

**Project to Support the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative
(SCBI) – Central Government Component**
Implemented by the Government of Rwanda and UNDP (2012-2013)

Summative Evaluation Report
Final Version

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
Distinguished Colleagues:

I am pleased to submit this Summative Evaluation Report on the *Project to Support the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative – Central Government Component*. The report describes the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the intervention, as well as the key lessons that were drawn from the evaluation process. It also forwards recommendations to improve the current successor programme on capacity building in Rwanda, and for similar future courses of action.

The focal persons and informants from your organizations contributed to the achievement of the objectives that were set for the evaluation. I would also like to note the special efforts rendered by the former project personnel and international experts who likewise participated in the exercise, despite the physical constraints and the lapse of time since the project ended.

I am happy to have been part of this evaluation, and hopeful that it will contribute to the advancement of your development goals.

Very Truly Yours,



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List of Acronyms Used in this Report

AGI	-	African Governance Initiative
BTC	-	Belgian Development Agency
COD	-	Common Operational Document
DAC	-	Development Assistance Committee
DAO	-	Delivering As One
DFID	-	Department For International Development
EDPRS	-	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
FAO	-	Food and Agriculture Organization
FP	-	Focal Person
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GoR	-	Government of Rwanda
HACT	-	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer
HIDA	-	Human Resource and Institutional Capacity Development Agency
HRBA	-	Human Rights Based Approach
IP	-	Implementing Partner
LPAC	-	Local Project Appraisal Committee
M&E	-	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDA	-	Ministries, Departments, Agencies
MIFOTRA	-	Ministry of Public Service and Labour
MINAGRI	-	Ministry of Agriculture
MINALOC	-	Ministry of Local Governments
MINECOFIN	-	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MININFRA	-	Ministry of Infrastructure
MINIRENA	-	Ministry of Natural Resources
MSCBP	-	Multi-Sector Capacity Building Program
MTEF	-	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NCBS	-	National Capacity Building Secretariat
NIM	-	National Implementation Modality
NISR	-	National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda
OECD	-	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	-	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PC	-	Project Coordinator
PhD	-	Doctor of Philosophy
PMO	-	Prime Minister's Office
PRSP	-	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSCBS	-	Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat
RDB	-	Rwanda Development Board
RGB	-	Rwanda Governance Board
RWF	-	Rwandan Francs
SCBI	-	Strategic Capacity Building Initiative
SPSD	-	Support for Policy and Strategy Development
SSS	-	Single Source Selection
UN	-	United Nations
UN Women	-	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
UNDAF	-	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDAP	-	United Nations Development Assistance Plan
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
VLP	-	Virtual Learning Platform
WB	-	World Bank

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Executive Summary

In early 2011, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) rolled out the pilot phase of the *Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI)*. SCBI was a new capacity building approach which was government led, priority-focused, and delivery-oriented. On-the-job coaching by international experts to counterpart national (Rwandan) staff was a key feature of this approach. SCBI served as the overall capacity building framework of the GoR that was launched within the context of its broader medium-term development plan (i.e. the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2008-2012 or EDPRS 1) and its strategic plan (i.e. Vision 2020).

The UN System in Rwanda, through UNDP, responded to the GoR's call for development partner support on the pilot phase of the SCBI through a project entitled *Project to Support the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) – Central Government Component*. It was originally designed to address the capacity building needs of the National Capacity Building Secretariat (NCBS). A later addendum was integrated in the project to likewise meet the capacity building needs at the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). NCBS and PMO were two of three agencies in the center of government that were identified for capacity building support under the SCBI. The approved budget for the intervention was US\$ 2.53 million, which was mainly sourced from the One UN Fund (63%) and the UNDP Core Fund (32%). The project was implemented over a twenty-month period (January 2012-August 2013) with NCBS as the Implementing Partner (IP) under a National Implementation Modality (NIM) arrangement with UNDP.

By August 2014, a summative evaluation on the project was carried out to inform similar future programming, as well as to provide directions to a successor capacity building project of the GoR and UNDP (i.e. the *Transformational Capacity Development for the Implementation and Coordination of Government Policies and Programmes Project*) that was already on-going at the time of the review. A mixed-methods approach was applied through document analysis, the conduct of qualitative interviews, and quantitative capacity measurements based on retrospective questionnaires. The evaluation was conducted by an independent consultant commissioned by UNDP. A significant and substantial sample of the national counterparts, international experts, focal persons, and other stakeholders were involved in the process.

The review showed that the project had been very relevant and significant to the capacity building needs and priorities in Rwanda. It was clearly aligned with the priorities identified in the SCBI, and it addressed the needs of two out of three key agencies in the center of government. While the financial input provided by the project was small with reference to the overall budgets of NCBS (then called PSCBS) and PMO, it was significant in relation to the capacity building budget requirements initially estimated by the GoR for the pilot phase of SCBI. It was also believed that the project had greater relevance in terms of how it was able to attract other development partners to also support the SCBI. It was the first project to respond to the SCBI, and the only one until 2013.

The project had thematic links to the UN planning frameworks over the period (i.e. the UN Development Assistance Framework UNDAF 2008-2012 and the Common Operational Document – COD), particularly on the governance-related outcomes. However, the intervention was implemented near the concluding stage of the UNDAF and the COD. Because it also had perceived spillover effects, its operational relevance can be more established in the current 2013-2018 UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP).

As programming was done in the concluding stage of the previous UNDAF and COD, some compromises in the project design had to be made. The implementation period was limited (originally one year), which was not adequate for capacity building. There was also less focus on outcomes because of the time constraint, and fund sourcing was based on practical availability. Still, this was the best design that can be made under the

circumstances, and it showed the ability of UNDP to adapt and be flexible in order to respond to a need expressed by its government partner.

The intervention responded effectively to capacity building needs at NCBS and PMO. At NCBS, support was provided by international experts who helped in overall management and coordination, and the coaching of seven national counterparts. At PMO, international consultants provided policy-related research and feasibility studies. A total of nine international experts (coaches and consultants) were mobilized through the project.

Despite the limited time, it was generally perceived by the informants that the project outcome of improving capacities at NCBS and PMO has been achieved. The quantitative measurements showed that capacity improvements at the level of institutions were marginal, from a “basic” level to the next “advanced” level. There were indications of greater capacity improvements at the level of individuals, where some counterparts progressed to an “excellent” level, and where there were movements by up to two points in the five-point scale.

Project attribution on the capacity improvements varied at the NCBS and PMO. NCBS granted a significant partial attribution of their overall capacity improvement to the project (although the capacity improvement measurement was qualified to be subject to the restructuring of the agency that occurred in mid-2013). Lesser attribution was given to the project at the PMO because the project had lesser effects there, due to delayed recruitment of international experts and non-clarity about the coaching and pairing strategy. At the level of individuals, most counterparts gave a partial attribution of their improvements to the project, although one granted a full attribution to the project. Attendance in formal training courses and the ability to obtain professional certifications were commonly cited factors for the improvement of capacities among the national counterparts, aside from the coaching support that they received from international experts.

The evaluation process showed that there was a gap in the capacity measurement system, as these were done through purely qualitative measures. Informants believed that there should also be quantitative means of measuring capacity changes. There had also been a gap in the gender dimension of the project, as there were no gender targets and strategy set for the intervention. The M&E System had been helpful in informing progress at the level of outputs, and the problems that arose from project implementation.

There were challenges on financial efficiency. Actual fund utilization was low, at 76% of the approved budget. This was primarily brought about by difficulties faced in the recruitment of international experts at PMO. Cost efficiency could also stand further improvement by possibly aligning the procurement system with UNDP’s procedures for competitive bidding. There was also a reported inefficiency issue on the fund transfer system used for the project, in which the project funds were required to be transferred to a local currency (RWF) account held by NCBS, although NCBS eventually had to convert the funds in US Dollars and UK Pounds to make payments to the international experts.

Implementation efficiency was aided by the presence of an IP (i.e. NCBS) that had a clear mandate to coordinate capacity building in the public sector of Rwanda. NCBS was also compliant with UN’s HACT (Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers) System. There were no difficulties in international recruitment at NCBS because there have been international experts posted there prior to the project. On the other end, the recruitment system at the PMO had to be used because NCBS was limited to a coordinative function. Project implementation also had to be in line with the Paris Declaration. There were trade-offs between the use of country systems and the implementation efficiency of the project.

Project implementation was also aided by the Project Steering Committee, which was active and was empowered to make certain decisions on the project. However, there was a limitation in the ability of the committee to solve the problem of delayed recruitment of international experts at the PMO. It was not also the proper mechanism to be informed about progress on the overall SCBI, particularly on synergy between the various capacity building interventions in Rwanda.

The project was not really intended to become self-sustaining in the short-run. A successor project was actually already in the pipeline even before it ended. Still, there were indications that the project outputs are continually being used in NCBS and PMO, and will be carried over in the successor project. The IP (NCBS) went through a second restructuring phase before the project ended, which was a factor in the sustainability of the intervention. There was also an issue with staff retention, as it turned out that three out of the seven counterparts have moved on to other jobs at the time of the evaluation. There was no staff retention target and strategy set for the project.

In view of the findings, the evaluation forwarded the following recommendations to NCBS, PMO, the Co-Implementing Partners of the Current Project, and UNDP:

For NCBS

- To review and elaborate the SCBI in terms of the effective time for capacity building (i.e. how long it takes to effectively transfer capacities), the profile of experts who will be effective in the process, the capacity building measurement system, the importance of non-coaching elements in capacity building (e.g. training and certification), staff retention strategies, and the sustainability strategy for the SCBI approach; and
- To convene the Capacity Building Coordination Forum as the higher-level mechanism to determine progress and synergy on the SCBI.

For the PMO

- To clarify the pairing and coaching strategy at the PMO; and
- To adopt a system to measure capacity changes among its training beneficiaries.

For NCBS, PMO and the Other Co-Implementing Partners of the Current Capacity Building Project

- To set staff retention targets for the current (successor) capacity building project;
- To consider applying the UNDP procedure on competitive bidding in the recruitment of international experts.

For UNDP

- To facilitate the setting of gender-based targets and the formulation of a gender equality and women's empowerment strategy in the current capacity building project;
- To consider inviting UN Women and the OHCHR to become members of the Project Steering Committee of the current project;
- To review the balance of the coaching and non-coaching components in the current project;

- To take steps that could clarify project-level accounting and attribution;
- To consider offering its jobs website or its international referrals network in advertising international expert positions required by the current project;
- To consider allowing some flexibility in the fund transfer system to NCBS; and
- To further study how the Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and South-South Cooperation can be possibly applied in capacity building projects in Rwanda.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Project Context

1. Public Sector Context

Latest (2010) census data show the public sector in Rwanda to be made up by around 82,000 state employees, most of whom are working in the education sector. On the whole, men (55%) outnumber women (45%) in terms of public service. Gender disparity in public sector employment is more pronounced at the center of government (i.e. at the level of “ministries and large state institutions” categorized in the census) where 58% are men and 42% are women, and also at the level of provinces and districts where men outnumber women at a ratio of about 2:1 [Table 1].¹

Table 1. Distribution of State Employees by Type of Institution and Sex, 2010

Type of Institution	Female		Male		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Ministries - Large State Institutions	813	42%	1,137	58%	1,950
Agencies - Commissions - Public Establishments	2,690	33%	5,360	67%	8,050
Provinces and Districts	1,261	36%	2,229	64%	3,490
Other Types	32,480	48%	35,888	52%	68,368
	37,244	45%	44,614	55%	81,858

Source of Data: 2010 Census of State Employees


One factor for the gender gap in public governance could be the advantage held by men in terms of academic qualification. Based on the same census data, it turned out that 13% of the men serving at the center of government (i.e. 143 out of 1,137) have Graduate (PhD and Master’s) Degrees, while only 5% of the women (i.e. 42 out of the 813) have such credentials. Across all state institutions, only 1% of the women employed in public service have graduate degrees, compared to 3% of male civil servants [Chart 1].

Nonetheless, there has been overall progress in the academic and skill competencies of public sector workers in Rwanda over time. The Ministry of Public Service and Labour (MIFOTRA) reported that 79% of state employees were university degree holders as of 2005, compared to only 6% in 1998.² The proportion of professional-level staff also rose to 80% in 2005, from 20% in 1998. These improvements were associated with public sector reforms that were implemented in the country starting in the mid-1990s, which ultimately led to a rightsizing of the government bureaucracy in terms of structures and personnel, decentralization of public service functions, and the adoption of new salary rates and incentives for government workers.³

¹ Based on census data, state employees working in the education sector (i.e. primary education, mixed education, secondary education, and higher education) make up 60% of the total government workforce.

