the prospects are not as good in this regard.

The extent of the challenges depends also on the maturity of local governance structures of course. **Kenya** and **Lebanon** had a policy of strong and close partnership with the local municipalities and it often positively affected the sustainability prospects. For example under the “Recovery in surrounding communities of NBC (LRF)” program, in Lebanon, Bebnine Municipality was a key partner throughout the process: at the end of 2011, the Municipality decided to appoint one focal person to follow-up and provide support to the women cooperative in addition to cover the rent fees of the cooperative office. In contrast, in **Sierra Leone** the pilot phase of the LGED-JP revealed capacity constraints of local councils to adapt to the growing needs of the communities including efficient use of the public-provate partnership tools (as a result, the LED approach introduced through the LGED-JP has remained a topic for exploration by both the GoSL and local councils).[[33]](#footnote-34)

In many projects, at the local level UNDP works with and through CBOs, but there does not seem to be a systematic assessment of the impact of such engagement on the sustainability of the CBOs (noted in particular in the case of Sri Lanka)

#### **Sustainable behavioural transformation and social cohesion**

There seems to be recognition that sustainable behavioural transformation requires ongoing training and awareness raising, and there are other actors in the field who UNDP should work with/piggy back further awareness raising for its beneficiaries with them, in order to reinforce the initial results. One way to ensure continuity is to target younger generation, who will not only grow with right mind-set but will also bring the new learning to their families: parents often learn from their children. In Sri Lanka for example, the social transformation initiatives primarily target children, youth and parents. In a number of communities where such programmes have been conducted, friendships formed across cultural, ethnic and community barriers were sustained by the communities themselves - particularly by the young participants of exchange programmes- even in the absence of further encouragement from UNDP or any other development agency.

#### **ANALYSIS OF KEY LESSONS LEARNT**

*a) Key lessons in programming*

**Design for sustainability**

The **lack of engagement and partnership** at the *de facto* Abkhaz Ministerial levels was the key factor hampering the potential for sustainability for the projects in Abkhazia (Georgia).

The lack of effective governance by the Government in Lebanon has been mentioned in a number of papers as one of the reasons for the lack of sustainability in many projects.[[34]](#footnote-35) For example, the Mine Action Authority (LMAA), the Inter-ministerial Advisory Committee and the International Support Group (ISG) have been inactive since 2007, since establishment, due to the political situation: this has resulted in a lack of integration of mine action at the higher level, missed opportunities to pool resources from other government sectors serviced by the LNMAP, lack of exposure and communication of good tangible results, and weaker lobbying for mine action. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, again the Mine Action project suffered from the lack of strong ownership by the Government, as noted in “MTR of Outcome 7” (2011), despite the fact that UNDP helped to build national capacity and contributed to the setting up of the institutional framework. In both countries however, UNDP support contributed to the emergence of local demining operators, specialised in survey and clearance.

In Kenya under LER UNDP’s role in the capacity building of 150 DPCs was very important, according to COWI (2012) report; however as noted by the same report, the protracted process of the enactment of the National Policy on Conflict and peace-building and other legislation (Bill on IDPs and National IDP Policy) endangering the success of DPCs (along with the highly inadequate funding).

**Youth Employment**

* Youths are high risk groups that need to have their energies constructively channelled into productive endeavours to avoid the risk of (re-)engaging in violent activities. This applies to both post-conflict environments (such as Burundi, Yemen, Somalia) but also to post-disaster contexts (Haiti) as high youth unemployment contributes to fuelling gang-type associations and illicit activities. Programmes that target youth employment are good entry point for LER. It is however important to properly track and disaggregate youth – since the age groups differ according to the country - separately from gender disaggregation in order to avoid double counting (female youth in some cases can be reported in either category, running the risk of double counting).
* Youth employment also has some challenges: In Sierra Leone there is little evidence that youth employment has a direct bearing on the emergency of, or recruitment into armed groups, and greater rigor in programmatic claims will encourage more realistic (and measurable) impacts. A more community-empowered development approach is needed in youth employment programs coupled with measures to strengthen governance by partnering with local decentralization committees: effective partnerships between implementing partners and local development committees increase the perceived legitimacy of these local committees. Youth employment programs should prioritize community resilience, e.g. using training programs like REFLECT training that strengthened the capacity of communities through adult education in health and financial literacy.
* It would be useful to provide proper benchmarks to be able to appraise the success of youth employment programmes. Particularly being able to identify a *critical mass* of youths dedicated to productive activities that, once reached, can ensure long-term sustainability in the target area.
* It is important to be inclusive of the different groups of youths, including the marginalized populations, and providing support and training to a mix of different categories of youths can contribute to improving social cohesion and communication in the programme catchment area.
* Not all youths can be entrepreneurs: UNDP should be mindful when targeting youths for SME development that a specific selection process is warranted, and also identify the percentage of youths that are expected to undertake viable economic activities as a results of the support provided.
* Youth employment is boosted through the combination of specific training, equipment, and access to finance or microfinance.

**Livelihoods**

* Livelihoods and employment generation directly addresses the root causes of conflict and violence, and can be a good programmatic entry point (Yemen, Burundi, Georgia, Sierra Leone) that contribute to social cohesion and in some cases also contribute to the wider peace building effort.
* To create the most enabling environment for livelihoods, LER interventions should be integrated and inclusive of all the different components of LER, inclusive of both hardware and software support, including psychosocial counselling Tackling infrastructure rehabilitation, or only vocational training, or only access to micro-finance, without an integrated developmental approach, lowers the chances of successful LER implementation;
* The 3x6 approach can be successfully implemented in unstable and volatile environments in order to defuse tensions and contribute to social cohesion and stabilisation; the 3x6 approach is also a good mechanism to contribute to women empowerment, particularly if an equitable ratio for gender targeting is established (Yemen and Burundi)
* The change in mind-set from an individual orientation to a group approach requires a certain level of trust that is often not found in post-conflict environments; but joint savings accounts have a potential of supporting the groups integration provided they are managed efficiently and transparently. Group approaches, when designed well, contribute to promoting social cohesion and integration. (Sierra Leone, Burundi)
* There does not seem to be a systematic approach to micro-finance in the LER interventions undertaken by UNDP. In some cases UNDP supports the linkages with MFI, and in other cases it does not. While MFI by itself cannot guarantee successful livelihoods, it is widely recognized as a necessary enabling factor particularly in countries whose financial systems are not well developed or regulated. In some cases such a support is given through the UNCDF (e.g. Liberia).
* Livelihood activities should be mindful of the demand side and a market analysis should be undertaken before engaging in livelihoods, in order to know both the demand for specific skills or businesses, as well as the prospects for further growth, including as far as possible a value chain analysis that may provide links to the micro and small businesses with the private sector.
* Cash for Work (CFW) can be a very useful component to rapidly inject money into the local economy (e.g. Haiti), and can be a critical, albeit temporary support, to the vulnerable groups in both post-conflict and post-disaster situations. It provides relief to the beneficiaries by giving money, but may also fuel some tensions in cash-strapped communities. CFW is a form of unconditional cash transfer, as it rarely leads to strong results, since the emphasis is placed mostly on the giving out of cash rather than on the results of the CFW activities themselves. An interesting and innovative option is the Cash for Production (CFP) approach used in Haiti that looked to provide payment based on the results of the work accomplished, in line with an RBM approach.
* Livelihood initiatives are strengthened by initiatives that aim at increasing the awareness in value addition techniques and building market linkages
* CBOs and implementing partners providing training and coaching in business skills need themselves to be properly skilled and prepared over a sufficiently long time-frame to ensure that the level of preparation will be carried over to the benefit of the beneficiaries

**Social Cohesion**

* Treating confidence building measures as a by-product of economic development will not do. Explicit efforts at building intra-community confidence building measures need to be pursued at the same time. This may require designing of programs and projects that bring diverse communities together in shared activities that generate benefits, and subsequent enrichment, for both parties (Georgia, Burundi).
* Effective linkages of livelihoods activities coupled with conflict prevention and psycho-social and counselling support can produce the desired results, and thus requires that a peace building approach be supportive of each of the different components, particularly the psychosocial dimension.
* Peace building and social cohesion are not the same thing (see following section 6 a). UNDP should be clear as to what objective is pursued under each of its interventions as programming categories vary across the countries: “social cohesion” , “conflict prevention”, and “peace building” are often employed as similar terms – when there important differences in these concepts, and particularly depending on the level at which they are applied.
* LER interventions can contribute decisively to social cohesion as they address the root causes of conflict (unemployment, exclusion, etc.)

