



United Nations

**EVALUATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK
(UNDAF II), IN NIGERIA (2009 – 2013)**

Evaluation Report

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Executive Summary

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework II (UNDAF II) is considered by both UN and nationals of the host country, as relevant and aligned to global priorities, as outlined by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), other international conferences, and international human rights conventions. The UNDAF as aligned to the national development objectives. The UNDAF supported the implementation of the national agenda, which was implemented through two instruments – the long term instrument called the Vision 20: 2020, which aims to transform Nigeria to one of the top 20 economies by 2020, and the National Development Plan, which was the medium term framework for action (2008-2011). UN assistance was aligned to the needs of the beneficiaries. There was participation of the national government and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the development of the document.

The participation of government, UN Agencies and CSOs operating within the Country ensured that the previous analysis identified the key development challenges to be addressed to enable the country reach its desired objectives.

The strategic positioning of the UNDAF II to national and state development plans is recognized. The UNDAF document anticipated the changes in national development, and focused on managing the aftermath of elections and insecurity, especially in the Niger Delta. What may not have been anticipated by the document is the magnitude of the insecurity challenge the nation was going to face. The UNDAF was also strategically positioned to support sectoral policies, such as the National Strategic Health Development plan, with its adaptations of state plans in all states and the FCT. There were, however, some missed opportunities in the implementation of the UNDAF, which if seized, could have led to a more successful implementation of the UNDAF II.

In terms of ownership, there is evidence that the process of developing the UNDAF II at the federal level was inclusive. The Federal government through the National Planning Commission participated in producing the development assistance framework. Similarly, the Annual Work Plans in the DAO States were drawn with the participation of the State Ministry of Economic Planning and the participating ministries, departments and agencies. The process ended up with the endorsement of the State Governors, an indication of the ownership of UNDAF in the DAO States. Nevertheless, the government was not seen to drive the UNDAF process. The National Planning Commission (NPC) does not seem to have provided full direction in programme implementation for the UNDAF. Some CSOs participated in the UNDAF II implementation at national, state and community levels. With respect to government ownership of the UNDAF at State level, State Planning Commissions chaired the implementation committees in the DaO states, gave direction and were directly involved in the UNDAF at state level. Nevertheless, UN agencies believe that ownership of the UNDAF at the level of the DaO states was not fully successful.

In responding to whether the expected UNDAF and Agency Outcomes of the results matrix were achieved through the outputs implemented in the UNDAF II, some agencies believed that they were partially achieved, while others consider that many of the outputs and targets were not achieved or were dropped. Close scrutiny of the set goals of the UNDAF and the achievements recorded during the period revealed indeed that a number of the outcomes were met, while others were not realized, leading to partial achievement of the UNDAF and Agency Outcomes. The evaluators believe that some attempts were made by the UN agencies to achieve the UNDAF and agency outcomes, but these efforts were limited by many factors ranging from the UNDAF design itself and commitment towards its implementation, together with a lack of an effective M&E system that would have allowed the UN

system to strategically manage the UNDAF. A detailed analysis of the level of achievement of all the UNDAF Outcomes and Agency Outcomes is presented in the report.

In terms of effectiveness of the UNDAF as a coordination mechanism of UN work, the UNDAF II served as a unifying mechanism that brought all the UN Agencies together to pursue a common goal since they were all signatories to it. In practice, the UNDAF II created the consciousness in the UN agencies of the need to work together despite the different mandates. Through the coordinating mechanisms of the meeting of the heads of Agencies (PMT), the UN Agencies deliberated on measures to achieve the goals, ensure synergy and maximize resources. However there were serious gaps, especially when meetings of the PMT were not attended or representations were mostly not at the right staff levels.

In the DAO states, coordination existed in the sense that there were coordinating agencies playing coordination roles: Adamawa - UNFPA; Akwa-Ibom - UNDP; Benue - UNICEF; Imo - UNIDO; Kaduna - UNFPA; Lagos - WHO; FCT - FAO. However, the coordination of the UN agencies was hampered at this level for the following reasons. First, not all agencies were resident in one location. Second, meetings were poorly attended, and there was poor representation. Third, agencies tended to be more interested by their agency mandates than by a commitment to UNDAF's joint programming. The development of UNDAF II entailed a consultative process with the participation of all UN Agencies, both resident and Non Resident Agencies (NRAs).

Joint programming was envisaged in the design of the UNDAF II, and the document itself is a product of this effort. However, joint programmes were not specifically considered given that the DaO pilot experience in the 6 states was the tool to improve collaborative programming. Joint funding by all UN agencies in the four clusters was captured in the document. During implementation, there were varying degrees of cohesion, coordination and programme implementation. Some collective interventions were carried out by some UN agencies in addressing specific challenges, e.g., UNH4 was a strong joint programming effort, where UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF and UNAIDS were active. There were other existing synergies that joint programming efforts were leveraging on. These included the UN joint programming on HIV/AIDS coordinated by UNAIDS.

In practice, there were, however, weak efforts in implementing joint programmes, as each UN Agency was preoccupied with fulfilling its agency mandate. Joint programme planning, joint programmes, and joint reviews were non frequent. Agencies' demands made it difficult for personnel to meet up with the demands of the joint programming activities, and the absence of the tasks assigned to them on joint programme in their job description made it compelling for staff to devote their time to their primary tasks, as reflected in their job descriptions.

With respect to the effectiveness of the Delivering as One experience, there was unanimous agreement among the clusters that the UNDAF did not succeed in all DaO States. The States where successes were recorded are Benue and Cross Rivers. The Cross River experience may serve as a best practice for the implementation of DaO in the country. In some States, the presence of the lead Agency was rarely felt, and there were few coordination meetings. Even where seeming success was recorded, only the one programme, one operating system to a limited degree, and some common services were implemented. Overall, joint programming was intended, but in terms of implementation it did not really take place, as much as the DaO concept would have led to, and it is hard to find tangible synergies that led to higher level results. The UN did not communicate its results, lessons learned, and good practices in a systematic way, while implementing UNDAF II, even if the Mid-Term Review was an effort in this direction.

Overall, the Result Matrix was quite well articulated at the design stage, but there were basic problems with the M&E Framework. Some of the indicators were not easily measurable. The baselines were often weak, as can be seen from the provision of limited or no information regarding the current state of the problems in the country and the states. Although data may have existed at the level of the agencies, marginal data existed on the implementation of UNDAF II. In addition, the implementation of UNDAF II could have been improved in the area of data collection and analysis, and regular updates of the M&E Framework would have been instrumental to guide its implementation and help managing the UNDAF II strategically. The targets were not always smart, and were not updated during the UNDAF II implementation, and after the UNDAF II extension to 2013 was approved.

The UN M&E Group in charge of monitoring the UNDAF II was partially functional, and there were TORs prepared. There were no work plans for the Cluster/Outcome groups, which reported instead to the Programme Management Team. The implementation of the UNDAF II was challenged by the lack of clear responsibilities of clusters, a weak M&E framework, and poorly implemented AWP in most DaO States. A key limitation of the annual reporting system is the fact that it focused on activities and outputs, but did not gradually shift to reporting at the higher level of the results chain – the UNDAF outcomes and agency outcomes. In addition, the annual review process was done outside the M&E framework – there was very limited consideration of the indicators, baselines and targets in these reviews, making their subsequent use very difficult, including during the evaluation. The reviews of each cluster were not assessed to ensure they would be harmonized, comparable and useful for a proper monitoring. The use of these reviews was very limited, and they were not used for communication or advocacy purposes, which were lost opportunities.

The cross cutting issues in the UNDAF II were human rights, gender equality, environmental sustainability and public–private partnership. These cross cutting issues were integrated into the document and were expected to underlie all UN programming processes. Limited evidence was found by the evaluation about mainstreaming of the five UNDAF II principles and of the cross-cutting issues. There was a Gender Thematic, but it looks like it has not been very effective. The evaluation team did not get any report from this group, and annual review reports did not analyse how these principles and cross cutting issues were actually mainstreamed.

The evaluation found that judging the sustainability of the UNDAF II is not easy, given the lack of evidence. To some extent, as pointed out by the Clusters, some conditions and mechanisms were in place at the end of UNDAF II, so that the benefits of UN interventions could be sustained by institutions and stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels after the interventions were completed. In particular, a lot of capacity building and coaching took place especially at the state level.

Overall, the evaluation found that while the UNDAF II was well aligned to the Vision 20:2020, it is difficult to measure the collective results that can be attributed to the UN, through the UNDAF II, in part because the UNDAF II contributed to higher level development issues, and in part because the M&E Framework and the reporting through annual reviews and the MTR, and from the Clusters during this evaluation, provide an incomplete view of what has been achieved with respect to baselines and targets. The UNDAF II results were insufficiently captured and communicated, and the evaluation could only report based on the evidence it could obtain. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties to attribute the results to the UNDAF, this evaluation has shown that the UNDAF made very important contributions to national development priorities. Indeed, the UNDAF achieved a number of important results in all its expected outcomes. These are explained in the section on “Effectiveness of the UNDAF with respect to expected UNDAF Outcomes and Agency Outcomes”.

I. Introduction and objectives

The second generation 2009-2012 (plus 2013) of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF II) was the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the United Nations System (UNS) in Nigeria. It provided a collective, coherent and integrated UNS response to the country's priorities and needs, expressed in the 7-Point Agenda, which is implemented through the Medium Term National Development Plan (NDP) with a long term vision 20:2020, expected to transform Nigeria to one of the top 20 economies by 2020.

Nigeria's development priorities are expressed within the framework of the MDGs and other commitments, goals and targets of other international conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments of the United Nations. In line with UNDG and UNDAF M&E guidelines, it is mandatory for Country teams to conduct an end of cycle evaluation for accountability and learning, and improving performance of subsequent UNDAFs. The UNCT in Nigeria undertook the process of evaluating UNDAF II with the Federal and State Governments.

The end of cycle evaluation of the UNDAF II was a joint UN process, conducted with national partners, to assess the progress made towards Nigeria's development priorities selected within the UNDAF II. It also took stock of the environment within which the UN was operating and assessed the effectiveness of UNDAF II as a tool of support to the achievement of national priorities and enhanced coordination and harmonization among all UN agencies. The UN and Government reviewed the results achieved from activities supported by the UNDAF II and the appropriateness of its planned results and strategies. The evaluation provided a unique opportunity to assess the achievements against the planned results, and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDAF II outcomes, interventions and strategies. This evaluation identified issues and gaps, and suggested strategic and usable recommendations that the UNS and its partners may utilize to improve the strategies, results, implementation mechanisms, and management efficiency of the next UNDAF.

The broader aim of the evaluation was to generate a usable evaluation report that would encourage the culture of accountability in the United Nations system programming processes, in terms of progress made towards the attainment of the main Outcomes and Outputs of the UNDAF II, and to provide relevant information and strategic recommendations that would support the UN system in Nigeria to enrich the UNDAF III process in a timely and effective manner. The recommendations aim to improve the strategies, implementation mechanism, and management efficiency of the new UNDAF. The evaluation exercise covered the current cycle of the UNDAF II from 2009 to 2013 and holistically reviewed and systematically analysed recorded achievements and the accompanied strategies and how all these supported the UN in delivering on its mandate.

In particular, the evaluation was expected to:

- Determine the extent to which the UNDAF II is evaluable, by doing a quick evaluability assessment;
- Assess the progress or lack thereof, towards the expected outcomes envisaged in the UNDAF II programming documents. Where appropriate, the evaluation highlighted unexpected results (positive or negative) and missed opportunities. This included an assessment of achievements against the planned results, and effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDAF II outcomes, interventions and strategies. This also fed into the current thinking of the United Nations System in

Nigeria on how to achieve a deeper collaboration between agencies, and a stronger relationship with the UN's partners and counterparts;

- Provided an analysis of how the UN has positioned itself to add value in response to national needs and changes in the national development context; and
- Assess the effectiveness of the implementation of UNDAF II, with a special focus on DaO and lessons learned, especially at State level.

The evaluation was broadly defined in Terms of Reference for the evaluation team. See *Annex 1: Terms of Reference for the UNDAF Evaluation*. The approach and methodology were further defined in an inception report and are described in *Annex 2: Approach and Methodology*. See also *Annex 3: Agenda for the Meetings with Key Partners in DaO States*, *Annex 4: List of interviewees*, and *Annex 5: List of references and background documents*.

The evaluation was undertaken by an international consultant and two national consultants, over the period December 2013 – June 2014. The international consultant has a wide experience with UNDAF MTRs and Evaluations, while the two national consultants had been involved in the UNDAF MTR in Nigeria.¹

II. Evaluation Findings

A. Relevance of the UNDAF II with Government priorities and Internationally Agreed Goals

1. Relevance with respect to Internationally Agreed Goals and Human Rights Conventions

The UNDAF II is recognized by both UN and nationals of the host country, according to interviews with UN personnel and IPs, as relevant and aligned to global priorities, as outlined by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), other international conferences, and international human rights conventions. The global priorities focused on assisting the country to align its development priorities, goals and strategies to achieve set targets, and attain sustainable economic development that enables the citizenry to live quality lives, within the context of the acceptable norms of the global community of human rights and gender equality. The United Nations System pursues its development assistance to Nigeria with global principles of development assistance and in the spirit of national ownership. It built the capacities of government personnel on the tenets of the UN assistance and on international best practices. The UN also facilitated Nigeria's participation in the 3rd global survey on implementation of the Paris Declaration. In addition, as mentioned by the 2011 Resident Coordinator's Annual Report (RCAR 2011), two high government officials were supported to attend the High-level Conference in Busan, Korea.

In responding to whether the UNDAF II result statements were relevant in relation to global priorities, the UN agencies contended that the statements in the UNDAF II were carefully formulated in relation to global priorities, taking into account the peculiarities and needs of the national and states government.

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All relevant indicators pertinent to MDGs were included in the UNDAF II and the document was aligned with international commitments (cluster B, C, D). The evaluators concurred with the clusters response that the design of the UNDAF took on board the global priorities.

2. Relevance with respect to national priorities

The UN agencies responded in the affirmative that UN support to Nigeria was aligned with the objectives in the National Development Plans (NDP) under UNDAF II especially Vision 20:2020 and the NDP (Cluster B and D) and the outcome areas were framed to support the government to achieve the objectives in the two documents (Cluster D). The evaluators noted the effort of the UN in aligning their support with the national development objectives. The extension of the UNDAF II cycle to 2013 was in the spirit of taking on board national developmental priorities.

The documentary evidence confirms that the UNDAF II was aligned to the objectives of the national development plan. The UNDAF II Mission Statement indicates, for instance, that "the UN Country Team will support Nigeria in its efforts to secure a policy and institutional environment within which all citizens are active agents of development that distributes benefits equitably to the present generation without jeopardizing gains for future generations". (UNDAF II, 2008: 19). The UNDAF II document further described the national priorities addressed by the four UNDAF II Clusters.

- The national priorities addressed in the UNDAF II Cluster A, Strengthening Governance and Accountability, as contained in *Vision 20:2020* and the *Transformation Agenda* are as follows: combating corruption/improving governance; macroeconomic framework suitable for effective revenue and expenditure management; good governance and sound macroeconomic management required for performance-based budget process; rigorous application of the provisions of the fiscal responsibility bill; promotion of citizen participation in public budgeting and expenditure monitoring; and public service reform which entails evolving measures for service-wide inter and intra-sector linkages as well as for joining-up of services.
- The national priorities addressed in the UNDAF II Cluster B, Productivity and Employment, as contained in *Vision 20:2020* and the *Transformation Agenda* are as follows: rural sector development agriculture/land reform; manufacturing/ SMEs; regional development, erosion management control, desertification, environment; and food security through growth in production output, employment generation, export expansion, supply of raw materials, domestic consumption and value addition. (UNDAF II, 2008: 20)
- The national priorities addressed in the UNDAF II Cluster C, Transform Social Service Delivery are as follows: Human Capital Development: education, health, skills acquisition; Human Infrastructure Health: reduce infant, under-five and maternal mortality from the current levels by 10%, 10% and 30%, respectively, by 2011; enhancement and strengthening of the health system for delivering of effective, efficient and qualitative health systems; Human Infrastructure Education: ensuring that, by 2015, all children particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities have access to complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality; improve the quality of delivery of education at all levels; Cross-Cutting Issues: gender, HIV/AIDS; Cross-Cutting Issues Gender: to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the social, political and economic sectors for sustainable democracy and development.

- The national priorities addressed in the UNDAF II Cluster D, Reduce the Risk of Crisis, Conflict and Insecurity- are Regional Development: Niger Delta; Adoption of a holistic approach toward accelerated development and fostering of peace in the Niger Delta.

The UNDAF supported the implementation of the national agenda, which is implemented through two instruments – the long term instrument called the Vision 20: 2020, which aims to transform Nigeria to one of the top 20 economies by 2020, and the National Development Plan, which is the medium term framework for action (2008-2011).

Furthermore, the UNDAF II was focused on national development priorities and policies, as articulated in the 7 Point Agenda². The precursor document to the Vision 20:2020 is the 7 point Agenda which is to be achieved through two frameworks – the long term framework – Vision 20:2020 and the Medium Term Framework – the National Development Plan. The Vision 20:2020 was still in development during the completion of the UNDAF II document but focus of the Vision and its strategies were captured by the UNDAF II document (see the elements provided in the Strategic positioning section, and also the UNDAF Document). The modification the UN sought and obtained from the Government was alignment of the UNDAF II cycle to tally with the government development cycle (in lieu of Vision 20:2020).

The 7 point Agenda of the national development priorities and policies are: i. the real sector – agriculture, land reform, manufacturing, solid minerals, oil and gas and housing; ii infrastructure – energy/power, transport, water supply and sanitation; iii. Human capital development – education, health and skills acquisition; iv. security, law and electoral reform including justice; v. combating corruption and improving governance – value reorientation, zero tolerance of corruption and effective service delivery; vi. regional development including the Niger Delta and the environment; and vii. Cross-cutting issues such as employment, gender and HIV/AIDS.

In addition, there was a consultative process in the development of the UNDAF II, whereby government identified its development priorities, with the engagement of stakeholders including CSOs. The UN System, in collaboration with the country, agreed on areas for development assistance by the UN³. The strategies adopted were designed to enable the Country to achieve the goals of the long term development of Nigeria – Vision 20: 2020. In addition, the UN and other partners provided technical and financial support for the development of the national development blueprint, according to the 2010 RCAR, thereby harmonizing the development focus of the nation and the UN System.

Clusters were not clear in considering that the UNDAF strategy was appropriate vis-à-vis the needs, as expressed in the Vision 20:2020 documents. During the Mid-Term Review, there was an effort to refocus the UNDAF II to the Vision 2020 document, including re-aligning with the programme cycle.

3. Alignment to the needs of beneficiaries

Efforts were made to align UN assistance to the needs of the beneficiaries. There was participation of the national government and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the development of the document. This was further demonstrated by the UN and the Federal Government agreement to extend the UNDAF II for an additional one year in line with the national planning cycle and priority. By this move, the current UNDAF II is fully aligned with the national development cycle and anchored on the government

² Nigeria's Vision 2020 Economic Transformation Blueprint (VISION 20:2020)

³ Nigeria UNDAF II 2009 -2012 United Nations Assistance Framework.

development blueprint. According to the 2011 RCAR, the UN fashioned out similar planning alignment with Benue, Kaduna, Imo and Adamawa States, and Federal Capital Territory implementing the Pilot DaO in 2011.

On whether the UNDAF II was adapted to the needs of beneficiaries, UN agencies contended that projects under the UNDAF II were designed and implemented to address the needs of targeted beneficiary groups as identified and in line with the NDP and it was developed using surveys and data such as MICS and DHS. In this sense, it addressed the needs of the beneficiaries (Cluster C). In addition, UN support at the state level was regularly updated. During interviews, it was brought to the attention of the evaluation team that the amendments in the annual work plans do not necessarily emanate from the States but rather from the UN Agencies within the context of the signed MOU document. In many occasions the amendments come as a result of shortfalls in funding, either from the UN Agencies or from the Government counterpart funding. It has also resulted on many occasions from tardiness by the UN Agencies or government IPs or both in processing the annual work plans resulting in low implementation rates, and thereby bringing distortions in programming activities in subsequent years. According to interviews in FCT, Benue, and Imo, the Government IPs were not always comfortable with the amendments to the annual work plans. Hence, the evaluation team has the impression that there may have been updates of the workplans that were more the result of some efficiency issues rather than the needs of beneficiaries.

The UNDAF II development process involved active participation of the Government, and to some extent, civil service organizations, at various stages of its development. It also used the government development plan addressing needs of the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, thereby ensuring that the needs of the beneficiaries were properly incorporated into it. The evaluation team considers that the UNDAF design and UN support were adapted to the needs of the Nigeria government and its citizens.

4. Relevance with respect to the country analysis

At inception, the UN System in Nigeria engaged in a consultative process to assess the national priorities of the country. The participation of government, UN Agencies and CSOs operating within the Country ensured that the country analysis identified the key development challenges to be addressed to enable the country reach its desired objectives. No specific Common Country Assessment (CCA) was undertaken but the analysis carried out led to the prioritization of the country's needs, and identified both the internal and external risks, which included the Niger Delta crisis, as well as border disputes between communities and other hotspots (internal political tensions and crisis). The UN assistance incorporated gender-sensitive and human rights-based approaches and these were cross cutting, and where relevant for all aspects of programming.

5. Agency programmes alignment and accountability of all actors

Operating under the guidance of its operational mandate, each of the UN Agencies identified their areas of focus in the National Development plan and based on these, chose selected priorities to address and formulated their programme of assistance for the nation. Therefore, the Agency outcomes in the UNDAF II are the set of strategies chosen by the specific UN Agencies to meet identified national priorities. A number of UN Agencies may be working separately to contribute to the same Agency outcomes.

On whether the accountability of all actors in the implementation of the UNDAF II was well defined, the agencies were divided on the point that the design of UNDAF II defined the accountability roles of

actors, but they were united on the way that they were understood. It is contended that the understanding of Results-Based Management (RBM) principles is not the same between the UNDAF II and the national counterparts (Cluster B) especially states governments were not very clear on the funding mechanism (Cluster D). From the point of view of evaluators, the design and implementation of the UNDAF II were faulty in terms of defining the specific line of responsibilities and accountability during implementation.

6. Strategic positioning of the UNDAF II

The UN agencies believed that UNDAF II was strategically positioned with respect to the Nigeria's Vision 20:2020, NEEDS and the 7-Point Agenda, Clusters pointed out that the support was directed towards the realization of the objectives of the National Development Plan. In addition, after one of the mid-year review, the UNDAF was further realigned with the Federal Government Vision 20:20. From the MTR, interviews, and Cluster replies, the evaluation team confirmed the fact that the UNDAF II was positioned in a strategic way with respect to national priorities.

The strategic positioning of the UNDAF II to national and state development Plans is recognized and is said to result from the close collaboration of the UN with the relevant institutions, the building of capacities of government personnel on international best practices and principles, the alignment of national development goals to global priorities, and the use of consultative processes in the development of the plans, which ensures the interests of all stakeholders are incorporated in national development. Since the UNDAF II document was derived from national priorities, was prepared in consultation with Government and CSOs partners, and incorporated global development priorities, it reflected the development focus and strategies of the country on the long term.

The UNDAF document anticipated the changes in national development, and focused on managing the aftermath of elections and insecurity, especially in the Niger Delta. What may not have been anticipated by the document is the magnitude of the insecurity challenge the nation was going to face. Measures were put in place to handle the effects of national elections but response to the insecurity situation is guided by the host nation approaches to the crisis.

The UN System assistance helped the country to develop its policy instruments, strengthen government institutions and build mechanisms for sustainable development, using international best practices. For instance, the UNDAF II was strategically positioned to support the National Strategic Health Development plan, with its adaptations of state plans in all states and the FCT. There are also policies and strategic plans in various areas of the social service delivery sector.

On whether there were missed opportunities in the UNDAF II programming, there is the feeling that opportunities were missed in the following areas: lack of closer collaboration with the development and donor partners outside the UN System; no significant change was made to the UNDAF II after the MTR; not having full joint programme(s); and non-mobilization of resources for the UNDAF II implementation. (Cluster B and C). There were no responses from the other clusters. The evaluation team believes that the above areas pointed out by the clusters were indeed missed opportunities in the implementation of the UNDAF II, which if seized, could have led to a more successful implementation of the UNDAF II.

7. UNDAF II added value and UN comparative advantage

On whether the UNDAF II added value to national efforts in the priority areas of UN work in the country, the agencies have the strong conviction that their intervention added value to national efforts and most

of the UNDAF interventions were also aligned to the result matrices of their CPDs (Cluster C). The interviews with government IPs in DAO States acknowledged that the UNDAF added value to national development, especially in the following areas: capacity building of personnel, bridged funding gap in development programmes, improvement in availability of commodities in service delivery points (for instance health facilities), inculcation of best practices in governance, public accountability, transparency, sustainable livelihood training, improvement in water and sanitation, creation of awareness on child rights law, improved participation of CSOs in development activities and visibility for CSOs etc. From the above, the evaluators conclude that despite the inadequacies in the design and implementation of the UNDAF, the UN agency interventions indeed added value in some way to the development process in Nigeria.

On whether the UNDAF was strategically positioned with respect to the UN Agencies' comparative advantage, the UN agencies generally believe that UN efforts were positioned to some extent to achieve this, although some agencies believe that UNDAF results were unfocused as it tried to achieve many results in too many areas (Cluster C). There could have been a better elaboration on sharing of roles and responsibilities amongst agencies in implementing the UNDAF (Cluster B). From the above the evaluators conclude that the design of the UNDAF was done having in mind the UN comparative advantage, but its implementation got diffused in many areas, with sometimes unclear division of labour between the agencies.

8. Responsiveness to change

In responding to whether UNDAF II anticipated and responded to significant changes in the national development context within its 4 core focus areas, UN agencies contend that to some extent, that was achieved within the limits of available resources. In situations where there were limitations, the UN agencies used the mid-term review to effect changes. The UNDAF II was extended to align with government planning cycle in 2013. The UNDAF II Cluster D (Reduce the Risk of Crisis, Conflict, and Insecurity) focused on the conflict in the Niger Delta but with later developments leading serious conflicts in other parts of the Nation, UN Agencies provided support to the nation in resolution of conflicts in other areas, such as Benue and Plateau States.

The national priority for Nigeria in the context of conflict and insecurity in 2008/2009 when the UNDAF II was developed, primarily on the Niger Delta, as shown in the national document from which the UNDAF II derived its focus. As a result, the UNDAF II narrowed its focus on conflict and insecurity on the Niger Delta, in line with national priority to the exclusion of other regions of the country. Unfortunately within the life span of the UNDAF II, the Boko Haram insurgency, herdsman's versus farmers' clashes, and other forms of conflicts spiralled in various parts of the country. This certainly diverted the attention of the UN system with respect to what was originally planned.

The evaluators arrived at a conclusion that the UNDAF II tried to anticipate adjustments in national development context, and some agencies made changes after the MTR. However, the M&E Framework was not updated leaving doubts on the capacity of the UNDAF II RBM systems to reflect changes in the actual hierarchy of results, and as a result, there is limited evidence that these changes translated into new, updated or higher level achievements in terms of outputs and outcomes.

The UN System in Nigeria is collaboration with the government is in a process of articulating the emerging issues in the country in the post MDG period, building on its experience with UNDAF II. Globally, important emerging issues in the UN in the post MDG era are being debated. The period

between 2013 and 2015 is considered a transition era when the UN is articulating the focus areas in the post MDG agenda. Apart from examining the vulnerabilities and development needs of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and possible policy responses, it will focus on how to further the full and effective implementation of the Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA) and the Mauritius Strategy, related in part to the post 2015 agenda,⁴ as well as the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.⁵ For the West African sub-region, peace and security, integration, development and cooperation, shared values and strengthening of institutions and capacities constitute the priorities.

B. Government Ownership of the UNDAF

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Action Plan and the Busan Declaration emphasized the need for national ownership of development assistance, and for the UN Agencies to play the role of providing technical expertise of guiding the beneficiaries implement the programmes by themselves. A number of mechanisms have been put in place to actualize this process. The government institution responsible for economic development, the National Planning Commission (NPC) assumes responsibility for guiding the development assistance in the nation. A consultative process involving government and CSO beneficiaries deliberated to determine the focus of the development assistance, the strategies to be adopted, and actually assumed responsibilities for its implementation.

In this respect, there is evidence that the process of developing UNDAF II at the federal level was inclusive. The Federal government through the National Planning Commission participated in producing the development assistance framework. Similarly, the Annual Work Plans in the DAO States were drawn with the participation of the State Ministry of Economic Planning and the participating ministries, departments and agencies. The process ended up with the endorsement of the State Governors, an indication of the ownership of UNDAF in the DAO States. In the UNDAF document, it was indicated that the Nigerian government was expected to make every effort to extend its assistance and facilities so that the UN can help achieve the outcomes set out in the result matrix.

With respect to the strategies to be adopted for the implementation of the AWP at the state levels, some implementing partners (Kaduna State) considered that the direction, funding, implementation and monitoring of the projects made them feel that UNDAF II ownership rests with the UN agencies. A respondent pointed out that UN agencies sometimes come in to request for proposals on issues that implementing partners do not know anything about. In addition, the language in the UN documents is too technical for ensuring a good comprehension.

With respect to government ownership of the UNDAF II at State level, State Planning Commissions chaired the implementation committees in the DaO states, gave direction and were directly involved in the UNDAF at state level. Nevertheless, UN agencies believe that ownership of the UNDAF II at the level of the DaO states was not fully successful. The element of ownership was "reasonable but not fully"

⁴ Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) integrated and enabling cooperation framework for the Barbados Programme of Action and Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation, Outcome of the Inter-regional preparatory meeting for the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States Bridgetown, Barbados, 26-28 August 2013.

⁵ "The future we want", United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20 to 22 June 2012.

present (Cluster B, C, D) for instance in Benue and Cross rivers, and limited in Kaduna, FCT and Adamawa. The evaluation team believes that though efforts were made by UN agencies to domesticate the UNDAF II, the limitations of both UN agencies and that of government limited the ownership of the UNDAF by government and citizens.

Obvious weaknesses are observed in this component of the implementation of UNDAF II as there was failure of the government to show true ownership of the UNDAF II both at national and sub-national level. The government was not seen to drive the UNDAF II process. The National Planning Commission (NPC), which is the national coordinating Agency does not seem to have provided full direction in programme implementation for the UNDAF II, but rather it is informed by the UN System what direction the UN is taking, and its endorsement is obtained. The NPC does not seem to be kept abreast with implementation arrangements and the UN System seems to get into engagements with sub-national institutions without knowledge of the NPC.

The UN agencies' perception of the role of the National Planning Commission in the design and implementation of UNDAF II shows that although the National Planning Commission was the coordinating agency of the government for the UNDAF II (Cluster B and D), their role is limited: the design was rather a UN exercise. Despite the fact that the UNDAF II was signed by government, the level and number of MDAs participants at the design stage was low. (Cluster C). From this perception and other data available, the evaluators observe that the National Planning Commission was not instrumental in the implementation of the UNDAF II, and its ownership of the UNDAF II was weak.

Also at sub-national level, it was observed that some states reneged on the provision of the counterpart funding the states committed themselves to in the UNDAF II and even signed memorandum of understanding with the UN. This made it difficult for the states to drive the implementation process. This is the scenario in Imo and Benue states as observed during the evaluation interviews. One of the visited states (Imo) did not even have existing coordinating mechanism to oversee the implementation of development assistance under the DAO strategy. So while the concept of national ownership appears to be understood by both the UN and government, there is still much left to make it operational.

