**TERMINAL EVALUATION OF THE UNDP/GOVERNMENT OF BOTSWANA PROGRAMME SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POVERTY REDUCTION (2005 – 2009)**

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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Any errors or misunderstandings arising out of the interviews, documentary reviews, and subsequent analysis are the consultant’s own responsibility.

**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

 AEET Action for Economic Empowerment Trust

ALDEP Arable Land Development Programme

CA Competition Authority

CAP Community Action Plan

CBO Community-Based Organisation

CRP Community Resilience Project

CSO Central Statistics Office

DETs District Extension Teams

DIA Department of Industrial Affairs

DIT Department of International Trade

DLGDP Department of Local Government Development Planning

DTCA Department of Trade and Consumer Affairs

FAP Financial Assistance Policy

GoB Government of Botswana

ISPAAD Integrated Support Programme for Arable Agricultural Development

LIMID Livestock Management Infrastructure Development

LSC Local Steering Committee

MDGs Millenium Development Goals

MFDP Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

MLG Ministry of Local Government

MSCPR Multi-Sectoral Committee on Poverty Reduction

NDP National Development Plan

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NSPR National Strategy for Poverty Reduction

PSC Programme Steering Committee

RADP Remote Area Development Programme

RDCD Rural Development Coordination Division

SME Small and Medium Enterprise

TOR Terms of Reference

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

VDC Village Development Committee

VET Village Extension Team

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. The NSPR was implemented in two distinct phases: Phase 1 [2005 – 2007] and Phase 2 [2008 – 2009]. The NSPR evaluation was undertaken to assess the extent of achievement of planned outputs and to suggest ways of improving the programming of UNDP Country poverty programmes.
2. The methodology of the evaluation involved key informant interviews with implementing partners and district officials using an evaluation questionnaire and Focus Group Discussions with beneficiary communities (CRP communities and Joint Garment Clusters).
3. Summary of study findings:
4. Most of the planned outputs were achieved in the various components. Annual Poverty Monitoring reports were produced for 2005/06 and 2006/07. The disaggregated Poverty Maps and the Poverty Datum Line based on the 2001 Population and Housing Census Survey and the 2002/03 Household Income and Expenditure Survey were produced. The Competition Authority was established and the Government was capacitated to develop a national position prior to the trade negotiations.
5. The Community Resilience Programme (CRP) is an important component that has potential to enhance the effective uptake and utilization of other government programmes to reduce poverty in a sustainable manner. The empowerment of communities to take charge of their development process is critical to change the dependency syndrome mindset. The CRP component should be rolled out but focus only on capacity development and leave the communities to mobilize resources for implementation as an indicator of resilience.
6. The design of the Cluster Development Concept under the garment sector had technical flaws. These have been addressed by the Department of Industrial Affairs in the re-design of the cluster development concept which incorporates support firms.
7. The important factors that contributed to the achievement of planned outcomes included UNDP technical support especially through consultants and provision of UNDP funding for activities. The factors that adversely affected the realization of some of the planned outcomes included UNDP procurement delays and lack of technical capacity among the local staff on the Government side, which explain why most of the baseline and impact survey data sets have remained unanalyzed.
8. UNDP contribution to the achievements of poverty reduction outputs was viewed to be very significant.
9. UNDP partnerships to the realization of poverty reduction goals was judged to be less effective and less efficient mainly on account of UNDP’s inefficient communications system with implementing partners, and the inefficient procurement system which led to unprecedented delays which negatively affected programme performance.
10. The programme governance and management was perceived to be very effective and efficient mainly on account of existence of clear reporting structures.
11. The use of resources for poverty reduction was assessed to be very efficient mainly on account of the principle of value for money in the implementation process.
12. The sustainability of poverty reduction outcomes were judged to be sustainable because the policy and strategy outputs are integral to the Government’s business and have been integrated into government processes. However there are some leakages of government poverty interventions (for example poor targeting of beneficiaries and creation of state dependency syndrome) that threaten the sustainability of some interventions.
13. Policy Recommendations to Improve Future UNDP Country Programmes:
14. UNDP should immediately review and improve the procurement process
15. UNDP should operate as a National Execution Agency by providing funding and technical support to the implementing partners
16. UNDP should develop a framework of advance funds disbursement to the implementing partners with clear accountability guidelines on a quarterly basis. Further disbursements can only be effected after satisfactory accountability of previous advance payments
17. UNDP should strengthen the project implementation structures
18. UNDP should invest in national capacity building on the government side by including skills transfer in contract performance of future consultants/advisors to be hired, and/or through partnerships with local institutions like University of Botswana to design and offer tailor-made short courses.
19. UNDP and other UN Agencies should work together instead of competing e.g. UNDP and UNICEF helping a sector separately on the same objective.
20. UNDP should develop effective communication strategies for programme interventions to raise their level of performance.
21. UNDP should develop and/or strengthen the monitoring and evaluation system of government poverty interventions.

1. **INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT**

The Government of Botswana adopted the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (NSPR) in 2003 to ensure that poverty efforts were more clear and well coordinated. To enhance the implementation of the strategy, The Government of Botswana and UNDP signed a support agreement which outlined the type of support that government would receive through the GoB/UNDP poverty programme. The poverty support programme was in two phases: Phase 1 (2005 - 2007) and Phase 2 (2008 – 2009). Phase 1 of the project ended in December 2007 and later extended to Phase 2 which ended in December 2009. The extension to Phase 2 was done so as to align the UNDP Country Programmes to the Botswana National Development Plan (NDP) cycle.

Phase 1 of the Poverty Support Programme (2005 – 2007) focused on five strategic areas:

* **Strengthening institutional capacity for the systematic measurement, monitoring and analysis of poverty (Component 1 – Central Statistics Office):** The programme component was expected to deliver three critical outputs that would enhance understanding of poverty in Botswana: a disaggregated national poverty profile and poverty map; an up to date database, a poverty observatory; and a system for updating poverty statistics between Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES). The poverty map was to incorporate analysis of poverty and related phenomena – health, environment, etc – through systematic integration of social and biophysical data. The database was also to incorporate a mechanism for capturing socio-economic data on women from such sources as educational institutions, business organizations, the courts, the police, government departments and women’s NGOs to support effective advocacy for women’s socio-economic empowerment.
* **Trade, investment and the development of Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises Development (Component 2 – Department of Trade and Consumer Affairs, Department of International Trade, and Department of Industrial Affairs):** The first major activity under this component focused on joint production programmes to support supply capacity development in the garments sector. Through joint production, the producers were expected to spread overheads on efficiency enhancing equipment, technical personnel and marketing. This was expected to raise output and quality levels to meet export thresholds and gain access to bigger and more lucrative markets. Through joint procurement, the producers were expected to reduce raw material costs through bulk purchasing and would be better positioned to control fabric quality. Joint production arrangements were also expected to help small producers access services from the government and private sector more efficiently and build more sustainable firms to break into the local and regional retail and distribution networks. The second major activity under this component was the development of a Competition Law. The Competition Law was expected to enhance competition to the extent that competition meets development needs, e.g. improving efficiency and product quality, facilitating innovation, and lowering consumer prices. Competition Law would regulate markets to ensure the attainment of development objectives such as employment creation, SMME development, industrialization, and the protection of consumer and small producers from corporate monopolies.
* **Pilot community renewal/redevelopment with community resilience as strategies for community driven development in rural and urban areas (Component 3 – Ministry of Local Government):** The focus of community renewal with community resilience was *to empower each target community’s capacity to take intentional action to enhance the personal and collective capacity of its citizens and institutions to respond to and influence the course of social and economic change[[1]](#footnote-1)*.

The main activities under the component included:

 (a) Social Mobilization (SM) and Community Capacity Enhancement (CCE) which included measures to strengthen the organizational capacities of poor people, improvement of access to information, strengthening social capital, bridging the gap between the community and leaders and institutions, raising the consciousness of individuals and the community as a collective about their rights and obligations in relation to the development process, and strengthen the human agency. The expected outcome was a resilient community capable of (i) making use of catalytic public programmes to improve their wellbeing, (ii) evaluating their own development needs and to make effective decisions on how best to mobilize and use their scarce resources, and develop and implement viable community development plans, (iii) develop community development activists/leaders as main agents for change in their communities;

(b) making poor rural and urban localities more liveable by upgrading shelter, improving access to related catalytic public investments without any significant new external investment. The envisaged outcomes included: (i) secure tenure and property rights for poor people, (ii) workable building and occupancy standards/controls to protect the value of property, (iii) improved access to and accelerated utilization of government housing schemes, (vi) viable innovative community level partnerships for upgrading shelter and improving wellbeing in poor communities, and (v) employment opportunities in the housing sector in poor localities.

* **Improving people’s access to financial services through sustainable micro-finance (Component 4: Women’s Finance House Botswana):** The component had planned to support Women’s Finance House Botswana to extend credit to the poor. The strategic programme support had been geared to : (i) installation of a Financial and Management Information System (FMIS) to improve the standards of record keeping and accounting, (ii) provision of technical support on marketing and product development, and (iii) resource mobilization. However this component was subsequently withdrawn because of identified implementing agency’s refusal to introduce strategic changes (inclusion of men) and threshold limit (P300 vs P900) which led to disengagement.
* **Capacity development for the secretariat to the Multi-Sectoral Committee on Poverty Reduction [MSCPR][[2]](#footnote-2) to ensure it is able to adequately carry out its oversight functions (Component 5 – RDCD, Ministry of Finance and Development):** The targeted technical support to the MSCPR Secretariat included: (i) recruitment of a Senior Policy Specialist with substantive experience in design and management of poverty reduction strategies, (ii) establishment of a Poverty Observatory within Rural Development Coordination Division (RDCD).

Phase 2 of the Poverty Support Programme (2008 – 2009) involved the completion of some of the activities carried over from Phase 1 and well as new activities. Phase 2 supported the delivery of products in four strategic areas:

1. **Capacity Support for the Implementation of the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction:** Through this component, the programme was planned to deliver products and services in five critical areas, namely, (a) policy and programme analysis, (b) policy and programme coordination, (c) monitoring and evaluation, (d) statistical capacity development. The component was to provide two specialists, a Policy Advisor and a Policy Analyst, to enhance the technical capacity of the secretariat of the Multi-Sectoral committee on Poverty Reduction (MSCPR). The programme was also to provide resources to support the delivery on three key outputs: (i) Improved monitoring of poverty and vulnerability, with particular focus on four pro-poor programmes administered by the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Local Government; (ii) mainstreaming poverty into National and District Development Plans; and (iii) improved national capacity to monitor poverty and inequality.
2. **Trade, Investment and SMME Development:** Botswana’s long term prospects for sustainable pro-poor economic growth were argued to depend on the development of the productive capacity outside the mining sector and thereby raising non-mineral exports significantly. But raising export performance required the effective management of trade and investment relations to promote Botswana’s development goals. Activities under this component included strengthening the capacity within the Ministry of Trade and Industry and its supporting structures e.g. line ministries and the National Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (NCTPN). The specific activities sought to strengthen the regulatory environment for pro-poor investment in order to create employment opportunities, with specific focus on enactment of the Competition Law and the establishment of a Competition Authority. The other activity concerned the completion of the Garment Cluster Pilot Project that was initiated in Phase 1 (2005 – 2007). The initiative, which targets a sector that employs low skilled women, was expected to contribute towards the development of a Cluster Development Strategy to guide the development of artisan-based SMMEs.
3. **Community Resilience Project (CRP):** The component aimed at strengthening the capacity of communities to influence the direction and pace of their own development by consolidating the work done in Phase 1. The particular focus was to strengthen the capacity of community level structures – the CRP Local Steering Committees, Village Development Committees to play their roles. It also supported the implementation of Community Action Plans (CAPs), the development of CRP facilitation tools, and the introduction of CRP to NGOs and CBOs. The project also envisaged the integration of housing into the CRP which entailed a review of the Poverty Alleviation and Housing project of the Ministry of Lands and Housing and a review of constraints on housing for poor people. The project concept was that housing does not only provide shelter, but it is also a critical asset. The project was concerned not only with access to housing to poor people but also with enhancing the role of real estate to leverage economic resource poor people to get out of poverty.
4. **Preparation of the 2010 – 2013 Poverty Component of the Country Programme**: The activities under this component were aimed at laying a foundation for the preparation of a comprehensive poverty component in 2010 – 2013 Country Programme. The component was to support research in critical areas – Access to Financial Services for Poor people; Trade and Poverty linkages; Poverty and Environment linkages; and the Informal Sector; and support a feasibility study on the establishment of an Enterprise Development Centre at the University of Botswana. The component also envisaged support for the preparation of the poverty component of the country programme through the identification of programme poverty outcomes, outputs and supporting activities.