² University Degree Holders refer to those with PhDs, Master’s Degrees, Bachelor’s Degrees [A0], and Diplomas [A1].

³ The World Bank [2004] estimated that upon the commencement of public sector reforms in 1998, 6,000 staff at the central level were retrenched, in addition to the removal of 6,500 ghost workers.



Source of Data: 2010 Census of State Employees

Capacity building measures were also undertaken as part of the larger effort on public sector reforms. By the mid-2000s, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) launched its initial campaign on capacity building through a *Multi-Sector Capacity Building Program (MSCBP)* that aimed to address the institutional capacity building needs arising from the first medium-term development plan (i.e. the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper or PRSP). However, the MSCBP was a large program that was significantly underfunded and supply-driven.⁴

Hence, by 2011, the GoR rolled out the *Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI)* as its new approach towards capacity building in the country. Based on the lessons from the implementation of the previous MSCBP, the GoR emphasized that the current approach has two distinguishing features: First, it is a government-led initiative, which means that support to it is based on government-identified priorities; Second, public service delivery is being done simultaneously with the capacity building effort. As such, the SCBI is being operationalized through the pairing of international experts with national (Rwandan) government personnel, in delivering services that are related to government-identified priority objectives. Through the pairing strategy, the capacities of the national counterparts are also expected to be developed.

Development efforts in Rwanda are guided by the agenda stated in *Vision 2020*, which is serving as the GoR's comprehensive roadmap towards the nation's attainment of a middle-income country status by 2020. The establishment of good governance through a capable state is among the main pillars identified in the country's long-term plan, together with the development of the nation's human resources, private sector, infrastructure, and agriculture, as well as its integration with regional and global economies.

In the intermediate periods, the GoR is making use of medium-term plans and tools such as the Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper (PRSP), the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2008 to 2012 (EDPRS 1) and for 2013 to 2018 (EDPRS 2). Under EDPRS 1, the government mainly sought to reduce income poverty by 11 percentage points from the previous measurement period (i.e. from a 57% poverty incidence in 2005/2006 to 46% in 2012/2013). This target was achieved, as poverty incidence was reported at 45% by 2010/2011. Real GDP Growth was also recorded near the target 8% per year. Overall, the GoR concluded that 85% of the targets under EDPRS 1 were met.

⁴ It was estimated that the MSCBP was underfunded by around 50%.

Within the context of EDPRS 1, the GoR launched SCBI and identified four priority sectors for capacity building: (a) The Agricultural Sector – To increase agricultural production, value added, and exports; (b) The Energy Sector – To increase electric generation capacity and increase access to electricity; (c) The Mining Sector – To increase revenue from the mining industry; and (d) The Private Sector – To increase private sector capital to 15.2% of GDP by 2012. Operationally, these involved capacity building at the level of the lead government agencies for each of these sectors (i.e. MINAGRI, MININFRA, MINIRENA, and RDB).

In addition to these main objectives, a component on *Support to the Center of Government* was included in the SCBI framework. In view of a need to address the whole delivery chain in the government structure, this component was added to strengthen the overall management capacities at the Office of the President, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), and the National Capacity Building Secretariat (NCBS). This component is intended to complement the capacity building activities that would be done at the level of the line ministries and agencies.⁵

The SCBI approach is being continued under the current EDPRS 2 (2013-2018). The GoR is aiming to accelerate economic growth in the five-year period, by 11.5% each year (from 8% in EDPRS 1), as a next step towards attaining middle income country status by 2020. Income poverty incidence is also expected to be reduced further to 30% by 2018. These objectives are expected to be achieved through several strategies, including prioritized capacity building across sectors and districts.

2. UN Strategies and Initiatives

The UN System in Rwanda has mainly operated on the basis of frameworks and plans that are aligned with national intentions as expressed through the PRS and EDPRS. Hence, a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2008 to 2012 was designed and adopted to align UN System interventions with the GoR's EDPRS 1 for the same period. A component on Good Governance was clearly incorporated in the UNDAF 2008-2012 to match the government's articulated priority to deliver equitable, efficient and effective public services within the time frame of EDPRS 1. In the current period, a UN Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) for 2013 to 2018 is in place, in response to the EDPRS 2.

Rwanda is also one of the pilot countries for the implementation of the UN's transitioning into its Delivering as One (DAO) Agenda. As such, the UN Agencies in the country have been taking key steps that are leading towards the creation of a One UN System, in terms of common programming and advocacy, and the establishment of a joint physical office. Common programming in the country is being done through the UNDAF/UNDAP system, the implementation of Joint Programmes (JPs), and the adoption of a Common Operational Document (COD). After the UNDAF 2008-2012 was adopted in mid-2007 by the UN System and the GoR, a COD for the same horizon was agreed upon by the UN Agencies in November of that year. The COD 2008-2012 defined the mechanisms and processes for jointly implementing the UNDAF, and also allocated a portion for a One UN Fund for the operationalization of the UNDAF. The funding structure was the UNDAF 2008-2012 was set at around one-third from the Core Fund of the UN Agencies, one-third from their non-core funds, and one-third from the One UN Fund.

Initial steps have been made towards the development of a Post-2015 Agenda in Rwanda. Countrywide consultations particularly among the youth sector, were conducted to identify areas of priority for the next 15 years. Rwanda has also been selected to pilot 2 sustainable development goals: one on governance and rule of law, and another on institutional capacity building. The current UNDP Project on capacity building that will be elaborated in the latter part of this report, is part of the piloting for the UN Post-2015 Agenda in Rwanda.

⁵ The NCBS was formerly the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS). In this report, the agency will be referred to as NCBS, unless it is otherwise necessary to distinguish between the two.

Within the setting of the UNDAF/COD 2008-2012, at least eight governance-related programmes and projects were implemented by the UN System. These were the: (a) *Support to the Establishment of the Rwanda Peace Academy* Project of UNDP and the Ministry of Defense [2009-2011]; (b) *Support to Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment for Development Effectiveness in Rwanda* of UNDP and MINECOFIN [2008-2012]; (c) *Programme for Strengthening Good Governance* of UNDP, DFID and the GoR [2007-2010]; (d) *Access to Justice Programme* [2008-2012]; (e) *Support to the National Institute of Statistics Rwanda* [2009-2012]; (f) *Support to M&E at the Ministry of Finance* [2010-2013]; (g) *Inclusive Participation in Governance Project* [2012-2013]; and (h) *Support to the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) – Central Government Component* of UNDP and NCBS [2012-2013].

In the present period, UNDP is supporting a capacity building project entitled *Transformational Capacity Development for the Implementation and Coordination of Government Policies and Programmes*. This is a four and a half year [2014-2018] project that aims to develop the capacities of seven national-level government agencies and 30 district-level offices in Rwanda.

B. Description of the Project

1. Background and Objectives

The *Support to the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) – Central Government Component* was originally designed as a one-year project from November 2011 until November 2012. An *Addendum to the Project Document* was however integrated into the original project, and the added component and activities were planned to be implemented from August 2012 until August 2013. The original project and its addendum were designed in response to the GoR's call for development partner support to the pilot phase of the overall SCBI, which started in early 2011. It was aimed to specifically address the component on *Support to the Center of Government* that was articulated in the SCBI document. It was particularly intended to support the capacity building needs of the NCBS and the PMO.

2. Implementation Details

The Implementing Partner (IP) of UNDP for the project (including its addendum) was the NCBS, and it was executed via a National Implementation Modality (NIM). As the IP under a NIM modality, NCBS was in charge of overall project reporting and fund management. NCBS was also responsible for the implementation of activities under its component (i.e. the original project). Because the mandate of NCBS is to coordinate (i.e. not implement) capacity building programs of other government agencies, PMO was responsible for the implementation of project activities under its own component (i.e. the addendum).

The total budget allotted for the project was US \$ 2.53 Million. An amount of US\$ 1 million was provided for the original project design, and US\$ 1.53 Million was earmarked for the addendum. 63% of the funding (US\$ 1.6 million) came from the One UN Fund, 32% (US\$ 800,000) came from the UNDP Core Fund, and 5% (US\$ 0.13 million) was the counterpart of the Government of Rwanda [Table 2].

Table 2. Funding Level and Cost Structure

	Amount of Funding (in US\$)	Sources
Outcome 1 (per Original Project Document)	600,000	One UN Fund UNDP Core Fund
Sub-Total	400,000	
	1,000,000	
Outcome 2 (per Addendum)	1,000,000	One UN Fund UNDP Core Fund Government of Rwanda
	400,000	
	130,000	
Sub-Total	1,530,000	
Total	2,530,000	

Sources of Data: Project Documents

The effective implementation period for the project (including the addendum) was twenty months, from January 2012 until August 2013. On a per outcome basis however, the activities under Outcome 1 of the project (i.e. per the original project document) were implemented over a period of eighteen months (i.e. from January 2012 until June 2013), while those under Outcome 2 (i.e. per the addendum) were implemented over a period of eight months (i.e. from January 2013 until August 2013).

3. Results Framework and Key Outputs Reported

Due to the merger of the original project with the addendum, the project was structured along two Outcomes (i.e. the outcome per the original design plus the outcome for the addendum) and four Outputs (i.e. the two outputs per outcome put together) [Table 3].

Table 3. Project Results and Indicators (per Project Documents)

Results	Indicators
Outcome 1. Capacity of key central government institutions to maintain focused delivery of government priorities strengthened	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Number of Rwandans providing expertise to the government ○ Central Government Institutions delivering government priorities
Output 1.1: Selected government institutions trained on relevant skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ International experts providing training to Rwandans in government institutions ○ Number of institutions with completed trainings by international experts ○ Number of Rwandan counterparts utilizing acquired skills ○ Coaching and mentoring mechanism in place and functional
Output 1.2: Institutional audit developed for selected government agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Number of agency institutional audit reports
Output 1.3: Capacity building plans developed and implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ MDA Management Teams in place and functional ○ Quarterly reports produced
Outcome 2. Strengthened coordination of government policies and programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Level of coordination of government policies and programs
Output 2.1: The PMO staff provide high quality policy analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Quality and well-coordinated policy analysis
Output 2.2: Capacity building for relevant PMO staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Number of partnerships and networks opened ○ Existence of a learning platform

Sources of Data: Project Documents

The following output achievements were stated in the end-of-project report:

- *Output 1.1: Selected government institutions trained on relevant skills* – Three international experts (strategic advisors) from the African Governance Initiative (AGI) were posted at the NCBS (2) and the PMO (1). They provided training, coaching and mentoring to an unspecified number of government institutions (particularly on planning and reporting tools – weekly progress tracker, work plans for experts, capacity building plans for national counterparts, skills transfer reporting template, most significant change tool, pre and post training tool). These experts were paired with seven national counterparts in delivering the capacity building services.
- *Output 1.2: Institutional audit developed for selected government agencies* – Institutional audits were conducted for two government agencies (i.e. MINIRENA and MININFRA) out of the target four agencies (i.e. including MINAGRI and RDB).⁶
- *Output 1.3: Capacity building plans developed and implemented* – Two workshops were held in March and October 2012 that were attended by government officials, the NCBS, international experts and

⁶ Based on the reports, there were budget limitations that constrained the project from covering all four target ministries.

national counterparts. Through these workshops, the SCBI concept and its progress were discussed, together with the capacity needs assessments and capacity building tools.

- *Output 2.1: The PMO staff provide high quality policy analysis* – Four international experts on agro-industrial development, institutional development, infrastructure development, and monitoring and evaluation were hired for the project. These experts provided technical support to the Government Action Coordination Unit (GACU) Team within the PMO in their respective disciplines.
- *Output 2.2: Capacity building for relevant PMO staff* – Feasibility studies on a Virtual Learning Platform (VLP) and on a Twinning Programme were carried out by two consultants.

C. Description of the Evaluation

1. Nature and Purpose of the Evaluation

A *Summative Evaluation* was conducted on the project. The summative nature of the evaluation implied use of the following approaches: (a) *Full Scoping* – The task reviewed the whole project period, which in this case is January 2012 until August 2013, subject to the time delineation created by the inclusion of a project addendum; (b) *Generalization* – Having covered the whole project period, the evaluation was in a position to make general conclusions and overall judgments;⁷ and (c) *Focus on Outcomes* – As the intervention has already ended and the evaluation was conducted twelve months after its conclusion, the review focused on the project outcomes (in lieu of the project outputs) which was more relevant for the purpose underlying the task.⁸

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide information that could be helpful in the implementation of the current GoR-UNDP capacity building project in Rwanda (i.e. the *Transformational Capacity Development for the Implementation and Coordination of Government Policies and Programmes* Project 2014-2018), and to contribute to future programming on public sector capacity building in the context of the current 2013-2018 UNDAF and the EDPRS 2.