**Gender**

* Most interventions have mainstreamed gender and have specifically targeted vulnerable female-headed households for a number of activities. The introduction of quotas for female participation in CFW programmes has led to a change of mindset on the traditional role of women, as women participants have shown to be better organized and even sometimes obtain better results, and thus higher income, in Cash for Production projects that are based on the actual amounts of results achieved (instead of the traditional CFW approach that pays based on a daily fee, regardless of the amount of work done). Haiti was somewhat a pioneer in developing this approach, but the inclusion of female quotas for participating in traditionally male dominated activities (such as construction or infrastructure rehabilitation or rubble removal) is developing attitudinal changes in several countries.
* Two aspects of women participation that must be closely monitored: avoid female only groups to be created (such as some SRGs in Myanmar) as exclusion of males may lead to resentment and can be a risk leading to gender-based violence. All female group initiatives should be inclusive of at least 10% of men in order to contribute to social cohesion. In some countries this may actually require a higher percentage depending on culture and traditions.
* Elderly, handicapped, and female headed households may not be in a position to take advantage of specific LER opportunities themselves given their vulnerable status. Therefore the option should be that one of the close family members be eligible for LER support programmes.
* The 3x6 approach is a good mechanism to contribute to women empowerment, if adequate preparation and sensitization are carried out at the community level, when placing women participation quotas (Burundi, Yemen)

**Program Design**

* Using the potential of specific regions/areas in order to undertake LER while major parts of the country are dependent on humanitarian aid may be helpful to trigger a shift from humanitarian toward recovery assistance in targeted areas (Somalia, Burundi).
* It is important to be able to address quick wins (such as rapid income generation) to fuel interest and participation from beneficiaries. But this needs to be coupled with the longer-term approach towards sustainability requiring a five-year time-frame to be fully effective.
* Implementation of too complex (many components) programs within short projects is overly ambitious and risks affecting the reputation of the program due to non (sub)–achievement and challenges in coordination (Georgia, Somalia).
* Building synergies at the onset, i.e. at the design stage is very important both within UNDP and the UN, as well as with other IOs and IFIs; it not only helps to avoid duplication but also helps bring the benefits of valuable specialized knowledge facilitating the effectiveness and sustainability of the project.
* Joint UN programmes allows to combine needed expertise across a range of interventions (e.g. Haiti UN joint programmes)
* Prior comprehensive needs assessment as well as assessment of available business opportunities and training (labour market survey) is vital – understanding the social and economic dynamics of the intervention area is a key requirement to successful programming.
* Innovative technologies can be successfully used to support LER interventions (e.g. mobile money, solar paneled mechanisms for lights or water supply).
* Linking recovery activities to long-term sustainable livelihood schemes supported by the governments is necessary and can be a very effective and sustainable strategy.
* M&E strategy established with baseline, benchmarks and indicators and adequate outcome level definitions are important for the success and stronger M&E capacity are needed locally.
* Clear targeting strategy, particularly regarding gender sensitive programme in LER interventions is very important to avoid the risks of exclusion.
* All programme designs should have a clear vision of success and an exit strategy, and address the issues of replication and scale

**Program Implementation**

* Procurement rules and bureaucratic inefficiency have often been mentioned as a major weakness undermining results both in evaluation reports and by national counterparts interviewed. There is a disconnect between the need to provide accountability and the need to achieve meaningful results, as the administrative procedures often do not reflect or adjust to the reality of the operational context. Noteworthy that UNDP rules are the same regardless of the country or operating context, whereas interventions are always context specific and design to respond to specifically identified needs.
* Activities in the areas with large refugee/IDP population need to benefit both returning refugees/IDPs and host communities (Kenya, Burundi); similarly it is important to ensure that emphasized support to certain communities does not cause resentment in the neighbouring ones (Abkhazia-Georgia).
* Having common communication and visibility guidelines and clarity of objectives is important for facilitating the coordination amongst the programme managers but also in order to communicate with an external audience.

b) Corporate level Lessons learnt and good practices

1. All LER interventions have been identified as highly relevant to the priority needs of the country, of the UN system, and of the population (with one exception). UNDP is clearly able to identify and conceptualize programmes that address fundamental needs and is responsive to those needs.
2. Income generation and economic recovery are good entry points to obtain quick wins regardless of the context (e.g. applicable to both post-conflict and post-disaster ER settings and equally effective regardless of the nature of the crisis).
3. UNDP is rightfully attempting to include long-term approaches that allow a shift from a humanitarian assistance mode towards empowerment of local population through community based recovery initiatives. Inclusiveness, participation, commitment are positive values that are embedded in the 3x6 approach used in two countries and that are enabling conditions conducive to planning over the longer-term.
4. Integrated approaches that are able to work on various mutually reinforcing interventions simultaneously are able to bring additional added value. A multi-sector approach is necessary when dealing with LER interventions in order to maximize results, something largely embedded in the majority of UNDP’s ER intervention designs, inclusive of psychosocial support
5. Capacity development tends to be included, particularly at the local level, in the designs of LER interventions. This contributes to greater local commitment and ownership both from local structures, partners and target communities.
6. UNDP’s streamlining of gender is causing attitudinal changes in a number of countries where women empowerment is traditionally lower. While the introduction of women quotas in almost all of UNDP’s LER interventions does not by itself lead to women empowerment, it does however force partners to include women participation and leads to change in the gender balance of power. This is noted in a number of countries reviewed. It is particularly important to understand that for women to be able to participate up to the required quota, gender awareness and communication must be undertaken at community level. UNDP has a specific credibility as a UN organization in that gender targeting is seen as an international requirement of good practice, and the fact that UNDP requires women quotas is in fact leading countries to accept that some change of attitude, and hopefully of behaviour, needs to take place regarding women participation.
7. A number of countries, although not all, have understood the important role of the micro-finance sector in addressing the needs and supporting the LER efforts of the vulnerable population. While by itself micro-finance does not guarantee the success of LER interventions, it certainly acts as an important contributing element that has been included in some countries. In some other countries, these interventions were developed by the UNCDF or the linkages with the MFIs were not included in the intervention. However MF is very often a necessary part of an integrated approach from the perspective of target communities.
8. The Strategic Plan 2008-2011 was hardly known or used by most of the countries covered in the thematic evaluation. The COs indicated that their programming was essentially based on national and local planning frameworks, and that the SP had neither been rolled out to the country office level nor did it bring any added value directly to the CO. Even in the cases where the SP was actually linked to the programming, it included the LER interventions under the Key Results Area 1 of Promoting Inclusive Growth, Gender Equality and MDG achievement, and not to the Key Results Area 3.3 of Restoring the Foundation for Development at Local Level, particularly outcome 9, that was specifically established to encompass LER interventions.

c) Corporate level - Shortcomings and challenges

UNDP works in all of the most under-developed, poor, fragile and complex countries in the world. The collection of cluster countries included in this evaluation comprise a majority of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries. It is therefore understandable that in many of these unstable and insecure environments, challenges emerge. The evaluation found the following challenges negatively affecting the performance and overall effectiveness of the UNDP LER interventions:

1. Lack of clear definitions, cut-off point, vision or benchmark for success

UNDPs interventions are often ambitious and use a variety of terms that are not operationally defined and are subject to interpretation. Interventions do not indicate any cut-off point from which UNDP can chose to either disengage or hand-over the programme, and very few interventions provide benchmarks for success. The statements in the results framework are often unclear and terms can be interpreted in different manners depending on one’s understanding. There needs to be a corporate glossary to not only define the terms that UNDP keeps using across its offices, but also grounding them into concrete applications and not merely conceptual definitions. This is further discussed in the section 6. Analysis