**1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMME SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POVERTY REDUCTION**

The purpose of the terminal evaluation as outlined in the terms of reference (TORs) was to satisfy compliance with corporate policy as a mandatory requirement for projects that come to an end as well as to extract lessons to inform future programming of UNDP Country support for Poverty Reduction Programmes [see Appendix 2 for detailed TORs].

The specific objectives of the terminal evaluation were to:

(i) analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of the results and impacts that the project has been able to achieve against the objectives, targets and indicators stated in the project documents (Phase 1 and Phase 2);

(ii) assess the extent to which UNDP project assistance contributed to outcomes

(iii) assess the extent to which the UNDP partnership strategy was appropriate and effective;

(iv) assess Project governance to determine the adequacy of the management arrangements, how these structures performed, how well they were adhered to and the consequences of the approach to governance employed on the project, especially work planning, work processes and execution;

(v) reflect on effectiveness of the utilization of available resources for poverty reduction; and sustainability of outcomes;

(vi) assess the extent to which issues of gender and human rights were addressed by the project;

(vii) document and provide feedback on lessons learned (both positive and negative) and best practices generated by the project during its implementation to inform future programming of UNDP Country Poverty Programme.

The key questions that guided the evaluation process included:

* To what extent were the stated outcomes or outputs achieved?
* To what extent were the project governance structures adequate and effective?
* What factors contributed to or hindered achievement of intended results?
* To what extent did UNDP project assistance contribute to outcomes?
* To what extent is the UNDP partnership strategy appropriate and effective?
* What key lessons are learnt (i.e. factors that have contributed to project effectiveness or lack thereof) to inform future programming of UNDP Country programmes?

###### **1.3. METHODOLOGY FOR THE EVALUATION**

The methodology for the evaluation of the programme support for implementation of NSPR followed the general framework of assessment of development results which included outputs, outcomes and impact (UNDP, 2006). Outputs are the tangible products (including services) that are directly attributable to the implementation of the NSPR programme. Outputs relate to the completion of planned activities which entails comparison of planned activities in each of the components vis a vis the achievements. Outcomesare theactual or intended changes in development conditions that the NSPR supported. The impact,on the other hand, is the *a*ctual or intended changes in human development as measured by people’s well-being as a result of the Poverty Support Programme intervention. In addition, the evaluation also assessed the contribution of UNDP to the realization of project activities; the project organizational and management effectiveness; the effectiveness of partnerships in the NSPR project. The important lessons for future programming of UNDP Country Poverty Reduction Programmes were distilled.

The methodological approach that the evaluation adopted combined desk reviews, key informant interviews with all relevant stakeholders, and synthesis of findings.

**1.3.1 Desk Review**: The desk review covered two sets of documents, namely:

* Documents directly related to the project: These included project documents, progress reports, evaluation reports, products produced (consultancy reports, feasibility studies), monitoring and evaluation reports, audit reports and minutes of meetings.
* Key Government/partner Documents: These included partner policy, strategy and programme documents that informed the project such as the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction, the Rural Development Policy, the National Development Plan 9, Vision 2016 and other policy and strategy documents relevant to the design and implementation of the project. The reports/publications produced by the various implementing partners in terms of achievement of various outcomes were also reviewed.

**1.3.2 Key Informant Interviews**: The key stakeholders included the relevant programme personnel based at UNDP, project personnel, and counterparts in partner institutions (government departments, civil society and executing agencies). A structured evaluation questionnaire was used to collect the information. The detailed list of stakeholders included:

1. Funding Agencies: UNDP
2. Executing Agency: Socio-Economic Policy Sub-division, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
3. Implementing/Cooperating Agencies: Central Statistics Office; Department of Industrial Affairs (DIA); Department of International Trade (DIT); Department of Trade and Consumer Affairs (DTCA); Department of Local Government Development Planning (DLGDP)
4. Other line Ministries Implementing Pro-poor Poverty Programmes: Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Local Government; Ministry of Lands and Housing
5. District Officials where the CRP sites are located (namely Hukuntsi Sub-District; Charleshill Sub-District; and Palapye Sub-District)

**1.3.3 Focus Group Discussions**

Focus group discussion were held with all beneficiary communities of the CRP (Old Naledi, Chobokwane, Hukuntsi, Karakubis, Lehututu, Lerala, Maunatlala) and the Garment Cluster Pilot Projects (Thamaga and Molepoleole) using an interview guide.

The key informant interviews and focus group discussions revolved around the major themes of assessment of the NSPR programme achievements; assessment of key challenges/failures of the NSPR; assessment of UNDP partnership and contribution to poverty reduction; assessment of programme governance; and recommendations to improve future programming of UNDP poverty programmes.

* 1. **WORK PLAN**

The terminal evaluation was scheduled to be undertaken over a period of 6 (six) weeks from 24th January – 9th March 2011, but there was a two week delay in start of fieldwork due to logistical issues which led to the extension of the period to 15th April 2011. The focus group discussions for beneficiary communities (CRP communities and Joint Garment Industries) were facilitated by a Research Assistant who was conversant in Setswana. The rest of the stakeholders were interviewed in English by the consultant.

**2.** **FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY**

The findings from the study are organized by component as follows: discussion of the achievement of project outcomes [Phase 1 and Phase 2]; key stakeholders assessment of programme performance (which include assessment of factors that contributed or constrained the achievement of planned outputs, UNDP/Government partnerships, UNDP contribution to poverty reduction, sustainability of outcomes, effectiveness and efficiency of programme governance, efficiency of resource use for poverty reduction) and recommendations for future poverty support programming for Botswana.

**2.1 MSCPR COMPONENTS: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR MEASUREMENT, MONITORING, AND ANALYSIS OF POVERTY [COMPONENT 1 – PHASE 1]; SUPPORT FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT DIVISION [COMPONENT 5 - PHASE 1] AND SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POVERTY REDUCTION [COMPONENT 1 – PHASE 2]**

The three components of institutional capacity building for measurement, monitoring, and analysis of poverty [component 1 – phase 1]; support for the Rural Development Coordination Division [component 5 - phase 1] and support for implementation of the national strategy for poverty reduction [component 1 – phase 2] have been grouped together for purposes of analysis because they are inter-related and the activities were mainly driven by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (Multi-Sectoral Committee on Poverty Reduction) and the Central Statistics Office (CSO).

**2.1.1 ACHIEVEMENT OF PLANNED OUTCOMES FOR MSCPR: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR MEASUREMENT, MONITORING, AND ANALYSIS OF POVERTY; SUPPORT FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION DIVISION; AND SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POVERTY REDUCTION**

***2.1.1.1 Improved National Capacity to Measure, Monitor and Analyze Poverty Strengthened***

The improvement of the national capacity to measure, monitor and analyze poverty was achieved through the training of two staff members from CSO in poverty analysis (but unfortunately one resigned to join the private sector); on-job training that was given to CSO staff who were attached to the various consultants who undertook various consultancy assignments (such as the Poverty Datum Line and the Poverty Map) and the various poverty analysis workshops that were attended by the staff. The Dissagregated Poverty Map Report based on the 2001 Population and Housing Census Survey data and the 2002/03 Household Income and Expenditure Survey was published and disseminated by the Central Statistics Office in April 2008. The Poverty Datum Line Report also based on the 2001 Population and Housing Census Survey data and the 2002/03 Household Income and Expenditure Survey was published and disseminated by the Central Statistics Office in July 2008.

The multi-topic survey (MTS) questionnaire was developed from the review of the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) questionnaire and its poverty focus was strengthened by a consultant. CSO implemented the MTS from March 2009 up to April 2010. The data entry and cleaning have been completed and the generation of statistical tables is now on-going. The Statistical Report is expected to be out by April 2011 and the new Poverty Datum Line Report based on the MTS data is expected to be out by May 2011. But the new Poverty Map Report will await the availability of the 2011 Population and Housing Census data in 2012.

The establishment of the Poverty Statistics Unit in CSO was not achieved because no posts could be availed because of the government freeze on expansion of the establishment and recruitment. The Poverty Observatory was not implemented because of lack of consensus of the framework for the observatory.

***2.1.1.2******Strengthened Management and Coordination of the Implementation of the NSPR:*** The capacity of the Rural Development Coordination Division was strengthened through the recruitment of contract staff (the Poverty Advisor and Policy Analyst) that strengthened the capacity of the Multi-Sectoral Committee on Poverty Reduction (MSCPR) and played a key role in the development of the comprehensive implementation plan for the NSPR. In the development of the annual plans for the unit, prioritization of the planned activities of the NSPR was done each year. This improved the coordination of poverty related programmes in the various Departments such as Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Lands &Housing, and Ministry of Health. Two capacity training programmes were organized for the staff of the unit. One of the capacity building workshops was a one week basic STATA training to develop their capacity in data analysis using STATA. The basic STATA training needed to have been followed by other training workshops so as to ground the staff in using the software because it is unrealistic to expect the staff to grasp the analytical skills in the one week basic training workshop. The Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) was not implemented because of capacity constraints.

***2.1.1.3 Improved Monitoring of Poverty, Inequality, and Vulnerability:*** The planned output targets included base line surveys on ALDEP and Livestock Management and Infrastructure Development (LIMID); training of four sectors in impact evaluation; Destitute programme impact survey; Food and Nutrition baseline survey; publication of annual poverty monitoring reports; and national drought and food security assessment and management procedures. In terms of achievements, the baseline surveys for LIMID and ALDEP were carried out in 2009 and the data was entered using CSPRO software but the analysis has not been done and no reports have been produced. The survey based evaluation was done for the LIMID programme only because at the time of the implementation of the survey the ALDEP programme had been phased out and replaced by the Integrated Support Programme for Arable Agriculture Development (ISPAAD). However the only data that was captured was on the agricultural component and the demographic variables while the rest of the data is still in its raw form in the questionnaires. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture did basic analysis on some of the variables of interest in the Agriculture module of the questionnaire that was captured and produced a preliminary report. The rest of the data is yet to be entered and analyzed. The destitute survey based evaluation, which had included a module on Food and Nutrition, was also undertaken but the data was not analyzed and no reports published yet. The key constraint that was highlighted by the MFDP stakeholders was inadequate capacity to handle the analysis of data given that the contract of the Poverty Advisor expired in 2009 before the completion of the analytical work. What this suggests is that the capacity of the staff was not sufficiently built by the Poverty Advisor on techniques of data analysis to generate the required reports. For the future it is recommended that for hired consultant staff, one of the key performance areas to be factored in their contracts is development/transfer of skills to local staff for sustainability of outcomes.

The monitoring and evaluation framework was developed for ALDEP and LIMID, which the sectors use for regular reporting of activities and outputs, but the key challenge is that there is no systematic analysis of that data to inform on the poverty trends in the various sectors due to capacity constraints.

In terms of publication of Annual poverty Monitoring Reports, two reports (i.e. for 2006/07 and 2007/08) have been published and disseminated.

***2.1.1.4 Poverty Mainstreaming Tools Developed:*** The planned outputs included the development of the mainstreaming tools and the review of the NSPR policy content. In terms of achievements, two sectoral reviews were completed and draft reports have been produced but not yet published. These include (a) policies and programmes for economic diversification, employment and poverty reduction, and (b) social protection for vulnerability and poverty reduction. The sector working groups (commonly referred to as reference groups) were established for the two reviews. However no tools were developed yet for mainstreaming poverty into sector development process.

***2.1.1.5 Review of the National Drought and Food Security Assessment and Management Proceedures***

A review of the national drought and household food security system was conducted in January 2010 and completed in May 2010 with funding from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). This resulted in the restructuring of the Food & Poverty Policy Committees and the establishment of a Vulnerability Assessment & Analysis System for Botswana to inform policy decision making. Significant progress has been achieved in the development of baseline profiles based on the household economy approach.

***2.1.1.6 Poverty Data Archiving System***

The strategy of CSO is to develop an archiving system for all the data under its possession and not only the poverty data. The Integrated Statistical Database System Project is currently on-going. The first phase of the project has been completed which includes: (a) development of the system of user requirements, (b) inventory of existing data sets, (c) systems to which the various data sets are associated to, (d) nature of publications produced with the various data sets. Phase 2 of the project involves the development of the data archiving system but has been put on halt to await the 2011 Population and Housing Census Survey data.

