



**Namibia Protected Landscape
Conservation Areas Initiative (NAM-PLACE)**

PIMS 4173, Atlas Award 00059705, Atlas Project No: 00074796

**Mid-term Evaluation, Volume I
March 2014**

Republic of Namibia

GEF SO1/SP3: Strengthened National Terrestrial Protected Area Networks

Republic of Namibia
**Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), Department of Environmental
Affairs (DEA)**
United National Development Program (UNDP)

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The evaluation is intended to give a summary of what has been achieved in the project to date and to look forward to what can be achieved in the remaining half of the project as well as glean some of the lessons that can be learned from it in what was a relatively short period.

We would like to stress our motivation here. We recognize that the project has been doing a fine job but that there are design issues that may provide the root explanation for some of the issues described in this report. However, we wish only to point out how the project's alignment can be improved such that its ultimate objective – to deliver global environment benefits and to catalyse further LCAs which deliver yet more global environment benefits – can be achieved in the most streamlined way possible. Thus, in the report, we have tried to offer constructive criticism where we think it is warranted and we hope that and would be grateful if those involved in the project take it as such.

Finally, for the international consultant, it was a pleasure to visit Namibia (with all its contrasts to Uganda!) to be shown around with such evident pride and to see wonderful places. We saw the results of the dedication and enthusiasm that people had put into the work of conserving important places in the world. We would like to offer them our thanks and wish them every success in their continuing endeavours.

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Executive Summary

Project Summary Table

Title	Namibia Protected Landscape Conservation Areas Initiative (NAM-PLACE)		
GEF Strategy and Objective	SO1/SP3 Strengthened National Terrestrial Protected Area Networks		
Country	Namibia	GEF grant	USD 4.5 million
Atlas Award	00058307	Management arrangements	NEX
Project ID	0003741	Start date	03 February 2011
PIMS no.	4173	Original end date	31 December 2015
		Revised end date	30 June 2016

Project Description (brief)

The project is aiming to establish five LCAs that “will ... be managed for the full suite of biodiversity and landscape values, including ecosystem services [and] ecosystem functioning, for sustainable land management and for economic performance.” The LCAs will be managed through adaptive collaborative arrangements to “nationally mandated standards” by empowered institutions and be funded through sustainable mechanisms. The project will also create an enabling environment for market incentives to operationalize the LCAs. Therefore, the project objective was defined as being: “Protected Landscape Conservation Areas are established and ensure that land uses in areas adjacent to existing Protected Areas are compatible with biodiversity conservation objectives, and corridors are established to sustain the viability of wildlife populations.” This objective would be achieved through three components, with a total of 15 outputs associated with them. The achievement of the project’s objective, components and outputs are measured through 17 indicators; when disaggregated, these amount to 31 indicators.

In principle, this will contribute to overcoming the threats and root causes as described in the Project Document. But because in the project document, the threats and root causes analysis is a ‘catch-all’ for all the ills in the protected area system rather than an explanation of the need for landscape-level conservation, more accurately, it will contribute to overcoming some of the threats and root causes and lead to the following results within LCAs: i) improve linkages between state PAs and their neighbours, and cooperative and harmonized management within a collaborative or joint management system and plan, ii) improve compatibility of land use in adjacent areas, iii) as fences come down within LCAs, there will be movement of wildlife among areas, iv) the capacity in areas adjacent to PAs will improve, and v) the project may test whether conversion of large-scale areas to non-consumptive wildlife viewing areas is economically beneficial.

The project is being implemented by the MET under NEX modalities. Indeed, the MET enjoys a great deal of autonomy in implementing the project. The project implementation is overseen by a PSC and implemented by a PCU that includes a PM, an AFA and three LSs. The nature of the project (establishing five collaboratively

managed LCAs) means that significant numbers of stakeholders are involved in the project including state, NGO, community and private actors.

Project Results. The project had a (10 month) delayed start-up following signature (on 03 February 2011 with the PCU being formed on 01 August 2011 but the Inception Report only being produced) but in the 24 months since the implementation started following the project's Inception Meeting on 15 November 2011, the project has moved forward effectively towards achieving its objective and components. Most notable among the project results (both against the project's design and landscape level conservation), to date, include:

- The five LCAs have been established (boundaries have been identified; the stakeholders have been identified; the Landscape Management Committees have been constituted; constitutions for the LCAs have been drafted, agreed and signed by most stakeholders).
- The area protected by the established LCAs (of 35,049km²) significantly exceeds the targeted 15,550km² (however it should be noted that this is not all formally protected as these areas will not have protected area status).
- Importantly, communication, collaboration and trust are being built among the stakeholders (but see section on issues below).
- The concept of landscape conservation areas was introduced into four policies Landscapes integrated into national policies. This provides the foundation for including the concept of landscape conservation areas in the pending Protected Areas and Wildlife Management Bill (PAWMB).
- The project has commissioned various studies, assessments and the development of various strategic plans; the results has been drafted or completed.
- A number of infrastructure projects have been completed and others are still in the process of being implemented.
- SEAs for tourism development in the five LCAs have been drafted.

Issues. A few moderate shortcomings in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency have arisen over the course of the project's implementation. These include:

- There is an urgent need to clarify the budgeting and spending processes with particular reference to the project management budgeting (specific details are given in section on Project Finance). This raises questions about the cost effectiveness of the project but the MTR is unable to assess this further until the details of budgets and spending have been redone and they have been examined to determine how the allocation is being done.
- In terms of methodology, the project has been carrying out activities and working towards the indicators in all five LCAs at the same time and at the same rate – thus, not taking into account the significant variation and difference among the LCAs. This, despite the fact that each LCA was profiled during the PPG phase including a capacity assessment; if this information was used properly in the project design, it would have led to establishing different target dates for achieving different indicators among the LCAs. That this was not done and that the project has been implemented simultaneously in all LCAs has resulted in unintended consequences – as illustrated by the status in the GW LCA (in which the community conservancies have become alienated and mistrustful – although this is but one reason for growing mistrust). The alternative and adaptive approach would have been to implement the activities, step-by-step in each LCA according to each one's particular status at any given time.

- Not all key stakeholders are involved in the Landscape Management Committees (e.g., hunting and game ranches).
- The PM and all Landscape Specialists (but particularly in Mudumu LCA) reported to the MTR team that the line ministries are not as engaged as they should be. This was also witnessed by the MTR mission.
- There are questions that exist about the relevance of some of the infrastructural inputs (from the perspective of landscape level conservation, and the objective and components of the project) that the project has either already made or is planning to make – see detailed in the section on Relevance). Thus, the project has been implementing the infrastructural components deemed necessary by the LMCs without first examining their relevance to the objective and components of the project or to the principles of landscape level conservation. The project document is clear on this (Output 2.6 – suggestions include guard posts, realigned boundary fences, fire management equipment and fire breaks, water points and visitor interpretation centres all of which are relevant to landscape level conservation)

Review Rating Table

Item	Rating	Comment
Overall Project Results	MS	Following a ten-month delay to the project start-up, the project got off to a good, effective start. It has achieved many aspects of what it set out to achieve some of which are well in advance of when they were expected. However, there are a few caveats – or moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency – and, therefore, it is rated as being Moderately Satisfactory. The MTR is, however, confident that these shortcomings can be overcome (and see section 4 for how they should be overcome) in the remaining 30 months of the project’s life and as such it will become Highly Satisfactory.
IA & EA Execution		
Overall quality of implementation & execution	MS	The project has been implemented well in terms of carrying out activities and the results achieved to date play witness to this. However, the relevance of the activities has not always been focused on the outcomes and objective of the project and questions remain unanswered regarding the cost effectiveness of the implementation (and specifically the project management costs). As a result, the implementation and execution has been moderately satisfactory. However, if the project continues to implement activities – that are well focused – and at this rate for the remaining 30 months of its life, it will achieve all or almost all that it set out to achieve.
Implementation Agency Execution (UNDP)	S	The UNDP-CO is playing the supportive role in the project as it should and as would be expected. There were a number of issues found over the course of the MTR and we believe that had the UNDP-CO and RTC been more vigilant and fastidious (e.g., in scrutiny of workplans and budgets, in scrutiny of LMC plans and overall guidance on project direction), then the project would have been more satisfactory overall. Obviously part of the MTR’s role is to pick up on these things – and we have done this – but we believe that if the UNDP-CO had been more vigilant they would have already have been noticed and some form of adaptive management implemented. This is not to say that the UNDP-CO should have an implementation role; but it is to say that they should have played a greater supportive and oversight role.

Item	Rating	Comment
		There was an assumption that “everything in Namibia was fine” and so vigilance by the RTC might not have been as sharp as it could have been. Further, the landscape level conservation aspect of the project has largely been missed and a landscape conservation expert has not been brought on (despite being suggested in the project document).
Executing Agency Execution (MET)	MS	<p>The MET has taken ownership of the project – and is almost completely autonomous from the UNDP-CO. Knowledge of the project is outstanding within the DRSPM and, partly, within the DEA. However, there are aspects that appear paradoxical and contradictory, and which suggest that the other parts of the institution are less engaged in and less supportive of the project that they could be. These are explained in detail in the body of the report.</p> <p>As with the above point, the MET could also have monitored the implementation of the project more closely to ensure that it was following the intended course.</p>
M&E		
Overall quality of M&E	MS	Had the M&E had been better (both by the DEA of the MET, by the UNDP-CO and RTC), we believe that some of the issues that the MTR found would have been dealt with already (although this is part of the role of the MTR!) and the ‘course’ adjustment that we are recommending would not be necessary. Quantifying impact – and not just those aspects that appear in the logframe – is important to elucidate the achievements (and, occasionally, shortcomings) of the project. With the variation among the LCAs, achieving indications uniformly and simultaneously was always going to be challenging and the project should be implemented adaptively in response to the capacity of stakeholders within each LCA.
M&E design at project start-up	S	The project adopted the standard M&E framework for UNDP-GEF projects. However, the M&E design could have indicated that the project should monitor each of the activities and interventions that it is carrying out – and, thereby, have quantitative information on the impacts (both intended and unintended) that it is having. In addition, the M&E is limited by the knowledge in landscape-level conservation and the relative youth of the Landscape Specialists (to stand up to strong people in LMCs, for example).
M&E plan Implementation	MS	The project has implemented the basic UNDP-GEF M&E framework, including production of an Inception Report, APRs, and PIRs. There have been few UNDP-CO and no RTC missions to the field sites. However, continuing from the design, while there have been field visits and the LSs spend a great deal of time in the field (to implement and monitor <i>activities</i>), the project has not quantitatively monitored the outcomes and impacts of interventions and activities that it has carried out (there are no data). This should be done in the second half of the project.
Outcomes		
Overall quality of project outcomes	MS	The project has been effectively implemented to date and has done much to create an enabling environment for LCAs as well as establish the five target LCAs. However, the project has not reacted adaptively to the large capacity variation that exists (and was recorded in the capacity assessments in the PPG) among the LCAs being guided by achieving indicators rather than be vigilant to that variation and the impacts that are being had.

Item	Rating	Comment
Relevance	MS	While the majority of the project's work is highly relevant to the national development objectives there are shortcomings in the relevance of some aspects of the project – most notably in the inputs that the project has made (relative to the relevance to landscape level conservation objectives – here the LMCs have treated the project as a source of funding for various inputs but not all of these have been fully relevant to the project's objectives). In addition, at the MTR stage of the project, there are questions about the global environmental benefits of the project (and hence incremental logic) at present (but this can be solved through replication).
Effectiveness	S	The project has been very effective about moving forward, particularly with the establishment of LCAs and an enabling framework for them. This has been done in good time.
Efficiency	U/A	There are questions that exist about the cost effectiveness of the project but because there were issues with the budgeting of project management costs (and that these things subsequently need to be updated and thereafter re-assess), the MTR was unable to assess them at present. This is explained in detail in the section on Project Finance.
Sustainability		
Overall likelihood of risks to sustainability	ML	The aspects of sustainability are closely interlinked. If Financial and Institutional Sustainability can be achieved (and this currently appears Moderately Likely), then the Environmental and Overall Sustainability will follow. The right language is being spoken by project partners and stakeholders to ensure sustainability but these need to be planned and then put into place in a demonstrative way (see section 4.4 that deals specifically with how to achieve sustainability). An overall sustainability plan should be developed and implemented adaptively at the LCA level.
Financial resources	L	
Socio-economic	MU	
Institutional Framework and governance	ML	
Environmental	ML	
Catalytic Role		
Production of a Public Good	S	In terms of replication, the project is at the point (or further) that one would expect by the MTR: it has spent 30 months creating a framework for and establishing LCAs. Through this process, it has learned many lessons (as indicated in the PIRs). This puts the project in a good position to develop guidelines for replication. These should be developed and disseminated in the remaining 30 months of the project's life.
Demonstration	S	
Replication	MS	
Scaling up	U/A	

Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons

The conclusion, at present, is that during its first half, the project has been very effective in the activities that it has carried out. If the momentum is maintained over the remainder of the project's life, it will then be on course to achieve most of what it set out to achieve and as a result be a successful project. Partly because of design issues and the location of the demonstration LCAs, the global environmental benefits (that are provide the incremental logic to GEF funding) that result from the project may be initially limited. (This is primarily because there is a focus on large mammalian fauna rather than the globally important biodiversity – e.g., the herpatofauna and invertebrate fauna – or ecological processes.) However, if the project acts as a springboard for replicating landscape level conservation processes elsewhere in Namibia, global environmental benefits will accrue.

The MTR makes a number of recommendations, which can be briefly summarised as being i) if the project maintains the work rate over the remaining 30 months of its life, it will complete all its tasks in good time, ii) the project must retain a focus on the objective and components of the project and, through enhanced monitoring, be in a position to demonstrate this and iii) the project must start to build for sustainability immediately. In more detail, the key recommendations include:

- Reconcile the budgetary – expenditure issues, with particular reference to the project management budgets and expenditure in YR2 and YR3. While broad reallocated budgets and expenditure were satisfactorily provided to the MTR evaluators, further examination of the details is warranted to determine what is being placed in the project management budget and what is not, and whether the guidelines for the project management budget in the project document is being followed. The reconciled budgets and accounts will have to be approved at least by the PSC. [Note that the management response to the draft MTR states: “*This is noted and will be reconciled accordingly. The M&E related costs, Travel and Salaries were recorded under Project Management (Component 4) instead of under other activities.*”]
- In line with the approval by the UNDP-CO (and its inclusion in the PIR), there should be a no cost six-month extension to the project to compensate for the slow start-up of activities following the signature. This no-cost extension needs to be approved by the PSC. The project would then terminate on 30 June 2016.
- The project should retain a focus on the underlying concepts of landscape level conservation to ensure that all (and not just some) activities remain relevant to this. The project should hire a landscape level conservation expert to provide technical backstopping (as is proposed in the Project Document); s/he can assist with ensuring that decisions and activities are carried out in line with the underlying concepts.
- The MTR makes some specific recommendations with reference to adjusting the logframe (see Annex IV); the adjustments respond specifically to the capacity differences among the LCAs and the effect that this will have on time frames; even with these recommendations, the project should be implemented adaptively – which demands that the level of monitoring is sufficient and sensitive enough to allow for adaptive management that takes into account those differences.
- When making inputs, care should be taken i) to remain transparent (to all stakeholders) so as not to create distrust; and ii) not to create expectations that may be unfulfilled which would then further exacerbate distrust.

- On the basis that the project was originally developed, endorsed and is owned by the MET (as well as providing significant cofinance for the project), the MET should demonstrate leadership in and enthusiasm for the project (including, for example, signing Constitutions) so as not to erode trust among partners and stakeholders.
- All relevant stakeholders should be engaged in the project, including line ministries; there needs to be coordination such that activities that the line ministries are planning and implementing do not undermine the objectives of the project (e.g., allocating small-holding land in the middle of a critical wildlife corridor). In addition, the hunting and game farming operations have been excluded from the LCAs despite their importance in some of the landscapes.
- Contribute, where possible, to the continued process of finalisation and approval of the PAWMB.
- Having now been established, consolidate the LCAs taking into account the profound differences among them. As examples, i) the Constitutions could be developed further into regulations and guidelines, and ii) the process with the community conservancies in the GW LCA may need to be re-started using both conflict resolution expertise as well as community conservancy governance expertise.
- Build an effective framework and process for replication of the LCAs elsewhere in the country (and, ideally, this should target the areas of highest global biodiversity significance).
- Ensure the sustainability of the processes and impacts that the project has achieved to date. This should start by developing – and then implementing – a Sustainability Plan. The MTR makes specific recommendations about some of the steps that should be taken to ensure both financial and institutional sustainability (both of which will contribute to environmental sustainability).
- The project should plan activities such that they are not simply implemented but also that their impacts should be monitored to the extent (i.e., sufficiently sensitively) that activities that lead to inadvertent, negative impacts can be stopped or altered. On project termination, an Impact Study should be conducted to determine the (intended and unintended) impact of the project in relation to its objectives.
- The project should aim to not only develop the plans, agreements, assessments, policies and legislation described in the Project Document and logframe but make efforts to ensure that they are implemented.
- It is essential that the project staff are retained until the end of the project and the MET should find mechanisms to do this. Recommendations for this have been made.

Many lessons have also been learned in the first half of the project's life. Lessons are embedded in many of the recommendations described above but specific lessons include:

- While the landscapes were partly selected on the basis of their variation (precisely to allow lessons to be learned) and despite the profiling and capacity assessments in the PPG, the project's design did not account for the differences in history, capacity, levels of interest and engagement, and expectations among the stakeholders within and among the LCAs. The differences mean that it is unrealistic to expect i) that they could move ahead using the same modalities and at the same rate and ii) that the LCAs could reach the same end point by the EOP.

The lesson here is that the project design should take into account the PPG outputs and that monitoring needs to be done during project implementation that is sensitive to such variation. The larger lesson is that when executing project in different demonstration sites among which there is variation, project implementers should expect that variation to impact the modalities and rates of implementation.

