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**Evaluation of UNDP Reintegration**

**Programs**

Volume I

Final Evaluation Report

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*This report represents the views and opinions of the authors only; it does not represent official UNDP positions or policy*

February 2013

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List of Acronyms

ADDR Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réintégration

ADF Allied Democratic Force

APPK Employment Promotion Agency in Kosovo

AU DDR CP African Union DDR Capacity Programme

AVR Armed Violence Reduction

BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

BNUB Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi

CAR Central African Republic

CBR Community-based Reintegration

CBRSP Community-based Reintegration and Security Project

CO Country Office

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPR Crisis Prevention and Recovery

CPT Conflict Prevention Team

CRIMS Comprehensive Rehabilitation Information Management System

CRRP Community, Recovery and Reintegration Programme

CRS Community Reconstruction Service

CSAC Community Security and Arms Control

CSP Community Security Programme

CVR Community Violence Reduction

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DDRCP DDR Capacity Program

DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration

DfID Department for International Development (UK)

DPA Department of Political Affairs

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda

FNL Front National de Libération

GBV Gender-based Violence

HC Humanitarian Coordinator

HQ Headquarters

IAWG Inter-Agency Working Group

IDDRS Integrated DDR Standards

IDDRU Integrated DDR Unit

IGA Income Generating Activities

ILO International Labour Organization

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

KPC Kosovo Protection Corps

KPC RP Kosovo Protection Corps Resettlement Programme

LRA Lord’s Resistance Army

LRG Livelihood and Economic Recovery Group

MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

MDI Mobilization, Disarmament and Inclusion into Society

MDTF Multi-Donors Trust Funds

MINUSTAH Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti

MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCDDR National Commission on DDR

NGO Non Governmental Organization

NRC Norwegian Refugees Council

NY New York

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office

PBF Peacebuilding Fund

PNDDR Programme National de Désarmements, Démobilisation et Réintegration

PPD Policy and Planning Division

RC Regional Coordinator

SC Security Council

SDDRP Sudan DDR Programme

SNG Special Needs Group

SPM Special Political Mission

SSR Security Sector Reform

TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program

ToR Terms of Reference

UN United Nations

UNAMID United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

UNIRP United Nations Interagency Rehabilitation Programme

UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal

UNOCI United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire

UNPKN United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal

UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

VMLR Verified Minors and Late Recruits

WB World Bank

YAR Youth at Risk

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**Executive Summary**

The United Nations (UN) has supported national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts since 1991. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has taken the lead on disarmament and demobilization, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has focused on reintegration support in contexts with and without UN peacekeeping and political missions. In 2010, the Secretary General estimated that UNDP was supporting programs in twenty-two countries and territories. In the same year the Policy Committee reviewed DDR arrangements within the UN system leading to the decision that UNDP should support institutional coherence for UN approaches to DDR. UNDP was directly charged with actions to ensure reintegration efforts were aligned with peace, recovery and development programming[[1]](#footnote-1).

When UNDP first engaged in DDR programming in Central America and Southern Africa, caseloads were well defined with a clear eligibility criteria and methods for vetting and verification. In more recent history conflict dynamics have changed considerably, and new and emergent caseloads now present a clear challenge to ‘classic’ DDR. More importantly, the reintegration of ex-combatants has become an increasingly complex and a sensitive issue. Recognizing these trends, UNDP decided to commission a study to examine the way forward for the reintegration of ex-combatants either with or without DDR.

The purpose of the study was to identify appropriate reintegration strategies and operation approaches providing recommendations on how to strengthen UNDP reintegration programs; keeping in mind that DDR is not seen as an end in itself but as a component of much larger recovery and peacebuilding strategy with a focus on national and community stabilization. The commissioned study, which took place from September 2012 to February 2013, evaluated selected UNDP reintegration programs.

The evaluation consisted of a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data collection from eight country cases, all of which had or currently have DDR projects or had DDR written into UN mission mandates: Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kosovo, Nepal, Somalia, and Sudan. The objective of each country study was to generate findings that underpin the appropriateness of modern approaches to reintegrate ex-combatants. In addition to an extensive literature review, the evaluation team undertook five field missions to the DRC, Nepal, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan (North), and Somalia (from Nairobi). The evaluation was limited by time constraints in each country and lack of access to certain beneficiaries, stakeholders, and government officials. Moreover, some of the literature provided by the UNDP for the desk review lacked consistency, reporting format, systematization, and availability.

The results of the evaluation are divided in two parts. The first volume (I) presents the main findings and recommendations of the evaluation team, while the second volume (II) presents the conclusions and findings of the eight country studies that were conducted. The main findings included in Volume I of the evaluation fall into three broad categories: Agency Function & Role, Coordination & Partnerships, and Reintegration Approaches. From these findings the team produced a list of lessons learned, best practices, and recommendations.

**The following summarizes the findings:**

**Agency Function & Role:** Improving DDR operations depends on a concerted institutional effort to support and implement robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Literature review and field visits uncovered deficiencies in this regard. Several factors have contributed to insufficient M&E. The first factor regards the complex multi-institutional landscape that UNDP DDR initiatives operate within. In most cases, UNDP has occupied a parallel or secondary role in DDR. This landscape makes it difficult to measure success and failure, because parameters of UNDP reintegration contributions are not clearly defined. It also complicates decisions on how priorities and needs for countries with DDR programs are determined; without clearly defined objectives, evaluations cannot be properly conducted. The evaluation team recommends that the UNDP coordinate with other agencies to collectively identify clear objectives and indicators relevant to a multi-institutional setting.

The second factor regards the robustness of UNDP M&E mechanisms in the field. Sound and reliable M&E tools; such as high-functioning databases, support effective and well-informed reintegration strategies and allow DDR programs to preserve institutional memory and to conduct in-depth assessments. However, UNDP has faced challenges in setting up and effectively running M&E systems and units, which has affected its ability to identify best practices and present clear progress to donors. M&E also supports conflict-sensitivity mainstreaming, which is required to ensure that reintegration initiatives are enshrined in a comprehensive understanding of local security and political dynamics, and which this study found lacking in some DDR project designs and implementation. The UNIRP Program in Nepal, which produced a systematic tracking system, is an illustration of an exemplary and systematic approach to M & E providing a possible way forward in regards to improving M&E and conflict analysis in the field.

**Coordination & Partnerships:** The evaluation team found that certain interagency coordination efforts optimized DDR program results, but not in all cases. In the spirit of “UN Delivering as One,” the DPKO and the UNDP set up a Structurally Integrated DDR Units under a single managerial structure in Haiti and Sudan. In both cases, this structural integration proved inefficient, and, in the case of Sudan, contributed to delays in the implementation of joint programming. In addition to each agency’s distinct political objectives and priorities, clashing organizational cultures and administrative, financial, and program-planning policies and mandates were all factors that complicated structural integration. In the end, these units were not nimble enough to efficiently respond to challenges in the field.

Conversely, in situations where interagency coordination was not integrated under the same managerial structure - as seen in Nepal (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, ILO) and to some extent Somalia (UNDP, ILO, UNICEF) and Côte d’Ivoire (DPKO, UNDP, UNOCI) - and when well-coordinated both at the political and the programmatic level by the UNDP and/or other UN partners, reintegration initiatives managed to capture the comparative advantages of multiple UN agencies through more programmatic and informal cooperative mechanisms. Evidence from the study suggests that non-structural integration with clear lines of “control and command,” shared and jointly planned expertise and resources, and a common political vision are a more productive interagency approach to DDR than structural reintegration.

While partnerships with national DDR commissions and community-level stakeholders can raise capacity and bring a sense of ownership to DDR benefactors, the low capacity of the partners can cause delays in implementation; partnerships can be operationally poor and even antagonistic. Local actors often lack the competencies to undertake complex reintegration tasks, and national partnerships can be administratively cumbersome and ineffective. The apex of UN coordination on DDR is through the IAWG, which brings together 22 entities as major contributors, and stakeholders to the DDR process. As a result of the foundational policy guidelines enshrined in the IDDRS, the IAWG was promulgated in 2005. The far reaching extend of the IAWG could marshal its considerable capacities to tackle difficult reintegration issues.

Nevertheless, in several cases, an emphasis on community involvement and ownership directly contributed to DDR program initiative reintegration successes. They benefitted from a better ability to identify the needs and priorities of the benefactors, improved social cohesion in communities, and reduced the risk of ex-combatants re-engaging in conflict. In Haiti and the DRC, the UNDP and DPKO took separate paths, overlooking the visions and concerns of national DDR commissions, which limited overall success. This study confirms that, despite common drawbacks, a more collaborative and community-based approach to DDR has potential to improve programming and contribute to the broader and longer-term recovery and peacebuilding strategy.

**Reintegration Approaches:** This study evaluated a number of new approaches to reintegration, many of which emerged from innovative responses to increasingly complex conflict environments. They include community-based reintegration (CBR) approaches such as innovative savings schemes, customized assistance, and community security initiatives. Although the 2000’s have clearly seen a focus on the “one size fits all” approach to individual reintegration, such as during the early stages of the Great Lakes reintegration initiatives, there are a number of cases where CBR approaches were successfully implemented. Field visits, in particular those in Burundi and in the later stages of DRC, quickly led to the conclusion that inclusive and well-articulated CBR initiatives result in sustainable social and economic benefits to ex-combatants and communities reinforcing the reintegration process. However, piloting these new initiatives in difficult, low-capacity environments has been challenging and some aspects are not always successful.

In some cases ‘classic’ DDR is still relevant, as shown in Kosovo and Nepal where programs dealt with very specific and well-targeted populations in a favorable political environment. In some cases, a constructive balance was found between community-based and individual approaches, such as the Community-Based Reintegration and Security Project (CBRSP) in Sudan. The Community Recovery and Reintegration Programme (CRRP) initiative in Eastern Congo was orientated in this direction, although the political and security environment were not as favorable as in Sudan.

New programs have also targeted women and Special Needs Groups (SNGs) with comprehensive reintegration programs. A gender-specific strategy in Nepal proved to be very successful quantitatively and qualitatively. However, women still face a multitude of issues related to gender and reintegration and there remains an overall lack of knowledge and skills for mainstreaming gender in DDR programs. The evaluation team also identified a need to focus programmatic efforts on vulnerable members of security forces (elderly, handicapped, mentally ill, and widows) and on psychosocial support for ex-combatants.

And finally, the evaluation team observed that, while the cost dedicated to reintegration is pegged to an average global standard, defining the appropriate unit cost for the reintegration of one ex-combatant depends on a much wider array of national, regional, and local factors and on indicators that can be interrelated or conflicting. These factors are not taken into account when estimating reintegration costs for DDR, making it difficult to create a standard per capita analysis.

**Based on the findings, the evaluation team identified the** **following lessons and best practices**:

* Measurement and review of reintegration initiatives depends on the quality of impact-monitoring and assessment mechanisms.
* Mainstreaming conflict analysis in DDR facilitates sensitive programming and implementation in difficult political contexts.
* Interagency cooperation in reintegration processes gathers the comparative advantages, expertise, and added value of each particular UN agency.
* An emphasis on community involvement, local ownership and ex-combatants personal investment in the projects can help contribute to the success of reintegration programs.
* Targeted gender-specific support increases the ratios of women participating in reintegration processes.
* Customized assistance in the last sequences of a reintegration process has a key impact on sustainability of individuals and associated groups.
* An ideal DDR design considers a mix of individually focused reinsertion/reintegration initiatives and community-based initiatives.
* Community Security Structures; these initiatives are not a replacement for traditional DDR but an alternative, complementary, or follow up of a DDR program.
* The success of community-recovery initiatives depends in part on the proportions of ex-combatants per capita.
* A relevant and successful training program is based on employment-market opportunity mapping and assessment.
* Training is not reintegration in itself; it is a means to support an overall reintegration process.