2. Approach and Methodology

A *Mixed-Methods Approach* was applied for the evaluation. The mixed-methods approach combines both qualitative and quantitative methods in the evaluation process. As such, it enhances the credibility of evidence in evaluations [Mertens, D.M. & S. Hesse-Biber, 2013]. An Independent Senior Evaluation Specialist was also contracted by UNDP to perform the task.

For this evaluation, the qualitative method was applied through a two-step process: First, the qualitative information provided in the project documents and reports [Annex A] were reviewed and analyzed, with reference to the questions that the evaluation sought to explore [Annex B]; These were followed through with the conduct of interviews among key informants who provided responses to the evaluation questions and made elaborations on these, as well as the information given in the project literature.

The quantitative component featured the use of *Retrospective Questionnaires* that measured capacity improvements among the beneficiaries of the intervention (i.e. the individual counterparts and the two institutions) over the life of the project [Annex E]. The questionnaires measured capacity changes based on a five-point scale. It was intended to supplement the qualitative portion of the analysis by answering this

⁷ In contrast to the limitations of a *Formative Evaluation* [Patton, 2002].

⁸ The OECD DAC also associates summative evaluations with outcomes measurement.

question: *If capacities have indeed improved, by how much?* It also measured the level of attribution perceived by the beneficiaries on the intervention being evaluated (i.e. *If capacities have indeed improved, how much of it was due to the project?*).

Individual face-to-face interviews with key informants in Rwanda were conducted through a Country Mission that was carried out by the Senior Evaluation Specialist from August 23 to September 13 [Annex D]. Individual interviews were given preference over focus group interviews because of time constraints by the informants. By design, the individual interviews were also arranged to be short (i.e. maximum of 1 hour). Among some informants who required the division of the interviews into topical sessions (i.e. the Project Coordinator and the Focal Persons), two interview rounds were conducted. The task also made use of a *Skype Interview* with an International Expert who was no longer in Rwanda at the time of the evaluation, and an *Email Interview* with a second expert who left the country earlier in 2013. In general, a *Standardized Open-Ended Interview* type was followed in the evaluation, in which standard interview questions were pre-set, while allowing a free flow of discussion as it arose during the interviews.

A total of twelve informants were interviewed for the evaluation [Annex C]. They represented a cross-section of the institutional stakeholders (i.e. the implementing government agencies and UNDP) and the individual role players (i.e. the claim-takers and duty-bearers) in the project. *Triangulation* of the collected information was thus made possible, in combination with the documents review.

Whenever applicable, the data and information used in the evaluation were gender disaggregated to highlight significant implications on the universal agenda for gender equality and women's empowerment. Data and information were also differentiated between the two project components (i.e. the original project and the addendum) whenever it was necessary to fairly describe the progress of the project.

A draft evaluation report was prepared by the Senior Evaluation Specialist. The draft version was submitted to a review panel composed by focal persons from UNDP, NCBS and PMO. Corrections and comments on the draft version were made using a standard template. The corrections and comments served as bases for the Senior Evaluation Specialist to prepare this revised version of the evaluation report.

3. Limitations of the Evaluation

The evaluation was done twelve months after the project concluded in August 2013. Some of the key informants (i.e. national counterparts, international experts, project coordinator) have already moved on to other jobs or have physically moved out of Rwanda. Nevertheless, a significant sample was reached by the review. Four out of the seven national counterparts who were involved in the project were interviewed. One of the two International Experts - Coaches who participated in the evaluation represented a substantially significant sample, because she was the only expert among the three who actually completed service for the whole project duration. The former Project Coordinator and the Focal Persons from the participating institutions (i.e. NCBS, PMO and UNDP) were also reached [Table 4].

Table 4. Summary of Sampling Frames

	Total Number	Actual Interviewed
National Counterparts	7	4
International Experts – Coaches	3	2
Focal Persons	3	3
Project Coordinator	1	1

In the measurement of the intervention’s outcomes, substitute indicators were used [Table 5]. As will be elaborated later in the main text of this report, the short time frame for the project logically led to a focus on output-based measurement and reporting. There have been no similar measurements done at the level of outcomes, and there are no reliable data to measure outcome changes based on the original indicators that have been set in the results framework [Table 3].

Table 5. Substitute Indicators Used for the Evaluation

	Indicator Used	Source of Information
Outcome 1. Capacity of key central government institutions to maintain focused delivery of government priorities strengthened	○ Perceived improvement in the overall capacity of NCBS	- Retrospective Questionnaire
Outcome 2. Strengthened coordination of government policies and programs	○ Perceived improvement in the coordination of government policies and programs at the PMO	- Retrospective Questionnaire

The measurement of Outcome 1 was also delimited to NCBS because it became clearer during the course of the evaluation that: (a) The project was implemented during a pilot phase of the SCBI implementation (i.e. 2011-2014) and as such, it would be more appropriate to measure capacity changes across the other MDAs after the full implementation phase of the SCBI; (b) The key project inputs (i.e. the international experts and national counterparts) were actually restricted to the level of NCBS, and that the other international experts and counterparts posted at the MDAs were supported through other sources; and (c) The project contribution to the capacity development of the other MDAs was limited to the conduct of two institutional audits and the conduct of capacity building workshops and as such, it would be difficult to associate the capacity changes in these MDAs to only these activities.⁹

⁹ The evaluation originally planned to also administer the questionnaires to a selected number of line ministries as proposed in the Inception Report. There was also an intention to make use of government scorecards as indicators, but it turned out that there are no agency-level scorecards for NCBS and PMO.

II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Findings

1. Relevance of the Project

After a series of internal assessments and initial planning activities that were conducted in 2010, the GoR took concrete steps in rolling out the SCBI by formally presenting the SCBI framework during the 46th Meeting of the Development Partners Coordination Group that was held on 27 January 2011. The overall capacity building framework focuses on four priority sectors, plus a component to address the capacity building needs of the center of government, specifically the Office of the President, NCBS, PMO and MINECOFIN. The capacity building activities for this component were initially estimated to cost around US\$ 6.3 million over a four-year pilot phase (i.e. 2011 – 2015) [Table 6].

Table 6. Details of the *Support to the Center of Government* Component of SCBI

Need	Indicative Cost (US\$)
Capacity building support for strategy and policy development in the Office of the President	2,126,505
Capacity building support to the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat in MINECOFIN	2,126,505
Capacity building support for strategy and policy development in Coordination Unit in the PMO	1,063,252
Government of Rwanda counterpart support	1,036,917
	6,353,180

Source: Capacity building for delivery: proposal for a package of targeted support in "Republic of Rwanda Capacity Building Update". Presentation Material by PSCBS during the 46th Development Partners Coordination Group Meeting held on 27 January 2011.

Afterwards, UNDP (through its Governance Unit), went through its internal processes and conducted follow-up consultations with NCBS to explore the possibility of project support that would respond to the new capacity building needs and approach that were articulated by the government through the SCBI. A draft project document on a project entitled *Support to the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative – Central Government Component* was eventually developed, and a meeting of the Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC) was held on 16 September 2011 to review and approve the draft. The final version of the original project document was thereafter signed by the GoR and UNDP in November 2011. This was the original project that aimed to support the capacity building needs of NCBS.

In 2012, consultations also took place between the PMO and UNDP for similar support under the SCBI framework. An addendum to the original project was finalized on August 2012, which integrated the capacity building support for both the NCBS and PMO. Because NCBS and PMO are two of the three agencies in the center of government that have been identified in the SCBI framework as target institutions for capacity

building, it can be stated that the project has been relevant and significant in addressing the needs at the center of government component of SCBI.¹⁰

From a financial perspective, the funds mobilized under the project were also significant, as it constituted around 40% (i.e. US\$ 2.53 million/US\$ 6.35 million) of the total financing requirements estimated for the whole component under the pilot phase [Tables 6 and 7]. Much of the funding needs of the NCBS for its operations nonetheless came from the regular budget support provided by the World Bank (WB) that was coursed through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN).¹¹

Table 7. Project and Budget Support for the *Support to Center of Government* Component of SCBI

	Project/Support	Partners	Period	Cost (US\$)
Support to the PSCBS/NCBS	<i>Project to Support the SCBI – Central Government Component</i>	NCBS, PMO, UNDP	Jan 2012 – Aug 2013 (Outcome 1: Jan 2012 – June 2013)	1.0 Million
	<i>WB Budget Support</i>	MINECOFIN, WB	2011 – Present	40.0 Million
Support to the Prime Minister’s Office	<i>Project to Support the SCBI – Central Government Component</i>	NCBS, PMO, UNDP	Jan 2012 – Aug 2013 (Outcome 2: Jan 2013 – June 2013)	1.53 Million

Sources of Data: Project Documents and Interviews

The project was also noted to have been the only project that came in to support the pilot phase of SCBI when it was launched in 2011. While there were other carryover projects at NCBS that eventually adopted the coaching strategy of SCBI, these were started under the framework of the previous *Multi-Sector Capacity Building Program (MSCBP)*. The project is also believed to have been a catalyst in attracting other development partners to also support the SCBI through their own partnership projects with NCBS that came in later (in 2013).¹²

The SCBI was the link between the project and the broader EDPRS 1. As the project had been relevant to at least a component of the SCBI, it can be stated that it has also been thematically relevant to the EDPRS 1, although from a more modest perspective, it should also be noted that SCBI came in at the latter stage of EDPRS and the project was actually implemented on the last year of EDPRS 1 (i.e. in 2012). The same line of reasoning can be applied on the project’s relevance with Vision 2020 of the GoR, as well as with the UNDAF

¹⁰ Separate support to the Office of the President was provided through the *Support for Policy and Strategy Development (SPSD)* Project (2010-2013) which was implemented by NCBS in partnership with the African Development Bank.

¹¹ NCBS is an agency attached to MINECOFIN.

¹² Aside from the SPSP Project which started in 2010, there was also an NCBS-BTC Project under the MSCBP framework. It was reported that BTC eventually adopted the coaching approach by fielding coaches at NCBS in 2011/2012. By 2013, NCBS also reported that new projects came in, specifically a project funded by the Dutch Government and a new project with BTC.

2008-2012 and the COD on the UN side: while the project was thematically linked to the bigger plans and frameworks, its actual operational contribution to these would be difficult to establish given the timing. However, because it is believed that the intervention actually had greater relevance in serving as a catalyst for the SCBI, it may have a more significant role in the implementation of EDPRS 2 and UNDAF for 2013-2018.

There are two features in the project design that were specifically examined by the evaluation because: (a) one stood out as a recurring issue in the project progress reports and during the course of the interviews; and (b) the other may have implications on programming.

The *Limited Time Frame* given to the project was an issue that had been raised in the project reports since the implementation period. It was commonly pointed out that the time given to the project had been inadequate for capacity building. As earlier stated, the original project was designed for one year. Together with the addendum the project was actually implemented over a period of twenty months (i.e. from January 2012 until August 2013).

Based on the LPAC Meeting held on September 2011, the absorptive capacity of NCBS was acknowledged to be a risk given the limited time frame (i.e. one year) allotted for the project. There was recognition since the planning phase that the project period may not be enough, at least from the point of view of fund utilization [Box A]. A key informant who was present during the said meeting further confirmed that the short project period was “an anticipated problem” at that time.

Box A. Excerpt from the Minutes of the LPAC Meeting dated 16 September 2011

“Issues Arising from Discussion of the project document:

.....

1. Absorption Capacity

The issue of the capacity of the PSCBS to absorb the resources within one year was put forward.

- Although the project duration is one year, the initiative has been designed for 4 years. Participants were also informed that the initiative had actually started with the existing resources and terms of reference and recruitment were at advanced stages.”

Source: Minutes of the Meeting

What was not made clear in the (minutes of the) LPAC Meeting was the basis in approving the project as a one-year intervention. It was explained by UNDP in the course of this review that the project had to be synchronized with the implementation period of the previous UNDAF 2008-2012, which was set to end by December 2012. Hence, there was a practical constraint to design the project for only one year, from its signing date (i.e. November 2011) until November 2012.

What complicated the design was the integration of the addendum into the original project, which was done in August 2012. The addendum essentially loaded the sub-component for the Prime Minister’s Office into the existing project. This was also done for a practical purpose: to be able to respond to the capacity building needs of the PMO in the fastest way especially given the limited time left. It was recalled that the negotiations between the PMO and UNDP for the addendum occurred after the original project had been finalized, and that

given the limited time left in view of the UNDAF expiration period, it was decided for the purpose of expediency that the PMO Project be attached to the original project as an addendum. It was also recognized that NCBS was mandated to coordinate capacity building programs in the government, and NCBS was already the IP for the on-going project. Thus, the addendum to the project was set to be implemented from August 2012 until August 2013, as it was impossible to limit the intervention until end-2012.