C. Civil Society Participation

In recognition of several UN resolutions that promote the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in development assistance, UNDAF II engaged CSOs, from inception during the development of the document, to its implementation and monitoring. There is therefore evidence that the design of UNDAF II factored in the participation of civil society as implementing partners at both federal and state levels, and this is noticeable in all the clusters. Some CSOs were urban-based, while other operated in the rural areas, and included the Network of CSOs (CISHAN), women organizations, community-based organizations and faith-based organizations. The challenge is that their involvement in the design of the UNDAF II was however limited, including at state level, for instance in the Kaduna State, and this created a problem in the implementation phase since they saw themselves as merely executing what they did not plan.

According to interviewees, some CSOs participated in UNDAF II implementation at national, state and community levels. Assistance was provided for some CSOs to mobilize the people, and build their capacities on how to engage with government and negotiate with them to deliver on their social contract with the population (Imo, Benue States), others promoted policy frameworks for good governance, gender equity and equality, protection of the vulnerable and minorities, engagement in

reaching out the population with health care services especially HIV/AIDS, maternal and child health, etc. The CSOs in Cross River and Benue States participated in monitoring and validating programme implementation. They have therefore been responsive in making the nation focus on addressing the vulnerable poor and disadvantaged groups in policy-making.

On whether civil society participated in the design and implementation of the UNDAF at federal and state levels, the UN agencies are divided on the level of participation. Cluster B agrees that civil society participated. UNODC's CSO partners at federal level were invited to participate at all stages of UNDAF II (Cluster D). At the state level, Cluster B indicated civil society was not engaged so much. However, agencies like Nigeria Red Cross participated in the implementation of UNDAF II at the state level (cluster D). The UNDAF document revealed that CSOs participated in the various stages of the development of the UNDAF II document however, at the implementation phase, the engagement of CSOs was limited both at Federal and State levels (interview). The evaluators believe that participation in the design of the UNDAF II at both federal and state levels was weak overall, while there was some higher level of participation of civil society at the implementation stage but only in some areas.

D. Effectiveness of the UNDAF

The evaluators considered that while the UNDAF II was well aligned to the Vision 20:2020, it was difficult to measure the collective results that could have been attributed to the UN, through the UNDAF II, in part because the UNDAF II contributed to higher level development issues, and in part because the M&E Framework and the reporting from the Clusters during this evaluation provide an incomplete view of what has been achieved with respect to baselines and targets. As analysed in other sections of this report, the UNDAF implementation was insufficiently monitored, and its results insufficiently captured and communicated.

1. Effectiveness of the UNDAF II with respect to expected UNDAF II Outcomes and Agency Outcomes

Nevertheless, despite the difficulties to attribute the results to the UNDAF, this evaluation has shown that the UNDAF made very important contributions to national development priorities. Indeed, the UNDAF achieved a number of important results in all its expected outcomes. These are explained in the section below, which analyses the effectiveness of the UNDAF with respect to expected UNDAF Outcomes and Agency Outcomes, at the highest level of the results chain of the UNDAF Results Matrix.

2. Effectiveness of the UNDAF with respect to expected UNDAF Outcomes and Agency Outcomes

In each of the four cluster areas of the UNDAF II, the UNDAF Outcomes served as the overarching goal to which all the agencies operating in the cluster focus on. The UNDAF Outcomes were further broken down to Agency outcomes. The document was articulated to ensure that the implementation of the Agency Outcomes would lead to the achievement of the UNDAF II Outcomes.

Using the mandate areas of each Agency as a guide, the UN Agencies implemented outputs within their mandates, and developed activities in collaboration with beneficiaries to contribute to the UNDAF Outcomes and the Agency Outcomes. This section examines the effectiveness of the UNDAF II at the outcome level, to reach these UNDAF II Outcomes and Agency Outcomes.

In responding to whether the expected UNDAF II and Agency Outcomes of the results matrix were achieved through the outputs implemented in the UNDAF II, the agencies believed that they were partially achieved (Cluster B) while others say that many of the outputs and targets were not achieved or were dropped (Cluster C). Close scrutiny of the set goals of the UNDAF II and the achievements recorded during the period revealed that a number of the outcomes were met, while others were not realized, leading to partial achievement of the UNDAF II and Agency Outcomes.

Therefore, the evaluators believe that some attempts were made by the UN agencies to achieve the UNDAF II and agency outcomes, but these efforts were limited by many factors ranging from the UNDAF II design itself and commitment towards its implementation, together with a lack of an effective M&E system that would have allowed the UN system to strategically manage the UNDAF II.

Cluster A - Strengthening Governance and Accountability

The Cluster on strengthening governance and accountability is built around two UNDAF II outcomes.

The **first UNDAF II outcome** aimed to ensure that more resources were mobilized and channelled effectively in support of national development priorities, including the MDGs. This was pursued through agency outcomes that focused on: medium-term plans and expenditure frameworks; access to timely and reliable data on development; and public demand for fiscal responsibility and better development results (Nigeria-UNDAF II: 2008:12).

UNDAF II Outcome A.1 expected that resource mobilisation and public expenditure management would meet international standards of fiscal responsibility and requirements for achieving national development targets, consistent with the National Development Plan and the MDGs. Before the implementation of UNDAF II, the proportion of States with approved fiscal responsibility and public procurement legislation (FRL/PPL) were less than 5 States. The target aimed at passing these legislations in all States by 2010. The target of this outcome was not achieved as at 2010. The Cluster reported that only five states (Anambra, Delta, Niger, Rivers and Sokoto) had passed the Public Procurement Law as at 2013. The statement of the baseline was weak. However it is crucial to note that the National Assembly passed the procurement law, but the MDAs have been slow in using it. Many states (30) are yet to pass the procurement law, which is aimed at fighting corruption. The enactment and implementation of the law in the public and private sectors is in compliance with article 9 and 62 of the UN Convention against Corruption, which enshrines the law on Public procurement and management of public finances. (MTR, 2011)

The second baseline in this outcome explained that there was a gap between estimated resource requirements for achieving the MDGs, and actual sectoral public expenditure at Federal level, and it was expected that the gap was to have been reduced by two-thirds by 2012. There hasn't been a report or an analysis of the reduction of the gap in resource requirement for achieving the MDGs and actual public expenditures by the agencies. Overall, the evaluation team considered that this outcome was therefore not achieved.

Agency Outcome A.1.1 indicated that at the end of UNDAF II, cross-sectoral planning and budgeting organizations and sectoral MDAs at Federal level and in the focus States would be able to develop medium-term plans in order to achieve key development targets. The baseline noted the low technical ability to develop MTEFs and MTSS at federal and states levels, and secondly, the MTEFs were not in use

at State level. The UNDAF target indicated that MTEFs would be available and would guide budgets in all the focus States by 2012. There is no information on the achievement of this report but "FGN and few states have MTEFs guiding their budgets". (MTR 2011)

Agency Outcome A.1.2 planned that a framework for timely, reliable and accessible data on the MDGs and other socio-economic targets in the National Development Plan would be institutionalized at Federal level and in the focus States. The baseline noted that before the implementation of UNDAF II, there were no formal frameworks available at State levels and targeted that by 2010, and that a framework would have been made available and institutionalised at the Federal and in unspecified number of focus States.

The targets were partially achieved. In 4 States, the State Statistical Master Plan was produced as a framework for timely availability of socioeconomic and MDGs based data. At the Federal level, UNDP supported a 'Statistical Data Methodological Quality Review', which provided a framework for availability of timely and reliable data (Cluster A M&E report). The National Bureau for Statistics (NBS), state statistical agencies publish data for national, sectoral and state planning (MTR 2011). The challenge is that these reports were published very late (Interview: Kaduna State Planning Commission 2014).

Agency Outcome A.1.3 was about broad coalitions and/or campaigns involving non-state actors at Federal level and in the focus States, which should be able to create public demand for fiscal responsibility, and effective use of resources for development. Prior to the implementation of UNDAF II, there was low level of public demand for fiscal responsibility, and effective use of resources for development, and therefore it was targeted that at least one nation-wide and State-wide campaign will be active at Federal level and in the focus states by 2010. The baseline as initially set was not precise and the number of campaigns were not specific. However, progress was made in achieving the target. The UN agencies convened a number of national and numerous state level campaigns designed to create awareness on public demand for accountability. Specifically, UNDP carried out capacity building sessions for civil society, media and CBO, including youth groups to empower them to demand transparent use of public resources at Federal and State levels. A notable outcome of the UNDP government collaboration was the creation of the "Vanguard for Good governance", a coalition of community-based CSOs that has sustained campaigns for improved governance and public accountability in Anambra state and CSOs were instrumental in the enactment of the procurement bill in Ondo state. UNDP has also facilitated and supported partnerships between CSOs and anticorruption Agencies notably, ICPC and EFCC in collaboration with UNODC. In 2013, with the support of the EU, UNODC supported a youth-friendly social media-based campaign against corruption. UNODC also provided technical and financial support to TUGAR and civil society organizations for the commemoration of the International Anti-Corruption Day at Federal and State levels (Cluster A M&E Framework report). A mapping exercise of CSOs was undertaken, together with the formation of the Development Watch Initiative in Benue State (MTR 2011).

The **second UNDAF II outcome** addressed improvements in political accountability through elections, justice and anti-corruption. This was enabled through agency outcomes that: supported Federal and State electoral organizations to conduct free and fair elections; assisted judicial and security institutions to ensure transparent, fair and timely consideration of civil and criminal cases; and buttressed key public sector institutions to embed corruption prevention measures and procurement reform in government operations, working with civil society and the private sector (Nigeria-UNDAF II: 2008).

The UNDAF II Outcome A.2 aimed at improvements in the three main pillars of accountable governance - elections, justice and anti-corruption - in accordance with the rule of law, and in response to public demand. The baseline noted the low level of participation of women in voting and elective positions and targeted that by 2010, at least 10% affirmative action would have been attained at Federal level and in the focus states. This target was partially achieved because UN agency support to NEC, political parties and CSOs in voter registration, and education have led to registration of over 45% women voters out of the over 73 million registered voters as at 2011. Although 7% of women are in elective positions, women aspirants increased by a hundred per cent in all the parties in 2011, compared to previous elections. In addition, sustained advocacy and campaign resulted in 35% representation of women in appointive positions at the Federal level (Cluster A M&E Framework Report). The targets at the State level were not stated.

The second baseline in this outcome noted that the justice sector reform proposal is on the anvil and targeted that by 2011, a proposal would have been adopted for implementation. Although the targets were not specifically stated, the UN assistance has promoted the updating and reforming of rules, procedures and systems to enhance the performance and integrity of the judiciary in line with the UN Conventions and protocols, as it relates to the strengthening of the institution and making it citizen, gender and child-friendly, and to increase its performance in deepening democracy and good governance (MTR 2011).

The third baseline noted that Nigeria ranked 147 (or 32nd most corrupt country) and targeted the building on the TII improvement of 30 places in 2004 to 35 additional places by 2012. Thus the target was not achieved as Nigerian position on the Transparency Perception Index continued to worsen as from 32 to 134 in 2010 out of 178 countries in the world (MTR 2011).

The Agency Outcome A.2.1 foresaw that National and State electoral organizations would be able to perform key functions associated with the planning, conduct and monitoring of credible elections, in collaboration with key stakeholders, and in conformity with national and international frameworks and standards. The target observed that the performance of electoral organizations was widely seen to have fallen short of national and international standards, and therefore targeted that by 2010, Federal and State electoral organizations would have met key national and international (EAD) benchmarks with respect to the performance of critical functions.

The target was partially achieved, although it did not indicate the performance of electoral organizations at federal levels. UN agencies' support resulted in enhanced capacity for INEC senior and middle level staff in strategic and operational planning, improved voter register, voter and civic education, improved stakeholder engagement (political parties, civil society, and media), as well as organizational restructuring.

Although the EAD benchmarks were not mentioned in the indicator, UN assistance has supported Nigerian efforts in putting in place plans, systems and promoting citizens' participation in the electoral reform; the development of procedures for broadening political education and participation including that of women; guiding against the use of children in electoral violence. UN assistance has facilitated the strengthening and development of new CSO networks at the national and state levels working in the area of promoting election education, and voter registration. It also sensitized voters on the need to play a decisive role in deepening democracy. This support has promoted the fulfilment of the UN convention on the right of citizens and their groups to be involved in the political developments in their

countries (MTR 2011). However, there is much work to be done at the state level, where elections are organized by SIECs, and are under the control of State Executives.

The Agency Outcome A.2.2 expected that the justice system and law enforcement institutions at Federal level and in the focus States would be able to perform key functions necessary for the transparent, fair and timely consideration of key civil and criminal cases, in conformity with national and international standards. The baseline noted that the assessment of judicial capacity and integrity conducted in the 10 pilot states, showed variable capacity, and that the Judicial Integrity Action Plan (JIAP) was in place at the Federal Level and only in 10 pilot states, while prosecution of cases was slow. Therefore, the UNDAF II targeted an unspecified number of focus states that would reach improvement in judicial capacity and integrity.

This outcome was partially achieved (although the target was not specified) thanks to the various agencies and interagency collaboration in this outcome. In 2011, UNODC began to support ten (10) States of the country with technical advice and operational equipment for the justice sector with the establishment of Judicial Research Centres. UNODC has continued to provide tailored trainings to judges and prosecutors of the justice sector. In 2013, UNODC in collaboration with national stakeholders, has supported the work on the introduction of non-custodial measures in the criminal justice system in line with the UN Minimum Rules. UNODC provided support to national partners for the development and adoption of Sentencing Guidelines at Federal levels and in 10 States (Anambra, Imo, Osun, Lagos, Cross River, Yobe, Benue, Katsina, Bayelsa and the FCT (Cluster M&E Framework report).

UN support has promoted the introduction and practice of an alternative to formal judicial model of work - Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The police and the prisons have been strengthened through capacity building, advocacy, policy dialogues and the modernization of working equipment. There have been innovative attempts to include human rights principles, gender and youth perspectives in police and prison work. There is, however, implementation gaps in carrying out State Action Plans in some DAO states, sometimes because of capacity gaps. The assistance is fulfilling the need to protect human rights of citizens who may have interacted with the police and the prisons (MTR, 2011).

The Agency Outcome A.2.3 expected that anti-corruption and procurement reform measures would be integrated further in key areas of public sector management at Federal level and in the focus States. UNDAF II baseline noted that efforts were in place to integrate anti-corruption measures including guidelines for code of governance, civil service reforms, procurement and fiscal responsibility acts/bills but targeted that by 2010, unspecified number of MDAs at Federal level and in focus States would have utilised integrated anti-corruption and reformed procurement measures in key areas of public sector management. Though the target is not specific, some interventions by the UN agencies have been undertaken to fulfil the UN hope of stamping out corruption at all levels according to its Convention against Corruption. UN assistance has complimented the efforts of the Nigerian Government in putting in place e-procurement solutions, as well as integrating them into the mainstream of public sector. However, little progress has been made in putting the procedure into use because many MDAs at federal and state levels including local government councils are resisting its implementation (MTR 2011). Other interventions include the articulation of a National Anti-Corruption strategy in 2012, which is yet to be adopted by Government. Upon adoption the suggested measures would be put in place. Similarly, the BPP and some states were supported to improve procurement management.

Similarly, UNODC has supported ICT infrastructure development, design and deployment of an ICT infrastructure and a data centre at BPP; website design (<http://bpp.gov.ng>), other infrastructure provided

to BPP includes a robust messaging system, a BPP portal, electronic document management system and other administrative applications. In addition UNODC has supported the development of the Public Procurement Review software (goPRS), which enables centralized regulatory authorities to oversee and monitor procurement solicitations and contract awards carried out by decentralized ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) to ensure that government expenditures are within approved budget limits as planned, and in accordance with the due process requirements of law. Two out of 5 modules of goPRS namely goPRS Enterprise and goPRS Web have so far been deployed. Work is on-going to further enhance these modules, as well as research and development of more modules (Cluster A M&E Framework Report).

Anti-corruption institutions like the EFCC, ICPC, CCB, BPP, IATT, and EITI have updated their operational procedures. Some states have taken the initiative in building capacity to fight corruption and UN agencies have provided assistance. However the continuing corruption in both public and private sectors could be a sign of resistance to the implementation of these efforts. But through UN support, citizens are increasingly getting involved in mobilizing and voicing public opinion against corruption. The challenge of this outcome is that despite these interventions, the position which the country is occupying on the Corruption Perception Index of 2012 shows that more work has to be done to fight corruption. However, UN assistance is in fulfilment of Article 60 of the UN Convention against Corruption and its Article 13 dealing with the citizens' participation in demanding for the enthronement of good governance and accountability (MTR, 2011).

Cluster B - Productivity and Employment

The Cluster on promoting productivity and employment had three UNDAF outcomes.

The **first UNDAF outcome** emphasized policies and investments that can lay the basis for faster and more sustainable growth in output and employment in the rural economy, especially agriculture and agro-industry. Contributing agency outcomes focused on medium-term plans and budgets that support such a drive; revitalized approaches to business development and technology transfer for increased agricultural and agro-industrial productivity and job creation; and an integrated framework for environmental governance.

UNDAF Outcome B.1: planned that enabling policies and investments would lay the basis for faster and more sustainable growth in output and employment in the rural economy. The baseline for this outcome states that fiscal and investment policies are both pro-urban/anti-poor, inadequate resources for sustainable growth in the rural economy and therefore targeted that focus states would have at least 10% increase in input into the rural economy by 2010. This target was specific but the Cluster B M&E Framework report did not provide elaborate information to show the extent of outcome achievement. There is therefore no clear evidence to show that UN support increased in input into the rural economy.

The Agency Outcome B.1.1 expected that sectoral MDAs at Federal level and in the focus States would be able to develop evidence-based medium-term plans and budgets that support sustained growth and employment in the rural economy. The baseline of this outcome recognised the fact that MTPs and budgets were mostly not evidence based and therefore UNDAF II targeted that with UN intervention, at least 25% of National and focus State MDAs would have developed evidence-based medium-term plans that met quality benchmarks by 2010. This outcome has partially been achieved (although the Cluster response contains no information on percentage achievement). The UN System has collaborated with the National Bureau of Statistics at the national level to support the conduct of Needs Assessment of

MDAs at sub-national levels in 4 states (Adamawa, Benue, Delta and Niger States). This resulted in leveraging the respective state officials' capacities in the allocation of the required resources in yearly plans and budgets in the different sectors (MTR 2011). This intervention is in line with the Paris Declaration, which emphasize the importance of national capacity development to plan and execute own programmes.

The Agency Outcome B.1.2 promoted revitalised approaches to business development and technology transfer, increased productivity and employment in selected sectors of the rural economy. The baseline acknowledged the absence of rural business development support and technology transfer strategies and targets that focus states would have had in place on rural business support and technological transfer strategies. This target is not specific, but some achievement has been reached because some of the DaO states notably Adamawa, Benue and FCT have established technology transfer and vocational training centres. These provide trainings for entrepreneurship and skills acquisition in various trades. UN-WOMEN and UNFPA have provided support to women to improve technology of processing, through the Ministries of Women Affairs, and this has, to some extent, facilitated economic empowerment of women, and employment and productivity in rural economy. In addition, FAO research extension input linkages and UNIDO's development of improved technology in cassava preservation and processing are added value that would leverage input into job creation in the rural economy (Cluster B M&E Framework report).

Agency Outcome B.1.3 expected that environmental policy, regulatory and enforcement agencies at Federal level and in the focus States would be able to establish and manage an integrated framework for environmental governance. The baseline notes that there was no integrated framework for environmental governance available as at the beginning of UNDAF II and targeted to have an integrated framework for environmental governance in place by 2012. Although the target is not specific, some UN interventions were made at the national Level where reviews of environmental policies and extant laws were made. This led to the establishment of new agencies such as National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) and a Department of Climate Change was created amongst other reforms. In addition, work on environmental guidelines in the oil industry and public awareness master plans was facilitated by UNDP, and this was designed to ensure environmental good governance and sustainability. The dialogue on environmental governance across the nation facilitated by UNDP helped in bringing environmental issues to light. A stronger advocacy has to be undertaken to ensure implementation of guidelines and dialogue outcomes.

The **second UNDAF outcome** centered on raising demand for, and increasing participation in the equitable delivery of services targeting rural markets. The related agency outcomes aimed at promoting broad participation in key policy, legislative and budgetary processes affecting the private sector; institutional and financing arrangements to increase the scope for private sector participation in service provision; and innovations in employment generation and employment-based safety nets (UNDAF II, 2008:12).

The UNDAF Outcome B.2 foresaw that organized agents would articulate and demand for and help ensure equitable delivery of services for growth and employment in rural markets (credit, production, renewable energy, skills formation, business development, and market information). The baseline observed that there was inadequate provision of equitable services for rural development and targeted that an unspecified number of focus States would provide equitable service delivery for rural development by 2012. Although the target is not specific, few efforts were made by the UN system and governments in policy reviews and governments refocusing on employment and rural development, this

has not been translated into quantifiable results, because rural unemployment is still high in Nigeria, leading to rural-urban migration with all the consequences being experienced (NBS, 2012 report). This applies to all the DaO states. This target was therefore not achieved.

The Agency Outcome B.2.1 expected institutional mechanisms to be in place and used to enable private-public sector dialogue on selected policy, legislative and budgetary issues. The baseline acknowledge that the institutional mechanisms to enable private-public sector dialogue on selected policy, legislative and budgetary issues was not in place, and then targeted that at least a third of relevant Federal and State level MDAs would have these institutional mechanisms in place. The target was not achieved as the only reported intervention was the support provided to the National Labour Advisory Council (NLAC) by the ILO on institutionalization of social dialogue as a means to facilitating public private sector engagement in policy, legislative and budgetary issues (Cluster B M&E Framework report). In any case, the intervention seems to have enhanced dialogue between labour and the public and private sector employers on labour related issues but not on legislative and budgetary matters.

The Agency Outcome B.2.2 expected that institutional and financing arrangements at Federal level and in the focus States would increase the scope for private sector participation in expanding access to services. The baseline noted that before UNDAF II, some ad-hoc institutional and financing arrangements existed in few states and targeted that by 2012, focus States would have institutional and financing arrangement for private sector participation. The challenge with this outcome is that both baseline and target were not specific. The target has not been achieved, although some initiatives were undertaken, such as the UN collaboration with the World Bank in supporting capacity development of CBN management staff on micro finance regulatory and policy development. These initiatives are expected to facilitate policy decisions that will benefit small entrepreneurs, and encourage employment and productivity. Capacity building of micro finance managers and institutions ensured sustainability, good management and effective distribution of micro finance support to relevant bodies and by implication encouraged productive ventures and set stage for employment possibilities.

The Agency Outcome B.2.3 dealt with innovations in employment creation, social safety nets and corporate social responsibility influence the design and implementation of labour and employment policies. The baseline indicated that before the UNDAF II, labour and employment policies excluded innovations in employment creation, social safety nets, and social corporate responsibility. The target foresaw that by 2012, labour and employment policies would have incorporated the innovations at Federal level and in the focus states. The target has not been met, although there are interventions directed at achieving this. For instance, the Ministry of Labour and productivity in collaboration with ILO developed an approved National Plan of Action for employment creation, while providing guidelines required for the implementation of the plan. With this, the Federal government employment policy is being reviewed to take into account new and evolving trends in the labour market and job creation.

The third UNDAF outcome focused on trade and investment-related policies that could stimulate competitive businesses in the rural economy. The agency outcome in this regard aimed at opening-up opportunities for value-added production in the agricultural, agro-industrial and extractive sectors (UNDAF II, 2008:12).

The UNDAF Outcome B.3.0 expected enabling policies and investments for trade and investment that stimulated businesses in the rural economy that would be competitive in domestic, regional and international markets. The baseline noted that policies and investments environment before the UNDAF II was not conducive for rural businesses to compete and therefore targeted that all the focus states

would create a competitive business environment in the rural economy. The Cluster A M&E Framework report is not sufficiently clear on the achievement: it notes that there has been a lot of policy reviews to liberalize and enhance the private sector driven economy. The effects of this are usually realizable in the long-term.

The Agency Outcome B.3.1 expected that trade and investment policies and regulatory frameworks would open up opportunities for value added production from agricultural, agro-industrial and extractive industries. The baseline noted that limited policies for value added production existed in these sectors, and targeted that at Federal level and in the focus states, policies and regulatory frameworks would be in place to promote value added agricultural production, agro-industrial and extractive sectors. The target has not been met but there are reported reforms in both the agriculture and financial sector, where Agricultural Development Funds have opened opportunities for private sector participation in production and agro-processing. At the DaO level, there are similar interventions. The Cluster B M&E Framework report is not exhaustive on the number of policies and regulatory frameworks that provide for value added production from agricultural, production, agro-industrial, and extractive sectors.

CLUSTER C: transforming social service delivery

The Cluster on transforming social service delivery consisted of three UNDAF II outcomes.

The first UNDAF II outcome targeted policies, investments and institutional changes that can facilitate access to quality social services in health, education, water and environmental sanitation and HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care. Contributions to this result will come from agency outcomes that enable preparation of evidence-based policies and plans as well as expansion of service delivery in selected areas of the 6 focus States. (Nigeria-UNDAF II: 2008: 13).

The UNDAF II Outcome C.1 expected that policies, investments and institutional changes would enable access to quality social services to achieve national development targets, including progressive realization of the MDGs (health, basic education, water and environmental sanitation and universal access to HIV and AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support). The baseline was the existence of rapid assessments or desk review to establish baselines per service delivery area. The target foresaw at least a 10% increase in input to provide improved and equitable social services in the focus States by 2012.

There has been substantial progress in meeting this UNDAF II Outcome C1, as reports showed an increased budgetary allocation (11.5% -Education). Various government institutions were supported by the UN to generate data to guide development, develop/adapt/review policies, strengthen mechanisms and tools for quality social service delivery. Having looked at the response of the Cluster C in their M&E Framework report, the responses from IPs during interviews, and documentation available (RC Annual reports, Mid Term Reports, survey reports such as NDHS 2013, MICS 2011, and Nigeria 2012 GARPR Report), the evaluation team considers that this UNDAF II outcome was achieved overall.

The Agency Outcome C.1.1 hoped that the Federal Government and the focus States would be able to utilize evidence-based approaches to formulate policies and develop strategic plans with transparent financing plans. The baseline indicated that there was a gap analysis of existing policies, strategic and financial plans and that some social sector policies/plans were neither evidence-based nor costed. The

target indicated that 25% social sector policies, strategic and financial plans at the Federal and focus States would be evidence-based by 2010.

This Agency Outcome was achieved as several government institutions were supported to develop several policies and plans using evidenced-based approaches for the delivery of quality social services. Several Government institutions were strengthened to generate and manage data to guide evidenced-based development. A number of studies and surveys were conducted by these institutions (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), National Population Commission (NPopC), Federal Ministry of Education (FME) and National Agency for Control of HIV/AIDS (NACA, National Planning Commission). This includes national surveys (the 2013 National Demographic and Health Surveys, the Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2011, the GAPR survey on sexuality and HIV/AIDS (NACA), the national survey on education, the annual school census, further analysis of the 2006 National Census to generate disaggregated data, further analysis of the 2008 NDHS data to support advocacy efforts of the stakeholders, particularly the Legislative Advocacy Coalition on VAW (LACVAW), the National Nutrition Survey (SMART methodology), the Global Programme for Reproductive Health Commodity Security (GPRHCS) Survey, the establishment of the Data for Assistance Development (DAD) – National Planning Commission, etc. These studies, provided fully disaggregated data in relevant socio-demographic variables (gender including GBV, social class, regional, data base for flow of development assistance into the country, etc.) and disseminated them in the states and FCT, and they are available on websites.

The UN System supported the development/review/adaptation of policies, frameworks, plans and guidelines in various areas of the cluster (HIV/AIDS, Gender equity, education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation) incorporating right-based approaches, equity and gender sensitivity to provide the necessary tools for development in the cluster. The development of the tools and frameworks enhanced the capacity of the different government institutions and CSOs in the development of policies, plans and budgets for improved social service delivery. The National Health Strategic Development Plan (NHSDP), the review of the National Policy on HIV/AIDS (2009), the National Strategic Framework on HIV/AIDS, the National Guidelines for Management of Severe Acute Malnutrition were all developed with the assistance of the UN system and from other partners. The National Policy on Gender in Basic education was developed and disseminated across the country. Other results included the development of the National Framework for HIV Prevention in Sex Work settings, the development of knowledge products to facilitate empowerment of victims of trafficking, the development of State specific tools on GBV monitoring and reporting, the technical assistance provided for the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 Country Blueprint, the guidelines for the establishment of School health Clubs, the review of IMNCH Strategy, the development of the ICCM National Guideline, the National Child Health Policy, development of national malaria policy, the development of a draft communication strategy for the promotion of ECD in 6 selected states of Sokoto, Bauchi, Niger, Katsina, Rivers and Ekiti States, the establishment of systems for Climate Change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR), infused into BE, NFE and IQE curricula, the development of plans for the elimination of mother to child transmission of HIV in 12+1 States, the development of a Gender Policy for the Nigerian Police Force, the review of maternal health related policies for gender responsiveness under the acceleration of reduction of maternal mortality in Nigeria, etc. The Evaluation Team considers that this agency outcome was achieved.

The Agency Outcome C.1.2 planned that focus States would provide quality and affordable social services in Y% of facilities. The baseline indicated that most social services were provided at a fee not affordable by poor households. A desk review or assessment would establish the baseline. The baseline also added that the rapid facility assessments/desk review of existing reports would establish the

baseline. The target indicated a Y percentage increase in the number of female headed households would have access to at least 3 basic social services.

The Agency Outcome, baseline and targets for this agency outcome are vague as the exact percentage was not stated, making it difficult to assess progress in the implementation of this Outcome. It is noteworthy to state that several activities were carried out during the lifespan of the UNDAF II under this Outcome. Tools and mechanisms were supported to enhance public participation and effective delivery of social services. The UN System provided technical assistance to the national councils on education, health, women affairs, AIDS, and water resources to enhance their coordinating role as the highest decision making body in the ministries to promote effective delivery of quality services. In addition, committees that coordinated development assistance were supported by the UN System in each of the Ministries. These included the Health Partners Coordination Committee, the National Expanded Theme Group on AIDS, the Development Coordination Meeting (Ministry of Water Resources, and the Coordinating Committee (Ministry of Education). Channels Software were installed and national capacity was developed on logistics data for Reproductive Health Commodities Security through UN System assistance. ICTs were increasingly employed in data management and transmission in the health sector, including the use of SMS (mobile phones) and internet services. The government was assisted to produce the MDG Acceleration Framework (MAF) country action plan focusing on MDG goal 5 to fast-track the implementation of maternal intervention to attain MDG 5.

Technical assistance was provided to the National Planning Commission (NPC) to institute a development assistance database, developed the National Aid Policy and Strategy document, and reviewed the first National Implementation Plan (NIP) of the Vision 20:2020, which covered 2010-2013, and provided critical inputs into the development of the second NIP, covering 2014 to 2017. In addition, the UN System facilitated the National M&E TWG to operate with clear TORs, the integration of basic education data into the Development Information System (DEVINFO), the application of gender tracking tools in reviewing education investments priorities, and the development of knowledge products for actors in the justice systems, law enforcers and civil society, to facilitate access to justice process, especially for victims of GBV. A draft curriculum for Mainstreaming Human development studies in Nigerian Universities was developed and validated with the National Universities Commission, the National Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Education.

Support was also provided for strengthening the institutional structures and systems, and in providing equipment and supplies for quality service delivery, such as the implementation of the Midwifery Service Scheme, the IMNCH Strategy, the immunization and training in education, nutrition, HIV/AIDS, Sanitation, Hygiene and maternal and child health, including Life Saving Skill, Modified Life Saving Skill, Extended Life Saving Skill, Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses etc. Several states (7) in the Sahelian region of the Country were supported to provide services to children for severe acute malnutrition in 145 sites. Health facilities were assisted with basic obstetric equipment, medicines, contraceptives, supplies, for the delivery of quality maternal and child health services. Support was provided for assessment of 12 hospitals in 6 geopolitical zones for quality of health Care for sick mothers and children (RMNCH-WHO).