***2.1.1.7 National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS)***

The implementation of the activities under this outcome was deferred to the establishment of the autonomous Statistics Organization as provided for by the 2009 Statistics Act passed by parliament.

In conclusion, the achievement of planned activities under these components was high.

**2.1.2 KEY CHALLENGES OF THE MSCPR COMPONENTS: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR MEASUREMENT, MONITORING, AND ANALYSIS OF POVERTY; SUPPORT FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT DIVISION; AND SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POVERTY REDUCTION COMPONENTS**

The key stakeholders for these components included Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (Multi-Sectoral Committee on Poverty Reduction [MSCPR]), Central Statistics Office, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health.

The key challenges that were experienced by the MSCPR under the various components included lack of local capacity to sustain outcomes, the UNDP rigid procurement procedures, lack of adequate funds, policy shift from poverty reduction to poverty eradication, and unsustainability of poverty programmes.

The glaring lack of local capacity is in the area of data analysis and report production. While a lot of baseline data and impact survey data has been collected under the different programmes, the lack of analysis of such data posses a great challenge. It should be noted during the lifetime of the NSPR programme, the components heavily relied on consultants to drive the analytical work. The stakeholders argued that poverty policy analysis was a new area and so they lacked the necessary skills. It is recommended that adequate local capacity in data analysis be developed in poverty measurements, poverty diagonistics and the use of softwares such as STATA, SPSS.

The UNDP rigid procurement procedures of consultancy services sometimes delayed the progress and as a result a lot of assignments were left pending, which partly explains why the necessary expertise could not be got to help with analysis of data sets. The UNDP contract procedures negatively impacted on progress. Lack of flexibility didn’t allow for the redesign in the process of implementation. It is recommended that the UNDP bureaucratic procurement procedures be reviewed for smooth implementation of activities.

The MSCPR also reported lack of adequate funds to provide the necessary materials needed to implement the new reporting indicators. Adequate funding was not provided for follow-ups at the district level, the adoption of new data capturing tools, and the general monitoring of poverty programmes. The NSPR had no funding to drive the poverty programmes from the government side, while funding from the UNDP side did not cover all that needed to be done under the NSPR. It is recommended that adequate funding be provided for monitoring of poverty programmes.

The policy shift from poverty reduction to poverty eradication has resulted in a stalemate in the programme with the mandate shifted from MFDP to office of the President. It is recommended that appropriate policy frameworks be developed to support any policy shifts and there should be effective communication to ensure continuity.

The high turnover of staff also posed a major challenge. As much as local staff were trained on poverty analysis and/or attached to consultants for skills transfer, the staff high turnover rate in search of greener pastures especially in the private sector dealt a blow to local capacity development. A case in point is where one of the staff in CSO who had undertaken poverty analysis training resigned to join the private sector. The fast tracking of the transformation of CSO to an autonomous body may be able to reverse the trend of high staff turnover by paying competitive salaries to attract and retain high quality staff.

The lack of sustainability of the various poverty programmes was also a major challenge. The lack of sustainability is accounted for by a number of factors such as poor design and targeting of the programmes, the non-commitment of the beneficiaries to proper implementation of the programs in a sustainable manner due to the dependency syndrome. While there are several poverty interventions (such the destitute programme, the orphan programme, the Home Based Care programme), they are poorly targeted where the benefits continue going to unintended beneficiaries. It is not uncommon to find the same persons benefitting from all programmes which diminishes the incentive to work and just depend on state handouts. Even the poverty programmes administered under Ministry of Agriculture (such as LIMID and ISPAAD) have suffered great abuse by the beneficiaries which compromises their sustainability for poverty alleviation. The wisdom in the design of LIMID 2 and ISPAAD which require beneficiary contribution is an important step in the right direction to enhance beneficiary commitment and success of the interventions. However some loopholes especially under ISPAAD where the beneficiaries just plough the land for purposes of getting paid for ploughing and thereafter abandon the fields (e.g by not weeding the crops) need to be closed. A possible policy option would be to pay the ploughing money after the harvest to give an incentive to the beneficiaries to attend to the fields. The consultant recommends that eligibility criteria for access to various poverty interventions be reviewed with a view of correctly targeting the beneficiaries and eliminating multiple access to government handouts. In addition, it is recommended that effective poverty monitoring information systems be strengthened for all interventions.

**2.1.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MSCPR COMPONENTS: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING FOR MEASUREMENT, MONITORING, AND ANALYSIS OF POVERTY; SUPPORT FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT CORDINATION DIVISION[[3]](#footnote-3); AND SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POVERTY REDUCTION COMPONENTS**

The summary of the policy recommendations to improve the performance of the components under the MSCPR include:

1. Capacity building of the staff in techniques of data analysis
2. Availing the Food & Poverty Policy Coordination Section with adequate funding for management and monitoring of various poverty programmes
3. A critical review of the eligibility criteria for access to various state programmes to target the right beneficiaries and eliminate multiple access for sustainability
4. The UNDP rigid procurement processes need to be reviewed so that they do not pose as a binding constraint to the implementation of activities
5. UNDP should support the strengthening of the poverty monitoring information systems for the various interventions

**2.2 TRADE AND SME DEVELOPMENT [COMPONENT 2 – PHASE 1 AND COMPONENT 2 – PHASE 2]**

**2.2.1 ACHIEVEMENT OF OUTCOMES UNDER TRADE AND SME DEVELOPMENT COMPONENTS**

***2.2.1.1 (a) Expanded Opportunity for Creation of Employment and the Reduction of Poverty; and (b) A stronger and more Pro-poor Regulatory Environment for Investment and Competition***

The key achievements under these outcomes include the passing of the 2009 Competition Act by parliament in December 2009; the preparation of the proposed organizational structure of the Competition Authority of Botswana in collaboration with UNCTAD in December 2008; the appointment of the Commission [Tribunal] for the Competition Authority in July 2010; the establishment of the Interim Competition Authority Secretariat in July 2010; the review of the institutional set-up for the operationalization of the Botswana Competition Authority in August 2010 and the induction course for the Commission on Competition Law. The induction course covered the Competition Law and Corporate Governance which was conducted by experts from the region and from the wider international Community. The Commission also undertook a benchmarking tour of South Africa and Zambia in November 2010 to learn lessons on the operation of the Competition Authority (CA). The Layperson’s regulations for the conduct of the proceedings of the Competition Authority were developed in 2007 and forwarded to the Attorney General to draft the regulations.

The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Competition Authority was appointed in January 2011 and takes office effective April 2011 and thereafter substantive staff for the rest of the positions in the Competition Authority establishment will be recruited. The total budgetary allocation to the Competition Authority for financial year 2011/12 is P19,986,921.

Advocacy materials on Competition Policy were developed in 2009 and private sector sensitization on this policy is currently on a small scale mainly through Annual Trade Fairs in the months of June - October. The full scale sensitization of the private sector stakeholders will be rolled out after April 2011 when the substantive staff of the CA will be recruited.

***2.2.1.2 Layperson’s Draft Revised Consumer Protection Act***

The Layperson’s Draft Revised Consumer Protection Act was developed by a consultant in 2008 but its progress has been hampered by the stalemate within the Ministry of Trade and Industry as to whether to transfer the implementation of the Consumer Protection Act to the newly established Competition Authority or to retain it under the Department of Trade and Consumer Affairs (DTCA). This has effectively halted the revision of the Consumer Protection Act of 1998. However the Competition Policy of 2005 clearly stipulates that the implementation of the Consumer Protection Act should fall under the Competition Authority. This is a major political decision to be made for any progress in the revision of the Consumer Protection Act to be made.

***2.2.1.3 Institutional Capacity to Manage, Monitor and Analyze Trade Strengthened***

The Trade Policy was passed by parliament in March 2010 and stakeholder consultations were undertaken on the establishment of the Botswana Trade Commission. The legislation establishing Commission is currently being drafted by the Attorney General’s Chambers.

Capacity building of the staff in the management and analysis of trade related issues was achieved through (a) Trade Policy and Negotiations training at The Harvard Kennedy School of Government for two officers, (b) Preferential Trade Agreements for Development Training in Washington for one officer; and (c) A Trade Facilitation workshop co-funded by UNDP. In terms of capacity building on trade negotiations, support was obtained through commissioned consultancies with funding from UNDP on (i) Study on SACU/INDIA commissioned to BIDPA (b) Study on SACU/CHINA commissioned to South South Trade Policy consultancy firm. The outcome of these studies enabled Botswana and other SACU countries to prioritize the negotiations.

***2.2.1.4 Supply Capacity in the Garment Sector Strengthened***

The key achievements in this outcome include the design of the joint production models of the two pilot projects in Molepolole and Thamaga. The Objective of cluster development for the Government of Botswana (GoB) was to resuscitate the garment industry in Botswana, especially at rural level to be once again competitive and provide the necessary employment and income that was lost to the vulnerable sectors of the community (i.e. women, disabled and youth). Capacity building of these rural and peri-urban communities was critical so that they could be competitive through better prices and overall quality of product, delivery and service for the local markets at the initial stage/phase. The project assisted village women, youth and disabled to gain skills (such as pattern design and sewing) that empower them to contribute to their own well- being whilst being a source for community development rather than being community dependant. The project aimed to transfer skills that could produce “great products at the right price and on time”. The initiative also aimed to facilitate the garment industry to improve its competitiveness as a means of eradication of poverty within rural and peri-urban communities (grass-root assistance to members of the communities where poverty is prevalent and the majority of the persons have very low skills and basic education) by way of cluster based development programmes. This was enhanced by the Government of Botswana’s desire to diversify industry (i.e. there is a special interest taken by the government through the Economic Diversification Drive [EDD] to diversify industry).

The joint garment cluster members were previous beneficiaries of the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) who had been operating as individuals. They were brought together into clusters so as to take advantage of economies of scale in terms of procurement of inputs and pooling skills together to increase output. The marketing strategy that was developed focused on internal markets first which included supply of uniforms schools and hospitals within their locations. The pamphlets on the products were produced and distributed through the Parent-Teachers Association (PTA) meetings and the District Council. The District Council gave the clusters tenders to supply uniforms to children under the destitute programme which created a good linkage of the government interventions. The beneficiaries were also taken on benchmarking tours in South Africa.

***2.2.1.5 Improved Production and Financial Performance of the Molepolole and Thamaga Clusters***

The key achievement under this outcome was enhancement of the capacity of the two joint garment clusters through the recruitment of a Production Manager who gave on-job training on pattern design and sewing. The clusters were also given seminars on corporate governance, HIV/AIDS and Fire Drills. The clusters also participated in the various exhibitions organized by Local Enterprise Authority (LEA), Botswana Export Development Investment Authority (BEDIA), and Department of Women’s Affairs which gave them an excellent opportunity to market their products.

Business plans for the clusters which focused on sustainability of their operations were developed. In terms of improved financial management performance, the capacity building focused on establishment of basic book-keeping method using the cash accounting method. The clusters were trained in keeping financial records in terms of sales revenue and expenditures on a daily basis from which they could extract their monthly profit and loss statement. From the unaudited financial statements for the period January 2009 – December 2009 that were availed to the consultant, Thamaga cluster made some profits but the Molepolole cluster made perpetual losses. What helped the Molepolole cluster to sustain their operations was the grant of P230,000 which they received from the Department of Women’s Affairs. Molepolole cluster decided through its board to discontinue the services of the General Manager and as a result there was no control over expenditures.

The PASTEL computerized accounting software that had been procured under the project was not installed to the two clusters on the rational grounds that they first needed to master the basic book-keeping before moving on to the computerized accounting system given their low education level.

Additional market development support was provided to the clusters through a negotiation with Choppies to provide a marketing outlet for the products of the clusters through their network of supermarkets throughout the country. Choppies would sell their products and not charge any commission. However the clusters were not able to meet this order as it required output of very high quality at the right price to compete with other products which are imported or produced locally.

***2.2.1.6 Botswana’s Industrial Development Policy (IDP) Revised***

The Industrial Development Policy Review was undertaken in 2009 and a draft report produced.

**2.2.2 CHALLENGES** **UNDER TRADE AND SME DEVELOPMENT COMPONENTS**

***2.2.2.1 Challenges of the Joint Garment Clusters***

The key challenges in the implementation of the Joint Garment clusters was the inadequate understanding of the cluster concept, lack of synergies between different components of NSPR, lack of support firms, and poor planning.