- Further to the above point, the LCAs were all at different starting points at the beginning of the project and those with better foundations have advanced further and more securely.
- While there may be advantages to having the project housed within the DEA of the MET, the general opinion among the majority of interviewees was that there would have been greater advantages had the project had been housed within the DRSPM. Indeed, this would have also have facilitated the transfer to the Landscape Coordination Service that has been proposed by the DRSPM under their centralised Coordination Service. (This does not mean that we are proposing a change at this point although the PCU will have to work even more closely with the DRSPM in the second half of the project.) The lesson here is to ensure appropriate institutional housing for the project from the outset of the project:
- For reasons of ownership and understanding, it would be ideal to involve the PM in the project for its conception, through the design and into implementation as well as in the selection of the members of the team; there are, of course, issues with this most specifically funding to have him or her involved at this early stage.
- Where it is possible for the UNDP-CO, in particular, but also the MET to provide training for the project's team in aspects that will result in the projects being managed and implemented more effectively, this would be worthwhile.
- The MTR believes that there are mechanisms that could expedite signatures and authorisations for those components of the project that require authorisations. The *processes and their predicted outputs* could be endorsed at the highest necessary level early on in a project's life such that when it comes to the endorsement of the outputs themselves, these would not be delayed. In other words, when the project is being planned, the need for signatures on important agreements (for example) should be identified knowing that this is often a barrier in projects. If the signee can agree, in advance of the project, to delegate the signature to someone more accessible. Therefore, that senior figure is signing off on the *process*; once s/he has agreed to the process and assuming the process is followed properly, the delegated person can then sign on the agreements. This would significantly streamline projects.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFA	Administrative and Financial Assistant
AHGP	Ai-Ais Hot Springs Game Park
APR	Annual Project Reports
BMM	Bwabwata-Mamili-Mudumu
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCF	Cheetah Conservation Fund
CPP	Country Pilot Partnership
DEA	Department of Environmental Affairs – part of the MET
EOP	End of Project
EU	European Union
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GFRCL	Greater Fish River Canyon Landscape
GRN	Government of the Republic of Namibia
GSNL	Greater Sossusvlei Namib Landscape
GWL	Greater Waterberg Landscape
ICREMA	Integrated Community Based Ecosystem Management Project
IRLUP	Integrated Regional Land Use Plan
LCA	Landscape Conservation Areas
LDMS	Land Degradation Monitoring System
LLM	Local Level Monitoring
LMC	Landscape Management Committee
LS	Landscape Specialist
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAWF	Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MET	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
METT	Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
ML	Mudumu Landscape
MLR	Ministry of Lands and Resettlement
MNC	Mudumu North Complex
MoW	Ministry of Works and Transport
MRLGHRD	Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Dvt
MTR	Mid-term Review
NACOMA	Namib Coast Biodiversity Conservation and Management Project
NAM-PLACE	MET/GEF/UNDP Project “Namibia Protected Landscape Conservation Areas

	Initiative”
NAMETT	Namibian Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
NASCO	Namibian Association of Community Based Natural Resource Management
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
NCSA	National Capacity Self-Assessment
NDP-4	Namibia’s Fourth National Development Plan
NEX	Nationally Executed
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NNP	Namib Narkluft National Park
NRNR	Namib Rand Nature Reserve
NTB	Namibia Tourist Board
NWR	Namibia Wildlife Resorts
PA	Protected Area
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PAWMB	Protected Areas and Wildlife Management Bill
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PIF	Project Identification Form
PIR	Project Implementation Reviews
LCA	Landscape Conservation Area
PM	Project Manager
PS	Permanent Secretary
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RCBCP	Richtersveld Community Biodiversity Conservation Project
RPRP	Rural Poverty Reduction Programme
SEA	Strategic Environmental Assessment
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SoCR	State of Conservancy Report
SPAN	UNDP-GEF “Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN)” project (already terminated)
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDAF	United Nations Development
UNDP-CO	United Nations Development Programme Country Office
UNDP-RTC	United Nations Development Programme Regional Technical Centre
UNPAF	United Nations Partnership Framework
WB	World Bank
WGBL	Windhoek Green Belt Landscape

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the review

1. The Mid-term Review of the MET/UNDP-GEF project “Namibia Protected Landscape Conservation Areas Initiative (NAM-PLACE)” was carried out according to the UNDP and GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policies. Thus, it was carried out with the aim of providing a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the project by assessing its design, processes of implementation, achievement to date relative to its objectives. Under this overarching aim, its objectives were i) to promote accountability and transparency for the achievement of GEF objectives through the assessment of results, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact of the partners involved in the project, and ii) to promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing on the results and lessons learned from the project and its partners as a basis for decision-making on policies, strategies, programme management and projects, and to improve knowledge and performance. As such, this MTR was initiated by MET as the GEF Execution Agency for the project to determine its success to date in relation to its stated objectives and to understand the lessons learned through the implementation of the project.

2. The MTR was conducted by two consultants – one International Team Leader and one National Consultant. The consultants were independent of the policy-making process, and the delivery and management of the assistance to the project; the consultants were also not involved in the design, implementation and/or supervision of the project.

3. The MTR was carried out over a period of 25 days starting on 21 October 2013. This placed it two years and eight months after the start of the project which approximates to its mid-point. Carrying out the MTR at this point was thus in line with UNDP/GEF policy.

1.2 Scope & Methodology

4. The approach for the MTR was determined by the Terms of Reference (TOR, see Annex I). The TOR were followed closely and, therefore, the evaluation focused on assessing i) the concept and design of the project, ii) its implementation in terms of quality and timeliness of inputs, financial planning, and monitoring and evaluation, iii) the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the activities that are being carried out, iv) whether the desired (and other undesirable but not intended) outcomes and objectives are being achieved, v) the likelihood of sustainability of the results of the project, and vi) the involvement of stakeholders in the project’s processes and activities.

5. The MTR included a thorough review of the project documents and other outputs, documents, monitoring reports, Annual Project Reports (APR), Project Implementation Reviews (PIR), relevant correspondence and other project related material produced by the project staff or their partners. The evaluation assessed whether monitoring and support visits by UNDP-CO and the UNDP-GEF RTC are being implemented and to ascertain the explanations if they had not been.

6. The MTR also included a mission to Namibia between 05 – 16 November 2013 (see Annex II for the itinerary of the MTR mission). The evaluation process during the mission followed a participatory approach and included a series of structured and

unstructured interviews, both individually and in small groups. Site visits were also conducted i) to validate the reports and indicators, ii) to examine, in particular, any infrastructure development and equipment procured, iii) to consult with local authorities or government representatives, and local communities, and iv) to assess data that may be held only locally. However, one of the limitations of the MTR was that time dictated that i) mission could not visit all five demonstration sites – only three of the five sites were visited, and ii) the time in the sites that the mission did visit was very short (e.g., only one day in the Greater Waterberg LCA). The implications of this are discussed in the Section 4.3 towards the end of the report.

7. The evaluators worked with the Project Staff and particularly with the Project Manager (PM) and the Landscape Specialists (LS) throughout the evaluation. Particular attention was paid to listening to the stakeholders' views and the confidentiality of all interviews was stressed. Whenever possible, the information was crosschecked among the various sources. A full list of people consulted over the course of the mission and by telephone or email thereafter is given in Annex III.

8. The evaluation was carried out according to the UNDP/GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy. Therefore, activities and results were evaluated for their: i) Relevance – thus, the extent to which the results and activities are consistent with local and national development priorities, national and international conservation priorities, and GEF's focal area and operational programme strategies, ii) Effectiveness – thus, how the project's results are related to the original or modified intended outcomes or objectives, and iii) Efficiency – thus, whether the activities are being carried out in a cost effect way and whether the results, to date, were achieved by the least cost option. The results, outcomes, and actual and potential impacts of the project, to date, were examined to determine whether they were positive or negative, foreseen or unintended. Finally, the sustainability of the interventions and results were examined to determine the likelihood of whether benefits would continue to be accrued in the remaining half of the project and, thereafter, on the completion and closure of the project. The sustainability was examined from various perspectives: financial, social, environmental and institutional.

9. In addition, the evaluators took pains to examine the achievements of the project within the realistic political and socio-economic framework of Namibia over the last three years. The evaluation further assessed extent of mainstreaming of other UNDP priorities including women empowerment (gender issues) and poverty alleviation and improved governance. These were undertaken with reference to Namibia's UNPAF (2014-2018).

10. The logical framework (which was amended over the course of the project, with the changes endorsed by the PSC) with Outcomes, Outputs and indicators towards which the PCU worked and which formed the basis of the MTR.

11. According to the GEF policy for Project Evaluations, the relevant areas of the project were evaluated according to performance criteria (Table 1).

Table 1. The ratings that were assigned to the various aspects of the project, in accordance with UNDP/GEF policies.

Rating	Explanation
Highly satisfactory (HS)	The aspect had no shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in

	terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Satisfactory (S)	The aspect had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	The aspect had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)	The aspect had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Unsatisfactory (U)	The aspect had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)	The aspect had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

12. There was one area that we were Unable to Assess (U/A) but no aspects of the project were deemed Not Applicable (N/A).

13. In a similar way, the sustainability of the project's interventions and achievements were examined using the relevant UNDP/GEF ratings (Table 2).

Table 2. The ratings that were assigned to the different dimensions of sustainability of the interventions and achievements of the project.

Rating	Explanation
Likely (L)	Negligible risks to sustainability, with key outcomes expected to continue into the foreseeable future
Moderately Likely (ML)	Moderate risks, but expectations that at least some outcomes will be sustained
Moderately Unlikely (MU)	Substantial risk that key outcomes will not carry on after project closure, although some outputs and activities should carry on
Unlikely (U)	Severe risk that project outcomes as well as key outputs will not be sustained
Highly Unlikely (HU)	Expectation that few if any outputs or activities will continue after project closure

14. A debriefing was given to the PCU and members of the PSC at the end of the mission in Namibia (at 14.00 on 15 November 2013 in the DEA Boardroom in the MET in Windhoek).

15. The MTR was carried out with a number of audiences in mind, including: i) the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) and the various Directorates found thereunder, ii) the UNDP-CO and UNDP-GEF RTC in Addis Ababa, and iii) the Landscape Management Committee in each of the five demonstration landscapes.

1.3 Structure of the review report

16. The report follows the structure of Project Evaluations recommended in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF-Financed Projects as given in Annex 5 of the TOR. As such, it first deals with a description of the project and the development context in Namibia (Section 2), it then deals with the Findings (Section 3) of the evaluation within three sections (Project Design, Project Progress, Adaptive

Management, Monitoring systems and Management arrangements, respectively). The report then draws together the Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons from the project (Section 4).

2 Project description and development context

2.1 Project start and duration

17. This project was conceived as far back as 2004 – at the same time as the UNDP-GEF “Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN)” project. It was originally conceived as a second phase to SPAN but was then brought forward for implementation (to ensure that it fell within GEF-4 as another project – presumably the “Strengthening the Capacity of the Protected Area System to Address New Management Challenges” was being earmarked for GEF-5). Therefore, the PIF was approved on 15 September 2008 with the PPG being approved on 19 February 2009. It appears that the project was approved on 13 November 2009 but it was not endorsed by the GEF CEO until 08 September 2010. The project was finally signed on 03 February 2011, some 29 months after the PIF was approved.

18. It took some time to recruit the project staff and they were in place by 01 August 2011 (six months after the start of the project) and then a further four months before the Inception Workshop was held on 15 November 2011. This represents an unusually long period (when compared to other similar UNDP-GEF projects around the globe) and we would have expected this to be a maximum of six months (three months for recruitment and three months for the Inception Period) and not just under ten months as happened.

19. The project was designed to have a duration of five years – thus, in principle, it was due to close in December 2015 (but this has been amended to 30 June 2016, see Section 4.3).

2.2 Problems that the project sought to address

20. As stated in its Brief Description, the project has been designed to “address threats to habitats and species loss on a landscape level” and to ensure “greater responsiveness to variability and seasonality issues around climate change.” This is a rather broad description.

21. With a little more clarity, the threats to biodiversity are listed in the Project Document (impacts of tourists; small, isolated PAs leading to fragmented wildlife populations; poaching; invasive alien species; fire; mining and prospecting; harvesting of plants; habitat degradation through aggregation of wildlife around water points). In addition, climate change is predicted to increase pressure on Namibia’s natural resources both through climatic and anthropogenic mechanisms.

22. These threats to biodiversity are underpinned by the following root causes:

- Shortcomings and gaps in the planning, policy and legal framework;
- Poor Integration of PAs and Landscape Management;
- Incomplete PA Network Coverage;
- Limitations with PA Infrastructure and Equipment;
- Human and Institutional Resource Deficit for Effective Management;

- Undervaluation of the natural resource base both within and outside the PAs;
- Insufficient PA Financing Systems and Access to Markets

23. The connection between these root causes and landscape level conservation remains opaque but detailed examination of the root cause analysis begins to reveal some of the problems that the project is seeking to address that may be resolved through a landscape level conservation project. Included here are the following factors:

- Insufficient linkages between state protected areas and their neighbours, whether private or communal, and an absence of cooperative and harmonized management among these areas
- There is no landscape level ecosystem management planning process, or coordinated management or co-management across landscapes – leading to discordant fire and water-resource, or compatibility of land use in areas adjacent to PAs.
- No established joint management structures at PA level; no participation of stakeholders in management activities; no measures to optimise local economic benefits of PAs – all through “ineffective linking up of [adjacent] areas”
- Unrepresentative PA network from both a biome and vegetation type perspective (four of the six major biomes and 16 of 29 vegetation types are inadequately represented in the PA network).
- The movement of wildlife between PAs is limited.
- Infrastructure and management capacities in some areas adjacent to PAs are poor
- All institutions – particularly state and communal – have poor capacity
- The financial benefits from livestock and even game production are limited but non-consumptive wildlife viewing may have greater returns; the Project Document speculates that there is an economic advantage to converting large-scale areas to non-consumptive wildlife viewing areas.

2.3 Immediate and development objectives of the project

24. In the section above, we dwelled on the problem analysis, on the basis of Project Document, to try to understand the thread linking the problem statements to landscape level conservation. This is not obvious because the threat and root cause analysis appears to be a catch-all for the ills facing the protected area estate in Namibia (when broadly defined as any land whose primary objective is conservation or harvesting natural resources, including state-managed PAs, community-conservancies as well as private conservancies and game farms). Indeed, on the basis of the problem analysis in the Project Document, we do not arrive at the same conclusion that “long-term solution to the conservation predicament facing Namibia’s unique landscapes will be an expanded and effective PA network through creating Landscape Conservation Areas (LCAs)”. To some degree, it appears as if a landscape level approach had been decided in advance and a catch-all problem statement was written, with some references to landscape level conservation, to justify it.

25. This does not mean that we are recommending a re-design of the project; we are simply pointing out that the logic, as written in the project document, does not follow. That being said, we believe that there is ample justification for the establishment of

the LCAs – but that justification was not presented in the project document. The recommendation here, then, is that when projects are designed, the logic that sets up the specific goal, objective and outcomes for the project must make sense and follow through.

26. Nonetheless, the project aimed to create LCAs that “will ... be managed for the full suite of biodiversity and landscape values, including ecosystem services [and] ecosystem functioning, for sustainable land management and for economic performance.” The LCAs will be managed collaboratively to “nationally mandated standards” by empowered institutions and be funded through sustainable mechanisms. Therefore, the project objective was defined as being

“Protected Landscape Conservation Areas are established and ensure that land uses in areas adjacent to existing Protected Areas are compatible with biodiversity conservation objectives, and corridors are established to sustain the viability of wildlife populations”

27. This objective would be achieved through three components, each with a number of outputs associated with them.

28. *Component One*: Establish new Landscape Conservation Areas (LCAs). This component has one predicted outcome – that five LCAs are established.

29. *Component Two*: Collaborative governance for LCAs. There are three predicted outcomes to this component: i) adaptive collaborative management frameworks for the five pilot LCAs operationalized; ii) collaborative oversight by individual LCA authorities supported by a LCA Coordination Unit; and iii) LCAs are being adaptively managed to cope with the impact of climate change¹.

30. *Component Three*: Incentives and Market Transformation. There are two predicted outcomes: i) where production is taking place within LCAs, it is compatible with biodiversity conservation while providing livelihoods to land users, and ii) the LCA management costs are underwritten by constituents.

2.4 Baseline Indicators established

31. There are a total of 18 indicators for the project all established before the project commenced. The indicators were distributed: three objective level indicators, five indicators for Component One, four indicators for Component Two, five indicators for Component Three and one indicator for project management (see Table 3).

32. Some of the 18 indicators were aggregated (i.e., they could be disaggregated into their component indicators); when disaggregated, the project has 31 indicators! In our opinion, this is too many if the project is really to collect quantitative data on all of them. Thought at the design stage should have gone into designing fewer, meaningful indicators.

¹ In the Project Document, this Outcome is stated as “LCAs are being adaptively managed to cope with the *predicted* impact of climate change;” we have removed “predicted” from this statement as we believe that the LCAs should be managed to cope with *all* impacts of climate change, not just the predicted impacts.

Table 3. The indicators for the project with established baselines and EOP targets.

Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	MTR Comments
Trends in increased abundance and distribution of selected species (<i>Objective level</i>)	Abundance estimates for game in place at conservancy and park level. Mudumu Landscape (excluding Mamili): Buffalo – 1 214; Giraffe - 205; Impala – 6 795; Wildebeest – 2 305 (Source September 2011 Dry Season Count, MET, NACSO); Greater Sossusvlei Landscape: Naukluft Mountains part of the Namib Naukluft Park: Mountain Zebras – 2 600 (Source June 2013 Aerial Survey, MET); Greater Waterberg Landscape: Waterberg Plateau Park: Buffalo – 550; Roan Antelope – 180; Sable Antelope – 100 (Source September 2012 helicopter survey, MET); Windhoek Green Belt Landscape: Daan Viljoen Game Park: Oryx – 150; Zebras – 180 (Source MET estimates only);	Abundance and distribution of selected species are found satisfactory (against background values and historic ranges for certain species, taking intrinsic and external factors into consideration) in each LCA by year 5.	Given that GEF rightly insists on achieving global environmental benefits in the projects that they fund, this indicator has been included. There are always issues about doing so, particularly with the k-selected species that have been chosen as indicators for this project. A five-year project that is working primarily on enabling and establishing LCAs will have no meaningful impact on any of these species. If there is any significant decline in any of these species it would surely be related to an extrinsic factor beyond the control of the project and project teams would end up scrabbling to analyse declines against all possible extrinsic factors. In summary, this renders such indicators quite meaningless. We recommend using other, more meaningful impact indicators (or proxies thereof) that still indicate the global environmental benefits of the project.
5 LCAs are established to improve biodiversity conservation at landscape level; an additional 15,550 km ² brought under collaborative management with protected areas (<i>Objective level</i>)	4 existing landscape conservation partnerships in place in ML.	5 LCAs established by year 5 with at 15,550 km ² additional land brought under collaborative management with protected areas, being ML (1,469), GWL (7,500), GSNL (173), GFRCL (5,750), WGB (658)	This indicator is suitable, particularly when coupled with some form of measurement of management effectiveness (see indicator below for measurement of METT). The only contentious aspects of it are i) how to <i>measure</i> whether the management is really collaborative (i.e., that the weaker

Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	MTR Comments
			partners are not overrun by the more dominant partners) and ii) the questionable process of putting a boundary (and thus quantified area) to LCAs (the boundaries that have been chose for the LCAs reflect arbitrary, human boundaries rather than ones that have ecological meaning).
Improved systems level operations capacity has ensured a reduced level of threats to habitats and species composition; Landscapes maintain global biodiversity values; METT scores are improved in protected areas within landscapes (<i>Objective level</i>)	Landscape management remains uncoordinated and biodiversity is lost over time. Current METT scores as follows: ML (71) GWL (69), GSNL (37), GFRCL (46), WGB (30): average: 51	An increase in METT scores across Protected Areas within the five landscapes by over 20% on average; monitoring indicates species diversity either unaffected or increased	This indicator appears to be confused. We have seen no data from surveys of species diversity. Therefore, we recommend disaggregating it and focusing only on the METT scores. Further, we recommend carrying out METT assessment <i>both</i> at a landscape level (i.e., for each LCA) <i>as well as</i> for each of the state-managed PA found in each landscape as part of an analysis of whether landscape level conservation improves the management of PAs contained therein.
Framework in place for collaborative management among stakeholders within landscapes (<i>Output 1.1</i>)	Draft MET Protected Area management planning policy guideline in place	Framework for collaborative management among stakeholders within landscapes / targeted 5 LCAs in place by year 5.	It remains a little unclear about the <i>form</i> that this framework will take but we understand from our discussions that landscape conservation areas may be included under the PAWMB.
National level best practice guidelines in place for the establishment of LCAs (<i>Output 1.2</i>)	Draft MET Protected Area management planning policy guideline in place	National level best practices guidelines for the establishment of new LCAs in place by year 5	The guidelines published under this indicator should be disseminated to catalyse replication.
Partnership agreements in place for 5 landscapes; Constitutions in place for 5	Constitutions in place for conservancies and drafts for GWC, GSNC and GFRCC.	5 LCAs with partnership agreements in place by year 5	These documents form the basis of the establishment of the LCAs but terminology should remain consistent,

Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	MTR Comments
landscapes (<i>Output 1.3</i>)			with clear definitions (e.g., “partnership agreements” vs. “constitutions”)
Landscape threats and sustainable land uses defined (setting the scene to develop regulations, standards and codes of practice); Standards and codes of practice developed for each LCA; National level best practice codes of practice in place. (<i>Output 1.4</i>)	Biodiversity threats defined for all LCAs - Land use zoning maps suggesting suitable land uses at conservancy, park and complex level - Draft PAWMB in place - Park specific regulations under development through SPAN Project) - Guiding principles in park M+D plans and conservancy management plans	Landscape threats and sustainable land uses defined by year 5; LCA level standards and codes of practice for biodiversity conservation in place by year 5; National level codes of practice, based on best practice, in place by year 5.	As indicated in the body of the report (see section 3.1.1), this ‘indicator’ is, in fact, an aggregation of four indicators. In addition, this indicator is a good example of the lack of sequencing in the logframe (all four components of the indicator to be achieved by year 5 of the project).
Infrastructure, based on approved recommended priorities, are in place for 5 LCAs. (<i>Output 1.6</i>)	Mudumu, fire management equipment, water points; GWC - guard posts, boundary fences, fire management equipment, water points; WGB - park and farm fences, water points, guard post at DVJ; GSNC - fences, water points, guard post; GFRCC - fences, water points, guard posts, solid waste management and Radio communication at /Ai-/Ais	Infrastructure is in place for all LCAs based on assessment by year 5.	No issues.
Key short, medium and long-term development issues identified and disseminated; Strategic plans, based on the key issues for each area, in place for 5 LCAs defining management objectives, standards, rules and procedures for LCA functions. (<i>Output 2.1</i>)	Management and development plans for parks (AHGP, NNP, BMM and Waterberg) - Draft Protected Areas and Wildlife Management Bill (PAWMB) and Regulations - Draft PA Management planning policy guideline in place	Strategic plans for each LCA in place by year 5.	This was merged with the indicator for Output 2.3 into “strategic management plans” for each LCA (see minutes of the PSC of 13 February 2013).
Management and development plans in place for interested LCA partner (e.g. conservancy, private farm, PA) (<i>Output</i>	- Environmental Management Act, Draft Regulations and guidelines in place to guide development planning	Management and development plans are in place for interested LCA partner by year 5.	This indicator was amended (see discussion in main body of text under section 3.1.1; for decision, see minutes of

Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	MTR Comments
2.2)	- National CBNRM Framework in place - Parks and Neighbours (draft) and Concessions policies in place		the PSC of 13 February 2013).
LCA management and development plans in place for all 5 landscapes (<i>Output 2.3</i>)		Management and development plans are in place for each LCA by year 5.	See above.
Partnership roles and responsibilities defined and agreed and "Partnership Committees" in place for each LCA (<i>Output 2.4</i>)	Management committees in place at conservancy and complex level and Park Wardens appointed by MET - Roles and responsibilities of Management committees defined in Management and development plans and in the job descriptions of Park Wardens	Partnership Committee for each LCA in place by year 5.	It is unclear how this differs with the indicator for Output 1.3; the agreements (or Constitutions as they are referred) stipulate the establishment of the committee – therefore, this appears to be repetition and we believe that the indicators could be satisfactorily merged (even though this indicator has already been achieved).
Key development issues defined for the SEA (drawing earlier consultation work); SEA in place with recommendations for tourism development in each LCA (<i>Output 3.1</i>)	SEA in place for Hardap region's coastal zone which includes the Namib-Naukluft NP; - Tourism development plan in place for BMM Parks; - Draft Tourism Plan for GFRCC; - National Tourism policy for Namibia; - Tourism addressed under conservancy management plans; Integrated Regional Land Use Plan (IRLUP) for Karas Region	SEA of the tourism sector completed for the 5 LCAs.	No issues but for the discussion on variation among the LCAs in section 3.1.1
Business plans in place for major initiatives supported in LCA based on SEA recommendations and drawing other existing work (<i>Output 3.2</i>)	Business plans in place for Ai-Ais Hot Springs Game Park and Bwabwata-Mamili-Mudumu (BMM) National Parks; Business and sustainability plans in place for conservancies in Mudumu	Business plans form for major initiatives in 5 LCAs in place by year 5	See point above.

Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	MTR Comments
	North Complex (MNC).		
Biodiversity monitoring and assessment system developed for each LCA and recommended at national level for integration into a national tourism venture certification system (<i>Output 3.3</i>)	SPAN Biodiversity indicators (yet to be developed) - National CBNRM Programme biodiversity indicators published in the State of Conservancy Report (SoCR) - ICEMA biodiversity indicators that would be adopted by MET (for long-term M&E) - NBSAP in place with biodiversity management objectives – national level - Local level monitoring (LLM) systems in place at conservancy level; incident (monitoring) books in place for parks. - CPP integrated sustainable land management indicators and Land Degradation Monitoring System (LDMS) with biodiversity indicators.	Biodiversity monitoring indicators in place by year 5 for each LCA and across LCAs.	This indicator is a little incongruous in its placement in the logframe table (it is only the reference to “integration into a national tourism venture certification system” that justifies its placement. What is important here is not only the development of the system but also the establishment of the baseline data before the project closes (see section 3.1.1 for further discussion)
Supply chains developed based on current and potential markets for the diversification of current goods and services and/ or the development of new ones; Supply chains identified for certification; Markets established and mobilised for certified supply chains (<i>Output 3.4</i>)	Cheetah-friendly beef initiative that could be used for lessons learnt and best practices - Current biodiversity-friendly off-take/ harvesting practices by private tourism operators/ game farmers (potentially not documented); Research by ICEMA on indigenous natural products.	Supply chains defined and markets explored/ established for new/ diversified goods and services.	With this indicator, the critical thing is first to determine <i>which products (or potential products) will be marketed</i> from each LCA. Having identified the product(s) for each LCA, the analysis for supply chains and certification processes can proceed.
Key operational aspects defined for each LCA; Agreement in place for cost and benefit sharing for each LCA (<i>Output 3.5</i>)	Current cost sharing arrangement in place at NamibRand Nature Reserve (NRNR); Cost sharing modalities in place in Mudumu between government, private sector and communities.	Cost sharing agreements for each LCA in place by year 5.	This indicator could (and arguably should) be nested within the “strategic management plans” that are being produced for each LCA (see Output 2.1 above).

Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	MTR Comments
Project management in place to allow an engaged and effective process throughout (<i>Project management</i>)	Nil	Effective project management	This indicator, while worthwhile, begs the question of how is this measurable (except, perhaps, through the MTR and TE)?

2.5 Main stakeholders

33. Being a project that involves creation of an enabling environment for LCAs as well as involving the establishment and management of five LCAs, the project has a large number of stakeholders. These are described in detail in the Project Document. In brief, though, stakeholders include the MET – which is central to the project, various involved line ministries, two parastatal organizations (Namibia Wildlife Resorts, NWR and Namibia Tourism Board, NTB), the Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development (MRLGHRD) and the local authorities, a number of communal conservancies, civil society organisations (Community Based Organisations, CBOs and Non-Governments Organisations, NGOs), the Municipal Authority of Windhoek (in the Windhoek Green Belt LCA), the private sector (tourism operators).

34. The Project Document does a good job in describing the stakeholders with a few exceptions – notably explicit mention of consumptive tourism sector (i.e., hunters) and consumptive wildlife production (i.e., game farms).

2.6 Expected Results

35. The project will establish five Landscape Conservation Areas (LCAs), develop the adaptive collaborative management arrangements for governance of these on a national and a landscape level, and create an enabling environment for market incentives to operationalize the LCAs.

36. In principle, this will contribute to overcoming the threats and root causes as described in the Project Document. More accurately, it will contribute to overcoming some of the threats and root causes and lead to the following results:

- Improve linkages between state PAs and their neighbours, and cooperative and harmonized management within a collaborative or joint management system and plan
- Compatibility of land use in adjacent areas
- As fences come down, there will be movement of wildlife among areas
- Capacity in some areas adjacent to PAs will improve
- The project may test whether conversion of large-scale areas to non-consumptive wildlife viewing areas is economically beneficial.

3 Findings

3.1 Progress toward Results

3.1.1 Project Design

37. A number of issues emerged from the analysis of the project design and formulation.

38. First, in examining the problems that the project is seeking to address and as discussed above, the linkage between the described threats and root causes, and a

landscape level conservation project was opaque, suggesting that the approach was decided in advance and the threats and root analysis was retrofitted².

39. Second, a number of the interviewees over the course of the MTR mission in Namibia complained about the lack of consultation during the design and formulation stage of the project³.

40. Third, the project is extremely ambitious. This is not necessarily unusual for a GEF projects (which are about overcoming fears, catalysing processes and demonstrating success). Such ambition is laudable when all stakeholders have bought into the vision. However, when this ambition is coupled with an incomplete consultation process – which, by definition, means that buy-in is equally incomplete – there may be issues with project implementation.

41. In addition, a number of criteria were used to select the five landscapes. These were: “i) *necessity of PA expansion to provide ecological security to wildlife populations in existing PAs, ii) site contribution to enhancing ecological representation in the PA estate, and iii) likelihood of success, based on assessed social feasibility, and the existence of emerging public-private- community partnerships; such emerging partnerships exist to various degrees in all of the target landscapes, providing a platform for PLCA establishment.*” These criteria do not precisely match the logic as presented in the situation analysis (and specifically in the problem analysis); if it had been, one might have expected that the project would be specifically targeting i) those biomes and/or vegetation types that are either not or under represented in the protected area network (and it is only in the Greater Fish River Canyon Landscape that this is the case), and ii) those areas harbouring the country’s endemic species (which are, as confirmed in the project document, primarily plants, herpetofauna and invertebrate fauna). This is, apparently, not entirely the case.

3.1.1.1 Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)

42. The indicators, baseline figures and EOP targets are presented above (see Table 3). There were 15 outputs associated with the three project components.

43. *Component One*: Establish new Landscape Conservation Areas (LCAs). This component has four outputs:

- Output 1.1 A framework for the formalisation of existing protected landscape conservation areas developed;

² Comment on draft: “Is this true? I am sure we have a prodoc and PPG phase that would show these are justified? Please address this in the management response.” *MTR response*: That this was the case was confirmed by interviews with key stakeholders who had been involved with the development of the original concept. This is supported by the consultancies and subsequent outputs of the PPG none of which questioned the concept.

³ Comment on draft: “Again – very strange- does this agree with the list of persons consulted during the PPG phase?” *MTR response*: On examination of the PPG outputs, three of four were desktop studies while the fourth was examining capacities (with relatively few stakeholders involved and, notably, some of the complaints came from people in the GSNL which is the area that was not visited during the capacity assessment); the concept was apparently not re-examined during the PPG phase of the project and the direction in which the project was going was not questioned (judging by the evidence in the PPG outputs). Therefore, while this provides adequate evidence for this statement, we are reporting information provided by key stakeholders who hold no grudge but would have preferred to have been included in the design of the project.

- Output 1.2 National level best practices guidelines for LCA establishment developed based on existing collaborative management arrangements;
- Output 1.3 Five LCAs formalised and boundaries agreed through deed/ trust with constitutions developed;
- Output 1.4 Landscape specific codes of practice developed for each LCA in order to create site-specific and national level standards. (Including best practices for adaptive management based on monitoring data generated from activities in the LCAs' management plans).

44. *Component Two: Collaborative governance for LCAs.* There are six outputs associated with this component:

- Output 2.1 Strategic plans approved for LCAs defining management objectives, standards, rules and procedures for PA functions. (participatory PA planning, joint enforcement, monitoring, dispute resolution);
- Output 2.2 Management and work plans for each individual landholding (e.g. conservancy, private farm, etc.) forming part of a LCA in place;
- Output 2.3 5 LCA management plans prepared, roles and responsibilities agreed, land use zones and resource use agreed. (LCA management plans and activities address biodiversity conservation objectives, background environmental variability and long-term climate change integrated fire and water management, landscape and biodiversity monitoring);
- Output 2.4 Adaptive collaborative management committees in place and operational in LCAs (PA authority and all landholder groups); LCA management capacity emplaced (covering inter alia self- regulation, and enforcement mechanisms; e.g. visitor control, wildlife sale and introduction, hunting practices, integrated fire and water management and monitoring);
- Output 2.5 National LCA Coordination Unit established with members represented from each LCA, incorporating government, community and private sector stakeholders;
- Output 2.6 LCA infrastructure in place (guard posts, realigned boundary fences, fire management equipment and fire breaks, water points and visitor interpretation centres).

45. *Component Three: Incentives and Market Transformation.* There are five outputs associated with this component:

- Output 3.1 Strategic Economic / Environmental Assessment (SEA) completed for tourism development in 5 LCAs and recommendations applied (with respect to wildlife stocking, infrastructure location, visitor controls)
- Output 3.2 Business plans developed for 5 LCAs (costs quantified for management; and non-state appropriated revenue options are defined for each LCA)
- Output 3.3 Biodiversity status/ pressure indicators and management objectives integrated into national tourism venture certification system
- Output 3.4 Supply chains established for game produced under biodiversity friendly production systems (zoning of hunting; off-takes account for inter and intra specific impacts at ecosystem level); certification and verification system

developed for appropriate supply chains and new market opportunities are mobilised.

- Output 3.5 Cost and benefit sharing arrangements negotiated and agreed to cover LCA common management costs and to ensure equitable benefit sharing amongst stakeholders (state/ conservancies/and private landholders).

46. The achievement of these components and outputs are to be measured through 17 indicators, with an additional indicator to measure the project's management performance. Detailed comments on the indicators can be found in Table 3. There are, however, a few general points that can be made about the indicators:

- First, it is immediately notable is that the timing and sequence has not been built into the logframe – thus, for many of the indicators, the EOP target is to achieve the indicator “by year five” rather than making an attempt to sequence the achievement of the indicators in a logical and meaningful way. The indicators are timebound – “T” – but only in the broadest, least meaningful way. This also makes it much more difficult to assess, at the stage of the MTR, whether the project is on track or whether some of the work is critically lagging behind other aspects of the project. However, we do make recommendations regarding the indicators and timing for the remainder of the project.
- Second, many of the indicators are, in fact, multiple indicators. For example, the indicator for Output 1.4 is “*Landscape threats and sustainable land uses defined (setting the scene to develop regulations, standards and codes of practice); Standards and codes of practice developed for each LCA; National level best practice codes of practice in place.*” There are four components to this indicator: i) identification of the threats at a landscape level, ii) defining sustainable land uses in each LCA, iii) developing standards and codes for each LCA and iv) publishing the best practice codes at a national level. If all the indicators are similarly disaggregated, the project has 31 indicators (depending partly on interpretation) – at which point it is becoming inefficient. As stated above, we do make recommendations regarding the indicators.
- Third, despite ostensibly being a landscape level conservation project, not one of the indicators refers to landscape level ecology. Thus, there are no indicators that measure, for example:
 - a. The creation of corridors or increased connectivity
 - b. The movement of wildlife
 - c. Ecological processes that occur at a landscape level
 - d. Ecosystem services
- Fourth, with the exception of putting infrastructure in place and increasing METT scores (see Output 1.6 in Table 3), all indicators relate to “paper-based” outputs. The indicators do not ask for any level of “implementation” of the plans, agreements, guidelines, assessments, codes of practice or frameworks. Indeed, implementation is only implied in one Objective level indicator with an EOP target of: “*an increase in METT scores across Protected Areas within the five landscapes by over 20% on average.*” In the Project Document, when describing how the project conforms to the GEF Focal Area, this indicator is described as being: “*an increase in METT scores from the current average of 51 across the five landscapes whereby monitoring indicates species diversity either unaffected or*

increased' (thereby demonstrating a lack of consistency). There is no analysis or guidance in the Project Document to indicate in which areas of the METT that that increase might come from and so it could, theoretically, come from aspects unrelated to the project⁴.