Assistance was provided for the institutionalization of the Conditional Cash Transfer in 2 states (Bauchi and Katsina), making it possible for children from the disadvantaged families to afford education (19,000 girls from poor households have benefitted from it). In addition, about 30% of teachers have been trained in school governance and interactive/participatory pedagogy, while there has been over a 50% increase in number of schools that meet the child friendly school benchmarks, as a result of assistance

from the UN System. Assistance was also provided through the WASH sector supported states to improve service delivery, capacity development and monitoring. Several communities (over 650) in the UNDAF states (Adamawa, Benue, Imo States) were assisted to access water and basic sanitation with 489 communities attaining open defecation free status.

These development measures are veritable intervention programmes for the achievement of MDGs 4, 5 and 6. The achievements represent, however, a modest accomplishment of the set targets in this Agency Outcome of the UNDAF II.

The second UNDAF II outcome emphasized behavioural change in the achievement of better social outcomes. It expected that changes in individual/household behavior would reflect a growing public engagement, especially of the poor and disadvantaged in the achievement of better social outcomes. The related agency outcome sought to boost public demand for and participation in social service delivery (Nigeria-UNDAF II: 2008: 13). The baseline for this UNDAF II Outcome foresaw that a desk review would establish the baseline. The target indicated that a Y% of care-givers would show required positive Key Household Practices.

The Agency Outcome C.2.1 planned that Groups and/or alliances of organizations would stimulate public demand for and community participation in social service delivery in the focus States, with particular attention to the role of the poor and disadvantaged. The baseline for this Agency Outcome foresaw a Gap analysis, and the target indicated that at least 60% of relevant CSOs in selected focus States would create demand for social services.

The baseline and target for the Agency Outcome were not SMART as there is no existing benchmark for measuring progress. However, reports of activities undertaken show evidence of modest achievement. The engagement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) by the UN System to facilitate behaviour change in the general public was limited, except in HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and gender related activities. Similarly, very little achievement was made in the UNDAF II target for stimulating community participation, including engaging the poor and disadvantaged and creating demand for delivery of social services. The key CSOs active in HIV/AIDS that were engaged in the implementation of the UNDAF II were CISHAN, NEPHWAN, NYNETHA, FOMWAN and LACVAW. Despite the recognition of the CSOs in mounting coordinated pressure on relevant sectors of society, and their technical competences to execute certain core interventions, there was very little use of their services by the UN System for grass root and people oriented interventions in the UNDAF II implementation. However, government institutions were supported to implement grass root activities, some of which were carried by community-based organizations and members of the National Youth Service Corps. The water and sanitation (WASH) intervention made a great achievement as the nation was declared Guinea worm free in 2013 by the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, remarkable achievement was made in river blindness (Onchocerciasis) control, and Community Led Total Sanitation. Nine states were supported in community-based control of river blindness (onchocerciasis), with community members mobilized for yearly distribution of medicines (mectizan) to over 10 million people.

CSOs and members of the National Youth Service Corps were supported to mobilize the people at the grass root level to adopt positive attitude and behaviours to HIV/AIDS, while social support was provided to orphans and vulnerable children. Another achievement for this Agency Outcome was the assistance for the development of the Communication for Behaviour and Social Change Strategy (November 2009), which is the BCC tool for the IMNCH Strategy. Technical committees (SESP/SESOP) were set up in 18 states, and FCT promoted citizens participation and inclusiveness of all major

stakeholders in the education sector. The Community Led Total Sanitation approach encouraged communities to take collective decisions, and demand for actions for appropriate change in behaviour, leading to attainment of open defecation free status for several communities. Despite these attainments, the achievement of this Agency Outcome is highly limited, and that NGOs were not sufficiently involved to ensure that 60% would have created the demand for social services. Overall, the evaluation team considers that this second UNDAF II Outcome was partially achieved.

The third UNDAF II outcome expected that country policies, plans and institutions would provide the basis for preventing and managing cross-border threats (for example, connected to Avian Influenza and HIV/AIDS). The relevant agency outcome targeted the implementation of agreed international norms and conventions for the prevention and management of such threats (Nigeria-UNDAF II: 2008: 13).

The baseline for this UNDAF I outcome explained that the review of available instruments to determine number was yet to be ratified by Nigeria, and that existing instruments were yet to be domesticated to establish a baseline. The target for this UNDAF Outcome was that at Federal level, relevant conventions and international instruments were going to be ratified. Both the baseline and the targets were imprecise and difficult to measure. The evaluation did not find evidence to analyse the level of achievement of this UNDAF II Outcome.

The Agency Outcome C.3.1 expected that the Federal Government and the focus States would be able to implement agreed international norms and conventions for the prevention and management of cross border threats. The baseline indicated that capacity gaps existed. The real meaning of this baseline is unclear. The target indicated that Y% of institutions at Federal level and focus States would have been equipped with the capacity to implement internationally agreed norms and conventions. Here too, the baseline and target are vague and not specific, making the evaluation of results difficult. Very limited activities were carried out in the Cluster to achieve the set goal. Activities included the assistance to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) to review emergency response and assistance to government institutions to strengthen epidemiological surveillance. The capacities of public institutions were built in preventing and managing cross border threats. The University College Ibadan and Ahmadu Bello University Zaria were supported to train epidemiologists and mount surveillance for disease threats. These two universities train these epidemiologists under the N-FELTP program funded by CDC through AFENET, with also support from WHO. States and FCT were also assisted to mount active surveillance for target diseases.

Government institution on disaster management (National Emergency Management Agency –NEMA) was supported to review national framework for emergency response (2010) and to help the development of the National HIV/AIDS emergency preparedness plan. The country was assisted to implement the Polio Emergency Plan to interrupt the circulation of the wild poliovirus by the end of 2013. Assistance was provided for the country to organize an international conference and meetings on cross border threats, including with neighbouring countries (Niger, Chad and Nigeria). Assistance was not provided to other government institutions with critical roles in cross border threats, such as immigration, customs, border police, NAPTIP and the arm forces. The achievement of this UNDAF Outcome and Agency Outcome is not very significant, and the Evaluation Team is of the opinion that they were only partially achieved.

Cluster D: Reduction of Risks Pertaining to Crisis, Conflict and Insecurity

The Cluster D aimed at a reduction of risks pertaining to crisis, conflict and insecurity. This Cluster had two UNDAF II outcomes.

The first UNDAF II Outcome hoped that the Federal Government and selected states in the Niger Delta would be able to secure a participatory policy and institutional environment conducive to sustained peace and equitable development. This UNDAF II outcome sought to foster a participatory policy and institutional environment in the Niger Delta region.

The baseline for this first UNDAF II Outcome noted that existing policy and development plans for equitable and sustainable peace and development had gaps. The target was the existence of policy and development plans in Focus states in the Niger Delta by 2012. It is unclear whether this UNDAF II Outcome has been fully achieved, but there were some results reached.

The relevant agency outcomes focused on development that was better integrated across sectors based on clear plans and spending programmes; and the deepening of institutional collaboration between Government, communities, civil society and private sector organizations. These issues were seen as central to conflict prevention and management, internal security and emergency preparedness (Nigeria-UNDAF II: 2008: 13).

The Agency Outcome D.1.1 expected that relevant Federal agencies and selected States in the Niger Delta would be able to design and implement participatory, integrated development policies and plans in an accountable manner. The baseline was that no such plans were implemented. The target indicated that Federal and selected Niger Delta states MDAs would design and implement integrated development policies and plans.

Some of the activities undertaken by the Cluster included the drafting of the peace plan of the IPCR as framework for equitable development of the Niger Delta, the Justice sector reform action plan for states in the region, the establishment of humanitarian coordination team (HCT), with the involvement of the National Emergency Management Agency, CSOs (Red Cross), and other national and international actors. Four States (Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross River and Imo) were supported to develop their Justice Sector Reform Action Plans to enhance access to justice for citizens. Through the assistance of the UN System, the Niger Delta Collaborative Development Framework and the Niger Delta Action Plan were developed to serve as development initiatives for the Region. The UN assistance also led to the development of the National Policy on Climate Change and Response Strategy, the Municipal Agricultural Waste Policy, and a National UPOPs Reduction Strategy. In addition, there was increased funding (of USD3.6m) for the implementation of the Nigeria's REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal in Cross River. Based on the information provided to by the Cluster, the evaluation team considered that this Agency Outcome was partially achieved.

The Agency Outcome D.1.2 foresaw that the Government, communities, civil society and private sector organizations would collaborate institutionally to address conflict prevention and management, internal security and emergency preparedness. The baseline noted that some limited collaboration existed. The target indicated that by 2010, selected states in the Niger Delta would have institutional collaborations.

The UN assistance led to the establishment of a Humanitarian Coordination Team (HCT) with involvement of the National Emergency Management Agency, CSOs (Red Cross), other national and

international actors etc. Assistance was provided to Bayelsa State to develop Guidelines on National Referral Mechanism for Trafficked Persons in Nigeria and to conduct assessment of Gender Mainstreaming in programmes about trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. The UN System supported two Camp coordination and camp managements (CCCM) trainings for NEMA, State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), CSOs and the UN agencies. Two training of Trainers (TOT) on CCCM were also conducted for 22 staff of NEMA and CSOs. The UN System also collaborated with agencies on early warning. There is no additional evidence of achievements on this Agency Outcome, and the Evaluation Team concludes that the Agency Outcome was not achieved.

The second UNDAF II outcome concerned areas outside the Niger Delta where there may be conflict, crises, natural disasters and/or high rates of violent and organised crime adversely affecting individual and institutional security as well as investment for development. The agency outcomes contributing to this result put the emphasis on developing the capacity of Federal and civic institutions to assess, prevent and manage the response to both natural and man-made crises as well as insecurity (Nigeria-UNDAF II: 2008:13).

More specifically, the second UNDAF II Outcome hoped that State and non-state institutions would be responsible for crisis prevention, management and law enforcement and would ensure security of persons and property. The baseline noted a low level of security of persons and property in the country. The target aimed at having state and non-state institutions, at Federal level and in the focus States, ensure security of persons and property. It is unclear whether this Agency Outcome has been achieved given the absence of a more specific reporting from the Cluster.

The Agency Outcome D.2.1 expected the Federal Government and civic institutions in the focus States to assess, prevent and manage the response to natural and man-made crises. The baseline explained that the system for crises and disaster management was not well coordinated and collaborative. The target expected that functional and inclusive framework for crises and disaster management would be available at Federal level and in Focus states.

The UN Country Team (UNCT) contributed to conflict reduction in Jos (Plateau State), through the institution of early warning mechanisms, and by bringing together security agencies, community leaders and CSOs. The UN also supported local CSOs to resolve the long-standing intra-communal conflict in Agila, Benue State. There were, however, limited activities undertaken in this Agency Outcome and there was no additional evidence provided to the evaluation team, which concludes that this Outcome was not achieved.

The Agency Outcome D.2.2 foresaw that Federal law enforcement agencies would be able to perform key operational functions to prevent and reduce crime, whilst respecting human rights norms. The Outcome noted that it was cross-linked with a complementarity to Agency Outcome A.2.2 (Strengthen Governance and Accountability). The baseline highlighted that limited capacity of Federal law enforcement agencies existed to perform key operational functions to reduce crime. The target expected that Federal law enforcement agencies would meet key national and international benchmarks, with respect to the performance of critical functions.

The target has not been met and the evaluation team concludes that the Outcome has not been achieved. However, it should be noted that while UN Agencies under the Cluster did not provide any information on activities carried out in this regard the cross-linked Outcome under Agency Outcome A.2.2 reported activities and good achievements.

Overall, this UNDAF Outcome was not achieved, despite some efforts made. The UNDAF II Outcomes in the fourth Cluster (Reduce the Risk of Crisis, Conflict and Insecurity) were narrowed to the insecurity and conflict in the Niger Delta, while hotspots for conflicts in other parts of the country were overlooked only for them to flare in unimaginable proportions later in the life span of the UNDAF II. These included the Boko Haram militancy in Northeast, the ethnic/religious conflict in Jos Plateau, the kidnapping gangs in the Southeast, the Fulani herdsman versus farmers' conflict in North Central, and communal clashes in different parts of the country. Though these areas did not appear in the UNDAF II document, the UN System provided support to the country in managing some of the conflicts with some assistance in developing early warning system for the conflict in the Jos Plateau, the initial efforts geared at resolving communal clashes in Benue State (Agila), the brokering interactions between Nigeria and Cameroon in smoothening relationship with regard to the displaced persons from the Bakassi Peninsular, etc.

Nevertheless, overall, the evaluation team found that very little development assistance was carried out in the fourth pillar of the UNDAF II – Cluster D. This is grossly manifest in the weak cohesion between the UN Agencies working in the sector, with no clear leadership exhibited by the Agency assigned to serve as the Lead Agency. There is even uncertainty as to which of the three Agencies operating in the Cluster (UNODC, UNHCR and UNDP) served as the Lead Agency. Whatever coordinating mechanism might have existed prior to the bombing of the United Nations Building in August 2011, it ceased to exist after the bombing, as Agencies were thereafter located in different parts of the FCT Abuja making it increasingly difficult for them to meet.

3. Effectiveness of the UNDAF II as a coordination mechanism of UN's work

The UNDAF II served as a unifying mechanism that brought all the UN Agencies together to pursue a common goal since they are all signatories to it. It promoted strong commitment in the meetings of the Heads of Agencies, encouraged interdependence among component members of the UN System, as the comparative advantages of the Agencies were used to address programme needs of the UNCT members.

The UNDAF II also served as the strategic programming framework, which all the Agencies used in their dealings with government and CSOs. It also enabled the UN to have a common front in the host country and all Agencies subscribed to it. According to the Annual Report of the Resident Coordinator (RCAR) in 2011, it has also helped the UN System to encourage government to adopt similar approach in harmonizing development assistance from all development partners, including bilateral and multilateral organizations. Interviewees also pointed out that a number of government coordinating mechanisms are now operational at Federal and state levels. The UN System supported the governments to establish the three governance structures for the DAO states – State Partnership Board, State Outcome Board and State Implementing Committees in four of the UNDAF states. However, this coordinating structure at the DaO states has been put in place in some states (Benue, Cross River), while in others, they are not working (Kaduna, Adamawa).

The 2011 RCAR pointed out that the UNDAF II served as a forum for regular meetings of the UN Agencies under the Programme Management Team (PMT) and the four clusters, which held regular weekly and monthly meetings for programme implementation, and to assess progress of the UNDAF II. The RC Office supported the Resident Coordinator in his capacity as the Designated Official in hosting the SMT meetings as required by the Security Phase and implementing the decision.

Through the coordinating mechanisms of the meeting of the heads of Agencies (PMT), the UN Agencies deliberated on measures to achieve the goals, ensure synergy and maximize resources. This was manifest in the existence of common services, and formation of programme clusters (and sub-clusters) where Agencies delivering in particular areas are grouped together, interact, and harmonize programme activities to maximize outcomes. In Cluster A, there have been interventions carried out by UNDP and UN-Women in the promotion of gender balance in political parties and in the parliament. There were also interventions in the fight against corruption by UNDP and UNODC. There were other joint interventions to improve judicial integrity by UNDP, UNODC and UNICEF. Within the Social Service Delivery Cluster, there are a number of effective interventions. These are exemplified in the Joint UN HIV/AIDS programme chaired by UNAIDS, UNESCO collaboration with UNICEF in education sector where both Agencies collaborate in programming and since UNICEF does not operate in the secondary school system, its programme for secondary schools is implemented through UNESCO. UNAIDS also has similar arrangement with UNESCO globally and within the country, so that the UNAIDS programme in schools is implemented through UNESCO. The operations of the UN System in the states also show existence of synergy, as supported states acknowledge the combined action of the UN Agencies and the synergistic effect in making development assistance have multiplier effect on outcomes.

In practice, the UNDAF II created the consciousness in the UN agencies of the need to work together despite the different mandates. However there are gaps, especially when meetings of the PMT were not attended or representations were not at the right staff levels.

In the DAO states, coordination existed in the sense that there were coordinating agencies playing coordination roles: Adamawa - UNFPA; Akwa-Ibom - UNDP; Benue - UNICEF; Imo - UNIDO; Kaduna - UNFPA; Lagos - WHO; FCT - FAO. However, the coordination of the UN agencies was hampered at this level for the following reasons. First, not all agencies were resident in one location. Second, meetings were poorly attended and there was poor representation. Third, agencies tended to be more interested by their agency mandates than by a commitment to UNDAF II joint programming.

4. Participation of all UN agencies, resident and non-resident

The development of UNDAF II entailed a consultative process with the participation of all UN Agencies, both resident and Non Resident Agencies (NRAs). This ensured inputs from the Agencies and engendered some ownership of the document. The resident UN agencies are UNDP, FAO, ILO, IOM, UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFEM (UNWOMEN), UNODC, WHO and WMO. The Non Resident Agencies that are signatories to the UNDAF II document are IAEA, IFAD, ITC, UN-HABITAT, and UNITAR. The Agencies used the document as the development framework that guided their development assistance in the country.

The UNCT involved NRAs in joint UN Day celebration and other international days. The UNCT, through the RC office, engaged some NRAs and secured their involvement in coordination structures such as the UNCT, PMT and OMT. Notable assistance was provided to WPF for logistical assessment and grains procurement, strengthened UNEP's contribution on the release of the Environmental report on Ogoni land, UNOPS' and UNITAR's job creation and private sector development projects. IFAD, UN-HABITAT and UNOPS participated in the UNDAF MTR consultative review meetings and processes in 2011. Assistance was provided for high profile missions for OCHA, UN HABITAT, IAEA, UNITAR, UNEP, IFAD, and WPF, aimed at boosting their activities in the country while some have been supported to establish full office or have focal personnel.

The participation of Non-Resident Agencies remains a challenge – many were not actively involved in the UNDAF II implementation due to the lack of capacity or other factors. At the level of the DaO States, participation of all UN agencies (resident and non-resident) within the DaO framework is weak. The level of participation amongst the resident agencies is also poor, especially in Kaduna and Adamawa. The design of the UNDAF II was geared towards the promotion of UN agencies, residents and non-resident's participation in the UNDAF processes, however, in practice, there were challenges in the level of participation in financing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

5. Effectiveness of joint programming

Joint programming and joint programmes in the UN are aimed to reduce fragmentations of the UN System and enable agencies to deliver as one in true partnership and serve the needs of host countries in their efforts to achieve MDGs and other Internationally Agreed Development Goals. Joint programming and joint programmes provide the opportunity for the UN to approach the host country as a single entity, and guide the country to develop a national development framework based on national priorities and policies. This then serves as a framework for a comprehensive approach to development. The countries define, own and drive the development processes at all levels. The results of the development assistance, lessons learned and best practices are assimilated and used to scale up development programme.

Joint programming activities by the UN at country level were manifested in the grouping of the UN Agencies under the four Cluster of the UNDAF II, inviting many Agencies to collaborate to deliver the Agency outcomes in the Cluster. However, consistency in meetings at the Cluster level has been lacking and commitment by personnel to the assigned tasks is weak. The plan to develop a common monitoring tool for UNDAF II was not achieved throughout the life span of the UNDAF II, neither was joint monitoring carried out, in a way that would have used the M&E Framework as a basis for reporting achievements based on baselines and targets. Joint programme planning and reviews were non frequent. Interactions with UN personnel reveal that Agencies' demands make it difficult for personnel to meet up with the demands of the joint programming activities, and the absence of the tasks assigned to them on joint programme in their job description (PAD) makes it compelling for staff to devote their time to their primary tasks as reflected in their PAD which is devoted primarily to Agency mandates.

Joint programming was incorporated in UNDAF II. There is evidence that joint programming was envisaged in the design of the UNDAF II, and the document itself is a product of this effort. However, joint programmes were not specifically considered given that the DaO pilot experience in the 6 states was the tool to improve collaborative programming. Joint funding by all UN agencies in the four clusters was captured (UNDAF 2008: 14). It was expected that 8 agencies would contribute to the governance and accountability cluster, 10 agencies to the productivity and employment cluster, 11 agencies to the social services delivery cluster, and 9 agencies to the conflict and security cluster.

Findings of the evaluation indicate varying degrees of cohesion, coordination and programme implementation. In practice, there were weak efforts in implementing joint programmes as each UN Agency was preoccupied with fulfilling its agency mandate.

On whether UN Agencies built sufficient synergies in the implementation of the UNDAF II Outcomes that would have led to higher level results, and whether they put in place strong joint programming strategies and joint programmes, agencies affirmed that there were weaknesses in the design and in the implementation of joint programming. However, they also pointed out that some collective

interventions were carried out by some UN agencies in addressing specific challenges, e.g., UNH4 was a strong joint programming effort, where UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF and UNAIDS were active.

There were other existing synergies that joint programming efforts were leveraging on. These included the UN joint programming on HIV/AIDS coordinated by UNAIDS. It was well structured, functional and effective in bringing many UN Agencies together for joint action on HIV/AIDS. UNESCO also engaged in a joint programming activity with UNICEF in secondary school education, and also with UNAIDS. In these joint programming activities, the Agencies harmonized their strategies, pooled resources, and implemented the activities in a more collective fashion. Other areas of the UNDAF II did not show evidence of significant synergy in joint programming, but rather showed that Agencies were working independently on their specific agendas.

While the UN Agencies were together in the UN House in Abuja, the spur on joint programming sparked off by the DAO concept, which was already building up with great momentum, resulting in frequent collaborative meetings among the Agencies in the four Clusters. The various Agencies were gradually buying-in to joint programming in the spirit of the DAO, when the UN House was attacked by terrorists in August 2011, leading to the Agencies settling in different offices across the city, and making it difficult for them to come together for meetings. Another impediment to increased synergies in joint programming was that many of the UN personnel did not show sufficient commitment to joint activities of the UN, as their primary allegiance was to their specific Agency assignments, which were spelt out in their job description. Another factor affecting joint programming is that except at the Head of Agencies level, there is no organizational structure for the functioning of the technical personnel within each of the four Clusters, leading to a lack of coordination and common action at the technical level.

The evaluators came to the conclusion that joint programming was intended but in terms of implementation it did not really take place, as much as the DaO concept would have led to, and it is hard to find tangible synergies that led to higher level results.

6. Effectiveness of the Delivering as One experience

There was unanimous agreement among the clusters who replied to the list of evaluation questions that the UNDAF II did not succeed in all DaO States. States specifically mentioned where successes were recorded, included Benue and Cross Rivers. In addition, they noted that even where seeming success was recorded, only the one programme, one operating system to a limited degree, and some common services were implemented (Cluster C). However, on the whole, there is no evidence that indicates that any of the DaO pillars was fully implemented in the field (Cluster D).

From the assessment of the implementation of the UNDAF II in the DaO states, the evaluators conclude that the implementation of the UNDAF II at that level was not effective, and it did not lead to the achievement of higher results.

A SWOT was prepared by the evaluation team following the missions to six DaO States and the Federal Capital Territory, which confirms these findings and conclusion, while providing at the same time a more nuanced and detailed analysis. See: *Annex 5: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis of Nigerian Delivering as One States*.

The evaluation team considers that the responses from the three Clusters showed that the UN responders acknowledged that successes were recorded in some of the States in implementation of the

DAO (Benue and Cross River States). The aspect of the DAO concept implemented in the UNDAF II was the one programme pillar. The non-inclusion of all components of the pillars may not necessarily be adjudged as failure on the side of the UNCT, since it represented a pragmatic way to start using the approach of DaO in the pillar that may have been more useful at that time. It should be noted that the United Nations Country Team piloted the DAO concept in Nigeria, with the intention of using the lessons learned to scale up the DAO in the Country, however, the evaluators observe that Nigeria did not become a formal DaO “self-starter”, and that the implementation of DaO seemed to have stalled at the end of UNDAF II implementation.

Joint programming and Joint Programmes under the Delivering as One concept are the focus of the UN reform. Following their missions to the DaO states, the evaluators noted that while joint programming was envisaged, it did not really take place. Six States and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja were selected to pilot the concept under the UNDAF II. The six states were selected on the basis of one from each of the six geo-political zones of the country. The DAO States (including FCT) are Adamawa, Akwa Ibom (later replaced by Cross River), Benue, Imo, Lagos, Kaduna and FCT Abuja. The UN System in Nigeria piloted the programming under the DAO concept in these States, but did not become formally a “DaO self-starter”, which would have made a formal request to start implementing the approach. The focus of Delivering as One in the States was the One Programme pillar, and it did not deal with the other pillars (one budgetary framework and one fund, one leader, one office and one voice). It should be noted that the evaluation team understood some of the origins of the DaO by reading the report of a 2012 consultancy mission on Nigeria UN coherence, but did not find other documents that would have defined and explained the rationale of adopting the approach and the modalities that were envisioned.

One UN Agency was selected to serve as the lead in each of the States, and to coordinate development assistance programme for the UN. The Lead Agencies in the different Delivering As One states was the following: Adamawa – UNFPA, Benue – UNICEF, Cross River – UNICEF, FCT Abuja – FAO, Imo – UNIDO, Kaduna – UNFPA, and Lagos – WHO. In some States, the presence of the lead Agency was rarely felt, there were few coordination meetings, except at the beginning of the programme when component members of the government institutions (ministries) met, developed the programme document and signed it. Subsequently, very little was done in terms of UN joint programming in the State.

While there were very few joint programmes, there have been periodic or *ad-hoc* interventions which have seen the collective efforts of the UN agencies demonstrated. In 2012 for instance, due to the unprecedented flooding in Nigeria, the RC and UNCT established and inaugurated a Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) comprising relevant UN agencies and INGOs to meet the needs of the population affected and displaced by the flood disaster. The HCT in the reporting period approved joint rapid assessments, endorsed Humanitarian Response Plan, approved application for Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) and provided technical support in Strategy, Relief and Logistics to the Presidential Committee on Relief and Rehabilitation (see RCAR 2012 - Nigeria, 2012 Results and Use of Funds).

UNICEF was the Lead Agency in Benue State, and showed physical presence in mounting coordination activities for the DAO in the State. This was manifest in holding of regular coordination meetings with partners, which is an evidence of a strong coordination by government institution, as well as in the implementation of UN development assistance with monitoring and supervision coordinated by UNICEF. Similarly in Cross River State where UNICEF was the Lead Agency, the same pattern is noticeable, with strong presence of UNICEF, and effective coordination of joint programme activities. However, it is observed that other UN Agencies did not participate in the coordination meetings, and as a result were not aware of developments in the implementation. Some UN Agencies (UNHCR, UNEP) still operated directly with the States and signed development programme documents (Annual work plans), instead of

abiding by the joint UN programme document. Some agencies approached the implementing ministry directly and implement programmes with them without contacting the government coordinating institution (Benue State scenario). In both Benue and Cross River, there were strong Government coordinating institutions for development assistance. **The Cross River experience may serve as a best practice for the implementation of DaO in the country.** The Department of International Development Corporation (DIDC) was well structured, active, and integrates development assistance into the entire government development programme. It indeed serves as a platform for negotiating development assistance in the state with other development partners, such as bilateral development partners, CSOs, foundations etc.

The perception of the UN agencies of the alternative ways of implementing the UNDAF under the DaO framework include the following: use the newly issued DaO SOPs; realistic determination of the activities and division of responsibilities; a limited use of veto power at UNCT meetings to prevent some agencies with few staff in the country to prevent decisions to be taken by the overwhelming majority of other agencies (Cluster C). In addition, where some of its key principles are found to be less than practicable, the minimum would be for UN Agencies to plan and design joint programmes, and implement joint programming together in close partnership with national partners (Cluster D), at the national and state levels (cluster B).

7. Effectiveness of coordination with development partners

The UN system plays a central role in assisting countries to develop policies and strategies that enhance their development potentials and utilize their development framework to negotiate with development partners. The system strives to strengthen the coordination mechanism of host countries for more efficient delivery of development assistance. As a key player in development assistance, UN Agencies serve as rallying point to bring other development partners together, in order to coordinate development assistance, and establish mechanisms and tools to promote enhanced cooperation among the development partners.

Thus, the design of UNDAF II factored the participation of the development partners in development assistance. For instance it noted the potential contribution of partners such as the World Bank, IMF, USAID, CIDA etc. The coordination of these assistance was done by the following: the JDBF for electoral assistance, Donor Groups on Political and Economic Governance, the Justice Sector Coordination Group, the mini-Dublin group on drug control, a Core Group on the MDGs, the Health Partners' Coordination Committee, the Country Coordination Mechanism for the Global Fund on HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, the Development Partners' Group on HIV/AIDS, the International Development Partners' Group on Education, and the Donor Coordination Group on Gender and another on the energy sector. In addition, there were different partnerships or groupings: the UN itself, the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) bringing together DFID, the World Bank and increasingly, USAID, and the EU which stands on its own.

The Development Partners Group (DPG) was very active and brought together all the UN Agencies, EU, DFID, CIDA, USAID, World Bank, etc. The Group was well structured and coordinated development assistance in several areas especially HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, etc. The DPG brought the development partners together in Nigeria and harmonized development assistance for better results. It also played an advocacy role to government to address some development challenges facing the population, especially the vulnerable groups. The DPG met regularly and deliberated on joint programming, especially in development assistance to HIV/AIDS response. In addition, the UN System has encouraged governments at national and state levels to have coordination systems to ensure harmonization in programming. At different times, UN Agencies operating within the country have

sourced grants from the bilateral development partners (DFID, EU, JICA, etc.), and implemented on their behalf. For instance the Fistula hospital was funded by JICA through UNFPA, the UNH4+ programme on maternal and child health was funded by CIDA, and the grant for contraceptives was funded by DFID through UNFPA. The collaboration between the UN system and the other development partners has helped the Country to develop streamlined mechanisms, management tools for effective and efficient programme implementation.

However UNDAF II did not remove the initial problems that existed with the coordination of development partner, and were noted in the UNDAF II document: prevalence of overlapping state focus, a multiplicity of collaborative efforts of varying scope, depth and effectiveness, and multiple and, sometimes, overlapping coordination structures (UNDAF II 2008). The National Planning Commission, whose responsibility is that of coordinating development assistance, noted that aid agencies circumvent the law by having direct dealings with state governments and other implementing partners, without notifying them.

8. Effectiveness of joint communication

The UN agencies were unanimous in acknowledging that the UN did not communicate its results, lessons learned, and good practices while implementing UNDAF II, even if the Mid-Term Review was an effort in this direction. The evaluators believe that although some agencies made efforts to report successes and challenges of the UNDAF II, overall, the efforts were weak in communicating as one.

9. Challenge of resource mobilization

Funding of UN Agencies comes through regular resources from the UN, dedicated trust funds targeting some thematic area in the agencies' mandate areas, and resource mobilization for special interventions. These resources may be sourced externally through the Headquarters of the Agency or locally from the Country Office of the UN Agency. The domestic resource mobilization comes through bilateral development partners, corporate organizations or government partnership. Governments may utilize the comparative advantages of the UN Agency in competitive bidding in international market and other expertise of the UN to channel funds to the UN to execute certain aspects of development programme on their behalf. The mobilisation of resources for UNDAF II according to the design was expected to come from both traditional sources and non-traditional sources. It is unclear whether the UNDAF II allowed a better mobilization of resources and more predictable and un-earmarked funding.

The challenges of resource mobilization arose from the global economic depression affecting key donor nations since 2008, as the US and many other EU countries have been adversely affected by the economic recession. Potential donors in Nigeria are oil companies, telecommunications companies, and domestic financial institutions.

As the chair of the Resource Mobilisation Committee of the CCM for Global Fund grants, the UN effectively supported the successful application to the Global Fund to continue the implementation of Phase II of the Single Stream of Funds grant that the country is currently implementing. The grant includes significant resources for Preventing Mother to Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT) and the UN is supporting building the capacity of National HIV/AIDS/STI Control Programme (NASCP) and State HIV/AIDS/STI Control Programme (SAPCs) to act as Sub-Recipients and Sub-sub recipients of the Global Fund for the second phase of the grant in the 12+1 States identified for PMTCT scale up.