**In addition to lessons and best practices, the evaluation team recommends the following:**

* Conflict/risk analysis and development of alternative and complementary approaches need to be reinforced.
* Following an initial conflict and risk analysis, UNDP should question whether it wants to engage in situations where basic stability, peace, and political conditions are not in place; decision-making on “grey” cases should rely on internal and external oversight.
* UNDP BCPR should develop a sound and strategic Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in order to track, study, and disseminate reintegration lessons, practices, and operational models.
* An increased effort in UNDP BCPR knowledge management (M&E, Research, and Promotion/Dissemination) should favor the development of standard operating reintegration models in “non-standard” approaches.
* UNDP CO should synergize IAWG’s financial, human and organizational resources to kick-start gender-and-DDR-related initiatives.
* In order to better evaluate DDR initiatives and to better coordinate with other stakeholders, UN programs should be less self-focused and more cognizant of wider political and strategic reintegration strategies.
* Strategic and operational requirements should take priority over agreements on structural integration, and
* UNDP BCPR should design a sound mainstreaming and operational policy in support of particular vulnerable or unrepresented groups.

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**1. Introduction**

**1.1 Historical Context**

The process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants contributes to security and stability in post-conflict environments and paves the way for recovery and development. The DDR process of ex-combatants is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian, and socio-economic dimensions. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been involved in DDR since the early 1990s and currently provides technical and advisory country-level assistance to DDR initiatives in fifteen priority countries, with a major focus on nine key countries. In 2010, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon estimated that the UNDP was supporting programs in twenty-two countries and territories and decided that, “in order to ensure that critical windows of opportunity are not lost due to gaps in funding and responsibility for integration, UNDP together with other relevant UN actors will establish multi-year, country-specific funding strategies to support reintegration strategies.”[[2]](#footnote-2)

UNDP focuses primarily on the reintegration component of DDR. This is done in varying contexts: 1) peacekeeping missions (Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], South Sudan), where UNDP often takes the lead in reintegration, closely cooperating with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); 2) Special Political Missions (SPMs) like in Central African Republic, where UNDP has assumed a lead in disarmament and demobilization operations, and; 3) countries without a UN peacekeeping or and SPM. UNDP plays a lead role in providing support to the local governments with respect to DDR and related processes such as Afghanistan and Nepal.

As a means of consolidating the wealth of knowledge and experience from the early days of DDR, the UNDP was instrumental in developing the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which consists of policy guidelines and procedures for UN-supported DDR programs in a peacekeeping context. The IDDRS were developed by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR—a group composed of twenty-two UN and non-UN departments, agencies, programs, funds and entities established to work toward developing a common strategic framework on DDR and improve the effectiveness of DDR programs at the country level. While the IDDRS are foundational for a classic approach to DDR, they do not integrate the new contexts DDR is facing.

Others within the UNDP, World Bank, and donor community are simply questioning the raison d’être of “classic DDR” and are proposing to redefine the ‘theory of change’ implicit in the design of reintegration programs targeting ex-combatants. The UN is increasingly being asked to support DDR programs in areas of active conflict in order to address new types of armed movements and emergent caseloads—including groups linked to terrorist organizations or with ties to organized crime—and to assist with the downsizing of security forces through the implementation of a DDR program. The political and legal frameworks for managing these new and highly diverse caseloads are increasingly unclear.

**1.2 Evaluation Scope & Objectives**

The changing context for DDR and related programs require further examination through a new lens. This lens concerns itself with emergent caseloads and shifting contemporary conflict dynamics, both of which are demonstrating that the ‘classic’ DDR model in and of itself is outdated in its current form. This evaluation on UNDP reintegration was set to give UNDP the opportunity to generate findings and recommendations in order to assist in identifying appropriate strategies and operational approaches to strengthen its programming on reintegration in peacekeeping (partnering with DPKO), special political missions (partnering with DPA), and non-peacekeeping contexts. In short, through this Livelihood and Economic Recovery Group (LRG)-driven evaluation, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is seeking to re-engage DDR differently by asking the question, ‘how should ex-combatants be reintegration, with or without DDR?’

As such, the purpose of this evaluation is to identify appropriate strategies and operational approaches, as well as lessons learned and recommendations that would strengthen UNDP’s reintegration programs in the field for ex-combatants either with or without a DDR process. Following the Terms of Reference (TOR), the evaluation specific objectives were to:

1. Investigate what constitutes reintegration in peacekeeping and SPMs;
2. Examine, define, or redefine the ‘theory of change’ implicit in the design of the reintegration programs;
3. Identify, assess, and strengthen the typology of programs implemented within the framework of reintegration;
4. Identify the relationship/convergence/integration between the reintegration programs and other programs implemented by country offices and missions;
5. Review overall lessons learned, challenges, and best practices from the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration phases of DDR programs; in particular special attention will be given to identifying:
	1. Critical sustainable and relevant political reintegration benefits at the national and community level;
	2. Benefits to male, female, and youth ex-combatants’ and;
	3. Sustainable economic and social linkages of reintegration at the national and local level.
6. Existence of requisite community/national ownership, capacity, and leadership in the execution of the reintegration programs;
7. Direct support and social benefits to communities and individual combatants;
8. Modes of decision making on key DDR policies, strategies, and technical issues;
9. Community involvement in the reintegration process through diverse mechanisms of community-based reintegration and recovery; and
10. National mechanisms and processes that support sustainable reintegration.

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**2. Methodology**

**2.1 Overview**

The evaluation was conducted by two consultants under the supervision of the UNDP BCPR LRG Team (Mr. Justus Okoko) and BCPR Evaluation Manager (Mr. Serdar Bayriyev) at the UNDP HQ in New York. The evaluation team leader had the overall responsibility of managing the evaluation and coordinating its development, traveling to two UNDP Country Offices (Nepal and DRC) and leading the production of additional desk review country studies. The evaluation team specialist provided expertise on core subject areas of the evaluation and conducted three country visits: Somalia (from Nairobi), Côte d’Ivoire, and Sudan.

The methodology proposed for the evaluation consisted of a mixture of qualitative and quantitative data collection. The objective of each country study was not to evaluate and assess the program itself at the country level but rather to generate findings from the several illustrative case studies that underpinned the appropriateness of the approaches chosen for the reintegration of ex-combatants where DDR programs were designed and implemented.

Those findings would then be used to inform UNDP/BCPR of new and innovative directions and approaches that will be used in the future for downstream support when advising on the development and design of initiatives aimed at the reintegration of ex-combatants supporting peace building and stabilization efforts. Additionally, the study will provide upstream policy guidance through BCPR LRG to senior UNDP management of the scope, levels, and conditions for engagement in the reintegration of ex-combatants in highly sensitive security environments.

The steps taken for the evaluation were: 1) a thorough desk review of all relevant case study reports, program documents, and related information; 2) data collection from field visits; 3) data analysis and synthesis, and 4) the production of the two written reports. The first expresses the overall findings and recommendations of the study, and the second is a consolidation of the case studies.

**2.2 Timeframe**

The initial schedule for the evaluation suffered various delays both in the administrative and logistical preparation of the five field missions that were conducted by the independent evaluation team.

|  | **Initial Schedule** | **Final schedule** |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Inception | September - October 2012 | September - November 2012 | Meetings and conference calls with headquarters-based stakeholders, Selected key interviews, Methodology revision-development, Draft and final Inception Report |
| Research | September – November 2012 | October – December 2012 | Desk Review, Follow Up Key Interviews, Field research, Country validation presentations, Country reports |
| Reporting | October 2012 – November 2012 | December 2012 – February 2013 | Production of draft and final reports, Presentation of findings (NY) |
| Follow-up | November 2012 onwards | Spring 2013 | Management Response Plan prepared |

**2.3 Desk Review**

The evaluation team initiated the evaluation with a systematic review of documents and files related to DDR for ex-combatants, which also occurred throughout the study. This review generated comprehensive and qualitative information enabling the evaluators to address the key evaluation criteria and issues of the evaluation. The document review included key internal documents provided by the UNDP, both at the HQ as well as the Country Office (CO) levels, including strategy, planning, progress reports, and evaluations as well as additional literature from ministries, NATO, the World Bank and additional analysis of think tanks, research centers, and academic centers.

**2.4 Country Review[[3]](#footnote-3)**

The countries that were considered for the evaluation are those that have or had DDR projects or have had DDR written into UN mission mandates under peacekeeping operations (PKOs) or SPMs (Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Nepal Somalia, and Sudan). In all these countries, DDR is not seen as an end in itself but as a component of much larger recovery and peace building strategy with a focus on national and community stabilization.

*BURUNDI:* The desk review was based on the UNDP documentation starting in 2004 with the DD program but also on additional documentation from the World Bank, the Peace Building Fund, the Relief Web, and NGO reports.

*DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:* The desk review was based on UNDP documentation starting in 2005 but also on additional documentation from the World Bank in relation to the Programme National de Désarmements, Démobilisation et Réintégration (PNDDR) and the past program of the Multi Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). Field evaluation was difficult, so only a limited number of key stakeholders of UNDP Reintegration operations at UNDP HQ and in Kinshasa were interviewed.

*HAITI:* The desk review was based on UNDP documentation starting in 2004 with the national DDR program but also on additional documentation reports from the Secretary General to the UN Security Council, evaluation reports of the Community Violence Reduction CVR Project, and independent reviews on DDR, which include analysis and comments on the Integrated DDR Unit (IDDRU) created jointly between UNDP and Missions of the United Nations for Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The evaluation team also undertook several interviews.

*COTE D’IVOIRE*: The evaluation used extensive document review and key informant interviews in the field as key data-collection methods. The extensive list of documents reviewed included all DDR UNDP projects from 2004 up to date; all DDR linked UNDP projects, especially those dealing with community security and small arms control; major DDR linked projects implemented by other partners; a series of major project evaluations; and a series of documents on the security and political situation in Côte d’Ivoire. The very short time spent in the field did not allow specific field visits outside of Abidjan. However, the country office was very helpful in organizing the maximum key informant interviews with all UNDP units and project staff, UN Office in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), other UN agencies, the World Bank, and the Government.

*KOSOVO:* The desk review was based on UNDP documentation starting in 1999 with the dissolution of the Kosovo Liberation Army but as well as on additional documentation from Relief Web, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and general information found on the UNDP Kosovo and UNMIK web sites in relation to Kosovo, and the Kosovo Protection Corporation (KPC) and the 2008 KPC Resettlement Programme (KPC RP). The desk review faced some limitations, namely lack of direct interviews with former UNDP personnel of the KPC RP and lack of interim progress reports from the project itself.

*NEPAL:* The desk review was based on the UN Inter-Agency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP) and the UNDP documentation starting in 2007 with the implementation of the UN Mission In Nepal (UNMIN) as well as on additional documentation official political documents (Comprehensive Accord Concluded from the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal – CPA-), the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), and contributions from local academia, International Labour Organization (ILO), and UNMIN. The evaluation met with key international and national stakeholders of the UNIRP at UNDP CO/Kathmandu. The UNIRP brought the evaluators to Biratnagar in order to meet with local beneficiaries as well as training programs and institutions. The mission had only six days on the ground and left just before the beginning of the religious Dhasain festive holiday, limiting the ability to visit one or two more additional regional offices of UNIRP in Nepal.

*SOMALIA:* The extensive list of documents reviewed included all DDR documentation and Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) projects from 2006 up to date, some major project evaluations, and a series of documents on the security and political situation in Somalia. Unfortunately, the evaluator had only three and a half days to organize interviews in the field.

*SUDAN:* The evaluation used extensive documents review and key informant interviews in the field as key data collection methods. The extensive list of documents reviewed included all DDR UNDP projects from 2006 up to date; all DDR linked UNDP projects, especially CSAC projects; a series of major project evaluations, in particular the Sudan DDR Programme (SDDRP) mid-term review (external); the Support to Human Security evaluation and the Darfur Preparatory Support project evaluation (both internal); and a series of documents on the security and political situation in Sudan. The very short time spent in the field did not allow specific field visits outside of Khartoum.