1. UNDP’s M&E culture does not allow it to report on outcomes. It focuses reporting on activities and outputs/products, but it is not able to report on the change process brought about by the interventions. There is a generally low M&E level in country offices and very few have a dedicated M&E specialist to assist programme design, monitoring and evaluation. This weakness is echoed in the ADR reports undertaken by UNDP’s EO. UNDP needs to understand that professional evaluations and a sound M&E system are key tools for decision making and reporting on results, and not some compliance oriented requirement only for the purpose of accountability. Senior management support is necessary to provide UNDP with the in-country mechanisms and tools that allow it to reach its objectives, and generally a better training and understanding of RBM approaches at the CO level is needed.
2. **Sustainability**

Sustainability is embedded in all the LER interventions, both conceptually and at the

design level. However the manner in which the interventions perform in the early stages of implementation condition the extent to which the sustainability can be achieved. For example, in the countries using the 3x6 approach (such as Burundi or Yemen), theoretically phases 1 and 2 contribute to phase 3 that is where sustainability is created. However, in practices, by implementing phases 1 and 2 in a very short time-frame (under a year for each phase), the ground work and preparation amongst the partners and the target beneficiaries is not sufficiently long for ensuring the successful development of the phase 3 – hence the need for a long-term local economic development programme. Adequate coaching and preparation of partners is needed in order to translate the skills and knowledge successfully to the beneficiaries and ensure adequate follow-up and support at least for at least a medium-term period of 2-3 years.

Furthermore, sustainability is also constrained by donor funding. It is unclear that donors are committed over the long-term for funding LER, perhaps because there is limited evidence yet of its impact. However funding short-term and unsustainable LER interventions will not contribute to winning over donors to long-term development support. A key finding of the UNDP Evaluation Office Evaluation of UNDP support to conflict affected countries in the context of UN peace operations, published in January 2013, reports “UNDP interventions in livelihoods and economic revitalization are an important and often innovative component of the broader United Nations approach to conflict-affected settings. Within integrated missions, there has been some tension between the time-bound and technical nature of the approach taken by peacekeepers towards DDR and UNDP’s longer term developmental objectives, which focus on building local capacities for economic generation. Similarly, donor time frames in conflict-affected settings are relatively short, limiting the scope and scale of UNDP interventions.

1. **Understanding of all parties on LER –** and a corporate approach to LER across the countries:

While UNDP HQ has a corporate LER definition and guidance notes established by the LRG, the understanding of LER at the country level varies across the countries. While most countries subject to a field visit had LER specialists (Myanmar, Burundi, Haiti, and Nepal), not all countries reviewed had in-depth knowledge of the LER approach. Particularly Liberia is a country that is marginalized as regards to its understanding of the LER approach and where capacities at CO level could be strengthened.

A concrete and positive initiative to contribute to mainstreaming of LER is the creation of a community of practice (COP) that held its first workshop in Addis Ababa in November 2013, and is expected to continue its work actively in the future, although some major LER countries were not present at the workshop (Indonesia, Haiti).

However, outside UNDP, a major difficulty is to communicate the LER approach – to other UN agencies, implementing partners such as NGOs, and even donors. There needs to be a vision that can be shared and supported by the necessary partners that UNDP needs to undertake LER programmes. Evaluative evidence shows that in some countries inter-agency collaboration was not optimal amongst UN agencies, in part given the fact that UNDP was not able to communicate a clear vision of the LER approach to its partners, so as to build common efforts on the results to be achieved.

1. **Linking LER to long term policies e.g. UN Policy on Employment:** inWhile the attempt by a third of the countries to nominally link their LER programming to the 2009 UN policy on post-conflict employment creation is a good effort to take into consideration corporate guidance for country-level programming, there has been however few strategic partnership with ILO at country level for implementing the policy: the policy was being rolled out in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Nepal. However this applies only to one quarter of the countries reviewed. Given that track C is much more focused on sustainability and ultimately deals with the formal sector, there is a need to have complementary efforts between the ILO and UNDP in this field. Unfortunately from the country visits it does not appear that ILO has the funding or manpower necessary to be able to provide support to UNDP in this endeavour, except at the policy level. But much more could be done address the track C approach, which UNDP cannot simply expect to undertake on its own, as there are also issues of CO capacity and funding that need to be considered. Noteworthy that in Burundi ILO and UNDP worked closely for the value chain assessment as part of the track C approach.
2. **Scalability:**  While sustainability is one of the challenges that UNDP needs to address, another is the question of scalability. UNDP COs often describe their LER programmes as “catalytic interventions” designed to attract further funding. However in none of the programmes reviewed is the issue of scalability clearly presented. Most countries reviewed experienced difficulties to identify how to upscale the interventions or replicate them. Targeting and coverage in project proposals often do not include any benchmarks for when the intervention is complete, or how it can slide and be expanded or replicated to other target groups or communities or areas. Here the question of “breadth and depth” must be addressed: it always looks more appealing to cover a larger catchment area and a higher number of communities, but what does happen to those who are not in the intervention areas because funding did not allow to cover all the places in need? This is a recurrent challenge of UNDP that should be addressed, as project proposals implicitly tend to present the UNDP intervention areas as the area of priority needs. But in under-funded situations, UNDP is not able to respond to all the LER needs. In that context, UNDP may have to think of having a corporate stand to address the issue of scalability to facilitate the work of the country offices.
3. **Internal Organisational Arranegements**: UNDP is constrained by some of its internal requirements. There is a trade-off between obtaining development results over the longer-term and the delivery rate which is used to appraise UNDP’s performance. The two aspects can be quite opposed. One aspect is to measure how much money was spent in a given year (delivery rate) and another is to appraise how much was done to achieve development results. In many LER interventions the implementation time-frame is very short, up to one year, as if it was a humanitarian response operation. However this contributes to higher expenditures in the period and a high delivery rate. But it is known that longer-term development interventions require an incremental approach over several years, something that is not necessarily conducive to high delivery rates, particularly for interventions where infrastructures are not the primary objective and no high start-up costs are involved (such as vocational training, developing micro and small business, income generation). UNDP should adopt a clear corporate position as a development organisation that its effectiveness should not be measured in terms of delivery and MYRF indicators, but in terms of development results. However this is intricately linked with an improved M&E and RBM corporate culture inclusive of the Country Offices, as well as adequate positioning for donor support over the long term (5 years).
4. **Targeting the poorest:** While it is the mandate of the UNDP to take care of those excluded groups and most vulnerable population, there is a contradiction within the LER approach that leads to missed opportunities. Interventions that focus on the poor in a community often do not take into consideration the employment and livelihood opportunities that are offered by larger farmers or existing medium and large size businesses. As a result, the impact of maximizing the conditions to create employment is not being reached as those who are able to offer a job in communities may not be included in the LER intervention. Another aspect of pro-poor targeting is that the poorest are not those who offer the best prospects of sustainability when looking at livelihood development or employment. Instead of targeting the most vulnerable individual, an option is to offer to one of the able-bodied family members the opportunity to take advantage of the support provided. As a result, it is necessary to offer some clear benchmarks and indicators in terms of how these criteria are being applied in order to ensure social cohesion, equity, but also without compromising the sustainability of the interventions.

# **Analysis and interpretation**

The key issues that have been identified in this analysis section are structured along three lines of enquiry:

1. Concepts and definitions
2. Objectives and results
3. Mechanisms and partnerships

#### ***Concepts and definitions***

UNDP is good at conceptualizing the LER interventions, but it fails to provide operational definitions (and benchmarks) for some of the key term it uses in its programme. This was identified in several external evaluations. While the use of standardized and operationally defined terms may appear trivial, it is in fact essential in communicating what it is that UNDP seeks to achieve. By using terms that can be interpreted differently, UNDP gives itself a wider margin of manoeuver. But at the same time it is also more difficult to communicate the expected results to government, national partners and donors and make them understand what UNDP wants to achieve. UNDP has been criticized for being involved in too many things and lacking focus. It needs to be clearly articulated if in post-crisis situations the LER interventions are seen as part of the backbone of UNDP interventions or whether it will be a secondary concern in support to other forms of programming.

UNDP has defined in its LER guide the key terms of employment and livelihoods as follows:

**“Employment** is defined here as a decent work situation that enables an individual to earn enough to maintain their own and/or their household’s needs above a reasonable poverty line.