The second feature of the project design that needed clarification was the use of the *One UN Fund*. Normally, the One UN Fund is allotted for joint programmes between the UN Agencies and for other activities related to the implementation of the DAO Agenda. In this case, the fund was utilized significantly, as it formed around 63% of the total project budget (compared to 32% from the UNDP Core Fund). The justification for the use of the One UN Fund was that capacity building is cross-cutting across the government agencies, and as such, other UN Agencies would benefit from the intervention through the developed capacities of their counterpart agencies.

Aside from the timing constraint (i.e. this was actually a case of late programming vis-à-vis the UNDAF 2008-2012), there was also uncertainty about the amount of funding from UNDP that would still be available given the nearing conclusion of the UNDAF. The amount and source of funding was not immediately known, and UNDP could not readily commit to support another sub-component, aside from the original project. This also appeared to be the practical reason why most of the funding came from the One UN Fund (63%) and not from the UNDP Core Fund (32%), as the One UN Fund was more accessible at that time.

Despite its defects, it appeared that the project design was still the best that the GoR and UNDP could come up with, given the extraordinary circumstances that were prevailing at that time. There was prior recognition on the challenges that will be brought about by the limited time provided for the intervention, as well as on the effectiveness of the budgets provided. This was an extraordinary programming case that had to be done to address a need that came in during the concluding phase of the UNDAF (as well as the ending phase of EDPRS 1). While it compromised some features of the project design, it also showed the flexibility of UNDP Rwanda in responding to a real need expressed by its government partner.

2. Effectiveness of the Project

The GoR had initially identified six capacity needs at the center of government under the SCBI framework: (a) Direct support for the President and his office; (b) Strategic communications, including effective cross-government communication, linked to driving the delivery of the government's development policies and priorities; (c) Skills to analyze barriers to delivery and support ministries to develop policy; (d) Skills to develop effective accountability mechanisms; (e) Programme management skills to build links between the center and ministries; and (f) Coordination and management skills in disseminating and mainstreaming good practice in capacity building.

The project has mainly responded to these *skills-related needs* at the level of NCBS and PMO, through the posting of international experts (strategic advisors) who acted as on-the-job coaches for seven national counterparts and international consultants who provided technical studies, policy-related assessments and policy proposals. A total of nine international experts (i.e. three coaches and six consultants) were mobilized through the project [Table 11]. The specific needs that they addressed with reference to the needs identified earlier were as follows:

- *Skills to analyze barriers to delivery and support ministries to develop policy* – This need was addressed at the PMO where four international consultants assessed on-going policies and programmes at different ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade) to determine coherence (or dissonance) with the priorities identified by the GoR (e.g. Agri-Business Development). These experts thereafter submitted proposals to the PMO that could serve as bases for the enactment of appropriate policies. As such, the policy needs of the PMO on agri-business development, infrastructure development, and institutional development were addressed through the project.
- *Programme management skills to build links between the center and ministries* – At the NCBS, this need was addressed through the posting of two international experts-coaches (AGI Experts called Strategic Advisors) who helped in overall management (one was assigned at the Executive Secretary's Office), and also in specific skill sets (e.g. in M&E). As such, the coaches were able to support the NCBS in their work on coordination, as well as on the adoption of standard tools (e.g. M&E Tools) that were eventually used by the line ministries. In a sense, this need was also addressed at the PMO through the work of the consultants who were able to link policies and programmes across several ministries with the coordinative function of the PMO. The project also supported one SCBI Coordinator and three Cluster Specialists who liaised with the line ministries.
- *Coordination and management skills in disseminating and mainstreaming good practice in capacity building* – This need was addressed through the government's adoption of M&E tools that documented and measured progress on capacity building (e.g. the Success Stories Tool, Pre and Post Training Tool). The use of these standard tools enabled the NCBS to promote and coordinate and the various efforts in capacity building across the ministries. These tools were introduced by one of the international experts-coaches who were fielded by the AGI [Boxes C and D].

While direct skills provision had been the main response of the project to the capacity building needs articulated by the GoR under the SCBI framework (i.e. the budget for international experts formed 60% of the total project budget, the project also responded to the pilot phase of SCBI through salary support to the national counterparts and other operating (including training-related) costs. Salary support formed around 14% of the budget.

The skills provided by the project were expected to result in overall capacity improvements at the NCBS and the PMO. These are the outcomes discussed in the next section.

As earlier shown in Table 4, the expected outcomes from the project are the strengthened capacity of key central government institutions (as delimited to NCBS) and the strengthened coordination of government policies and programs by the PMO. These were generally discussed with the Focal Persons (FPs) from NCBS and PMO, and also measured using the five-point scale in the retrospective questionnaires that were separately administered for NCBS and PMO.

There was common perception by the FPs that the capacities of their institutions have indeed improved when they responded to the general question (of *Was the Outcome Achieved?*). These were based on indicators such as trust by development partners and performance of colleagues at the workplace [Box B].

Box B. Excerpts from the Interviews with FPs

FP 1: "...I think it did. But how do we qualify that statement? I say that the fact that we got a second project ...is a demonstration of trust. The donor will not give money if they think that you do not have the capacity to effectively and efficiently manage these resources..."

FP 2: "...I realized that for this period, there was a slight change in coordination. The reason is there were many other inputs from outside. The new staff, while working, acquired more techniques and tools that advanced coordination mechanisms..."

Sources: Transcripts of the Interviews

The questionnaires were also administered to the FPs to quantify the *perceived extent of change* in the capacities of their agencies and the *level of project attribution* to such change. Both FPs perceived a one-point improvement in the general (i.e. regardless of the project) capacity/ability of their institutions over the project period, from a *Basic Level* (i.e. Level 2) to an *Advanced Level* (i.e. Level 3). For the NCBS, it was emphasized by the FP that this rating should be qualified, in the context of a major restructuring in the agency in mid-2013 which affected its capacity building efforts, particularly in terms of the staff turnovers that happened due to the restructuring.¹³

Both FPs also acknowledged that there were other elements that contributed to the improvement of the capacity/ability in their institutions. The attribution given to the intervention being evaluated varied: there was a higher level of project attribution in NCBS (i.e. Level 2.8) than in PMO (i.e. Level 2.4) [Table 8].

¹³ In June 2013, the institutional and legal frameworks of PSCBS were replaced with the creation of the NCBS. The change from PSCBS to NCBS involved a total restructuring of the staffing complement to match the new and expanded mandate of NCBS.

Table 8. Summary of Outcome Questionnaire Results

	At Project Start	By Project End	Attributed Level (By Project End)
Perceived Capacity Level of PSCBS/NCBS	Level 2 (Basic Capacity Exists)	Level 3 (Advanced Capacity Exists)	Level 2.8 (Between Level 2.5 and Level 3.0)
Perceived Level of Coordination of Policies and Programs at PMO	Level 2 (Basic Coordination Exists)	Level 3 (Advanced Coordination Exists)	Level 2.4 (Between Level 2.0 and Level 2.5)

Source: Retrospective Questionnaires

While the project was reported to have contributed to the improvement of the PMO’s work to coordinate policies and programs by one step, it appeared that there were other factors that mattered more in the change, as the attribution given to the project was less than half of the unit of change (i.e. 0.4 out of 1.0). The entry of new staff at the PMO and their self-improvement (i.e. learning while doing) were cited as the principal drivers for the improved capacity of the PMO to coordinate policies and programs over time. It turned out from the interview that the international consultants who were hired through the project carried lesser weight in the capacity change because there were challenges faced in the recruitment aspect: it took a long time to recruit them, not all the target experts were recruited, and one consultant resigned after one month of service.

One of the key features of the SCBI that was piloted through the project was the pairing of long-term international experts (i.e. coaches) with national counterparts, with the former expected to deliver on-the-job coaching to the latter personnel as they together perform their daily work. Through this strategy, it was believed that capacity building could happen simultaneously with service delivery.

In general, the four national counterparts who were interviewed for the evaluation believed that their capacities have improved over the life of the project. They cited specific skills that they acquired which they were able to use in their work, and other indications that their capacities have indeed improved [Box C].

Box C. Excerpts from the Interviews with National Counterparts

Counterpart 1: "...We developed the (M&E) tools with the support of AGI...Gillian developed the pre and post tests, success stories. That was the work of Gillian, mainly... I learned a lot of things. Now I manage many functions, including M&E, including planning, statistics (data management), knowledge management, human capital skills development, and institutional capacity development..."

Counterpart 2: "...I worked with her when I was trying to do my work in terms of the procurement process. She supported me when I was trying to present in what we call the Friday Clinics. The clinic is where we go and make a presentation. She helped me a lot in terms of presentation of the PowerPoint..."

Counterpart 3: "...I do not know how to quantify that, but I think that the answer would be better packaged by the witnesses. UNDP itself can testify that my capacity has improved. NCBS itself can testify to that..."

Counterpart 4: "...Personally, I had weaknesses in being able to prioritize my work. She was not an expert in the technical work, like helping you to do better costing, better budgeting, not really. But she helped me especially on issues like how to prioritize your work, how do you follow up, how do you make your to do list, what you give first priority,... Another thing, she was very good in spreadsheets..."

Sources: Transcripts of the Interviews

A retrospective questionnaire was also administered to the counterparts after the qualitative discussion. The results show that they perceived their capacity increments to be one or two points up, from a *Basic Capacity* to an *Advanced Capacity*, or from an *Advanced Capacity* to an *Excellent Capacity*, or from a *Basic Capacity* to an *Excellent Capacity*. One notable point in the result of the exercise is that there were three counterparts who perceived their capacities to be at the highest point in the scale (i.e. Level 4 – Excellent Capacity) by the end of the project [Table 9].

Table 9. Summary of Counterpart Capacity Building Questionnaire Results – Capacity Levels

	LEVEL				
	0	1	2	3	4
	(Little or No Capacity)	(Weak Capacity)	(Basic Capacity)	(Advanced Capacity)	(Excellent Capacity)
Number of Counterparts who described their <i>general</i> professional capacity at level:					
In January 2012 (Project Start)			2	2	
By August 2013 (Project End)				1	3
n = 4					

Source: Retrospective Questionnaires

Another interesting finding is that at least one counterpart who perceived that she had *Excellent Capacity* by the end of the project fully attributed her capacity improvement to the intervention. This was a counterpart who was apparently most engaged with the international expert – coach from AGI, and who reported getting additional personal training outside NCBS that was supported by the project [Table 10].

The other three national counterparts gave an attribution at a point less than their overall capacity levels [Table 10]. They explained that they attended training courses outside of the project scope that helped them in their work. One of them also reported that there was another international expert from the Belgian Development Agency (BTC) posted at NCBS who also helped in M&E, while another said that there was also another international consultant who was of big help to him in financial management.

Table 10. Summary of Counterpart Capacity Building Questionnaire Results – Project Attribution

	LEVEL				
	0	1	2	3	4
	(Little or No Capacity)	(Weak Capacity)	(Basic Capacity)	(Advanced Capacity)	(Excellent Capacity)
Number of Counterparts who described their <i>general</i> professional capacity at level: By August 2013 (Project End)				1	3
Number of Counterparts who described their professional capacity <i>due to the project</i> at level: By August 2013 (Project End)			1	2	1
n = 4					

Source: Retrospective Questionnaires

Attendance in a formal training course (either in-country or abroad) and professional certification were commonly cited by the counterparts as factors that helped in their capacity improvement, in addition to the coaching support that they got from the project.

While there are indications that capacities have indeed improved at the level of institutions and persons, one of the gaps in the execution of this capacity building project was that there was no systematic way to measure capacity improvements in the target groups (i.e. institutions and individuals) over time. It was acknowledged during the review that the project could have benefited from M&E Tools that estimated baseline capacities at the NCBS and PMO, as well as by the national counterparts, which could then be compared with capacities at later periods. The limited time allotted for the project was also a factor for the measurement gap, as it was already mentioned earlier that there was really no focus at outcomes when the project was being designed and implemented, given the short time frame.