**2.5 Challenges & Limitations**

The main limitations to the evaluation process were twofold:

*Time and organization:* The first limitations are linked to the limited periods of time to comprehend the main characteristics and features of the UNDP-led reintegration processes in each of the country visits. In DRC, time spent with key local and national stakeholders was limited due to extensive time spent dealing with local administration. In Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia (Nairobi), and Sudan, stakeholders in the field including ex-combatants of local partners, beneficiaries, or implementing partners could not be accessed, and in DRC and Nepal, these visits were brief. Also, limited time spent with local officials (Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Nepal, DRC) did not support an in-depth and historical review of trends, facts, and processes. In all missions, meetings with donors and/or governmental officials were limited or non-existent (DRC, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire).

*Information:* although UNDP BCPR did its very best to collect and assemble relevant and effective documentation, in many occasions the quantity and quality of the information provided was distorted by a lack of consistency, reporting format, systematization, and availability, and they were often insufficient for supporting the triangulation of facts, evaluations, and perceptions in a systematic and analytical review.

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**3. Country Case Studies**

**3.1 Burundi: The Adultes Associés[[4]](#footnote-4)**

Burundi’s post-independence is characterized by instability and ethnic violence. After several ceasefire and peace agreements, the Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi (BNUB) was given the mandate to strengthen national institutions, support the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and promote dialogue and reconciliation.

The international community implemented disarmament and demobilization activities of the various rebel groups that put down their arms from 2004 to 2010. The UNDP Burundi focused specifically on the reintegration part of the DDR process, targeting in particular one group of beneficiaries, namely the Adultes Associés (associated adults) ex-combatants. Adultes Associés are individuals that have been part of an armed group. However, as they did not carry arms—a prerequisite to gain access to existing DDR programs—they were excluded from the main strategy. In total, 10,186 associated personnel (including 1,051 women), mostly from the Front National de Libération (FNL), were in need of a reintegration program in 2010. Many of them had little or no formal education and could not find employment.

To target those individuals, the UNDP implemented the “3x6” approach. This approach is based on the 2009 UN Policy for post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration and relies on three principles: inclusiveness, ownership, and sustainability. The Community Reconstruction Service (CRS) helps to quickly address the needs of the Adultes Associés and supports community and social reintegration of ex-combatants. Thanks to an effective partnership and willingness from both parties, the peace process has achieved peace dividends accentuated by a positive change in the community attitude towards ex-combatants is noticeable.

This innovative approach focuses on personal savings and investment of ex-combatants as a central focus. The beneficiaries participate in three-month-long labor-intensive community reconstruction activities (reconstruction and maintenance of bridges, rural paths, schools, health centers, etc.) where one third of their income is put in a savings account. At the end of the three months they can keep the money or invest it in a project they worked on during their weekly training. If they decide to reinvest, the UNDP with the help of micro-loans institutions triples the investment. By creating a network of associations supported by a self-funding mechanism the projects are more sustainable.

The 3x6 approach ensures the participation of women in all of its steps. Guidelines ensuring a minimal representation of women in the program—set at 50 percent—were nearly reached during the second and third phases, providing an opportunity for men and women to work together as equals.

In conclusion, the “3x6” reintegration approach in Burundi, complementary to other demobilization programs, strengthened security in Burundi. The approach proved that the emphasis on sustainability, community involvement, and local ownership is the key for successful DDR reintegration programming and that a solid exit strategy oriented towards community recovery and local ownership helps to ensure the sustainability of reintegration projects and processes.

**3.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo: Challenging Context for DDR**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has for a long time been the scene for national and international conflict. With several peace agreements signed, the UN mission to the DRC, UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) in partnership with the UNDP, has and continues to support the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR) process in Eastern Congo. Since the early 2000s over 23,000 militia members (including 7,000 children demobilized between 2005 and 2006) have been disarmed and demobilized in the Eastern DRC.

UNDP has supported the DDRRR process to neutralize the main three foreign armed groups in the DRC, namely the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Force (ADF), and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). To do so it supported initiatives promoting defection within the rebel groups ranks.[[5]](#footnote-5) Thanks to this process 5,448 FDLR combatants (both Rwandan and Congolese) were extracted from the armed groups between 2009 and 2011,

In 2009, the UNDP developed the Community, Recovery and Reintegration Programme (CRRP), which focused on reintegration of ex-combatants and community-based recovery, providing a platform for community-level post-conflict reconciliation.[[6]](#footnote-6) The program was designed to take into account not only armed ex-combatants but also other affiliated groups of vulnerable individuals. The objective was to concentrate program activities in regions with a high level of returnees and ex-combatant, and facilitate transition towards development in order to increase local economic, social, and political conditions of populations. CRRP seems to rely on solid inter-personal group willingness to work together and strong control from implementing partners.

The evaluation team found that reintegration choices of ex-combatants were most often guided by administrative reasons limiting the quality and long-term sustainability of ex-combatant reintegration projects. At the individual level, vocational training for the demobilized remains concentrated in a few thematic areas (tailored-sewing, fishing, farming, livestock, etc.) and was rarely building upon previous skills[[7]](#footnote-7) or based on opportunity mapping corresponding to market needs. One of the most limiting issues consists of the fact that very short duration of contracts with NGO implementing partners limits the choice of vocations, orienting them towards the simplest trades that can be taught quickly. As a consequence many ex-combatants encountered by the mission have changed work, selling their initial kit to settle in other areas.

Three lessons emerged from the visit and the review of the CRRP:

The first one is that the ratio “ex-combatants” vs. “members of the community” has a direct impact on the social and economic cohesion of locally created Economic Interest Groups. Originally determined to be a 50/50 ratio between members of the community and ex-combatants, the revision to a new balance of 70 percent ex-combatants/30 percent members of the community created a social misbalance in the internal discussions and organization of the Economic Interest Groups. A more equitable ratio would have possibly weakened the local power of the ex-combatants and, in some circumstances, facilitated their economic reinsertion.

The second lesson that clearly emerged was that sustainability is not only a matter of organization, performance, and hard work. Two critical preconditions should support a sustainable reinsertion of ex-combatants in economic associations: a strong control of the external environment and an effective and consistent M&E and coaching from implementing partners upon their beneficiaries. The third lesson is that International NGOs are fundamental partners to implement a successful reintegration program.

**3.3 Haiti: from “Classic DDR” to “CVR”**

The national DDR program in Haiti began in October 2004 during a sensitive phase of political transition. The program was a joint initiative between the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UNDP, and the Transitional Government of Haiti. During this initial phase it was stated that a “comprehensive approach for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed groups will be required,” and that “the transitional Government should commence political engagement with the armed groups to secure their commitment.”[[8]](#footnote-8) Haiti was seen as a very peculiar DDR case as “the informal and unstructured of many armed groups requires a tailored and decentralized approach to voluntary disarmament” to be combined with “a sustainable process of socio-economic reintegration, which could be framed with a broader process of longer-term community recovery development, local reconciliation, and peace-building.”[[9]](#footnote-9)

The targeted population was estimated at a total of 25,000 individuals when the program was launched.[[10]](#footnote-10) In 2005, after only one year, it became clear that the conditions for a traditional DDR approach were not present. The failure of traditional DDR in Haiti was a combination of various internal factors and causes, namely the absence of national dialogue of peace, the absence of a legal framework guaranteeing the safety of people, insecurity, and a lack of national ownership.

The UN Security Council requested MINUSTAH in 2006 to re-orientate DDR towards a Community Violence Reduction (CVR) strategy.[[11]](#footnote-11) Therefore, MINUSTAH initiated its own CVR strategy with smaller projects like the Mobilization, Disarmament and Inclusion into Society (MDI). This project brought together strategies for Security Sector Reform (SSR), gun control, anti-organized crime initiatives, education, job training, access to social services, family care programs, and reconciliation using an innovative approach that involved music scholarship and community events.

In parallel, the UNDP designed and started implementing what was called the Community Security Programme (CSP). CSP is an innovative approach to reduce violence that can be implemented in partnership with the communities and the local authorities when the conditions for a ‘classic’ DDR are not present. Three objectives were defined: 1) set-up an inclusive mechanism for peaceful conflict management within the mayor’s office; 2), reinsert the victims through community-based socio-economic recovery projects, and; 3) contribute to the evaluation of a legal framework for arms control.

CSP was a challenging program in Haiti. From the very beginning, the CSP suffered from a deliberate lack of ownership from the government, generating a deep mutual mistrust between UNDP and the National Commission on DDR (NCDDR). Training programs were not based on an opportunity map and therefore had limited relevance. There was no proper monitoring or evaluation system implemented. Ultimately, by being overly ambitious in a context characterized by the weakness of state structures and local authorities, CSP failed by lack of realism and quickly lost the donors confidence.

UNDP is no longer involved in DDR in Haiti. After the closure of the CSP, CVR initiatives continue to be implemented through MINUSTAH. Current efforts focus on institutional support NCDDR, labor-intensive projects and small arms control, as well as social mobilization and sensitization campaigns, promotion of a culture of non-violence and peace through community sporting and cultural events, consultative workshops, and programs on local FM radios.

**3.4 Côte d’Ivoire: DDR proved difficult as continued hopes for peace never materialized**

After the Linas-Marcoussis agreement in 2004 DDR projects were in order. However, as the peace agreement never materialized and there was a widespread mistrust among signing parties, the implementing partners faced the impossibility of running a comprehensive DDR program. From the DDR projects that UNDP ran from 2004-2007, two of them resulted in the construction of demobilization sites that were never used, and the others were abandoned or transformed with very modest objectives.

In 2007 after the Ouagadougou agreements, the “1000 micro-projects” contributed to enhancing the security situation and was quite successful at servicing ex-combatants. This joint project between the UNDP and the UN operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) targeted 5,000 ex-combatants, ex-military forces, and youth at risk. It allowed the provision of socio-economic benefits to 3,843 beneficiaries through the establishment of 526 micro-projects. The ex-post evaluation concluded that the project had proven effective with regards to its global objective to contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security. The “1000 micro-projects” was a response to a critical and urgent situation and prevented the peace and DDR process from being derailed at an early stage, even though the full process did not eventually take place.

UNOCI and the UNDP coordination for the “1000 micro-projects” was successful. They were able to use their comparative advantages to efficiently implement the project. It allowed its beneficiaries to earn a living, restoring self-esteem, dignity, and hope for the future. Plus, projects had a positive impact on social cohesion, as it allowed ex-combatants from different ethnic and rebel groups to work together in common micro-projects. However, it needs to be emphasized that its sustainability and long-term relevance might be limited. Indeed, as the micro-projects were freely chosen by the beneficiaries and not based on an economic opportunity map; very few were viable in the long run.

The French cooperation funded the “Projet d’appui à la reinsertion des ex-combatants et jeunes associés au conflit en zone Centre, Nord et Ouest” between 2009 and 2010, and it was implemented by the UNDP. The project targeted some 700 ex-combatants and youth. Contrary to the “1000 micro-project,” this project’s strategy focused on vocational training and on sustainable Income Generating Activities (IGA). A full assessment of the formal and informal private sector operating in the intervention zones was carried out in order to identify the employment generating value chains.

According to the ex-post evaluation, 350 beneficiaries were able to complete full vocational training in three training centers. The project appears to have achieved better micro impact on livelihoods for ex-combatants than the “1000 micro-project.” The beneficiaries’ survey shows high rates of satisfaction on the quality of the training. However the number of beneficiaries targeted by this project has been relatively small compared to the overall number of ex-combatants.[[12]](#footnote-12) Trainings focused on professions that apparently did not require, for the most part, a long period of training.