**Livelihoods** comprise the “the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living.”[[35]](#footnote-36)

Based on the above, it appears that livelihoods apply to a wider context than the term of “employment” that is also more commonly used in the formal sector, whereas the term of livelihoods is more common in the informal sector. It can further be argued that the term employment is particularly relevant in the track B, but even more so the track C approach of the 2009 UN Policy on Post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration, whereas livelihoods encompasses the term “employment” and applies to all three tracks A, B, C.

UNDP takes for granted certain terms which are always context specific: one such term is the concept of community. Not a single project document defines the notion of community, which is very much context specific and dynamic.

Community: a sociological model

“To be more effective as a mobilizer, to empower or strengthen communities, you need to know the nature of communities, and how they behave. Communities are social or cultural organizations, and, as such, are characterized by the six cultural dimensions. Communities are not the same as human individuals, but grow and change by their own sets of principles.”[[36]](#footnote-37)

The key to understanding these characteristics and principles is to recognize those six dimensions of culture, and their inter-relationships.

1. The *technological dimension* of community is its capital, its tools and skills, and ways of dealing with the physical environment. It is the interface between humanity and nature.
2. The economic dimension of community is its various ways and means of production and allocation of scarce and useful goods and services (wealth), whether that is through gift giving, obligations, barter, market trade, or state
3. The *political dimension* of community is its various ways and means of allocating power, influence and decision making. It is not the same as ideology, which belongs to the values dimension. It includes, but is not limited to, types of governments and management systems. It also includes how people in small bands or informal groups make decisions when they do not have a recognized leader.
4. The *social or institutional dimension* of community is composed of the ways people act, interact between each other, react, and expect each other to act and interact. It includes such institutions as marriage or friendship, roles such as mother or police officer, status or class, and other patterns of human behaviour.
5. The *aesthetic-value dimension* of community is the structure of ideas, sometimes paradoxical, inconsistent, or contradictory, that people have about good and bad, about beautiful and ugly, and about right and wrong, which are the justifications that people cite to explain their actions.
6. The *belief-conceptual dimension* of community is another structure of ideas, also sometimes contradictory, that people have about the nature of the universe, the world around them, their role in it, cause and effect, and the nature of time, matter, and behaviour.

UNDP actually has *de facto* followed the concept of communities as a place or geographical location where people interact. But since the concept of community is much wider, it is necessary to identify exactly which dimension(s) UNDP is working on. Just taking a group of people who reside in a specific location does not add up to the concept of community. UNDP needs to understand the dynamics of a community if is really wants to work with and on *communities.*

This is important because another aspect that often leads to confusion is the concept of ***targeting*** of specific groups of beneficiaries, often the most destitute and poorest. Often women and youth are specific targets, and ***vulnerability*** is another criterion that is used in targeting in UNDP interventions.

If UNDP does work with specific target groups, then it no longer works with the community, as the community is a wider concept than the sum of the target groups. UNDP should therefore be clear on what unit of analysis it uses to ensure its coverage: specific target groups within a given geographically defined location, or a wider and more complex unit that needs to be defined in operational terms: a community. This is particularly important when addressing the results and the outcome of the interventions. From the review of the different programmes undertaken in this evaluation it appears that UNDP does try to address the community dimension (since a number of effects of the interventions go beyond the specific target groups and influence other dimensions of the community) with a certain percentage of poor, vulnerable, and other specific target groups being the direct beneficiaries. But obviously it can’t expect to place the same level of efforts onto both and it should identify the results expected at each of the two levels. It should be interesting for UNDP to work on and report on *processes* that contribute to positive dynamics rather than just on activities and outputs.

Another term that is widely used and not defined is *most vulnerable*. Vulnerability is always expressed in relation to a specific risk or hazard. An individual can be vulnerable to natural disasters, but economically well off, and become poor overnight as a result of flooding, earthquakes, etc., and therefore be considered as *affected by the crisis*. Vulnerability in conflict environments is even more complex as it comprises the *multiple dimensions of human security* (as defined by UNDP in the early 1990s). Vulnerability should therefore be related to a specific risk : social vulnerability, economic vulnerability, vulnerability to natural disasters, vulnerability to infectious diseases, etc.. The cause of vulnerability should be well understood and explained, and the process by which UNDP intends to reduce vulnerability as well. In a humanitarian context the vulnerable population is the recipient of humanitarian aid. But in the context of recovery and development the issue of vulnerability needs to be better understood and explained.

So being clear and consistent about what UNDP intends to do, where it intends to do it and with whom, are actually not trivial questions, but should form part of the initial description of the intervention design. It is even more important in countries that do not produce programme documents (using CPDs and AWP) to have a clear explanation regarding the approach and basic concepts used in operationalising the interventions.

Another term that is used by UNDP without any definition is the notion of “sustainable” livelihoods, or “**sustainability**”. While the OECD/DAC does not offer any operational benchmarks in terms of time frame for appraising sustainability, there needs to be at least a shared understanding as regards to the concept of sustainability. In LER a basic guidance, that needs to be adjusted to each context given its specificities, is that “Early Recovery” is indicatively set as an 18 months period following a crisis situation. Obviously in contexts of repeated and varied crises, there can be a protracted ER period, if recurrent crises affect the same geographical location or population groups. It is important to give an operational definition and time-frame to the concept of sustainability, otherwise it remains an empty shell. Without it, it remains more of a statement of intent than a guiding principle for programming. Worse, sustainability is achieved after the intervention has ended, so it is largely dependent on the performance of the intervention and the capacity to monitor or evaluate sustainability after the end of an intervention. A programme can have planned for sustainability, but constraints and challenges during its implementation may have negatively affected its prospect for sustainability. Key terms should be sufficiently grounded into operationally defined benchmarks, even if they be country or region specific, to avoid the risk of erroneous interpretation.

**Standardised definitions** are therefore not just a matter of semantics; they are at the heart of well-designed programmes that have analysed and reflected on the challenges of its operational performance and have correspondingly identified the applicable terms that sustain the interventions and allow to identify and communicate clearly the results and outcomes achieved.

In a number of LER intervention, another key concept used is that interventions develop the population’s **resilience[[37]](#footnote-38).** This is another term that requires some explanation. A proposed working definition for resilience from Yale University is the following:

*"In the context of exposure to significant adversity, resilience is both the capacity of individuals to navigate**their way to the psychological, social, cultural, and physical resources that sustain their well-being, and their capacity individually and collectively to negotiate**for these resources to be provided in culturally meaningful ways."[[38]](#footnote-39)* [www.resilienceresearch.org](http://www.resilienceresearch.org).

According to this research, a resilience-based approach is based on no less than seven different characteristics:

1. PRO-CAPACITIES EMPHASIS: An emphasis on strengths, resources and capacities rather than deficits
2. PREVENTIVE FOCUS: Anticipation of actions that reduce the impact of adversity (DRR based)
3. MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS: Attention to multiple levels of influence ranging from the structural and cultural through to the community and the individual
4. SYSTEMS ORIENTATION: Mapping influences within ecologically-nested systems
5. PARTICIPATIVE ANALYSIS: Use of participative analysis to map systems in a particular context
6. LEVERAGE POINTS: Attention to key influences on developmental outcomes
7. PLANNED SYNERGIES: Interventions anticipate linkages to reinforce impact

A number of development actors have produced some literature on resilience: DFID (2011) Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper; UNICEF (2011). Fostering Resilience, Protecting Children: UNICEF in Humanitarian Action; USAID (2012) Building Resilience to

Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance.

In programmatic terms, some UN Joint plans have been established to foster resilience, for example in Somalia in 2012, “FAO, UNICEF and WFP have identified three complementary core building blocks to promote resilience in Somalia that must be addressed comprehensively in order to achieve communities’ resilience:

I. **Strengthen the productive sectors** - to increase household ***income*** by diversifying livelihood strategies, intensifying production at household level and by enhancing the access to markets and to market information to extend households frontier of possibilities.

II. **Improve basic social services** - to strengthen vulnerable household ***human capital*** by creating systems able to assess communities and capture the information needed to enhance the demand and access to car practices and capacity building opportunities.