The effectiveness of the *SCBI Pairing Strategy* as it was experienced in the project could also stand further review, as it turned out that only one out of the three AGI Experts (i.e. coaches) was able to complete a full length of service within the project period (i.e. 20 months). It was reported that the other two experts actually left in July 2012 and in October 2012. Personal constraints were cited as reasons for the reasons for the turnover in the coaching positions (i.e. a need to get back into one’s career in the UK, slow pace of change that did not match individual temperament and personal frustration over an inability to adjust to the local system and context). NCBS clarified that the positions of the AGI Experts supported by the project were never left

vacant because there were other experts that were fielded by AGI. Still, the turnover costs associated with such events may need to be studied further, particularly as to how these may affect the capacity building process.¹⁴

On the counterpart side, the pairing strategy under SCBI also estimated an optimal combination of three counterparts for each international expert–coach for the capacity building objective. In the case of the project, there were seven reported national counterparts for the three AGI Experts. This combination was obviously based on the budget, as the project budget had estimated the cost of keeping the three AGI Experts and the salary support for the seven NCBS staff. Based on the discussion with the AGI Expert however, there were other NCBS staff that benefited from her coaching services, which means that the actual number of Rwandan counterparts who benefitted from the project could be higher than seven. However, this could have been understated in the project reports because the reporting system is more inclined towards financial accounting (i.e. as to which seven staff had salary support being charged to the project).

All of the seven Rwandan counterparts reported by the project are (or were) from the NCBS, and there were no similar counterparts at the PMO (even though there was an AGI Expert who was posted there until July 2012). According to the PMO, this matter (i.e. the pairing and coaching strategy) was unclear to them. The other international consultants who were hired for the project under the PMO component were not really expected to be coaches, but as technical experts who were tasked to deliver assessments, proposals, and feasibility studies. Nonetheless, if such was the case, the project may have missed out on targeting national staff at the PMO for capacity building within the SCBI framework.

Gender data on the international experts (i.e. coaches and consultants) and national counterparts who were involved in the project are shown in Table 11. On the whole, there does not appear to be much gender disparity among the national staff who benefitted from the project (i.e. three women and four men), as well as the international experts who were mobilized (i.e. four women and five men). However, these happened only by chance as there was no gender equality and women’s empowerment strategy that was adopted for the project. The seven national counterparts were selected on the basis of their roles in NCBS, the AGI Experts (i.e. coaches) were fielded as a team by AGI, and the international consultants were chosen on the basis of their technical abilities. Gender was not considered in the selection process. Also, out of the six consultants hired by PMO for the project, only one was a woman [Table 11].

¹⁴ Based on the SCBI Concept, international experts are expected to stay in Rwanda for around two years so that they can effectively transfer their skills to their Rwandan Counterparts. It follows that a shortened period of service by the coaches may not effectively fulfill this purpose, as could be the case in the two AGI Experts posted by the project.

Table 11. Gender Data on Experts and Counterparts

	Women	Men	Total
National Counterparts Trained Under the Project	3	4	7
<i>NCBS</i>	3	4	7
<i>PMO</i>	<i>n. a.</i>	<i>n. a.</i>	<i>n. a.</i>
International Experts Hired by the Project	4	5	9
<u>Coaches</u>			
<i>NCBS</i>	2	-	2
<i>PMO</i>	1	-	1
<u>Consultants</u>			
<i>NCBS</i>	-	-	-
<i>PMO</i>	1	5	6
Total	7	9	16

Sources of Data: Reports and Interviews

Project M&E activities were based on a Results Framework that integrated the results matrix in the original project document and the one in the addendum [Table 4]. The progress reports prepared for the project have included information with reference to the output indicators stated in the overall results framework. This was also the same format used in making presentations about project progress in the meetings of the Project Steering Committee. The system had been able to provide information on the progress of the project at the level of outputs, and also in terms of financial expenditures. Bottlenecks (e.g. delays in recruitment of experts) and challenges (e.g. low project spending) were identified through the system.

At the same time, the results framework had been focused on outputs, as there were no reports made on the progress of the two outcomes. As stated earlier, there was not much importance given to the outcomes because of the short duration of the intervention: at an originally-planned implementation period of only twelve months, it was expected that no outcome could yet be achieved.

The progress reports and the end-of-project report nonetheless included success stories that seemed to indicate effects at the level of outcomes at some ministries and agencies (e.g. the signing of a major mining agreement between the GoR and a mining firm). However, it turned out from the interviews that the project most likely only had a minor contribution to these success stories because of the marginal and indirect project inputs associated with the case (e.g. an SCBI Coordinator coached by the international expert from AGI reportedly facilitated a meeting between key persons at MINERENA and RDB that closed the mining agreement). In general, there has been a challenge in distinguishing effects brought about by the project, from effects brought about by the overall support to SCBI.

UNDP also acknowledged that a theory of change was lacking in the M&E System. The causal relationships between the outputs and outcomes were not identified and elaborated. This weakness had been due to the focus on M&E capacity building at the level of the NCBS, and not the project. Thus, while the project had made contributions to the strengthening of M&E capacity at NCBS (through the M&E tools that will be used by the ministries), there had been no parallel effort to review and improve the M&E Framework of the project. While

a mid-term project review was discussed in one of the meetings of the Project Steering Committee, this did not also happen because of the shortness of time.

The basic challenge in the effectiveness of the M&E System for the project was that the M&E Capacity at the implementing partner (i.e. NCBS) was itself being developed at the same time that the project was already being implemented. The project had actually contributed substantially to the improvement of M&E Capacity at NCBS over time.

In sum, there were three key activities that were not implemented due to challenges that the project faced. The project originally planned to conduct institutional audits on four priority MDAs (i.e. MINIRENA, MININFRA, MINAGRI, and RDB) but was only able to cover two MDAs (i.e. MINIRENA and MININFRA) because of an underestimation of the cost requirements (i.e. the project eventually reported a lack of funds to cover all four MDAs). There were also five international experts who were targeted to help the PMO but only four were recruited during the project period, due to difficulties in hiring an expert (on social protection). Finally, the four international experts were supposed to perform coaching activities to PMO staff, but were not able to do so because of non-clarity about the coaching concept at the PMO.

3. Efficiency of the Project

The project document and addendum approved a budget of US\$ 2.53 million for a period of 13 months (i.e. November 2011 to November 2012) on the original project and another 13 months (i.e. August 2012 to August 2013) for the addendum. This amount was expected to come largely (95%) from UN funds, particularly from the One UN Fund (63%) and the UNDP Core Fund (32%). The government counterpart was acknowledged to be a token contribution to the project, in view of limited revenue-raising abilities at this time. It was also accepted to be in the form of non-cash support to the project (e.g. use of government premises and equipment) [Table 12].

Table 12. Project Budget and Expenditure Structure

	Budgeted		Expended (as of Dec 2013)	
	Amount (US\$)	%	Amount (US\$)	%
One UN Fund	1,600,000	63%	1,427,973	79%
UNDP Core Fund	800,000	32%	384,213	21%
GoR Counterpart	130,000	5%	n. a.	n. a.
<i>Total</i>	<i>2,530,000</i>		<i>1,812,186</i>	

Source of Data: UNDP data based on ATLAS

The actual cost structure (as of December 2013) was around 79% for the One UN Fund and 21% for the UNDP Core Fund. Greater use of the One UN Fund over the UNDP Core Fund had been due to resource availability (i.e. there were more funds available from the One UN Fund that can be utilized for the project). The purpose however, of the One UN Fund is to promote joint interventions among the UN Agencies in the context of the DAO Agenda. Operationally, this usually takes the form of joint programmes or joint activities. In this case however, UNDP had justified the use of the One UN Fund for the project in the sense that capacity building has a cross-cutting benefit among the UN Agencies (e.g. the capacity building of MINAGRI would also benefit FAO because MINAGRI is the traditional partner of FAO).

Over an extended period of 24 months (i.e. January 2012 to December 2013), the project was able to utilize only 76% of the total approved budget (i.e. US\$ 1,812,186 out of US\$ 2.4 Million excluding the GoR non-cash counterpart). As earlier stated in this report, there was recognition at the start by both the GoR and UNDP that there would be a fund absorption issue given the limited time frame. Much of the funds were also actually used during the second half of the year (i.e. July to December) in both years. The infusion of funds under the addendum caused the spending rate to dip in the first half of 2013. It also appeared that most of the spending occurred during the last remaining months of the project implementation period (i.e. in July to August 2013) [Table 13].

Table 13. Actual Budget and Expenditures, 2012 and 2013

	Budget for the Year	Actual Expenditures			Expenditure Rates		
	(US\$)	(Jan – Jun)	(Jul – Dec)	(Jan – Dec)	(Jan – Jun)	(Jul – Dec)	(Jan – Dec)
2012	737,000	198,590	432,895	631,485	27%	59%	86%
2013	1,177,558	446,166	734,535	1,180,701	38%	62%	100%
	1,914,558			1,812,186			

Source of Data: UNDP data based on ATLAS

There was a basic challenge in the recruitment of international experts – consultants on the PMO component of the project that in turn, affected the fund utilization rate. It took a long time to get the consultants on board (i.e. the consultants were hired only by the first quarter of 2013) because there had been no full time person in charge of the project at the PMO, the job description of the experts had to be specified (i.e. the job description in the project document addendum was a general job description), and the expert positions that the PMO needed were realized to be extraordinary (e.g. the energy expert that they wanted had to be good in mining and petrol; there was an expert in roads who had experience in traffic, but they wanted a specialist on airports). Some offers that were received by the PMO from potential experts were also higher than the budget. It was the first time for the PMO to do international recruitment.

The project followed the standard financial management system being observed in a NIM modality. Being the IP, NCBS was responsible for the management of the project funds (including the funds allotted for the PMO component). Fund transfers by UNDP to NCBS were based on a fund advance system, in which the budget for the first year per the approved work plan was advanced by UNDP, and subsequent transfers were based on approved budgets for the succeeding periods net of the fund balances. Although there had been difficulties in fund spending on the part of the PMO due to the problems in international recruitment that have been earlier mentioned, it only affected the PMO component (i.e. not the NCBS component) because the NCBS activities were already on-going when the addendum came in.

It was also reported that the UNDP NIM Guidelines required the IP (i.e. NCBS) to deposit the funds in a local (RWF) bank account. Presumably, this policy was intended to safeguard against foreign exchange losses that may be incurred by the project. However, in the case of the project, much of the funds (around 69%) were allocated for international experts who required payment in foreign currency (i.e. UK pounds and US dollars). The system thus required the IP to receive the budget (which was calculated in US dollars) in RWF, and then convert it to UK pounds and US dollars to pay the international experts. According to the Finance Expert interviewed by this evaluation, this system was unfavorable to the project as the foreign currencies have appreciated during the project period. Flexibility may be needed in a future project to address this situation.

As will be elaborated in the next section, the GoR followed a *Single Source Selection (SSS)* Method in obtaining international experts from the African Governance Initiative (AGI). This was a method in which the GoR procured the services of the firm (i.e. AGI), with the firm providing the individual experts to NCBS and the other agencies that have advisors and consultants from AGI. Under this method, the procurement of professional services is based on the ability of the firm to provide the services; it may or may not be based on least costs.

In the same way, international experts were recruited by the PMO on the basis of their technical qualifications to undertake the tasks. Based on the interviews, the costs of services are negotiated between the PMO and the expert after the expert has been selected or considered. This method may not also result in least costs for the project.

The procurement system at UNDP has operated via a competitive bidding procedure, in which vendors are selected on the basis of both technical and financial criteria (usually 70% technical and 30% financial). The procedure allows procurement of the same quality of service at the lowest cost. Future projects may consider benefiting from a similar procedure to raise the cost efficiency of the intervention.

As already stated, the IP for the project was the NCBS. The NCBS is mandated to oversee and coordinate all capacity building programmes in the government, and is the host agency of the SCBI. NCBS was also HACT (Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers) compliant. NCBS was therefore the most appropriate IP for the project, given its mandate and position in the bureaucracy, as well as its capacity to manage funds in behalf of UNDP.

The project was implemented under a NIM modality; as such, and also in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness Principles, country systems had to be used, in this case the NCBS System and the PMO System. The project funds were transferred by UNDP to NCBS as the fund manager, but the implementation of the project work plan was done by both NCBS and PMO for their respective components. A major task under this project was the recruitment of the international experts who would be posted at the NCBS and the PMO. For this project, there were three international experts – coaches who were recruited under component 1 of the project (i.e. the NCBS component) and six international consultants who came on board for component 2 (i.e. the PMO component). Considering the short duration of the project, the timely recruitment of the international experts was a key success factor. From an RBM perspective, this was a major input by the intervention that would affect the whole results chain.

For the NCBS component (i.e. the original project), there were no reported challenges in getting the three international experts – coaches on board in time because NCBS already had a *Single-Source Selection* contract with the African Governance Initiative (AGI), a UK-based charity that fields expert advisors in Africa. AGI had been working with NCBS even prior to the project, and the three international experts–coaches (under the title of “Strategic Advisors”) were placed by the AGI.