**3.5 Kosovo: from KLA to KPC to “dissolution with dignity”**

After the armed conflict that took place in Kosovo between 1998 and 1999, the Security Council, (Resolution 1244, 10/06/1999) authorized member states to establish a security presence to deter hostilities, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army[[13]](#footnote-13) (KLA), and facilitate the return of refugees.[[14]](#footnote-14) Demobilization of the army was guaranteed by the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), formed in 1999.[[15]](#footnote-15)

UNDP was involved with DDR in Kosovo since 2008 and was the lead implementing partner of the KPC Resettlement Program. The program was divided in two components with separate budgets, both financed by NATO. The first was the “Transitional financial assistance in the form of severance payments,” directly implemented by the UNDP. The second was a “Comprehensive assistance to create sustainable livelihoods” through counseling, training, further education, placement and small business assistance, which had a particular focus on sustainability. The employment and business assistance was implemented by APPK, the employment promotion agency in Kosovo. A vast majority of the recipients benefitted from business assistance (mainly in agriculture for traditional/geographic reasons), while others opted for the job placement support (mostly in the public sector), and a very small number benefitted from the professional training and further education.

There were 1,464 eligible beneficiaries from seventy-four minorities, including forty-three women. UNDP worked alongside the resettlement program investing heavily and complementing Kosovo’s security and justice sectors. Other well-synchronized UNDP-related projects, such as the employment generation projects, complemented the program. The program strategically targeted populations by having clear eligibility criteria from the beginning.

Beneficiaries were satisfied with their new or strengthened skills that they received and the support overall. The evaluation of the program states that almost 100 percent of the eligible beneficiaries completed the severance scheme. To date, the results of the program proved to be satisfactory and targets were met. The program one of the highest “budget per beneficiary” ratio for a DDR project to date, with an average “unit investment” per beneficiary of $11,000.

The program incorporated an efficient gender-mainstreaming component within its strategy. Women received customized support and mentoring through the support of a full-time gender specialist. Plus, a specific budget line had been foreseen in order to ensure that women’s skills could be strengthened and their reintegration opportunities increased. Customized assistance largely contributed to the success of this project.

However, two shortcomings existed: the M&E database was not implemented at the earlier stage of the program, and, throughout the program, UNDP experienced a challenging working relationship with NATO as both entities had a limited understanding of each other’s role.

**3.6 Nepal: A long DD process for Verified Minors and Late Recruits**

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nepal in 2006 put an end to ten years of violent conflict and laid out an ambitious transformational agenda on equity, inclusion, accountability, good governance, and restructuring of the Nepalese state.[[16]](#footnote-16) On the January 23, 2007, the UN Security Council responded to the request of the CPA parties for UN assistance by establishing the UN Mission in Nepal (UMMIN).

UNDP has been engaged in Nepal’s DDR process from the beginning. At first, it assigned a team of demobilization experts from the UNDP’s country office in Afghanistan to design the registration and the verification process and train national staff. In this initial process, a total of 32,350 Maoist army staff were registered and 19,604—comprising 15,761 men and 3,843 women—were verified. Out of the verified total, 4,008 individuals were Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLRs). The Government of Nepal asked the UN to facilitate the socio-economic rehabilitation for these individuals. By 2010, the UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP) together with UNDP, UNICEF, UNFP, and ILO developed a framework to support the government’s request. It is a unique blend of project where each agency gets the best from its partners out its own strengths, and whereby each agency makes the best use of its comparative advantages for the successful project implementation.

The UNIRP framework is framed around two complimentary outcomes: 1) provision of option packages made available to beneficiaries in vocational training, small and micro-enterprise development, education (both formal and non-formal), and health-related education and training, and; 2) broader engagement and support for the rehabilitation of the individuals, supported and implemented through public information and sensitization campaigns.

In Nepal, local ownership was developed through a comprehensive and coordinated communication plan oriented towards local community members and organizations. ILO’s training initiatives helped build long-term institutional capacity and answered ex-combatant, as well as the community’s needs. Plus, the training implementing agencies had proper capacity to advocate and advise on employment opportunities that were identified through a mapping process. The trainings enabled the ex-combatants to improve their confidence thanks to an improved teaching methodology customized according to capacities and gender considerations.

In Nepal, the gender specific support was well organized. Twenty-four percent of the ex-combatants within the program were women. It was facilitated by guidelines that ensured a gender-friendly environment during counseling in regional offices; by guidelines for the nutritional support to pregnant and lactating mothers; by the enrolment of men, women, and participant's children in childcare centers; and by the childcare grant and baby food. It became clear that systematic gender-specific support strongly increases the ratios of women participating in reintegration processes.

The case of Nepal illustrates the possibility for the UNDP and its partners to invest in reintegration programs through BCPR funding and harness the catalytic PBF funding, as the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) proved to be a key tool in mobilizing international funding for UNIRP.

**3.7 Somalia: a non-DDR, or at least a non-formal DDR context**

Somalia has faced decades of conflict, violence, and instability, leading to social disruption and political, turmoil, and economic insecurity. Some seventeen peace agreements failed to restore a functional government in South Central Somalia, further eroding confidence in the prospects of peace and security.

The UNDP has not been involved in formal DDR projects in Somalia though it has reached certain DDR objectives through various community-security projects. The Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) DDR/Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) Pilot Project, implemented by the UNDP in 2007 and 2008, disarmed and reintegrated members of the security forces and freelance militias back into civilian life. It was a successful project. However, there are some doubts about whether the selection process of ex-combatants was biased and targeted the right population presenting a real threat.

In view of the extremely challenging security and socio-political situation in Somalia, the above-mentioned results should be considered per se as real achievements. Yet, it should be emphasized that the YAR remained a community security project and not a DDR project. It cannot be considered either as having quasi or informal DDR effects. Firstly, the YAR project is not based on a peace agreement. Secondly, it was not aimed at disarmament, but only on arms registration. Thirdly, it would is debatable whether the project improved the overall security level. Fourthly and most importantly, it appears that, for various and unknown reasons, hardcore militia combatants experienced in military operations were not selected in the process, willingly or not.

The Community Security and Armed Violence reduction program (AVR) brought together international and national actors involved in community security and set up the framework for future DDR projects and especially for the youth at risk (YAR) project and the SAACID DDR project.

The SAACID DDR project integrated two months of intensive training on business principles and practice followed by six months of guidance and monitoring of individual micro-business development with the provision of micro grants. This project was particularly successful and well executed.

The objective of the YAR project, implemented by UNDP, UNICEF, and ILO between 2010 and 2012, was to “to contain and prevent violent conflict by engaging youth at risk through the creation of employment and livelihood opportunities at the district level.” The cooperation between the three agencies around five clearly identified components is an excellent example of partnership in livelihoods-support projects. In this particular context, the UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation, and Reintegration formed a basis for cooperation, especially between ILO and UNDP. However, in contexts as complex as Somalia, the two agencies would have benefited from preliminary and detailed agreements to avoid being involved in the same type of activities.

The aims were to: 1) support to the selection and demilitarization process of some 2,000 youth and adolescent below the age 35 with UNDP as the leading implementing partner; 2) demobilize and reintegrate some 700 adolescents (below age 18) within the 2,000 youth with UNICEF as the leading implementing partner; 3) create 1,300 short-term job opportunities for youth above age 18 (labor-intensive, income-generating activities) to contribute to violence reduction, community development, and public works with ILO as the leading implementing partner and UNDP support); 4) empower women, youth, and marginalized groups to contribute to safety and security decision-making with UNDP as the leading implementing partner, and; 5) create longer-term job creation or enterprise development through vocational training, youth entrepreneurship training, and related business skills development.

The evaluation of the YAR pointed out that the training period was too short, which did not allow participants to be competitive on the job market. This last point aside, the project was quite successful and allowed socio-economic reintegration for youth in targeted areas. These projects have established and tested a framework and a process that will play a crucial role in the future for more ambitious and more DDR-like exercises. This structure can, to a large extent, replace the potential establishment of a national or state DDR Commission. As future DDR processes are likely to be decentralized and based on locally negotiated peace agreements, projects established at the district level might be copied.

**3.8 Sudan: UNDP’s largest process of ex-combatant reintegration**

North Sudan has held one of the largest DDR-process for reintegration of ex-combatants implemented by the UNDP. With a budget of $61 million, the Sudanese DDR program (SDDRP), based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), targeted to reintegrate 90,000 ex-combatants and reaching 22,000 individuals.[[17]](#footnote-17)

The poor overall 25-percent performance rate of the program is the result of a series of major difficulties during the implementation: 1) lack of will and an ambiguous attitude towards the peace agreement by several parties and a lack of national ownership; 2) initial disagreements between the Sudanese Government, DPKO, and UNDP on the approach to reintegration and the structure for coordination; 3) slow donor funding processes due to mistrust for the verification mechanisms; 4) weak presence and low capacity of the national implementing partners; and 5) the separation of Sudan in two entities, with the consecutive split of the DDR program in two and the withdrawal of UNMIS at the end of its mandate.

The overall Sudan context raised major coordination questions between UNDP and DPKO, which significantly delayed the design and implementation of the program. Difficulties have been linked to differences in staff background and expertise impacting coordination. Thus, both UNDP and UNMIS kept separate M&E as well as Public Information units. From 2013 onwards, it was therefore agreed that UNDP and DPKO programming should be closely coordinated within a single logical framework, but the implementation structure should remain separate.

The SDDRP’s midterm review was critical of the approach taken. Following the recommendations of the review, the program underwent a gradual and significant methodological shift from a “one size fits all” strategy with targeted reintegration packages to broader community reintegration programs. The SDDR program was then redesigned to a “Community Based Reintegration and Security” program (CBRS). This new program provides benefits to communities as well as to ex-combatants and links DDR to CSAC, and community recovery efforts, fairly demonstrating the incorporation of lessons learned when redesigning a DDR and reintegration program.

At the micro level, impact remained unclear. Trainings were not based on employment market opportunity mapping, and despite new methodologies used their sustainability can be doubted. However, positive conclusions deriving from beneficiaries’ satisfaction surveys appeared to be contradicted by other sources.

At the macro level, the impact of the programs on the overall security situation vary from good for the DDR program in East Sudan to partial with regards to the SDDRP. The impact on the development of civil society as well as government structures seems quite positive. Moreover, the impact of UNDP’s action on the sustainability of the SDDRC looks rather positive. Even though institutional capacity building proved difficult and progressed slowly, the support provided for the development of the civil society and government structures were quite positive. The problematic time gap between the DD and the R is not tackled in a comprehensive way.

From the Sudan’s evaluation, the UNDP appears to be the only international agency with the capacity to support large-scale DDR programs. Where DPKO is not mandated to carry out DD, UNDP also appears as the agency in the best position to support the Government in both DD and R.

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**4. Findings**

**4.1 Agency Function & Role**

**Finding 1: UNDP DDR programs operate within wider political and strategic reintegration frameworks, which often includes other reintegration agencies and a broad landscape of stakeholders, making it difficult to isolate UNDP reintegration achievements**

Throughout the comprehensive review of the countries, it was difficult to define the parameters of UNDP reintegration contributions to security and stability aims in post-conflict settings. In most cases UNDP is not the lead reintegration agency but occupies a parallel and secondary role.[[18]](#footnote-18) Therefore, UNDP’s Reintegration contributions are directly influenced (positively/negatively) by the efforts of a large range of DDR and Reintegration stakeholders.

**Finding 2: UN programs tend to be overly self-focused**

UNDP’s evaluation and programmatic literature very often tends to ignore the role of other institutional or private stakeholders in the presentation of the overall results contributing to security and stability in a particular setting. This self-focused perspective can lead to turf wars (South Sudan), exclusivity, and a lack of constructive cooperative attitude with national commissions as in DRC and Haiti. Paradoxically, in Somalia and Haiti this translated into overly ambitious programming that required a more coordinated and harmonized approach for success.