E. Challenges of RBM and M&E

1. Evaluability of the UNDAF

The evaluation team undertook an Evaluability Assessment of the UNDAF II. They developed a tool, based on a recent Working Paper developed by Dr. Rick Davies for DFID.⁶ This Evaluability Assessment, which was adapted for the UNDAF II, was first administered, through a list of questions, to programme managers (Desk Officers and Directors) in selected DAO States from three of the six geo-political zones (the states of Benue, Cross River and Imo State). A total of 27 respondents replied to the list of questions. This was useful to get some insight of how evaluable the UNDAF II was for key stakeholders in the field. The informative replies were then analysed and synthesized by the evaluation team in a table format. This exercise was started at the beginning of the evaluation process and subsequently finalized when more information was made available to the evaluation team during the evaluation process, and when further analysis was undertaken. *See Annex: Evaluability Assessment of the UNDAF II.*

The following sections explain in more details the issues around the evaluability of the UNDAF but also the challenges met by the UNCT in monitoring and evaluating the UNDAF II.

2. Design of the Results Matrix

The Mid Term Review of the UNDAF II observed that “the design of the UNDAF II was weak with respect to its compliance with the Results Based Management (RBM) principles”.⁷ The Clusters considered that the UNDAF II was designed with sound Result-Based Management (RBM) principles particularly in the outcome areas. Nevertheless, on whether the hierarchy of results in the Results Matrix was well-articulated between UNDAF II outcomes, agency outcomes and outputs, the UN agencies appear to be divided on their perceptions. On one hand, it is believed that the hierarchy of results in the Results Matrix was not well articulated as the results were unfocused, with numerous activities included (Cluster C). On the other hand, it is also believed that the hierarchy of results in the Results Matrix was well-articulated between UNDAF II outcomes, agency outcomes and outputs, but the link between the federal and state was weak (Cluster D). From the analysis of the Results Matrix and the Clusters’ responses, the evaluators consider that overall the Result Matrix was quite well articulated at the design stage. In general the planned UNDAF II Outputs at the lower level in the hierarchy of results could effectively lead to the expected Agency Outcomes, which could have led to the achievement of the UNDAF II Outcomes at a higher level.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the UNDAF II document provided a summary of UN activities, but not where synergetic efforts are required. While the UNDAF II contained no less than 10 UNDAF II Outcomes, 21 Agency Outcomes, and 67 Outputs, it did not indicate which were the ones that should have been implemented as a priority in order to achieve the key, most important objectives. If done, this would indicate a clear strategic intent. The UNDAF II was designed as a simple framework that accommodated everything. Country Programmes would have been implemented anyway without

⁶ Planning Evaluability Assessments, A Synthesis of the Literature with Recommendations, Report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID), Working Paper 40, Dr Rick Davies, October 2013.

⁷ UNDAF II (2009-2012), Mid Term Review Report, UNCT NIGERIA, 2011.

UNDAF II. It was a framework, but not a “strategic framework”, with a lot reflected, but no clear indication of the priorities.

3. Design of the M&E Framework

UN agencies considered that the M&E Framework was not designed with systematic SMART principles (specific, measureable, achievable, realistic and time-bound). The indicators, baselines and targets were not sufficiently defined, while some targets were overly ambitious (Clusters B, C and D).

The design of UNDAF II provided in the M&E Framework, but the analysis made during the evaluation shows that there were indeed basic problems with this Framework. Some of the indicators were not easily measurable. The baselines were often weak as can be seen from the provision of weak or no information regarding the current state of the problems in the country and the states (in the case of AWP). For instance in the UNDAF II document, Output D.1.1.3 states that the baseline is "capacity gap exists" or in Agency Outcome D.1.2: some limited collaboration exist.

On whether data was available, collected and analysed in UNDAF II, and what could be done in the future to provide data for UNDAF III, the information available shows that data collection was fragmented and challenging to gather (Cluster B). In addition, there was a strong feeling that in the last year of UNDAF II, the cluster arrangement was not triggered by the RC office, while at PMT meetings the focus was predominantly on UNDAF III (Cluster C). The evaluators conclude that although data may have existed at the level of the agencies, marginal data existed on the implementation of UNDAF II. In addition, the implementation of UNDAF III could have been improved in the area of data collection and analysis, and regular update of the M&E Framework would have been instrumental to guide its implementation and help managing the UNDAF II strategically.

The targets were not always smart. For instance some were not specific at all: Agency Outcome A.1.2: states that that the target is : “By 2010, framework available and institutionalized at the Federal and Y% of focus States statistical systems”; Output B.1.1.2: “Y% increase in the number of analytical reports on rural economy produced and disseminated”; Agency Outcome C.1.2: “Y percentage increase in the number of female headed households with access to at least 3 basic social services”; Output D.1.1.1: “At least Y% of Federal and focus State MDAs complete a programme cycle for appropriate medium term development plans”, etc. In addition, some of the targets of UNDAF II and the AWP at the DAO States level were many, and some were actually unrealistic and over-ambitious when matched with availability of resources. The targets were not updated during the UNDAF II implementation and also after the normal completion of the UNDAF II in 2012, after the extension to 2013 was approved.

In some instances, the agency objectives were not sufficiently related to the outlined targets. For instance, the Output C.3.1.2 objective was that policy and legislative proposals are in place for domestication of international norms and conventions on the prevention and management of cross-border threats. The baseline stated: “Review international instruments to determine those yet to be domesticated”, while the target is limited to: “Proposals in place for the domestication of key conventions relating to specific social sector issues” (UNDAF II 2008: 61).

4. Lack of updating of the M&E Framework

The evaluation team observed that the UNDAF II M&E framework was not updated even if efforts to undertake annual reviews were made, and that it should have been used and updated on a regular basis, according to RBM principles.

The assumptions were defined but not monitored. The evaluators are in fundamental agreement with the assessment of the point that the design of the M&E had challenges and obtained no data that would allow them to conclude that the M&E Framework was regularly used and updated at the state level. The updating might have been possible within agencies, but was not noticeable under the UNDAF II M&E Framework. The evaluation team has also observed that the assumptions were defined but the monitoring of these assumptions was weak.

Similarly, on whether the external risks (i.e. political, governance, conflict and fiduciary), and the internal threats to the UNDAF II implementation were identified, the UN agencies were of the view that these reflected the true nature of the country situation at the time and the risks identified were appropriate (Cluster B). From an analysis of the UNDAF II M&E Framework and the MTR, the evaluators observed that the external risks and assumptions were identified. It was not however contemplated that the UN House would be affected by the general security situation in the country, and by the attack it was subjected to.

Government partners expressed concern that decisions on M&E were taken independently by the UN Agencies. This confirms the fact that the Government and Institutional Partners were marginally involved in the M&E of the UNDAF II.

5. Lack of a M&E mechanism

The UN M&E Group to monitor the UNDAF II was partially functional, and there were TORs prepared. In responding to the issue of the effectiveness of M&E mechanisms, the availability of TORs for the outcome/cluster group, and work plans for each cluster, the UN agencies agreed that they were M&E mechanisms that were designed into UNDAF II but noted that there were no TORs for the outcome and cluster groups, and no work plans for each cluster group (except at the DaO State level). The evaluation team confirms this observation and notes that the implementation of the UNDAF II was challenged by the lack of clear responsibilities to clusters, weak M&E framework and poorly implemented AWP in most DaO States.

The groups reported that the cluster groups were not meeting (Cluster C) or not meeting on a regular basis (Cluster D). This affected the cohesion of the group in the delivery of UNDAF II. It is reported that at the federal level, the Lead Agencies for Cluster D had no or little activities in the Niger Delta and this made the cohesion in the group very difficult. The Lead should be the agency with majority of the activities in the cluster. The evaluation team confirms this position.

Additionally, just as the UNCT has an organizational structure and TORs for the PMT, it would have been important to similarly set organizational structure and TORs for the Cluster Groups, and make them functional. The UN personnel participating in the Cluster Groups should have the activities they are performing in the Clusters reflected in the job description in their Agency (PAD). Provisions should have been made in budgeting for the UNDAF III to include the Cluster activities, and the activities of the M&E Committee or Group.

6. Link with agencies' M&E

On the issue of the existence of a relationship between the M&E of UN agencies and that of the UNDAF II and its functionality, some agencies were uncertain (Cluster D) while other agencies believed that it did not exist (Cluster C). It is believed that the M&E was not well coordinated, and that for UNDAF III, Agencies' M&E systems should be reviewed by the UNDAF coordinating team, prior to the development of the UNDAF M&E framework, to ensure coherence and alignment (Cluster D and B). The evaluation team concurs with the point that there was no coherent and functional relationship between the M&E systems of UN agencies and the UNDAF M&E framework. Future UNDAFs should ensure that the UNDAF M&E Group is strengthened.

In practice, in the absence of a UN M&E Committee, each of the UN Agency relied on its own M&E framework and conducted its own monitoring independently. Agencies' M&E frameworks were used as instruments for monitoring the UNDAF II in the DAO States. Due to time constraints the evaluation could not assess the extent to which the separate Agencies' M&E frameworks were appropriate tools that generated data to measure the UNDAF II indicators, however, it looks like these systems were marginally used for monitoring the UNDAF. Furthermore, it does appear that only for Clusters B and D, the evaluations, surveys and studies that were conducted by agencies, contributed inputs in the UNDAF II monitoring process.

The RCAR 2012 also confirmed that joint monitoring of the UNDAF II was not done, and agencies relied mainly on the lead Agencies and their M&E system to track, monitor and report on the performance of UNDAF II in the focal states. Attempts to have a centralized M&E system housed in the RC Office were thus not realized, and the UN M&E Committee was not functional. The absence of a common monitoring tool and joint monitoring by the UN System has been a weakness that was not addressed during UNDAF II.

7. Annual reviews

The evaluation tried to determine whether the UNDAF II annual reviews were useful to report on results and track progress. The available information from the clusters shows that annual reviews were done but they were unfocussed and not aligned to indicators and targets (Cluster C). In addition, the AWP at the state level were reviewed, and in the process, some were rolled over, while others were either added or dropped (Cluster D). From the evaluation assessment of the UNDAF II process, these reviews were done at agency level, and very few at cluster levels. In the DaO states, other annuals reviews were conducted and were reportedly useful in tracking progress.

It is also very important to understand if the UNDAF II reporting gradually shifted to the achievement of outcomes. The evaluation team considers that a key limitation of the annual reporting system is the fact that the annual reporting focused on activities and outputs, but did not gradually shift to reporting at the higher level of the results chain – the UNDAF II outcomes and agency outcomes. The MTR did not succeed to report more strategically on outcomes achievements. This is one of the reasons why the methodology for this evaluation made a special effort to focus its analysis at the outcome level to compensate the weaknesses of the monitoring and reporting processes.

Unfortunately, the annual review process was done outside the M&E framework. There was very limited consideration of the indicators, baselines and targets in these reviews, making their subsequent use very difficult, including during the evaluation.

With respect to the quality assurance processes in the conduct of annual reviews (peer reviews between clusters, review from the RCO, etc.), scanty mechanisms existed, and the reviews were not assessed to ensure they would be harmonized, comparable and useful for a proper monitoring. They seem to have been undertaken as a requirement, and no quality assurance process existed at the UNCT level.

The response to the question of whether reviews were used for other purposes, for instance communication, the evaluation team observed that the use of these reviews was very limited, and that they were not used for communication or advocacy purposes, which were lost opportunities. Shared communication products could have built on annual reviews to highlight the results achieved by the UNCT, and deliver the agreed UNCT common advocacy messages and key positions, related to national development challenges. An interesting example of such an approach to communicate as one by using the annual review process is the Zimbabwe annual results report.⁸

With respect to the added-value of the MTR and the UNCT response to the report, some clusters reported that the mid-term review process was useful in re-shaping and re-prioritizing the outputs and results (Clusters B and D), while other believed that the MTR report was unfocused and contained no clear recommendations, and the many recommendations were unrelated to the observations made, which weakened the MTR's usefulness (Cluster C). The evaluation team concurs with the point that there was a weak relation between some of the recommendations and observations contained in the report. The team considers that the strength of the MTR lied in the information which it brought out on the activities of UN agencies and clusters, and its weakness lies in the fact that it did not fundamentally influence the direction of the UNDAF II, and was not followed by a management response.

8. Monitoring missions

The response to the question of the influence that monitoring mission had on the design, direction of work, resourcing, and staff allocation priorities of the UNDAF II, the clusters were divided. Some reported that the monitoring missions facilitated their direction of work, resourcing, and staff allocation priorities (Cluster D) while other noted that there was no re-design of the UNDAF II even after the MTR, and so the reporting did not influence changes in the implementation of the UNDAF II (Cluster B). The evaluation team is in agreement with the fact that the UNDAF II was not redesigned, though some few changes were effected at the activity levels. This was not, however, occasioned by the results of monitoring missions.

⁸ Through the 2013 UNDAF Annual Review in Zimbabwe, the UNCT made an effort to produce an “advocacy” oriented UNDAF report that can capture the interest of both internal and external partners. The report showcases the “ZUNDAF” as a robust and flexible tool, which allows for enhanced UN positioning and responsiveness to national priorities. Ultimately, the UNCT has sought to communicate UN supported results in a manner that can generate greater interest in, and understanding of, the work of the UN in Zimbabwe.

9. Usefulness and adequacy of the M&E System overall

There was scanty response from the Clusters to the question on whether the monitoring, evaluation, reporting and accountability systems were adequate to enable the UN to demonstrate UNDAF II results. The evaluators concur with Cluster B and the doubts of Cluster C that accountability systems were not adequate to enable the UN to demonstrate UNDAF II results and its comparative advantage. There were challenges in the design of the M&E Framework and its practical use, the reporting of UNDAF II and the accountability systems. For instance, the Results Matrix and M&E Framework were not updated. Furthermore, the M&E system was not adequately used to adjust programme strategies to changing policy and programme contexts and needs, in the course of programme implementation.

This evaluation confirms that while the outcomes were included in a detailed Results Matrix and M&E Framework, it is difficult to measure the attainment of many of them, as most were not SMART. In addition, there was no common monitoring and evaluation tool developed by the UN to assess the implementation of the UNDAF II. Individual UN Agencies used the specific M&E tools for the monitoring of their programmes, implemented within the UNDAF II framework. There is no evidence of any form of standardization of the different tools developed by the UN Agencies. Though there was a Joint Monitoring Group established by the UN to monitor the implementation of the UNDAF II, the Group was not functional and very little was achieved by it, with the exception of a role it may have had occasionally during Annual Reviews.

The Clusters believe that UNDAF results could better be captured in the future through strengthening the M&E system (Cluster B) and also by a better integration and well defined accountabilities within agencies (Cluster C). The evaluators consider that the UNDAF II results could be better captured by putting in place a stronger UNDAF II M&E mechanism constituted by agencies and directed by the UNCT.

The key lessons emerging from this analysis, is that there is a need to ensure that a joint UN M&E Committee or Group is established for UNDAF III, and that it is functional, that the UN develops a common monitoring tool for the UNDAF III, that there is regular joint monitoring of UNDAF III involving the UNCT, the Government and the CSOs, that data generated is analysed and the reports shared with all the stakeholders, and finally that the monitoring results is used to guide programming activities.

F. Cross-cutting issues

1. Cross-Cutting Issues in general

The cross cutting issues in the UNDAF II are human rights, gender equality, environmental sustainability and public-private partnership. These cross cutting issues were integrated into the document and were expected to underlie all UN programming processes.

The UNDAF mission statement captures this vision with its focus on enabling Nigeria '....to secure a policy and institutional environment within which all citizens are active agents of development that distributes benefits equitably to the present generation without jeopardizing gains for future generations.' The mission statement is embedded programmatically through three rights-based principles which call for a consistent emphasis on overcoming institutional blockages to achieving the MDGs, fostering societal demand and capability through active citizenship, and placing national action within a global and regional setting. A final set of 'filters' emphasizes the cross-cutting themes of human rights, gender equality, environmental sustainability and public-private partnership (UNDAF 2009-2012:9).

Clusters indicated that mainstreaming of the five principles was undertaken at programming level by each agency (Cluster B), that it was done poorly, outside of regular work, and considered as a burden (Cluster C), and to the extent possible (Cluster D). Cluster B is the only one considering that the UNDAF II partially developed capacities of partners involved on cross cutting issues, but that this was done within agencies' programme implementation and availability of resources.

The evaluation team highlights that limited evidence was found about mainstreaming. There was a Thematic Group set up on Gender, but it looks like it has not been very effective. The evaluation team did not get any report from this group, and annual review reports did not analyse how the five principles were actually mainstreamed.

2. Human Rights-Based Approach

According to some UN interviewees, human rights issues cut across the four clusters of the UNDAF II by including activities to support the rights of the citizenry, strengthening participation for political parties, and promoting the rights of all citizens especially women. The UNDAF II supported the justice sector reform aimed at protecting the rights of those awaiting trial, as well as those serving jail terms.

The Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) is enshrined in HIV/AIDS programming, where measures are taken to protect the rights of people affected, reduce stigma, and enhance access to treatment. In addition, the UN supported efforts to the passage of the bill prohibiting and punishing discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS in housing, employment, social, educational and health services. The UN also supported efforts in protecting the rights of children (Child Rights Act) and supported the campaign against trafficking in persons. UNFPA supported the training of 70 programme personnel and other partners who worked on protection and management of rescued trafficked women and girls. The zonal workshops also aimed at enhancing the capacity of 30 counsellors situated at various centres in the north central Nigeria to provide more effective services to survivors of trafficking in person.

The perceptions of the clusters regarding HRBA is that some clusters believe that the 5 principles were mainstreamed (cluster D), while other clusters do not indicate any precise way by which this would have been done (cluster B and C).

The evaluation team considers that the UNDAF II document did not specify if and how human rights were going to be mainstreamed, and mainstreaming has not happened during implementation. For example, there was no systematic effort to integrate HRBA in all clusters, and no analysis of such a mainstreaming is made in annual review reports.

3. Gender Equality

In line with national realities of gender inequalities, UNDAF II sought to mainstream gender equality in some facets of national development, and this was factored into all clusters during the design. Support was provided for the development of the National Policy on Gender along with a framework of actions to successfully mainstream Gender in a lot of sectors including Education, Health, HIV/AIDS, Productivity, Conflict resolution and Governance. Gender desks have been opened in all federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and in a number of UN assisted States. UNICEF has supported eleven additional states (Bayelsa, Benue, Edo, Delta, Ogun, Kogi, Gombe, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe), bringing to 29 the number of states and Federal Capital Territory Abuja, which now have and are implementing gender-sensitive, evidence and rights-based education sector strategic and operational plans, as revealed in the RC Annual Report of 2012. The emphasis on participation of

women has encouraged the current government to commit itself to actualization of affirmative action in appointive positions for females in the administration.

CSOs and other stakeholders are relentlessly campaigning against gender-based violence and other acts of discrimination against women, while a number of states have passed laws protecting the rights of women.

The UNCT could refer to the on-going update of UNDP Nigeria's Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan of the UNDP office based mainly on a Gender Seal self-assessment, a comprehensive gender review of the Country Offices portfolio, UNDP Strategic Plan and Corporate Gender Equality Strategy 2014-2017, and interviews and focus groups with partners and stakeholders. A priority of UNDP Nigeria is to enhance Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment and to strengthen institutionalization of Gender mainstreaming. UNDP Nigeria is one of the designated country offices and business units that are participating in the UNDP Gender Equality Seal exercise which commenced in June 2013. Within the framework of this process, the country office conducted a self-assessment and finalized an action plan that is currently being implemented until June 2014. The updated version of UNDP Nigeria's Gender Equality Strategy will include development results as well as institutional arrangements, including management systems for gender mainstreaming, capacities, knowledge management, enabling environment, etc. The office is particularly interested in including a comprehensive approach to capacity development, based on an assessment of the skill levels and learning needs of the staff, as well as developing individual capacity development plans for staff with key roles in gender mainstreaming. In order to link UNDP Nigeria's institutional arrangements with its ability to deliver gender results, the country office will also be conducting a comprehensive gender review of the UNDP Nigeria country programme to identify opportunities for enhancing gender impact, as well as to identify entry points for additional programme components that advance gender equality and women's empowerment. All this work could be very useful for the UNCT in the context of the mainstreaming of gender equality in the UNDAF implementation.

4. Environmental Sustainability

The design of UNDAF II mainstreamed the promotion of environmental sustainability in only Cluster D and thus in its implementation, only outcomes from this cluster reflected the principle. The design needed to have mainstreamed the principle to cluster A in the area of leadership commitment to the protection of the environment; cluster B especially in areas relating to productivity in agriculture, industry and other related areas; and in cluster C, for instance in the education of citizens on the environmental sustainability. However, the implementation of this principle in UNDAF II is noticeable in cluster D only.

5. Public-Private Partnership

The promotion of public-private partnership was defined by the role of the organised private sector and non-governmental organisations, and was acknowledged in the design of UNDAF II. There were noticeable collaborations with civil society organisations at the point of implementing the interventions in all the clusters. However, there was weak collaboration with the organised private sector in the initiating and implementing UN interventions.

G. Efficiency of the UNDAF II

In a context in which UNDAF II expenditures were not precisely monitored, clusters were divided on the need for a closer monitoring of expenditures and whether aggregate expenditure would be useful for the implementation of UNDAF III.

Data on expenditure was indeed not readily made available to the evaluation team. Therefore assessment of this aspect of efficiency was not possible. Anecdotal information indicates low level of implementation. FCT Abuja stated that only about 5% level of implementation was made in 2013, and the rest were rolled over into 2014. Other states (Imo, Benue and Cross River) also commented on the low level of programme implementation. There were delays in signing of annual work plans, repeated changes on submitted plans, and late release of funds.

Staffing is reported to be adequate in both the UN Agencies and government institutions and the skill mix is right, but high turnover of staff is common occurrence in both the UN and government institutions leading to a loss of institutional memory, and need for repeated trainings of personnel. Partners acknowledged that the time of UN personnel deployed to support programme implementation is maximally utilized. The personnel are available, technically sound, and diligent and deliver on the job professionally.

Generally speaking, UN Agencies provide assistance across the states of the Federation and the DAO concept is operational in each state of the six geo-political zones and the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. In supported states, while some programmes have state-wide spread, others are localized in few Local Government Areas (4 LGAs for WASH project in Benue State, 9 LGAs for UNFPA assisted programme Benue State). The localized projects are meant to achieve high level of outcomes, and serve as best practices for scale up by the states. On the principle of aid assistance, the geographical coverage of development assistance is adequate but government partners often expect UN Agencies to take responsibility for the overall programme in the states.

The results of the monitoring reports, reviews, and evaluations conducted at state level were used to guide programme implementation, effect changes in programme design or mount pressure on government to take decision on programming issues. UNICEF is reported to do follow up visits to states following findings of quarterly/annual reviews to urge governments to act on identified lines of action for effective implementation. Also after site assessment of disaster episodes in states, UNICEF mounted strong advocacy pressure on government to take action based on reports of the assessment of the disaster situation. A funding assessment of HIV/AIDS response by the Joint UN on AIDS and an accompanying advocacy brief were prepared, and the UN System was able to mount pressure on the government to make significant commitment to funding HIV/AIDS response in the country. There are however comments by partners in the states (government and CSOs) either of delays in taking actions on reports or a lack of consultations on the line of response to programme reports.

With that said, Cluster B reported that, to some extent, the implementation of the UNDAF II in the DAO states increased efficiency. Cluster C considered that it probably did not translate in efficiency gains since there was an increased in UN transaction costs. Cluster D felt that in the States where DaO worked, it increased efficiency.

Government partners reported that multiple accounting assessments are carried out by the different Agencies resulting in different fund transfer systems into a particular state by the UN Agencies. This is corroborated by the RCAR 2012 that stated that even though a joint TOR for micro assessment for

Institutional Partners (IPs) was developed to enable the UN to conduct joint assessment of IPs, joint training for UN personnel was not done. This gave rise to the use of different fund transfer systems.

In the case of financing, the joint budgetary framework has been a herculean task, and therefore having a joint basket of funds for joint projects has achieved little. This implies that few interventions are implemented on a collaborative way. The implementation of the UNDAF II was weak in most DAO States where agencies although occupying common spaces, do not have joint programming and programmes, budgetary frameworks and project intervention. There are, however, occasions where some agencies have created a basket for some emergencies, such as the flood disaster in 2012 and health related challenges in Northern States of the country

At the national Level, there is no financial data to show actual agency expenditure on the UNDAF II, but some agencies have uploaded the financial data showing commitment and expenditures on the Development Assistance Data Base (DAD).

The post-bombing experience in Abuja eroded the delivery as one component of having "One Office". This had implication on the efforts to lower some transactions costs.

The evaluation team considers that it is difficult to get a clear picture of the efficiency gains with the UNDAF II in general and in the DaO States, given the lack of data. There are certainly, however, efforts that could be made in the future to enhance the efficiency of the UNDAF II, both at the level of the agencies and the government partners.

H. Sustainability

While Cluster B indicated that the UNDAF II did not incorporate adequate exit strategies and capacity development measures to ensure sustainability of the results over time, Cluster D explained that an exit strategy was incorporated with the involvement of government agencies and CSOs in the implementation. Nevertheless, if this was done, it was ad-hoc, and the evaluation team did not see any specific exit strategy or anything that would refer to it in all the documentation reviewed.

The evaluation team considered that judging the sustainability of the UNDAF II is not easy, given the lack of evidence. To some extent, as pointed out by clusters, some conditions and mechanisms were in place at the end of UNDAF II, so that the benefits of UN interventions could be sustained by institutions and stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels after the interventions were completed. A lot of capacity building and coaching took place especially at the state level. The UNDAF II has led to putting in place systems, and to an increased level of involvement amongst government officials and other implementing partners in development programming. Partnerships with all stakeholders could have been strengthened, and a more regular and effective monitoring could have been undertaken, within the timeframe of the UNDAF II, to improve the likelihood of sustainable activities and positive long-term impact.

III. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

- The experience has revealed that the UNDAF can enhance UNCTs' coherence, effectiveness and relevance of the UN system at field level. There was some measurable change in the outcomes achievement, albeit to varying degrees. It is also unclear whether some higher level results are attributable to the UNDAF II, and the real value added of the framework.
- The UNDAF II in Nigeria as a coordination mechanism seems to have been a marginally useful tool to enhance effectiveness, and to strengthen cooperation and coordination between agencies, within the UN System. The UNDAF II was not used as a “strategic framework”, but merely a “framework”, which explains the many difficulties the UNCT has faced trying to implement and manage the UNDAF strategically. Agencies were involved in different areas, with little accountability. There were gaps, especially when meetings of the PMT were not attended or representations were rampant, and when the quality of these representations was weak. Nevertheless, the UNDAF reinforced the consciousness in the UN agencies of the need to work together despite the different mandates.
- In the DAO states, coordination exist in the sense that there were coordinating agencies playing coordination roles: Adamawa - UNFPA; Akwa-Ibom - UNDP; Benue - UNICEF; Imo - UNIDO; Kaduna - UNFPA; Lagos - WHO; FCT - FAO. However, the coordination of the UN agencies in the DAO States was hampered at this level for the following reasons: i. not all agencies were resident in one location; ii. meetings were poorly attended: none attendance and poor representation, and iii. engagement within agencies' mandate but limited commitment to UNDAF II joint programming.
- At central level, the government does not seem to have recognized the UNDAF II as a very useful instrument, and there is very little government ownership in the UNDAF II process. While it seems that the process of developing the UNDAF II at the federal and DAO level was inclusive, with respect to the implementation of the AWP at the state levels, some implementing partners felt that ownership of the projects rests with the UN agencies. Nevertheless, the UNDAF II was relevant with Internationally Agreed Goals, Human Rights Conventions and the MDGs in all the clusters, and Government priorities and Internationally Agreed Goals, and with respect to national priorities
- With respect to the effectiveness of the Delivering as One experience, the UNDAF II was not successfully implemented in all DaO States. In the DAO states, coordination existed in the sense that there were coordinating agencies playing coordination roles: Adamawa - UNFPA; Akwa-Ibom - UNDP; Benue - UNICEF; Imo - UNIDO; Kaduna - UNFPA; Lagos - WHO; FCT - FAO. However, the coordination of the UN agencies in the DAO States was hampered at this level for the following reasons: i) not all agencies were resident in one location; ii) meetings were poorly attended: none attendance and poor representation, and iii) there was engagement within agencies' mandate but limited commitment to UNDAF joint programming. In some States, the presence of the lead Agency was rarely felt, and there were few coordination meetings. Even where seeming success was recorded, only the one programme, one operating system to a limited degree, and some common services were implemented. Overall, joint programming was intended, but it did not really take place, as much as the DaO concept would have led to, and it is hard to find tangible synergies that led to higher level results. The States where successes were recorded are Benue and Cross Rivers. The Cross River experience may serve as a best practice for the implementation of DaO in the country.

- There are remaining challenges on practical reform steps and geographic focus of UN Coherence implementation in Nigeria, some of which were identified in *the Nigeria UN Coherence and Strategic Planning Support* report, in March 2012:
 - What to do with work being done in a less coherent way in several states?
 - How to fully involve state authorities in the achievement of changes that will facilitate a more strategic positioning of UN's work at state level?
 - How to involve the Federal government to ensure that the reform benefits the entire country in the long term, and not just the targeted states?
 - How to ensure effective and efficient coordination mechanisms at federal and state level, which would provide an enabling platform for the UN's supported development programmes at federal and state levels? and
 - How to involve local donors?

- The UN did not communicate sufficiently, internally and externally, its UNDAF II results, lessons learned, and good practices.

- The current UNDAF II outcome groups have met very irregularly and mostly in the context of the UNDAF II annual review exercises. The UN did not communicate sufficiently, internally and externally, its UNDAF results, lessons learned, and good practices. Coordination between the RCO and the current UNDAF II outcome groups has also been a challenge: since these groups did not have a regular work plan, met infrequently, did not report to any coordinating body (i.e. M&E Group), and relied almost exclusively on the small number of RCO staff for guidance, functioning, reporting and substantive back-stopping.

- There was significant scepticism expressed during the evaluation among UN staff on the value and purpose of the UNDAF II, and most agree that both the UNDAF II content and process should be improved. In addition, some agencies were very active and engaged in the UNDAF II, while others did not participate much. Further, the Government, with its own time and capacity constraints, understandably, seemed to view the UNDAF as a UN tool/process and is therefore not fully engaged. UN and interagency processes are also overwhelming for new people. Due to rotation issues, training can have a limited impact, both the UN and external partners, and may not be totally adapted to real needs.

- The establishment of a solid Results-Based Management (RBM) system has proven to be a major challenge, along with an effective way for monitoring UNDAF implementation. As a result, the UNDAF M&E Framework was not updated, reviewed and updated, and remained very difficult to evaluate as it stood. Some UNDAF outcomes and indicators were vague and difficult to measure. A clear and well-formulated UNDAF results matrix and properly functioning M&E system would have enhanced the UNDAF's implementation and results, and could have helped the UNCT to manage the UNDAF more effectively. While a laudable effort, the reporting was not done in line with established RBM principles, using "SMART" criteria, based on indicators, baselines, targets, and analysing risks and assumptions. Therefore, it is difficult to know, when assessing results, what these results are being assessed against, and the exercise becomes rather subjective.

- The monitoring and evaluation of the UNDAF II has faced challenges also because it could not always rely on agencies' inputs. This was compounded by the generic M&E weaknesses in UN agencies. The UNDAF M&E Group, comprised of senior M&E staff from UN agencies did not function as planned, while it would have been very useful to monitor the UNDAF implementation. There was no UNDAF M&E calendar tracking key M&E activities of the UNDAF and UN agencies. Another problem has been the lack of Government ownership of the M&E system, and the limited participation of

Government in review processes, which were considered more internal to the UN. There have been limited efforts to strengthen the evaluation capacities of the UN system and Government, through trainings, workshops, professional associations, etc.