III. **Establish predictable safety nets** - to address the most vulnerable people’s ***basic needs*** through ***predictable*** and sustainable transfer of food or cash for the destitute or seasonally at risk populations”

Based on the complexities on how to work with communities and target groups to enhance resilience of crisis affected populations, UNDP has, for the first time, moved to respond to a crisis - the Syrian crisis - through a regional approach that goes beyond the national boundaries, recognising that conflict affected communities spread geographically across state and national boundaries, and through the posting of a sub-regional coordinator.

As mentioned by the UN Assistant Secretary General in the foreword,

“Members of the Regional UNDG agreed, when they met in Amman in November 2013, that UN agencies need to think and act beyond traditional mandates, to strongly connect the humanitarian and development responses, and to ensure the strongest relevance and value of our work addressing emergency, fragility, resilience and recovery.

The United Nations Development programme (UNDP) has worked closely with its sister UN agencies to formulate a Resilience-based Development response to the Syria crisis, as its contribution to the comprehensive response strategy of the UN.

The Resilience-based Development approach supports capacities of affected communities to cope with immediate needs emanating from the crisis, recover from its impacts and sustain this recovery through development gains over the long-term.”[[39]](#footnote-40)

The approach, inspired from the 3x6 used in recovery interventions in countries such as Burundi and Yemen – and also in line with the 2009 UN policy on post-crisis employment generation-, defines three entry points to developing resilience:

1. Local governance structures are empowered to bolster livelihoods, housing, infrastructures and basic services to respond to the increased demand.
2. Vulnerable households (internally displaced, refugees and affected communities) are empowered to recover from the socio-economic impact of conflict and displacement.
3. Economic, social and political institutions are strengthened in all neighbouring countries to ensure sustainability.

The three track approach is therefore embedded in the strategy. As mentioned in this evaluation report, UNDP is strong at conceptualizing and identifying the approaches to be responsive to the needs. But to be able to reach all three tracks requires a systemic effort from the UN system, national governments, and development partners: the level of complexity is such that UNDP cannot, by itself, be expected to develop resilience. The necessary multi-level inter-dependent factors that are involved in this approach also requires a level of skills that is not often found amongst the staff of agencies of the UN system: understanding of community dynamics requires socio-anthropologic skills and experience, and working in conflict environments requires a psychological and sociological knowledge that enables to understand the process involved in healing trauma and advancing towards reconciliation and conflict dynamics and transformation. Applying tools such as “Do No Harm” or the PCNA are good starting points but not sufficient to obtain a profound understanding of social dynamics.

Clearly there are many challenges to the successful implementation of the resilience-based approach described above. From the perspective of this thematic cluster evaluation of LER interventions, one of the key challenges is how to evaluate resilience. This leads to the next point which relates to UNDP’s M&E culture and systems at the country office level.

#### **Peacebuilding, social cohesion and conflict prevention**

The Secretary General’s Policy Committee has defined peacebuilding as

“A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”[[40]](#footnote-41)

A number of LER interventions aim at contributing to **social cohesion**, which is a necessary pre-condition, but not the only one, to avoid relapse into conflict. There is a distinction between in the two terms, in that social cohesion is an enabling factor to contribute to peace building, but it is not the only factor that is required to build peace. Another difference is where the concept is applied. In post-conflict countries, peace building normally relates to the national level conflict – so individual targeted programmes are not able to address the national peace building process, something that requires multiple actors and national partnerships and programmes.

UNDP tends to use peace building, social cohesion, and conflict prevention as synonyms. However more training to UNDP staff is necessary to understand the differences between these key terms. Programmatically, what UNDP has been most successful in is at building social cohesion, which in turn has contributed to avoiding conflict, and this may or may not be contributing to the wider issue of peace-building in post-conflict countries. However, it does not flow automatically that simply because UNDP programmes achieve social cohesion through LER, they directly contribute to the national peace building efforts. Conflict management is much more complex and requires a deeper understading of conflict dynamics.

LER interventions cannot by themselves build peace. But because they do address the root causes of conflict, they can be a very valuable entry point, if designed well, to contribute both to social cohesion at the local level, while also contributing to the wider objective of peace building.

1. **Objectives and results**

**UNDP M&E culture and systems**

UNDP is challenged to show the results of its interventions. This applies across the types of interventions and is not specific to LER programming. UNDP has an Independent Evaluation Office that undertakes a number of evaluations, notably the Assessment of Development Results (ADR), as well as other thematic and specific evaluations, and is a member of the UNEG (UN Evaluation Group). However at the country level, many programmes are actually evaluated through the commissioning of what is called “Decentralized evaluations”, whereby the Country Office is in charge of the management of the evaluation. A study is currently being undertaken by a private consulting firm on behalf of the UNDP EO regarding the commissioning of decentralized evaluations. However based on previous UNDP experience and a recent EO evaluation (see footnote), the quality and usefulness of decentralized evaluations is generally quite weak, something that does not contribute to CO’s commitment to developing evaluations.

There are several challenges to having a good M&E system in country offices. Some of these are:

1. Lack of proper M&E skills or dedicated M&E specialists in the office
2. Skills of the evaluators and quality of the evaluation reports
3. Lack of buy-in from senior management and unclear understanding of the value of RBM and M&E linked to the weak quality of evaluations mentioned under point 2.[[41]](#footnote-42)
4. Understanding the value of being able to report on results, and not just on activities and outputs
5. Costs and complexity of setting up a proper M&E system, including a good Management Information System (ATLAS cannot be the database for M&E given its design limitations), to inform programme management on performance and results, particularly at the outcome level. The costs associated vary but it is recommended to invest from 3% to 7% of the programme budget for setting up a full-fledged M&E system (inclusive of the external evaluations)
6. Evaluations tend to be under-budgeted and seen as an expenditure, rather than as an investment in RBM and a support to management decision making. UNDP uses a weighing system of 70% qualification and 30% for costs in the selection of its evaluators based on their financial proposals, something that undoubtedly leads to hiring the least costly evaluator – but not necessarily the one best suited for the job.
7. Lack of dedicated funding for M&E, normally project based

The findings under this thematic LER evaluation indicate that M&E systems have repeatedly been mentioned as a weak point for UNDP. Each country note details the weaknesses that were found –particularly for those countries subject to a field mission-, but the overall finding is that M&E at CO level does not feed into the management decision-making process and is not based on RBM principles, something reflected in a number of external evaluations of LER interventions (e.g. Nepal, Somalia, Yemen).

UNDP objectives

UNDP has traditionally been reporting on activities and outputs, meaning that information is available on what takes places and what UNDP does, and the immediate results of what is does. However the shift towards looking at higher level of results, at the outcome level, is relatively recent. Normally UNDP impact evaluations are not done through the country offices because they require more means and can be very complex. However UNDP has been moving towards Outcome evaluations at the country office level. UNDP defines an outcome-level result as “the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups”.[[42]](#footnote-43)

The challenge here is to be able to report on something that requires a wider unit of analysis than simply UNDP funded interventions. Because UNDP interventions are not the only factor involved, it is much more difficult to appraise and impossible to create attribution (e.g. defining how much UNDP is actually responsible for the change). Several evaluations techniques have tried to address the problem of attribution at the outcome level (for example the Most Significant Change approach, contribution analysis, outcome mapping, etc. are all tools that take into consideration the impossibility of measuring the attribution to an outcome), hence the wording used by UNDP to “contribute to the outcome” and not to “achieve the outcome”. As a multi-factor and multi-level analysis is required to understand outcome-level results, there is a particular need to frame the unit of analysis and look beyond UNDP interventions (including those of the government, of other UN agencies, of donors, of NGOs, and of all development actors) to having an global understanding of the issues.

The documentary review indicated that only 4 outcome evaluations concerning LER interventions were commissioned in the twelve countries included in the cluster thematic evaluation.[[43]](#footnote-44) Although more evaluations (mid-term and final project evaluations) were commissioned by country offices, it is telling that only 4 evaluations targeted directly the outcome level.

As the United Nations have declared 2015 as the International Year of Evaluation, it is important that UNDP is able to address some of the challenges mentioned above in order to develop its M&E capacity.