**Finding 3: Decisions on how priorities and needs for DDR countries are established are unclear, however increased inter-departmental cooperation within UNDP and UN DPKO appears to be resulting in better clarity on country priority and needs in regards to reintegration**

UNDP has struggled in articulating peacebuilding and reintegration strategies in the context of large UN peacekeeping operations. In 2010, the Strategic Review of the BCPR concluded that it still remained “unclear how priorities and needs for CPR countries are identified, discussed, and agreed” (within BCRP and across UNDP, particularly with regional bureaus).[[19]](#footnote-19) Some BCPR staff believe that UNDP is currently “looking for itself” seeking to articulate a vision of where to go within the realm of contemporary DDR programs in particular. For instance, UNDP decided in some contexts to be involved in disarmament and demobilization operations, which is outside of its mandate. By extension, some argue that UNDP should not undertake disarmament and demobilization programming in situations that resemble that of CAR or in North Sudan at the time they were initiated.

Increased cooperation provides opportunities to better clarify country priorities and needs in regards to DDR and Reintegration. At central level, UNDP/BCPR, DPKO, and DPA have initiated a process of regular consultations through VTCs with PKOs, SPMs, and UNDP COs in order to collect, exchange, and analyze relevant information; discuss the various programmatic, operational, and policy options available; and ensure that the UN is “Delivering as One.” This approach has been initiated with CAR, South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), and Côte d’Ivoire.

**Finding 4: The implementation of reintegration programs relies on various strategic and complementary “pillars” working in close coordination.**

Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) units in the field appear as the most appropriate unit configuration to design and implement DDR programs, as they acknowledge the multi-dimensional aspects of reintegration. Success depends on close cooperation among 1) livelihoods and economic recovery specialists; 2) conflict analysts and security specialists, especially when SSR dimensions are present; 3) RoL specialists, and; 4) reintegration specialists.

The lead entity for reintegration does not have to be a DDR team. The Poverty Reduction Unit may in certain cases be in charge of DDR projects, if they are backstopped by a security and/or rule of law specialist. And in other cases, the Governance unit can be in charge of DDR if assisted by a reintegration, livelihoods, or economic-recovery specialist. Independent evaluations commissioned by UNDP in Côte d’Ivoire and DRC reinforce these findings.

**Finding 5: Mainstreaming conflict-sensitivity initiatives have the potential to drive UNDP DDR reintegration initiatives in a sound and safe direction**

Measuring the impact of reintegration initiatives in post-conflict contexts requires a continuous multidisciplinary review and understanding of local political, economic, and sector security dynamics. A conflict-sensitivity mainstreaming project, such as the one developed by UNDP’s Peacebuilding and Recovery Unit in Nepal and jointly implemented by the Regional Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)’s Office and UNICEF, constitutes a key asset in the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of reintegration for DDR. Unfortunately, conflict-sensitive driven initiatives in many cases have suffered from structural changes within UNDP CO or insufficient conflict analysis. In Haiti conflict sensitive analysis was insufficient to respond to express needs of the DDR commission.

In global terms, “the absence of comprehensive conflict analysis and other kinds of socio-economic analysis/profiling, gender and diversity analysis, analysis of fragility causes/trends/patterns is a serious weakness” and “if the drivers of conflict and the power dynamics are not understood in some depth, there is not only a risk of missing relevant needs but a risk of 'doing harm.”[[20]](#footnote-20) In Somalia, the evaluation believes that “evidence of negative impacts puts in question community security initiatives in too unstable areas.”[[21]](#footnote-21)

**Finding 6: Impact-monitoring and assessment mechanisms for measuring UNDP reintegration initiatives benefited from increased and targeted BCPR and CO support**

In many cases monitoring and evaluation of UNDP-led reintegration initiatives are insufficient and suffer from a lack of national and HQ coordination. Another UNDP Mid-term evaluation concludes “a robust Monitoring and Evaluation system should be placed from day one in order to generate all basic data that could be used to gauge the success of the DDR program and further monitoring of gender indicators.”[[22]](#footnote-22) Field country reviews support this finding.

A critical support tool for M&E is the database. The UNDP Final Review Report of the KPC in Kosovo states that the main operational issue was the establishment of a performing database, as the one developed was unable to support M&E and reporting requirements. Furthermore, field visits and discussions with M&E UNIRP officials show the difficulty to identify, monitor, and assess the progress of each UNIRP beneficiary. However, the development of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation Information Management System (CRIMS) in Nepal allowed the UNIPR to comprehensively support the multiple components of the rehabilitation program including data collection, client classification, unified reporting, and client tracking in a timely and efficient manner. In Sudan, the SDDRP’s midterm review was critical of the approach taken. Following the recommendations of the review, the program underwent a gradual and significant methodological shift.

UNDP does not stand alone in this general lack of adequate M&E. Recent evaluation missions conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services to MINUSTAH and MONUSCO concluded that dedicated M&E units were missing, leading to the existence of “an information gap . . .”[[23]](#footnote-23)

**Finding 7:** **BCPR technical support to the development and review of UNDP DDR processes was generally rated favorably although UNDP BCPR technical capacity appears insufficient**

Before UNDP BCPR’s last restructuring resulting in a decrease in staff numbers for DDR, BCPR is quoted for having provided policy, organizational, and technical support to various reintegration processes, which have been rated favorably by local UNDP country offices. Historically, it is believed that one of the key successes of UNDP’s CO was “the support provided by BCPR to the CO, which also helped it set up a post-conflict unit that was the first of its kind in Africa.” But this was prior to a restructuring, which organized the CO around democratic governance and poverty reduction.

Today, it appears that UNDP country offices have the ultimate authority and/decision to undertake DDR programming in post conflict countries. BCPR seems to have less control on programmatic processes at the Country level. An apparent lack of ownership from HQ to the CO does not seem to facilitate a more constructive working relation as well as a more directive planning and selective programming approach where required..

The evaluation was not in a position to assess which kind of influence HQ units on DDR e.g. LRG in NY effectively had on the development of current and/or future DD and Reintegration programme design as current data only came from 3 countries (DRC, Kosovo and Nepal).

UNDP BCPR may benefit from increased technical capacity to support, advise, operationalize, and review critical operational issues at the field level. The perceived need for innovative networking approaches, such as “South-South” cross fertilization initiatives or peer-to-peer capacity development, may currently lacking. By extension, reinforcing the current capacity of the LRG to carry on lengthy technical assessments on the field may in turn decrease the reliance on rapid deployment capacity of central and regional rosters of DDR experts.

**4.2 Coordination & Partnerships**

**Finding 8:** **While interagency coordination has optimized program results, attempts at structural integration between agencies were not constructive. Subsequent approaches at interagency coordination benefited from a more flexible approach.**

The UNIRP in Nepal is a collaboration of four UN agencies working together in a reintegration process. It is a unique blend of project where each agency gets the best from its partners out its own strengths, and whereby each agency makes the best use of its comparative advantages for successful project implementation. In Somalia, the Youth at Risk project is also a good example of active partnership between UNDP and two other UN agencies; ILO, and UNICEF. The cooperation between the three agencies around five clearly identified components is an excellent example of partnership in livelihoods-support projects. In this particular context, the UN policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation, and Reintegration formed a basis for cooperation, especially between ILO and UNDP. However, in contexts as complex as Somalia, the two agencies would have benefited from preliminary and detailed agreements to avoid being involved in the same type of activities.

Conversely, partnerships to implement DDR programs with UN agencies proved difficult to establish in Sudan.[[24]](#footnote-24) “One size fits all” programming was not conducive to a good and effective sharing of responsibilities. Joint projects worked better when clear and independent components implemented, financed, and monitored by different agencies were identified. In 2012, in Sudan, both the UNDP and DPKO agreed that a close coordination system rather than an integrated partnership offered better opportunities for cooperation.[[25]](#footnote-25) In general terms, the key conditions for closer interagency operational and policy cooperation seem to rely heavily on an upstream political and operational willingness to strongly coordinate and harmonize objectives, activities, and sharing of resources on an equal footing.

Attempts at a more structurally integrated approach have been attempted in the last ten years of DDR practice with limited success. In the spirit of “UN delivering as One,” DDR units were joined under a single managerial structure in Haiti and Sudan. In Sudan, coordination between UNDP and DPKO within the framework of an integrated DDR unit proved very difficult and caused significant delays in the implementation of the program. In both Haiti and Sudan, the efforts to achieve these aims through structural integration wasted valuable time and resources.

The establishment of a new structure between African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and UNDP appears to have taken stock of past experiences by giving up some of the aspects of the Sudan DDR program a more flexible coordination structure. In Côte d’Ivoire, the “1000 micro projects” was a good example of a successful cooperative DPKO/UNDP action. In Burundi, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, coordination evolved at the programmatic level either formally or informally. In Burundi, although joint programming was perceived as difficult, there was space and opportunities for dialogue and good cooperation for sharing information.[[26]](#footnote-26)

**Finding 9: UNDP appears challenged when identifying the most appropriate organizational channels to carry on DDR programs.**

Linkages between DDR/R and other UNDP practices at the country level benefit from increased understanding of reintegration as a multi-dimensional process. New joint information sharing and strategic thinking in NY between UNDP/BCPR LRG and DPKO seems to be currently developing, but it remains to be seen to which extent this will generate a new substantive working model at the field level and an improved inter-sectoral and inter-institutional programming approach between UNDP, DPKO and DPA, particularly on reintegration issues. In fact, this positive trend may be in contrast to many DDR initiatives initiated at the field level. UNDP may be perceived as a single potential operator (Sudan), or it may initiate its own reintegration initiatives that may not be solicited by the local government as occurred in DRC. UNDP may also be trying to work in opposition to somehow reluctant national DDR commissions or government like in Haiti, DRC, and Nepal.

The Strategic Review of the BCPR was the first to conclude that “it still remained unclear how priorities and needs for CPR countries are identified and agreed.” The evaluation team, however; was not in a position to assess in a more analytical way why there often appears to be a lack of convergence and mutual interest by UNDP CPR unit to the local CO Governance to design a comprehensive and integrated DD and/or R project or program. DDR programs appear to be piloted by various UNDP structures in the field, depending very much on the UNDP offices’ configuration.

**Finding 10: It appears that UNDP country offices have the ultimate authority on decisions to undertake DDR programming in post conflict countries.**

The BCPR LRG team seems to have less control on programmatic processes at the country level. An apparent lack of authoritative decision making from HQ to the CO does not seem to facilitate a more constructive working relationship as well as a more directive planning and selective programming approach where required. The evaluation was not in a position to assess the nature of the influence of HQ units on DDR. For example, the current data of the effect LRG in NY had on the development of current and/or future DD and Reintegration program design only came from three countries: DRC, Kosovo, and Nepal.

**Finding 11: Harnessing comparative advantages as well as partnerships with International Non-Governmental Organizations have benefitted the management of complex reintegration initiatives.**

INGOs are not “natural” partners of UNDP in the implementation of DDR programs, although recent history shows that INGOs present definite comparative advantages in implementing DDR initiatives in complex and volatile environments. Well-coordinated and structured sub offices of INGOs have in many instances demonstrated a wealth of experience, know-how, logistical and administrative capacities, and strong understanding of developmental and social issues required to affect DDR Reintegration programs.

In difficult contexts like DRC, the support of international and experienced NGOs proved to be key for the success of the Community, Recovery and Reintegration Programme (CRRP). INGOs were often in a position to create local inter-project synergies that would support and consolidate reintegration projects achievements. Concentration of INGOs in DRC has supported local peace building and economic activities in the context of reconstruction and recovery.[[27]](#footnote-27)

In Kosovo, the cooperation of UNDP with NATO and MINUK effectively supported the resettlement process of former KPC elements. The LRG strategy of “strengthening of bilateral partnerships” with key partners seems to be lacking compared to other international models. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire like in CAR, the World Bank is working together with other national and international stakeholders in ensuring coordination and program-sharing initiatives at the request of local governments.