There was inadequate understanding of what cluster concept meant and its relationship to poverty reduction as a component of NSPR among the stakeholders. There was inadequate understanding between the aim of cluster development as a means of poverty alleviation/ eradication through development of capacity and linkages within rural and peri-urban communities as compared to Industrial cluster development. Industrial cluster development is related with development of competitive advantage based on the comparative advantage nationally or at district level. In providing support in key areas such as developing models for local interventions and networking linkages, facilitating access of cluster firms to business development and research services, the design of the component needed to have an understanding the concept of cluster development and the needs of the sector and take into consideration the interventions necessary for success with respect to all four elements of industrial development/cluster development.

Lack of a network of local core firms, support firms and soft infrastructure firms that can collectively find solutions to their common problems was a key challenge in the implementation of the Joint Garment clusters. It is the growth of a cluster as a whole (i.e. a cluster family network) that ensure sustainability and profitability. Cluster firm development required technological capacity, processes, skills and managerial capabilities in entirety which was not provided for in the design of the component. Whilst providing some inputs as in the form of management capacity (e.g. providing support in the form of the General Manager) but not providing the support requested for technical assistance in the form of technicians who would assist in development and production of products that are more efficiently produced and meet both quality and timely delivery, was a great shortcoming in the design of the project.

Lack of synergies between the different components of the poverty programme was also a great challenge. There are distinct synergies that can be gained by creating and developing strong relationships between components of NSPR (e.g. Community Resilience Programme and Garment Cluster Development). There was no strategy in place to take advantage of such synergies.

Poor planning due to inadequate understanding the concept of cluster development as means of poverty eradication/reduction led to inadequate provision of the necessary resources to achieve the desired result of empowering the vulnerable persons in these rural and peri-urban communities. Planning is considered to be the most crucial part and in fact the first step for management of any project or organization. Planning helps to visualize the big picture about the work to be done and proper planning consequently, enhances organization competitiveness. Planning helps in analyzing strengths and weaknesses and allocating available resources proficiently. In the Joint Garment component planning was generally poor causing the project not to achieve the full potential. The indicators of poor planning include: the delay in recruitment of the General Manager; the delay in the provision of technicians; the delay in providing working capital required at the right time (e.g. In December 2008 the funds needed to purchase material for the supply of school uniform was not processed and paid until February 2009) which caused the firms to fail in meeting the demand during the school uniform purchasing season; under capitalization of firms (i.e. at the start of the project these two firms needed working capital as they were capitalized by bringing together equipment owned by its shareholders) where there was hardly any cash available for working capital.

**2.2.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TRADE AND SME DEVELOPMENT COMPONENTS**

***2.2.3.1 Policy Recommendations for the Joint Garment Clusters***

To enhance the Joint Garment Clusters as a strategy for poverty reduction, the following policy recommendations are proposed:

1. There is a need for a clear understanding of cluster development among all stakeholders so as to improve the design of the component and commitment of the necessary resources
2. Adequate network of core supporting firms need to be developed
3. The UNDP procurement procedures need to be improved to avoid the long delays that negatively impact on programme performance.
4. The synergies between the various poverty programme components need to be developed

**2.3 COMMUNITY RESILIENCE PROJECT [COMPONENT 3 – PHASE 1 & 2]**

**2.3.1 ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUTCOMES UNDER COMMUNITY RESILIENCE COMPONENT**

***2.3.1.1 Poor Communities Become More Liveable***

The implementation of the community resilience component (CRP) commenced in 2007, with a team of consultants engaged in the mobilization of communities. The CRP pilot communities included Old Naledi in Gaborone; Chobokwane and Karakubis in Charleshill Sub-district; Hukuntsi and Lehututu in Hukuntsi Sub-district; Lerala and Maunatlala in Palapye Sub-district. The participatory needs assessments were carried out in all the seven communities and the communities were capacitated in the setting of their priorities. The community asset mapping process was initiated. Furthermore, some representatives of the communities were taken on benchmarking expeditions locally (for example NAMPAAD projects in Dikabeya, Palapye Dairy, community based tourism enterprises and individually owned tourism enterprises in Maun area) and in the region (South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho). Benchmarking was dependent on the type of project that the respective communities want to undertake. The review of the relevant policies, plans and programmes was undertaken by the Ministry of Local Government through commissioned consultancies. The community development activists were identified and trained in community resilience model.

***2.3.1.2 Poor Communities Use Own Assets to Improve Own Wellbeing***

The communities were capacitated in the development of action plans based on own assets and existing public programmes. The community asset maps were developed. These included the social networks; existing institutions in the community; the natural resource base; the skills available (e.g welders, mechanics, building masons). Most of the action plans developed included agriculture related projects (horticulture, poultry, tannery) and community based tourism. It was evident from initial CAPs that the priorities and projects that been identified required further reflection and decision making for them to be realised. There was need for further technical expertise to help the communities refine them and come up with meaningful budget proposals. Thus, the CAPs were simply an indication of the communities’ dreams, needs and aspirations, which they believed could make a difference in the economic and social lives of their people. For the selected priorities, technical support was sought from the respective line ministries. For the tourism projects, World Tourism Organisation was engaged to conduct feasibility studies.

The communities were encouraged to mobilize resources internally and externally for implementation of their action plans. Information on existing public programmes and Donor funds which could be mobilized to finance the community action plans was given to the communities through seminars [and subsequent on site networking seminars] where the officers from such organizations gave presentations and followed by plenary discussions. Networking seminars were also conducted. It is worthy to note that the concept of Cluster Development was also presented to the communities in Hukunsti Sub-District. It is the consultant’s view that such awareness should also be extended to other sites. Clearly an indicator of community resilience would be the extent to which the communities would take advantage of the provided information to mobilize resources to finance their action plans, which in turn would indicate their level of commitment to the success of those action plans.

***2.3.1.3 Community Capacity to drive Own Development Enhanced***

The key achievements under this outcome include the updating of Community Portraits and action Plans in 2008; the appraisal of CAP projects in all the 7 communities; the development of Tourism Development Strategies in selected pilot sites; development of tourism products and marketing strategies; revision of the community resilience model manual; design of community resilience training modules and facilitation tools; and training of District Extension Teams (DETs) in community resilience model. However the extent to which DETs were involved in implementation of CRP remains questionable. The training of the Village Extension Teams (VETs) in community resilience was not implemented because of budgetary constraints. In addition the process of registration of Local Steering Committees (LSC) as Trusts so as to give them a legal status hit a snag due to the suspension of registration of trusts by the Attorney General. The implication of this was that the communities did not have any legal status and this negatively affected their ability to mobilize especially external resources from Donor agencies like Action for Economic Empowerment Trust (AEET). However, Chobokwane was an exception in that they have registered and legally recognized entities but still could not source funding for implementation of their action plans. Different reports show that commitment of the community and willingness still remains a challenge for this community.

***2.3.1.4 Strategy on Housing for the Poor People Developed***

The activity of development of the housing strategy for the poor was implemented by the Department of Housing. The National Housing Policy of 2000 was still deemed to be relevant and the only major activity that was done was the review of the implementation guidelines of Low income Housing programmes in August 2008 which led to the emergence of the Turnkey Scheme. The review led to increased budget for low income housing programmes. A consultancy was commissioned to undertake the evaluation of the Poverty Alleviation and Housing Pilot Project but the report was rejected by the Reference Group. The Multi-Sectoral Committee on Poverty Reduction (MSCPR) directed that a holistic review of all housing programmes be made. The Department of Housing was tasked to develop the ToR to be discussed and approved by the MSCPR, which activity is still outstanding.

In conclusion, the majority of the planned outcomes under the CRP component were achieved which would imply a success of the intervention. The CRP Evaluation Report (2011) by the Applied Research Unit of the Ministry of Local Government has a detailed matrix of the CAPs for each of the pilot communities.

**2.3.2 CHALLENGES OF COMMUNITY RESILIENCE PROJECT**

The Draft CRP Evaluation Report (2011) undertaken by the Applied Research Unit, Ministry of Local Government concluded that the CRP pilot phase was a failure and made several recommendations which included transfer of CRP from Department of Local Government Development Planning (DLGDP) to Department of Social Services (DSS); and provision of incentives to LSC similar to VDC. The consultant’s view is that these conclusions and recommendations were based on the narrow view that community resilience is a short-term project with immediate results. The consultant has a broader view that community resilience is a long-term social investment programme with potential long-term benefits and so it is more prudent to recognize the challenges faced by the CRP pilot phase, harness those experiences so as to transform the challenges into opportunities with focus on the long-term goal rather than declaring the Pilot Phase as a failure. The DSS lacks capacity in the Community Resilience Model (CRM) and the mere transfer of CRP from DLGDP to DSS kills it completely as social service delivery may not be compatible with community resilience. The provision of incentives to LSC kills the creativity and self-reliance spirit and enhances the dependency syndrome as this will be interpreted as a government led programme with paid LSC employees.

The consultant’s analysis and conclusions about CRP are based on the broader perspective that CRP is a long-term social investment programme which is critical to enhance the uptake and sustainability of publicly funded poverty reduction programmes. The consultant therefore the documents the challenges faced by CRP, the lessons learnt and what should be done to address those challenges in the roll out phase.

The greatest challenge facing the CRP component is the non-implementation of CAPs by the beneficiary communities. In all the seven pilot communities, it was only in Lehututu where the implementation of the tannery project was on-going with Ipelegeng funding of P300,000 being implemented by the Village Development Committee (VDC). The activity included the renovation of the building to house the tannery but actual production had not started as members were waiting to receive the necessary technical training on leather tannery.

In Chobokwane, they fenced the campsite and constructed additional block to the existing pre-school so that they could increase the intake in a bid to introduce children to school at an early age. Again these projects were implemented through Ipelegeng. At least most communities have managed to secure land for their income generating projects. In all other communities, the CAPs were largely unimplemented.

From the perspective of the beneficiary communities the CAPs were not implemented mainly because the project did not give them funding for implementation of action plans. However this view of the communities was contrary to the objectives of the CRP which required resilient communities to take lead in the mobilization of resources from internal sources, existing public programmes or donor agencies as a way of taking control of their own development. To get a better understanding as to whether the non provision of funding was the real factor explaining the non-implementation of CAPs, the consultant decided to find out the performance of other public funded programmes with specific reference to LIMID 1; LIMID 2; ISPAAD and Youth Fund through interviews with the implementing Officers in the respective districts of Hukuntsi Sub-District; Palapye Sub-District and Charleshill Sub-District. The findings suggested that the publicly funded programmes which were 100% grant were largely mismanaged by beneficiaries because of lack of commitment to the success of such projects since they had not made any contribution.

Examples were given of where under LIMID 1 which was 100% grant, the beneficiaries would not bother to take good care of the small stock (goats and chicken) provided because they knew government would always provide more which is characteristic of the endemic state dependency syndrome that has been created. Some beneficiaries would connive with their parents and submit quotations for small [breeding] stock only for them to share the money once the payment has been made and not buy the small stock. Immediately they would divert the money to other purposes (e.g. buy a car as in the case currently being handled by Police Officers in Palapye). This non-commitment by beneficiaries motivated the design of LIMID 2 where beneficiaries were expected to make a contribution and only part would be a grant. Even ISPAAD and the Youth Fund were designed in such a way that part of the funding would be a grant and the rest would be beneficiary contribution. Evidence of the implementation of such programmes where the beneficiaries are expected to contribute is that their uptake is low. The beneficiaries are keen only to take up the grant component and abandon the rest, again highlighting the dependency problem.

A case in point is the ISPAAD programme where a person is paid for ploughing the first 5 hectares at P400 per hectare; for the next 5 hectares 50% would be paid; and for the next 5 hectares it would be 100% contribution by the farmer. Shocking stories were told of people using their own drought power (donkeys) to plough 5 hectares of land just for the sake of getting P2,000 and they would not weed the crops and later abandon the fields which contradicts the objectives of increasing agricultural production, food security and increased household income through marketing of agricultural output. In addition, the design of LIMID 2; ISPAAD and the Youth Fund encourages the formation of groups as indicated by a smaller percentage of beneficiary contribution for those in groups as compared to individuals, which has a synergy to CRP.