On the other end, and as earlier noted, the PMO faced challenges in international recruitment. The in-house HR system at PMO was utilized for the recruitment: they advertised the positions, did the processing, and made final selections (in consultation with the NCBS).

As the problem of delayed recruitment at the PMO became apparent, a proposal to transfer the recruitment function to NCBS was forwarded by the Project Coordinator during a Project Steering Committee Meeting held on 22 March 2013. This proposal was not approved by the committee because it would go against the agreed-upon implementation arrangement stated in the signed project document, which specified that while NCBS

would continue to be responsible for the fiduciary management of the overall project, the implementation of the addendum activities would be done by the PMO.

Aside from assuming the recruitment of international experts by NCBS in behalf of the PMO, another approach towards addressing the challenge would have been for the PMO to break down the specific tasks involved in the recruitment process (e.g. preparing the TORs, advertising the position, preparing long lists and short lists, interviewing, and final selection), analyze the task/s in which they were having difficulties, and identify alternative course/s of action. For example, one alternative course of action would have been to seek the help of UNDP in posting the advertisements in the UNDP jobs website [<https://jobs.undp.org>], if the problem was in online advertising. This option would have also shown that the project had made efficient use of existing resources (i.e. technologies) held by a project partner (i.e. not merely as a donor). In general, the lack of options in addressing the challenge faced by the PMO in international recruitment was the basic management issue.¹⁵

There was clear collaboration between the project partners (i.e. NCBS, PMO and UNDP) in the design and implementation phases of the project. Records show that the partnering institutions participated in the LPAC Meeting held on 16 September 2011, as well as the Project Steering Committee Meetings held from July 2012 until March 2013. In these meetings, it was apparent that the partners were active in discussing the status and issues about the project. Still, improvements can perhaps be made in the future on clarifying the role of UNDP as a partner and not just a donor, and that as such, there could be other ways that UNDP could help in fulfilling the purpose of the project, given its international reach and expertise.

The Project Steering Committee was the management and accountability structure for the project. Records show that it had been functional: at least five committee meetings that lasted around 1.5 hours each were held from July 2012 until March 2013. The minutes indicate that the project partners have been active in these meetings, that they were informed on the progress of the project through periodic reporting done by the Project Coordinator, and that the main issues (e.g. delayed recruitment, fund use) have been discussed. A key informant who attended the steering committee meetings appreciated the fact that the group was empowered to make certain decisions (e.g. fund re-alignment and time extension) that worked well for the project. The problem-solving function of the committee was nonetheless challenged by the fact that it was unable to solve the problem of delayed implementation of the PMO component. The steering committee was also focused on the capacity building project itself, and that it was not the venue to discuss the progress of the whole SCBI, possibly in terms of how other development partners (aside from UNDP) have come in to support it, and the synergy (or overlaps) that may have been created by greater support to the approach.

There were nonetheless no noted major overlaps or duplications between the project activities and other interventions. As shown earlier on Table 7, the GoR-UNDP intervention had been the only project that came in during the 2011-2012 period when the pilot phase of the SCBI was launched. While there also was continuing assistance from the WB, it was in the form of budget support to NCBS through MINECOFIN.

Based on the interviews with the national counterparts, there were some operational overlaps on the coaching aspect, as there were also other international coaches (aside from the three international experts funded through the project) who came in at NCBS to train them during the project period. These were the other experts fielded by BTC, and also from AGI (AGI fielded other experts at NCBS aside from the three who were funded through the project budget). It turned out that BTC, which had been a partner of NCBS since the previous MSCBP, had also shifted to the coaching strategy as the project was being implemented and had fielded at least one expert (on M&E) who worked with the same national counterpart supported under the

¹⁵ According to an informant, they had actually thought of using the UNDP Jobs Website but were concerned that people might think that the job would be a UN job, and not a job for the GoR.

GoR-UNDP project. From the point of view of the counterparts however, the overlaps were not an issue, as they had gained knowledge and skills from the various coaches who worked with them.

Given the complexity of work being done by NCBS on capacity building, as well as the multi-partner support that the agency is obtaining, it makes sense nevertheless to rationalize the inputs, possibly in terms of identifying which coaches from which project (or budget support) would train which counterpart/s, in order to maximize the development effectiveness of the interventions. Such a system of input-output accounting would also help in arriving at a fairer measure of attribution to the various efforts in capacity building. On this point, it was noted that a *Capacity Building Coordination Forum* is being organized, with NCBS as the technical secretariat. This mechanism would be composed by the development partners that are involved in capacity building in Rwanda.

4. Sustainability of the Intervention

There are indications that the project benefits are continuously being used even after the project has ended around twelve months ago. The national counterparts who were interviewed reported that the skills and knowledge that they have gained from the intervention are being applied in their work. The tools and systems that have also been introduced by the international expert-coach from AGI are also being utilized [Box D]. On the part of the PMO, the main project outputs (i.e. the feasibility studies on the VLP and the twinning program) will be used for the implementation phase that will happen in the successor project.

Box D. Excerpt from the Interview with the M&E Specialist

“...One of the ways we see that skills and knowledge have been transferred is through success stories. In our strategic plan right now, one of our indicators is to capture a number of success stories documented from our counterparts. We get to meet the counterparts, we ask them where they started from and how much they have learned through the approach, and where they are at the moment. That really helps. We still use the tools, pre and post test questionnaire, we have already made inputs to it and we have disseminated it to our capacity building suppliers (Rwanda Management Institute), which works very closely with us. So we have tailor-made it to their training and we want them to use it. We want to assess the situation before and after...”

Sources: Transcript of the Interview

However, not all of the seven counterparts who were trained under the project are still with NCBS. It turned out that three of them have left and have moved on to other jobs also in the GoR and with NGOs in Rwanda. It is nonetheless believed that they are still able to apply their skills and knowledge in their current jobs with other ministries and NGOs.

The staff retention rate of the project after twelve months is therefore around 57% (i.e. four out of seven). One other gap in the project is that the issue of staff retention was not addressed, as it is a major challenge in

the context of Rwanda. A target staff retention rate was not set in the project, and a risk assessment on it was apparently not done.¹⁶

The NCBS underwent a restructuring phase in June 2013, in which the mandate and staffing of the agency was changed as it transformed from the previous PSCBS to the current NCBS. As part of the transformation process, all of the staff were made to re-apply for the positions that were made available based on the new requirements. This restructuring was apparently not anticipated in the project document, and the risks that it possibly brought on staff retention was not assessed and mitigated. It is also apparent that NCBS is still in its growth stage, as it has reportedly gone through a restructuring process twice in the last four years (i.e. from HIDA to PSCBS to NCBS).

Aside from the issue of staff retention, the interviews also pointed out that the retention of experts – coaches is also a lesson on the sustainability of capacity building projects. It is common knowledge now that capacity building takes time (exactly how long is not known yet), and it is for this reason why it is believed that the coaches also have to ideally stay for a “long” period of time in order for the intervention to become self-sustainable in the long run. But based on experience with the project and with other projects as well, there have been turnovers among the experts – coaches themselves for several reasons.

The third lesson on project sustainability that has been shared during the course of the interviews was on funding. It was known that the hiring of international experts – coaches is expensive, and there was awareness that this cost will not be sustained by the GoR after the end of donor support. As the pilot phase of the SCBI is ending at the time of the writing of this evaluation report and its actual implementation phase is about to roll out, it may be a good idea to start thinking about the issue of sustainability of the coaching strategy from this area of concern.

By May 2013, it became clearer that the project was not really intended to be a full intervention, but as an interim effort that would cross over into the programming for the next UNDP. The Project Steering Committee Meeting held on 9 May 2013 was already discussing a proposal for a succeeding project that would start by July 2013. There was no exit strategy adopted for the project.

The successor project is currently being implemented by NCBS as the IP, and it is co-implemented by the PMO, MINECOFIN, MINALOC (and the District Governments), RGB, RDB, and NISR. Entitled *Transformational Capacity Development for the Implementation and Coordination of Government Policies and Programmes*, the project started in January 2014 and is targeted to run until June 2018. The approved budget for this four and a half year intervention is around US\$ 7.04 million, with US\$ 6.8 million coming from the UN (specifically US\$ 4.5 million from the UNDP Core Fund and US\$ 2.3 million from the One UN Fund). It is essentially a bigger version of the pilot project (i.e. the project being evaluated).

At least four improvements have been made on the current project, based on the known lessons from the implementation of its predecessor project. These are: (a) The setting of a longer time frame – As already stated, the current project has been designed for four and a half years (2014-2018), compared to the previous one which ran for only twenty months; (b) The presence of a diagram of a Theory of Change in the project document – There is at least a diagram of the theory of change assumed for the project; (c) The inclusion of full-time Project Coordinators (PCs) in the project staff plantilla – These PCs will be based at the different participating ministries and agencies to ensure the implementation of project activities; and (d) The adoption of a risk mitigation measure in case there will be significant delays in the recruitment of international experts –

¹⁶ On the whole, the GoR acknowledges that staff retention is a major challenge in the public sector. Staff Turnover was estimated at up to 50% in one agency until 2010, and there were difficulties in filling positions [MINECOFIN, undated].

The risk log in the project document indicates that the NCBS procurement system will be used in case there will be a delay in recruitment by the other agencies.

The current project may also benefit from the other recommendations that will be forwarded later in this report.

5. Other Findings

The evaluation was also asked to look into the aspects of the *Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA)* to programming and *South-South Cooperation*, as to how it was possibly applied in the project. The HRBA uses a human rights lens in programming, and as such, it identifies power relations between claim-takers and duty-bearers in the context of the project. There has been no mention of the HRBA in the documents and in the interviews conducted for the evaluation. Further study will also have to be made if the HRBA would be applicable in the context of capacity building of the public sector in Rwanda (i.e. Is capacity building considered to be a matter of right in the country?).

There have been reports of some form of South-South Cooperation in the NCBS website. There have been delegations from Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Burundi and Malawi who were reported to have come to Rwanda to learn about the SCBI. However, this was obviously about SCBI as a whole, and not just the project. There was also no mention about the elements of South-South Cooperation in the interviews and the documents. International expert recruitment have mostly been sourced from the northern countries where there are believed to be advanced capacities. Still, the current and future projects may consider how the element of South-South Cooperation can be integrated in the capacity building interventions.

B. Conclusions

Based on the foregoing findings, the following conclusions can be stated:

The project had been very relevant and significant to the capacity building needs and priorities in Rwanda. Its objectives and strategies were directly aligned with the center of government component of the SCBI. Through the intervention, the capacity building needs of two out of three agencies in the center of government (i.e. NCBS and PMO) were addressed. Although the financial contribution provided by the project had been small in supporting the overall operations of the NCBS, the funding input was significant with reference to the initially estimated capacity building budget for the center of government.

Data shown by NCBS for the evaluation support a view that the project has had greater relevance in terms of how it served as a catalyst for other development partners to support SCBI. It was the first project that responded to the piloting of the SCBI, and it is perceived to have attracted other development partners in Rwanda to also support the initiative.

While a direct relevance by the project to SCBI can be established, the same link cannot be concluded for the broader planning frameworks of the GoR and the UN System (i.e. EDPRS 1, UNDAF 2008-2012, and COD). This is because the effort was done in the last years of the planning horizon. The relevance of the project to the bigger plans could only be thematic. However, due to its perceived pioneering effect (i.e. it attracted other development partners to buy into the SCBI), it can be stated that the intervention will be more relevant in the succeeding EDPRS 2 and UNDAF 2013-2018.

In order to respond to the new capacity building approach taken by the GoR, the UN System through UNDP had to compromise some elements of the project design. The project time frame was limited because there was a practical need to fit the project within the UNDAF 2008-2012 period. The limited time frame was a known constraint since the planning phase of the project. The funding structure for the project had also been based on practical considerations. Despite these compromises, the project design was still the best that could be done, given the extraordinary circumstances that were prevailing at that time.

The project was effective in responding to the skills-related needs at NCBS and PMO. Through the international experts, the project was able to provide research skills that aided the PMO in creating policies that were aimed at facilitating the achievement of the four priorities identified in the SCBI, program management skills that helped the NCBS coordinate capacity building programs across the line ministries and agencies, and coordination and management skills that were useful in promoting good practices in capacity building in the government. There have been initial positive results in the coordination of M&E for capacity building through the adoption of M&E tools that tracked success stories and pre/post training changes.