**Finding 12:** **Support and Capacity Building of National DDR Commissions is a delicate political issue**

Recent history has presented two different models of national DDR commissions in various countries. One in which diverse national stakeholders are engaged and play a strong implementing role and another where national commissions are small, apolitical, technical, and disengaged from stakeholders and government ministries. In the former, as in the case of the Great Lakes Region, some national DDR commissions were administratively cumbersome and ineffective, poorly operational, and antagonistic[[28]](#footnote-28). Significant readjustments undertaken in countries where this situation occurred showed that the latter type of national commission could deliver more effectively and efficiently.[[29]](#footnote-29) While a shift to a more disengaged commission helped in the Great Lakes, in some cases a more engaged approach helped to foster more constructive relationships, such as in Nepal where support of local institutions provided political buy-in. In contrast, the “DEX” model put in place by UNDP for the implementation of its CSP in Haiti did not emphasize building local ownership through a mutually designed investment in local capacities. In many countries, UNDP reintegration programs remained somehow “marginal” to core national DDR programs, with limited interaction between other institutional national or international partners.

**Finding 13: State-level and sub-national institutional frameworks reinforce national ownership and respective capacity building of national institutions**

Ownership of a DDR process should extend beyond national ownership at the central level to a wide range of national and community-based actors and stakeholders. However it has not always occurred. This is especially true in countries where different international institutions, from UNDP to the World Bank, ran separate DDR initiatives with limited cooperation. This trend seems to be slowly changing in some instances in two different ways. The first one seems to be the desire of UNDP/BCPR to make a concerted effort to engage other DDR stakeholders at the HQ and field levels through regular information exchange and strategic thinking. For example, in Burundi during the third phase of the 3x6 approach, responsibility is progressively transferred from the UNDP to local and national authorities through a comprehensive process of transferring skills and capacities to manage the project at the national level. The second relates to the collective and international building up of the capacities of the AUDDR CP, although UNDP/BCPR is not yet part of this initiative.

**Finding 14: While engaging national partners have hampered certain aspects of implementation, the emphasis on community involvement, local ownership, and personal investments by ex-combatants contributed to the success of reintegration programs**

It is difficult to assess in general terms the relevance (as well as the efficiency) of the participation of national NGOs to the implementation of reintegration programs and initiatives. In many regards, national NGOs contribute deeply to local ownership supporting social, psychosocial, and community reintegration of ex-combatants. In Nepal, local ownership was developed through a comprehensive and coordinated communication plan oriented towards local community members and organizations. Training initiatives of ILO helped build long-term institutional capacity. Even so, local actors often lack the competencies to deliver complex reintegration results facilitating delays in implementation. In DRC, a call for proposals had poor results as many local NGOs were motivated by profit making rather than investing in sound and constructive reintegration initiatives. The capacity of many local NGOs needs to be built from scratch.

A good example of ex-combatant engagement and ownership is the 3x6 approach in Burundi. It distinguishes itself from other reintegration programs by its systematic emphasis on sustainability and local ownership. It was successful in part because ex-combatants relied on their own investments from savings generated while participating in the Community Reconstruction Service phase. The “Ownership phase” helps to make Adultes Associés (ex-combatants without arms) aware of their responsibilities. Moreover, local communities were involved at all phases of the Burundi project, which helped identify the needs and priorities of the ex-combatants. To join the second phase of the projects, beneficiaries need to sign an agreement with a local NGO. In exchange for their contribution, UNDP strengthens the local partner NGOs and their capacity. However even though it did not cause major disturbances, the capacity of the local partner NGOs seems to remain low, preventing them from fully assuming their role.[[30]](#footnote-30)

The success of the “1000 micro projects” in the Côte d’Ivoire can be attributed to the fact that it allowed ex-combatants and youth at risk to be very much involved in projects by selecting the type of projects that they wanted to run. Social reintegration capital also increased, as ex-combatants demonstrated that were able to earn an honest living. Contributions to psycho-social reintegration accrued through restoration to their self-esteem, dignity, and hope for the future. The project had a positive impact on social cohesion in the communities as it allowed ex-combatants of various factions and of different ethnicities to work alongside each other in common micro-projects.

**4.3 Reintegration Approaches**

**Finding 15: Most contemporary reintegration programs are gradually moving from individual, ex-combatant-focused reinsertion or reintegration to community-based reintegration initiatives**

The nature of the success of ex-combatant reintegration is not often clearly linked to classic “DDR” programming and is in many aspects more of a clearly different nature. Major national or regional programs like the World Bank’s Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program that initially focused on the individual disarmament of ex-combatants eventually combined individual and community-based approaches to reintegration. Such programs appear best suited for programs aiming to: 1) help communities to accept the ex-combatants and to not feel discriminated as compared to ex-combatants; 2) support social cohesion of the communities; 3) prevent or reduce conflict through negotiated solutions; 4) prevent idle or destabilized youth from joining the conflict, and; 5) prevent or reduce conflict through civilian disarmament and arms control.

However, when dealing with ex-combatants representing a major threat to security in terms of violence and/or as spoilers to the peacebuilding process, classic targeted programs may still be the most appropriate approach. This approach is especially justified in cases where ex-combatants will not disarm unless the package is “attractive” enough. Reintegration initiatives in Nepal and Kosovo that appear to be successful are also the ones that had very specific and well-targeted populations.

**Finding 16: Community-recovery initiatives with high proportions of ex-combatants per capita faced social imbalances**

The issue of the appropriate ratio between local community members and ex-combatants participating an integrated socio-economic reintegration effort remains problematic. The benefits of having ex-combatants participating in local associations or local economic groups have been demonstrated in various reviews and studies.[[31]](#footnote-31) In DRC, the original budgets of the CRRP were building upon a 50/50 ratio between members of the community and ex-combatants. However, the project changed the ratio to 70 percent ex-combatants and 30 percent members of the community. This new ratio seems to have created a social imbalance in the internal discussions and organization of the Economic Interest Groups.[[32]](#footnote-32)

**Finding 17: Skills training of ex-combatants seems to be a first step in their professional and socio-economic reintegration, but relevance can be limited and efforts lacking, both financially and technically**

Training should generally be regarded as a tool for reintegration not as reintegration itself. In many instances, DDR programs often send ex-combatants on training vocational skills courses assuming this will lead to sustainable livelihoods, which oftentimes does not occur. Field visits confirmed that: 1) training or vocational training is part of a continuous, systemic, and coordinated reintegration process, whereby the ex-combatant receives an adequate preparation for further employment, self-employment, and integration in the economic market; 2) training and vocational training are often delivered at a standard level and are supply driven, and; 3) training may be perceived as a means for further disbursements. Sustainable reintegration requires the full length of the training to ensure that ex-combatants acquire top-quality professional skills.

Among the successful trainings were the ones in Nepal, Somalia, and Burundi. In Nepal, the integrated nature of the training provided by ILO was effective. The employment opportunities were identified and the implementation unit had the proper capacity to advocate and counsel on these opportunities. The trainings enabled the ex-combatant to improve their confidence thanks to an improved teaching methodology that took in account women’s needs as well. In Somalia the SAACID DDR project successfully provided two months intensive training on business principles and practice followed by six months of guidance and monitoring of individual micro-business development with the provision of micro grants. In Burundi, the one-to-one trainings on the beneficiaries’ business plan as well as management trainings enabled this part of the population to be part of the larger economic recovery plan. In Cote d’Ivoire even though the “1000 micro project” was successful to restore self-esteem, dignity, and hope for ex-combatants, the project sustainability and long-term relevance was limited, as the micro-projects were freely chosen by the beneficiaries and not based on an economic opportunity map. Similarly in Sudan, the lack of an employment market opportunity mapping limited the relevance of the training programs.

**Finding 18: The management of reinsertion to reintegration through saving schemes can face challenges associated with war-torn and fragile economies**

A growing number of reintegration initiatives include saving schemes as a reinsertion and reintegration path for ex-combatants. However, challenges remain how to link reinsertion and the skills sets transferred with existing and emerging market realities that include the lack of formal economy which restricts the scope of potential reintegration opportunities.”[[33]](#footnote-33) Results are mixed. In DRC reinsertion benefits were squandered, whereby the “3x6” approach in Burundi gave a central role to savings, encouraging ex-combatants to engage in more sustainable economic endeavors.[[34]](#footnote-34) This UNDP-driven approach successfully harnessed savings in all phases of the process, from the Community Reconstruction Phase, through the use of savings within associations to create self-funding mechanisms designed to support its members with positive outcomes.

**Finding 19: Sustainability of Livelihoods interventions is often jeopardized by program-implementation cycles that are too short and have limited investments in equipment**

In many countries, the brevity of program-implementation cycles jeopardized the sustainability of livelihoods interventions. Vocational or on the job training projects that are limited to two or three months are insufficient for most professional sectors. Short cycles prevent thorough follow-up of ex-combatant reintegration efforts by implementing partners. They also hinder the ability of implementation partners to discover more imaginative designs and context-adapted solutions. In Somalia, the Youth at Risk project reiterated the fact that “too short period of training did not allow participants to be competitive on the job market”[[35]](#footnote-35) and in Côte d’Ivoire, the “1000 micro projects” between UNOCI and UNDP, which provided the ex-combatants and youth at risk with immediate source of income “did not provide them with significant vocational or on the job training . . . making the sustainability of the small businesses that they had started at best doubtful.”[[36]](#footnote-36)

**Finding 20:** **“Customized Assistance” is a key element for increased sustainability of individual reintegration initiatives; funding may be required to cover long-term reintegration processes.**

In Kosovo, customized assistance utilized a blend of reintegration assistance aimed at socio-economic, social, and psychosocial support. Customised assistance in Kosovo proved to be a factor of consolidation during the second phase of the program implementation, focusing on sustainability to beneficiaries already operating a successful business and interested in strengthening their skills. Additionally, UNDP also managed “at risk cases,” comprised primarily individuals facing high costs associated with the health treatment of relatives. Similarly, in Nepal, UNIRP supported “at risk cases” in order to ensure their socio-economic sustainability through lengthy mediation, training, mentoring, and monitoring. To ensure project sustainability in Burundi, the exit strategy is particularly innovative. It creates a network of associations to seek the assistance of others in case they face an important challenge. This network is supported by a self-funding mechanism from which the members can use the funds to diversify their activities.

**Finding 21: Comprehensive gender support increases women’s representation and contributes to reintegration processes, however UNDP and DPKO capacities may not be sufficient to tackle reintegration gender needs without support of other UN agencies**

Kosovo had a comprehensive gender mainstream strategy put in place, and in Burundi, the 3x6 approach ensures the participation of women in all steps of the program. In Nepal, the Gender Specific Support was well with female ex-combatants making up 24 percent of the beneficiaries. It was operated according to the guidelines for ensuring a gender-friendly environment during counseling in regional offices.

The evaluation did not have the time to investigate in depth the impact of gender-focused programs or the issues pertaining to Gender and Reintegration in DDR with the exception of Nepal and marginally Kosovo. Practitioners continue to recognize the multitude of issues related to gender and reintegration of special needs groups (SNGs), including: 1) blockages which prevent women from accessing DDR programs in the same proportions as men (“hidden women”) because of stigma, lack of knowledge, intimidation, or ineffective communicative strategies, and; 2) prevalence of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) whereby ensuring women’s protection once a DDR program remains critical.[[37]](#footnote-37) The truth remained that, “despite an existing desire to mainstream gender in DDR, there is an overall lack of knowledge and skills for how to do so.”[[38]](#footnote-38) Also, moving from developments at the policy level to practical implementation was identified by UNDP as a main stumbling block and the “cultural barriers to advocacy for, and work on, gender issues were identified as overarching challenges.”[[39]](#footnote-39)

**Finding 22:** **Little attention has been given to vulnerable groups and individuals (wounded, handicapped, elderly, widows) in UNDP Reintegration processes**

This trend is not particular to UNDP. In cases where UNDP seemed to take the lead in reintegration efforts, SNGs were rarely mentioned, attended to, or a subject of particular interest. This was the case in DRC, Somalia, Burundi, and Sudan. Even so, ex-combatants with disabilities were part of the interim reintegration program in Sudan and received treatment and support. However, the number of cases involved in the project was not very high in relation to the total, and the packages received were not well tailored to meet their specific needs. Genuine efforts and concern took place in Nepal, whereby critical cases received specific attention, either as referrals for health, psychosocial, or legal support, or through social reintegration or community counseling and mediation, including cases with trauma, distress, substance abuse, etc.