- Reporting mainly focused on outputs, and the progress reports have not progressively moved towards a more holistic assessment of outcomes at the highest possible level in the results chain. In general though, the annual reviews have been an artificial exercise and there has been no mechanism for follow-up and there is insufficient Government ownership. Annual reviews have been more useful for reporting purposes rather than as a management tool for programme managers or as coordination tool for the UNCT as a whole.
- At the DAO states, the programme activities were not implemented as planned due to funding gaps from the government and non-releases of funds from the UN agencies that pledged funding
- Some efforts in mainstreaming the Human Rights-Based Approach, Gender Equality, Results-based Management, and capacity development were undertaken but none have really been considered as a key, cross-cutting principle during the UNDAF implementation. The added benefit of the UNDAF in this respect remains unclear. It has also been difficult to measure how far the five principles are addressed since there are no specific, measurable indicators to report on, and the annual reviews simply did not assess the five programming principles. While the UNDAF document refers to the Human Rights-Based Approach to development, HRBA has not been fully integrated in the UNDAF implementation, and there was no interagency Human Rights thematic group. This evaluation did not find evidence of some common and joint UN agencies activities on the human rights mechanisms' and treaty bodies' recommendations, and it is unclear whether advocacy on issues deemed sensitive have benefited from a concerted action by the UNCT, through the UNDAF mechanisms.
- While judging the sustainability of the UNDAF is not easy, the UNDAF II has led to putting in place systems, increased capacity building, and an increased level of involvement amongst government officials and other implementing partners in development programming.

B. Recommendations

The evaluation team offers these recommendations, together with these suggested actions to implement them. It is aware, however, that the implementation of some of these recommendations may have started with the implementation of UNDAF III (2014-2017), which was not the object of this evaluation. In addition, it bears in mind that all the capacities (technical, human, financial) may not be in place to respond to all these recommendations.

These recommendations are also offered as a way to stimulate the thinking and concrete action around the UNDAF implementation. At the same time, the evaluation team is also cognizant with the limitations that the UNDAF has for the UN System worldwide. Similarly, while some of these recommendations are inspired by the DaO lessons, the evaluation team also recognizes the challenges in implementing DaO to enhance the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of development assistance.

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
Recommendation 1: The UNCT should ensure that the UNDAF supports the country to achieve the MDGs, and the Post 2015 MDGs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The next UNDAF is a good opportunity for the UNCT to demonstrate how it intends to use the UNDAF as a leveraging factor for accelerating progress towards the MDGs. It should be very useful to increase government ownership, building on the Post 2015 MDGs. 	
Recommendation 2: The UNCT and Government are called to improve the strategic positioning of the UNDAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ It is imperative that the UNDAF III implementation emphasize a collective strategic vision of the UN's contribution to national priorities, and focuses the UNCT's limited resources on those issues where the UN can make the biggest difference, based on its comparative advantage and capacities. It should show how the UN has internalized in its programme the principles of aid effectiveness, capacity development and national ownership. It should also reflect the normative standards that the UN is mandated to promote, such as a human rights-based approach, gender equality and environmental sustainability. ✚ A realistic vision of what the UNDAF is/is not doing, and what it can/cannot do is needed. The UNCT is called to set realistic expectations on what can be achieved, and to be inclusive, but focused. The UNCT must be very clear in efforts to prioritize. The UNDAF should reflect a clearer focus and strategic intent, and be realistic, with a limited number of expected results. Concentrating the M&E system on key strategic results will be key to show where the UN best contributes. To achieve this, the Results Matrix and M&E Framework should be considered a living tool and should be updated if needed. ✚ Implementing the UNDAF with a clearer strategic intent will be a key challenge, but if successful, this would result in a clearer role for the UN, Government, DaO states, and development partners, strengthening thus mutual accountability. ✚ An UNDAF Action Plan could also be developed, which would complement the UNDAF by setting out "how" the UN system agencies will work with national partners and each other to achieve the results identified in the UNDAF. ✚ The key features of the UNDAF Action Plan that the UNCT should keep in mind is that it: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Complements the UNDAF with a common operational plan . Specifies strategies used to deliver UNDAF results . Replaces Country Programme Action Plans, and . Is voluntary. ✚ Finally, there must be a logical relationship between the UNDAF, the UNDAF Action Plan and work plans (such as AWP) or project documents. These documents, collectively, should maintain the results chain and clarify how the UN is supporting the achievement of national development priorities. ✚ It is crucial to strike the right balance between inclusiveness of the Non Resident Agencies (NRAs) <i>and</i> the strategic focus of the UNDAF, learning 	

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
	<p>from the difficulties experienced during the previous UNDAF cycle and by the “Delivering as One” pilots. The participation of Non-Resident Agencies in the UNDAF and in the DaO States needs to be commensurate with their capacities and other factors, in the interest of focus, and not only inclusiveness.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ It is necessary to reduce the focus of the agencies’ participation to key Clusters: each agency should focus on few key activities in the DAO states, subject to agreement with the government. ✚ The lessons from the pilot countries can contribute to future planning on how to deepen and strengthen the efforts of the UN system to work together with greater effectiveness and efficiency, as they provide a reference point for the reform strategy. 	
Recommendation 3: The UNCT and Government should ensure the continued relevance of the UNDAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ A closer and more articulated relationship with national and institutional partners and CSOs would allow the UNDAF to remain relevant to national priorities during the entire cycle. ✚ The UNDAF should also establish clear linkages between national priorities and achievement of the MDGs in the post 2015 context. ✚ There should be a clear logic model between the UNDAF and agency country programmes. 	
Recommendation 4: The Government and DaO States should strengthen their ownership and coordination of the UNDAF, and the UNCT and Government should encourage the involvement of NGOs and CSOs at a more strategic level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ Streamlining the UNDAF, making it less diffuse, more focused and more strategic would strengthen Government’s ownership. ✚ UN agencies should open clearer lines of communication with the National Planning Commission to enhance relations, in particular with the Aid Coordination Unit. ✚ The UNCT should review the experiences of the ‘Delivering as One’ pilot countries that have tried to enhance the role of the Government. ✚ In order to enhance the implementation of DAO at State level, there is the need to strengthen the supportive entities: (i) the State Partnership Boards, which are expected to provide oversight and strategic direction across all programmes, reporting back to the political leadership of the State (the Governor) (ii) the State Outcome Boards, in charge of results management, and (iii) the State Implementation Committees, in charge of programme components implementation. There is also need to ensure that there is a good coordination between these entities. ✚ In order to strengthen “national” ownership of the UNDAF, it would be very important to involve NGOs and CSOs at a more strategic level in the UNDAF implementation. 	
Recommendation 5: The UNCT and Government should maintain a strong geographical targeting in the UNDAF III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ It is advisable to maintain a strong geographical targeting in the UNDAF III implementation, with a focus on the 6 DaO States to consolidate the lessons of the first phase, during the previous UNDAF. ✚ The UN could thus better show the results of targeted interventions, by measuring progress. This would allow to subsequently replicating the good practices in other states. Geographical targeting will also significantly help 	

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
implementation, while replicating the DaO reform benefits in other states	the UN system become more accountable, because it will be easier to show the results of the system and synergies between agencies, if they work together in focus states.	
Recommendation 5: The UNCT and Government should enhance the effectiveness of the UNDAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The UNDAF should strengthen the capacities of relevant Government agencies to enhance the effectiveness of the UNDAF. ✚ In order to assess the effectiveness of the UNDAF over time, an UNDAF M&E group should be formed to coordinate and support the work of the outcome/thematic groups and carry-out M&E functions, with the support of the RCO. ✚ Outcome/thematic groups should focus their attention on joint efforts (i.e. key UNDAF outcomes), with the support of a strong M&E framework and an effective monitoring. ✚ The new UNDAF outcome/thematic groups should be formed, and have clear responsibilities, including an agreed division of labour with the RC Office and PMT. It will also be important to keep engaging both management and programme staff. 	
Recommendation 6: The UNCT is invited to strengthen joint programming and implement targeted joint programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The UNCT could move towards more joint programming with a focus on joint results, rather than the joint programme modality in which interventions are conceived and developed by UN agencies. This process can enable an increased focus on country priorities, and on the assessment of where UN support can best fit national needs. The starting point for joint programming is the identification of a set of priorities with or by the government, which determine a range of programmes designed to meet these priorities. This approach may still include a number of joint programmes, jointly planned and designed from the start. The 2013 SOPs provide important information on this approach, and the recently issued Guidance Note on One Programme provides further insights. ✚ The UNDAF should progressively be implemented with some joint programmes, carefully chosen, after a cost-benefit analysis. In line with its careful and pragmatic approach to Joint Programmes, the UNCT should pursue JPs that reflect complementarities and synergy among UN agencies to collectively work together on common national development priorities, and reduce duplicative activities between the UN and development partners. Before undertaking a JP, the UNCT should identify a clear rationale for joint action and a division of labour, clear benefits, as well as complementary expertise and comparative advantage among participating UN agencies. There should also be a high level of government ownership in these joint programmes. ✚ Until the business processes, human resources systems, and internal IT platforms are harmonized across UN agencies at corporate level, the transaction costs of joint programming (i.e. one programme document) may be high to justify. Better results at this stage may be achieved through joint analysis and joint work planning and monitoring, without joint project 	

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
	<p>documents, through a good division of labour.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ Agency Headquarters and UNDG are expected to continue efforts to reduce the heavy processes, and procedures among line agencies, as well as additional reporting requirements and rigid administrative procedures. ✚ There is a need to include the implementation of UNDAF in the schedule of duty of the Lead person in each of the agency, in addition to provide incentives to agency staff that make contributions to the UNDAF. 	
Recommendation 7: The UNCT and Government should put in place Results/Outcome Groups, and Thematic Groups, raise their profile, and use them to manage the UNDAF strategically	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The UNDAF Guidelines recommend the use of “Outcome Groups” to manage and monitor the implementation of the UNDAF. In the implementation of Delivering as One, the 2013 SOPs now recommend “Results Groups” as coordination mechanisms. It is recommended that the UNCT revitalize the “Cluster Groups”, and call them “Results Groups”. UNDAF outcomes should be operationalized and translated into concrete, measurable and time-bound outputs and annual/biennial action plans, through these Results Groups. Each Result Group should be chaired by a Head of Agency on behalf of the UN Country Team. The Results Groups should be organized to contribute to specific outcomes through coordinated and collaborative planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. They should meet regularly (every 2-3 months) to ensure a proper monitoring, and support the UNCT in strategically managing the UNDAF. ✚ Each Results Group should create a joint work plan that is rolling in nature, and articulates short-term outputs (one to two years) that will contribute to the achievement of outcomes, performance benchmarks, division of labour, and budgetary requirements. All Results Groups should use the same Results-Based Management tools and standards, as agreed by the UNDG. ✚ To ensure maximum reduction of transaction costs for all involved partners, the Results Groups’ joint work plans could become the only work planning instrument, replacing agency-specific plans, except where Governments require an agency and/or (line) ministry work plan, and/or the joint work plan cannot be signed by all agencies within an agreed period. Some specialized agencies may not be mandated by their governance structures to replace their country programmes and work plans in given sectors and thematic areas. ✚ If the UNCT wishes to strengthen DaO, an annual UN Country Results Report encompassing programmatic, operations, communications and financial results, and based on outcome areas and Results Groups’ outputs, could document the collective work of the UN development system in the country, and the contribution of the UN to the national development agenda. Normally, the annual UN Country Results Report should replace agencies’, funds and programmes, individual reporting requirements. This report shall be inclusive of work performed by all funds, programmes and specialized agencies. However, it shall not preclude individual agency-specific reporting by specialized agencies, as 	

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
	required by their governance structures.	
Recommendation 8: The UNCT should ensure a better resource mobilization around the UNDAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The UNDAF should facilitate a better mobilization of resources, and a more predictable and un-earmarked funding. 	
Recommendation 9: The UNCT and Government should strengthen their use of effective RBM and M&E systems to monitor and manage the UNDAF strategically	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ Results need to be attributable to the UN system, in order to ensure accountability. The UNDAF should therefore include a robust set of results that are measurable, and for which agencies can be held accountable. ✚ The UNCT may find it more useful to concentrate the UNDAF monitoring on a limited number of expected results and indicators that are considered a priority, and report on them annually through a rigorous exercise. If needed, the Results Matrix and M&E Framework could also be revised, to ensure that expected results, indicators, baselines and targets, are in line with the SMART criteria. There should be reliable sources of information, and a common understanding on how data will be gathered. ✚ There should also be a clear idea of how results will be monitored during implementation, and the tracking system that will be used for the UNDAF outputs and outcomes, in order to make the UNDAF a more evaluable framework. UN agencies and the UNCT should invest time and funds on developing baseline data and update them during the implementation of UNDAF III. Targets should be SMART and regularly updated. They are particularly important to help decision-makers manage the UNDAF strategically, knowing where they are, and what objectives they want to reach. ✚ It is absolutely critical to have a strong and active M&E Steering Committee and/or an M&E Group established to support and guide the UNDAF monitoring and implementation, and coordinate the Results /Outcome groups' work with support from the RCO. ✚ M&E agency systems should be able to provide inputs to the UNDAF M&E system. This may imply the need to strengthen M&E capacities within the agencies, or alternatively to develop a culture of results of staff so that monitoring and measuring achievements and progress would become a routine and valued exercise that can be undertaken without major difficulties. ✚ An UNDAF M&E Calendar should be prepared and regularly updated. ✚ Workshops and trainings could be organized to continuously strengthen M&E capacities, both in UN agencies, government ministries and institutions, and DaO States, and the UNCT could consider facilitating the establishment of a solid, national and independent M&E network in the country (or strengthen it if it already exists). ✚ Agencies contributing to the UNDAF should include the schedule of responsibilities to Cluster Leads and other staff in their job descriptions, and provide incentives to such agency staff to work on coordination issues. ✚ The AWP in DAO states should have M&E frameworks and the monitoring should be done under the DaO framework. 	

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
Recommendation 10: The UNCT should produce high quality annual reviews and a Progress Report at mid-term, together with a final evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The practice of rigorous UNDAF annual reviews covering each UNDAF Outcome should be complemented by a Progress Report at mid-term, as suggested in the 2010 UNDAF Guidelines. The format for reporting proposed by the UNDG (for both the Annual Reviews and the Progress Report) could be used as a basis, but could be improved, to make these reports less outputs-oriented, more analytical, and more useful, including for management and communication purposes. For instance, reporting should gradually shift towards outcomes, at the highest possible level of the results chain. In addition, Annual Reviews and the Progress Report should be more analytical than those which reported on UNDAF II, by including, for instance, an analysis of progress towards the UN reform efforts, Delivering as One at States level, and the cross-cutting issues. ✚ Reporting could use the UNDAF reporting to establish clear linkages between HRBA and RBM, as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Outputs – capacities of rights holders and duty bearer are improved; . Outcomes – behaviour/performance of duty bearers in fulfilment of rights are improved; . Impacts – rights are realized. ✚ It will be indispensable that the Annual Reviews and the Progress Report report on the basis of the M&E Framework, and analyse the level of achievement, based on indicators, baselines and targets, instead of merely listing activities. ✚ In order to be able to measure the value added of the UNDAF, the UNCT should also pay particular attention to the issue of attribution. Reporting on results that the UN will be accountable for, in the broader efforts made by the country will help show the contribution of the UN system to higher level development results. ✚ Annual Review and the Progress reports should be reviewed collectively at a joint meeting of the Clusters, after they have been prepared by the UN agencies and clusters, and a quality assurance process should take place to ensure that they are harmonized, comparable and of a good quality. The UNCT and the RCO would thus ensure a quality control and consistency of reporting from the Results/Outcome Groups, and make possible a good cumulative reporting of results on a multi-year timeframe. ✚ The final evaluation of the UNDAF should be conducted in the penultimate year of the cycle to ensure that it can feed into the strategic planning of the next one. 	
Recommendation 11: The UNCT should ensure a greater mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues and the five UNDAF programming	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ Ensuring a greater mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues and the five UNDAF programming principles in the UNDAF and in the UNCT's work, would help achieve better linkages between operational activities and normative work, and allow the UNCT to use all of its expertise and capacities to make a collective contribution. ✚ The UNCT should take into account, to the best possible extent, the five programming principles, which may provide the opportunity for an 	

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
principles in the UNDAF	<p>increased strategic focus, increased effectiveness and enhanced impact.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The UNCT should build on the experience of the HRBA and RBM Workshop which took place in March 2012, which report is available. ✚ The UNCT should use the entire UNDAF process to pursue the quest of placing human rights at the centre of the UN system's activities, and resolve to continue to apply a HRBA, from the analysis to programming and implementation stage. The HRBA holds the potential to ensure a high quality review and analysis of development challenges. For instance, a regular analysis that reflects the institutional changes and the behaviours required in order for rights-holders to claim their rights and for duty-bearers to fulfil their obligations would contribute to making the UNDAF more strategic and hopefully reach better results. ✚ UN staff, Government officials and other partners would also need to be continuously trained and capacities built on these principles. ✚ A more systematic, agency-wide set of actions could therefore be defined and undertaken with respect to the treaty bodies reporting systems and human rights mechanisms. ✚ An enhanced mainstreaming could be ensured at a minimum through a Working Group on the Five Principles, which could develop specific checklists and indicators with clear baselines and targets to ensure a more coordinated and regular assessment and use of the five principles, as well as reporting in the Annual Reviews and the Progress Report. ✚ An alternative could be to create cross-cutting inter-agency thematic groups, which would meet regularly, for instance one on Human Rights with UNHCHR, another one on Gender Equality with UNWOMEN, and another one on Environment Sustainability, with UNEP. ✚ Finally, the UNCT could benefit from the current (June 2014) updating exercise of the UNDP Nigeria's Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan of the UNDP Office for promoting an enhanced mainstreaming of gender equality in the UNDAF implementation. 	
Recommendation 12: The UNCT and Government should use the UNDAF to strengthen the efficiency of the UN system and implementing partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The UNCT should continue the efforts towards the harmonization of business models and management practices, which is crucial for a cost-effective implementation of joint programmes. ✚ Transaction costs should be assessed in a more systematic way, and on a more regular basis, based on previous experience. Efforts to implement HACT should also be pursued. ✚ The UNDAF implementation should support the use of common services. ✚ UN agencies are also called to reduce the bureaucracy in the release of funds to implementing partners. 	
Recommendation 13: The UNCT should increasingly "communicate as one"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ The UNCT is called to increasingly "communicate as one", by focusing on issues rather than individual agencies' mandates. It would be important to focus communication on "one message" rather than on "one voice", which could be miss-interpreted as if only one person could speak for the UN system. The main elements of the communication strategy for the UNCT 	

Key Recommendations	Suggested actions	UNCT Response
	<p>could be based on the newly issued Communicating as One guidance on DaO, based on the practical experience from the “Delivering as one” pilots and self-starters.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ It is also strongly recommended to establish a United Nations Communication Group (UNCG). The Resident Coordinator’s Office should, where feasible, provide secretariat support to the group, and help to ensure coherence between joint communications on one hand, and the role of the RC as One Leader on the other. UNCT members may consult or seek assistance from their respective Regional undg Teams/Headquarters as necessary, especially on handling sensitive issues. ✚ Agencies should assume, whenever possible, the responsibility of ensuring that sufficient human and financial resources are in place to support message consistency. This contribution should be in the form of dedicated time and resources from existing agency structures, including at the regional and HQ levels, in order to support joint communication work without necessarily adding additional costs to the UNCT. To strengthen capacities, UN agencies could also consider cost sharing some communication staff. This would be particularly useful for small agencies with limited staffing. 	
Recommendation 14: The UNCT and Government should strengthen sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✚ Future Annual Reviews and especially the mid-term Progress Report, as well as each Result/Outcome Group in their respective areas should look into sustainability factors, and point out potential measures that would be or could be taken to enhance continuity and replicability of activities, after the UNDAF completion. 	

IV. ANNEXES

Annex 1: Terms of Reference for the UNDAF Evaluation

CONSULTANTS' TERMS OF REFERENCE (ToR) FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK (UNDAF II), IN NIGERIA (2009 – 2012/2013)

Office of the Resident Coordinator, United Nations System in Nigeria
United Nations House, Plot 617/618, Diplomatic Zone, Abuja.

1. Background

The second generation 2009-2012 (plus 2013) of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF II) is the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the United Nations System (UNS) in Nigeria. It provides a collective, coherent and integrated UNS response to the country's priorities and needs, expressed in the 7-Point Agenda, which is implemented through the Medium Term National Development Plan (NDP) with a long term vision 20:2020, expected to transform Nigeria to one of the top 20 economies by 2020. Nigeria's development priorities are expressed within the framework of the MDGs and other commitments, goals and targets of other international conferences, summits, conventions and human rights instruments of the United Nations. In line with UNDG and UNDAF M&E guidelines, it is mandatory for Country teams to conduct end of cycle evaluation for accountability and learning, and improving performance of subsequent UNDAFs. The UNCT, Nigeria has commenced the process of evaluating UNDAF II with the Federal and State Governments.

The end of cycle evaluation of the UNDAF II is a joint UN process, conducted with national partners, to assess the progress made towards Nigeria's development priorities selected within the UNDAF. It will also take stock of the environment within which the UN is operating and assesses the effectiveness of UNDAF II as a tool of support to the achievement of national priorities and enhanced coordination and harmonization among all UN agencies. The UN and Government will review the results achieved from activities supported by the UNDAF II and the appropriateness of its planned results and strategies. The evaluation provides a unique opportunity to assess achievements against the planned results; and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDAF II outcomes, interventions and strategies. This assessment will identify issues and gaps, and proffer strategic and usable recommendations that the UNS and its partners will utilize to improve the strategies, implementation mechanisms, and the management efficiency of the next UNDAF. The United Nations System in Nigeria is therefore seeking the services of qualified consultants to lead the conduct of this Evaluation. Firms and companies are also encouraged to apply for this opportunity with the view of putting forward experts for this assignment.

2. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The broader aim of the evaluation as indicated above is to generate a usable evaluation report that would aid the inherent culture of accountability in the United Nations system programming processes in terms of progress made towards the attainment of the main Outcomes and Outputs of the UNDAF II, provide relevant information and strategic recommendations that would support the UN system in Nigeria to enrich the UNDAF III process in a timely and most effective manner. The recommendations will aim to improve the strategies, implementation mechanism, and management efficiency of the next UNDAF. The Evaluation exercise will cover the current cycle of the UNDAF II from 2009 to 2012 and 2013 and will holistically review and systematically analyse recorded achievements and the accompanied strategies and how all these aided the UN in delivering on its mandate.

In particular, the evaluation will:

- Assess the progress or lack thereof, towards the expected outcomes envisaged in the UNDAF II programming documents. Where appropriate, the evaluation will also highlight unexpected results (positive or negative) and missed opportunities;
- Provide an analysis of how the UN has positioned itself to add value in response to national needs and changes in the national development context;
- Present key findings, draw key lessons, and provide a set of clear and forward-looking options leading to strategic and actionable recommendations for the next UNDAF implementation.

3. Evaluation Questions and Evaluation Criteria

The Evaluation will have 2 components, (i) the analysis of the focus areas, and (ii) the analysis of the strategic positioning of the UNDAF program in Nigeria. To define the broad aspects of the UNDAF II Program that will be assessed within the 2 components, a series of evaluation criteria would constitute the framework used to formulate the evaluation questions.

Component 1: Analysis of the Focus Areas

a) Relevance of the UNDAF II Program:

- Assess the degree to which the UNDAF result statements were relevant in relation to Global priorities e.g. International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the Millennium Summit Declaration, the World Summit on MDG (2005), Paris and Accra Declaration amongst others;
- To what extent is the UN support to Nigeria aligned with the objectives in the National Development Plans and responding to the national priorities?
- Is the strategy appropriate vis-à-vis the needs as expressed in the NDP and the Vision 20:2020 documents?
- To what extent is the UN support in the various pillars of the UNDAF II (i) adapted to the needs of the Beneficiaries (ii) and in line with the priorities set by national policy frameworks?
- A realistic analysis of the country situation, including political, social and economical analysis; to what extent were the external risks (i.e. political, governance, conflict and fiduciary) and the internal threats to the programme implementation identified?
- Assess to what extent the UNDAF II incorporated gender-sensitive and human rights-based approaches.

b) Effectiveness of the UNDAF II Program:

- To what extent were the expected outputs of the UNDAF II results matrix achieved or are likely to be achieved through the events and activities implemented in the UNDAF II?
- Was there sufficient synergy among the various UN Agency programmes and the various components? Did other projects contribute to and reinforce achievement of programme results?
- To what extent were the monitoring, evaluation, reporting and accountability systems adequate to enable the UN demonstrate programme results?
- To what extent the UN programmatic five principles were taken into account and/or utilized in the implementation of the UNDAF?
- To what extent were these systems adequately used to adjust programme strategies to changing policy and programme contexts and needs in the course of programme implementation?
- How well has the UN communicated its results/lessons learnt/good practices?

c) Efficiency of the UNDAF II Programme:

- Was the UN's actual expenditure in line with expectations and plans? Were there any significant changes or delays?
- Was the skill mix and continuity of key staff appropriate to the country context and strategy?
- Was the time of UN staff spent (i.e. policy dialogue vs. technical assistance; project work vs. administration) efficiently?
- To what extent was the geographic programme coverage cost-effective?
- To what extent were the results of monitoring missions, periodic reviews and evaluations used to reconsider design/direction of work and resourcing and staff allocation priorities?

- How has the UN been effectively working together with other development partners in the country?
- d) *Sustainability of the UNDAF II Programme:*
- Did the UNDAF programme incorporate adequate exit strategies and capacity development measures to ensure sustainability of the results over time?
 - How was the UN's Humanitarian response linked to its development assistance?
 - Are conditions and mechanisms in place so that the benefits of UN interventions are sustained and owned by commissions, institutions and stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels after the interventions are completed?
 - What could have been done within the timeframe of the UNDAF II additionally to improve the likelihood of positive long-term effects and reduce the likelihood of negative long-term effects?

Component 2: The analysis of the strategic positioning of the UN System in the Country

The evaluation will analyse a core set of criteria related to the strategic positioning of the UN as follows.

- a) Strategic Alignment:
- To what extent is the UNDAF II aligned with the Country's Strategic Development Plan?
 - How effectively has the UN been working together with other development partners in the country?
- b) Responsiveness:
- To what extent did the programme anticipate and respond to significant changes in the national development context within its 4 core focus areas? What were the missed opportunities in the UNDAF II programming?
- c. Added Value:
- To what extent did the UNDAF II add value to national efforts in the priority areas of UN's work in the country?

4. Evaluation Methodology and Approach

The Evaluation shall benefit from existing or newly commissioned studies, research or evaluations conducted by individual or collaborating Agencies including the UN Agencies.

Based on the documented innovations, lessons learnt and findings from the research, studies and evaluations, the Consultants will work with the UN and partners to conduct in-depth analysis of progress towards results, identify lessons learnt and propose corrective actions. The consultants will work with state governments and UNS to produce a report on lessons learnt related to Delivering as One in the six states (Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Benue, Kaduna, Lagos, Imo) and FCT to feed into the draft Evaluation report.

Data Collection

In terms of data collection, the evaluation will use a multiple method approach that will include document reviews, group and individual interviews and field visits as appropriate.

Final methods to be selected must match the above stated objectives and specific questions. It is expected that the technical proposal will:

- Identify methodology and sample (address sampling limitations)
- Level of stakeholders' participation amongst other issues

Information Sources

The following minimum documents will be used for obtaining detailed background information on the UNDAF II: The UNDAF Document; The results matrix ; The monitoring and evaluation framework and plans; The available Medium Term Cooperation Frameworks and Annual Work Plans for the DaO states and FCT; Mid-term reviews report, Relevant Reports.

Validation

The Evaluation Team will use a variety of methods to ensure that the data is valid, including triangulation.

Stakeholders' Involvement

An inclusive approach, involving a broad range of partners and stakeholders, will be taken. The evaluation will have a process of stakeholders mapping in order to identify both UN direct partners as well as stakeholders who do not work directly with the UN, yet play a key role in a relevant outcome or thematic area in the national context. These stakeholders may include representatives from the economic, social and political commissions and institutions, Governments at all levels, civil-society organizations, the private-sector, or other multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and most importantly, the beneficiaries of the programme. The Inception report will describe consultants' understanding of the assignment, with detailed methodology as well as chronogram and the different report to be submitted to the Evaluation Committee (to be put in place).

5. The Evaluation Process

The process of the evaluation will be divided into four phases, each including several steps.

Phase 1: Preparation and Desk Phase: i. Desk review ii. Stakeholder mapping; iii. Development of an operational/logistical plan. The Output of this phase is the Inception Report.

Phase 2: Data Collection Phase: At the end of this phase, the evaluation team will provide a debriefing of the preliminary findings to the UNCT/PMT, take initial comments and validate the preliminary findings.

Phase 3: Drafting the Evaluation Report: i. *A draft evaluation report* will be prepared by the evaluation team after the data collection exercise. The draft report will be submitted by the Lead Consultant to the Evaluation Committee/RCO. ii. *Review and Quality Assurance* – The Lead consultant will be directly responsible for addressing any comments or observations towards eventual finalization of the report by securing inputs from the respective subject area consultants. iii. *Presentation of findings, Validation and submission of report- The Evaluation team* shall present the final draft for validation to stakeholders in designated meetings while the *final report* shall be submitted to the UNCT via the Chair of Evaluation Committee/RCO (Word and PDF version).

6. Deliverables

- Inception report describing consultants' understanding of the assignment and his/her plan to execute it (8 to 12 page document) 4 days after the start of the assignment.
- progress report/briefing to the Evaluation Committee/PMT/RCO (the briefing periodicity to be determined in the Inception Report
- SWOT analysis report on the pilot DaO in Nigeria
- Comprehensive Final Evaluation Report (25 pages content including not more than 4-page Executive Summary)
- A Power Point presentation containing the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation for dissemination and debriefing purposes
- A light Annual Review report for the implementation of UNDAF II in the year 2013.

7. Management and Process

The consultants will be expected to work independently on the evaluation although organizational support will be available from the office of the Resident Coordinator and the Evaluation Committee (EC). Under the overall supervision of the RC/UNCT, the EC will be primarily responsible for managing the evaluation process with the day-to-day technical management support by the RCO. The EC/RCO will facilitate (where necessary) access of the consultants to key informants, including UN agency heads and staff, development partners, government and other partners; prepare the necessary documentations for the consultants. A detailed work plan will be prepared by the consultants and submitted to the EC/RCO for approval to guide the monitoring of the assignment. The three selected consultants will be jointly accountable for the deliverables within deadlines agreed upon with UNS in Nigeria. The team will ensure sufficient division of labor and coordination among themselves.

8. Time Frame and Remuneration

The consultancy is expected to last six weeks (30 working days) from immediate December, 2013. Remuneration will be in accordance with the UN Rules and Regulations and will be commensurate with the complexity of the assignment. The UN will in addition to the agreed fee meet the costs for official travel of the consultant and pay the appropriate Daily Subsistence Allowance which should be included in the financial proposal. The Consultancy fee will be paid as a lump sum contract or in line with the following schedule and upon acceptance of key deliverables:

- At the end of the Desk Phase: 20%
- At the submission of the Final Draft Reports: 50%
- At the end of the Evaluation exercise: 30%

9. Composition of the Evaluation Team

There will be a team of three (3) consultants made up of one international expert and two National Experts; the international consultant will be the team leader. Each of the other two national consultants should possess relevant qualifications and experience in at least one of the four UNDAF outcome areas. As much as possible, the composition of the team should be gender sensitive. The selected consultants are expected to be independent and should not have been involved in the implementation of UNDAF II programmes in any of the Agencies.

