UNDP SWAZILAND GOVERNANCE OUTCOME (2011-2015)

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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12 November, 2014
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In line with its corporate policy, UNDP engaged an independent consultant to undertake an evaluation of its Governance outcome over a period of 25 days from 2 September to 7 November 2014.

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the achievements and contributions made towards the outcome during the first three years of programme implementation, including identifying relevant lessons and make recommendations for future programming strategies. The evaluation process included review of official UNDP programme documents, interviews with key programme stakeholders in Government, UNDP, civil society and development partners.

Overall, the evaluation found that key stakeholders agreed that the ‘governance’ programme was both relevant and important; but they also had different expectations and perhaps even different understanding of what should be included in a governance programme. In addition, UNDP’s interventions covered a wide range of governance areas, including support to constitutionalism, civil and political rights, public administration, human rights, public service delivery, judiciary services and democratic governance. Some of these areas did not quite fit together under one programme in a meaningful way.

The evaluation made 12 specific findings with respect to the programme’s design, implementation and delivery of results.

- UNDP interventions were aligned to needs of beneficiary constituents, including government and civil society.
- The programme was also aligned to the priorities articulated in national development frameworks and programmes, as well as UNDP’s corporate strategy and comparative strength.
- However, the programme lacked specific strategic design and therefore interventions lacked internal coherence. Consequently, there was limited complementarity or synergy between individual interventions.
- The programme also covered many areas of good governance and lacked strategic focus. UNDP supported three major areas of governance – political governance, human and civil rights, and economic governance.
- UNDP did not deliver on planned outputs, but its interventions contributed towards the expected outcomes. Evidence suggests that planned outputs were not delivered as per the defined indicators, although the efficacy of some of the indicators was questionable. However, some of the interventions strengthened capacity of critical institutions for good governance, which have huge influence on legal and policy issues.
- Effective contribution was affected by the programme’s lack of a strategy and plan to identify, monitor and mitigate risks and assumptions, and
- There was no formal coordination with other partners’ interventions. While UNDP planned to ‘...utilise its limited core resources as catalytic funding to leverage
resources from (other) bilateral and multilateral partners...’ evidence suggests that most of the times, UNDP acted as sole benefactor.

- Programme interventions contributed to highlight critical gaps in the country’s legal and policy frameworks, especially the inconsistencies of some of the statutory and customary laws in relation to the constitution.
- Although the planned budget was delivered, expenditures deviated from the programme’s priorities to support transparency, accountability and voice towards supporting policy and legal framework.
- In addition, even though the interventions were of limited scale, most of them still experienced implementation delays.
- The programme’s processes were likely to be sustainable due to strong national ownership combined with UNDP’s capacity building approach, but
- There was no clear exit strategy and sustainability plan for continuing the programme’s results at the level of public services.

Based on analysis of the evidence, the evaluation identified five key lessons that have emerged from programme implementation so far.

**Lesson # 1.** Good governance entails mutual responsibility and accountability between providers and users of the services. If the governance programme is understood as a means to an end, then national ownership should also be defined from the perspective of both providers and users of services.

**Lesson # 2.** In spite of the good intentions of all stakeholders and partners, there may arise events that could prevent the programme from progressing as planned, or from successful completion. The negative impact of risk, can only be mitigated if a comprehensive assessment of the risks and assumptions is done at the time of programme planning, combined with continual monitoring during implementation.

**Lesson # 3.** Principles of results-based management are a critical factor in designing the programme. These principles entail that a programme should be based on a clear logic model with well-defined theory of change; and also that formulation of expected results (outcomes and outputs) as well as their associated indicators will impact on the programme’s capability for effective monitoring and evaluation.

**Lesson # 4.** Building partnerships provide UNDP with an opportunity to improve its effectiveness. Partners not only help expand the resource base, but will also increase the scope and depth of the governance programme through increased scale, and wider reach to intended beneficiaries. This can create the critical mass required to achieve developmental impact, and in that regard can also be a powerful tool for advocacy.

**Lesson # 5.** Sustainability of programme results cannot occur in a vacuum. There has to be a well-thought out plan that clearly defines what needs to be sustained, how and by whom it will be done. This structured approach will help UNDP to make an objective assessment of the additional resources, capacities and partnerships that should be developed to sustain the programme results.
On the whole, the programme’s interventions were relevant and contributed to the broader outcome to ‘strengthen national capacities for promotion and protection of rights’; and UNDP should therefore continue its support for good governance in Swaziland. However, in order to enhance its impact in the governance sector, UNDP should consider the following six specific recommendations.

**Recommendation 1.** UNDP should focus its governance programme on areas where it has the greatest comparative advantage to achieve the greatest impact. In order to do this, UNDP should develop a programme with strategic focus informed by a comprehensive assessment of the governance issues and challenges in Swaziland, and a thorough audit of its comparative advantages, including mapping the strengths and focus of development partners.