The consultant’s conclusion is that the non-provision of funding under the CRP component was not the main cause of the non-implementation of the CAPs. The real explanation lies with the grant mentality of the communities /state dependency syndrome. The fundamental question is why the individuals and groups decided to sit back and not mobilize resources from other public programmes (such as LIMID 2; ISPAAD and the Youth Fund) to finance their CAPs. The consultant’s informed opinion is that CRP is an important social investment with long-term benefits that Botswana needs for sustainable alleviation of poverty. The communities must be capacitated to take control of their development through commitment to attain their planned goals. This will enhance the efficiency of the utilization of publically funded programmes for poverty alleviation. The mindset of the communities must be changed from state dependency to being proactive in the development process. It would be unrealistic to expect the mindset of the communities to be changed over such a short period of time. The consultant’s recommendation is that CRP should only concentrate on capacity building of the communities in form of development of CAPs and leave the mobilization of resources to the communities as an indicator of resilience. Otherwise if CRP provides funding for implementation of CAPs then it will not only be defying its objective but also be duplicating the efforts of other existing programmes and perpetuate the dependency syndrome.

 The lack of legal status of the Local Steering Committees (LSC) also contributed significantly to the non-implementation of CAPs. The communities were constrained in their mobilization of resources by lack of a legal status. The Attorney General had suspended the registration of community trusts. As reported by the LSC in Old Naledi, though they had well articulated CAPs such as township tours, they could not mobilize the necessary resources (such as a caravan and financing) because of lack of legal status. The Department of Local Government Development Planning has explored engaging the Department for Cooperative Development to engage the communities to consider alternative forms of registration such as cooperatives. While community dynamics are well known and understood, the LSCs and communities in general should be continuously facilitated to embrace the idea that the income generating projects must not be necessarily implemented by the whole community but individuals or a group of individuals can implement the CAPs and the benefits will flow to the community in form of creation of employment opportunities which will contribute to poverty reduction. The community of Hukuntsi is commendable for having tasked a youth group with implementation of the horticulture project, though the project has not kick started.

The internal conflicts (either within the LSC members themselves or between the LSC and VDC or between the LSC and the Chiefs) also significantly contributed to paralyzing the operations of the communities. The communities attributed conflicts within the LSC members to ethnic differences where some members were considered to be of an inferior social status (such as in Hukuntsi). The LSC was a parallel structure to the VDC and this created a rift between the two structures. The VDC is responsible for all development projects and felt marginalized by the new enlightened LSC structure which was emphasized under CRP. In some communities tensions between *Bogosi* (traditional leadership) and the LSC made the implementation of CAPs difficult as *Bogosi* were reported to be undermining the efforts of the LSC (as was the case in Lerala and Karakubis). The parallel LSC structure was informed by the need to have continuity over the project period (as VDC members are elected every two years). The consultant’s view is that the tensions created between the two structures (i.e. between the VDC and LSC) must have been created as a result of the inadequate sensitization of the VDCs on the role of LSCs. Basically the VDC would be the overall structure to whom the LSC would be accountable to just like other structures under the VDC such as the Village Health Committee, the Parents and Teachers’ Associations, and others. In this way the VDC would not perceive the LSC as a competitive structure but rather a complementary structure to foster development in the village. Further, the VDCs will require continuous training given that the members of VDC are elected every two years.

The politicization of the CRP was also cited by communities as having contributed to its underperformance in terms of implementation of CAPs. Despite the fact that the objectives and mandate of CRP was clearly explained to the beneficiary communities, some politicians used it as a decampaining strategy for the party in power on the grounds that government must provide grant funding for CAPs because the people are poor. This dampened the community resilience spirit and enhanced the dependency syndrome. It is recommended that politicians should take responsibility and sing from the same hymn book when it comes to enhancing the resilience of communities to take control of their own development for sustainable poverty reduction. Nowhere in the world has any government been able to provide for all its populace.

The non-involvement of districts from the initial stages of the CRP may also account for the poor implementation of CAPs. While the CRP commenced in 2007, districts only came on board in 2008. By implication the planning of the CRP and the selection of the pilot sites was largely driven by the Ministry of Local Government headquarters and little ownership of CRP by the districts. The reports by the team of consultants engaged to mobilize the communities also show that the role of the Sub districts were minimal and limited to introducing the Field Managers to the sites (in particular to *Bogosi)*. The CRP has assisted in reflecting on communities’ relationships with local government structures. While local government has District Extension Teams and Village Extension Teams that provide technical expertise and support to local communities, their presence and effectiveness was not felt across the sites. Extension workers seemed to play a major role in annual events and particularly in the development of DDPs/UDPs when local communities are expected to have an input. Beyond that there did not appear to be an active partnership on development planning between CBOs and extension workers. This became evident when nearly all key extension workers did not turn up for the Community Action Planning workshops. It must be acknowledged that extension workers have many competing national and district agenda they must attend. The consultant recommends that for the future the districts should play a key role in the CRP and the selection of communities with technical support from the Ministry headquarters in terms of capacity building in community development/resilience. The district officers need to be capacitated in the Community Resilience model so that in their various components they enhance the resilience concept. The Community Resilience model also provides an important framework for community level planning and has thus been included in the revised District Planning Handbook. It was also observed that not all policy makers (at the district and Ministry level) had a clear understanding of the Community Resilience model. It is recommended that an effective communications strategy be developed on all poverty interventions to enhance their performance.

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The lack of synergy of the different Government Department programmes also contributes to the non-implementation of the CAPs. A case in point is the production of handicraft which was reflected in the CAPs for Old Naledi. Some members of the LSC for Old Naledi reported that they had put their own resources to start the production of bead products but they experienced a binding constraint in marketing the products and so stopped the project. Interestingly the DIT informed the consultant that they have negotiated a number of trade agreements for a number of product lines including handcrafts and that it was the production side that was letting them down to supply to the various export markets, which information was not available to Old Naledi LSC. The consultant’s view is that synergies should be developed between the CRP component and the DIT component where the beneficiary communities are given information on the potential export market; the prices obtaining for their products in such markets; the product quality issues; the potential exporters they could link up with to buy their products. By so doing the communities would be motivated to pay attention to product quality issues and negotiate better prices for their products, thus empowered to move out of poverty. But if programmes work in isolation and yet targeting the same client (i.e. a poor Motswana), then the beneficiaries will be denied the opportunity to maximize the benefits from the various government programmes.

In conclusion, the implementation of CAPs was bedeviled by a number of factors which included the dependency syndrome, lack of legal status, internal conflicts, politicization of the CRP, and lack of synergies of various government programmes.

On a positive note, Modise Development Society in Lerala Village which also benefited from the CRP training, started a poultry project with funding from Action for Economic Empowerment Trust (AEET). AEET is a cooperative instrument set up by the Government of Botswana and the Commission of the European Union aimed at supporting communities’ efforts to develop their living standards and sustaining small-scale activities at grassroot level. Modise Development Society membership is comprised of all members of Modise Ward under the leadership of their Headman. Modise Development Society was initially formed as a burial group for members of the ward then was transformed to an income generating projects on realizing that a significant majority of the members were not able to sustain their membership and felt left out. On getting training under CRP, Modise Development Society members contributed their own resources (in form of money and labour) to put up the poultry house and the AEET grant was used as working capital. They have a production capacity of 2,000 broilers and so far they have had two rounds of output and created employment for 4 people. Modise Development Society is also in the process of diversifying their operations to piggery. This is the ideal case of community resilience as they fought hard to acquire the plot for their project, contributed own resources to start the project, and took steps to mobilize external resources.

**2.3.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNITY RESILIENCE PROJECT (CRP)**

This section gives a summary of the policy recommendations to improve the CRP component for the future:

1. The CRP component is an important social investment with long-term benefits to change the mindset of the communities for sustainable development and poverty reduction. CRP should focus on capacity building and provision of information on alternative funding sources but leave resource mobilization and implementation to the beneficiary communities as a sign of resilience.
2. The CRP model must be driven by the districts but not the Ministry headquarters. For the districts to take ownership of the programme, they must be involved from the beginning. The starting point is the sensitization of the district officials and the various structures (such as VDC) on the Community Resilience model so that they will be ambassadors to the grassroots carrying the right message. This will also reduce tensions between VDCs and LSCs. It is commendable that the Ministry of Local Government has engaged the Districts in the selection of the poor communities to be considered for roll out in addition to the existing sites. The critical role that will be played by the Ministry of Local Government is supporting the districts with capacity building on the community resilience model.
3. The training module of the Community Resilience model should also articulate that the benefits of the intervention will be to the community but implementation of the CAPs need not be undertaken by the whole community. The CAPs may be implemented by individuals or groups of individuals within the community, but the entire community stands to benefit in form of creation of employment opportunities. The community should be capacitated to explore other business models such as joint ventures.
4. The various government programmes should develop synergies so as to maximize benefits to the target beneficiaries.
5. An effective communications strategy should be developed on all progammes to enhance the understanding of all the actors (policy makers and implementers) to improve programme performance

**2.3.4 CHALLENGES OF THE LOW INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMMES**

The various housing programmes for the poor that have been implemented by the Department of Housing include the Self Help Housing Agency (SHHA), the Home Improvement Scheme, the Turnkey Scheme, and the Poverty Alleviation and Housing Programme. All these housing programmes for the poor were implemented by the District Councils which would identify the beneficiaries, oversee the construction of houses, and collect the loan repayments. The intention was to create a revolving fund that would be used to finance more houses for the poor people.

The implementation of the SHHA programme started in 1973 with various housing loan amounts being given to the beneficiaries. However prior to the review of 2008, the beneficiaries were being given a loan of P20,000 to be repaid over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of 10% per annum. The unique challenge of the SHHA programme was that it created a lot of incomplete housing structures as most beneficiaries would start construction of much bigger structures and the P20,000 would get exhausted before completion of the houses. There had been no control on the type of housing structures to be constructed as the beneficiaries took the responsibility of implementation. The National Housing Policy was approved in 2000 and the implementation guidelines of the SHHA programme were reviewed in August 2008 which replaced the SHHA programme with the Home Improvement Scheme and the Turnkey Scheme. Under the Home Improvement Scheme, the beneficiaries were given interest free loans up to a maximum of P45,000 payable over a 20 year period on a monthly basis. However in case of default, an interest of 10% per annum would be charged on arrears. Under the Turnkey Scheme, the beneficiaries would get an interest free loan of P60,000 (in form of a complete house constructed by Council) payable over a 20 year period, with interest of 10% per annum charged on amount in default. The shift in policy for Councils to undertake the construction of houses and hand over to the beneficiaries was to curb the problem of incomplete structures.

The fundamental problems underlying all these low income housing programmes is lack of sustainability due to the heavy subsidy by Councils and willful default of the beneficiaries. By Councils undertaking the construction of houses and handing them over to the beneficiaries at the fixed term loan of P60,000, the Councils have to bear a high subsidy for the beneficiaries as some houses may cost more than P60,000 to construct especially in cases where Council vehicles have to ferry building materials (such as sand, water) over long distances. The Turnkey Scheme has also encountered some problems especially in cases where Councils did not involve the beneficiaries in the implementation process and beneficiaries end up refusing to accept the completed houses for one reason or another. The consultant’s recommendation is that the policy framework should be amended to compel all Councils to involve the beneficiaries in the implementation of the Turnkey Scheme. The beneficiary involvement can be in identification of the builders and negotiating their labour costs; involvement in the purchase and safekeeping of building materials; and involvement in the day-to-day supervision of the building work. This beneficiary involvement is critical in enhancing ownership of the project and also save Councils costs which may arise from a tendering process where costs may be deliberately hiked by suppliers of services on account that it is the government paying. The willful default problem (especially for beneficiaries who are not on the pay roll where automatic deductions can be made from salaries) arises mainly because of the entitlements mentality where they expect government to freely provide houses for them even when they have the ability to pay the loans. This willful default problem is also reinforced by lack of political will to take stern action against defaulters even though they have signed binding agreements with Councils. The consultant’s recommendation is that action be taken against willful defaulters as per the terms of the signed agreements to enhance the sustainability of the low income housing programmes. The loan recoveries will boost the revolving fund that can be used to provide more houses for the poor.