10. Tasks of the Consultants

- Thoroughly review and familiarize self with the UNDAF documents including the Country Analysis, the UNDAF Outcomes, the UNDAF Results Matrix, the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the UNDAF Evaluation Concept Note/TORs;
- In close consultation with the RCO, manage the day-to-day coordination of the detailed tasks of the Evaluation including communication with the Evaluation focal points in the Agencies, sending, receiving and proper archiving of documents; organizing and facilitating consultative/coordination meetings etc.;
- Participate actively and take initiative in the meetings of PMT/EC on the Evaluation;
- Convene coordination meetings with and provide technical guidance to the UNDAF Area/Sub-area consultants and ensure their full understanding and application of the Evaluation principles and guidelines to both the processes and outputs.
- Attend and provide technical support to UNDAF Area/Sub-area consultative and review meetings;
- Review and analyse inputs from all UN agencies and stakeholders, ensure that the reports answer the Evaluation Questions (see above) and collate into the draft Evaluation Report;
- Draft the text for the crosscutting parts of the report including the executive summary; and synthesis of the Situation Analysis update, the constraints, the lessons learnt, summary of proposed changes and recommendations for UNDAF III;
- Plan, organize, facilitate and summarize outputs from a participatory comprehensive SWOT analysis of the Delivering-as-One planning and operationalization process ;
- Present the draft Evaluation Report to the EC/PMT/UNCT and incorporate any comments or changes and produce the final draft of the report;
- In collaboration with the Office of the RC, lead the planning for, and organization of, the Evaluation meeting including preparation of the report document, the accompanying presentations and the meeting logistics;
- Attend Evaluation meetings and incorporate any comments or changes and produce the final Evaluation report.

11. Competencies of Consultants

11.1. International Expert P5 (Team Leader)

The International consultant should have the following qualifications and competencies:

- Advanced University degree in one or more of the following areas: political science, demography, economics, social sciences, public health, law or related fields;

- Excellent knowledge of the UN system and UN common programming process with 15 years or more experience in development programming;
- Expert knowledge and/or methodological/technical knowledge, including some specific data collection and analytical skills, particularly in results-based management, human rights based and gender mainstreaming approaches; logic modelling/logic framework analysis, quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis; participatory approaches;
- All-round understanding of the UN's mandate and *modus operandi* is required;
- Excellent facilitation, coordination, communication and report writing skills in English;
- Ability to work in a team and deliver results.

11.2. National Consultants Governance and Accountability

The National Consultant Governance and Accountability should have the following qualifications and competencies:

- Advanced University degree in one or more of the following areas: political science, economics, social sciences or related fields;
- At least 10 years experience in accountable governance, anti-corruption programming, institutional and regulatory reforms, public procurement and fiscal responsibility laws in Nigeria;
- Expert knowledge of and working familiarity with results-based management, human rights based and gender mainstreaming approaches.
- Demonstrated experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodology
- Understanding of the UN's mandate and *modus operandi* preferred
- Excellent communication and writing skills in English
- Ability to work in a team and deliver results.

11.3. National Consultant Productivity and Employment

The National Consultant Productivity and Employment should have the following qualifications and competencies:

- Advanced University degree in one or more of the following areas: Economics, Social sciences or related fields;
- At least 10 years experience in programming for poverty reduction through productive activities, trade capacity building, business development and technology transfer, environmental governance etc.;
- Expert knowledge of and working familiarity with results-based management, human rights based and gender mainstreaming approaches.
- Demonstrated experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodology
- Understanding of the UN's mandate and *modus operandi* preferred
- Excellent communication and writing skills in English
- Ability to work in a team and deliver results.

11.4. National Consultants Social Service Delivery

The National Consultants Social Service Delivery should have the following qualifications and competencies:

- Advanced University degree in one or more of the following areas: Health sciences, Demography, Social Sciences, Law or related fields
- At least 10 years experience in programming for social services (including Education, Health, skills acquisition) delivery etc;
- Expert knowledge of and working familiarity with results-based management, human rights based and gender mainstreaming approaches;
- Demonstrated experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodology;
- Understanding of the UN's mandate and *modus operandi* preferred;
- Excellent communication and writing skills in English;
- Ability to work in a team and deliver results.

11.5. National Consultant Reduction of Risk of Crisis, Conflict and Insecurity

The National Consultant Reduction of Risk of Crisis, Conflict and Insecurity should have the following qualifications and competencies:

- Advanced University degree in one or more of the following areas: Political Science, Economics, Demography, Social Sciences, Law or related fields;
- At least 10 years experience in programming in conflict prevention and management, internal security and emergency preparedness, management and responses to natural and man-made crises, design and implementation of integrated development policies;
- Expert knowledge of and working familiarity with results-based management, human rights based and gender mainstreaming approaches;
- Demonstrated experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodology;
- Understanding of the UN's mandate and *modus operandi* preferred;
- Excellent communication and writing skills in English;
- Ability to work in a team and deliver results.

Ethical Code of Conduct for UNEG Evaluations

For details on the ethics and independence in evaluation, please see UNEG Ethical Guidelines and Norms for Evaluation in the UN System

<http://www.unevaluation.org/search/index.jsp?q=UNEG+Ethical+Guidelines>

http://www.unevaluation.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=21

Annex 2: Approach and Methodology

1. Approach and methodology

An Inception Report was prepared at the beginning of the evaluation to agree with the Evaluation Committee and Resident Coordinator Office (RCO) provided on the approach and methodology, based not only on a careful reading of the TORs, and discussions with the RC Office, but also on a consultation process between the Evaluation Team members and some UN agencies, which provided comments to the first draft inception report, and during the inception phase. The Inception Report described first the consultants' understanding of the assignment, with a suggested approach and a detailed methodology. It was complemented by a successive section, which details the evaluation steps and activities, as well as another one with the specific programme of work suggested, with detailed activities and a division of labour between the three consultants, together with the key deliverables, a precise timeframe, and specific dates.

a. Approach

The evaluation attempted to respond to the country needs in the best possible way. In order to make the methodology as **country-driven** as possible, the consultants were very much listened to what was considered more appropriate in the country context, and the methodology was strengthened further by the interaction with the Evaluation Committee. The approach of the evaluation was **participatory and flexible in design and implementation**. It ensured stakeholder participation and ownership, and facilitated learning and feedback. This inclusive approach involved **a broad range of partners and stakeholders**. The evaluation complemented the key stakeholders list, in order to identify both UN direct partners, as well as stakeholders who did not work directly with the UN, yet played a key role in a relevant outcome or thematic area in the national context. These stakeholders included representatives from the economic, social and political commissions and institutions, Governments at all levels, civil-society organizations, the private-sector, or other multilateral organizations. A list of specific stakeholders was elaborated by the national consultants, as a result of their initial meetings with the UN agencies, the M&E staff and Outcome Groups.

The evaluation provided a good opportunity for **a self-assessment by all the key stakeholders**, both in the UN system and among national counterparts. The participatory nature of the evaluation allowed discussing past experiences and identifying ideas for the future, giving importance to an agreed analysis, **oriented towards the future**.

The evaluation used methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the issues set out in the ToRs, the availability of resources, and the priorities of stakeholders.

Means for data collection were desk review, interviews with key stakeholders, and meetings with Cluster/Outcome Groups and key partners in DaO States. To avoid unnecessary transaction costs for national and external partners, the evaluation focused on key strategic meetings and interviews.

The evaluation was carried out **in accordance with current guidance**, including UNEG norms and standards, and UNEG/UNDG UNDAF evaluation guidance. The UNEG Quality checklist for evaluation reports was also used, as relevant.

UNDAF evaluations are meant to be **strategic exercises** at the UN system level. This evaluation was set at a strategic level, which meant that in order to provide an answer to the evaluation questions, the evaluation focused on strategic considerations and provided an assessment of the relevance of the UNDAF, the achievements against the planned results, and effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDAF II outcomes, interventions and strategies. This had three key implications.

First, the evaluation focused on assessing, on one hand, cooperation and synergies between the UN system and Government, at federal and states levels, partnerships (within the country and outside at the regional and international levels), and the added value brought by the UN in the country, and on the other hand, cooperation between agencies, joint programming and joint programmes, communication and advocacy strategies by the UN system, the strategic role played by the UN in the country and in the States, and the expectations of its partners for the future. This also included an analysis of how interventions have led to the results achieved by UN agencies, either jointly or individually, on nationwide interventions, e.g., Country-wide Family Planning Commodities provision/distribution, Nationwide Immunization programs, etc. The evaluation therefore did not involve detailed assessment of individual agencies' programmes, projects and activities.

Second, the way the UNCT organized itself to manage the UNDAF was also assessed. This included the mechanisms that were set up following the UNDAF approval, the functioning of these mechanisms during the entire cycle, and the results they produced (for instance their reports, and their reporting to the UNCT).

Third, in light of the strategic nature of this evaluation, it did put an emphasis on the **results at the highest possible level of the chain of results included in the UNDAF Results Matrix** -- that is the "UNDAF outcomes" and "Agency outcomes" -- and not the UNDAF "outputs". The key reference that was used in this regards by the Evaluation Team is the UNDP Outcome-Level Evaluation Guide.⁹ In this context, the evaluation undertook an analysis of results, based on the performance indicators in the M&E Framework, as a reliable means to document changes in development conditions, but it focused on outcomes. A reference may have been made to the "outputs", provided they contributed significantly to the UNDAF outcome or Agency outcomes.

b. Methodology

The consultants used a mix of methods, both qualitative and quantitative. Information sources included statistical data sources, documentary evidence, meetings, workshops, and individual interviews. This provided evidence on which to base evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations, and made possible the **triangulation of information**. All these aspects of information and data collection were, to the largest possible extent, triangulated and validated -- three or more sources of information were typically used to verify and substantiate a key finding. This analysis was used as evidence for forming an overall judgment that led to generic findings and recommendations. Findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned were **user-oriented**, and fed into major decision-making for the future programming in the UN system in Nigeria.

The nature and context of the evaluation and the limitations of time and resources implied a **stronger focus on qualitative information**. The evaluation questions were answered using qualitative research

⁹ Outcome-Level Evaluation, A companion Guide to the Handbook on Planning and Evaluating for Development Results, for Programme Units and Evaluators, UNDP, 2011.

techniques, and only relied on existing quantitative performance measures, which may have been available in surveys, studies and reviews. Given the short timeframe of the evaluation, it was not possible to undertake a comprehensive search for secondary data that may not have been collected or may not have been available yet at the UNDAF or agency level.

The methods for collecting specific data were determined by: the evidence needed to address the evaluation questions; the analyses that were necessary to translate the data into meaningful findings in response to the evaluation questions; and judgments about what data could be collected given constraints of time and resources.

Desk review and written sources

The evaluation relied on a variety of documentary evidence. It analysed some of the **previous M&E work** (such as UNDAF annual reviews by the Cluster/Outcome Groups, and the UNDAF MTR), and attention was given to their findings, lessons learned, and recommendations, as they reflected the implementation of the UNDAF in different times of its cycle. However, the evaluation was not able to heavily rely on the data generated through the UNDAF monitoring and annual reviews during the implementation cycle. Following an analysis and discussions on this issue, it appeared that the evaluation team was not able to use these Outcome Groups reviews as much as it had hoped to initially, for 3 reasons:

- These reports did not report precisely on the indicators, baselines and targets included in the M&E framework.
- While they represented a laudable effort to document results and analyse them, they were mainly describing the outputs and activities achieved for the particular year under review, and did not specifically report on the outcomes at the highest level of the results chain. This led them to be very detailed and of limited use for the evaluation.
- The evaluation team obtained only four annual reports from the outcome groups for the period 2011-2012, instead of the eight that should have been prepared.

This led the evaluation team to suggest using the **M&E Framework** instead, as a basis for gathering information, especially on UNDAF and agency outcomes.

The evaluation also relied on the **RC's Annual reports**, especially as they set up the context and highlight key aspects of the UN system's work in the particular year under review. The evaluation also used the MTR report, and looked for possible reports from the Cross-cutting / Thematic groups, but these did not exist. The evaluation also studied **other documents and reports**, for instance, an important mission undertaken by two consultants in 2013, at a strategic juncture of the UN system in Nigeria, as it embarked on planning the new UNDAF 2014-2017.¹⁰ This built on a UNCT Strategic Consultative Retreat, in July 2011.¹¹ In addition, the evaluation looked for some important agency documents such as programme evaluations and mid-term reviews, as well as other relevant documents from other partners. See in annex a more complete list of references and background documents, which were part of the desk review.

¹⁰ Nigeria UN Coherence and Strategic Planning Support, Consultants' Report, Joseph Foubi and Brenda Langdon, March 2012

¹¹ UNCT Strategic Consultative Retreat, 2011, Retreat Report, RCO, July 2011.

Quantitative data

While annual reviews were of limited use, there were some data available elsewhere, for instance the MICS 4 and SMART survey, the evaluation team tried to use their results. The outcome orientation was also kept in mind in that respect, and priority was given to data that informed the achievement at the level of UNDAF and Agency Outcomes.

Quantitative data was gathered in view of **updating the M&E Framework**. This was done first by asking the agencies / clusters / outcome groups to fill out a new column of the M&E Framework that was been called "Key achievements", and to refer to the baselines and targets. Agencies / outcome groups were asked to indicate an appreciation of performance with 3 options "Achieved", "Partially achieved", "Not achieved". Of course, there was the risk of ending up with a long matrix, but also making this exercise endless and un-focused. However, agencies/outcome groups were only asked to report on UNDAF and Agency Outcomes, and to provide short replies, so that the essential information on outcome achievements was captured, while avoiding reporting on activities or outputs. This was further fine-tuned and discussed to make sure that the final product was somehow useful for the evaluation purposes. Second, the M&E Framework was also completed by the national consultants as a result of their data collection efforts.

UNDAF Meetings in DaO States and in Abuja

Following discussions with the RCO, the evaluation team suggested organizing **UNDAF evaluation meetings in the following DaO States**: Benue, Kaduna, Adamawa, Imo, FCT, and Cross River. They were briefed on the States where they did not go to, and could conduct a few phone interviews if this was useful to complement the possible missing information. The national consultants went to these States in January 2014.

The international consultant was going to participate in the meeting in the FCT, but this was not possible due to the postponement of his mission. However, the national consultants took the opportunity of an important meeting in February 2014 (UNDAF II annual work plan review and 2014 annual workplan preparation), to include an agenda item on the evaluation, where questions were asked to participants. See the list of participants in annex.

In each State, the evaluators met with two sets of implementing partners: on one hand, the Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies, and on the other hand, Civil Society Organisations. **Organizing the meetings** (group interviews or larger meetings where possible) **in a few States** to get their perceptions and experiences on DaO has been the preferred method, with respect to sending out the list of questions or preparing a Monkey survey. Indeed, it was pointed out that the response of people to phone requests and online interviews in Nigeria is not always good. If this method had been adopted and a low response rate was recorded, the problem of representativeness of the respondents would have become a serious issue.

In preparation of the **field missions to the DaO States**, an Agenda for the meetings, with the list of questions tailored to the States had been prepared, and is included in Annex. The list of question was very much inspired by the original list of questions included in the TORs. Of course, the duration (and need to organize working groups during these meetings) varied depending on how many people were targeted. Also, to the extent possible, this agenda with the questions was sent in advance.

The evaluation gathered evidence from **key people**, both in the States and in the FCT, who were representative of the partners involved in the UNDAF, so that the right conclusions could be drawn about the UNDAF implementation and challenges. The interviewees and participants to meetings were therefore selected on the basis of their involvement with UN development cooperation, within the framework of the UNDAF, the purpose and objectives of the evaluation, and their selection was intended to ensure accuracy in the interpretation of findings and usefulness of evaluation results. The RCO, the Cluster/Outcome Groups Chairs and Co-Chairs, and the Agencies were instrumental in specifying the list of actors and stakeholders to interview. See the List of key actors and stakeholders in Annex. The consultants discussed with the RCO and UN agencies to ensure that a representative group of people was selected, and to understand the limitations of this group for interpreting evaluation results.

The **key interlocutors** who participated in these interviews and meetings included:

1. Heads of Agencies, programme officers, and possibly targeted staff from UN agencies (resident and non-resident), who may have been mainly staff involved in programmes, projects or activities that were implemented jointly or in cooperation with several agencies or that could be the object of joint programming;
2. Relevant government officials and other key federal/sub-national stakeholders in DaO States;
3. Civil society representatives, and possibly universities and other implementing partners, and private sector if relevant; and
4. Representatives of donor agencies or development partners, etc.

For the individual and group interviews, depending on the type of interlocutors, the evaluation focused on some criteria and questions or others. **The list of questions was used in a flexible way** – for technical meetings, the whole list was used, while for interviews with specific high level counterparts, more targeted questions were asked, depending on the level of knowledge and seniority of the interviewee.

Contribution analysis

The evaluation used the **contribution analysis** to explore the cause and effect relationship, and used John Mayne Brief for that purpose,¹² and other sources of data and performance.

Questions of cause and effect were critical to assessing the performance of the UNDAF. Given the difficulties in assessing performance based on indicators, baselines and targets, which this evaluation ran into, the contribution analysis could provide credible assessments of cause and effect. Verifying the theory of change that the UNDAF was based on, and paying attention to other factors that may influence the outcomes, provided reasonable evidence about the contribution made by the UNDAF.

The steps suggested by Mayne could not, however, be fully followed, given the short timeframe of this evaluation for a framework as complex as the UNDAF. These steps, which were analysed, were the following:

1. Set out the attribution problem to be addressed
2. Develop a theory of change and risks to it
3. Gather the existing evidence on the theory of change
4. Assemble and assess the contribution story, and challenges to it

¹² Contribution analysis: An approach to exploring cause and effect, ILAC Brief No 16, John Mayne, May 2008.

5. Seek out additional evidence
6. Revise and strengthen the contribution story.

Possibly, further work could be undertaken with these steps for the implementation of UNDAF III.

Other methodology features

The **organization of work within the evaluation team** was based on the comparative advantage of its members. While the international consultant coordinated the whole evaluation process and the drafting of the inception and evaluation reports, the national evaluators went to the six DaO States, and paid a particular attention to the **Delivering as One approach**. The evaluation report includes an annex with a SWOT analysis and lessons learned of Delivering as One in Nigeria: i) in the six states (Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Benue, Kaduna, Imo, and Cross River); and ii) in the Federal Capital Territory.

The thematic division of work between the national consultants was as follows. Pf Dung Pam Sha handled the following Clusters: 1. Governance and Accountability, and 2. Productivity and Employment. Pf Ibeh Christian Chibuzo will handle: 3. Social Service Delivery, 4. Reduce Risk of Crisis, Conflict and Insecurity.

Since Nigeria adopted some aspects of DAO, with some of its organizational structure and strategy, it is hoped that the evaluation may contribute to enhance the strategic thinking around DaO, especially in the context of the newly published Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Countries Wishing to Adopt the "Delivering as one" Approach, finalized in August 2013.

The evaluation report will **feed into the current thinking of the United Nations System in Nigeria** on how to achieve a deeper collaboration between agencies, and a stronger relationship with the UN's partners and counterparts. This may provide insights in the development of a strategy for the current UNDAF III implementation, and may become a building block for the future. The evaluation process also helped find synergies and linkages with other complementary processes undertaken by the UN and the Government, to ensure that the next UNDAF document is aligned with the recommendations generated by the post-2015 national consultations and priorities articulated in Nigeria's Vision 20:2020, which will guide the Government's policies over the next seven years, which is striving to transform Nigeria into a high-income country and placing it, hopefully, in the group of the 20 top-ranked countries, with high human development.

In this sense, the consultants examined the **opportunities for a different type or different modes of engagement of the UN system** in the country, with the different actors, which could inform the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations, and taking into account the possible change of status of Nigeria into a high-income country.

Evaluators tried to make **recommendations** that would flow logically from the findings and conclusions, were directed at resolving the cause of identified deficiencies and findings, and would clearly state the actions recommended. These recommendations should encourage improvements in the conduct of programmes and operations. Recommendations are addressed to parties that have the authority to act, and the recommended actions are hopefully specific, practical, cost effective, and measurable.

2. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The evaluation had 2 components, (i) the analysis of the focus areas, and (ii) the analysis of the strategic positioning of the UNDAF in Nigeria. A series of evaluation criteria and questions was provided in the TORs. In addition to this generic list of questions, a more specific list of questions has been prepared for the DAO States (see annex). The list of questions has been customized for the meetings with Cluster/Outcome Groups and for interviews.

3. Evaluability

The evaluation identified challenges linked to the evaluability of the UNDAF. The revised evaluation timeframe allowed a detailed assessment of evaluability. This is an element that was added to the evaluation objectives during the inception phase. The key resource that was used was the recent DFID report on Planning Evaluability Assessments, from Rick Davies.¹³

The evaluability of the UNDAF II depended on a many factors, which were already identified in the inception phase. The evaluation first built on previous M&E work, such as the 2011 and 2012 annual reviews (with the limitations explained before), and the Mid-Term Review.

Given the weaknesses of the M&E system identified in the inception phase, efforts were made to collate available existing data to support the evaluation findings. For instance, there were some data available, such as the MICS 4 and SMART survey, and other sources of data and performance from other research. The UNDAF M&E Calendar (Annex 3, p. 70-71) was used as a reference. The outcome orientation was also kept in mind in that respect.

Therefore, the evaluation was not able to count very much depend on the data generated through the project monitoring during the implementation cycle, in the Results Matrix and in the Annual Review reports. A lot of information was available in the reports; however, assessing the level of achievement of results of an UNDAF depends a lot on how achievements were monitored against indicators, and how the UNDAF was managed to achieve its targets. In other words, it depends on the use of the monitoring system for management and strategic purposes.

The inception phase identified that there were some weaknesses in the way the UNDAF has been monitored, at least with respect to tracking the achievement of results, based on baselines and targets. Another challenge was the difficulty to report on the achievement of results, based on these indicators, baselines and targets.

For instance, the M&E Framework has been revised only in one occasion during UNDAF implementation (the 2011 RCAR mentions this work of the M&E Group, presumably in 2011). The evaluators could not locate this updated M&E Framework and used the original framework from the UNDAF document as a basis for gathering the inputs from the Cluster/Outcome groups. The MTR had pointed out, and the inception phase confirmed that the Framework did not always have “SMART” objectives and indicators, baselines and targets, making it very challenging to qualify and quantify the results that have been achieved.

¹³ Planning Evaluability Assessments, A Synthesis of the Literature with Recommendations, Report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID), Working Paper 40, Dr Rick Davies, October 2013.

Another challenge to evaluate the UNDAF was the imprecision of some indicators, baselines and targets to inform the achievement of the indicators *at the outcome level* (UNDAF outcomes and Agency outcomes) in the M&E Framework.

4. Limitations and possible solutions

Besides the issue of evaluability, there were other limitations that affected the evaluation. These are presented with possible ways to address them in the inception report. They are summarized below.

The relatively short timeframe for this evaluation was identified in the inception phase as a constraint, given the scope of the work. The national consultants were going to do several field missions, and the international consultant a 10 days in-country mission. For different reasons, the timeframe was extended and the evaluation team considers that this was indispensable and very useful.

With this extension, the evaluation design could include new aspects that were not originally contemplated: the added quick evaluability assessment using Davies' methodology, the contribution analysis using Mayne's suggested steps, with an attention to the theory of change, and the search for data that had not been collated by the outcome groups, etc.

Another limitation of the evaluation is that the consultants undertook field visits in a few DAO States, where the UN has concentrated its activities. It was not possible to get much information from other States to gather the views of key stakeholders and beneficiaries, in these other states.

Another constraint for the evaluability of the UNDAF was the difficulty to assess the real *impact* on the lives of ultimate beneficiaries, as well as the *sustainability* of the outputs and outcomes reached by the UN in the framework of the UNDAF, making both the impact and sustainability difficult to fully evaluate.

The dimension of efficiency was also challenging to evaluate. First, UNDAF financial data is very rarely available in different countries, and this was the case in Nigeria as well. Second, there was little information on the cost of operations, especially as far as the exact contributions from partner governments and other partners (civil society, NGOs etc.) were concerned. Even if results were more or less clearly stated, there was little information on economic aspects of these results. Moreover, there were limited counterfactuals, and no way to reasonably compare costs with other similar development organizations of a comparable size, such as the World Bank or the European Union. The MTR also pointed out that there is neither fund pulling, nor information on pulling on funds, which makes the evaluation of the UNDAF efficiency difficult to appreciate, since it would involve evaluating the efficiency of each UN agency, a daunting activity that would have gone beyond the scope of this evaluation. It was therefore be extremely difficult to assess whether results were achieved at a reasonable cost, which is the key question related to efficiency. The evaluation used the list of questions under the criteria of efficiency, as a way to get qualitative information on this issue, which helped mediate this limitation. The Evaluation Team provided a simple appreciation on this criteria, based on the analysis of answers to the evaluation questions.

Other factors that may have affected the evaluation process were also related to the availability of key UN staff and partners for interviews and meetings during the national consultants' missions to the States, and the international consultant's mission in Nigeria.

Annex 3: Agenda for the Meetings with Key Partners in DaO States

<p>EVALUATION</p> <p>OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK (UNDAF II),</p> <p>IN NIGERIA (2009 – 2012/2013)</p>

Agenda for the Meetings with Key Partners in DaO States

21 January 2014

The second generation (2009-2012 plus 2013) of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF II) was the common strategic framework for the operational activities of the United Nations System (UNS) in Nigeria. The end of cycle evaluation of the UNDAF II is a joint UN process, conducted with national partners, to assess the progress made towards Nigeria's development priorities selected within the UNDAF. It also takes stock of the environment within which the UN is operating and assesses the effectiveness of UNDAF II as a tool of support to the achievement of national priorities and enhanced coordination and harmonization among all UN agencies.

The main objectives of this evaluation, which covers the period 2009-2013, are the following:

- Determine the extent to which the UNDAF II is evaluable, by doing a quick evaluability assessment.
- Assess the progress or lack thereof, towards the expected outcomes envisaged in the UNDAF II programming documents. Where appropriate, the evaluation will also highlight unexpected results (positive or negative) and missed opportunities. This will also include an assessment of achievements against the planned results, and effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of UNDAF II outcomes, interventions and strategies.
- Provide an analysis of how the UN has positioned itself to add value in response to national needs and changes in the national development context.
- Assess the effectiveness of the implementation of UNDAF II, with a special focus on DaO and lessons learned, especially at State level.

The purpose of this meeting is to seek the key members of the Cluster/Outcome Groups, and UNDAF actors' and stakeholders' views on the UNDAF implementation, through the list of questions included in this agenda for discussion.

All information provided will be treated with the confidentiality it deserves, in line with the UNEG guidelines on such evaluation processes.

Participants to the meeting are encouraged to read this list of questions in advance before the meeting, so that they can be better prepared.

Each Working Group should choose a Rapporteur and a Note Taker with a laptop. Notes should be sent to the consultants.

Component 1: Analysis of the Focus Areas

a) Relevance:

- To what degree were the UNDAF result statements relevant in relation to global priorities, e.g., International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the MDGs and the Millennium Summit Declaration, the World Summit on MDG (2005), the Paris Declaration and the Accra and Busan documents on aid effectiveness, among others;
- To what extent is the UN support to Nigeria aligned with the objectives in the National Development Plans (NDP) and state development plans, and responding to national/state priorities?
- Was the strategy appropriate vis-à-vis the needs, as expressed in the Vision 20:2020 documents (and specific State's vision for long term development)?
- To what extent is the UN support in the various areas of the UNDAF II-adapted to the needs of beneficiaries?
- With respect to the analysis of the country situation, including political, social and economic analysis; to what extent were the external risks (i.e. political, governance, conflict and fiduciary), and the internal threats to the UN development assistance (UNDAF implementation) identified?
- To what extent has the UN development assistance in your State or MDAs (UNDAF II) incorporated gender-sensitive and human rights-based approaches in its planning and implementation?

b) Effectiveness:

- To what extent were the expected outcomes of the UN development assistance to your State/MDAs, achieved through the outputs implemented in the UNDAF II?
- Was there sufficient synergy among the various UN agency programmes and the various components? Did other projects contribute to, and reinforce the achievement of programme results?
- To what extent were the monitoring, evaluation, reporting and accountability systems adequate to enable the UN to demonstrate UNDAF results? To what extent were findings of the M&E, evaluations, reporting and accounting systems used to adjust programme strategies for better performance in the course of programme implementation?
- To what extent were the five UN programming principles (HRBA, gender equality, environmental sustainability, capacity development and results-based management (RBM)) taken into account and/or utilized in the implementation of the UNDAF?
- How well has the UN communicated its results, lessons learned, and good practices to its partners?

c) Efficiency:

- Was the UN's actual expenditure in line with expectations and plans as jointly agreed between the UN Agency and your State/MDAs? Were there any significant changes or delays in the release of funds or shortfalls in the amount of funds actually released? Are there aggregate figures available? (Please provide data on this).
- Was the skill mix and continuity of key staff engaged in the implementation of the development assistance appropriate to the country context and strategy?
- Was the time of UN staff spent in the project implementation (including monitoring visits) efficiently used (i.e. policy dialogue vs. technical assistance; project work vs. administration)?
- To what extent was the geographic coverage of the UNDAF cost-effective?
- To what extent were the results of monitoring missions, UNDAF annual reviews and agency evaluations used to reconsider design/direction of work, resourcing, and staff allocation priorities?

- How has the UN been effectively working together with other development partners in the Country/State/MDAs? Have there been collaboration between the UN Agencies and bilateral organizations, and CSOs (both international and local) in the implementation of projects or have they worked independently or competitively?

d) Sustainability:

- Did the UNDAF incorporate adequate exit strategies and capacity development measures to ensure sustainability of the results over time?
- How was the UN's Humanitarian response linked to its development assistance?
- Are conditions and mechanisms in place so that the benefits of UN interventions are sustained and owned by commissions, institutions and stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels after the interventions are completed?
- What could have been done additionally, within the timeframe of the UNDAF II, to improve the likelihood of positive long-term effects and reduce the likelihood of negative long-term effects?

Component 2: The analysis of the strategic positioning of the UN System in the Country

The evaluation will analyse a core set of criteria related to the strategic positioning of the UN as follows.

e) Strategic Positioning:

- To what extent was the UNDAF II aligned with respect to the Country's Strategic Development Plan? Could you explain the reason for the level of alignment you perceive between the two? What would you expect of the UN in terms of alignment of UNDAF II and the Country's Strategic Development Plan?

f) Responsiveness:

- To what extent did the UNDAF anticipate and respond to significant changes in the national development context within its 4 core focus areas? What were the missed opportunities in the UNDAF II programming?

g) Added Value:

- To what extent did the UNDAF II add value to national efforts in the priority areas of UN's work in the country?