**Recommendation 2.** UNDP should develop independent programme document for the integrated governance programme. A focused governance programme with multiple interventions spanning across several sectors (public service, justice, human rights, elections, etc.) would require that there should be a dedicated programme document that serves as its specific road map. The programme document should contain a clear articulation of the programme’s theory of change, including critical risks and assumptions for the programme’s success.

**Recommendation 3.** UNDP should strengthen capacity and practice of results-based management in programme design and implementation. UNDP may also consider engaging an external consultant to review its programme monitoring and evaluation framework, including appropriate and efficacy of its performance indicators.

**Recommendation 4.** UNDP should adopt the strategic capacity development approach in designing and developing interventions. While UNDP had developed a good practice that included supporting development of strategic plans and policy implementation frameworks, it was apparent that many interventions were not based on a comprehensive capacity needs assessment.

**Recommendation 5.** UNDP should develop and strengthen strategic partnerships with other actors in the governance sector. At global level, UNDP expects increasing difficulty in accessing funding in the future, thereby making partnerships even more critical.

**Recommendation 6.** UNDP should develop and implement an exit strategy and sustainability plan for all interventions. Although UNDP’s interventions had delivered good outputs, including strategic action plans, etc. many of them lacked implementation. UNDP should therefore develop an exit strategy and sustainability plan based on systematic assessment of potential risks and specific risk mitigation strategy that will ensure sustainability of results.
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### ACRONYMS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>APR</td>
<td>Annual Progress Report</td>
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<td>CANGO</td>
<td>Coordinating Assembly of Non-governmental</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<td>CHRPA</td>
<td>Commission for Human Rights and Public Administration/Integrity</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>EBC</td>
<td>Elections and Boundaries Commission</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Government Programme of Action</td>
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<td>LDF</td>
<td>Leadership Development Foundation</td>
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<td>MoJCA</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs</td>
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<td>MoPS</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service</td>
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<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Implementation Modality</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>Public Financial Management</td>
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<td>PLHIV</td>
<td>People Living with HIV</td>
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<td>PRSAP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Programme</td>
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<td>Small Claims Court</td>
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<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UPR</td>
<td>Universal Periodic Review</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Context

1. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation with the host government on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people’s lives. UNDP defines an outcome-level result as “the intended changes in development conditions that result from the interventions of governments and other stakeholders, including international development agencies. They are medium-term development results created through the delivery of outputs and the contributions of various partners and non-partners. Outcomes provide a clear vision of what has changed or will change in the country, a particular region, or community within a period of time. They normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups”.¹

2. UNDP commissioned the evaluation of the Governance outcome by an independent consultant. The evaluation was undertaken over a period of 25 working days starting on 2 September to 30 October 2014. The evaluation was conducted in a consultative manner and in compliance with the principles of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), and is therefore free from any undue interference or influence on its analysis, findings, conclusions and recommendations.

3. This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Governance Outcome Evaluation in Swaziland. The report addresses the overarching questions as outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR) as agreed between UNDP and consultant in the evaluation inception report. The report is presented in six chapters.

- Chapter 1 introduces the report including the purpose and objectives, the evaluation methodology and limitations.
- Chapter 2 presents the country context and describes the development challenge in Swaziland as well as government policies and strategies.
- Chapter 3 describes UNDP’s response to the development challenges, and presents its strategy and results framework.
- Chapter 4 contains the evaluation findings in accordance with the guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) criteria for evaluation of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.
- Chapter 5 contains the lessons learned and good practices emerging from UNDP implementation of interventions.
- Chapters 6 contains the conclusions and recommendations.

¹ UNDP (2011); Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p 3.
1.2. Purpose and Objectives

4. The overall purpose of the evaluation was to capture objective evidence of UNDP’s contribution to the Governance outcome, including assessment of the resultant changes in development conditions at the country level as articulated in the country programme document. Based on initial consultations with UNDP, the evaluation focused on the ‘Governance’ component of the outcome, excluding the gender component.

5. The specific objectives of the evaluation were to assess:
   a) The processes and achievements made during the first three years of implementing the Governance and Gender Programme with a focus on contributing factors,
   b) The relevance of the progress made in terms of the UNDP outputs (including an analysis of both project activities and soft-assistance activities,
   c) UNDP’s contribution or progress towards the achievement of the outcome, including an analysis of the partnership strategy,
   d) Identifying future intervention strategies and issues, including recommendations for future programming strategies, and
   e) Identify strategies for citizen’s involvement/participation on issues of Governance and in the future,
   f) The extent to which the programme attained intended development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries and participants including individuals, communities and institutions.