- Finally and importantly, the indicators are “blanket” indicators. In other words, the indicators are expected to be achieved in all the LCAs irrespective of their variation, status or issues. Indeed, one of the most remarkable aspects noted over the course of the MTR mission in Namibia was the differences and the variation among the LCAs (see more discussion on this in the Progress section). Therefore, it is unrealistic and, arguably, disingenuous to apply the activities uniformly across the LCAs without first considering that variation. At the very least, because of their differences, the activities will have to be carried out at different times – thus, when they are ‘ready’ for the activity.

47. The conclusion from this analysis of the logframe is that it has not been very useful as a mechanism for guiding the project team. Similarly, because the focus has been on creating a framework (or enabling environment) rather than implementation, it is possible that the project will end up with a pile of documents and little or no implementation⁵.

48. Because of all of these factors, we believe that adjustments should be made to the logframe. We have made suggestions to this end (see Annex IV); however, in order to do so, we acknowledge two things: first, an eleven-day mission to Namibia was too short to do this task comprehensively (especially because of the broad gamut of factors that we were assessing – thus, we were not focusing on logframe adjustments alone!). Second, we did not manage to visit all of the LCAs; we visited three of the five and spent too little time in each to fully understand the situation (e.g., a few hours of one day in the GW). Therefore, the suggestions for adjusting the logframe are broad and may require further thought and analysis before a final proposal can be put to the PSC for approval. In addition, as can be seen from examining the suggested logframe (see Annex IV), it should be noted that we *build on* the existing logframe, trying to improve it in reflection of the reality on the ground, rather than creating a whole new set of indicators. Finally, the broader framework of the logframe, at the Objective and Component levels, remains exactly the same⁶.

3.1.1.2 Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) incorporated into project design

49. The project was conceived at the same moment as the UNDP-GEF Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN) project. Originally, the thinking was that this project was build from the foundation of SPAN but, as discussed above (Section 2.1), it was brought forward. However, it retained linkages with the SPAN project, not least in that the PM of NAM-PLACE was the Project Coordinator for the SPAN project for 19 months. Thus, knowledge and linkage could not have been better.

⁴ The METT is discussed further in section 3.2.3 (the section on Monitoring and Evaluation) with recommendations in section 4.

⁵ We are pleased to note that this is not happening: of its own accord, the project is taking steps forward (for more discussion, see the Results section).

⁶ As a consequence, the approval of any of the suggested amendments to the logframe can be done at PSC level.

50. There are various aspects of the project that have drawn directly from SPAN, including: i) the threats analysis, ii) the process of developing management plans for protected areas, iii) building on capacity developing process from SPAN and iv) the NAMETT/METT scores for state-managed protected areas. Indeed, SPAN focused on addressing many of the limitation of the protected area network by improving institutional capacities, planning and enforcement and revenue generation potential. Further, SPAN tested collaborative management arrangements; the lessons learned from that process feed directly into this project.

51. Aside from SPAN, there are numerous other projects and programmes to which the project is linked and from which lessons have been and will continue to be learned. These include i) the CAPE Agulhas Biodiversity Initiative, ii) the National Capacity Self-Assessment (NCSA) project, iii) the Country Pilot Partnership (CPP) for Sustainable Land Management (SLM), iv) the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) led and EU supported Rural Poverty Reduction Programme (RPRP), v) the NBSAP and Biodiversity Country Study processes, vi) the Namib Coast Biodiversity Conservation and Management Project (NACOMA), vii) the Integrated Community Based Ecosystem Management Project (ICEMA), partly funded by the WB-GEF and viii) the Richtersveld Community Biodiversity Conservation Project (RCBCP), a WB-GEF project in South Africa which has linkages with the Greater Fish River Canyon area and thus LCA. The linkages are well described in the Project Document and the project should strive to maintain these linkages.

3.1.1.3 Planned stakeholder participation

52. Because “collaborative management” is at the heart of the project, working with stakeholders is planned throughout the project. However, as is discussed below (see section on Project Results), there are a few stakeholders who have not maintained a satisfactory level of engagement.

53. The project is working at two levels – the central or national level and the LCA level. As a consequence, a large number of stakeholders are involved, each of which has i) different capacities, ii) different levels of interest to participate and iii) overall interests in biodiversity goals. The differing levels of stakeholder capacity means that the project has to be responsive both in terms with providing capacity development activities as well as for mediating in committees.

3.1.1.4 Replication approach

54. The project has developed a Replication Strategy, which is focused on codifying good practices and “ensuring” they are replicated across Southern Africa. This might seem very ambitious for a project whose outputs, at least as far as the indicators are concerned, are mainly producing “paper-based”. Nonetheless, the comprehensive replication strategy is well described in the Project Document. The project needs to ensure that as lessons learned emerge – starting, perhaps, with the lessons learned described in Section 4 of this report – are disseminated.

55. However, there is one aspect that is important to mention here. The areas that the project is targeting are of relative lesser importance from the perspective of global environment benefits (cf. those areas for which Namibia is renowned⁷ - with the exception of the GFRC LCA which has global environment benefits and, to a lesser extent, GSN LCA). However, from the perspective of the GEF this is acceptable if

⁷ See, for example, the discussion on the Biodiversity of Namibia in the Project Document.

the project catalyses, through replication, the establishment of LCAs in those areas of the country that are more important globally important biodiversity.

Catalytic Role		
Production of a Public Good	S	In terms of replication, the project is at the point (or further) that one would expect by the MTR: it has spent 30 months creating a framework for and establishing LCAs. Through this process, it has learned many lessons (as indicated in the PIRs). This puts the project in a good position to develop guidelines for replication. These should be developed and disseminated in the remaining 30 months of the project's life.
Demonstration	S	
Replication	MS	
Scaling up	U/A	

3.1.2 Progress

3.1.2.1 Overall results (attainment of objectives) (*)

56. As indicated in Sections 2 and 3 of this report, the project objective was defined as being:

“Protected Landscape Conservation Areas are established and ensure that land uses in areas adjacent to existing Protected Areas are compatible with biodiversity conservation objectives, and corridors are established to sustain the viability of wildlife populations”

57. There are three components to the project:

58. *Component One:* Establish new Landscape Conservation Areas (LCAs). This component has one predicted outcome – that five LCAs are established.

59. *Component Two:* Collaborative governance for LCAs. There are three predicted outcomes to this component: i) adaptive collaborative management frameworks for the five pilot LCAs operationalized; ii) collaborative oversight by individual LCA authorities supported by a LCA Coordination Unit; and iii) LCAs are being adaptively managed to cope with the impact of climate change⁸.

60. *Component Three:* Incentives and Market Transformation. There are two predicted outcomes: i) where production is taking place within LCAs, it is compatible with biodiversity conservation while providing livelihoods to land users, and ii) the LCA management costs are underwritten by constituents.

61. The project has made significant gains in a number of areas. Key results for the project, to date, include:

- The five LCAs have been established. This means that: the boundaries have been identified (but are adjustable, as necessary); the stakeholders have been identified; the Landscape Management Committees have been constituted; constitutions for the LCAs have been drafted, agreed and signed by most stakeholders. Currently, there is no formal legal recognition of the LCAs. As such, the LCAs exist more as a forum that brings together people and organizations within any given area.

⁸ In the Project Document, this Outcome is stated as “LCAs are being adaptively managed to cope with the *predicted* impact of climate change;” we have removed “predicted” from this statement as we believe that the LCAs should be being managed to cope with *all* impacts of climate change, not just the predicted impacts.

The area included in the five LCAs far exceeds the targeted 15,550km² – primarily through the inclusion of substantial areas within the Greater Waterberg LCA.

Moreover – and something that cannot be directly measured and will only be indirectly measurable in the long-term – is the communication, collaboration and trust that is being built among the stakeholders⁹. This is an invaluable aspect that cannot be underestimated and on which the sustainability of the project processes and impacts will be dependent.

- The concept of landscape protected areas was introduced into four policies Landscapes integrated into policies: National Policy on Protected Areas, Neighbours and Resident Communities; National Policies on Prospecting and Mining in Protected Areas; National Policy on Game Utilization in Protected Areas and Other State Land; National Policy on Community-Based Natural Resource Management. This provides the foundation for including the concept of landscape protected areas in the pending Protected Areas and Wildlife Management Bill (PAWMB).
- Various studies have been carried out under the auspices of the project – for example:
 - a. Legal Opinion of the City of Windhoek Boundary Extension on the establishment of the Windhoek Green Belt Landscape;
 - b. Water Quality and Pollution Study for the Windhoek Green Belt;
 - c. Baseline Study of Bush Encroachment and Available Management options for the Windhoek Green Belt Landscape
 - d. The Ecological, Social and Economic Implications of Private Game Parks & Private Nature Reserves in Namibia
 - e. National Rapid Assessment Study on Waste Management and Pollution Prevention in Protected Areas in Namibia undertaken through UNDP Development Support Services Funds; and
 - f. Baseline Study on Integrated Rangeland Management for four Conservancies in Greater Waterberg Landscape
- A number of infrastructure projects have been completed and others are still in the process of being implemented (for details see Output 2.6 in Annex V).
- A number of plans have been developed – including strategic management plans for three of the five LCAs.
- In collaboration with other projects (SPAN, NACOMA, BMM Parks Project), a number of protected area management and tourism development plans have been produced.
- SEAs for tourism development in the five LCAs have been drafted.

62. In summary and despite the absence of timebound indicators (see Section 3.1.1 for discussion on this), the project has taken significant strides forward. However, there are some issues:

⁹ That is with the notable exception of the Greater Waterberg LCA in which distrust still is deeply dividing the stakeholders.

- We have already discussed the limitations of working towards “blanket” indicators: thus, working to achieve the indicators in all the LCAs without taking into account the particular context and stage of development of any one LCA. Part of the adaptive management of the project will be to demonstrate that the team can assess a situation and move forward on the path towards establishing a successful and effectively managed LCA as the context demands. If the project simply works, in a blinkered way, to check off the indicators one by one in all LCA, then it will result in having some problematic, if unintended, consequences.

An excellent example of this has already arisen (although there were certainly historical and political issues in the area as well¹⁰). The Greater Waterberg LCA has emerged as the most problematic LCA. This is primarily because the process, to date, as well as the opportunistic expectations of the communities from the outset has led to the alienation of the community conservancies¹¹ and the project (and other stakeholders) will have to work extremely hard to re-build trust such that the thing can move forward at all. There are a number of things that warrant discussion in this example as they serve to illustrate some of the pitfalls. First, expectations (that may have already been present) were further built among the community conservancies as they were incorporated into the LMC; the expectations were that they were to receive some funding or inputs. For many reasons based primarily around the fact that the expectations were unrealistic and not conservation orientated¹², this has not happened (despite studies and efforts of the project) and the failure to deliver on these expectations has led to frustration and mistrust. Second and further to the above point, the conservancies in the GW mistakenly believe that while they have been excluded from receiving inputs, the other stakeholders in the LCA have received inputs. All efforts at transparency, therefore, have failed and mistrust is deeper than ever.

Finally, the communities mistakenly attributed a CCF mediator (who happened to be working in the area even though CCF is an organisation distrusted by the communities) to the project; this has further deepened mistrust even though it was based on a misunderstanding.

The result is that *if* work in the GW LCA is to move ahead, an independent and mutually respected conflict-resolution/mediator (not from CCF!) will have to be brought in to start to re-build the process (for further details, see section 4 below).

- There are a number of different issues with the engagement of stakeholders. First, as discussed in the section on Main Stakeholders, there are a few key stakeholders who have not been included in the project processes, including the Landscape Management Committees – despite their importance¹³. These include the consumptive users of wildlife (both the hunters and the game farmers). The

¹⁰ See PPG output on environmental, social and economic profile for the Greater Waterberg.

¹¹ The MTR evaluators note and appreciate the complexities of working with communities who are more often than not opportunistic and full of expectation; we also appreciate that the communities in the Greater Waterberg are not the only communities that are challenging to work with!

¹² As it was explained to the MTR evaluators – the communities in the Greater Waterberg Landscape primarily practice livestock husbandry; the requests/expectations were oriented more towards their livestock than biodiversity conservation. Consequently, the Landscape Management Committee, rightly, declined to provide the things that the communities desired.

¹³ Comment of draft: “Why?” *MTR response: It appears to be an oversight that occurred during the PPG stage of the project: these organizations were not included in the stakeholder analysis in the project document and this has followed through until now.*

hunters, in particular, may be important because i) they will be in a position to contribute the sustainable financing of the LCAs and ii) they may also benefit from some form of certification system that results from operating in (and conforming with) the framework of the LCAs.

Second and in contrast, other stakeholders are demonstrating little interest in being involved in the project¹⁴; however, the main point here is the lack of coordination among the line ministries, the MET and the project. Most notable among these are the “line ministries” – among them, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry (MAWF), the Ministry of Works and Transport (MoW), Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development (MRLGHRD), and Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (MLR). The project will have to work to keep these people involved and engaged throughout the project, and a mechanism or forum to enhance coordination could be formed (if the LMCs are not already fulfilling this role).

One example demonstrating the lack of coordination that the MTR mission encountered while visiting the Mudumu Landscape was that land was being allocated for smallholding farmers along the eastern boundary of the Mudumu National Park – right in the centre of the landscape.¹⁵ Such allocation will serve i) to exacerbate human-wildlife conflict and, potentially, ii) to sever corridors for wildlife. Participation in the LMC, coordination and making such plans transparent would obviously ensure that such contradictory activities do not take place.

- In the section below (on Relevance), we discuss the relevance of some of the inputs.

However, despite the lack of monitoring, it appears as if there are inadvertent or unintended consequences to some of the infrastructure inputs that the project has made. For example, the MTR visited a waterpoint (borehole and windpump) on the boundary of the Dzoti and Sobbe conservancies. It was apparent that despite the fact that this was intended to be for the use of wildlife alone, it was evident that it was being used predominantly by livestock¹⁶.

¹⁴ Comment of draft: “Why?” *MTR response: As reported to the MTR team, consistently by PM and all Landscape Specialists but particularly in Mudumu LCA.*

¹⁵ Comment of draft: “Based on what source? Is this a fact?” *MTR response: It is a fact: we edited out “apparently;” we met the mission by the representatives of the Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development (MRLGHRD), and Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (MLR) – together with the traditional authorities to identify the land. However, the PM has subsequently pointed out that the project and KAZA are aware of this process and have, as a result, significantly slowed this development down and are included in the process for the development of an Integrated Land Use map for the Mudumu area. This is laudable and welcome; such coordination should continue.*

¹⁶ Comment of draft: “Is this a good or bad unintended consequence?” Further comment from the PM: “As part of the wildlife corridor creation in the region, there is a need to provide water in the corridors for wildlife as well as water for communities who voluntarily moved away from corridors. Although NAM-PLACE has opted to support water provision for wildlife and not communities, it should be noted that it is close to impossible to achieve a wildlife exclusive water point in a densely populated communal area such as ML. One of the principles stakeholders have adopted in the creation on corridors is to compromise as it is difficult to achieve corridors without human activities. What is important is therefore to avoid settlements and crop fields in corridors. When well regulated wildlife and cattle can share same water points and I believe this should be the approach if wildlife corridors are to be realised in communal areas.” *MTR response: The waterpoint (borehole and windpump) were*

63. In conclusion, then, the project is making good headway through the tasks set out before it. But as discussed below, it must retain a focus on the *landscape level conservation* that lies as the heart of the project, with LCAs being “first and foremost managed for the full suite of biodiversity and landscape values, including ecosystem services [and] ecosystem functioning, for sustainable land management and for economic performance.”

Item	Rating	Comment
Overall Project Results	MS	Following a ten-month delay to the project start-up, the project got off to a good, effective start. It has achieved many aspects of what it set out to achieve some of which are well in advance of when they were expected. However, there are a few caveats – or moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency – and, therefore, it is rated as being Moderately Satisfactory. The MTR is, however, confident that these shortcomings can be overcome (and see section 4 for how they should be overcome) in the remaining 30 months of the project’s life and as such it will become Highly Satisfactory.

3.1.2.2 Relevance(*)

64. In its overall objectives as a project establishing LCAs, the project retains its relevance to the GEF Strategic Objectives and Programmes (Strengthened National Terrestrial Protected Area Networks). However, when one compares the distribution of the biodiversity of global importance with the five LCAs, with the exception of the GFRC LCA, they do not significantly overlap with these areas¹⁷.

65. In addition, the project retains a connection with the UNDP country programme – both in the former (2006-2010) UNDAF and the recently published UNPAF (2014-2018). Superficially, the UNPAF, with its four distinct pillars (Institutional Environment – with a focus on governance, democracy and the rule of law including policies and the legislative framework, human rights, M&E systems and Namibia’s international obligations; Education and Skills Pillar – focusing on improved learning; Health – with an obvious focus on diseases, economic and environmental determinants of health, and the health care system; and, finally, Poverty Reduction), remains some distance from the objectives of the project. However, while it remains indirect, it is in the final pillar, Poverty Reduction, that the project can find linkages with the UNPAF particularly with Outcomes 8, 11 and 12.

*established to maintain (if not enhance) wildlife corridors. Their heavy use by domestic livestock and the presence of people excludes wildlife – therefore, the waterpoints do **not** have the intended impact; on the contrary, they result in a breakdown of and barrier within the corridor; in addition, the heavy, sustained use by livestock leads to rapid degradation. In response to the PM’s comment – if dual use of the waterpoint was anticipated, an agreement regarding use (e.g., segregation in time and no permanent human presence) should have been negotiated, agreed, implemented and monitored. This works well in other arid/semi-arid locations. We agree that ensuring that new settlements and crop fields should be avoided; restoration of some badly placed settlements and fields could even be considered.*

¹⁷ It should be noted that the maps of ‘biodiversity’ that were provided to the MTR were of species richness (i.e., number of species) which is only one facet of globally important biodiversity. Endemism, rarity, restricted range species are others and are generally considered more important. Nonetheless, as we have argued elsewhere in this report, the project can lead to global environmental benefits, first, by succeeding in the LCAs and, second, by catalyzing replication in those areas with higher global biodiversity values. In summary, the project is largely focusing on large mammals that, in Namibia, are of lesser global biodiversity value than other taxa.