Despite the limited time given for the intervention, the general perception is that the project outcome has been achieved, in terms of improved capacities at NCBS and PMO, and also at the level of the national counterparts. There was marginal capacity improvement at the level of the institutions, as both agencies were believed to have moved only one point up in the scale, to an "advanced" level. The improvement was felt more at the level of individuals (i.e. the national counterparts), where some capacities were perceived to be already at the "excellent" level and where there was progression by two points in the scale.

The level of project attribution at the institutional level varied. There was greater attribution given to the project at NCBS, compared to the PMO where other factors were perceived to have been more significant in their capacity improvement. The PMO component of the project faced greater challenges than the NCBS component which influenced this outcome.

At the level of individuals, capacity improvements were also partly attributed to the project although there was an extreme case of full attribution given to the intervention. The opportunity of having attended formal training courses and obtaining professional certifications were cited as the other variables in personal capacity improvements.

The measured capacity improvements among the national counterparts indicated that the SCBI coaching strategy that has been piloted under the project was effective. However, there was a gap in the adoption of a capacity measurement tool and system. The effectiveness of the pairing strategy could also stand further review with regard to the project experiences on the turnover among some international experts–coaches, the ratio between the coaches and the counterparts, and clarity about the coaching and pairing strategy outside of the NCBS (i.e. at the PMO).

While there was not much gender disparity in the project in terms of the gender distribution of the national counterparts who benefited from the intervention and the international experts who participated in service delivery, the project had been gender blind as there were no gender targets and gender equality and women’s empowerment strategy adopted for the undertaking.

The project’s M&E Mechanism contributed to the achievement of project results, but only up to the output level. There was not much importance to the measurement of results at the outcomes level because of the short time frame that was set for the intervention. There were also weaknesses in the M&E System itself because the M&E function at NCBS was itself undergoing a process of capacity building within the project.

The following intervention strategies and issues should be taken into account in future programming:

- *Time Frame for a Capacity Building Intervention* – There is general belief that “capacity building takes a long time”, but nobody knows how long it will really take. What is only known at this time is that it should take longer than one year;
- *Capacity Building in a NIM Environment* – The complexity faced by the project is that the target groups for capacity building were also the implementing partners. Given such a situation, future similar projects may have to balance development results with process improvements;
- *Change and Attribution Measurement* – It is known that capacity changes are difficult to measure but there is recognition that it should be measured. There are also several variables in the capacity building effort that complicate attribution;
- *Combination of Coaching and Training/Certification* – It appeared that it was not only coaching that mattered in the capacity building of counterparts, but also formal training and professional certification. The SCBI may want to take consider this point in a future updating of the approach; and
- *Profile of an Effective Capacity Builder* – It turned out that the ideal person for capacity building is one who is a technical expert who is at the same time a good coach. Additionally, the person should be capable of adjusting to the people and systems in Rwanda.

The project faced challenges on financial efficiency, particularly in terms of low fund utilization and possible cost inefficiencies. Low fund utilization was primarily due to difficulties encountered in the recruitment of international experts. The fund transfer system from UNDP to the IP, and the non-use of competitive bidding procedures similar to that being followed at UNDP, also contributed to cost inefficiency.

As a project that was implemented under a NIM modality and in consonance with the Paris Declaration principles, country systems were used. There were however efficiency trade-offs incurred in the use of country systems: there were delays in critical activities and there were cost inefficiencies in the procurement systems. It was the best approach that could be taken given the overall context. Implementation efficiency was also aided by the presence of a government agency that had a clear mandate on capacity building, which was at the same time, HACT compliant.

The main project partners were active in the project through their participation in the Project Steering Committee. However, there could have been opportunities to access available technological, networking, and expert resources available at UNDP that could have helped in project implementation. UNDP's participation in the project had also been limited at the Project Steering Committee, which was not a mechanism to discuss higher-level concerns like synergy of the various supports given by development partners to SCBI. Nonetheless, there is a new mechanism called Capacity Building Coordination Forum which is being organized for this purpose.

The Project Steering Committee efficiently functioned as the management and accountability structure for the project, although it had limitations in the problem-solving function, as it was not able to solve the problem of delayed international recruitment.

The financial management procedure of transferring funds to a local currency account affected this project, as it was dependent on foreign currency to pay international experts. Aside from this weakness however, the financial management system had been supportive to an efficient implementation of project activities.

One strength of the project implementation process is the presence of an IP that had a clear mandate on capacity building in the country, and which was also HACT-compliant. On the other hand, there is a weakness in that arrangement because the IP can actually only implement capacity building programs for its own agency. As such, it had to rely on the capability of the other agency to implement its own component of the project. One opportunity that has been created over the life of the project is that there has been greater support for the SCBI from other development partners. There is a continuing threat however, to the stability of the IP which has restructured twice in the last four years.

This was an intervention that was not really intended to become self-sustaining within its short life time. There has actually been a successor project which is on-going, and which is expected to carry on with the capacity building effort. There are nonetheless indications that the project outputs are being used in the present period, and some will be carried over into the phase of the successor project.

The key factors that will require attention in order to improve the prospects of sustainability of the project approach are: (a) *Staff Retention* – In the context of Rwanda, staff retention is a known challenge and capacity building programs will be bounded by this limitation; (b) *Retention of Coaches* – Ideally, coaches should stay for a certain period of time to transfer skills and knowledge, but experience on this project showed that there are personal and institutional factors that have led to their turnovers; and (c) *Continuity of Funding* – International hiring is expensive, donor support will eventually run out, and it remains to be seen if domestic resources will be able to cover these costs.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT

NCBS, PMO, the Co-Implementing Partners of the current capacity building project, and UNDP may wish to consider the following recommendations:

A. Recommendations for NCBS

Based on the experiences during the pilot phase of SCBI, it may be helpful to review and elaborate the following aspects of the SCBI approach as the GoR moves on to its full implementation:

- *Effective Time for Capacity Building* – There is a minimum amount of time that is needed by an expert-coach to effectively transfer skills and knowledge to a national counterpart. Also, there is a maximum amount of time that should be allotted for the capacity building process (it is assumed that after this period, the coaching strategy will no longer be effective). During the course of the evaluation, it was also noted by informants that the international experts likewise have to pass through a transition phase (i.e. a learning curve) themselves before they can effectively transfer their skills and knowledge. This factor also has to be considered in estimating the effective time for capacity building. A study on the effects created by turnovers among experts on the capacity building process would also be helpful.
- *Expert Profile* – Aside from the technical skill requirements of the experts, there may also be a need to set minimum standards that are related to their coaching abilities: previous capacity building experience, communication skills, interpersonal skills, level of maturity, amount of patience, ability to work in the Rwandan context, etc. For this purpose, the profiles of the experts who have worked for NCBS and PMO may be reviewed and analyzed, as to who among them have been effective, who have not, and what features were present in the two categories;
- *Capacity Building Measurement System* – These are the tools and processes by which capacities among individuals and institutions can be measured over time, to objectively determine changes. Informants believed that the current system is mostly qualitative (e.g. success stories). Adoption of such a system may also be helpful in the M&E of capacity building interventions.
- *Training and Certification* – It turned out from the evaluation that coaching was not the only element for effective capacity building: formal training and professional certification were also common features among the national counterparts who perceived improvements in their capacities. It would be interesting to explore the optimal formula between coaching and non-coaching (e.g. training and certification) support to the staff (i.e. the question would be: how much coaching and how much training/certification would be needed to effectively improve capacities?)
- *Staff Retention Strategy* – As stated in the report, staff retention was a challenge for the project and is known to be a challenge in the whole of government. It would therefore be helpful to adopt staff retention targets and a strategy that could be applied to meet such targets.
- *Sustainability Strategy* – It would also be good to start thinking about the sustainability of SCBI. Will the approach go on by itself at some point in time, will there be a gradual assumption of capacity building activities at the national level, or will SCBI only cover a segment of the public sector workforce until 2020 when the country has already become a middle income country and will therefore have the resources (financial and human) to carry on with capacity building?

There will also be a need to convene the *Capacity Building Coordination Forum* in order to establish an overall mapping of the various interventions on capacity building in the country. Perhaps one of the purposes of convening the mechanism would be to determine if there are synergies (or overlaps) among the various interventions.

B. Recommendations for the PMO

Clarity on the Pairing and Coaching Strategy – Based on the experience with the previous project, the PMO may need to be clear about the pairing and coaching strategy on its specific component. The key questions that need to be addressed are: How many counterparts in the PMO are expected to be trained by which coaches? How long are the coaches expected to work with the counterparts in order to be effective?

Measurement of Capacity Changes - The PMO component in the current project has a lot of training activities. It will be helpful for the PMO to adopt a systematic approach in measuring capacity changes among the training beneficiaries, in order to determine the effects of the project.

C. Recommendations for NCBS, PMO and Other Co-Implementing Agencies of the Current Project

In relation to the earlier mentioned point about adopting a staff retention strategy, it is also being respectfully recommended to the co-implementing partners of the current GoR-UNDP Project to adopt staff retention targets for the on-going project (i.e. the *Transformational Capacity Development for the Implementation and Coordination of Government Policies and Programmes*). Specifically, the following question should be addressed: How many of the national counterparts that would be capacitated under the project can be expected to stay with their current institutions by the end of the project? One year after the project?

Lastly, the co-implementing partners of the current project may also wish to consider the UNDP procedure on competitive bidding later on in the procurement of international experts who would be taken in for capacity building purposes. The UNDP procedure could be helpful in raising the level of cost efficiency in capacity building interventions.

D. Recommendations for UNDP

It will be helpful for UNDP to facilitate the setting of gender-based targets and the formulation of a gender equality and women's empowerment strategy in the current project (i.e. the *Transformational Capacity Development for the Implementation and Coordination of Government Policies and Programmes*). Specifically, the project implementation plan should indicate how many women and men will benefit from and participate in the project, in terms of the national counterparts, the international experts, the trainers, and the training beneficiaries.

In relation to the aforementioned recommendation, the Project Steering Committee through UNDP may wish to consider inviting UN Women to the said committee to act as an Institutional Gender Advisor for the project. It is expected that UN Women will have an advisory role in the committee, to help in ensuring that the project plans are gender sensitive and that the project outcomes will be gender fair. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should also be invited to the steering committee, to help in advising on the integration of the human rights based approach in the current project. Through the involvement of UN Women and OHCHR, the use of the One UN Fund in the project can also become more justifiable.

UNDP may also consider reviewing the balance between the coaching component with the non-coaching component (i.e. formal training and professional certification) in the current project. As experienced in the previous project, non-coaching elements are also important in capacity building.

Based on the experience with the previous project, it would be good if steps can be taken to clarify project-level accounting and attribution. Due to the increasing number of development partners that are coming in to help in capacity building, it can be assumed that there will be a duplication of coaching and training efforts among the same set of national counterparts (i.e. one counterpart will most likely be trained by more than one coach fielded under different projects). In the end, there will be a question on attribution: how much of the capacity improvement in the counterpart is due to the GoR-UNDP Project, how much of it is due to the GoR-BTC Project, etc.).

Aside from the measure already taken to mitigate the risk involved in the delayed recruitment of international experts, UNDP can also consider offering its jobs website [<https://jobs.undp.org>], or its international referrals network to the Project Steering Committee as an additional option.

UNDP may also consider allowing some flexibility in the fund transfer system to NCBS to mitigate the risk in foreign currency fluctuations that have affected the previous project. If it would not be possible to allow NCBS to receive the full funds in US Dollars, perhaps the portion dedicated to payment for international experts may be allowed to be deposited in a US Dollar account.

Lastly, further studies can be made on how the HRBA and the element of South-South Cooperation can be possibly applied in capacity building projects in Rwanda.