1.3. Evaluation Methodology

6. The methodology was agreed with UNDP as the commissioners of the evaluation. An evaluation inception report was prepared and submitted for comments. The evaluation was participatory and stakeholders had opportunity to provide inputs and comments during presentation of preliminary findings and draft report. The final version of this report incorporates stakeholder comments from these processes.

7. The following four-step approach was adopted.
   a) Document Review. Desk review of UNDP programme documents and reports, including quarterly and annual reports, as well as other official government reports and publications. The desk review culminated with a draft inception report outlining the evaluation plan and methodology, to which UNDP provided comments before endorsing. The list of documents reviewed is at Annex 1 to this report.
   b) Individual Interviews. A data collection mission to Swaziland was undertaken from 15 to 24 September 2014. A total of 24 individuals were interviewed, including UNDP and other UN agency management and programme staff, officials of Government of Swaziland, independent commissions and civil society organisations (CSOs). The list of individuals interviewed is at Annex 2.
c) Preliminary analysis. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data was undertaken to extract information linked to the evaluation questions outlined in the terms of reference and inception report. Preliminary findings were presented to UNDP for comments as part of triangulation and validation of information.

d) Comments to draft report. The draft evaluation report was presented to stakeholders for discussion and comment. The final version of this report incorporates their comments.

1.4. Limitations

8. The major limitation was that the lack of specific theory of change model for the governance outcome. UNDP interventions implemented its interventions based on the Country Programme Action Plan, without individual programme documents for its outcomes. The absence of a specific programme document deprived UNDP of the opportunity to clearly articulate its game plan, which limits the programme’s evaluability.

9. In addition, some of the indicators were neither appropriate nor sufficient as objective measures of progress towards the stated results expected. This limited the evaluation’s capability to objectively assess UNDP’s contribution and value-added. However, to mitigate this challenge, the consultant proposed and agreed proxy indicators against which progress and UNDP’s contribution towards outcomes was measured.

II. DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

2.1. Country Context

10. At independence in 1968, Swaziland had British-based constitution which was repealed and replaced by the King’s Proclamation of 1973. The King’s Proclamation was later repealed and replaced by the 2005 Constitution under which, the Government of Swaziland committed to strengthen governance and accountability by mandating the establishment of accountable and sustainable local governments across the country.

11. However, the country has a unique dual governance structure, both at central and local government level. In terms of the Constitution, Swaziland is a Kingdom headed by an Executive Monarch. Although the parliamentary system is not based on political parties, it consists of two chambers - the House of Assembly and Senate. The House of Assembly has 65 members, of whom 55 are directly elected from their constituencies in their individual capacity for a five year term, and 10 are appointed by the King. The Executive Arm of Government is headed by a Prime Minister with delegated powers from the King. The Judiciary, as an independent arm of Government is subject only to the Constitution, and is

2 World Bank (2008), Review of the Swaziland Institutional and Governance Framework.
headed by the Chief Justice. The superior Court of Judicature comprises the Supreme Court and the High Court.

12. At the local government level, the country is divided into four administrative regions, with each region headed by a Regional Administrator with the status of Deputy Minister appointed by His Majesty and responsible to the Minister for Tinkhundla Development and Regional Administration (TDRA). There is also a parallel traditional local governance system based on traditional chieftaincy. Chiefs have powers to pass customary laws which are binding, allocate land, maintain law and order, and levy fines. They derive these powers from the traditional system which recognizes them as authorised chiefs and directly responsible to the King. Chiefdoms also have a localized role to plan and direct development in their areas.

2.2. Government Policies and Strategies

13. The Constitution passed in 2005 provides for fundamental rights and freedoms as well as greater decentralization in the provision of services\(^3\). The government also established several autonomous commissions to champion the reforms envisioned in the new constitution (Sidebar).

14. Swaziland’s policies are presented in the Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Programme (PRSAP), which spans the period 2007-2015. The PRSAP is the Government’s medium- to long-term development framework and action programme and aims at facilitating sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. Government policies under the PRSAP lay stress on (a) macro-economic stability; (b) good governance; (c) equitable access to productive assets; (d) human capital development; (e) private sector led job creation; (f) rural and agricultural development; and (g) provision of infrastructure, extension services, technology, markets, social services, and financial services. The PRSAP was inspired by the Vision 2022 that was launched in 1999 articulating a national vision that “by the year 2022, the Kingdom of Swaziland will be in the top 10 percent of the medium human development group of countries founded on sustainable economic development, social justice and political stability.”

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\(^3\) Swaziland UNDAF (2011 – 2015).

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### Commission on Human Rights and Public Administration Integrity

The Commission was established under the Constitution with powers to investigate complaints concerning alleged violations of fundamentals rights and freedoms under the constitution; complaints of injustice, corruption, abuse of power in office and unfair treatment of any person by a public officer in the exercise of official duties; and to monitor adherence of leadership code of conduct by public and elected officials to ensure transparency and accountability.