66. At a national level, with the publication of the fourth National Development Plan (NDP-4, 2012/13-2016/17), the connections are much more direct. There are three overarching goals to the NDP-4, all three of which (high and sustained economic growth, increased income equality, and employment creation) bear indirect links to the project's goals. In addition, tourism "enjoys priority status". In summary, then, the project is well connected and relevant for Namibia's development goals.

67. It is, however, with *its own objectives as a landscape level conservation project* that the project has not always been carrying out work of relevance¹⁸. This is particularly true of the inputs that have been carried out under Output 2.6 (LCA infrastructure in place – guard posts, realigned boundary fences, fire management equipment and fire breaks, water points and visitor interpretation centres). Before describing some examples for where the project has strayed from its focus, we believe that it is necessary to point out the basic concepts of landscape level conservation:

- Landscapes conserve ecological processes – including migration or dispersal. This is the feature of landscape level conservation – maintaining connectivity – that the project was set up to do and should focus on, and connectivity for all species (of all taxa including plants and animals) is something that will be increasingly important in the face of climate change. The foundation of this thinking lies in the patch-corridor-matrix models as these led to changed perceptions that biodiversity conservation needs to occur at different spatial scales to account for the different levels of biological organisation.

Other ecological processes that operate over different spatial scales include resource use (e.g., grazing patterns which are often linked to movement patterns) and fire. Indeed, landscape level planning is important when elements of biodiversity (whether species, populations or ecosystems) have strong biotic or physical linkages (including anthropogenic threats) to the surrounding landscape.

- Landscapes also conserve ecosystem functions and services primarily because they most often operate at a larger scale than discrete and often fragmented protected areas. Water and water flow systems (from watersheds to the terminus of a water flow system) are classic examples but carbon fixation and storage are also good examples.
- Landscape level conservation is also often the only way to conserve processes and habitats that, with the constituent species, are poorly known.
- Because ecosystem processes, and functions and services are involved, *time* is an integral part of landscape level conservation and, therefore, by definition, it is adaptive in nature.
- Landscape level conservation moves away from the traditional conservation assumption that more is simply better but instead asks "how much more, why do we need it and where do we need it?"
- Depending on the scale, it allows for different land-use and land-tenure systems.

¹⁸ We recognize that there are design issues that may lie at the root explanation of this. In this MTR report, we wish only to point out how the project's alignment can be improved such that its ultimate objective – to deliver global environment benefits – can be achieved in the most streamlined way possible.

- Landscape level conservation specifically counters broad-scale changes include: i) climate change, ii) land use and land cover change, iii) water and air-borne pollution, iv) a shift in disturbance/recovery regimes, and v) habitat loss and fragmentation.

68. From the above synopsis – which by no means is exhaustive – it becomes immediately clear that landscape level conservation is complex. Our interpretation of the project document is that the landscape-level thinking that underpinned the project was primarily five-fold: i) to remove the fences where possible to allow movement of large mammalian fauna, ii) to secure corridors especially for elephants and buffaloes specifically in the Mudumu LCA, iii) to try to ensure compatible land use among all parties within a LCA, iv) (somewhat related to the previous aspect) to enhance collaborative management within the LCA, and v) to try to harmonize the products from each LCA and seek mechanisms to enhance the supply chain for those products. Overall, as stated above, the key outcome of the project is to establish a true, functional partnership among the members of the LCA.

69. Further, our interpretation of the inputs that the project have made, to date, in the LCAs have been at the request of the Landscape Management Committees but have not necessarily kept in their minds the Objective and targeted Outcomes of the project foremost in their minds (nor to the suggested input in Output 2.6). As a consequence and when keeping in mind the landscape level conservation concepts listed above, some of the inputs (e.g., the involvement of the project in the development of the solid waste disposal site at Kongola in the Mudumu LCA¹⁹ or the waste disposal in the GFRC LCA) have a limited relevance for the project's Objective and Outcomes. In the section 4, we make suggestions as to how the project can overcome this and keep its focus.

70. In conclusion, the project is not a funding mechanism to mop up those tasks that may indeed need to be done but no one else is doing²⁰. Rather, it must stay true to its direction as defined in the Project Document.

3.1.2.3 Effectiveness & Efficiency (*)

71. As indicated above (in the section on Overall Results), the project has taken significant steps in working on the outputs which will contribute to achieving the Outcomes and Objective of the project. Indeed, with the few caveats described in this report, the project has been very effective in working towards various indicators.

72. In terms of efficiency, the project has adopted the GRN procurement rules; these are equivalent to those of UNDP and, as such, there is an emphasis on ensuring good value for money in all contracts awarded.

¹⁹ Comment on draft: “The Project was only involved in the Environmental Impact Assessment and not the actual solid waste disposal site. This was informed by the Minister of Environment and Tourism directive to stop waste dumping in Parks in line with the EMA. Secondly the project did not decide on the Waste disposal site in Kongola because it does not fall under any proclaimed area. The project only did the EIA before the site was selected.” *MTR response: We appreciate the response from the PM on this point and we appreciate the fact that the project was only involved in the EIA for the solid waste disposal site. However, it is concerning that the project will pay for the EIA (with limited relevance to the objectives of the project) because of a directive from the MET. The project is not a convenient source of funds but it has its own goal, objectives and outcomes for which it must strive. If there is work to be done which will demonstrably contribute to the results and impacts of the project, then that is not only acceptable but also recommended.*

²⁰ In contrast to this statement, once the LCAs are self-financing, they will be in a position to fund whatever they wish!

73. In addition to this, the project made efforts to recruit knowledgeable and experienced members of staff – particularly with reference to the Project Manager who, as has been already mentioned, was the Project Coordinator for the SPAN project for 19 months.

74. Within the MET, the project has shared human resources – for example, the use of the IT Specialist, Armstrong, who not only deals with the project’s IT requirements but also those of the other MET offices in the building shared by the project.

75. Most concerning, with respect to cost effectiveness, are the questions that hang over the project management budget and spending. In global terms and even taking into account its complexity, the project has a generous project management budget (particularly when one considers that the GEF Secretariat uses the benchmark of allocating 5% of the project budget for project over USD 2 million; see footnote under the section on Project Finance). That the project is considering allocating some of the Project Manager, and Administrative and Financial Assistant’s costs to other components suggests that project management in this project is less cost effective than in other projects around the globe.

76. There are various areas in which the project could be more efficient; if they adopt some of these things, there will be better cost effectiveness:

- a. If the PCU, the MET and UNDP (both CO and RTC) remain vigilant, they will pick up things before it is too late and course adjustment will mean enhanced efficiency
- b. If the project retains its focus on the project’s objectives and the principles of landscape-level conservation without straying, it will improve efficiency
- c. If the project can retain its staff until the end of the project, efficiency will be significantly improved.
- d. When carrying out communications and branding, the project should adopt the most cost effective alternatives.

3.1.2.4 Impact

77. At the time of the MTR, the project had established the LCAs, carried out many studies and made some inputs (including infrastructural inputs). However, it will be some time before there are impacts from the project, particularly on the biodiversity of the LCAs.

78. It is only in the movement of the larger mammalian fauna that there may be impacts already – particularly as fences have come down (especially in the GFRC LCA and the GSN LCA). This movement (and hence impact) has yet to be recorded although with the initiation of the research project in the GSN LCA – through the attachment of satellite collars to oryx and mountain zebras, the first quantitative information about impact will emerge.

79. Because so much of the rest of the project, to date, has been the production of agreements, plans, policies, assessments, until these documents result in on-the-ground action or changes of behaviour, the impact will remain minimal. The project should focus on this over the course of the remaining part of its life. However, those changes of behaviour can be significant in themselves and they should be monitored as well.

Outcomes		
Overall quality of project outcomes	MS	The project has been effectively implemented to date and has done much to create an enabling environment for LCAs as well as establish the five target LCAs. However, the project has not reacted adaptively to the large capacity variation that exists (and was recorded in the capacity assessments in the PPG) among the LCAs being guided by achieving indicators rather than be vigilant to that variation and the impacts that are being had.
Relevance	MS	While the majority of the project's work is highly relevant to the national development objectives there are shortcomings in the relevance of some aspects of the project – most notably in the inputs that the project has made (relative to the relevance to landscape level conservation objectives – here the LMCs have treated the project as a source of funding for various inputs but not all of these have been fully relevant to the project's objectives). In addition, at the MTR stage of the project, there are questions about the global environmental benefits of the project (and hence incremental logic) at present (but this can be solved through replication).
Effectiveness	S	The project has been very effective about moving forward, particularly with the establishment of LCAs and an enabling framework for them. This has been done in good time.
Efficiency	U/A	There are questions that exist about the cost effectiveness of the project but because there were issues with the budgeting of project management costs (and that these things subsequently need to be updated and thereafter re-assess), the MTR was unable to assess them at present. This is explained in detail in the section on Project Finance.

3.1.2.5 Sustainability (*)

80. Continuing from the above discussion on Mainstreaming, the second thing that the project needs to focus on in the remainder of the project is the sustainability of the LCAs and the processes that underpin them. The project has yet to have *impacts* (see section below for a discussion on this), but the foundations have been laid. The project will have to shore up these foundations to ensure that they do not dissipate once the project comes to a close. Indeed, there is a risk that this will happen: the project has facilitated the processes, brought together the stakeholders and funded small projects within each of the LCAs. Once this funding dries up, it is possible that the LCAs will fade away.

81. However, it is reassuring that a number of the stakeholders have vested interests in the continuity of the LCAs; indeed, some have contributed significant cofinance to the achievement of the project Objective and Outcomes. Nonetheless, the project has significant work to do to ensure sustainability of the processes that it has started, the institutions that it has created and the infrastructure that it has put into place.

82. The majority of the discussion about what we recommend that the project do in the remainder of the project to ensure sustainability can be found below in the section 4. However, overall and as a guiding principle, we recommend that the project produce a Sustainability Plan as soon as possible (say, by April 2014²¹). We believe

²¹ This was the date suggested in the first draft of the MTR report; given that the final version is being re-submitted in March 2014, it is suggested that this date be put back to June 2014 – if the PCU has not already started the process of developing the Sustainability Plan.

that such a plan is necessary because of the complexity of creating and then maintaining institutions – and the LCAs and their Landscape Management Committees are such an institution. While they have money to administer – as they currently do with the project funds – there is a reason for the LMCs to meet; once the project has ended, without this motivational factor, they are less likely to get together and the LCAs may cease to function. The Sustainability Plan will significantly contribute to improve the likelihood that these institutions will continue; the Plan can use the recommendations made below and the framework provided in the Project Document as starting points.

83. We recommend that the project should develop an overall Sustainability Plan that should then be adapted and then adopted locally in each LCA. We suggest this because we believe that if the overall plan is developed in a participatory way, there will be many fruitful ideas especially for financial sustainability. These should be collectively developed into the overall, broad Sustainability Plan.

84. Once developed, the Sustainability Plan should then be implemented and, at least in principle, should lead to a high likelihood of sustainability.

85. Sustainability		
Overall likelihood of risks to sustainability	ML	The aspects of sustainability are closely interlinked. If Financial and Institutional Sustainability can be achieved (and this currently appears Moderately Likely), then the Environmental and Overall Sustainability will follow. The right language is being spoken by project partners and stakeholders to ensure sustainability but these need to be planned and then put into place in a demonstrative way (see section 4.4 that deals specifically with how to achieve sustainability). An overall sustainability plan should be developed and implemented adaptively at the LCA level.
Financial resources	L	
Socio-economic	MU	
Institutional Framework and governance	ML	
Environmental	ML	

3.2 Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)

86. To date, there have been a number of adjustments to the project design. These have been based on practicalities encountered with project implementation and focus on a number of the indicators (see Table 4). This demonstrates a level of adaptive management – thus, where practicalities and pragmatism has defined the need, the indicators have been changed.

87. In addition to these adjustments that have been already made, the MTR is proposing a number of further adjustments, including to the logframe.

Table 4. The indicators and EOP targets that have been amended over the course of the project to date; the amended sections are shown in red.

Original indicator	Original EOP target	Amended indicator	Amended EOP target	MTR Comment
5 LCAs are formalised to improve biodiversity conservation at landscape level.; an additional 15,550km2 brought under protected area status	5 LCAs formalised by year 5 with at 15,550 km2 additional land under enhanced protected area status, being ML (1,469), GWL (7,500), GSNL (173), GFRCL (5,750), WGB (658)	5 LCAs are established to improve biodiversity conservation at landscape level.; an additional 15,550 km2 brought under collaborative management with protected areas	5 LCAs established by year 5 with at 15,550 km2 additional land brought under collaborative management with protected areas, being ML (1,469), GWL (7,500), GSNL (173), GFRCL (5,750), WGB (658)	This change betrays an important consideration regarding the LCAs – thus, will they be considered as formal protected areas or areas under less formal collective management arrangements (even though they are governed by formal Constitutions).
Improved systems level operations capacity has ensured a reduced level of threats to habitats and species composition; Landscapes maintain global biodiversity values; METT scores are improved in 5 target landscapes, especially GSNL and WGB.	An increase in METT scores across the five landscapes by over 20% on average; monitoring indicates species diversity either unaffected or increased	Improved systems level operations capacity has ensured a reduced level of threats to habitats and species composition, Landscapes maintain global biodiversity values; METT scores are improved in protected areas within landscapes	An increase in METT scores across Protected Areas within the five landscapes by over 20% on average; monitoring indicates species diversity either unaffected or increased	The change is relevant especially considering the point above. It will also be interesting to assess whether the inclusion of the protected area within a LCA lead to quantitative changes in its management effectiveness (as compared, say, to areas not included within LCAs).
Key short, medium and long-term development issues identified and disseminated; Strategic plans, based on the key issues for each area, in place for 5 LCAs defining management objectives, standards, rules and procedures	Strategic plans for each LCA in place by year 5.	Key short, medium and long-term development issues identified and disseminated; Strategic plans, based on the key issues for each area, in place for 5 LCAs defining management objectives, standards, rules and procedures	Strategic management plans for each LCA in place by year 5	This is a question of semantics and is acceptable.

Original indicator	Original EOP target	Amended indicator	Amended EOP target	MTR Comment
for PCLA functions.		for CLA functions.		
LCA management and development plans in place for all 5.	Management and development plans are in place for each LCA by year 5.	LCA management and development plans in place for all 5 landscapes		
Management and development plans in place for each LCA partner (e.g. conservancy, private farm, PA).	Management and development plans are in place for each LCA partner by year 5	Management and development plans in place <i>for interested LCA partner</i> (e.g. conservancy, private farm, PA).	Management and development plans are in place <i>for interested LCA partner</i> by year 5	It would be difficult if not impossible for the project to impose management plans on each partner within the landscapes (even if those stakeholders had total ownership of the process and product). The Constitutions (and guidelines and regulations as and when they are produced) will be better suited to providing the management framework for the LCAs.
Business plans in place in each LCA based on SEA recommendations and drawing other existing work	Business plans for each of the 5 LCAs in place by year 5	Business plans in place <i>for major initiatives supported in LCA</i> based on SEA recommendations and drawing other existing work	Business plans <i>form for major initiatives in 5 LCAs</i> in place by year 5	Again, the change reflects a shying away from the LCAs, themselves, being the units for business plans (or other aspects of planning). As long as LCAs retain the ability to be adaptive (and reverse this decision, as necessary, in the future) this is acceptable at present.

3.2.1 Work planning

88. In terms of how the budgeting and spending has actually occurred to date, on an annual basis, the annual workplans with their associated budgets, are approved by the PSC. The funds are transferred to an MET account and spending proceeds from there. There are two signatures required on the chequebook, one signature from a member of the PCU but always countersigned by a member of the MET – usually the Environmental Commissioner or his Deputy.

3.2.2 Finance

89. The project is being financed by the GEF through UNDP, which is, therefore, accountable to the GEF for project delivery. The value of the GEF grant is USD 4.5 million plus a further USD 100,000 for the project development phase.

Table 5. The planned value and actual expenditure, to date, of the project including the funding from GEF, the GRN and other sources of co-finance.

Type	Donor	Value (USD), planned	Value (USD), actual
UNDP-managed grants	GEF	4,500,000	2,414,525.90
	UNDP	100,000	53,000.00
Partner-managed grants	Govt. of Namibia		
	Gondwana	605,000	320,650.00
In-kind donations	Government of Namibia	14,000,000	7,420,000.00
TOTAL		19,205,000	10,208,175.90

90. In addition to the grant from the GEF, the project enjoys considerable co-finance from the Government of Namibia and from a number of private sector organizations (see Table 6).

91. The funding is not equally distributed among the project Components (*as originally budgeted in the Project Document*: Component One: 14.1%; Component Two: 59.7%; Component Three: 16.1%). That the distribution of funds is not equal among the three components is understandable, particularly because Component Two, to which 59.7% of the total budget is allocated, includes aspects of planning as well as infrastructure development.

Table 6. The total budget (as it appears in the annual, approved workplan) and actual expenditure, by Outcome and funding source, for the project to date.

Outcome	Budgeted (ProDoc)	Budgeted (workplans)	Actual (before reallocation)	Actual (reallocated)
1	547,800	530,166	437,002.74	437,002.74
2	1,864,150	1,133,231	1,033,071.86	1,236,794.31
3	529,200	556,546	450,760.64	555,708.57

Project Mgt	266,500	553,080	493,690.66	185,020.28
Total	3,207,650	2,773,023	2,414,526	2,414,526

92. However, before the MTR, there were significant issues with budgeting and expenditure. The first figures that were given to the MTR evaluators indicated serious problems in budget and expenditure allocation in YR2 and YR3, particularly in the Project Management budget line (see Table 7 in which there are significant differences between the original budget from the Project Document and those approved by the PSC and appear in the project's financials, especially for Component Two and the Project Management budgets).

93. The MTR evaluators requested that these figure be re-examined by the PCU and UNDP-CO; they who responded by agreeing that the budget and expenditure were incorrectly allocated (primarily because the technical work of the Landscape Specialists had, in YRs 2 and 3 been incorrectly allocated to the Project Management budget and hence their technical costs were being included in the Project Management actual expenditure). The PCU then resubmitted the reallocated expenditure (as also seen on Table 7). The reallocated expenditure is much more in line with the original approved budgets as they appeared in the project document.