**Finding 23: Although central for the treatment of “at risk” cases, psychosocial support remains the “poor child” of reintegration with most cases handled on an ad-hoc basis.**

Ex-combatants may return home deeply traumatized by war. In Nepal, psychosocial support was needed for up to 10 percent of the known caseload of the VMLR population. In general terms, psychosocial reintegration (in DDR programs) has been largely underdeveloped, particularly for adults, and there remains an institutional and programmatic need to “raise awareness about the importance of psychosocial reintegration and to identify partners with capacity to support psychosocial programs.”[[40]](#footnote-40)

**4.4 Other Findings**

**Finding 24: Per capita analyses of UNDP-led reintegration initiatives present significant differences, which complicate the meaning of an average “$ per person” ratio; resource mobilization remains a ‘cookie cutter’ approach**

While Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) mechanisms seem to be functioning well, there is a minimum ceiling in costs that usually need to be considered, which could be estimated at $800 per person. With this figure as a starting point, “the cost per demobilized person will increase depending on how much greater the per capita income of the country is.”[[41]](#footnote-41) While the cost dedicated to reintegration is pegged to an average global standard, defining the appropriate unit cost for the reintegration of one ex-combatant depends on a much wider array of national, regional, and local factors and on indicators that can be interrelated or conflicting. These factors are not taken into account when estimating reintegration costs for DDR, making it difficult to create a standard per capita analysis.

**Finding 25: Opportunities are present for multi-year, country-specific funding strategies**

The Secretary-General suggested that UN actors should establish “multi-year, country-specific funding strategies to support reintegration programs” through a “One UN” approach in pursuit of early and substantial resource mobilization from donors. This approach is being pursued in Côte d’Ivoire. The case of Nepal illustrates the possibility for the UNDP and its partners to: 1) invest in reintegration programs through BCPR funding; 2) harness the catalytic PBF funding, and; 3) organize a multi-year strategic funding strategy for all the various steps of a DDR processes.

**Finding 26: Community Security Projects led by UNDP are seen as proactive, innovative initiatives, though they had limited impact on the ground**

UNDP is advocating for creative and innovative programming initiatives with the concept of Community Security Projects. There is a growing tendency to believe that community security structures would be the solution for a real DDR process. However, the Youth at Risk project in Somalia did not provide sufficient incentives for hard-core militia elements to give up their weapons and return to civil life. While helping Youth at Risk is a very valuable objective, in most cases, these types of projects do not attract the hard-core combatants that pose a larger security threat. On the contrary, particularly in Haiti, the MINUSTAH demonstrated that initiatives and projects contextually adapted to immediate responses and local needs tended to play a crucial role in dealing with local armed and violent groups.

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**5. Lessons Learned & Best Practices**

**Lesson 1: Measurement and review of reintegration initiatives depends on the quality of impact-monitoring and assessment mechanisms**

Sound and reliable M&E tools support effective and well-informed reintegration strategies and analysis. However, impact-monitoring and assessment mechanisms for measuring UNDP reintegration initiatives do not always receive sufficient support. Reintegration program databases need to be appropriately designed from the early stages of the program in order to support effective M&E systems. The lack of an effective database system at any point of the project life cycle will weaken M&E functions and, by extension, weaken any review and redesign of reintegration processes.

**Lesson 2: Mainstreaming conflict analysis in DDR facilitates conflict sensitive programming and implementation in difficult political contexts**

Mainstreaming conflict analysis identifies interactions between the program and its context, prioritizes the range of issues needed to be addressed in program implementation, and facilitates the timely design of an appropriate DDR exit strategy. Conflict sensitivity is most effective when it is built in from the program design and developed throughout the project life cycle. Systematic conflict analysis of local political, economic, and sector security dynamics enables the program to take timely action in case one of the program activities threatens to feed into or cause a conflict situation or dynamic.[[42]](#footnote-42)

**Lesson 3: Interagency cooperation in reintegration processes highlights the comparative advantages, expertise, and added value of each particular UN entity**

The benefits and added value of joint proposals through an interagency cooperation mechanism highlight the comparative advantage and added value of each UN agency when joint partners have the technical capacity to implement a joint program. A proposed ceiling of the “ideal” number of agencies involved in joint programming is difficult to define, although a proposed maximum of four agencies appear to lessen the likelihood of individual agencies with limited capacity slowing down the implementation process and derailing the cooperative process.

Communication and information sharing between agencies can help to stimulate policy and dialogue sharing, coordination; cross fertilization of experiences and expertise and sharing of concerns demand UN inter-institutional responses. Moreover, increased cooperation between UNDP and UN DPKO may bring better clarity when identifying country priorities and needs in regards to DDR.

The effectiveness of interagency cooperation in reintegration programming depends on the extent to which their political willingness, technical strengths, and managerial capacities are all linked together. That said, joint projects appear to work better when clear and independent components to be implemented, financed, and monitored by the different agencies are identified.

**Lesson 4: An emphasis on community involvement, local ownership, and ex-combatants personal investment in the projects can help contribute to the success of reintegration programs**

Many of the reintegration successes such as Côte d’Ivoire, Nepal, and Burundi can be attributed to the systematic emphasis on sustainability and local ownership during implementation. This emphasis helps in identifying the needs and priorities of the benefactors, reduces the risk of conflict re-engagement and helps restore the self-esteem, hope, and dignity of ex-combatants. Moreover, ex-combatants contributing to the reintegration program financially leads to successful projects.It can also have a positive impact on overall social cohesion in the communities.

**Lesson 5: Targeted gender-specific support increases the ratios of women participating in reintegration processes**

A well designed gender-specific strategy beginning at the design and conceptualization phase of a reintegration program will not only support the continuing presence of women and young girls within a reintegration program, but will also increase the rates of completion by female participants of training or education initiatives or those pursuing microenterprises.

**Lesson 6: Customized assistance throughout the reintegration process has a key impact on sustainability of individuals and associated groups**

Customized assistance is a factor contributing to the sustainability and of consolidation of individual and/or collective reintegration benefits; although it may be a long and fastidious process. While financially difficult to sustain, continuous customized assistance is a key strategy to improve success rates and sustainability of socio-economic investments for a given group of ex-combatants and associated personnel.

**Lesson 7: An ideal DDR design considers a mix of individually focused reinsertion/reintegration initiatives and community-based initiatives.**

Community-based programs appear best suited for programs aiming to: 1) help communities to accept the ex-combatants and to not feel discriminated as compared to ex-combatants; 2) support social cohesion of the communities; 3) prevent or reduce conflict through negotiated solutions; 4) prevent idle or destabilized youth from joining the conflict, and; 5e) prevent or reduce conflict through civilian disarmament and arms control. However, when dealing with ex-combatants representing a major threat to security in terms of violence and/or as spoilers to the peacebuilding process, ‘classic’ individually targeted programs may still be the most appropriate approach. These initiatives are also suitable for situations where there are very specific and well-targeted populations.

**Lesson 8: Community security programs are not a replacement for traditional DDR but an alternative, complementary, or follow up of a DDR program**

Community security projects led by UNDP are seen as proactive and innovative initiatives. Indeed, in some cases, initiatives and projects contextually adapted to immediate responses, and local needs tended to play a crucial role in dealing with local armed and violent groups. However, overall they have limited impact as they do not provide incentives for hard-core combatants to give up their weapons and return to civil life.

**Lesson 9: The success of community-recovery initiatives depends in part on the proportions of ex-combatants per capita**

The benefits of having the ex-combatants participating in local associations or local economic groups have been demonstrated in various reviews and studies, however the appropriate ratio between local community members and ex-combatants participating an integrated socio-economic reintegration effort remains problematic.[[43]](#footnote-43) In DRC, the original budgets of the CRRP were building upon a 50/50 ratio between members of the community and ex-combatants. However, the project changed the ratio to 70 percent ex-combatants and 30 percent members of the community, creating a social imbalance in the internal discussions and organization of the Economic Interest Groups.[[44]](#footnote-44)

**Lesson 10: A relevant and successful training program is based on employment-market opportunity mapping and assessment aids reintegration of ex-combatants**

Without opportunity mapping and assessment, training program relevance is limited, as it is not linked to the communities’ needs nor market demands. Thorough employment opportunity, market, and economic recovery assessments at the local level significantly increases the chances of micro-project sustainability as well as the overall socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

**Lesson 11: Training is not reintegration in and of itself; it is a means to support an overall reintegration process**

Training or vocational skills training of ex-combatants seems to be a first step in their professional and socio-economic reintegration. However, in many instances, DDR programs assume this will lead to sustainable livelihoods, which oftentimes does not occur. Vocational training is simply part of a continuous, systemic, and coordinated reintegration process whereby the ex-combatant receives an adequate preparation for further employment, self-employment, and integration in the economic market.

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**6. Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1: Conflict analysis and development of alternative and complementary approaches need to be reinforced**

Field visits and review of literature have all emphasized the need to deepen and mainstream conflict analysis throughout the various phases (linear/nonlinear) of a DD and/or R process, in order to develop clear and common political and operational strategies that are nationally owned, particularly in contexts where DDR processes are (politically) stalled or where there is no longer a formal DDR (or reintegration) program. This approach proved to be central in Burundi and Nepal and created a firm grounding for inter-agency/government efforts to design alternative or complementary approaches (Haiti, Somalia, Eastern Congo, CAR), which evolved in highly fluid and volatile environments. In order to be conflict sensitive a program has to make all of its staff and stakeholders aware of potential conflicts and manage and train them accordingly.[[45]](#footnote-45)

**Recommendation 2: Following an initial conflict/risk analysis, UNDP should question whether it wants to engage in situations where basic stability, peace, and political conditions are not in place; decision-making on “grey” cases should rely on internal and external oversight**

The “1000 projects” in Côte d’Ivoire was a quick-fix response to a serious risk of resurging violence. Based on a thorough conflict analysis, the UNDP must determine whether to be involved in disarmament and demobilization (CAR) or reintegration activities when basic conditions are not fulfilled. Too many field examples prove that entering into these partial, informal, and in many cases endless processes (Haiti, DRC, and Somalia)—along with the limited, if not void, impact of UNDP efforts—may end up by creating more expectations than recovery. In order to assess risk and opportunity scenarios of involving the program in a particular direction, UNDP should ensure that the analytical review of all sensitive cases and the decision-making process in respect to these “go/no-go” decisions is shared between HQ and respective COs.

**Recommendation 3: UNDP BCPR should develop a sound and strategic Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in order to track, study, and disseminate reintegration lessons, practices, and operational models**

UN DPKO missions as well as UNDP reintegration programs rarely constitute dedicated M&E units and functions for DDR sections, program, and initiatives. This shortage of M&E leads to a loss of institutional memory delimiting the use of lessons learned and best practices. This is related to the benefits BCPR would derive through increasing its internal BCPR capacity to conduct in-depth assessments of DDR programming in different UNDP COs. In coordination with interested field COs, UNDP BCPR should consider setting up a dedicated M&E Unit that would advise, monitor, evaluate, and capitalize on lessons learned and best practices of field DDR practice. UNDP should also support inter-CO exchanges for high-quality database systems to maximize its support of M&E for future reintegration processes.