The Poverty Alleviation and Housing Programme started in the year 2000 where councils provided industrial plots and Department of Housing provided funds for construction of office blocks, reticulation of water, provision of water, construction of production slabs, purchase of machinery (brick moulding machinery). The beneficiaries of the Poverty Alleviation and Housing Programme are the able bodied who are unemployed identified by the Department of Social and Community Development (S&CD). The beneficiaries are given skills in brick production and are paid a monthly allowance based on quantity of bricks produced. The projects are supported by technical officers from the Department of Housing and by design the projects were supposed to be self-sustaining. Currently there are 12 Poverty Alleviation and Housing projects but only 11 are operational. The fundamental problem with these projects is lack of sustainability due to the heavy subsidy by the Councils in the form of paying salaries for technical officers, using council vehicles to ferry sand for brick making, ferrying bricks to customers who buy them, and at times paying the water bills. The consultant’s recommendation is that the extent of the subsidy in the brick production be quantified through a technical study to establish the actual cost of producing various sizes of bricks and relate this to the market price of bricks so as to design a strategy of increasingly making the projects to bear the full cost of production over a period of time in a bid to enhance the sustainability of such projects.

It is reported that the employment of persons in these projects have enabled them to own their houses by being enabled to apply for low income housing programmes, especially the Home Improvement Scheme (where the allowances they earn enable them to service the loans) or by the project loaning to them materials for construction of own houses which they pay back over a period of time. The brick laying skills are also given to some of the employees which enabled them to partake in the construction of houses for the beneficiaries in the project to construct their own houses. Business skills are also given to some beneficiaries who have been identified and found to be competent enough to comprehend the lessons The consultant, like the MSCPR had recommended, also recommends that a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the various housing programmes for the poor be undertaken with a view of informing policy.

**2.3.5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LOW INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMMES**

To enhance the sustainability of the low income housing programmes, the consultant recommends the following:

1. A comprehensive evaluation of the impact of all the housing programmes for the poor be undertaken with a view to informing policy
2. The subsidy components in all the housing programs be quantified with a view to moving to full-cost recovery to enhance sustainability of the interventions
3. Appropriate action consistent with the signed agreements be taken against willful defaulters of housing loans to serve as a lesson to the others. Willful default is contagious and if not firmly addressed, it will quickly spread to all beneficiaries.
4. Synergies be enhanced between the Poverty Alleviation and Housing programme and the Home Improvement/Turnkey Schemes where the bricks produced by the Poverty alleviation and Housing programme are sold to the Home Improvement/Turnkey Schemes. Though this requirement was communicated by the Office of the President and a significant number of Councils are obliging, a few are not.

**2.4 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS OF PREPARATION OF THE POVERTY COMPONENT OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAMME FOR 2010 – 2013 [COMPONENT 4 – PHASE 2]**

The key achievements of outcomes under this component include the FINSCOPE study on access to financial services by the poor that was undertaken from November 2008 to August 2009 and the results of were disseminated; the development and signing of the Poverty Component of the Country Programme between Government of Botswana and UNDP in May 2010.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the rate of achievement of planned outcomes was generally high across the different components though there were some challenges which constrained achievement of planned outputs.

**3. ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP IN POVERTY REDUCTION IN BOTSWANA**

The assessment of the strategic positioning of UNDP in the context of poverty reduction in Botswana includes the stakeholder assessment of factors that contributed (or constrained) the achievement of planned outputs; the contribution of UNDP to the achievement of poverty reduction outputs; the effectiveness and efficiency of UNDP partnerships to the realization of poverty reduction goals; the effectiveness and efficiency of programme management and governance; the efficiency of the use of resources for poverty reduction; and the sustainability of poverty reduction outcomes. The analysis was based on responses from implementing partners (N = 18) based at the Ministry Headquarters and the UNDP Country Office (see Appendix 2). The rationale for restricting the analysis to this group of stakeholders was that most of the officers at the district level were not well informed on these issues as they are handled at the respective Ministry Headquarters. The districts get the funds from the various Ministry Headquarters who in turn deal with UNDP for funding.

**3.1 ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED (OR CONSTRAINED) THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PLANNED OUTPUTS**

As discussed in section 2 under the different components, the rate of achievement of planned project outputs was generally very high. The factors that accounted for the high rate of achievement of planned outputs include UNDP technical support in form of consultants; UNDP funding of the programme; staff commitment to work; and government commitment to the poverty reduction drive (see figure 1). This finding is consistent with UNDP (2009) which reported that implementing partners in the poverty reduction programme valued UNDP support and considered UNDP to be responsive to their needs. The UNDP strategic relevance was demonstrated by the adequate match between Government of Botswana policies (as articulated in the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction and National Development Plans) and the objectives of the UNDP Country Programmes.

For implementing partners that experienced some constraints in the attainment of planned targets, the main contributory factors include UNDP procurement delays; lack of technical capacity of local staff; weak implementation structures; and policy shifts (see figure 2).

What is interesting from these results is that UNDP strikingly stands out both as a key catalyst and as an obstacle to the achievement of planned outputs. From the perspective of the consultant, what UNDP needs to urgently do is to improve its procurement system to eliminate all the bottlenecks that constrain the smooth programme implementation process. UNDP should operate as a National Execution Agency through provision of funding and technical support and leave the implementation processes to partners. UNDP should enhance the functioning of the framework of advancing funds to all the implementing partners with clear procurement and accountability procedures in a quarterly basis. The consultant was informed that this framework of advancing funds is already in place with a few implementing partners and so the specific recommendation is to extend it to all implementing partners. In this way UNDP will provide a solution to procurement delays that negatively affect programme performance. UNDP should also strengthen the implementation structures and invest in capacity building of the local staff.

**3.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF UNDP TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POVERTY REDUCTION OUTPUTS**

The responses to the question on stakeholder assessment of UNDP contribution to the achievement of poverty reduction outcomes were coded to generate a categorical variable as: 1 = very significant; 2 = less significant; 3 = do not know. The distribution is presented in figure 3.

The majority of the stakeholders were of the view that the UNDP contribution to the achievement of poverty reduction outcomes was very significant. UNDP was argued to be quite a resourceful window that helped supplement government funds for implementation of the NSPR. The government was facing binding budgetary constraints especially as a result of the global financial crisis. The UNDP funds were available as and when needed and were not subject to budget cuts once funds have been allocated which enhanced the attainment of poverty reduction outcomes. UNDP also provided the technical support that was critical for the implementation of programme activities. Poverty analysis was a new area so the technical assistance provided by UNDP was very important. UNDP also contributed to capacity building which enhanced the achievement of poverty reduction outcomes. UNDP funding was also instrumental in the production of various poverty related reports (Annual Poverty Monitoring Reports, Poverty Datum Report, and Poverty Maps).

With specific reference to the Joint Garment Industries, UNDP support to the Government of Botswana in bringing informal sole traders together to create social enterprises within the communities that created employment opportunities and better sources of livelihood. UNDP support also contributed to capacity building of the beneficiaries by AMSCO General Manager which provided them with better skills and competencies to produce better quality garments and run their sole trading operation better than before. The firms have been a source and in some instance the lead vendors for the supply of apparel need of the community (e.g. most school uniforms of schools in the local area is supplied by these firms). The two firms were successful in winning tenders from both Scottish Livingstone Memorial Hospital in Molepolole and Thamaga Primary Hospital to supply uniforms. In addition UNDP support has provided very important lessons for developing the way forward for the next phase for continued support for garment cluster development and broadening of the cluster concept.

With specific reference to the international trade sector, UNDP contribution was significant in enabling Botswana to form country positions before the trade negotiations. UNDP also made a significant contribution towards the establishment of the Competition Authority.

For the stakeholders who argued that UNDP contribution was less significant, their contention was that UNDP should go beyond mere provision of funds to actual monitoring of field activities. This would give UNDP the realities on the ground to guide their policies and procedures which at times negatively impact on achievements of poverty outcomes. The case in point is the lengthy and bureaucratic UNDP procurement procedures which lead to delays in getting technical staff in place which hinders the achievement of poverty outcomes. Cases were reported where some of the technical staff were brought on board only at the beginning of 2009 when the project was due to end in December 2009, thus negatively affecting the achievement of poverty outcomes.

 In conclusion, it can be argued that UNDP contribution to achievement of poverty reduction outcomes was very significant.

**3.3 ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF UNDP PARTNERSHIPS TO THE REALIZATION OF POVERTY REDUCTION GOALS**

The analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of UNDP partnerships to the realization of poverty reduction goals was done through creation of a categorical variable: 1 = very effective and efficient; 2 = less effective and efficient; 3 = do not know. The distribution is presented in figure 4.

The majority of the stakeholders pointed out that the UNDP partnership was less effective and less efficient in the realization poverty reduction goals, with the main argument being that UNDP lacks the capacity to service implementing partners. Proposals submitted to UNDP take a long time than necessary to be processed, which negatively impact on the delivery of activities. Sometimes implementing partners even lose potential consultants because they wait for too long to be given feedback.

There is no consistent feedback from UNDP on the correspondences submitted by implementing partners which makes them feel that UNDP does not have a sense of accountability and good partnership. UNDP does not only delay in processing requests, but they also fail to give feedback on their delay or decisions taken. Again there appear to be no laid down turnaround times for the service they render to implementing partners. As a result, it is very difficult for the implementing partners to project the timelines for the completion of projects. UNDP has been very slow in providing both technical input requested and financial assistance agreed in a timely manner.

There is also an apparent lack of transparency of UNDP as there is no sharing of procurement processes and other procedures necessary for the execution of the projects. As a result, the proposals submitted are in most cases sent back and forth because there are no clear policies and this delays the completion of projects. The expectations and roles of the implementing partners need to be clarified. Some implementing partners argue that though UNDP signs a contract agreement with MFDP, there may be a need to develop service level agreements to ensure that both parties are committed. Cases were also pointed out where implementing partners are not aware how much of their budget with UNDP had been spent and how much was available.

UNDP (2009) also observed that some implementing partners in the poverty reduction programme were not sufficiently aware of how UNDP operates; what its operational limits are; lacked clarity regarding the selection process for consultants; and the role of technical assistance. UNDP (2009) advocated for transparent communication with all actors regarding the UNDP administrative process, what the steps are, and the respective durations. UNDP (2009) further noted that the high number of interventions undertaken by the Botswana Country Office puts significant pressure on its human resource capacity to adequately respond to the needs of the implementing partners. The Country Office was also observed to be doing tasks that should be the responsibility of projects and technical assistance such as contracting and certain disbursements.

The proponents of the partnerships being effective and efficient argue that UNDP is an effective and efficient partner in addressing poverty reduction goals through the provision of funding and capacity building. Poverty reduction is accorded high priority through this partnership which is very critical.

It is recommended that UNDP revamps the communication strategy with implementing partners and the procurement processes to reduce the delays so as to enhance the mutual partnership relationship.

**3.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF PROGRAMME GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT**

The responses on the effectiveness and efficiency of programme governance and management were coded as follows: 1 = very effective and efficient; 2 = less effective and efficient; 3 = don’t know. The distribution is presented in figure 5.

The majority of the stakeholders argued that programme governance and management was effective and efficient. The high level of accountability, the well established structures that guided the implementation of the programme, and the well defined reporting formats were highlighted to be good indicators of the effectiveness and efficiency of programme governance. Management of resources was guided by the key principle of value for money. Programme governance was also exceptional in terms of pooling together a wealth of resources that would otherwise be scattered. There is also some form of flexibility in the management of resources such that if there is a constraint, UNDP will always find some way of allocating resources to address the constraint, as long as it is in line with the programme.

The concerns of less effective and less efficient programme governance and management was pointed in the areas of UNDP contract management and payment of contractors processes which is a challenge. Contracts take long to be concluded and payments to the contractors take long to be processed. UNDP should resuscitate the periodical meetings with implementing partners to plan and review the programmes together.

With specific reference to the Joint Garment Clusters, the stakeholders argued that there has was a lack in governance as no accounting and administrative records had been maintained by the clusters prior to African Management Services Company (AMSCO) intervention (i.e before January 2009). No Board meetings were conducted by the two firms periodically. The Board Chairman of the Molepolole cluster instructed the General Manager to stop providing the technical assistance from January 2010. This caused the controls that had been put in place to be ignored and as a result the firm incurred substantial losses based on the draft accounts provided to the consultant during the site visit.

In conclusion, it can be stated that overall the programme governance and management was good but the shortfalls need to be urgently addressed.

**3.5 ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE USE RESOURCES FOR POVERTY REDUCTION**

The responses to the question on efficiency of resource use for poverty reduction were coded as: 1 = efficiently used; 2 = less efficiently used; 3 = don’t know. The distribution is in Figure 6.

The majority of respondents were of the view that resources were efficiently used for poverty reduction. Their argument was that UNDP and Government of Botswana jointly run the NSPR and as a result the resources were used for planned activities.