94. It appears that the problem lay mainly in the project management budget line. It should be recalled that in this project, 10% of the total budget is targeted to cover project management expenses²². This is the level that was approved for this project – thus, the GEF-approved project management budget is USD 450,000 (thus, 10% of the total budget of USD 4.5 million).

95. From this point, there are a number of steps forward:

- First, despite the fact that the project has now retrospectively reallocated the actual expenditure and that this actual expenditure is much more in line with the originally approved budgets (as stated in the Project Document; see Table 7), further work and analysis is necessary to sort this out, and to determine whether the project is overspending its Project Management budget in particular.
- Second, the project and UNDP-CO will have to reallocate, retrospectively, the budgets for YR2 and YR3 and, thereafter, to match expenditure with the budget lines. The budgetary (and subsequent expenditure) reallocation should refer back to what expenses are to be allocated under the project management budget, including:
 - a. All the Project Manager's costs
 - b. The Administrative and Financial Assistant's costs.

²² It should be noted that an external review of GEF Administrative Costs – including project management costs (Agenda Item 12, GEF Council Meeting Nov 8 – 12 2011, *GEF Administrative Expenses – Fees and Project Management Expenses: External Review*; GEF/C.41/07; see also *Highlights of the Council's Discussions, GEF Council Meeting Nov 8-10 2011* - http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Highlights_Revised_11-18-11.pdf) was carried out in 2011. The review noted that “project management budgets [should be] 10 % of the GEF grant for grants up to \$2 million, and 5% of the GEF grant for grants above \$2 million [and] if project proposals request above these benchmarks, then additional details have to be provided regarding the project management budget for scrutiny by the Secretariat.” The conclusion was that the “Secretariat continues to keep close scrutiny of project management budgets.” The project management budget for this project is, therefore, above the benchmark but was nonetheless approved by the GEF.

- c. The management related costs of the Landscape Specialists.
- d. The travel costs for the PM to travel to the field to visit the five LCAs, and
- e. Equipment costs (which should have already been expended).

This reallocation should be carried out urgently. Once the reallocation is complete, the budgets and expenditure will have to be re-examined (line by line to ensure that the funds are being allocated correctly according to the above regulations for allocating the project management budget and expenditure) and re-approved at least by the PSC if not at a higher level.

In addition, because keeping project management costs as low as possible is an important aspect of cost efficiency, the project's Terminal Evaluation will have to carry out a thorough and detailed examination of what was (and, importantly, what was not) included in the project management budget and expenses.

- Third, it is impossible for us to carry out the analysis of project finance as we would like – including i) this aspect of the cost effectiveness of the project, ii) the rate of expenditure vs. the allocated budget, iii) whether any budget lines are over- or underspent.
- Fourth, the PCU and UNDP-CO should ensure that the budget, when submitted to the PSC for approval (on an annual basis in conjunction with the workplan), is accurately allocated and, subsequently, that the spending is then done and accounted for against the approved budget lines.
- Finally, under no circumstances should project management expenditure exceed the approved budget of USD 450,000; any project management costs that exceed this amount should be covered by UNDP or MET. Indeed, given the fact that the GEF Secretariat already uses a threshold of 5% for projects over USD 2 million (see footnote on previous page), if the project even approaches its own project management budget of USD 450,000, its efficiency would be called into question.

96. The project has been audited twice during its lifetime and has received no qualified opinions to date.

Table 7. The project as originally budgeting in the Project Document.

	Year 1 (2011-12)	Year 2 (2012-13)	Year 3 (2013-14)	Year 4 (2014-15)	Year 5 (2015)	Total (USD)
Component 1	175,100	254,600	118,100	75,200	14,200	637,200
Component 2	168,350	489,700	1,206,100	635,900	186,800	2,686,850
Component 3	51,200	253,900	224,100	137,850	58,900	725,950
Project Management	82,000	80,000	104,500	79,500	104,000	450,000
PROJECT TOTAL	476,650	1,078,200	1,652,800	928,450	363,900	4,500,000

Table 8. The differences between the budgets for the project, first as originally budgeted in the Project Document and, second, as included in the annual workplans as approved by the PSC

	YR 1		YR 2		YR 2	
	ProDoc	Annual Workplan	ProDoc	Annual Workplan	ProDoc	Annual Workplan
Component 1	175,100	175,100	254,600	150,000	118,100	205,066
Component 2	168,350	168,350	489,700	382,000	1,206,100	582,881
Component 3	51,200	51,200	253,900	119,000	224,100	386,346
Project Management	82,000	82,000	80,000	247,874	104,500	223,206
PROJECT TOTAL	476,650	476,650	1,078,200	898,874	1,652,800	1,397,499

Table 9. The project's cofinance as originally planned and actual (as recorded to date).

	UNDP own financing		Government		Partner agency		Total	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Grants								
Loans/Concessions								
• In kind	100,000.00	53,000.00	14,000,000.00	7,420,000.00			14,100,000.00	7,473,000.00
• Other								
Totals	100,000.00	53,000.00	14,000,000.00	7,420,000.00			14,100,000.00	7,473,000.00

3.2.3 Monitoring systems

3.2.3.1 *Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation (*)*

97. The project was designed with the usual UNDP-GEF M&E framework – but no M&E budget was specifically assigned (it appears to have been built into the project management budget – when re-analysing the budget and expenditure, this will have to be taken into account as well).

98. While the regular M&E appears to have been carried out well, there have been issues – most obviously with the issue of budgeting (see section on Project Finance above) but also with the relevance of some of the inputs and retaining an overall focus of the project on landscape level conservation. A small part of the problem lies in the *relative confidence* that the RTC has with Namibia²³. More vigilance and monitoring are required – coupled with soliciting expert technical assistance with issues such as landscape-level conservation.

99. In addition to this lack of oversight, there are other issues with the monitoring. First, the project has implemented a number of small, “in-the-field” projects (as part of Output 1.6) – however the monitoring of the impacts (intended and unintended) has not been carried out systematically. The principle must be that whenever an activity or action is carried out in the field (or, for that matter, with the endorsement of policies, legislation, regulations, plans, etc.), the project must consider how its impact will be measured and to put into place systematic mechanisms to measure it.

100. Finally, there remains an issue regarding the use of the METT and/or NAMETT for monitoring the management effectiveness of the protected areas in this project. While there are strong arguments for the use of the NAMETT (supported by the MTR team), this was not agreed upon at the beginning of the project. As a result, the project will have to continue using of the METT until a ruling is received from the GEF Council on this (and this will not be in the project’s lifetime). Thus, to conform to GEF policy, the project will have to continue using the METT until the end of the project. It should not just be applied at the LCA level but it should also be applied at the individual PA level within each LCA. In this way, the effect that inclusion within an LCA on management effectiveness can be determined.

101. In the future, neither the project nor the MET nor, indeed, the UNDP-CO can approach the GEF Council on the use of the NAMETT for further protected areas projects that may be implemented in Namibia. The appropriate course of action is for the GEF Focal Point for Namibia to take the matter to a future GEF Constituency Meeting and request that the issue be tabled at a future GEF Council meeting. The GEF Council can then decide whether this will be possible.

3.2.3.2 *Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management*

102. As is described in various places in this report, there is a great deal of variation among the LCAs. This is an area where M&E would have been critical to provide feedback to allow for adaptive management of the project – by ensuring that the developments in the LCAs could proceed at different rates. The M&E and the resulting feedback loop have not been as good as it could have been and the project has attempted to proceed at the same rate with the same activities in all LCAs. One

²³ This confidence is warranted when projects, capacity and processes are compared with many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa; however, this project is especially complex given i) the number of stakeholders, ii) the political processes and iii) the complexities of landscape-level conservation.

result may have been alienation and confusion among stakeholders – as illustrated by the community conservancies in the GW LCA.

M&E		
Overall quality of M&E	MS	Had the M&E had been better (both by the DEA of the MET, by the UNDP-CO and RTC), we believe that some of the issues that the MTR found would have been dealt with already (although this is part of the role of the MTR!) and the ‘course’ adjustment that we are recommending would not be necessary. Quantifying impact – and not just those aspects that appear in the logframe – is important to elucidate the achievements (and, occasionally, shortcomings) of the project. With the variation among the LCAs, achieving indications uniformly and simultaneously was always going to be challenging and the project should be implemented adaptively in response to the capacity of stakeholders within each LCA.
M&E design at project start-up	S	The project adopted the standard M&E framework for UNDP-GEF projects. However, the M&E design could have indicated that the project should monitor each of the activities and interventions that it is carrying out – and, thereby, have quantitative information on the impacts (both intended and unintended) that it is having. In addition, the M&E is limited by the knowledge in landscape-level conservation and the relative youth of the Landscape Specialists (to stand up to strong people in LMCs, for example).
M&E plan Implementation	MS	The project has implemented the basic UNDP-GEF M&E framework, including production of an Inception Report, APRs, and PIRs. There have been few UNDP-CO and no RTC missions to the field sites. However, continuing from the design, while there have been field visits and the LSs spend a great deal of time in the field (to implement and monitor <i>activities</i>), the project has not quantitatively monitored the outcomes and impacts of interventions and activities that it has carried out (there are no data). This should be done in the second half of the project.

3.2.4 Risk management

103. The assumptions and risks, as presented in the Project Document, seem appropriate. There is one risk that has not been considered: this is that there is sufficient understanding or knowledge in landscape level ecological processes. However, knowledge of processes is relatively limited. While people reason intuitively that operating at a landscape level is probably a good thing, the state of the knowledge is such that little is actually known. Thus, for example, what are the long-term impacts on wildlife populations? The mitigation strategy for this is to institute a monitoring protocol that is sufficiently sensitive to determine the impacts on all aspects of biodiversity as well as the ecological processes and ecosystem services, and, thereafter, for the areas to be managed adaptively depending on the recorded impacts. In addition, the project should consider hiring a technical advisor with experience and expertise in landscape-level conservation; such a consultant can build the capacity of the team and also ensure that the direction of the project retains its focus on landscape-level processes.

3.2.5 Reporting

104. The project is using standard UNDP-GEF reporting frameworks. This appears to be working well.

105. In addition, each of the studies and additional work in the project have produced good and detailed outputs (see Annex VI for list of documents produced by Component).

3.3 Management arrangements

106. The project is being implemented under NEX modalities through the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET).

107. Oversight of the project implementation is being done by a Project Coordination Unit (PCU), which is comprised of a Project Steering Committee (PSC), a Project Advisory Committee (PAC), and the project staff and consultants, led by the Project Manager (PM). Over the life of the project, the PCU is expected to evolve into a LCA Coordination Unit under the MET.

108. The PCU is responsible for the coordination of the project, particularly at the national (or central) level – thus, those activities linked with policy and legislation, and systemic and institutional capacities. The PCU is also be responsible for collating and disseminating lessons learned as well as linking with other projects, including those financed by the GEF.

109. The PCU falls under the oversight and supervision of the PSC. This is the highest decision-making structure for the project and ultimately takes full responsibility for the implementation and results of the project. The PSC is comprised of :

- a. Environmental Commissioner - DEA- Chairperson
- b. Director - (Directorate of Tourism)
- c. Director - (Directorate of Regional Services and Park Management)
- d. UNDP representative
- e. Federation of Namibian Tourism Association (FENATA)
- f. Ministry of Agriculture Water and Forestry (MAWF)
- g. 5 x Landscape representatives
- h. The PM acts as the Secretary for the PSC.

110. The project also has a Project Advisory Committee (PAC). The original idea of the PAC was to bring insight, advice and suggestions from the landscape level up to the national or central level.

111. The PCU, comprised of the PM, an Administrative and Financial Assistant (AFA) and three Landscape Specialists (LS) (see Table 10) is responsible for the day-to-day management of the project, coordinating the implementation of the project, including supervising the consultants that are contracted by the MET for project activities.

Table 10. The composition of the PCU team, their positions and their duration of employment to date

Name	Position	Period of employment
Michael Sibatani	Project Manager	01 Aug 2011 – present
Cameroon Kandjii	Administrative and Financial Assistant	01 Aug 2011 – 31 April 2013

Martha Ndove	Administrative and Financial Assistant	15 June 2013 – present
Urioukwao Matundu	Landscape Specialist, Mudumu LCA	01 Aug 2011 – present
Laudika Halueendo	Landscape Specialist, GW and WGB LCAs	01 Aug 2011 – present
Jonas Heita	Landscape Specialist, GFRC and GSN LCA	01 Aug 2011 – present

112. At a landscape level, project activities are being coordinated by the LS. There are three LS: one based in Katima Mulilo to coordinate activities in the Mudumu LCA; the second was originally based in Otjiwarongo but is now based in Windhoek and coordinates activities in both the Greater Waterberg and Windhoek Green Belt LCAs; and the third, who was also originally based outside Windhoek – in Keetmanshoop but is now also based in Windhoek, coordinates the activities in both the Greater Fish River Canyon and Greater Sossusvlei-Namib LCAs.

113. The project has worked to establish management committees in each of the five landscapes. These management committees are guided by constitutions (or they will be once they have been signed by all parties); the management committees coordinate project activities at the landscape level with the support of the LS. The LS will act as the Secretary at all meetings of the management committee.

3.3.1 Overall project management

3.3.2 Quality of executive of implementing partners

114. The project is being implemented by the MET but, by definition, as a project developing collaborative management arrangements in five areas of the country, there are a significant number of stakeholders involved.

115. There are no formal partnership arrangements *directly with the project*. However, in each of the five LCAs, through the establishment of the Landscape Management Committees, founded on their Constitutions, there are some distinctly formal partnership arrangements. The process was, of course, *facilitated* by the project but the arrangement remains among the stakeholders.

3.3.3 UNDP's comparative advantage

116. One good indicator of UNDP's comparative advantage was that UNDP was selected by the Government of Namibia as the Implementation Agency for this project. The project is aligned with UNDP's Country Programme – one component of which is energy and environment for sustainable development. As described above, the project has strong synergy with the UNDP-GEF SPAN project. In addition to SPAN, UNDP has been and continues to be involved in many other biodiversity and protected areas projects in the country. As such, UNDP is well positioned to “ensure inter-project learning” within Namibia.

117. UNDP released the latest UNPAF, coinciding almost precisely with the MTR mission in Namibia. This provides multiple entry points for the objectives of this project.

118. As described above (see section on Management Arrangements), the project is being implemented under NEX modalities and enjoys significant autonomy from the

UNDP-CO. Indeed, through the PCU, the MET is responsible for the implementation of the project as well as all the management of the finance. This is not to say that the UNDP-CO is not involved but rather they are involved in project monitoring as well as participating in the various oversight and advisory committees.

IA & EA Execution		
Overall quality of implementation & execution	MS	<p>The project has been implemented well in terms of carrying out activities and the results achieved to date play witness to this. However, the relevance of the activities has not always been focused on the outcomes and objective of the project and questions remain unanswered regarding the cost effectiveness of the implementation (and specifically the project management costs). As a result, the implementation and execution has been moderately satisfactory. However, if the project continues to implement activities – that are well focused – and at this rate for the remaining 30 months of its life, it will achieve all or almost all that it set out to achieve.</p>
Implementation Agency Execution (UNDP)	S	<p>The UNDP-CO is playing the supportive role in the project as it should and as would be expected. There were a number of issues found over the course of the MTR and we believe that had the UNDP-CO and RTC been more vigilant and fastidious (e.g., in scrutiny of workplans and budgets, in scrutiny of LMC plans and overall guidance on project direction), then the project would have been more satisfactory overall. Obviously part of the MTR’s role is to pick up on these things – and we have done this – but we believe that if the UNDP-CO had been more vigilant they would have already have been noticed and some form of adaptive management implemented. This is not to say that the UNDP-CO should have an implementation role; but it is to say that they should have played a greater supportive and oversight role.</p> <p>There was an assumption that “everything in Namibia was fine” and so vigilance by the RTC might not have been as sharp as it could have been. Further, the landscape level conservation aspect of the project has largely been missed and a landscape conservation expert has not been brought on (despite being suggested in the project document).</p>
Executing Agency Execution (MET)	MS	<p>The MET has taken ownership of the project – and is almost completely autonomous from the UNDP-CO. Knowledge of the project is outstanding within the DRSPM and, partly, within the DEA. However, there are aspects that appear paradoxical and contradictory, and which suggest that the other parts of the institution are less engaged in and less supportive of the project that they could be. These are explained in detail in the body of the report.</p> <p>As with the above point, the MET could also have monitored the implementation of the project more closely to ensure that it was following the intended course.</p>

3.3.3.1 Country ownership

119. Unsustainable natural resource management and loss of wildlife and biodiversity is one of the developmental challenges in Namibia. The immediate objective of the NAM-PLACE project will ultimately contribute to the achievement of MDG Goal 7 on environmental sustainability. One indicator of Target 9 of MDG Goal 7 (Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and

programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources) is the ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area. Hence establishment of landscape conservation areas at selected sites will address the wider Vision 2030 objective 6, “*Ensure the development of Namibia’s natural capital and its sustainable utilization for the benefit of the country’s social, economic and ecological well-being*”. This was also articulated in National Development Plan 3, Key Results Area 6 which aimed to achieve Productive Utilization of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. It is very important to further note that the establishment of the five LCAs through NAM-PLACE project are output indicators in the 2011-2020 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action.

120. The implementation modalities of the project – with a large degree of autonomy from the UNDP-CO in that all procurement, financial management, project implementation are being carried out by the PCU through the MET. Of course, UNDP is involved in monitoring the implementation of the project. However, this level of autonomy is not common and reflects both the capacity and ownership of the project by the MET.

121. The project is housed within the DEA (Department of Environmental Affairs within the MET). The Environmental Commissioner is also the GEF Focal Point for Namibia.

122. Despite the project not being (currently) housed in the Directorate of Regional Services and Parks Management (DRSPM), the knowledge displayed in the project by the Director and those of his staff that the MTR met was impressive: it was evident that they took significant interest in the project and its progress.