The challenges are however not limited to evaluation, but also relate to monitoring. Normally evaluations rely on the monitoring data, which contributes to inform the evaluation process. But monitoring has largely been done as a compliance system to ensure that activities and outputs are taking place (e.g. deliverables, training), but without looking to inform about the wider changes brought about by the intervention. Monitoring regularly looks at the performance through a narrow window, and this evaluation has not seen any evidence of outcome level monitoring in the field countries that were visited.

The critical challenge is for UNDP to be able to document, inform and report on the objectives that it has set for itself under each intervention. It is difficult to communicate to donors and other partners what has been achieved without having a clear idea of what are the objectives that must be met. In order to do so UNDP needs to prepare what is called a Results Framework. This is not systematically done (particularly where there are no project documents) and therefore makes communication and reporting on results more difficult.

Conceptually the Results Framework (normally based on a logical framework approach) is meant to define the hierarchy of results in support of what UNDP tends to call its “development objective”. In LER interventions the objective is generally associated with the outcome statements of the CPD, CPAP and to the programme document, depending on the type of intervention. However a number of external evaluations have indicated the lack of “a clear vision” or manner in which results can be appraised. This is further often supported by the lack of initial targets for the components of the interventions. As mentioned in one evaluation report, “technically it means that managers knew what to shoot at, but not what to aim for!”

Targets are generally defined at the activity and output levels, but not for outcomes or objectives. This is where results become a question of interpretation by the evaluator, since there is no defined target: Is the figure of 50% of beneficiaries able to continue income generating activities after receiving training a success? In the absence of benchmarks, it is not possible to appraise this result. In one context 50% may be very good, but conversely it can be a very low result in other situations. As mentioned in the previous section about the complexity level of the UNDP interventions, only with an in-depth knowledge of the situation where the intervention takes take can UNDP determine its benchmarks for success.

It is important to be able to appraise success for various reasons:

1. Because it you don’t know what success is like, you won’t know when you’ve found it
2. Because it you don’t find success, you can’t report on it
3. If you don’t report on it, you won’t be able to communicate what you did well
4. If you don’t communicate achievements, it will be more difficult to obtain support and funds
5. In addition, achieving benchmarks allows to think about scalability, and the hand-over or disengagement from a given intervention.

In order to prepare a Results Framework, it is common practice to establish a **baseline** of the situation, in order to be able to compare the situation at the beginning of an intervention with that at the end. It should be mentioned that UNDP does not usually commission baseline surveys, and that projects documents tend to minimize the existing capacities and assume that the intervention largely starts from scratch, which is a flawed reflection of the reality based on insufficient knowledge of the situation. Developing a baseline takes time and some resources, and project managers might be keener in obtaining funding for the interventions than about making in-depth assessments. Normally UNDP takes for granted that it knows the situation in the country and area, but this is often an unverified assumption.

In addition to the needs for identifying applicable indicators at the various levels of the results framework, there is also a need to define **outcome and objectives statements in an evaluative manner.** Again a number of evaluations underline the lack of clear operational definitions that eventually lead to interpretation and sometimes disagreement over the interpretation. Note that the use of adjectives (increased, enhanced, improved, etc.) should be linked to a baseline indicator and be something that can be measured. Some outcome statements are simply too broad to be used for evaluation purposes, and much less for programme management, to be applicable. The statement: “increased capacity of the crisis-affected population to generate income” for example, is not self-explanatory. Who is the crisis affected population, how is it defined, and where is it located? Are there other population in need not affected by the crisis? How does their exclusion from the programme affect results? Are all of the crisis affected population going to benefit from the intervention?

Regarding income generation, what sort of results are sought? Is obtaining one USD per day considered as “income generation” and therefore a success? Are there any thresholds for success? Regarding the “increased capacity” for income generation, what is it based on? Skills development, amounts of income earned, networking, etc. or a combination of all factors that affect income generation?

It is therefore important that the statements that are in the UNDP programming documents be guiding principles to commit UNDP to the expected results, instead of being at times used as basic aspirations but that do not tie UNDP to its achievement (since after all, UNDP is not the only one responsible for the outcome or the impact generated).

A culture of M&E needs to be built in the COs on the understanding that a proper M&E system is a valuable tool that not only informs senior management but is able to actually provide evidence that UNDP is achieving its objectives. A constructive approach entails the formal training of UNDP staff from all programmes on RBM and M&E, including senior managers, so that M&E becomes an investment into demonstrating proper programme management and results, rather than just simply an expenditure.

Such an approach is already in use in some regions, notably in the evaluation area of the Panama Regional Service Centre, which has been providing RBM and M&E training in the region not only to UNDP staff, but also to government counterparts, in various countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

To create a culture within UNDP where M&E is an asset and evaluation reports become tools for informing decision making, a shift must be made in the mind-set of the staff and it is important to be able to show that evaluations can and are actually used to inform management decision-making.

UNDP does not invest into decentralised ex post evaluations – or ex post monitoring - so that it is not equipped to appraise the sustainability of its interventions after they have been completed – or be able to evaluate resilience, that can only factually be appraised after a new crisis has affected the target group.

#### ***Mechanisms and partnerships***

Given that UNDP is involved in very complex programming often in difficult and fragile situations in (post-) crisis countries, the LER interventions need to be grounded on appropriate mechanisms and partnerships to support efforts to implement the programmes.

In order to do so, UNDP needs to be much better at communicating its strategy and its approach. UNDP has shown to possess highly relevant programmes to address the needs of the country, but is fails to communicate its achievements and generally has poor reporting capacity that focuses on narrative reports of activities and outputs. UNDP needs to link its M&E system with the communication unit/staff so that there is clear streamlining of information within the organisation that can be used for external and internal communication.

A number of the countries under the thematic cluster review (though not all) are still working cloistered in their own projects, without internal communication or using synergies across the projects and interventions. It is necessary for all country offices to have a mechanism that contributes to diffusing the learning and synergies from one intervention across the different programmes in the country. This normally is based on knowledge management capacity of the country offices. To create a mechanism for internal knowledge transfer can contribute to better synergies being exploited, but most importantly, it is necessary to ensure that the collective learning is embedded into the intervention design and the development of a results framework and M&E plan.

As mentioned earlier in this report, the high level of complexity of UNDP programmes means that UNDP should not and is not the only one responsible for the result it achieves. A strong element that can contribute to the achievement of results is a sound partnership strategy. While in some cases the mere fact to receive funds from UNDP is enough to consider the grantee as “partner”, the concept of partnership in LER interventions is expected to go much beyond this view. UNDP should be able to bring its partners about a common vision and a complementary framework for collaboration that transcends agencies’ mandates and is conducive to the achievement of the outcomes. As the UN agency with a development mandate, UNDP should strive, with support from the Resident Coordinator, to achieve a consensus with its sister agencies and seek to develop integrated interventions frameworks based on holistic programmes composed of various agencies projects, but linked together into a common results framework at the outcome levels. Experiences in Joint Programmes have yielded vastly different results but it has certainly been recognized that this modality requires extra effort and time as it has not been the common format for project implementation in the UN[[44]](#footnote-45). With the UN reform, it is expected that higher levels of synergies may be leveraged from the various actors. The support and commitment from the Resident Coordinator is a key factor to create enabling conditions for successful joint programmes.

Partnerships are not limited to other UN agencies. UNDP also relies on the capacity and experience of NGOs to actually implement a good number of its interventions (in some cases, such as in Somalia, the intervention design is even done by the NGO). Therefore it is critical to map out the capacities upon which the partnerships are being developed. It should also apply to the programme performance, and particularly in a shared strategy for M&E so that the partners are able to supply the necessary data and information to inform performance.

Partnerships are sometimes developed with government agencies or department. Here again, there are synergies that can be exploited, provided UNDP is able to clearly communicate what it seeks to achieve through its LER interventions at the community level, and that provides a basis for informing policy that can directly address the challenges identified in the LER interventions and provides clear linkages towards results.

A sound review of UNDP’s partnership strategy might allow to leverage untapped capacities amongst the local actors and complete some components that UNDP does not have the skill set, the technical knowledge or capacities to implement.