**Recommendation 4: An increased effort in UNDP BCPR knowledge management (M&E, Research, and Promotion/Dissemination) should favor the development of standard operating reintegration models in “non-standard” approaches**

The fluidity, diversity, and complexity of new and challenging approaches in contemporary DDR has led to the production of new conceptual approaches. One of the best current examples is the production of the “Second Generation DDR” produced by DPDKO. UNDP needs to invest in developing new approaches on new reintegration schemes being developed not only in DDR operations but also through community recovery, community security and related initiatives in order to improve its know-how and be in a position to support new avenues for building upon the failures and gaps of ‘classical DDR operations.

**Recommendation 5: UNDP CO should synergize IAWG’s financial, human and organizational resources to kick-start gender-and-DDR-related initiatives**

The IAWG brings together twenty-two entitles as major contributors, and stakeholders to the DDR process. Among these entities some are specifically mandated with affect gender and women’s concerns and vulnerabilities including UNWOMEN. In other cases, agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF have considerable capacities and institutional resources that can be effectively harnessed to increase dedicated support to women’s reintegration and comprehensive gender programing in reintegration during DDR processes. Targeted IAWG resource allocations in this regard could enhance gender-targeted efforts for reintegration within DDR programs.

The Kosovo resettlement program and Nepal’s UNIRP has proved that customized support and mentoring could support an effective reintegration of female ex-combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups. Nevertheless, field studies recognize that blockages still prevent women from accessing DDR programs in proportion to men, and that the prevalence of gender-based violence throughout DDR programs remains critical. In the past IAWG members have proposed seed-money to kick-start gender and DDR-related initiatives as well as onsite country-specific DDR and gender trainings. UNDP should invest and capitalize on this proposed partnership in order to develop and implement comprehensive gender support strategies in its DDR initiatives.

**Recommendation 6**: **In order to better evaluate DDR initiatives and to better coordinate with other stakeholders, UN programs should be less self-focused and more cognizant of wider political and strategic reintegration strategies**

UNDP’s evaluation and programmatic literature very often tends to ignore the role of other institutional or private stakeholders in the presentation of the overall results contributing to security and stability in a particular setting. This makes it difficult to determine the impact of UNDP reintegration efforts in contributing to the achievement of security and stability in post-conflict environment. This self-focused perspective can limit, or even harm cooperation with legitimate national commissions (DRC, Haiti) and can translate into overly ambitious programming scenarios (Haiti, Somalia), which ironically require a more coordinated and harmonized reintegration approach.

**Recommendation 7: Strategic and operational requirements should take priority over agreements on structural integration**

Structurally integrated DDR units have proven to be ineffective and dysfunctional. After analyzing various country cases, external observers have concluded that the efforts to achieve integration managerially have been developed in vain; integration should be seen as and means to discover “constructive ways to work together.”[[46]](#footnote-46) Noting that poor planning frameworks remain one of the biggest obstacles to enhanced collaboration between peacekeeping operations and UNDP, the DDR community of practice recommended that “operational requirements should always take priority over agreements on structural reintegration.”[[47]](#footnote-47) Based on the need for maximum clarity of roles and responsibilities, DDR teams on the ground should pursue the creation of “common strategic frameworks” drawing on comparative advantages of each organization.

**Recommendation 8: UNDP BCPR should design a sound mainstreaming and operational policy in support of particular vulnerable or unrepresented groups**

Although particular reinsertion initiatives (Nepal, Kosovo) have demonstrated the necessity and additional value of vesting in support of particular underrepresented or vulnerable groups, such as female ex-combatants, the evaluation has highlighted the general apparent lack of coherence and/or interest in tackling these issues in a comprehensive and articulated policy. Field experience demonstrates that more national commissions (DRC, Burundi) invest in gender-responsive strategies, and that informed program design should integrate a greater gender lens.[[48]](#footnote-48) Also, all DDR practitioners recognize the need to raise awareness about “the importance of psychosocial reintegration and to identify partners with capacity to support psychosocial programs.”[[49]](#footnote-49)

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Since UNDP’s engagement in the early 1990s in DDR, shifting conflict dynamics and emergent caseloads prompted UNDP to commission an evaluation on selected reintegration programs of ex-combatants. While the reintegration evaluation is not exhaustive, clear and definitive successes, as well as shortcomings have been unearthed it provides space for UNDP to further investigate the environment for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

**Complementarity and Coordination:** A critical component for DDR and the reintegration of ex-combatants is harnessing the complementarities of mandates *between* the political components of a PKO or SPM and the comparative advantages *amongst* AFPs. Inter-agency coordination remains a minimum requirement with UNDP HQ making considerable headway in this regard. Structural integration has proven ineffective, though informal coordination is providing avenues for results. Effective programming thus requires senior UN management buy in and support at both programmatic and political levels in the field and HQ. The reintegration of ex-combatants is a multi-stakeholder and multi-dimensional process whereby the UNDP is a lead actor though not the only actor. Unlike DPKO, which is mandated by the UNSC to undertake DDR, UNDP can exercise more discreet and analytical decision making on levels, type, and scope of engagement—“go and no-go” areas. In this light a continuing effort at conflict and political analysis is foundational to reintegrating ex-combatants. Nowadays, new joint information sharing and strategic thinking in NY with UN DPKO seems to be developing, but the extent to which this will generate a new substantive working model at the field level and an improved inter-sectoral and inter-institutional programming approach between UNDP, UN DPKO, and UN DPA remains to be seen, particularly on reintegration issues. In fact, this positive trend may be seemingly contrary to some DDR field initiatives, whereby UNDP is perceived as the sole potential operator acting outside the margins of local and national government, including DDR commission and support for reintegration. In this regard Sudan, Haiti, Nepal, and DRC are instructive.

**DDR and SSR/CVR:** Other considerations merit closer review. Expertise in this area (SSR/CVR) may come more from conflict prevention and recovery thematic areas than from livelihoods. The DDR/SSR nexus, which remains tenuous in UNDP programming may benefit from a closer look, particularly in contexts where UNDP has a lead and when subsequent financing from the UN Peace building Fund, particularly in countries on the priority agenda of the Peace Building Commission (Burundi, CAR). Notwithstanding, the fact is that UN DPKO has more concrete expertise working on SSR in PKO mandated missions. On the edge of SSR, DD, and Armed Violence Reduction methodologies; UNDP-led CSP approaches seem to be challenged translating highly conceptual and methodological frameworks into applicable approaches relevant to fragile and sensitive political and security environments in evolving contexts. Reaching a significant as well as relevant number of beneficiaries without exceeding community-absorption limits is difficult, especially when the mission evolves parallel to a peacekeeping mission with broader political, military, and security objectives.

**Reintegration Approaches:** There are no globally standardized means, methods, or approaches to the reintegration of ex-combatants; the reintegration of ex-combatants can occur with or without DDR. The shift towards community-based reintegration offers opportunities to move away from a “one size fits all” reintegration approach. Evidence demonstrates that a mix of “individual and dual” targeted, “customized assistance” is more likely to be sustainable. The reintegration of SNGs and concerted efforts linking socio-economic, social, and psychosocial reintegration enhance female representation in DDR programs. In Nepal and Kosovo, it appeared that a comprehensive gender strategy and, by extension, a comprehensive strategy in support to SNGs seemed to be a very effective means to facilitate a more sustainable and effective reintegration of female ex-combatants. When taken through this lens, gender strategies are a unique and creative form of ‘customized assistance‘ reintegrating ex-combatants.

**Reintegration Partnerships:** There is considerable space and scope for burgeoning partnerships with other international institutional and regional organizations, such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the newly created African Union DDR Capacity Programme (AU DDR CP), where the possibility to benefit from mutually profitable expertise and funding exists. In terms of efficiency, a closer look at how the World Bank TDRP’s flexibility and responsiveness of this regional African initiative complements the deployment of its experienced technical assistance may be warranted. These assets have supported the African Union DDR Capacity Program and other WB National DDR capacity-building or reintegration initiatives in South Sudan, CAR, and Côte d’Ivoire.

**Reintegration Costs:** While it remains difficult to develop a realistic understanding of reintegration unit costs in various settings, among the most interesting elements of this review is the observation that *‘resource allocation’* for reintegration programs is not customized—perhaps representing the most significant *‘cookie cutter’* approach to DDR Reintegration. The *‘real’* cost for reintegrating ex-combatants is not assessed; rather a global average rate is applied. Financing reintegration is also an area that would require a more thorough review. Partial review of the supporting role of the PBF in UNDP initiatives seems warranted, for example the impact resulting from Nepal and Burundi allowing UNDP and its partners to finance the continuum of strategic and complementary approaches to DD and Reintegration.

**M & E:** Although time and documentary resources were insufficient to conduct a comprehensive review of each reintegration process and generate comprehensive and well-informed findings and conclusions, the evaluation indicated that the effectiveness and sustainability of reintegrating ex-combatants relies on common and relatively simple organizational and programmatic settings. UNDP seems to be experiencing challenges in regard to monitoring and evaluation outcomes and impact levels, although initiatives like in Nepal proved that a concerted and institutional effort toward M&E greatly improves the credibility of the program and the confidence that the donors would invest in its reintegration initiatives. In DRC and Haiti, with the exception in Sudan, UNDP experienced difficulties in setting up and using effective M&E systems and units for reintegration programming. This led to losses of institutional memory and program information, which could have further supported field and HQ practitioners in future activities. As an illustration of a possible way forward, the work developed by the UNIRP Program in Nepal of a systematic M&E tracking is exemplary. Additionally, the World Bank TDRP approach to Knowledge and Management in the Great Lakes Region remains a model to be followed. Conflict mainstreaming expertise is required in a context whereby UNDP and DPKO develop mutual interpersonal and inter institutional coordination efforts. Such innovative reintegration approaches requires a rethink of M & E systems for measuring the impact of reintegration. Dedicating more UNDP resources toward M & E would substantially improve reintegration programs. The complexity of measuring reintegration impact may correlate directly to UNDP’s struggle in articulating its contributions to peacebuilding and stability, which are in fact the overall goals and aims of DDR Reintegration. Moreover strengthening M & E capacities may well enable UNDP to capture reintegration successes that are currently hidden.

**Sustainability and Relevance**: In too many instances, it appeared that the brevity of program implementation cycles jeopardized the sustainability of livelihoods interventions in comparison to the continuity of DPKO reinsertion initiatives financed through assessed budgets (Haiti). Quality and duration of training as well as national, ex-combatant, and local ownership appear to be a risk factor impacting the sustainability of reintegration initiatives as was the case in DRC, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti. While UNDP is progressively moving its programming towards CBR approaches, other innovative schemes such as building upon savings or the creation of economic associations demonstrate the importance of taking community participation and involvement in new and innovative directions.

Sustainability of social and economic reintegration is only part of a wider contextual economic and political approach and part of a broader integrated strategy, emanating not only from one UN actor, but many, if not all. In this regard, reintegration schemes need to be well articulated, tested, and assessed before further investments are committed that to go scale. ”Pilot” approaches can lead to significant local lessons learned before investing in “major” DD and R schemes (Sudan). This provides space to modify programming approaches that may bear the risk of being sealed in their own methodological and operational boxes (Haiti, Somalia) without taking into account the evolutions of local power and security dynamics. UNIRP in this regard is a model of inspiration given its dual ”conflict sensitivity monitoring” and ”political control” that led all UN agencies to adhere to well-crafted M&E and communication and sensitization procedures that simultaneously facilitated risk mitigation and program monitoring. Part of this monitoring is linked to the issue of the sensitive relations that may traditionally prevail between local DDR counterparts and UNDP or the UN as a whole. That being said, risks of disengagement on the issue of ex-combatant reintegration exceed the risks of re-engagement for UNDP. This evaluation has proven instrumental in addressing certain elements regarding the direction UNDP may need to consider when readapting its approach to reintegrating ex-combatants with, or without DDR.

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| EUROPEAN UNION | Staff is new, with no specific knowledge of DDR |
| NETHERNLANDS EMBASSY | Staff is new, with no specific knowledge of DDR |
| NORWAY | Ambassador has been PNGed. Almost no presence on the ground since then |

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