Table 14. Summary of Proposed Actions to be Taken by NCBS, PMO, Co-Implementing Partners and UNDP

Issues and Needs to be Addressed	Proposed Actions	Agency Concerned
Review and Elaboration of the SCBI based on the experiences during the pilot phase	Review and elaborate the following aspects: Effective Time for Capacity Building; Experts' Profile; Capacity Building Measurement System; Training and Certification; Staff Retention Strategy; and Sustainability Strategy	NCBS
Identification of synergy from the various SCBI interventions	Convene the Capacity Building Coordination Forum	NCBS
Clarity on the Pairing and Coaching Strategy	Be clear about the pairing and coaching strategy at the PMO	PMO
Measurement of Capacity Changes	Adopt a system to measure capacity changes among beneficiaries of the various training courses	PMO
Lack of Staff Retention Targets	Adopt staff retention targets for the current project	NCBS, PMO and Co-Implementing Partners of the Current Project
Improvement of Cost Efficiency	Consider the UNDP procedure on competitive bidding for procurement of expert services	NCBS, PMO and Co-Implementing Partners of the Current Project
Lack of gender-based targets and strategy for gender equality and women's empowerment in the current project	Facilitate the setting of gender-based targets and the formulation of a gender equality and women's empowerment strategy in the current project Invite UN Women to the Project Steering Committee	UNDP
Balance between the coaching and non-coaching components in the current project	Review the coaching and non-coaching components of the current project	UNDP
Clarity on project-level accounting and attribution vis-à-vis other SCBI projects	Clarify project-level accounting and attribution on the current project	UNDP
Possibility of delayed recruitment of international experts	Offer the UNDP jobs website [https://jobs.undp.org], or its international referrals network	UNDP
Inefficiency in the fund transfer system	Consider flexibility in the fund transfer system to NCBS in the current project	UNDP
Need to review the elements of South-South Cooperation and HRBA in the current project	Make further studies on how South-South Cooperation and HRBA can be applied in the current project Invite the OHCHR in the Project Steering Committee	UNDP

E. Lessons Learnt

In the implementation of the *Project to Support the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative – Central Government Component* by NCBS, PMO and UNDP, the following lessons stood out:

- *Time Management Is Key In A Capacity Building Process* – There is a *Start-Up Phase* involved in the process: it primarily includes the recruitment of experts, as well as their transitioning to the new situation (i.e. their learning curves). Based on experience, this start-up phase itself takes time, especially in a learning environment (i.e. the recruiters do not have experience yet on the recruitment). After the start-up phase comes the *Actual Capacity Building Phase*, in which the coaches physically do their work. This should be the longest phase within the whole process (as to how long, it is not known yet!). After determining that the capacities have indeed been transferred or are being transferred, there should also be an *Exit Phase*, in which the coaches eventually withdraw from the intervention. In this phase, the tools and other outputs produced by the expert are turned over to the counterparts. These phases should be properly managed in a capacity building intervention. It also follows that the coachees (i.e. the counterparts) should also be allotted time to participate in the capacity building process.
- *Non-Technical Competencies Are Also Important* – While having the technical skills and experience, an effective coach should also possess competencies such as the ability to adapt to local practices and paces of work, patience in a process-oriented setting, and a basic heart to help the people of Rwanda.
- *The Coachee Is As Crucial As The Coach* – People can also leave once trained, so it is important to find out how they can be made to stay. There is also a profile of a good coachee (e.g. willingness to learn) that should be considered in the equation.
- *Aside From Coaching, There Are Other Key Success Factors in Capacity Building* – Attendance in formal training courses and ability to obtain professional certifications were cited as positive factors in the capacity improvement of the counterparts.
- *There Has To Be A Proper Balance Between Coaching and Delivery* – It was observed in some cases that there was less coaching and more delivery being done by the experts. This is a challenge in the SCBI approach which combines the two elements together to get things done.
- *Ownership Of and Clarity About SCBI Is Needed* – The project was implemented during the pilot phase of SCBI, and it was possible that the approach had not yet been fully understood and accepted by the whole GoR bureaucracy. It will be good to ensure that the SCBI approach is appreciated and owned by all the co-implementing partners, aside from NCBS.
- *There Is A Need To Measure Capacity Improvements* – Informants agree that capacity improvements should be measured not only in a general, qualitative way but also in a quantitative manner.
- *There Are Trade-Offs Involved in A Capacity Building Project In A NIM Environment* – There is a built-in challenge when the target groups in a capacity building project are also the project implementers. Adjustments (e.g. overall expectations, development results, partnership approaches) may have to be made in this context.

Annex A. List of References

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Annex B. List of Evaluation Questions

Project Relevance (2)

1. To what extent were the project objectives and strategies aligned with the identified needs, priorities and policies on capacity building in the country?
 - 1.1 What were the identified needs, priorities and policies on capacity building in the country?
 - 1.2 To what extent were the project objectives and strategies aligned with these?
2. To what extent was the project design (inputs and strategies) appropriate, adequate and realistic for the capacity building needs?
 - 2.1 What was the project design?
 - 2.2 Why was it designed that way?
 - 2.3 Was it appropriate, adequate and realistic?
 - 2.4 What other designs worked in the country?

Project Effectiveness (5)

1. How effective has the project been in responding to the needs of the beneficiaries, and what results were achieved?
 - 1.1 What were the needs?
 - 1.2 Did the project respond to these?
 - 1.3 What were the end results (effects)?
 - 1.4 To what extent did the project contribute to these effects?
2. To what extent was the project effective in delivering desired/planned results?
 - 2.1 What outcomes were expected?
 - 2.2 Were the outcomes achieved?
 - 2.3 To what extent did the project contribute to these outcomes?
3. How effective were the strategies and tools used in the implementation of the project?
 - 3.1 What strategies and tools were used?
 - 3.2 How effective were these?
4. To what extent did the Project's M&E mechanism contribute to the achievement of project results?
 - 4.1 What M&E System was adopted?
 - 4.2 Did it contribute to the achievement of results?
5. What are the future intervention strategies and issues?

Project Efficiency (8)

1. Was the process of achieving results efficient? Specifically did the actual or expected results (outputs and outcomes) justify the costs incurred? Were the resources effectively utilized?
 - 1.1 What was the cost structure?
 - 1.2 Was it within standards?
 - 1.3 What were the utilization rates?
 - 1.4 What factors affected fund utilization?

2. What factors contributed to implementation efficiency?
 - 2.1 What was the implementation modality?
 - 2.2 Was it efficient (in getting things done)?

3. Did project activities overlap and duplicate other similar interventions (funded nationally and/or by other donors? Are there more efficient ways and means of delivering more and better results (outputs and outcomes) with the available inputs?

4. Could a different approach have produced better results?

5. How was the project's collaboration with the UNDP, the Government of Rwanda, national institutions, development partners, and the Steering Committee?
 - 5.1 What was the extent of collaboration during the design and implementation phases?

6. How efficient were the management and accountability structures of the project?
 - 6.1 What management and accountability structures were adopted?
 - 6.2 Did these structures work as expected?

7. How did the project financial management processes and procedures affect project implementation?
 - 7.1 What financial management system was followed in the project?
 - 7.2 How did it affect project implementation?

8. What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the project implementation process?

Project Sustainability (5)

1. To what extent are the benefits of the project being continued after the completion of the project?
 - 1.1 Are the experts and counterparts still at the MDAs?
 - 1.2 Are the project outputs still being used?

2. How effective were the exit strategies/phase out approaches, and what were the contributing factors and constraints?
 - 2.1 What exit strategy was adopted?
 - 2.2 Did it work? Why?

3. What are the key factors that will require attention in order to improve the prospects of sustainability and the potential for replication of the project approach?

4. Describe the main lessons (on project sustainability) that have emerged.

5. What are the recommendations (on project sustainability) for similar support in future?

Annex C. List of Persons Consulted

Focal Persons

- Mr. Jean de Dieu Kayiranga - Programme Analyst, UNDP
- Mr. Peter Malinga - Single Project Implementation Unit Coordinator, NCBS
- Mr. Innocent Nkurunziza - Advisor to the Prime Minister on Social Affairs, PMO

National Counterparts

- Ms. Judith Katarwa - Division Manager, Capacity Building, NCBS
- Mr. Cassian Mugume - Procurement Management Specialist, NCBS
- Ms. Comfort Mbabazi - Former SCBI Coordinator, NCBS
- Mr. Richard Musuhuke - Former Finance Specialist, NCBS

International Experts – Coaches

- Ms. Gillian Turnbull (via Skype) - Former AGI Strategic Advisor, AGI
- Ms. Rosalind Wall (via E-Mail) - Former AGI Strategic Advisor, AGI

Others

- Ms. Anita Kayirangwa - Former Project Coordinator, NCBS
- Mr. Peter Kamau - Programme Analyst, UNDP
- Mr. Andre Nkulikiye - Project Coordinator, PMO

Annex D. Itinerary of the Country Mission

23 August 2014	Arrival of the Senior Evaluation Specialist in Kigali
25 August 2014	Preliminary Meeting with Mr. Jean de Dieu Kayiranga, Programme Analyst, UNDP
26 August 2014	Interview: Mr. Jean de Dieu Kayiranga, Programme Analyst, UNDP
27 August 2014	Interview: Ms. Anita Kayirangwa, Former Project Coordinator Discussion on Inception Report with Review Panel
28 August 2014	Interview: Mr. Peter Malinga, SPIU Coordinator, NCBS
29 August 2014	Interview: Mr. Andre Nkulikiye, Project Coordinator, PMO
30 August 2014	Write-Up
1 September 2014	Interview: Mr. Peter Kamau, Programme Analyst, UNDP
2 September 2014	Interview: Ms. Judith Katarwa, Division Manager, NCBS Interview: Mr. Cassian Mugume, Procurement Specialist, NCBS
3 September 2014	Interview: Ms. Anita Kayirangwa, Former Project Coordinator Skype Interview: Ms. Gillian Turnbull, Former AGI Strategic Advisor Interview: Mr. Innocent Nkurunziza, Advisor, PMO
4 September 2014	Interview: Ms. Comfort Mbabazi, Former SCBI Coordinator, NCBS
5 September 2014	Interview: Mr. Peter Malinga, SPIU Coordinator, NCBS Interview: Mr. Jean de Dieu Kayiranga, Programme Analyst, UNDP
6 September 2014	Interview: Mr. Richard Musuhuke, Former Finance Specialist, NCBS
10 September 2014	Submission of Draft Report
12 September 2014	Debriefing/Discussion on the Draft Report with Review Panel
13 September 2014	Departure of the Senior Evaluation Specialist from Kigali

Annex E. Retrospective Questionnaires

Outcome 1 Questionnaire

As part of the evaluation of the *Project to Support the SCBI – Central Government Component* which was implemented from January 2012 until August 2013, it would be good to know if capacities have indeed improved and by how much.

1. In general (i.e. regardless of the project mentioned above), how would you describe the capacity level of the NCBS in January 2012 and by August 2013?

	<i>Little or No Capacity Exists [0]</i>	<i>Capacity Exists but Weak [1]</i>	<i>Basic Capacity Exists [2]</i>	<i>Advanced Capacity Exists [3]</i>	<i>Excellent Capacity Exists [4]</i>
January 2012	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
August 2013	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

2. How would you describe the capacity level of the NCBS by August 2013 which was due to the project mentioned above?

	<i>Little or No Capacity Exists [0]</i>	<i>Capacity Exists but Weak [1]</i>	<i>Basic Capacity Exists [2]</i>	<i>Advanced Capacity Exists [3]</i>	<i>Excellent Capacity Exists [4]</i>
August 2013	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Outcome 2 Questionnaire

As part of the evaluation of the *Project to Support the SCBI – Central Government Component* which was implemented from January 2012 until August 2013, it would be good to know if there have been improvements in the coordination of policies and programs at the PMO.

1. In general (i.e. regardless of the project mentioned above), how would you describe the level of coordination of policies and programs at the PMO in January 2012 and by August 2013?

	<i>Little or No Coordination Exists [0]</i>	<i>Coordination Exists but Weak [1]</i>	<i>Basic Coordination Exists [2]</i>	<i>Advanced Coordination Exists [3]</i>	<i>Excellent Coordination Exists [4]</i>
January 2012	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
August 2013	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

2. How would you describe the level of coordination of policies and programs at the PMO by August 2013 which was due to the project mentioned above?

	<i>Little or No Coordination Exists [0]</i>	<i>Coordination Exists but Weak [1]</i>	<i>Basic Coordination Exists [2]</i>	<i>Advanced Coordination Exists [3]</i>	<i>Excellent Coordination Exists [4]</i>
August 2013	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Questionnaire for National Counterparts

As part of the evaluation of the *Project to Support the SCBI – Central Government Component* which was implemented from January 2012 until August 2013, it would be good to know if personal capacities have indeed improved and by how much.

1. In general (i.e. regardless of the project mentioned above), how would you describe your professional capacity to do the work expected of you in January 2012 and by August 2013?

	<i>Little or No Capacity Exists [0]</i>	<i>Capacity Exists but Weak [1]</i>	<i>Basic Capacity Exists [2]</i>	<i>Advanced Capacity Exists [3]</i>	<i>Excellent Capacity Exists [4]</i>
January 2012	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
August 2013	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

2. How would you describe your professional capacity to do the work expected of you by August 2013 which was due to the project mentioned above?

	<i>Little or No Capacity Exists [0]</i>	<i>Capacity Exists but Weak [1]</i>	<i>Basic Capacity Exists [2]</i>	<i>Advanced Capacity Exists [3]</i>	<i>Excellent Capacity Exists [4]</i>
August 2013	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>