# **7. Conclusions**

UNDP has shown that the LER interventions are highly relevant to the context in all countries covered by the thematic cluster evaluation but one. This means that the LER interventions are responding to identified needs. However the importance given to LER interventions varies from country to country. In some cases it has been used as an entry point for integrated programming (Burundi, Nepal, Yemen) while in others do not seem to have a holistic approach to UNDP’s LER programming.

Programming performance is globally slightly above average, indicating that UNDP could do more to enhance its programming performance. Within this criterion, specific gaps and needs have been identified as regards to targeting, M&E, time-frame for implementation and difficulty of capturing and communicating results.

The effectiveness of UNDP programming is globally close to a good rating, indicating that UNDP is better at achieving its objectives than at the individual performance of its interventions. This is likely due to the fact that despite having a somewhat lower performance ratings, the interventions are being effective in achieving their objectives.

Despite all LER programmes addressing the issue of sustainability, UNDP is barely able to collectively reach a just-above average rating, with two countries clearly under average. Not a single country has achieved a high sustainability rating, indicating that the situation is not yet at a stage of sustainability, either because a) the recent implementation of the interventions are still on-going and are not yet complete; and/or b) because these interventions are not able, by themselves, to contribute to sustainability. As discussed in section 5. Analysis, it is also important to be specific about what sustainability means in the context of each interventions, as the standard definition of this evaluation criterion is incomplete and does not provide an operationally applicable standard that can be applied across countries. In addition many of the interventions were being implemented to respond to a crisis, many of which are cyclical.

After reviewing the perceived importance of the LER interventions, their approaches, strengths and strategies, it appears clearly to the authors of this thematic evaluation that the LER interventions are highly valuable as entry points to address unstable situations in early recovery contexts. While it is necessary to communicate clearly in the vision and the objectives and approach of the LER interventions, both to obtain better and stronger partnerships but also to inform better the funding base of UNDP, the collective LER interventions have contributed to ***hundreds of thousands of jobs/livelihoods***, with the participation of women and other vulnerable groups. These interventions have also ***significantly developed the capacity of income generation of its target population in a number of countries covered***by this evaluation e.g. Burundi and Myanmar. UNDP has, in some cases, also been ***instrumental in closing the gap between the communities and the micro-finance sector***, by including the linkages and direct support to the target groups to access micro-finance. A number of interventions also contributed to ***develop national and local capacities both of government and national partner institutions,*** a necessary precondition to contribute to sustainability of the benefits.

Despite its efforts however, UNDP’s pending signature is ***to be able to develop LER interventions that are sustainable***. The early evidence in this evaluation suggests that LER interventions by themselves, despites following guidance of the 2009 UN policy on post-crisis employment creation, are not able to create sustainability conditions on their own. The lack of an operational application of the policy also means that UNDP is often alone in trying to achieve sustainable livelihoods interventions with one year project timeframes, low funding and lack of requisite (livelihoods) capacities in some UNDP COs. The evaluation questions the feasibility for sustainability as the short time-frame that characterizes the ER interventions, with most interventions being undertaken under one year (for tracks A and B), is insufficient to generate the conditions for sustainability. The UNDP LER Community of Practice in Addis Ababa in November 2013 and a UNDP regional workshop in Bujumbura in February 2014 pointed out some of the shortfalls and limitations of the current approach and the need to move towards a longer-term programming modality that truly creates sustainability – that of local economic development programmes – akin to linking Outcome 6 and Outcome 1 of the UNDP Strategic Plan, right from the start of the LER programming.

There remains room for improvement in programming LER interventions, but most importantly, UNDP has to be clear on what it seeks to achieve with every intervention in every country. Most outcome statements are overly ambitious and are not achievable over a short time frame. If UNDP is committed to achieving sustainability in LER programming, it must make the linkages and implement LER interventions alongside of long-term, economic development programmes that are able to build on the foundations laid out during the ER phase based on national programmes. UNDP’s three track approach to LER gives a good direction if fully put into practice at UNDP Country Offices’ level.

# **Recommendations**

Depending on the importance that UNDP wants to give to LER programming in the future, several options are available to improve programming efficiency and effectiveness. Although the focus is on LER interventions, it appears that these recommendations could also be useful across a range of UNDP’s areas of involvements. The objective of these recommendations is to contribute to better, more effective and efficient programming that is able to achieve to the expected results – and knowing why such results are achieved:

1. Scaling up LER interventions: UNDP should definitely upscale LER interventions in post-conflict and post-disaster settings as they address the root causes of conflict, violence and exclusion. LER interventions are an excellent entry point, but need to be properly designed, implemented and ideally should be financially supported over a three to five-year time-frame. This requires that UNDP COs are able to leverage donor funding over the long-term to actually be able to reach its stated objectives, rather than focusing on “pilot” projects or “catalytic” interventions that have to be done in a short-time frame but do not allow to reach the critical mass required to make the benefits sustainable. Use of the Guide on Livelihoods and the Signature products as ONE package is an option to consider, and not as discrete or standalone interventions.
2. LER funding strategy: At corporate level a specific LER funding strategy should be discussed with donors in order to design, implement and evaluate selected full three to five-year LER programmes (depending on crisis contexts) covering all the components of LER including the hardware and software, with in-depth livelihoods and economic recovery assessment and sociological understanding of the communities and a baseline to appraise results – including an ex post evaluation.
3. Capacity onn LER in UNDP COs: In those countries where there is no LER specialist and little LER programmatic experience (e.g. Liberia), provide consistent support from HQ or Regional Centres to the country office to better understand and address LER programming, including training opportunity on UNDP and other relevant policy and programming tools; the development of the Community of Practice on LER, the LER Guide and the LER signature products are all efforts that feed into better awareness and understanding of LER interventions.
4. Provision of proper training in RBM and M&E to the UNDP staff – including senior management- in order to enhance the M&E system as well as the use and quality of evaluations; Provide training to programme managers in managing evaluations, or request support from the Regional UNDP Bureaus with a more pro-active support and advice on evaluation management.
5. Results orientated programme frameworks: Focus on developing a results framework that explains clearly the terms, concepts, and provides both operational definitions and benchmarks for success. These can be expressed as a range in situations where the actual target is difficult to appraise (e.g. 70 to 80% of beneficiaries).
6. Development or commissioning of a baseline survey for interventions, that follows a more informed analysis of the target groups and/or communities as mentioned in the analysis above. The LER Group should develop a user friendly guide on livelihoods and economic recovery assessment, and ensure its use by COs in programming for LER interventions.
7. Provision of training to UNDP staff and programme managers not only on conflict/disaster sensitivity, but on conflict dynamics /trends in disasters and conflict transformation /disaster risk management. Working in conflict/disaster environments doesn’t turn staff in conflict/disaster experts. PCNA/PDNA are an entry point, but may not be sufficient to address all the dimensions of the crisis programming.
8. Improved partnerships for LER programming: Improve the partnerships and seek more synergies and complementarities with partners, be they government, UN agencies or NGOs, around a common vision and approach for the complex programmes that deal with integrated approaches to community recovery – and particularly addressing the links with longer-term sustainability.
9. Design programmes in line with funding expectations: Adopt a less ambitious and more realistic intervention design to LER programming. In some cases, there are too many components not all of which are funded, being achieved and adequately coordinated, such as in Georgia and Somalia.
10. Linking with UNCDF on microfinance: Wherever possible, provide support and linkages with the MFIs in the country working closely with UNCDF.
11. Macro-micro linkages: Use the LER interventions as a basis to support *specific policies* that address the same objectives as the LER interventions, so there is a clear example to see how policies contribute to achieving the objectives on the ground. The Three Track approach if operationalised across countries can achieve this objective.
12. As the new Strategic Plan 2014-2017 is just being disseminated to the Country Offices, it may be useful for the next SP to be piloted in five to ten countries. There are issues regarding aggregation at the corporate level that need to be addressed (for example, youths have different age groups according to countries, and how does UNDP count a 28 year-old woman? As youth or as woman, or as both?). The new SP provides particular and detailed M&E guidance for LER interventions, particularly through Outcome 6, but it could be useful to have a roll-out strategy of the SP to leverage buy-in from country offices – as the evidence collected from this evaluation indicates that the previous SP 2008-2011 did not have much buy-in from UNDP country offices. A possible strategy for the new SP is to concentrate on those countries that have linked their CPDs to outcome 6.