123. And yet despite these very impressive aspects, the MET is also, arguably, the least engaged partner to the project in the field. There are a number of things that support this assertion. First, constitutions have been developed by all five demonstration LCAs. They have been signed by all partners – with the notable exception of the MET. Indeed, the MET has not signed any of the constitutions; as initiator and owner of the project, one would have expected them to have been the first to sign²⁴. This is not only slightly inexplicable but it has also led to diminished confidence among the other partners in all five LCAs. Second, in areas where fences are being taken down (e.g., in the GSN LCA), the MET – as the organization with the mandate to manage the state’s protected area (and in this example, the Namib Naukluft National Park) – has not followed suite. Indeed, on the contrary, while the MTR mission was underway, within the GSN LCA, the MET was *repairing* a section of fence that was within the LCA. If there are issues that lead the MET to repair a fence (and there may well be associated with security for high-value species such as

²⁴ The MTR understands the reason why they have not been signed: this was explained to us in detail. However, requiring that each LCA Constitution requires the signature of the Attorney General via the top management committee, via the policy, research and development committee is a long-winded process that should have been precluded from the outset of the project: if the committees and the Attorney General had signed off on the process either during the design phase or at the onset of the project, the necessity for them to sign off on each Constitution may have been negated. This would have significantly improved efficiency and engendered trust.

Comment on draft: “Can it be simplified going forward?” MTR response: *Unlikely, however it is a lesson learned and future projects should recall this and prevent it in the design of the project. It should be included in the risk assessments of future projects and appropriate mitigation steps put into place.*

rhinos or to exclude exotic species), then the MET must be transparent with the partners of the LCA.

124. This, in fact, is the arguably the key outcome of the LCAs: to have a true, functional partnership among the members of the LCA; that they share a conversation vision and they pull together in the same direction for the conservation of biodiversity and ecological processes at a landscape level; that this partnership is based on transparency and trust.

125. Again, the lack of transparency surrounding the repaired fence has only acted to reduce confidence and trust among the other partners. Third, in some of the areas visited by the MTR mission, it was the MET officers that were the least interested with engaging with the MTR mission and displayed indifference to the project and the mission. A fourth example lies in Bwabwata National Park in the Mudumu Landscape. Here, the project assisted with the construction of a cement plinth to act as a signboard for passing tourist traffic. This plinth was to act as a demonstration and training was provided to the park staff so that they could carry on with the task of constructing plinths elsewhere in the park, as needed. In addition, the project provided the materials for the construction of the other plinths. However, at the time of the MTR mission, some five months after the materials, demonstration and training were provided, nothing has been done.

126. In contrast, again, to the above issues, the MET is investing directly in various aspects of the project – including monitoring wildlife populations, carrying out research projects (e.g., monitoring the movements of oryx and Hartmann’s mountain zebras in the GSN LCA now that many of the fences have been removed and as a mechanism to persuade the MET that the NNP fences should also be removed).

127. In summary, there are some paradoxical aspects of the country’s ownership of the project. On one hand, they appear extraordinarily committed while on the other, there are certain aspects of their behaviour which is breakdown trust among the partners. It is essential that in the final years of the project, the MET demonstrates ownership and leadership in the project – and thereby (re)build the trust that is so necessary for the partnerships that are at the foundation of the LCAs and the collaborative management that underpin them. The concrete ways that they can do this include:

- a. Ensuring that agreements, management plans and other such documents are signed immediately (and preferably before other partners sign the documents as a signal of goodwill)
- b. Taking bold steps to remove fences in selective places (e.g., along the Namib Narkluft NP) and certainly not repairing fences when other partners are removing theirs!
- c. Demonstrating leadership and enthusiasm for the project and for landscape level conservation overall; part of this is to look to replicate landscape conservation areas elsewhere in the country.
- d. Demonstrate some interest and enthusiasm for the project when being visited by independent evaluators!!

3.3.3.2 Mainstreaming

128. A number of the project’s indicators directly target mainstreaming and replication:

- *Objective level* – Improved systems level operations capacity has ensured a reduced level of threats to habitats and species composition
- *Output 1.2* – National level best practices guidelines for the establishment of new LCAs in place by year 5
- *Output 1.4* – National level codes of practice, based on best practice, in place by year 5
- *Output 3.3* – Biodiversity monitoring and assessment system developed for each LCA and recommended at national level for integration into a national tourism venture certification system
- *Output 3.4* – Supply chains developed based on current and potential markets for the diversification of current goods and services and/ or the development of new ones; Supply chains identified for certification; Markets established and mobilised for certified supply chains.

129. The project has yet to embark on any of these things; they have now demonstrated that the establishment of the LCAs is possible and there are a number of lessons that they have learned from the process. The project will have to spend the remainder of the project focusing on two things, one of which is to create a framework to facilitate replication of LCAs across Namibia. Achievement of the above indicators will demonstrate that this has been partly achieved: to have the process of establishment of LCAs in other areas of the country would be even better!

3.3.4 Quality of support provided by UNDP

130. The UNDP-CO is playing the supportive role in the project as it should and as would be expected. There were a number of issues found over the course of the MTR and we believe that had the UNDP-CO and RTC been more vigilant and fastidious (e.g., in scrutiny of workplans and budgets, in scrutiny of LMC plans and overall guidance on project direction), then the project would have been more satisfactory overall. Obviously part of the MTR's role is to pick up on these things – and we have done this – but we believe that if the UNDP-CO had been more vigilant they would have already have been noticed and some form of adaptive management implemented. This is not to say that the UNDP-CO should have an implementation role; but it is to say that they should have played a greater supportive and oversight role.

131. There was an assumption that “everything in Namibia was fine” and so vigilance by the RTC might not have been as sharp as it could have been. Further, the landscape level conservation aspect of the project has largely been missed and a landscape conservation expert has not been brought on (despite being suggested in the project document).

4 Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons

4.1 Conclusions

132. The project is almost precisely halfway through its lifetime (including the no cost extension discussed above). During its first half, it has been very effective in the activities that it has carried out. The reality is that, despite the pages of recommendations found below, the project simply has to keep up the momentum over *all* of the rest of the project's life and it will then be on course to achieve most of what

it set out to achieve and as a result be a successful project. There are a few things that need to be done and to be focused upon; if these are done and the momentum is maintained, the project will contribute significantly to the conservation of the biodiversity of Namibia. Partly because of design issues and the location of the demonstration LCAs, the direct *global environmental benefits* that result from the project may be initially limited. However, if the project acts as a springboard for replicating landscape level conservation processes in those areas of Namibia where the globally important biodiversity is to be found at greater concentration, then it could be said to have contributed significantly to global environmental benefits. To do this, however, there is some way to go and, again, the momentum will have to be maintained all the way.

Item	Rating	Comment
Overall Project Results	MS	Following a ten-month delay to the project start-up, the project got off to a good, effective start. It has achieved many aspects of what it set out to achieve some of which are well in advance of when they were expected. However, there are a few caveats – or moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency – and, therefore, it is rated as being Moderately Satisfactory. The MTR is, however, confident that these shortcomings can be overcome (and see section 4 for how they should be overcome) in the remaining 30 months of the project’s life and as such it will become Highly Satisfactory.

4.2 Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project

133. Throughout the report, we have been making suggestions and recommendations for the enhancement of the project as it moves through its remaining time. Here we consolidate and reinforce those recommendations. Before doing so, we would like to say that despite the pages and pages of recommendations that follow, these can all be summarised into three things:

- a. The project has been working at a good pace to date; if the team keeps this rate up until the end of the project and it will complete all its tasks in good time.
- b. The project must retain a focus on the objective and components of the project and, through enhanced monitoring and technical support, be in a position to demonstrate this.
- c. The project must start to build for sustainability immediately.

134. **Reconcile the budgetary – expenditure issues** (for PCU, UNDP-CO and to be approved by PSC and RTA). We have discussed the budgetary – expenditure issues in detail in the sections on Project Finance and Effectiveness & Efficiency. The project and the UNDP-CO must urgently re-do the finances for YR2 and YR3 ensuring that the items are allocated to the correct budget lines (as approved in the Project Document) and ensure that the expenses line up with the budgeted amount.

135. The updated accounts will then have to be approved *at least* by the PSC. The update accounts should be scrutinized in detail to determine *how* the reallocation has

been carried out. If it turns out that the project management costs are too high, the cost effectiveness of the project should be reviewed.

136. **Improve monitoring.** While the project and project partners (e.g., UNDP-CO) have been carrying out standard monitoring of the project activities, there is no quantitative information on the impacts of the project. This is simply because the project has carried out the activities without putting in place any monitoring mechanisms. It is important that the project team consider how the impacts (both intended and unintended) will be determined for every intervention and activity that they carry out. Just because it does not exist as an indicator or appear in the logframe does not mean that it should not be done! Finally, impacts can be on a number of different levels – from impacts on biodiversity, ecosystem services or ecological processes at the highest level but they can also include measuring changes of behaviour, how changes of attitudes are leading to changes of behaviour, how training is being used on a daily basis by trainees in their daily routines, etc.

137. In addition to this basic principle, the project still needs to develop a “biodiversity monitoring and assessment system developed for each LCA and recommended at national level” – this is the indicator for Output 3.3.

138. In summary, the actions to be taken for improving the monitoring include:

- a. The PCU must ensure that there is some level of monitoring for all activities that it carries out including being vigilant for inadvertent impacts. We do not think it is necessary to hire an M&E specialist for this but rather this work can be done by the existing team.
- b. The UNDP-CO, together with the PSC (and supported by the UNDP RTC) must ensure that the project retains its focus its goal, objective and outcomes. One especially important step will be the approval of annual workplans and budgets and the PCU should provide adequate detail to ensure that the PSC and UNDP-CO can make a well founded decision when approving these plans. The PSC and UNDP-CO, with the support of the proposed landscape-level conservation specialist should also examine each of the proposed inputs to ensure that they satisfy the project’s landscape-level conservation objective.

139. **Adjustments to logframe.** As discussed in various sections of this report (as well as in the Analysis of the logframe, section 3.1.1), there is variation among the LCAs – indeed, that was one of the criteria for selecting them. However, the variation goes beyond differences in biota, ecosystems, vegetation type, biodiversity and stakeholders. From a project implementation perspective, it is the differences in history, capacity, levels of interest and engagement, and expectations among the stakeholders among the LCAs that are more important. For example, in the Mudumu Landscape, there has been a very long history of interventions, it is an area that is full of actors and this has, arguably, brought advantages (high capacity) and disadvantages (dependency of conservancies). In contrast, in the Greater Waterberg Landscape there has been some level of work by a small number of actors (through the Greater Waterberg Complex) but the capacities and level of development of the conservancies is low (which has now resulted in profound mistrust).

140. As a consequence, the project has to be implemented *adaptively*, depending on those factors. As a result, the sequencing of establishment and development will be different as they proceed at different rates. One thing is abundantly clear: the LCAs

will not be at the same stage of development at the EOP. We also make recommended adjustments to the logframe as a consequence of this analysis. (*For the PCU – adaptive implementation; MTR – logframe adjustments; PSC – approving logframe adjustments*).

141. **Attention to detail.** This really is a small but important point. The project is dealing with a broad range of stakeholders some of whom are also sensitive (particularly those with lower capacity) and can easily be alienated and mistrust. The adage “trust takes years to build, seconds to break, forever to repair” applies. Therefore, the project should give due consideration to all stakeholders and to try to understand things from their perspective. Here, there are two examples from the MTR mission that serve to illustrate what we mean²⁵. First, when attending the meeting of the Landscape Management Committee in the GSNL, over a number of presentations, a number of different maps were presented. These maps were not all consistent in that they showed different representations of the LCA. If there had been a particularly sensitive stakeholder present at the meeting and they saw that they had been excluded from the LCA, they would certainly feel alienated and less trustful of the process²⁶. Second, English is being used as the ‘official’ language of the project – and yet for many of the stakeholders of the project (as well as the protect team itself), English is their second or third language. The project could easily facilitate their understanding by communicating important (but synthesised – e.g., Executive Summaries) components or outputs in an accessible way for them (e.g., producing a German translation of an Executive Summary or given an oral presentation at a community gathering). (*For the PCU with the LMCs*)

142. **Project branding and communications.** This is another small but important point. The project is the ‘face’ of a number of organisations, including the MET, the UNDP-CO and the GEF. In the quid pro quo that exists between the project and these organisations, they should provide all the support they can to enhance the effectiveness of the project. The project, equally, owes it to these organisations to acknowledge their support (which, of course, it is already doing).

143. However, there are two other concerns here. First, the project has invested in producing all kinds of branding material (jackets, flyers, banners, etc.; if items such as banners are important for international meetings, explain this to stakeholders; be transparent!). The question we (and other stakeholders who we met over the course of the mission) have is whether this is the most *cost effective* branding? Is it possible that this has led to some degree of alienation and mistrust (as was suggested on a few occasions to the MTR mission)? The project must remain sensitive to these issues. (*For the PCU to reflect on cost effective branding and communications – to be approved by PSC.*)

144. Finally, information on the project exists on two websites – that of the MET²⁷ and on the Landscapes Namibia website²⁸. First, neither website is complete nor has up-to-date information (with the exception of the sub-sections of the Landscape Namibia website). Second, it would be simpler to maintain one website and simply link from one to the other. We recommend that the Landscapes Namibia website is

²⁵ Note that these are *illustrations* not an attempt to chastise!

²⁶ This was explained at the NTR mission’s debriefing meeting in Windhoek; nonetheless, the point still holds – the project needs to be sensitive, consistent and pay attention to detail.

²⁷ <http://www.met.gov.na/NAMPLACE/default.aspx>

²⁸ <http://www.landscapesnamibia.org>

further developed and updated and a link to it is placed on the MET website that opens the page as a new tab or page. (*For the PCU*)

4.3 Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project

145. **No cost extension (for PSC).** The project has already requested – and been granted – a no cost extension. The MTR supports this as it compensates for the slow start-up period. If endorsed, the project would then terminate on 30 June 2016²⁹.

146. **The role of the MET.** There are some paradoxes to the behaviour of the MET. On the one hand, they have unprecedented ownership of the project, they are providing significant cofinance for the project, they are carrying out expensive research to determine the impacts of the project and, yet, paradoxically, they have not yet signed the LCA Constitutions (in contrast to all other stakeholders) and at least in one LCA are carrying out activities in the opposing direction to the rest of the LCA constituents. Such inconsistent behaviour erodes trust and is even more important when this behaviour is being displayed by the owner of the project!

147. It is essential that in the final years of the project, the MET demonstrates ownership and leadership in the project – and thereby (re)build the trust that is so necessary for the partnerships that are at the foundation of the LCAs and the collaborative management that underpin them. The concrete ways that they can do this include:

- a. Ensuring that agreements, management plans and other such documents are signed immediately (and preferably before other partners sign the documents as a signal of goodwill) (*specifically for the Environment Commissioner, MET, National Project Director and GEF Focal Person*)
- b. Taking bold steps to remove fences in selective places (e.g., along the Namib Narkluft NP) and certainly not repairing fences when other partners are removing theirs! (*Specifically to the Director, Regional Services and Parks Management, MET*)
- c. Demonstrating leadership and enthusiasm for the project and for landscape level conservation overall; part of this is to look to replicate landscape conservation areas elsewhere in the country (*Specifically to the Department of Regional Services and Parks Management with oversight by the Environment Commissioner, MET, National Project Director and GEF Focal Person*)
- d. Demonstrate some interest and enthusiasm for the project when being visited by independent evaluators!! (*Specifically to Met representatives in the LCAs*).

148. If there is any hesitation on the side of the MET to commit to various agreements (e.g., the Constitutions), then it should be recalled that they endorsed and fully committed to all these concepts from the outset when the project was being designed and agreed (*for UNDP-CO and DEA*).

²⁹ Although this date appears in the PIR for 2013, it does not appear to be approved by the PSC: in other words, the approval of the extension does not appear in the minutes of any of the PSC meetings. This was confirmed by the PM who asked that the MTR evaluators include it as a recommendation. Given the slow start-up to the project and that we think that a full 30 months is necessary to complete the project, we have included it as a recommendation here.

149. **Ensure all stakeholders are participating and engaged.** For detailed discussion, see the Results Section but there are a number of stakeholders who need to be included to a much greater degree; moreover there needs to be good cooperation and coordinator among these stakeholders – otherwise they will end up implementing activities that undermines the other. These include the “line ministries” and consumptive users of wildlife. *(For PCU and Landscape Management Committees to include all key stakeholders; for the Environment Commissioner to request that the Minister of Environment and Tourism takes the issue to the Council of Ministers to make the require of cooperation and collaboration from the line ministries)*

150. **Complete the job!** The project is almost precisely halfway through its lifetime (including the no cost extension discussed above). This means that it has 30 months to run before it closes. In that time, it still has a vast amount to achieve but if it keeps up the pace that has been established in the first 27 (active) months of its life, it is well on course to be a successful project. The outstanding tasks are essentially to i) consolidate the established LCAs, ii) ensure the framework for replication is in place and iii) ensure the sustainability of the processes and impacts of the project.

151. **Consolidating the LCAs.** While the project has established the LCAs, there are still outstanding tasks to further consolidate them. These include:

- The Constitutions that govern each of the LCAs are equivalent to policies at a governmental level. Like national legislation, they can be taken further into the development of guidelines and regulations. Such guidelines and regulations can then strengthen the framework for what may (or may not) happen within the boundaries of the LCA. An example may be that a given LCA may wish to adopt a “dark skies” regulation for all stakeholders within the LCA. Another example may be the adoption of a regulation governing ground water use. *(For LMCs with the assistance of the PCU to develop guidelines and regulations for each LCA.)*
- As indicated in the Introduction (under the Scope & Methodology), the MTR mission only managed to visit three of the five demonstration sites and the visits to the three sites were very brief. This has given us an overview of the three sites that we visited but we believe that a more detailed review at site level would be warranted. This could easily be done by the project. The aim of the review would be to take stock of the situation (including those landscape level attributes towards which the project should be working) and to develop a road map for each. The road map will determine how the targets for each LCA will be met by the EOP; the road map should give indicators and milestones. Finally, it is clear that not all five LCAs will be at the same stage at the EOP; it would be unrealistic to think otherwise. The project will, therefore, have to continue to display adaptive management to deal with this situation. *(For the PCU with support from UNDP-CO and RTC and from other Technical Advisors.)*

The necessity of this can be illustrated by the site visit to the Greater Waterberg LCA. When the MTR mission visited this site, the depth of the distrust between the communal conservancies and other stakeholders in the area. The difference between this LCA and the others visited by the MTR mission was profound. It is, therefore, inconceivable that the same stages of LCA establishment and development can be applied across each of the five demonstration sites.