Annex 4: List of interviewees

UNDAF II Result Area	Agency	Names of Respondents
Governance and Accountability	UNDP - Lead	Bernardo Cocco
Productivity & Employment	UNODC - Co-Lead	Maureen Lance-Onyeiwu
	UNDP	Kemi, M&E Officer
		Sam Egwu, Governance Programme Officer
		David Andrew, Prgram Officer, Local Governance
	FAO - Lead	Rabe Mani
Social Service Delivery	FAO	Mr. Danjuma Garba Saleh
	ILO - Co-Lead	Dennis Zulu
	ILO Program Officer	Pius Udo
	ILO Program Officer	Ms. Chinyere E. Anuna
	UNWOMEN	Mr. Peter Mancha
	UNICEF - Lead	Samuel Momanyi
	UNICEF	Denis Jobin
	WHO	Mbewe Andrew
	UNODC	Maureen Lance-Onyeiwu
	UNWOMEN	Adekemi Ndiele
	UNAIDS	Modupe Oduwole
	UNESCO	Saidou Jallow
Conflict and Insecurity	UNHCR - Lead	Terna Abbo
	UNODC - Co-Lead	Maureen Lance-Onyeiwu
	UNDP	Matthew Alao
National Planning Commission	Director, International Cooperation	Bassey Akpanyung
	Deputy Director International Cooperation	S. O Eloho
	CPO (UNDS)	Sanjo Faniran
	SPO (UNDS)	Ibrahim Shehu
	SPO (UNDS)	Olatunde Oniyanda
	DAD (Manager)	Henry Asor

Dao States	Lead Agency	Focal Person
Kaduna State	UNFPA	Adonri Osaretin
	UNFPA	Ms. Fatima Mamman-Daura Programme Officer-RH, Kaduna
	UNFPA	Yinka Akibu, State Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Kaduna State
	WHO State Programme Coordinator	Dr Fureratu Zakari

	UNICEF	Mr. Frederick Musoke, Officer-in-charge
	UNICEF	Dr Raymond Akor, Principal M&E Specialist
	Director Development Aid Coordination	Phoebe Sukai Yayi
	Ministry of Finance	Garba Sani Aliyu, Director Planning, Research and Statistics
	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	John Jakada
	Ministry of Youth and Sports	Danjuma Timbuwak
	SEMA	Seth Christopher
	Gender Coordinator, Ministry of Women Affairs	Haruna Gora
Adamawa State	UNFPA	Joy Michael
	Rural Health Coordinator, State Ministry Of Health	Amina Mohammed
	Program Accountant	Maurice Albert
	Director, Adamawa State Planning Commission	Patrick Kwabe
	Coordinator, State Ministry of Women and Social Development	Anna Alahirah
Benue State	UNICEF	Denis Jobin
	Ministry of Economic Planning	Jacinta Wombo
		Justin Gbagir
		Elizabeth Jeiyol
		Agera Tersoo
		Mom Lazans
		Asobo Victor
		Igbashal Raymond
		Samuel T. Tough
		Laura Utume
		Asawa Samuel
		Tor Hemen
Imo State	UNIDO	Reuben Bamidele
	Director, Ministry of Economic Planning	Mrs Ugochi Ohagwa
	CSO, Imo State	Chiadikobi Umeh
	CSO, Imo State	Udechukwu Chukwudi
	CSO (Codsbec), Owerri, Imo State	Frank Ehuru
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Emmanuel Euka
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Udeji GN
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Carol Unaeze

	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Unachukwu
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Linus Anozie
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Chris Obijuru
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Charles Okafor
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Chu Chinwe
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Obinna Rowland
	Ministry of Health Owerri, Imo State	Ebere Anyaie
Cross River State	UNDP	Bernardo Cocco
	JDP Caritas, (CSO) Calabar	Bar William Itorok
	James Olabi Odey	ARADIN/ Budget Transparency and Accountability Initiative Nigeria (BTAN)
	Obase Okanke	Justice Development and Peace, Caritas
	Mike Mgbekem	Department of International Development Corporation, CRS, Calabar
	Uko Ekott	Budget Transparency and Accountability Initiative Nigeria (BTAN)

DaO - FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, ABUJA
UNDAF II ANNUAL WORK PLAN REVIEW/2014 ANNUAL WORKPLAN PREPARATION
(where the evaluation was discussed)
10-11th February 2014, Venue - Rockview Hotel
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

SN	NAMES	SDA'S
1	RABE MANI	FAO
2	MOHAMMED A. ADANGBA	CAPACITY PLUS
3	JOEL AMANOPWA MAIGARI	ABUJA ENT. AGENCY
4	LAWAL A. MUHAMMAD	FCT- ECONOMIC PLANNING
5	MODUPE ODUWOLE	UNAIDS
6	RAYMOND AKOR	UNICEF
7	ABU MUNIRAT	FCT WASH
8	HUSSEINI ABDULKADIR	FCT WASH
9	OKAFOR OBINNA	FCT ECONOMIC PLANNING
10	TOM EDWARD TERKIMBI	FEMA
11	OCHEA NNENNA SAM	FEMA
12	MERCY KALBA	FCT PHCDB
13	VICTORIA URUOANMI	FCT ECONOMIC PLANNING
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16	OBANEWA OLAYINKA	FCT PHCDB
17	ENGR. OLUFEMI OYEKENU	FCT WATER BOARD
18	OKORO CLEMENTINA	FCT PHCDB
19	EKWUEME CC	FCT PHCDB

20	YUSUF NANA HAUWA	FCT PHCDB
21	IBRAHIM USMAN	FACA
22	ALAYA T. N	AEPB
23	BELLO MOHAMMED BELLO	AEPB
24	ADEMOLA AZEEZ KADIRI	FEMA
25	ISMAIL EVUTI	FEMA
26	IDRIS ABBAS G.	FEMA(DG)
27	PIUS UDO	ILO
28	KEVIN O. IKE	FCT ECONOMIC PLANNING
29	EUGENE IGBUDU	UNAIDS
30	MOMOH MARIAM	PHCDB
31	AGBESO PRECIOUS U	FAO UN
32	AMINA ABUBAKAR	SDS
33	BABAGANA KYARI	FCT ECONOMIC PLANNING
34	ISMAILA MOHAMMED	FCT WATER BOARD
35	AUTA EMMANUEL	FCT UBEB
36	ZUBAIRU LIMAN A	FCT AME
37	HABIB YUSUF KUSADA	FCT AME
38	MADU YOUNG Z	FCT AME
39	DR. U. BAJOGA	FCT PHCDB
40	FATIGUN OLUSEGUN	FCT ECONOMIC PLANNING
41	SHUAIBU U ADAMU	FCT MDGS
42	NATHAN S. NANCY	FCT MDGS
43	ABDULHAMEED ISHAKU M	FCT MDGS
44	HART UTA AGNES	SDS
45	PROF. SHA DUNG PAM	UNDAF II CONSULTANT
46	MISBAHU RABIU	AICL
47	MAIDAWA DANLADI	FCT ECONOMIC PLANNING
48	MRS. B SANI	FCT PHCDB
49	ENGR UYI OTEKI	FCT WASH
50	NITA P LANBATA	FCT SDS
51	ADEOLA OLUNLOYO	UNFPA
52	AMAECHI P. U	GENDER HEALTH
53	MOHAMMED IBRAHIM	GENDER HEALTH
54	DR. M. A. DAN-HASSAN	RUWASSA WATER BOARD
55	ARABI TUKUR M	FCT CSDP
56	OCHONU MARIE	SDS
57	ORJI CHIAMAKA CHISOLYTE	CAPACITY PLUS
58	ADDISHIMOT ENEGA	CAPACITY PLUS
59	DR. BABA-GANA ADAM	FCT ECONOMIC PLANNING
60	DR. CHINENYE ORJIOKE	HHSS
61	OLAFEMI FOLARIN	ARDS
62	OGU EMMANUEL	SECURITY SERVICES
63	MBONU THERESA O	EDUCATION SECRETARIAT
64	TANKO MARY	NOA
65	EYEGHELENE FLORENCE	NOA
66	EJIO OKONLO	SDS
67	ADIGWE JOSEPHINE	SDS

Annex 5: List of references and background documents

Nigeria and UNCT

- ➡ UNDAF document 2009-2012, and extension 2013
- ➡ UNDAF Results Matrix / Monitoring and Evaluation (in the UNDAF document)
- ➡ UNDAF M&E Calendar (Annex 3 of the UNDAF)
- ➡ UNDAF document 2014-2017
- ➡ UNDAF Annual reviews 2011-2012
- ➡ UNDAF Mid-Term Review 2010
- ➡ Conceptual documents and presentations about DAO in Nigeria
- ➡ Nigeria UN Coherence and Strategic Planning Support, Consultants' Report, Joseph Foubi and Brenda Langdon, March 2012
- ➡ UNCT Strategic Consultative Retreat, 2011, Retreat Report, RCO, July 2011.
- ➡ Medium Term Cooperation Frameworks and Annual Work Plans for the DaO States and FCT
- ➡ Information on the Strategic Programme Framework and Strategic Fund
- ➡ Reports of thematic groups on cross cutting issues
- ➡ Selected studies, research and evaluations conducted by individual or collaborating agencies including the UN Agencies
- ➡ Common Country Assessment / Country Analysis
- ➡ Resident Coordinator's Annual reports, 2011-2012, and 2013 when it will become available
- ➡ UNCT's / Resident Coordinator's Workplans
- ➡ Minutes of key UNCT meetings dealing with strategic issues or deemed relevant for the evaluation, where the UNDAF and DaO may have been discussed, especially after the MTR, and/or management response to the MTR
- ➡ Communication materials
- ➡ Other relevant documentation.

Guidance material

- ➡ UNDAF Guidelines, 2010, and other guidance material on strategic positioning, 2010-2013
- ➡ UNDG Toolkit
- ➡ Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Wishing to Adopt the "Delivering as one" Approach, UNDG, August 2013.
- ➡ UNEG norms and standards for evaluation
- ➡ UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System, 2008
- ➡ UNEG FAQs for UNDAF Evaluations, 2011
- ➡ UNEG Guidance on Preparing TORs for UNDAF Evaluations, 2012
- ➡ Guidance Note on the Application of the Programming Principles to the UNDAF, 2010
- ➡ Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation – Towards UNEG Guidance, 2011

- ➡ Outcome-Level Evaluation, A companion Guide to the Handbook on Planning and Evaluating for Development Results, for Programme Units and Evaluators, UNDP, 2011 (especially Sections 5, 6 and 7)
- ➡ Handbook on Planning and Evaluating for Development Results, UNDP, 2009 (in particular Chapter 7)
- ➡ How to Design and Manage Equity-focused Evaluation, UNICEF (especially Sections 4, 5 and 7)
- ➡ Evaluation for Equitable Development Results, UNICEF (in particular Part 2)
- ➡ Non-Resident Agencies material: see link.¹⁴

UN Reform

- ➡ QCPR studies on UNDAF, RC System, Business practices, Emerging issues
- ➡ Replies from Nigeria to QCPR surveys
- ➡ QCPR Secretary-general's Reports, and General Assembly Resolution
- ➡ Delivering as One Independent Evaluation

¹⁴http://www.undg.org/content/programming_reference_guide_%28undaf%29/common_country_programming_processes_-_undaf/non-resident_agency_guidance_and_support

Annex 6: Evaluability Assessment of UNDAF II

The evaluation team undertook an Evaluability Assessment of the UNDAF. They developed a tool, based on a recent Working Paper developed by Dr. Rick Davies for DFID.¹⁵ This Evaluability Assessment, which was adapted for the UNDAF, was first administered, through a list of questions, to programme managers (Desk Officers and Directors) in selected DAO States from three of the six geo-political zones (the states of Benue, Cross River and Imo State). A total of 27 respondents replied to the list of questions. This was useful to get some insight of how evaluable the UNDAF was for key stakeholders in the field. The informative replies were then analysed and synthesized by the evaluation team in a table format. This exercise was started at the beginning of the evaluation process and subsequently finalized when more information was made available to the evaluation team during the evaluation process, and when further analysis was undertaken.

This Evaluability Assessment is inspired by and adapted from “Planning Evaluability Assessments, A Synthesis of the Literature with Recommendations, Report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID)”, Working Paper 40, Dr Rick Davies, October 2013.

1. UNDAF Design (as described in a Theory of Change, Logical Framework or narrative)		
Clarity?	Are the long-term impact and outcomes clearly identified and are the proposed steps towards achieving these clearly defined?	The long term outcomes (UNDAF Outcomes and Agency Outcomes) are clearly identified in the results matrix of the UNDAF and the proposed steps are clearly defined with the outputs.
Relevant?	Are the UNDAF objectives clearly relevant to the needs of the target groups, as identified by any form of situation analysis, baseline study, or other evidence and argument? Are the intended beneficiary groups clearly identified?	Most respondents (25/26) agreed that the objectives of the UNDAF were relevant to the target groups. The evaluation team concurs.

¹⁵ Planning Evaluability Assessments, A Synthesis of the Literature with Recommendations, Report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID), Working Paper 40, Dr Rick Davies, October 2013.

Plausible?	<p>Is there a continuous causal chain, connecting the intervening agency with the final impact of concern?</p> <p>Is it likely that the UNDAF objective could be achieved, given the planned interventions, within the UNDAF lifespan? Is there evidence from elsewhere that it could be achieved?</p>	<p>The state programme managers (Desk Officers and Directors - 20/23) stated that there was a continuous causal chain, connecting the intervening agency with the final impact. The evaluators agree that, to a large extent, the interactions in the chain of results (Outputs → Agency Outcomes → UNDAF Outcomes) could lead to the achievement of the final result in most cases. The logic model was reasonable, and overall, the result matrix was quite well articulated at the design stage.</p>
Validity and reliability?	<p>Are there valid indicators for each expected event (output, outcome and impact levels)? i.e. will they capture what is expected to happen? Are they reliable indicators? i.e. will observations by different observers find the same thing?</p>	<p>All the respondents (23) agree that there were valid indicators for each expected event (output, outcome and impact levels) and that they captured what was expected. While the evaluators acknowledge that some indicators could truly measure the performance of the UNDAF and measure the achievement of outputs and outcomes, the M&E Framework was not designed with systematic SMART principles (specific, measureable, achievable, realistic and time-bound). The indicators, baselines and targets were not sufficiently defined, while some targets were overly ambitious.</p>
Testable?	<p>Is it possible to identify which linkages in the causal chain will be most critical to the success of the UNDAF, and thus should be the focus of evaluation questions?</p>	<p>The linkages that the evaluators consider the most crucial in the hierarchy of results are the way Agency Outcomes fed into UNDAF Outcomes. This is one of the reasons why the methodology for this evaluation made a special effort to focus its analysis at the outcome level. This allowed the evaluation to compensate the weaknesses of the monitoring and reporting processes, which cantered on outputs.</p>

Contextualised?	Have assumptions about the roles of other actors outside the UNDAF been made explicit (both enablers and constrainers)? Are there plausible plans to monitor these in any practicable way?	More than half (12/22) of the respondents agreed that assumptions about the roles of other actors outside the UNDAF were explicit but many expressed concern on the lack of monitoring of these assumptions. The evaluators confirm that some assumptions were defined, but they were not monitored. Similarly, the external risks (i.e. political, governance, conflict and fiduciary), and the internal threats to the UNDAF implementation were identified, and reflected the nature of the country situation at the time. It was not, however, contemplated that the UN House would be affected by the general security situation in the country, and by the attack it was subjected to.
Consistent?	Is there consistency in the way the Theory of Change is described across various multiple documents (UNDAF Document, M&E plans, work plans, progress reports, etc.)?	The majority of the programme managers (20/24) considered that there was consistency in the description of the Theory of Change across the various documents (UNDAF Document, M&E plan, work plans, progress reports, etc.). The evaluation team considers, however, that because the M&E plan was not developed and used, it is not possible to confirm its consistency with the Theory of Change. Progress reports reported on activities and were not based on indicators baselines and data, hence consistency was not ensured.
Complexity?	Are there expected to be multiple interactions between different UNDAF components (complicating attribution of causes and identification of effects)? How clearly defined are the expected interactions?	The majority of the programme managers (18/20) are of the view that there are multiple interactions between different UNDAF components complicating the attribution of causes and identification of effects. The evaluators confirm this judgment and consider that the UNDAF itself is a short document that explains some of the interactions but does not get into much detail.

Agreement?	To what extent are different stakeholders holding different views about the UNDAF objectives and how they will be achieved? How visible are the views of stakeholders who might be expected to have different views?	<p>Slightly more than half of the respondents replied to this question and most (12/15) considered that there was general agreement (acceptance) on the objectives of the UNDAF with minimal divergent views. The concept of joint programming (DAO) brings all the views of the stakeholders together and reduces differences of opinions.</p> <p>The evaluators consider that DaO and joint programming may have helped bring the stakeholders together, and that the possibility of divergent views may have been greatly reduced, as the differences may have been sorted out during the consultative processes, especially in the States where the principles of DaO were mostly implemented.</p>
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2. Information availability		
Is a complete set of documents available?	...relative to what could have been expected? E.g., UNDAF document, Progress Reports, Annual Reviews, Evaluations / impact assessments, Commissioned studies	Most of the programme managers (23/26) consider that there is a complete set of documents, except with respect to evaluation/impact assessments. The evaluators confirm this opinion, with a nuance. While the MTR was undertaken, and the report available, some of the UNDAF annual reviews were missing. It looks like Clusters have not produced them every year, and no annual review was prepared for the last year of the UNDAF, given that the evaluation was taking place.

<p>Do baseline measures exist?</p>	<p>If baseline data is not yet available, are there specific plans for when baseline data would be collected and how feasible are these?</p> <p>If baseline data exists in the form of survey data, is the raw data available, or just selected currently relevant items? Is the sampling process clear? Are the survey instruments available?</p> <p>If baseline data is in the form of national or subnational statistics, how disaggregated is the data? Are time series data available, for pre-UNDAF years?</p>	<p>Almost all the programme managers (22/25) stated that baseline data exist possibly inferring national surveys (NDHS, MICS, GPRHCS or state PRSP, statistics documents, e.g., CSDP document and other data from the State Planning Commission, etc.). The Consultants observed, however, that some States may not have data in all sectors, and that some of the sources may not have sufficient process indicators to guide programming.</p> <p>It does not appear that all the studies that should have been commissioned to inform data on baselines were conducted, given the absence of updated data.</p> <p>The UNDAF has suffered from a lack of monitoring.</p>
<p>Is there data on a control group?</p>	<p>Is it clear how the control group compares to the intervention group? Is the raw data available or just summary statistics? Are the members of the control group identifiable and potentially contactable? How frequently has data been collected on the status of the control group?</p>	<p>The majority of respondents (11/16) acknowledge that data exists for both intervention and control groups. The Evaluation Team feels that the respondents concept of control groups here are the Local Government Councils, where the UN intervention programme are not being implemented). Statistics on control groups are likely to have been rarely collected.</p>
<p>Is data being collected for all the indicators?</p>	<p>Is it with sufficient frequency? Is there significant missing data? Are the measures being used reliable i.e. Is measurement error likely to be a problem?</p>	<p>Three quarters of respondents (15/20) stated that data was collected for all the indicators but some of the respondents commented that frequency was not enough. The evaluation team considers that evidently, routine data was collected in most of the programmes through the assistance of the development partners (UN Agencies). However, due to delays in the release of funds, the data collection process may not be done on a regular basis.</p>

Is critical data available?	Are the intended and actual beneficiaries identifiable? Is there a record of who was involved in what UNDAF activities and when?	The majority of the respondents (18/21) stated that actual beneficiaries were identified. The Evaluation Team notes that the managers recognize that it may be possible to identify the beneficiaries at state level, and the fact that critical data is available, however, they also feel that there are lacunae in data that prevented a good monitoring of the UNDAF.
Is gender disaggregated data available?	In the baseline? For each of the indicators during UNDAF intervention? In the control group? In any mid-term or process review?	The managers (13/19) acknowledge availability of gender disaggregated data. A number of documents have gender disaggregated data, e.g., further analysis of the 2006 national census, state school enrolment data, various types of health programme data (maternal and child health including immunization, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation etc.). However, the availability of gender disaggregated data remained a key challenge during the UNDAF implementation.
If reviews or evaluations have been carried out...	Are the reports available? Are the authors contactable? Is the raw data available? Is the sampling process clear? Are the survey instruments available?	<p>More than half of the respondents answered the question and about two thirds (11/16) of them stated that reports were available possibly referring to the national/state surveys and other development plan documents.</p> <p>Unfortunately, the annual review process was done outside the M&E framework. There was very limited consideration of the indicators, baselines and targets in these reviews, making their subsequent use very difficult, including during the MTR and the evaluation.</p> <p>Furthermore, the evaluation team considers that a key limitation of the annual reporting system is the fact that the annual reporting focused on activities and outputs, but did not gradually shift to reporting at the higher level of the results chain – the UNDAF outcomes and agency outcomes.</p>

Do existing M&E systems have the capacity to deliver?	Where data is not yet available, do existing staff and systems have the capacity to do so in the future? Are responsibilities, sources and periodicities defined and appropriate? Is the budget adequate?	<p>Two thirds of respondents (15/21) stated that existing staff and systems have the capacity to deliver on results. Following the capacity building of staff during the UNDAF, respondents recognized that the existing personnel have the capacity to deliver on M&E data and reports.</p> <p>Nevertheless, the M&E systems were weak. The M&E Framework was not regularly used and updated at the state level and at agency level, raising issues of capacities but also motivation to coordinate the UNDAF M&E.</p>
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3. Institutional context		
Accessibility to and availability of stakeholders?	Are there physical security risks? Will weather be a constraint? Are staff and key stakeholders likely to be present, or absent on leave or secondment? Can reported availability be relied upon?	The majority (19/22) of programme managers stated that the stakeholders were available. The evaluators noted staff availability and could be relied upon, since most of them were civil servants, CSOs, and community members. The national consultants could travel to the 6 states without problems.
Resources available to do the evaluation?	Time available in total and in country? Timing within the schedule of all other activities? Funding available for the relevant team and duration? People with the necessary skills available at this point?	The time for the evaluation of the UNDAF was extended and flexibility was given to the consultants, including an increase in the time planned in their contracts, and a wider period of time to undertake their work, which was greatly appreciated, as the complexity of the evaluation and requirements increased over time.
Is the timing right?	Is there an opportunity for an evaluation to have an influence? Has the UNDAF accumulated enough implementation experience to enable useful lessons to be extracted? If the evaluation was planned in advance, is the evaluation still relevant?	<p>Two thirds of respondents (17/23) stated that the timing of the evaluation was alright and that the evaluation was relevant.</p> <p>The evaluation was conducted after the UNDAF II concluded and at the beginning of the implementation of the next UNDAF. It is therefore expected that it may be useful to provide lessons but it did not provide inputs in the strategic planning for the UNDAF III. On the other hand, the evaluation of results was more complete, since the UNDAF has been implemented for 5 years giving sufficient time for reasonable data to have been generated.</p>

Coordination requirements?	How many other donors, government departments, or NGOs need to be or want to be involved? What forms of coordination are possible and/or required?	<p>About one third of respondents considered that the coordinating government partner (Ministry of Economic Planning/Commission) was the necessary body to organize coordination of the evaluation – i.e. internal coordination. Some felt that UN Agencies (UNDP, UNICEF) needed to coordinate.</p> <p>The focus of the evaluation in the DaO States allowed government institutions and departments to be consulted. Other development assistance partners were not consulted.</p>
Who wants an evaluation?	Have the primary users been clearly identified? Can they be involved in defining the evaluation? Will they participate in the evaluation process?	<p>Most of the respondents (19/20) stated that stakeholders are the ones that need the evaluation and should be involved in defining the evaluation.</p> <p>The concept of stakeholders in this context is broad and includes government, CSOs and others involved in the UNDAF implementation. The general public and direct beneficiaries of the UNDAF did not participate in the evaluation process, given the limited scope of the evaluation.</p>
What do stakeholders want to know?	What evaluation questions are of interest to whom? Are these realistic, given the UNDAF design and likely data availability? Can they be prioritised? How do people want to see the results used? Is this realistic?	<p>Two thirds of respondents (15) stated that the stakeholders were interested to see the results of the intervention (programmes) and how they have impacted on the lives of the beneficiaries. Some of the questions they were interested in were: was the UNDAF properly implemented and executed, were the resources adequate, and were they released in a timely manner, was the UNDAF effective, and what impact did it had on the beneficiaries.</p> <p>The evaluators consider that the choice of evaluation questions was realistic, however the limitations in data and the lack of updating of the M&E Framework proved to be a serious constraint during the UNDAF evaluation process.</p>

What sort of evaluation process do stakeholders want?	What designs do stakeholders express interest in? Could these work given the questions of interest and likely information availability, and resources available?	About one third of respondents (8) were interested in progress reports during the evaluation. A number of them would have wanted it to be inclusive and participatory reflecting popular interest. The evaluation team considers that such an exercise would have been much more extensive and was not in the scope of this evaluation.
What ethical issues exist?	Are they known or knowable? Are they likely to be manageable? What constraints will they impose?	Less than half of all respondents (10) answered this question and were of the view that ethical issues existed. The evaluation team notice that respondents failed to state what these issues were. During the evaluation, there were very limited ethical issues identified, and the evaluators followed the UNEG guidance in this respect.
What are the risks?	Will stakeholders be able to manage negative findings? Have previous evaluation experiences prejudiced stakeholder's likely participation?	About half of the respondents answered to the question and most of them (11/13) considered that the stakeholders were able to manage negative findings. The evaluation team confirms this impression.

Annex 7: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis of Delivering as One States in Nigeria

This table presents the results of the analysis made of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis of Nigerian Delivering as One States, related to the implementation of the UNDAF II, as part of the UNDAF evaluation. This includes the six states (Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Benue, Kaduna, Cross River, Imo); and the Federal Capital Territory.

Kaduna State	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Relevance	<p>Political will demonstrated in signing MOUs on UNDAF and AWP</p> <p>MDAs input their development priorities into AWP</p> <p>Release of Government Counterpart Cash Contribution (GCCC) for DaO activities</p>	<p>The late release of budget by the Government and State House of Assembly weakens the implementation of AWP</p>	<p>Existence of Public policy: vision 20-2020 and the Transformation Agenda designed to move the country out of poverty and citizens eagerness to key into this vision plan</p>	<p>Late signing of AWP</p>
Ownership of the DaO State	<p>State Planning Commission and MDAs participate in DaO processes, such as meetings to prepare AWP.</p> <p>AWP are implemented by MDAs</p>	<p>State Planning Commission and some MDAs feel programme design and implementation are solely determined by UN agencies</p>	<p>Existence of UNDAF coordinating mechanism at the DaOs to facilitate participation and sense of ownership of UNDAF</p>	<p>High turnover rate of skill personnel from services of the state</p> <p>Technicalities of UN language not understood by some MDAs</p>

Role and presence of UN agencies, and participation of NRAs	<u>Role:</u> UN agencies provide technical assistance (e.g. results-based template for planning and reporting); Funding and capacity building is provided by UN agencies; Monitoring and evaluation of intervention	Some templates, manuals are not being used by MDAs	Endorsement of UNDAF III and commitments to make a change from UNDAF II	Late release of funds by some agencies to IPs None release of funds by some UN agencies to IPs Trained staff of MDAs proceed on retirement without passing skills to the next officers
	<u>Presence:</u> Some UN agencies are in the state making contributions (WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF)	Nonattendance of planning and review meetings of UN agencies Poor attendance of planning and review meetings of UN agencies	Endorsement of UNDAF III and AWP by UN agencies	The following may threaten the presence of UN agencies in the state: ethno-religious violence, armed robberies; attacks on polio workers; political and election related violence; terrorist violence in Northern Nigeria
	<u>Participation:</u> Partnership during emergencies such as flooding and outbreak of diseases Non-Resident Agencies run	Reluctance of the UN agencies to go beyond periodic and ad-hoc interventions to having joint programmes	Endorsement of UNDAF III with its commitment towards collaboration of UN agencies	Slow understanding and implementation of joint programming

	interventions			
Coordination mechanisms	<p>UNFPA is a coordinating agency</p> <p>Lead person is active and enthusiastic to work toward DaO.</p> <p>There is the existence of a coordination mechanism led by the State's Ministry of Economic Planning</p>	Inadequate technical capacity of the State Partnership Coordinating Agency	Presence of UN capacity building programmes	Protection and defense of agency mandates
Effectiveness in achieving results	UN agency interventions in the various clusters have yielded <u>some</u> results in the state	Late release of funds from both UN agencies and State government	Adoption of HACT, a uniform fund disbursement modality for all UN agencies	Non-release of allocations by government
Joint programming	Few collaborations during periods of emergencies such as outbreak of diseases and flood (e.g., WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF)	<p>No joint programming among UN agencies</p> <p>Lack of joint implementation of DaO activities in the AWP</p>	<p>There is an understanding of the need for joint programming</p> <p>Existence of baselines data (a State database that captures routine health indicators) that can be used for joint programming. Presence of UNFPA, WHO and UNICEF offices and staff in the state can be used to achieve high level advocacy, consultation for better health outcome</p>	<p>Protection and defence of agency mandates,</p> <p>adherence to agency administrative and financial regulations</p>

	Participation of MDAs in writing of AWP	No joint programming among MDAs	Operating under UNDAF III, MDAs can be introduced to joint programming	The MDAs are not structured and designed for joint programming
Partnerships, CSOs	UN, government and CSOs partnered in implementing UNDAF e.g., faith based organisations, Center for Development, Research & Advocacy (CDRA) in cluster A, none in cluster B; Women Advancement & Protection Alternative (WRAPA) in cluster C; Child Protection Network (CPN) in cluster D	Civil society is not involved in design of AWP	Increasing commitment by UN and Government to promote participation of citizens in Government and its programmes	CSOs weak understanding of the workings of the UN Regime change that may not be friendly to CSOs
M&E and reporting	M&E and reporting frameworks are included in the UNDAF documents and AWP at DoA state level	Inadequate joint monitoring visits by the UN agencies.	UNDAF III provided a chance to improve on M&E framework	Commitment to agencies' activities
Cross-cutting issues	<u>Human Rights</u> Activities related to human rights are included in the AWP of the state	The mainstreaming and reporting of human right issues in AWP is weak	The presence of a vibrant human rights community in the state with whistle blower capacity and advocacy skills	Weak understanding of mainstreaming HR principles by government officials
	<u>Gender</u> Mentions in the design of AWP	The actual mainstreaming is not reported	The presence of a vibrant gender based groups in the state with good advocacy skills	Cultural and Religious believes in the states

	<u>Environmental Sustainability</u> There is an understanding that it should be mainstreamed and few output target address it	It is not mainstreamed and it is not reported	Government emphasis in Vision 20:2020 and the Transformation Agenda provides basis for States to key into the idea	State government seeing itself as an independent tier of Government and not bound to use Federal State policies
	<u>Public-private partnership</u> There is recognition given to it in UNDAF and AWP's	Public-private partnership Are not mainstreamed in the AWP's	The place of the private sector in development is enshrined in UN and Government policies in Vision 20:2020 and the Transformation Agenda	Continued government control of the economy
Efficiency in the use of resources	Resources are allocated in budgets in order to meet the needs of citizens of the state	The none transparent and unaccountable way of using state resources	The implementation of the Public Procurement law and the campaign against corruption in the state	Late release of state budgets, and poor release of allocations
Sustainability	Capacity building by UN agencies Laws, manuals/models and frameworks are in place consciously amongst MDAs and citizens in place	Some frameworks/ manuals are not being used by MDAs	Implementation of UNDAF III	High rate of turnover of skill staff Non-release of funds by state government Possible threat if an unfriendly regime comes into office in 2015

Adamawa State	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Relevance	Political will of leaders is noticeable, with the signing of AWP, and the release of Government Counterpart Contribution	Citizens expectation of the outcome of UN support in the country is higher than the outputs and outcomes that directly affect their livelihood	Existence of a Public policy framework (Vision 20:2020 and the Transformation Agenda) and citizens support to antipoverty measures	The change in membership of the present top political leadership in the state into a different political party can be an obstacle
Ownership of the DaO State	Planning Commission and MDAs participate in meetings to prepare AWP and AWP are implemented by MDAs	Lack of political commitment from the side of State government to provide counterpart funding	Commitment to implement UNDAF III	UN agency role in driving the process may threaten bureaucrats and politicians
Role and presence of UN agencies, and participation of NRAs	<u>Role</u> Provide funding and technical assistance and capacity building Monitoring and evaluation of interventions	Late and sometimes non-release of funds by some agencies to IPs	Existence of UNDAF III and the commitment of UN agencies to its implementation	Weak commitment from state Government in paying counterpart funds
	<u>Presence</u> UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO have offices in the state UNICEF,WHO, and UNFPA	Poor and/or non-attendance of planning and review meetings of UN agencies	Endorsement of UNDAF III by UN agencies with commitment to deliver as one	Ethno-religious violence Political and election related violence

	they are housed by WHO building			Violence of Boko Haram terrorist (from Republic of Cameroun)
	<u>Participation</u> Non-Resident Agencies (UNDP, FAO, UNAIDs and UNESCO have programmes in the state)	There physical absence makes coordination and joint programming difficult	Joint programming principle could enhance visibility and participation of UN agencies in the State	The security situation in the State due to communal and Boko Haram Violence could affect continued participation
Coordination mechanisms	UNFPA is a coordinating agency	Lead person is not resident in the state and this weakens coordination	UNDAF III and the commitment of UN agencies to deliver as one	Protection and defence of agency mandates to the detriment of DaO
	At state level the coordination agency (Ministry of Economic Planning) exist	Coordinating foreign assistance has been weak since UN agencies prefer to work directly with IPs such as MDAs	Presence of government policy on coordinating foreign assistance	Poor understanding of delivering as one modality by government
Effectiveness in achieving results	UN support has led to some changes at output level at the federal level and DaO state	Some of the interventions have not yet led to significant changes in the lives of citizens	UN strengthening of support mechanisms at federal level and DaO states and Federal intention to deliver services to people	Weak commitment at UN level to deliver as One Weak government's commitment in remitting its counterpart funding.