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1. The DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD (1991), Glossary of Terms Used in Evaluation, in 'Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation', OECD (1986), and the Glossary of Evaluation and Results Based Management (RBM) Terms, OECD (2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. final evaluation of ALIR [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. according to the final Evaluation report of HUS-CO [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Lebanese American University (2011):” UNDP and the Reconstruction of Beirut Southern Suburbs following the July 2006 Was: Aims and Achievements” by Layal Abu Darwich [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. UNDP Sri Lanka: “MTR of Outcome 7” (2011) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. The mid-term evaluation of the YEEP programme [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. final evaluation of ALIR [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. According to “UNDP CPAP Outcome Evaluation for the Outcome “Effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery” (2012) report [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. http://www.socialwatch.org/node/12091 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. ibid and EU/UNDP/USAID/Government of Sweden (2013):” Final Evaluation of the Impact of the

    Economic Rehabilitation and Confidence Building in Abkhazia (ERCBA) and the Abkhazia Community Revitalization (ACR) Projects” [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. At the same time no comprehensive conflict assessment was or is being carried out as part of the needs assessment, and the goals are at times overly ambitious, exceeding the capacities of the local actors, e.g. in the case of the LGED-JP [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Lebanese American University (2011):” UNDP and the Reconstruction of Beirut Southern Suburbs following the July 2006 Was: Aims and Achievements” by Layal Abu Darwich [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. The mid-term evaluation of the YEEP programme [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. According to “MTR of Outcome 7” [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. MDGF (2012):”Final Evaluation: Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon”, by Carlos Carravilla and Nasser Yassin [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. UNDP Georgia (2009): “External Project Evaluation of Abkhazia Livelihood Improvement and Recovery (ALIR) Programme” [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. COWI (2012):’ UNDP Portfolio review for UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

    Final Report: February 2012)” [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. The mid-term evaluation in Yemen on the contrary recommended UNDP to move from a sequential to incremental implementation in the following manner: UNDP should “redesign the current implementation approach from sequential to incremental to improve the project’s efficiency and effectiveness: this means that the implementation of the project should be broken down into several semi-concurrent “streams” that are implemented incrementally. The basic idea behind this method is to implement the 3x6 approach in repeated cycles (iterative) and in smaller portions of youth at a time (incremental), allowing staff members and M&E officers to take advantage of what was learned during development of earlier 3x6 streams of the project as well as reducing the overall cost of the implementation per stream, which will reduce the cost per capita. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Final evaluation of the Employment Generation for Early Recovery (EGER) and Area Based Early Recovery ABER) projects, Ada Consultants, Quebec [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. MDGF (2012):”Final Evaluation: Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in North Lebanon”, by Carlos Carravilla and Nasser Yassin [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. UNDP Lebanon website: Support to the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee, currently in its third phase, 2013-2014, starting in 2009; Towards Sustainable Solutions for Improved Living Conditions of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon (2011-2014); Improving Living Conditions in Palestinian Gatherings Host Communities (2013- 2014); Addressing Urban Hot Spots in Lebanon (2013-2014); Coordinated support to UNRWA in response to the Nahr El Bared Crisis (2009-2013); Strengthening Civil Peace in Lebanon (2011-2013); Flood and Water Management for Livelihood Recovery in Baalback-Hermel (LRF); 2007-2011; Support to economic recovery, community security and social cohesion in Lebanese communities affected by the Syrian Crisis (2013-2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. according to the Final Evaluation of ALIR, [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Lebanese American University (2011):” UNDP and the Reconstruction of Beirut Southern Suburbs followin the July 2006 Was: Aims and Achievements” by Layal Abu Darwich [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. There are three projects in Northern Kenya (1. Japan-funded recovery programme; 2. Human Security Trust Fund-funded host community programme; 3. Kenya Drought Response project funded by BCPR). Cash for work for rehabilitation of water harvesting infrastructure with a focus on women and youth is included in all the three projects. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. was commissioned for the various programs funded under the Peace-building Fund (PBF), Irish Aid, and the Government of Norway [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Average increase in income also hides the variation of the impact within a project. A number of projects had a more inconsistent impact on its beneficiaries. As expected, this was especially the case for projects working in urban environments and those projects targeting high-risk youth. Rural projects had a more consistent impact. These results also do not take into account the different investment levels per beneficiary for each project. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. According to “*UNDP CPAP Outcome Evaluation for the Outcome “Effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery*” (2012) report, [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. according to “UNDP CPAP Outcome Evaluation for the Outcome “Effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery” (2012) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. GoL/UNDG/UNDP (2012):” Fifth Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Lebanon Recovery Fund Report of the Administrative Agent of the Lebanon Recovery Fund for the period 1 January – 31 December 2011” [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. “UNDP CPAP Outcome Evaluation for the Outcome “Effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery” (2012) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. of Youth employment programs administered by UNDP/GoSL and funded by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), Irish Aid, and the Government of Norway [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. According to “Mid Term Review of the UN Joint Vision for Sierra Leone 2009-2010” [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. According to “Consolidated Report on Projects Implemented under the Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund” (2013) report, [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. University of York (2010):”Field Study Report: An Evaluation of the Reconstruction in Southern Lebanon, Following the July War in 2006” [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Borrowed from DFID’s “The sustainable livelihoods distance learning guide”, 1999 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. Phil Bartle, article on http://cec.vcn.bc.ca/cmp/whatcom.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Interestingly UNDP did not have a corporate definition of resilience until April 2014 when a position paper “Building resilience for sustainable human development” was prepared by UNDP, with the following concept “Building resilience is a transformative process of strengthening the capacity of men, women communities, institutions, and countries to anticipate, prevent, recover from, and transform in the aftermath of shocks, stresses, and change”. However this gives a conceptual definition, but limited guidance as to how to operationalise such a concept in programme implementation, and much less on how to evaluate the levels of resilience – something no doubt extremely challenging, if at all possible, that would normally require an ex post evaluation to appraise [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Panter-Brick, Ager, Anna, Yale University, 2013, policy brief, http://www.yale.edu/anthro/anthropology/Catherine\_Panter-Brick\_files/Resilience\_Policy%20Brief\_Ager,%20Annan%20%26%20Panter-Brick\_Final.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. UNDP Resilience-based development approach to the Syria Crisis, December 2013, foreword [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/ [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. UNDP Evaluation Office evaluation report of the SP 2008-2013, May 2013. A main finding of that evaluation is that “Finding 15. The system of decentralized evaluation is not working well, and while steps have been taken to improve overall utilization of evaluation, it is not as high as it could be. There were a total of nearly 1,300 UNDP decentralized evaluations (including UNDAF evaluations) uploaded onto the Evaluation Resources Centre between 2008 and 2012, which means an average of approximately 9 per country office over the five-year period. Coverage by decentralized evaluations between 2008 and 2012 across the four focus areas has been quite even. Decentralized evaluation by programme units remains weak, and of all decentralized evaluations that were assessed in 2012 only 30 percent rated in the satisfactory or highly satisfactory categories (a large increase from 20 percent the previous year). UNDP management has made important efforts since the start of the Strategic Plan to increase utilization of evaluation”. A similar finding was made by the UNDP RSLAC in Panama. The low quality of decentralised evaluations are not only the reflection of the poor skills and credential of evaluators, but also depend on the budgetary allocation for an evaluation and the quality of the Terms of Reference – often also excessively ambitious and not dimensioned to the budget and time-frame for the evaluation [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. October 2013 Haiti Evaluation of the Outcome “improvement of living conditions of populations vulnerable to crises” 2010-2012, November 2009 Outcome/impact assessment of UNDP support for recovery of cyclone Nargis affected rural communities, 2011 Nepal Livelihoods Outcome evaluation, 2012 Kenya UNDP CPAP Outcome evaluation for the outcome “effectiveness of Emergency Response and Early Recovery” [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. See for example the evaluations reports of the MDG-Fund, with 130 joint programmes across 50 countries and eight thematic funding windows [↑](#footnote-ref-45)