Indeed, our recommendation is that in the GW LCA, further analysis should be carried out to determine whether the four community conservancies are really

appropriate for wildlife conservancies (thus, for example, to assess whether the communities are suitably interested and motivated in wildlife conservation at present when compared with livestock husbandry). If the analysis finds that the areas are not suitable (using established criteria for community conservancies), then the project has learned many lessons from the intervention in the Greater Waterberg and the PSC should close the project in this area. We would support this. If, on the other hand, the analysis finds that there is a possibility that it may work, then we strongly recommend that the process be re-started – from scratch. This would entail the following steps: i) bringing in a conflict resolution specialist to re-build trust in the process, and ii) bringing in a community conservation/governance specialist (possibly with the assistance of an organisation such as NACSO) to re-start the process of build the community conservancies. *(For the PCU under the guidance of the PSC and UNDP-CO).*

- As indicated in the above point and as provided for in the Project Document, the project will need to call on further Technical Assistance. The Project Document provides for both international and national technical assistance. As well as the conflict resolution and a community conservation/governance specialists mentioned above, we believe that because of the complexities, a landscape level conservation specialist would also be useful from time to time³⁰. *(For the PCU)*
- Further to the above point about a landscape level conservation specialist, care must be taken when providing funding for further inputs in the LCAs for the various reasons already discussed in this report (e.g., lack of transparency creating distrust; unfulfilled expectations exacerbating distrust; inputs less relevant to objectives and components of project). They must i) remain relevant to the objectives of the project (including both the landscape level conservation objectives and the incremental logic behind the project), ii) their impacts (both intended and unintended) must be monitored and iii) the expectations surrounding the inputs must be managed very carefully. *(For the PCO with the support of the TA for landscape-level conservation)*
- The Project Document describes in detail and makes provision for the development of plans, agreements, assessments, policies and legislation. Aside from the establishment of the LCAs and infrastructural inputs, there is little mention of *implementation* of the resulting enabled environment. Where possible, the project should catalyse implementation processes. *(For the PCU with the support of the PSC)*
- ***Resolving which Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) to use.*** As discussed in the section on M&E, there is an issue with which version of the management effectiveness tracking tool to use – whether the GEF advocated METT or the version that was slightly amended for use across the Namibian protected area system (NAMETT). As also indicated in the section on M&E, the project was endorsed by the GEF using the METT; thus, it will have to continue using the METT until the end of the project. What will be most interesting about using the METT for the PAs found within the LCAs is whether their METT scores (i.e., their management effectiveness) increases significantly (and the logframe demands a 20% increase on average) compared with other, control PAs across the

³⁰ This may involve a longer contract of, say, 60 days distributed across the remainder of the project with analytical and assessment inputs.

country. We also recommend that the project attempts to applied the METT is to the LCAs as a whole (i.e., carry out one METT for each LCA). (*For the PCU*)

- However, in the longer-term, we recommend that the project catalyses a process to make a formal application to change this such that future protected area projects use the NAMETT rather than the METT. The project should encourage the GEF Focal Point for Namibia to take the matter to a future GEF Constituency Meeting and request that the issue be tabled at a future GEF Council meeting. This will then harmonise the use of the NAMETT across the protected area system. (*For the PCU, DRSPM, UNDP-CO and GEF Focal Point in DEA*).

4.4 Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

152. ***Continue to support the process towards the finalization and enactment of the PAWMB.*** The project is already involved in the process of finalizing the PAWMB – through the production of four of the policies that underpin the Bill (and, in the process, including the concept of LCAs in these policies). The project should continue to be involved, opportunistically, until the Bill is passed – with the inclusion of the landscape concept included therein (*for the PCU*).

153. ***Working towards replication.*** It is unlikely that we will see a mushrooming of LCAs across the country in the coming 30 months of the project's life. However, there are some indicators that are specifically designed to promote replication of LCAs across the country and elsewhere in the region. The project must work to achieve the targets associated with those indicators. In addition, it is necessary to replicate the LCAs in the areas of highest global environmental interest, as indicated throughout this report, to demonstrate that the project will lead to global environmental benefits as demanded by the GEF. (*For the PCU with the DRSPM*).

154. As the project proceeds, the project team should maintain their record of lessons learned (thus, by adding to the Lessons Learned section of the annual PIR) and, with the lessons learned listed below, start to build the guidelines for landscape establishment (that are, in any case, one of the indicators for the project). Certainly, by the EOP, we would expect to see those targets achieved; it would be all the more gratifying if other areas in the country were looking to replicate LCAs, building on the lessons learned in this project. (*For the PCU*)

155. Finally, there is already the opportunity for cross-fertilisation among the existing LCAs: the Landscape Specialists – and when the Landscape Coordinators are recruited (see below), they should have the opportunity whenever possible to visit other LCAs to learn lessons and adopt best practices. (*For the PCU*)

156. ***Working towards sustainability.*** As described in the section on Sustainability, there is no small risk that the processes and impacts of the project will not be sustainable. In order to reduce that risk, the project will have to put into place systems that promote sustainability. From the outset and to think clearly and strategically about how to go about doing this, we are strongly recommending that the project work in the coming few months to develop a Sustainability Plan. The target should be to produce the plan by, say, April 2014³¹ and for the implementation of the

³¹ This was the date suggested in the first draft of the MTR report; given that the final version is being re-submitted in March 2014, it is suggested that this date be put back to June 2014 – if the PCU has not already started the process of developing the Sustainability Plan.

plan to commence immediately on approval from the PSC. (*For the PCU with the LMCs*)

157. As with replication, there are targets for indicators towards which the project should be working. The project must achieve those targets by the EOP as a basic minimum.

158. There are different aspects of sustainability, all culminating in environmental sustainability. In this project, both institutional and financial sustainability are critical to the longevity of the LCAs and, as a consequence, to environmental sustainability³². Recommendations for ensuring institutional and financial sustainability will be discussed in turn.

- Institutional sustainability. There is an adage among development agencies that one should not attempt to create institutions anew during projects because they will not be sustainable. The project is attempting to do just that in five LCAs but, fortunately, it is partly building on existing foundations rather than working from scratch. Nonetheless, sustaining the LCAs, including full and equitable participation of key stakeholders will be challenging. We are proposing that within 15 months from now (i.e., by March 2015), each LCA carry out the following tasks:
 - a. The LMCs should each go through the process to recruit a Landscape Coordinator for themselves – who will take over the role currently played by the Landscape Specialist. Additional staff may also be (eventually) necessary – e.g., Administrative Assistants. (*For LMCs with support from PCU*)
 - b. Find an appropriate institutional housing for that Landscape Coordinator. This is not a trivial task as using an existing organisation (e.g., the MET, one of the private sector organizations or one of the existing NGOs) may not be possible as it could lead to alienation of some key stakeholders (cf. to the example of alienation and mistrust that has been already created in the GW LCA). Thus, registering a new association may be appropriate (unless the PAWMB provides for the establishment of a separate LCA institution with its own status). (*For LMCs with support from PCU*)
 - c. Find (or, if necessary, construct) an office (and possibly other infrastructure) for the Landscape Coordinator (and any other necessary staff). (*For LMCs with support from PCU*)
 - d. Develop a plan for the Financial Sustainability of the arrangement (to include salaries, running costs, maintenance, depreciation on assets, etc.) Because of the diversity of people involved across all LCAs, there would be much to gain by bringing the key stakeholders from all LCAs to exchange ideas for sustainable financing of the Landscape Coordinator and his/her office and running costs. In the meetings we had over the course of the MTR mission, a number of very good suggestions were proposed by the interviewees (e.g., direct contributions from stakeholders, including a

³² It should be noted, however, that this project is not working in isolation and the environmental sustainability is not dependent on the outcomes of this project alone. In other words, if the processes and impacts of this project, for any reason, are not sustained, the environment will not simply collapse but there are other facets that will contribute to its sustainability. Of course, if the processes and impacts of this project are sustained, environmental sustainability will be only further enhanced.

small 'LCA' fee in user fees – thus, as a small increase on bed-night fees or trophy fees, etc). *(For LMCs with support from PCU)*

- e. By the EOP, the arrangement should be fully operational but also financially autonomous. *(To be verified by project's TE)*

It is worth noting that finding the balance for the role that this arrangement plays is also delicate. The mandate and Terms of Reference for the staff should be carefully crafted to ensure that the right balance is achieved. Lessons from elsewhere suggest that such arrangements or forums can suffer from mandate drift and eventually become NGOs themselves! *(For LMCs with support from PCU)*

- In the longer-term and as provided for in the Project Document, the PCU will transform into a Landscape Coordination Service as part of the restructuring that is being considered under the DRSPM. The restructuring is precisely to establish a global Coordination Service – under which a few sub-services will sit, including the Landscape Coordination Service. Ideally, we would like to see this transformation to occur during the next 20 months so that it is well established before the end of the project. We appreciate that this will entail transferring the PCU from the DEA to the DRSPM and that this will require negotiation, planning and agreement. *(For DRSPM with support from PCU)*
- Financial sustainability. We have already mentioned financial sustainability in the points above. However, those focus primarily on the financial sustainability of having a Landscape Coordinator in place for each LCA with an office, possibly an assistant and running costs. One other aspect that will have to be considered is the costs of meetings. Over and above these costs, if the LCA wishes to carry out activities (at the very least monitoring activities that should be part of the 'running costs') but any developments, inputs, consultancies or research, then funding will have to be sought. For the moment, identifying all the potential sources for such funds would be a useful thing to do. We believe that thereafter it should be part of the role of the Landscape Coordinator to seek and secure funding. *(For LMCs with support from PCU)*
- At a system level, there will have to be financial sustainability. As described above, a Landscape Coordination Service will be established under the DRSPM. While this may be funded under the MET (and it would be most sustainable if this was simply included in the government's budgetary processes). However, given that the service will be provided to the LCAs across the country, some assessment and analysis of sustainable financial mechanisms to fund the service would be warranted. *(For DRSPM with support from PCU)*
- There is one final aspect of financial sustainability are the mechanisms to enhance the financial sustainability of all stakeholders living and working in the LCAs. This includes the state-managed protected areas, the private sector operators and the communities with their conservancies. The project still needs to work towards the finding marketing mechanisms that would enhance the value of products from each of the LCAs. The first step would be to determine what is being produced or what services are being provided within each LCA - and there are differences so it is impossible to adopt a one-model-fits-all approach. For example, there is beef production in the GW LCA and only tourism in the GSN LCA. Once the products and services have been identified, examples of mechanisms that increase value to the products and services should be sought – particularly those that stem from the

landscape values of the LCAs. The Project Document provides two examples which should be examined³³, however, all possibilities should be explored bearing in mind that there is a level of pragmatism that is also important here because what is important is to judge how the market will respond to “landscape-certified” products. In other words, it is important to determine what will have impacts in the market and not simply apply, say, a certification scheme because it exists. It must be functional and successful! All this will require a degree of creativity, negotiation and agreement. *(For the PCU with technical support)*

- ***Find a mechanism for retaining the project staff*** *(For the DEA, DRSPM and UNDP-CO)* Notwithstanding the recommendation to recruit Landscape Coordinators, there is a history in Namibia of people who work in projects such as this departing before the project has closed. To remain effective until the close of the project, the project should find ways to ensure that the necessary members of staff remain with the project until its closure. Because the experience is common with projects that are implemented in Namibia, surely lessons have been already learned. The PCU should make enquiries among other project-implementing donor agencies. Some ideas could include:
 - a. Offering staff that stay to the end of the project a bonus linked partially to performance and partially to the fact that they have stayed on until the end of the project
 - b. Making linkages to future UNDP-GEF (and, potentially, other Implementing Agencies such as the World Bank, WWF, UNEP, etc) to indicate that those staff that stay on until the end of projects will be given preferential positions on short-lists for future positions.
 - c. Similarly, the MET could make a policy to give preferential treatment to those people who stay on until the end of projects, either for jobs within the MET itself but also for projects with donors.
- ***South-South cooperation and sharing experiences.*** There are other complex landscape level conservation programmes that are being carried out across Africa and these present the opportunity to share experiences and learn lessons. One such project that includes multiple stakeholders is an AFD funded project in northern Kenya. The project is focused around Marsabit National Park and involves community conservancies in semi-arid areas surrounding the park. Therefore, this may be an opportunity for reciprocal South-South cooperation. *(For the PCU, with input from UNDP-GEF RTC)*

4.5 Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success

159. ***Underlying concepts – relevance for landscape level conservation and global environment benefits targeted in replication*** *(for PCU)*. As has been discussed in detail in the Relevance section, the project is (or at least should be) a landscape level conservation project. While this may be complex, the thinking, planning and conservation objectives that underpin landscape level conservation work should underpin the activities that are undertaken under this project. The corollary of this is that the project and the GEF funds are not there simply to fund a hodgepodge of things that nobody else is willing to do but it must stay true and relevant to its

³³ The cheetah-friendly beef example and the certification process by the NTB.

objective and components. In order to facilitate this, we recommend that the PCU hire a Technical Advisor with landscape-level conservation expertise to assist the project in ensure its relevance to the concepts that underpin the project. If the PCU is in any doubt at any stage whether inputs or direction are questionable (including the ‘wish lists’ from the LMCs or community conservancies), the Technical Advisor should be consulted for advice on their relevance.

160. In addition to this, the PCU and stakeholders involved in the project must recall that GEF funding is to cover incremental costs that result in national benefits and impacts being converted to global environmental benefits. With this in mind, the project is not focusing on those aspects of the global environment for which Namibia is renowned³⁴. Nonetheless, this design issue can be overlooked ***if the project can be seen to catalyse the establishment of LCAs, through replication***, in those areas of the country that are more important for such globally important biodiversity. In other words, the LCAs act as demonstration sites for replication in those areas in which endemism and species diversity are higher.

4.5.1 Lessons

161. A number of the recommendations described above also translate into lessons learned. For example, one lesson is that there is a great deal of variation among the LCAs – probably more than was originally thought by the designers of the project. What the designers may not have accounted for was the variation in history, capacity, levels of interest and engagement, and expectations among the stakeholders within and among the LCAs and, therefore, any assumptions that i) the LCAs could reach the same end point by the EOP and ii) that they could move ahead using the same modalities and at the same rate were simply flawed. A further observation from the LCAs is that at the beginning of the project, they were all at different starting points and those with better foundations have advanced further and more securely.

162. Therefore, in addition to the lessons that can be derived from within the recommendations (and which will not be repeated here), we list a number of lessons that could be learned from the process to date and which can, therefore, feed into i) the remainder of the project, ii) into future LCAs as this project is replicated across the country and iii) future projects with similar objectives.

163. To start with, a general observation from GEF projects is that they are about overcoming fears, catalysing processes and demonstrating success. This project is no exception to this observation: indeed, the caution displayed by the MET to signing the LCA Constitutions may be part of those fears that need to be overcome and the project is there to work with them through that process.

164. ***Institutional housing***. The project is currently housed within the DEA. While there may be advantages to this, the general opinion among interviewees was that there would have been greater advantages had the project had been housed within the DRSPM. Indeed, this would have also have facilitated the transfer to the Landscape Coordination Service, which has been proposed by the DRSPM under their centralised Coordination Service³⁵.

³⁴ See, for example, the discussion on the Biodiversity of Namibia in the Project Document.

³⁵ We do not recommend a change at this point of the project but the PCU should continue close collaboration with the DRSPM. We were impressed with the knowledge that the Director of DRSPM had of the project so this has a good foundation from which to build.

165. The lesson here is that the institutional housing is an important part of project planning and getting it right will enhance connections and, as a result, the effectiveness of project implementation.

166. ***Involvement of the PM from the outset.*** There are pros and cons of having a PM involved in the project from its conception, through the design and into implementation. However, in this case, the benefits would probably have outweighed the costs. The PM would have a good, clear understanding of the objective and components of the project; this may be even more important in complex projects such as this in which the complexity lies not only within the concept of landscape level conservation itself, but also with the number and diversity of stakeholders involved. However, the person should *not* be involved in the drafting of aspects such as the Terms of Reference as at that point there is a conflict of interest.

167. As a further extension of the above point, having a PM also involved in the selection of his/her team would also be beneficial. Again, the PM's understanding of the circumstances would allow for accurate selection and allocation of personnel. It was not necessarily the selection of the personnel but their allocation that has proved challenging. More specifically, the LS assigned to the Greater Waterberg LCA is not only a woman but she also has only a limited ability to communicate in the language of the local community in that area. While the Landscape Specialist in question has done an excellent job in difficult circumstances, we are led to wonder how much more would the project had achieved had someone else had been assigned to this particular area. In order to demonstrate that this was not just an issue with this one Landscape Specialist alone, the MTR mission heard other opinions that the age of the other LSs was also a(n initial) limiting factor, particularly when taking into account cultural aspects in Namibia. Similarly, when another LS was assigned temporarily to the GW LCA, he was both a man and a speaker of the appropriate languages – and yet distrust and expectations deepened while he was there (probably because of his age and the expectations he allowed to grow). The important conclusion is that these things are complex and require planning and thought.

168. The lesson here, then, is that assigning people is a critical aspect of project management and requires people first to understand fully the complexities of each area.

169. ***Provide team with tools and training.*** UNDP-GEF projects are complex and demanding. There are many different things to understand – not only the complexities of the project itself but also the implementation processes themselves. Where it is possible for the UNDP-CO, in particular, but also the MET (say, in government procurement processes) to provide training in aspects that will result in the projects being managed and implemented more effectively, this would be worthwhile. The teams should also be fully briefed in the rules and regulations that they should follow as people associated with UNDP and the GRN.

170. ***Find mechanisms that expedite signatures and authorisations.*** As discussed above, the Constitutions have been signed by all parties – with the notable exception of the MET and that this is eroding trust. The reasons for the delay were explained to the MTR – this is primarily that signatures from the highest level are required. This should have been foreseen (knowing that this was a project in which policies, legislation, plans and agreements – as well as Constitutions – would have to be signed) and early on in a project's life (either in the design phase or early in implementation), those at the higher level (e.g., at the Attorney General's level via all

other committees) should sign off on the process and then delegate the signature to appropriate people within the MET (e.g., Director of Environmental Affairs or Director of the DRSPM). This way the signatures would be expedited and the project would be more efficient.