Joint programming	There is the consciousness among UN agencies (UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO) on the need to work together	There are no joint programmes among UN agencies	Strong elements of joint programming in UNDAF III	Protection and defence of agency mandates by UN agencies
	MDAs participation in writing AWP	Lack of joint implementation of AWP by MDAs at the state level	The State will work under UNDAF III framework which has strong element of delivering as one	Lack of understanding of the operational workings of joint programming amongst MDAs
Partnerships, CSOs	AWPs addresses the needs of CSOs	CSOs were not involve in the design of the AWP	UNDAF III and Vision 20:2020's commitment to the promotion of popular participation	There are new CSOs with weak capacity to deliver on such complex UNDAF activities
M&E and reporting	UN agencies and MDAs have monitoring frameworks	No baselines in AWP to facilitate the monitoring of achievement of targets No joint monitoring and reporting of AWP	Current efforts of the UN agencies in operating UNDAF III with renewed vigour	UN agencies occupied with agency mandates and interventions
Crosscutting issues	<u>Human Rights</u> mention is made of human rights in the AWP	The mainstreaming of human rights is not evident in the implementation of AWP	The implementation of UNDAF III will facilitate its mainstreaming	Weak understanding of how to mainstream it into all clusters
	<u>Gender</u> The design of AWP has	There is no evidence that gender is being mainstreamed at the	The implementation of UNDAF III should facilitate its	The resistance to the observance of certain rights at the point of

	some outputs across cluster A, B, C with gender related issues	level of implementation, although there are stand-alone activities in the clusters	mainstreaming since attention is being drawn to it.	implementation due to cultural and religious rights in that Northern State
	<u>Environmental Sustainability</u> The AWP contains outputs in Cluster D on environmental sustainability	Implementation of activities is weak; the principle is mainstreamed in only clusters D	Current global demands for Environmental sustainability and related conventions signed by Nigerian government	Poor understanding of the principle by MDAs, and poor funding from UN and the State government
	<u>Public-private partnership</u> There is the consciousness that the principle is required to meet the development priorities of the state	The principle was not mentioned in any cluster in the AWP and so it is not a cross-cutting issues	Both Vision 20:2020 and the Transformation Agenda have recognised the use of PPP in the implementation of development plans	The movement of the present political leadership in the state into a different political party may be an obstacle
Efficiency in the use of resources	Budgets allocations are made according to the strength of the state	The activities in the AWP are many, and the allocated resources at state level as well as by the UN agencies are inadequate. Late release of state budgets, and poor release of budgetary allocations	The implementation of the Public Procurement law and the campaign against corruption in the state	The non-transparent and unaccountable way of using state resources

<p>Sustainability</p>	<p>Capacity building of state officials by UN agencies</p> <p>There is consciousness of the existence of UNDAF processes amongst MDAs</p>	<p>Some MDAs still don't know how to work under UNDAF framework</p>	<p>Implementation of UNDAF III will further provide understanding which MDAs require for effective work</p>	<p>High rate of turnover of skill staff.</p> <p>None release of funds by government.</p> <p>Possible threat if an unfriendly regime comes into office in 2015</p>
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FCT Abuja	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Relevance	<p>The signing of MOUs on UNDAF and AWP by the Political leadership in FCT;</p> <p>MDAs input their development priorities in AWP;</p> <p>Release of Government Counterpart Cash Contribution (GCCC) for DaO activities</p>	Sometimes late signing of AWP e.g., the 2013 AWP	FCT has keyed into Vision 20:2020 and the Transformation Agenda	The late release of budget by the FCT administration due to late signing of the Appropriation Act
Ownership of the DaO State	The FCT Departments and Agencies participate in meetings to prepare AWP, annual reviews and evaluation	The IPs sometimes see UNDAF as an imposition by the UN agencies	UNDAF III framework increases citizen's participation and a sense of ownership of the process and the project activities	<p>Weak understanding of the UN system by FCT personnel implementing the UNDAF</p> <p>UN agencies acting as a "dictator"</p>
Role and presence of UN agencies, and participation of NRAs	<p><u>Role</u></p> <p>The UN agencies provide technical assistance by putting in place results-based templates for</p>	Late release of funds by some agencies to IPs due to absence of counterpart funds	Endorsement of UNDAF III and commitments to meet the developmental priorities of the Nigerian government	The continued disbelief by some IPs (government MDAs) that UN plays a domineering role in

	<p>planning and reporting;</p> <p>Capacity building of Departments and Agencies in FCT involved in the implementation of UNDAF</p>			UNDAF
	<p><u>Presence</u></p> <p>UN agencies' presence is noticeable in support of interventions in AWP's of FCT</p>	The UN agencies are not delivering as one in the FCT	Endorsement of UNDAF III by agencies with commitment to DaO	Insecurity in Abuja and the continued threat by Boko Haram Violence may scare away UN staff from the country
	<p><u>Participation of Non-Resident Agencies</u></p> <p>Their presence is noticeable in their support of interventions in relevant clusters</p>	Participation within the NADF framework is weak	The DaO principle has the capacity to sustain their participation in addressing the developmental priorities of the Nigerian government	The continued threats of Boko Haram in FCT and other parts of Nigeria constitutes a concern
Coordination mechanisms	FAO is a coordinating agency and the lead person is active	Coordinating agency does not have powers to compel other agencies to deliver as one	Endorsement of UNDAF III by agencies with commitment to DaO may lessen coordinating difficulties faced by FAO	Predominant concern with UN agencies' mandates to the detriment of DaO

	There is the presence of a coordination mechanism led by the FCT's Economic Planning Department	Week coordination by the FCT of development assistance dues to UN agencies' preference to work outside UNDAF framework	Presence of UN capacity building programmes	UN agencies' interest in fulfilling agency mandates outside the UNDAF framework may frustrate coordination
Effectiveness in achieving results	UN assistance has helped in the implementation of some activities in all the clusters in the FCT	AWPs contain may activities that are not implemented due to poor funding and capacity gaps Activities in AWP are rolled over to the new year due to non-implementation	The FCT can leverage from the experience of implementing UNDAF III for effectiveness	Poor funding by UN agencies and FCT
Joint programming	Department and Agencies in the FCT participate in drawing up the AWP	No joint programming by UN agencies in the FCT	The UN agencies understand the need for joint programming	FCT non-release of counterpart funds to meet UN agencies contribution. Adherence to agency mandates
	AWPs indicate commitment to joint funding of activities by UN agencies and FCT	No joint programming among Departments and Agencies in FCT	Operating under UNDAF III, Departments and Agencies can be introduced to joint programming	Inadequate skills of staff in the FCT can frustrate the operation of UNDAF activities
Partnerships, CSOs	AWPs addresses the needs of CSOs	CSOs were not involved in the design of the	UNDAF III and Vision 20:2020's commitment to the promotion of popular	Erosion of trust in CSOs as vehicles in the

	CSOs in the FCT are involved in the implementation of UNDAF	AWPs	participation. There are many CSOs in FCT with capacity, experience and reach which can be leveraged on	transparent use of resources
M&E and reporting	There is an annual evaluation meeting by all the Departments and Agencies of FCT in collaboration with the UN agencies. The reporting of AWP is made	Inadequate joint monitoring visits by UN agencies. No joint monitoring of activities by Departments and Agencies in FCT	UNDAF III provides an opportunity to improve on the M&E UNDAF framework and its use by FCT and UN agencies	UN agencies' concentration on fulfilling M&E agency to the detriment of UNDAF Unskilled M&E personnel at the FCT level
Crosscutting issues	<u>Human Rights</u> There is no specific evidence of mainstreaming			
	<u>Gender</u> Gender is included in AWP of Adamawa State and activities are planned around it	Gender is only considered in Cluster C and it appeared under the treatment of HIV/AIDs. It is therefore not cross-cutting	UN agencies commitment to gender-based practices can be leveraged on by the State	The presence of gender-blind public policy designers
	<u>Environmental Sustainability</u> There is an increasing	It is not crossing as there is no mention of it in the AWP, except where there are activities	The current efforts of the government at state and federal level and development partners	Weak capacity building in government and CSO to build policy

	consciousness amongst government and CSOs that environment should be mainstreamed	designed around sanitation.	focus on sustaining the environment as a response to the present environmental challenges in the North Eastern part of the country	consensus, provide funding and engage in advocacy
	<u>Public-private partnership</u> The AWP contains some activities that addressed the needs of entrepreneurs in agriculture	This principle is not cross cutting because it is not reflected in any other cluster in the AWP. The word is not even mentioned anywhere in the AWP	The inclusion of the principle in government's vision plan and role of UN agencies in promoting it is an opportunity for the State	Weak knowledge of how to mainstream it in public policy designing by government officials
Efficiency in the use of resources	Budget allocations are made in such a way as to take care of FCT development priorities	The activities in the AWP are many: the annual budgets could not go meet those outlined activities. Non-release of counterpart fund by FCT administration and therefore the none release of funds from both UN agencies	Adoption of HACT a uniform fund disbursement modality for all UN agencies.	None release of allocations by government
Sustainability	Capacity building by UN agencies. Laws, manuals/models and frameworks are in place	High rate of turnover of skill staff Non-release of funds by government	Implementation of UNDAF III to continue to leverage results from UN and its agencies	UNDAF III may affect the on-going activities in UNDAF II, especially those that are not supported in UNDAF

	Consciousness amongst MDAs at federal and DaO states about UNDAF's ability to address national priorities is noticeable			III
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Benue State	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Relevance				
Ownership of the DaO State	<p>Strong political support by Benue State Government</p> <p>Well organised government institution and personnel anchoring the DAO programme for the State</p> <p>The DAO programme in the State developed from the blueprint of the State Development Programme</p>	<p>Poor compliance of Government to payment of the Counterpart Cash Contribution.</p> <p>The Benue State Economic Commission unable to bring all UN Agencies to key into the DAO programme as some Agencies continued to operate outside of the DAO umbrella.</p>	<p>There is good presence of UN Agencies operating in the State thereby providing room to show advantages of the DAO concept.</p> <p>The success of the DAO concept will provide a basis for scale-up of DAO in other States and in the UNDAF III.</p>	<p>Political transition for the 2015 general elections and uncertainties about the focus of the new government and to agreements entered by previous government.</p> <p>Loss of experienced personnel (civil servants and political appointees) leading to loss of capable hands and institutional memory.</p>
Role and presence of UN agencies, and participation of NRAs	<p>Joint programming through DAO brings together UN Agencies, pooling resources and harmonizing programmes for a common goal.</p> <p>DAO provides platform for UN Agencies not operating in the State to quickly utilize existing</p>	<p>UN Agencies still operating directly with State IPs without going through the DAO – UNHCR</p> <p>UNFPA still signing work plans with State Government rather than</p>	<p>UN could use existing structures of specific Agencies to mount DAO programme to enhance efficiency rather than create new ones.</p> <p>Non-Resident UN Agencies could use DAO structures to</p>	<p>Apprehension by some UN Agencies of losing relevance or of being swallowed up under joint programming ventures.</p> <p>Non-commitment by some UN personnel to DAO as activities</p>

	structures to address issues in their mandate areas – e.g. UNHCR intervention in the State.	using the DAO document.	implement their programmes with collaboration of other UN Agencies	demanding of them in the DAO is not reflected specifically in their job description.
Coordination mechanisms	Presence of coordinating mechanism for aid assistance through the Benue State Planning Commission	Direct engagement with State Government by some UN Agencies rather than through the DAO mandate subverting UN joint programming arrangement (UNHCR is not participating in joint programming while UNFPA still signs independent Annual work plans with the State Government.	Existence of well-developed programme structure established by some Agencies for their Agency operations that channelled into joint programming e.g. UNICEF. Presence of a number of UN Agencies already operating in the State – UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, and a joint UN programme in maternal and child health (UNH4+) – providing opportunities to show effectiveness of DAO	Non-participation of some UN Agencies in coordination meetings and inability to follow-up on decisions made, which undermines coordination. Only one pillar of the pillars of DAO concept was pursued in DAO states – one programme pillar. DAO did not deal with the other pillars - one budgetary framework, one fund, one leader, one office and one voice.
Effectiveness in achieving results	UN Agencies operating in Benue State presented a common front under DAO programme and signed a common MoU. The UNH4+ already operating in Benue State on maternal and child health intervention for	Harmonization of programmes still remain a sensitive issue as Agencies attachment to specific mandates are very strong	Successes in joint programming in HIV/AIDS and the implementation of joint programming under the UNH4+ are examples to be explored and scaled up	Demands by funding organizations for programme reports may create apprehensions for pooling funds together for joint programming

	joint UN programming			
Joint programming	Joint programming through DAO brought UN Agencies together under a common platform for aid assistance to the State	The capacity of the State Planning Commission to effectively drive the DAO process in the State is not fully evolved.	Cross-sectoral collaboration bringing together all components of government agencies for achievement of government development blueprint	Non-compliance of some UN Agencies to the DAO mandate undermining joint programming venture.
Partnerships, CSOs	Well organised network of CSOs (Benue Net) operating in the State and providing oversight function for the interest of the beneficiaries.	<p>Engagement of CSOs in project implementation at the grass roots is limited with most of the programmes (99%) implemented through government agencies – (interview with Network of CSOs).</p> <p>Low engagement of CSOs in programme activities casts doubts on programmes yielding desired results as the watch-dog role of CSOs.</p> <p>Lack of knowledge of the CSOs and Government IPs of the various UN conventions detailing roles of CSOs in UN assisted</p>	<p>Availability of Network of CSOs provides room for grass root mobilization for demand creation activities for increased use of services.</p> <p>The CSOs showed great enthusiasm in promoting rights of the citizenry and demanding good governance from elected officers</p>	<p>Poor funding of activities for CSOs under the DAO programme</p> <p>Concentration of DAO programme on Government IPs</p>

		development programmes.		
M&E and reporting	<p>UNICEF and UNFPA already have existing frameworks for the monitoring of their specific Agencies programme</p> <p>Regular monitoring and supervision already in place for UNICEF and UNFPA programme in the State.</p>	<p>Absence of a joint monitoring tool for DAO programme in the State.</p> <p>Weak monitoring system, absence of joint monitoring by UN Agencies and lack of feedback to Government IPs.</p>	<p>Inter-sectoral participation of all the Government IPs provided room to develop tool for joint monitoring and build capacity of the State to conduct monitoring of its long term development plan.</p>	<p>Insecurity resulting from herdsmen versus farmers clashes leading to restriction of movement in some parts of the State.</p> <p>Failure to institute functional Joint Monitoring in UN Office - DMAG</p>
Cross-cutting issues	<p>Capacities of State personnel built on key programming principles of the UN – HRBA, Gender equality and capacity development.</p> <p>Gender Desk Offices established in Ministries in the State.</p> <p>HIV/AIDS programme is one of the focus areas of the UN intervention in the State</p>	<p>Failure in complying with basic programming principles of the UN especially environmental sustainability in programmes as environmental impact assessment is not done prior to commencement of programmes (concern expressed by network of CSOs in the State).</p>	<p>Benue is the focus of HIV/AIDS intervention as the State with highest prevalence in the country</p>	<p>Insecurity leading to mass displacement of people fuels HIV incidence and makes intervention difficult.</p> <p>Cultural norms and human behaviours favouring the spread of the disease show resistance to change</p> <p>High level of unemployment among youths predispose to HIV</p> <p>Low status of females contributes to gender inequalities, transactional sex, and vulnerabilities of females.</p>

Efficiency in the use of resources	<p>Capacity of State personnel built on UN financial principles</p> <p>UNH4+ programme involving UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, UNAIDS enhanced efficiency in utilization of resources and provided an example of success story in joint programming.</p>	<p>Delays in submission of proposals, reports, work plans by government partners.</p> <p>Delays in release of funds by UN Agencies for programme implementation</p>	<p>Pooling of resources for joint activities as exemplified in response of the massive flooding in the State in 2012 through UN response (CERF).</p> <p>Provides lessons to be used in subsequent programming in the State – UNDAF III</p>	<p>Weak financial governance - corruption</p>
Sustainability	<p>Well organised government institution and personnel with history of consistent good performance and reporting of aid assistance</p> <p>Strengthened partnership for inter-sectoral partnership & collaboration</p>	<p>Non-payment of Counterpart Cash Contribution by State Government.</p>	<p>Well-developed capacities in Government IPs available for programme implementation.</p> <p>State Government scaling up water and sanitation programme to reach wide number of communities.</p> <p>Communities pooling funds together to support interventions on water and sanitation</p>	<p>Inadequate counterpart funding from Benue State Government</p> <p>Security threats resulting from herdsmen's versus farmers' clashes, creating tensions, displacement of communities, etc.</p> <p>Transition moving towards UNDAF III (from UNDAF II) threatened the stability of projects</p>

Cross River State	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Relevance				
Ownership of the DaO State	<p>Strong political support by Cross River State Government</p> <p>Well organised government institution (Department of International Cooperation) and personnel anchoring the DAO programme for the State</p> <p>Highly motivated Government personnel manning the government institution for aid coordination.</p> <p>The DAO programme in the State developed from the blueprint of the State Development Programme</p>		<p>There is good presence of UN Agencies operating in the State thereby providing room to show advantages of the DAO concept.</p> <p>The State has earned good reputation as tourism hub in Nigeria and enjoys peaceful environment making it attractive for development assistance and investors.</p>	<p>Political transition for the 2015 general elections and uncertainties about the focus of the new government and to agreements entered by previous government.</p> <p>Loss of experienced personnel (civil servants and political appointees), leading to loss of capable hands and institutional memory.</p>
Role and presence of UN agencies, and participation of NRAs	<p>Joint programming through DAO brings together UN Agencies, pooling resources and harmonizing programmes for a common goal.</p> <p>High presence of most of the UN</p>	<p>Absence of UN Agencies (WHO, UNFPA, etc.) in coordinating meetings resulting in weak cohesion among the UN Agencies in joint</p>	<p>UN could use existing structures of specific Agencies (UNICEF, UNFPA) to mount DAO programme to enhance efficiency rather than create new ones.</p>	<p>Apprehension by some UN Agencies of losing relevance or swallowed up under joint programming ventures.</p> <p>Non-commitment by</p>

	<p>Agencies in the State because of the welcoming environment in the State for development assistance – UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, FAO, UNDP, UNODC, UNEP, etc.</p> <p>DAO Provides platform for UN Agencies not operating in the State to quickly utilize existing structures to address issues in their mandate areas – e.g. UNHCR intervention in the State.</p>	programming	Non-Resident UN Agencies could use DAO structures to implement their programmes with collaboration of other UN Agencies	some UN personnel to DAO as activities demanded of them in the DAO are not reflected specifically in their job description.
Coordination mechanisms	<p>Presence of coordinating mechanism for aid assistance through the Cross River State Department of International Cooperation (DIDC)</p> <p>UNICEF - the Lead UN Agency for DAO showed strong presence in the State and ensured regular coordination meetings and follow up of programme activities.</p>	<p>Direct engagement with State Government by Some UN Agencies rather than through the DAO mandate subverting UN joint programming arrangement (UNHCR does not participate in the joint programming while UNFPA still signs independent Annual work plans with the State Government.</p>	<p>Existence of well-developed programme structure established by some Agencies for their Agency operations that are channelled into joint programming, e.g. UNICEF.</p> <p>Presence of a number of UN Agencies already operating in the State – UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, and a joint UN programming in maternal and child health – UNH4+ providing opportunities to show effectiveness of DAO</p>	<p>Non-participation of some UN Agencies in coordination meetings and inability to follow up on decisions made – undermining coordination.</p> <p>Only one pillar of the pillars of DAO concept was pursued in DAO states – one programme pillar. DAO did not deal with the other pillars (one budgetary framework, one fund, one leader, one office and one voice).</p>

Effectiveness in achieving results	<p>UN Agencies operating in Cross River State presented a common front under DAO programme and signed a common MoU with the State Government.</p> <p>The UNH4+ already operating in Cross River State on maternal and child health intervention for joint UN programming</p> <p>Cross River State maintained coordinated system for all aid assistance including non UN grants leading to aid assistance accounting for over 10% of the State budget in 2013</p>	Harmonization of programmes still remain sensitive issue as Agencies attachment to specific mandates are very strong	Successes in joint programming in HIV/AIDS and the implementation of joint programming under the UNH4+ are examples to be explored and scaled up	Demands by funding organizations for programme reports may create apprehensions for pooling funds together for joint programming
Joint programming	Joint programming through DAO brought UN Agencies together under a common platform for aid assistance to the State.	Commitment of some UN Agencies to the DAO concept still in doubt as some still continue to engage State government directly, e.g. UNEP.	Cross-sectoral collaboration bringing together all components of government agencies for achievement of government development blueprint.	Non-compliance of some UN Agencies to the DAO mandate undermining joint programming venture.
Partnerships, CSOs	Well organised network of CSOs operating in the State and providing oversight function for the interest of the beneficiaries, and having good relationship with	Low engagement of CSOs in programme activities casts doubts on programmes yielding desired results as the	Availability of Network of CSOs provides room for grass root mobilization for demand creation activities for	Too close relationship between government and network of CSOs operating in the State may make CSOs lose their

	<p>State Government.</p> <p>The DIDC strengthened partnership for inter-sectoral partnership & collaboration between all the State Ministries as an umbrella body and ensured well organized development assistance in the State for both UN and Non-UN development assistance.</p>	<p>watch-dog role of CSOs is not utilized.</p>	<p>increased use of services.</p> <p>The CSOs showed great enthusiasm in promoting rights of the citizenry and demands for good governance from elected officers.</p> <p>The CSOs enjoy close collaboration with government institution and could use it to influence people oriented policies and programmes</p>	<p>independence and forego their watch-dog role in society.</p>
M&E and reporting	<p>UNICEF and UNFPA already have existing frameworks for the monitoring of their specific Agencies programmes.</p> <p>Joint monitoring of programmes coordinated by the Department for Development Corporation.</p> <p>CSOs involved in monitoring activities and voice views of beneficiaries</p>	<p>Absence of a joint monitoring tool for DAO programme in the State.</p> <p>Weak monitoring system with absence of joint monitoring by UN of the DAO programme.</p>	<p>Inter-sectoral participation of all the Government IPs provided room to develop tool for joint monitoring and build capacity of the State to conduct monitoring of its long term development plan.</p>	<p>Failure to institute functional Joint Monitoring in UN Office - DMAG</p>
Cross-cutting issues	<p>Capacities of State personnel built on key programming principles of the UN – HRBA, Gender equality</p>	<p>Relevance on UN Agencies for development of</p>	<p>The State is focus of UN with particular reference to climate change, preservation</p>	<p>The unresolved settlement of people displaced from the Bakassi</p>

	<p>and capacity development, environmental sustainability etc.</p> <p>Gender Desk Offices established in Ministries in the State.</p> <p>HIV/AIDS programme is one of the focus areas of the UN intervention in the State</p>	capacities in the programming principles of HRBA, RBM, gender equality, environmental sustainability	<p>of some endanger species of monkeys and other wild lives thereby bringing presence of UN Agencies.</p> <p>The State is also focus of the UN in relation to the Green Tree Agreement signed between Nigeria and Cameroon ceding the Bakassi Peninsular to Cameroon</p>	Peninsular when it was ceded to Cameroon remains prickly to the State indigenes and Government of Cross River State.
Efficiency in the use of resources	<p>Capacity of State personnel built on UN financial principles</p> <p>UNH4+ programme involving UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, UNAIDS enhanced efficiency in utilization of resources and is an example of success story in joint programming.</p>	<p>Delays in submission of proposals, reports, work plans by government partners.</p> <p>Delays in release of funds by UN Agencies for programme implementation</p>	The well-organized State institution for coordinating aid assistance has made the State a model for development assistance and assisted in attracting development partners to the State.	Weak financial governance - corruption
Sustainability	<p>Well organised government institution and personnel with history of consistent good performance and reporting of aid assistance</p> <p>Strengthened partnership for inter-sectoral partnership & collaboration</p>	Reliance on UN Agencies for building of capacities in relevant areas development assistance.	<p>Well-developed capacities in Government IPs available for programme implementation.</p> <p>Establishment of sustainable livelihood training, e.g. bee keeping imparted to community members to enhance economic status and</p>	<p>Minimal security threats as a cordial relationship exists between Nigeria and Cameroon under the Green Tree Agreement on the Bakassi Peninsular area.</p> <p>The issue of the displaced</p>

	<p>Good working environment and minimal security threats</p> <p>Good record of development assistance for development partners – both UN Agencies, multilateral (EU) and bilateral Agencies (USAID, CIDA)</p>		divert their attention from forest degradation activities.	<p>persons from the Bakassi Peninsular is still unresolved.</p> <p>Transition moving towards UNDAF III (from UNDAF II) threatens the stability of projects</p>
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Imo State	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Relevance				
Ownership of the DaO State	The DAO programme in the State developed from the blueprint of the State Development Programme.	Poor compliance of Government to payment of the Counterpart Cash Contribution. Weak coordinating mechanism for aid assistance through the State Ministry of Economic Planning.	There is good presence of UN Agencies operating in the State thereby providing room to show advantages of the DAO concept.	Political transition for the 2015 general elections and uncertainties about the focus of the new government and to agreements entered by previous government. Loss of experienced personnel (civil servants and political appointees), leading to loss of capable hands and institutional memory.
Role and presence of UN agencies, and participation of NRAs	Joint programming through DAO brings together UN Agencies, pooling resources and harmonizing programmes for a common goal. DAO provides a platform for UN Agencies not operating in the State to quickly utilize existing structures to address issues in	UN Agencies still operating directly with State IPs without going through the DAO as there is weak coordination by the Lead UN Agency – UNIDO.	UN could use existing structures of specific Agencies (UNICEF, UNFPA) to mount DAO programme to enhance efficiency rather than create new ones. Non-Resident UN Agencies could use DAO structures to implement their programmes with collaboration of other	Apprehension by some UN Agencies of losing relevance or being swallowed up under joint programming ventures.

	their mandate areas.		UN Agencies.	
Coordination mechanisms	Well organised development structures mounted by individual UN Agencies (UNICEF, UNFPA) that can serve as a platform for joint programming activities.	Absence of coordinating mechanism by UNIDO the Lead UN Agency for DAO in Imo State leading to lack of cohesion between the UN Agencies operating in the State.	Existence of a well-developed programme structure established by some Agencies for their Agency operations that are channelled into joint programming e.g., UNICEF. Presence of a number of UN Agencies already operating in the State – UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, and a joint UN programming in maternal and child health – UNH4+ providing opportunities to show effectiveness of DAO.	Use of UN Agencies as Lead Agency in States where they have limited activities or lack physical presence leading to failure in mounting a coordination mechanism for DAO as exemplified by UNIDO in Imo State. Only one pillar of the pillars of DAO concept was pursued in DAO states – one programme pillar. DAO did not deal with the other pillars - one budgetary framework, one fund, one leader, one office and one voice.
Effectiveness in achieving results	UN Agencies operating in Imo State presented a common front under DAO programme and signed a common MoU with the State Government. The UNH4+ already operates in Benue State on maternal and child health intervention for joint UN	Harmonization of programmes still remains a sensitive issue as Agencies attachment to specific mandates is very strong.	Successes in joint programming in HIV/AIDS and the implementation of joint programming under the UNH4+ are examples to be explored and scaled up.	Demands by funding organizations for programme reports may create apprehensions for pooling funds together for joint programming.

	programming.			
Joint programming	Joint programming through DAO brought UN Agencies together under a common platform for aid assistance to the State.	The capacity of the State Ministry of Economic Planning to drive the DAO process in the State was not developed.	<p>Cross-sectoral collaboration bringing together all components of government agencies for achievement of government development blueprint.</p> <p>Joint programming strengthens the capacity of the State coordinating institution – Ministry of Economic Planning to deliver on its mandate.</p>	Non-compliance of some UN Agencies to the DAO mandate undermining joint programming venture.
Partnerships, CSOs	Well organised network of CSOs operating in the State and providing oversight function for the interest of the beneficiaries.	<p>Low engagement of CSOs in programme activities casts doubts on programmes yielding desired results as the watch-dog role of CSOs is not fully utilized.</p> <p>The governance system in the State does not encourage CSO operations as their efforts in mobilizing populace on negotiating with political office holders on their social</p>	<p>Availability of Network of CSOs provides room for grass root mobilization for demanding the creation of activities for increased use of services.</p> <p>The CSOs showed great enthusiasm in promoting rights of the citizenry and demanding good governance from elected officers.</p>	<p>Poor funding of activities for CSOs under the DAO programme.</p> <p>Concentration of DAO programme on Government IPs.</p>

		contract could not be sustained.		
M&E and reporting	<p>UNICEF and UNFPA already have existing frameworks for the monitoring of their specific Agencies programme and these can be adapted for joint programming activities.</p> <p>Regular monitoring and supervision already in place for UNICEF and UNFPA programme in the State.</p>	<p>Absence of a joint monitoring tool for DAO programme in the State.</p> <p>Weak monitoring system and absence of joint monitoring by UN Agencies and lack of feedback to Government IPs.</p>	Inter-sectoral participation of all the Government IPs provided room to develop tool for joint monitoring and build capacity of the State to conduct monitoring of its long term development plan.	Failure to institute functional Joint Monitoring in UN Office – DMAG.
Cross-cutting issues	<p>Capacities of State personnel built on key programming principles of the UN – HRBA, Gender equality and capacity development.</p> <p>Gender Desk Offices established in Ministries in the State.</p>	Reliance on the UN to build the capacities of the State personnel on development assistance.	DAO provides opportunity to mainstream gender equality into all sphere of development in the State and to build capacities in other programming principles – RBM, HRBA, sustainable development etc.	Cultural norms still undermine the status of women and undermine efforts on gender equality, HRBA and negative cultural practices.
Efficiency in the use of resources	<p>Capacity of State personnel built on UN financial operations.</p> <p>UNH4+ programme involving UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, and UNAIDS enhanced efficiency in utilization of resources and provided an example of success</p>	<p>Delays in submission of proposals, reports, work plans by government partners.</p> <p>Delays in release of funds by UN Agencies for programme</p>	Success in DAO and the implementation of the joint programming under UNH4+ provided lessons to be used in subsequent programming in the State for UNDAF III.	Weak financial governance – corruption.

	story in joint programming.	implementation.		
Sustainability	<p>Well organised government institution and personnel with history of consistent good performance and reporting of aid assistance.</p> <p>Strengthened partnership for inter-sectoral partnership & collaboration.</p> <p>High presence of many of the UN Agencies in the State for development assistance – UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, FAO, UNDP, UNIDO, etc.</p> <p>Good private sector involvement in delivery of social services in health, education and community based organizations actively engaged in community development projects leading to the state have one of the best national indices in health and education.</p>	<p>Lack of commitment by State Government to DAO programming as evidence in poor compliance to the agreed Counterpart Cash Contribution.</p>	<p>Well-developed capacities in Government IPs available for programme implementation.</p> <p>High level of community led development activities and private sector involvement in development work and social service delivery.</p>	<p>Inadequate counterpart funding from Imo State Government.</p> <p>Transition moving towards UNDAF III (from UNDAF II) threatens the stability of projects.</p>