From the perspective of UNDP, the efficiency of resource for poverty reduction was demonstrated by the procurement process that was based on competitive bidding with the standard value for money criteria employed in vendor selection. All activities undertaken went through the normal approval process, respecting the separation of roles in the process flow to ensure adequate checks and balances. The consultant’s view is that there is a trade-off between an elaborate procurement system and systematic delays in the beauracratic process, which is an opportunity cost to efficient project delivery. UNDP should work towards minimizing the opportunity cost.

For the stakeholders who pointed out that the resources were less efficiently used for poverty reduction, their contention the UNDP delays in the processing of funding requests lead to some activities not to be implemented which negatively affects efficiency of resource use for poverty reduction. The stakeholders pointed out that this was a sticky issue that had been brought to the attention of UNDP and promised to review its processes to improve performance.

With specific reference to the Joint Garment Clusters, it was pointed out that there was no effective planning prior to committing resources which reduced the efficiency of resource use. For example the purchase of Pastel Accounting Package, which is too advanced for the promoters who have very basic education was judged to be inefficient use of resources. Similarly, some machines have been purchased but no hands on training taking place therefore; these machines cannot be put into the best use they are meant (for example Double needle machine and Fusing Machine). Also the recruitment of the General Manager and not providing the required technicians for improvement of efficiencies, quality of product, timeliness of delivery and production process management of many operations needed for achieving the required price point for improving competitiveness and the aim of a producing a “great product, at the right price and deliver at the time” is incongruent.

Others argued that lack of effective targeting of beneficiaries and inefficient coordination of poverty reduction interventions jeopardize efficiency of resource use for poverty reduction. What this suggests is the need to improve the targeting of potential beneficiaries so as to minimize the leakages. This has also to be accompanied by better monitoring and evaluation of the interventions. There is also a concern of duplication of efforts. For example, the Department of Social Services having many poverty alleviation programmes addressing the objective and targeting the same households at different levels (e.g. the destitute programme; the orphan programme). This creates the dependency syndrome on the state and the people become less willing to work for themselves.

**3.6 ASSESSMENT OF THE SUSTAINABILITY OF POVERTY REDUCTION OUTCOMES**

The responses on the question of sustainability of poverty reduction outcomes were coded as: 1 = sustainable; 2 = Not sustainable; 3 = do not know.

The majority of the stakeholders argued that outputs are sustainable. The policy and strategy outputs are integral to the Government’s business and have been integrated into government processes. For example, Community Resilience has been formally adopted by the Government as an approach to community development; the cluster development approach is now an integral approach to creation of employment opportunities. The Government of Botswana (GoB) has taken a deliberate step to harness the lessons from the Joint Garment Cluster pilot project to re-design Cluster Development so as to contribute to long-term sustainability. The re-design includes development of linkages with other poverty components, provision of technical assistance and technicians for the development of the competencies that firms require to achieve long term suitability. The increased Government commitment to poverty reduction is a major indicator of the sustainability of poverty reduction outcomes. Government recently elevated the goal of poverty reduction to poverty eradication coordinated by the Office of the President with an increased budget for the programme.

For those stakeholders who argued that poverty reduction outcomes were less sustainable, their main contentions were lack of local capacity; ineffective targeting of beneficiaries; and creation of dependency syndrome on the state. The inadequate analytical capacity is a major challenge for sustainability of. MFDP lacks capacity to analyze the many data sets (base line and survey based impact) collected from various poverty programmes under their coordination (ALDEP, LIMID, and Destitute Programmes). The inadequate skills transfer from consultants engaged by UNDP to the local staff poses a great challenge to sustainability of poverty reduction outcomes. In addition, government’s inability to attract and retain the high quality human resources is a major threat to sustainability of poverty reduction outcomes. The high rate of staff turnover in search for greener pastures in the private sector implies that the capacity built through training is lost, which problem was more pronounced in Central Statistics Office.

The high subsidization of the low income housing programme by the District Councils and the willful default of beneficiaries make such programmes unsustainable. The other factor contributing to non-sustainability of poverty outcomes is the dependency syndrome that such programmes have created. Cases were cited where some programmes negate the performance of other programmes. For example Ipelegeng (Labour Intensive Public Works) hinders the performance of other programmes like ISPAAD where people opt to work for Ipelegeng during the ploughing season rather than attend to their fields and continue to be food insecure.

In conclusion it can be said that while government commitment is likely to lead to sustainability of poverty reduction outcomes, lack of local capacity and the dependency syndrome are a major threat.

**4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE FUTURE PROGRAMMING OF UNDP COUNTRY POVERTY PROGRAMMES**

The key recommendations to improve future UNDP programmes are summarized in figure 8.

The most important recommendations are the capacitation of UNDP, followed by local capacity building, review of existing programmes, and close collaboration of UN Agencies.

1. Capacitation of UNDP to efficiently respond to the needs of implementing partners in a timely manner: From the perspective of the stakeholders, the key areas of concern are the contracting arrangements, processing of funding requests, and effective communication. The UNDP procurement rules and regulations need to be revised for efficiency and transparently shared with implementing partners to enhance compliance and timely delivery of projects. In addition UNDP should regularly consult and give timely feedback to the implementing partners with a view of improving the procurement capacity. For example technical assistance funds could be administered by implementing partners with clear reporting and accounting procedures to fast track the execution of activities. UNDP should also reconsider the decision of having Project Officers for specific projects to avoid crowding too much work in a few hands which leads to inefficiency. UNDP needs to invest in implementation support through creation of adequate project management structures. From the perspective of the consultant, the major concerns of the stakeholders revolve around the UNDP procurement system and the inadequate implementation structures. The consultant recommends that (a) UNDP immediately reviews and improves the procurement process, (b) UNDP should operate as a National Execution Agency by providing funding and technical support to the implementing partners, (c) UNDP should develop a framework of advance funds disbursement to the implementing partners with clear accountability guidelines; (d) UNDP to strengthen the project implementation structures. This is consistent with UNDP (2009) recommendation of a holistic and comprehensive review of Botswana Country Office internal structures, resources and systems.
2. Local Capacity Building: The implementing partners admitted lack of technical capacity within the local staff to drive poverty reduction outcomes in a sustainable manner. Most of the outcomes were mainly achieved by consultants hired with UNDP funding, which the stakeholders rightly argued that it is not sustainable. The consultant recommends that UNDP invests national capacity building. This could be through tailor made courses designed in partnership with institutions like University of Botswana. In addition for consultants/advisors to be hired in the future, skills transfer to the local staff should be part of their performance contract. UNDP (2009) also recommended local capacity building as a critical component to enhance the sustainability and long term effectiveness of programmes.
3. Review of existing programmes to assess impact and then re-design strategies to improve them. UNDP support to projects and interventions should be for a period long enough to achieve the desired results. The pilot projects implemented should be used to learn important lessons for re-design of programmes for roll out. Merely implementing pilot projects and abandoning them after the pilot phase is tantamount to a waste of resources. Therefore, any future UNDP Country Poverty project should not be terminated or support withdrawn or withheld without the complete maturity of the projects due to changes of UNDP policy, such as the policy shift from supporting micro projects to supporting strategic or macro projects. UNDP (2009) also underscored that all pilot projects should have a strategy that defines how their experiences will be collected, processed and capitalized with a view for roll over.
4. UNDP and other UN Agencies should work together instead of competing e.g. UNDP and UNICEF helping a sector separately on the same objective. UNDP (2009) also emphasized the need for effective cooperation and aid coordination among UN agencies to avoid duplication of efforts.
5. Development and/or strengthening of monitoring and evaluation systems of government poverty interventions.

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**APPENDIX 1**

 **KEY STAKEHOLDERS FOR THE TERMINAL EVALUATION OF NSPR**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Department** | **Designation** | **Name** | **Contact** |
| **Ministry of Local Government** | CRP Project Manager | Mr. Kenosi | 5920111 |
|  | Director | Ms. Modisa | 3658400 |
|  | CRP Project Assistant | Ms. Oeme | 3658421 |
| **Ministry of Finance and Development Planning** | Head, Food & Poverty Policy Coordinator | Ms. Koketso | 3914938 |
|  | Chief Food & Poverty Coordinator | Ms Molefhi | 3914938 |
|  | Principal Food & Poverty Coordinator | Ms Kutlwano | 3914938 |
|  | Food & Poverty Strategy Coordinator | Ms Lillian Mookodi | 3914938 |
|  | Director, Population and Development/MDG | Mr. Baakile | 3950286 |
| **Ministry of Health** | Chief Health Officer | Ms Phegelo | 3632041 |
| **Ministry of Agriculture** | Chief Rural Sociologist | Ms Keboneliwe | 3689219 |
| **Department of Housing** | Senior Housing Officer | Mr. Kuaho | 3906547 |
| **Department of Industrial Affairs** | General Manager | Mr. Prasanna | 3957406 |
|  | Director | Ms. Mosele | 3180273 |
| **Department of International Trade** | Deputy Director | Ms. Gaborutwe | 3190243 |
|  |  Senior Commercial Officer | Mr. Moseki | 3190243 |
| **Department of Trade and Consumer Affairs** |  Principal Commercial Officer | Ms. Ndubiwa | 3934278 |
| **Central Statistics Office** | Deputy Government Statistician | Ms. Kerekang | 3953174 |
| **UNDP** | Programme Manager | Mr. Obuseng | 3633710 |

**Other Stakeholders from Districts**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **District** | **Designation** |
| **Hukuntsi Sub-District** | Senior Assistant District Officer (Development) |
|  | Principal Social & Community Development Officer |
|  | Assistant Youth Officer |
|  | Assistant Scientific Officer |
|  | Economic Planner |
| **Palapye Sub-District** | Assistant District Officer, Development |
|  | Assistant Scientific Officer |
|  | Social Welfare Officer |
|  | Local Councillor, Lerala Village |
|  | Assistant Social Welfare Officer, Lerala Village |
|  | Local Councillor, Mauntlatla Village |
| **Charles Hill Sub-District** | Community Development Officer |
|  | Senior Assistant District Officer |
|  | LIMID Coordinator, Karakubis Village |
|  | ISPAAD Coordinator, Karakubis Village |
|  | Councillor, Karakubis Village |
|  | Headmistress, Chobokwane Primary School |
|  | Councillor, Chobokwane Village |
|  | Assistant Project Officer, RADP Chobokwane Village |
| **CRP Communities** | Hukuntsi CRP  |
|  | Lehututu CRP |
|  | Lerala CRP |
|  | Mauntlatla CRP |
|  | Karakubis CRP |
|  | Chobokwane CRP |
|  | Old Naledi CRP |
| **Joint Garment Clusters** | Thamaga |
|  | Molepolole |
| **Society** | Modise Development Society, Lerala |

**APPENDIX 2**

**Terms of Reference**

**Terminal Evaluation of the GoB/UNDP Poverty Programme**

1. **Background and Context**

UNDP Botswana is approaching the end of its eighth cycle of programme cooperation with the Government of Botswana (2005-2010) as extended 2007 and 2009. In this cycle, as in the seventh, the Country Programme Document focused on four strategic programme areas, viz., Poverty Reduction, Environment, HIV & AIDS, and Governance. As a matter of corporate policy, programmes are evaluated when they come to an end to assess how well they have performed at the levels of implementation and achievement of results and the lessons, both positive and negative, they generate for future programming.

The Poverty programme, which is the subject of evaluation as per these Terms of Reference (TOR), had four major components.

1. *Capacity support the implementation of the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction*: The GoB and UNDP envisaged strengthening the capacity of key Government institutions to implement the National Strategy for Poverty reduction through interventions in five key areas: policy and programme analysis; policy and programme coordination, monitoring and evaluation, statistical capacity development/strengthening, and advocacy.
2. *Trade, Investment and SMME Development*: Trade and investment provide the wherewithal for sustaining growth and creating jobs, so the trade, investment and private sector development nexus is central to creating opportunity for people to work their way out of poverty. The poverty programme sought to influence the role of trade and investment in creating opportunity for growth, job creation and poverty reduction through interventions aimed at strengthening the regulatory environment for trade and investment in order to spur growth and create opportunities for employment and poverty reduction
3. *Community Resilience Programme (CRP):* Through this component, the programme aimed to build the capacity of communities to influence both the direction and pace of their own development.
4. *Preparation of the successor programme*: There were two phases to his component. Phase one was the preparation of the poverty component of the 2008-09 bridging programme. Phase two entailed the development of UNDP’s input towards the Economic Diversification and Poverty Reduction component of the UN Programme Operational Plan (POP) for 2010-2014. The 2010-2016 UNDAF envisages a unified UN programme covering five outcome areas, one of which is Poverty Reduction and Economic Diversification.

The broader context in which the programme is developed is defined by two agendas: the Millennium Development Goals objective of halving poverty by 2015, and Botswana’s more ambitious Vision 2016 goal of eradicating poverty by 2016. Trends in poverty reduction suggest that the MDG target is achievable. However, the Vision 2016 target is unlikely to be achieved.

**2. Purpose of the Evaluation**

The terminal evaluation of a programme when it comes to an end is a mandatory requirement. It is in this regard a matter of compliance with corporate standards and requirements. Even more important, from a programming perspective, the evaluation provides an independent assessment of the programme in several crucial respects, in particular:

* The relevance of the programmes objectives vis-à-vis national priorities. Botswana has, through vision 2016, the national development plan, and in more specific terms, the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction, outlined its priorities for poverty reduction. The evaluation should determine how well the programme’s objectives are aligned with national priorities as articulated in these instruments.
* The relevance of the programme’s design to the objectives. For the programme to achieve its objectives, its design must be geared towards fulfilling them. Misalignment between programme design and objectives compromises the achievability of programme objectives. It may produce the intended outputs and still fail to achieve the desired outcomes, let alone make a recognisable contribution to the intended impact.
* The performance of the programme in terms in terms of delivery of results, specifically key outputs and the effect on the desired outcomes
* Key lessons learned, both negative and positive, during the implementation of the programme to inform programming in the future.

The terminal evaluation of the Poverty Programme therefore serves both the administrative purpose of compliance with corporate policy and the functional objectives of extracting lessons to inform future programming on poverty reduction.

**3. Scope and Objectives**

**3.1 Aspects of the intervention to be covered by the evaluation**

This is a standard evaluation exercise. It is expected to cover all project activities from inception to the time of evaluation. It is expected to cover aspects of relevance; design, implementation and delivery against set outputs and outcomes; institutional arrangements; effectiveness in terms of achieving the desired goals and adherence to UN principles and values, in particular with respect to gender and human rights.

The evaluation will solicit views from representatives of all relevant stakeholders in Government, civil society, communities, the private sector and other development partners. The list of stakeholders as provided in the programme document shall be expanded to include beneficiary communities and other institutions that have had some association with the programme.

**3.2 Primary issues of concern to users**

The primary issues of concern to users are varied. The key issues are stakeholder expectations, project delivery, project governance, and the role of key players in the implementation of the project.

* Despite the inclusive nature of the programme development process, stakeholder expectations may vary with individual stakeholders depending on their positioning in relation the project. Beneficiaries may expect and demand more than what is permissible given the project design and purpose. Government institutions and UNDP may also have different perceptions of their roles and indeed what the project should be doing compared to UNDP.
* Project delivery is a matter of the project’s performance over the course of its life. How well the project delivers planned products (goods and services) and how these deliver against project outcomes are matters of concern to all stakeholders.
* Project governance is concerned with the adequacy of the management arrangements outlined in the project document, how these structures performed, how well they are adhered to and the consequences of the approach to governance employed on the project.
* The implementation concern is related to that of delivery. The key concern is how the stakeholders to the project have implemented project activities, especially work planning, work processes and execution.

The evaluation will also concern itself with the issues of the overall relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the programme and the sustainability of its results. It would also look at how the project addressed issues of gender and human rights.

1. **Evaluation Questions**

The key questions to be addressed by the Evaluation are outlined hereunder as follows:

* The extent to which the stated outcomes or outputs achieved.
* The adequacy and effectiveness of project governance structures
* Factors that have contributed to or hindered achievement of intended results
* The extent to which UNDP project assistance contributed to outcomes
* The extent to which UNDP partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective
* Key lessons learnt i.e. factors that have contributed to project effectiveness or lack thereof

###### **5. Methodology**

It is envisaged that the evaluation shall adopt a methodology that combines desk review and face to face interviews with key informants.

Desk Review: This shall cover two sets of documents, viz.

* Documents directly related to the project: This shall include project document, progress reports, evaluation reports, products produced (consultancy reports, feasibility studies), monitoring and evaluation reports, audit reports and minutes of meetings.
* Key Government/partner Documents: These will include partner policy, strategy and programme documents that inform the project. These include the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction, the Rural Development Policy, the National Development Plan, Vision 2016 and other policy and strategy documents relevant to the design and implementation of the project.

Key Informant Interviews: These will target relevant programme personnel based at UNDP, project personnel, and counterparts in partner institutions (government departments, civil society and executing agencies).

###### **6. Evaluation products (deliverables)**

The following are the key products to be delivered:

1. **Inception report** inception report should be prepared by the evaluators before going into the full fled**, outlining the evaluation team’s understanding of the assignment, its opinions on the evaluation questions, and its approach to the evaluation exercise.** The inception report provides the programme unit and the evaluators with an opportunity to reconcile expectations and must be approved prior to the substantive evaluation exercise.
2. **Draft evaluation report, based on the outline proposed in the evaluation guidelines, attached hereto as Annex X and outlining the key findings in respect of all evaluation questions.**
3. **Final evaluation report, incorporating comments from the stakeholder review of the draft report.**

**All products shall be reviewed and approved by a quality Reference Group co-chaired by the UNDP Deputy Country Director and a Senior Government Official. The Reference group is a quality assurance mechanism and shall draw its membership from the stakeholder institutions [UNDP, Government, Civil Society, and other non-government partners such as executing agencies).**

###### **7. Evaluation Team**

The specific skills, competencies and characteristics required for the evaluation are outlined hereunder:

**7.1 Team Leader**

* An Evaluation specialist with at least a Masters Degree in Development related filed, e.g. Development Studies, Economics, Community Development
* A minimum of five (5) years of relevant work experience in development.
* Proven expertise in evaluating multifaceted programmes/projects and results-oriented monitoring and evaluation.
* Previous experience in evaluating programmes/project for UNDP or other UN/multilateral agencies.
* Good analytical and reporting skills and fluency in written and spoken English are essential.
* Demonstrated ability to assess complex situations in order to succinctly and clearly distil critical issues and draw forward looking conclusions.

**7.2 National Consultant**

* At least a Masters in a development related field e.g. Development Studies, Economics, Community Development
* A minimum of five (5) years of relevant work experience in development.
* A good understanding of the national policy and strategy context in relation to poverty
* Good analytical and reporting skills and fluency in written and spoken English are essential.
* Demonstrated ability to assess complex situations in order to succinctly and clearly distil critical issues and draw forward looking conclusions.

Members of the evaluation team shall submit up-to-date résumés, copies of academic certificates, and references from previous clients as evidence of ability to undertake assignments. Furthermore, both members of the evaluation team shall be independent from organizations that have been involved in designing, executing or advising on any aspect of the GoB/UNDP Poverty programme.

###### **8. Evaluation ethics**

The evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’ document, attached as Annex IV. The document outlines evaluation ethics and procedures to safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers. These include measures to ensure compliance with legal codes governing areas such as provisions to collect and report data, particularly interviewing or obtaining information about children and young people; provisions to store and maintain security of collected information; and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.

###### **9. Implementation arrangements**

The evaluation team is contracted to UNDP-Botswana and will work closely with the Implementing Partner (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning in the execution of its duties. A Reference Group consisting of key stakeholders will review the Inception Report, Draft Report and the Final Report for quality control and advise UNDP as appropriate.

The logistics of the evaluation will be managed directly by UNDP. The Team Leader shall be responsible for the division of labour within the evaluation team. S/he shall be responsible for ensuring that a quality final evaluation report is prepared. A schedule of meetings will be proposed at inception and approved as part of the Inception Report. Thereafter, UNDP will take the responsibility for the implementation of the schedule, in close partnership with the Implementing Partner.

The evaluation team will be provided with three (3) hours of workspace, telephone and internet each day for team meetings, confirming appointments and briefing sessions. The balance of the time will be spent meeting stakeholders or working from home. Resources for copying and printing will be provided by UNDP as part of the evaluation budget.

###### **10. Time-frame for the evaluation process**

Table 1 below outlines the tasks and deliverables for which the evaluation team will be responsible and accountable, as well as those involving the commissioning office (UNDP-Botswana).

The required formats for the Inception Reports and the Evaluation Reports are provided in Annex X. It is envisaged that evaluators shall be engaged in the evaluation exercise for approximately 32 working days over a six week period.

**Table 1: Indicative Evaluation Work plan**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Task** | **Time-Frame (weeks)** | **Responsible Entity** |
| **1** | **2** | **3** | **4** | **5** | **6** |
| Desk review |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team |
| Briefings of evaluators |  |  |  |  |  |  | UNDP Mgnt |
| Preparation and presentation of Inception Report  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team |
| Reference Group Meets to Review Inception Report |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team, UNDP PM |
| Field Visits & Interviews |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team, UNDP PM |
| Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team |
| Preparing the draft report |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team |
| Stakeholder review of the draft report  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team, UNDP PM  |
| Finalisation of Evaluation Report |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team |
| Debriefing Session |  |  |  |  |  |  | Evaluation Team |

###### **11. Cost**

The evaluation budget includes travel, consulting fees and stakeholder meetings.

###### **12. Annexes**

1. Norms for Evaluation in the UN System
2. Standards for Evaluation in the UN System
3. UNDP Evaluation Policy
4. UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation
5. Code of Conduct for Evaluators in the UN System
6. Project Document – Poverty Programme
7. Mid-term Evaluation - Poverty Programme
8. National Development Plan 9
9. National Strategy for Poverty Reduction
10. Format for Inception Report and Final Evaluation Report

**APPENDIX 3**

**TERMINAL EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE UNDP /GOVERNMENT OF BOTSWANA (GoB) NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR POVERTY REDUCTION (2005-09)**

*Dear Stakeholder,*

*We are conducting an evaluation study of the UNDP/GoB National Strategy for Poverty Reduction Programme (2005 – 2009) to comply with the corporate policy of evaluating programmes that come to an end to assess how well they have performed at the levels of implementation and achievement of results and the lessons, both positive and negative, to inform the design of future UNDP programmes. Your responses will be kept confidential and used only for this study.*

*Thanks for your co-operation,*

*Dr. Francis Nathan Okurut, Evaluation Consultant*

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1. Name of Ministry/Organization: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
2. Position Held: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
3. Date of Interview: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
4. In your opinion, what were the important achievements of the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction Programme (NSPR) to the poverty reduction goal with specific reference to your Project component? (*State as many as possible*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
5. In your opinion, what were the significant challenges/failures of the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction Programme (NSPR) to the poverty reduction goal with specific reference to your Project component? (*State as many as possible*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
6. In your opinion, what factors (internal or external) contributed to the achievement of planned outputs of NSPR programme with specific reference to your Project component? (*State as many as possible*)
	1. Internal Factors that contributed to achievement of planned outputs \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_External Factors that contributed to achievement of planned outputs \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
7. In your opinion, what factors (internal or external) hindered or constrained the achievement of planned outputs of NSPR programme with specific reference to your Project component? (*State as many as possible*)
	1. Internal Factors that hindered or constrained the achievement of planned outputs \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
	2. External Factors that hindered or constrained the achievement of planned outputs \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
8. What is your assessment of the contribution of UNDP to the achievement of Poverty Reduction outputs with specific reference to your Project component? (*Give as many reasons as possible for your answer*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

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1. What is your assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of UNDP partnerships to the realization of Poverty Reduction Goals in Botswana with specific reference to your Project component? (*Explain your answer*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
2. What is your assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of Programme Governance and Management with specific reference to your Project component? (*Explain your answer*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
3. What is your assessment of the efficiency of the use of resources for Poverty Reduction in Botswana with specific reference to your Project component? (*Explain your answer*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
4. What is your assessment of the sustainability of Poverty Reduction outcomes in Botswana with specific reference to your Project component? (*Explain your answer*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
5. What are your recommendations to improve future UNDP Country Poverty Programmes for Botswana with specific reference to your Project component? (*State as many as possible*) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

*Thank you*

1. Centre for Community Enterprise (CCE) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This has been re-structured to be Multi-Sectoral Committee on Food Security and Poverty Reduction (MSCFSPR) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. **As a result of the MFDP restructuring, the RDCD was transformed into the Socio-Economic Policy Sub-Division** [↑](#footnote-ref-3)