### Anti-Corruption Commission

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2006. The core objectives of the Commission are to prevent and combat corruption and to achieve zero tolerance on corruption.

### Election and Boundaries Commission

The Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC) was established by the new constitution (Constitution 2005, Article 90(1)). The mandate of the EBC are:

- To supervise voter registration.
- To ensure free and fair elections.
- To facilitate voter education.
- To delimitate ‘tinkundla’ (constituencies).
- To produce periodic reports of its work.
15. The government’s short to medium term goals are articulated in the Government Programme of Action (GPA) 2008-2013 with five focus areas: (a) prudent management of the economy to ensure macro-economic stability and rapid, sustainable economic growth and development; (b) poverty reduction, job creation and food security; (c) efficient access to, and delivery of, basic social services (education, health, water); (d) strengthening governance institutions for improved governance; and (e) disaster risk reduction especially for vulnerable groups.

16. Swaziland has also ratified a number of United Nations treaties and conventions, including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, as well as global frameworks for development and basic service delivery such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

III. DESCRIPTION OF UNDP PROGRAME

3.1. Strategy and Logic Model

17. Although the CPAP did not articulate a specific strategy for the governance programme, UNDP reviewed some of the lessons learnt from past cooperation with the Government of Swaziland in the framework of the CPAP 2006 – 2010. The lessons included:
   a) Need to build capacity of relevant government and partner institutions in order to effectively implement development policies and programmes.
   b) Critical importance of government leadership to provide strategic direction and programme delivery.
   c) UNDP’s comparative advantage as a catalyst for policy and institutional reform, especially in sensitive areas such as governance and human rights.

18. As per UNDP Guidelines, \(^4\) (Box 1) the following outcome and theory of change (TOC) model was developed in retrospect in order to create an objective and structured basis upon which to assess UNDP’s performance and contribution against a clearly defined game plan. The TOC may not adequately, or even correctly reflect the thinking of UNDP at the time of programme formulation, but it serves a purpose to put the subsequent interventions within a logical framework so that the evaluation’s analysis and conclusions may be situated in context.

19. Based on the above therefore, the evaluation proceeded to make an assessment of UNDP’s contribution to the governance outcomes on the assumed basis that the intended programme ‘theory of change’ twofold (Figure 1).

   - By enhancing the government’s institutional capacity, the government will be able to develop pro-poor policies based on good governance and lead to improved service delivery.

\(^4\) Outcome-level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning, monitoring and evaluation for development results, December 2011.
By strengthening civil society capacity to participate and demand public accountability and transparency, the government will improve delivery efficiency and thereby accelerate achievement of MDGs.

**Figure 1: Governance programme theory of change**

3.2. **Programme Results Framework**

20. Under the Governance and Gender pillar, UNDP supported the implementation of the constitution, strengthening the capacity of governance institutions (parliament, the anti-corruption commission, commission on human rights and public administration, and the judiciary), and promoting participation by citizens through opening space for public dialogue. The programme also aimed to strengthen national capacities for the promotion and protection of rights, especially gender equality, and facilitate greater involvement of women in political participation and decision-making. The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) has three expected governance outcomes\(^5\) (Table 1).

\(^5\) This evaluation did not focus on the fourth CPAP outcome on gender equality.
Table 1: Governance programme results framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDP Programme Component</th>
<th>Expected UNDP Outcome</th>
<th>Expected UNDP Output</th>
<th>Indicative Resources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Strengthening accountable and responsive governance institutions</td>
<td>4.1. Supportive policy and legal framework for improved governance in place</td>
<td>4.1.1. Implemented and improved constitutional provisions and adherence to reporting requirements on international and regional treaties and conventions</td>
<td>$400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.1.2. Public sector management enhanced for increased transparency and accountability</strong></td>
<td>$300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Policy developed and adopted by Cabinet</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) Legal framework adopted</td>
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<td>4.2. Grounding democratic governance in international principles</td>
<td>4.2. All citizens have access to justice</td>
<td>4.2.1. Improved access to justice through strengthened capacity</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administration of justice enhanced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>4.3. Fostering inclusive participation</td>
<td>4.3. People have full knowledge on all their rights</td>
<td>4.3.1. Enhanced representation in public decision-making bodies of under-represented groups, including women, youth, disabled and PLHIV</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Improved knowledge of human rights among the populace</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) The majority of women claiming their rights</td>
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IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

4.1. Relevance

21. This section contains an assessment of the relevance of the governance programme and provides evidence based on independent analysis of stakeholders’ views and perceptions on the underlying questions, including:

- Whether or not the programme’s objectives and interventions were suited to national needs and priorities,
Whether or not the programme’s design was capable of addressing the needs of stakeholders and achieve desired outcomes, and

Whether or not the programme’s outcomes were aligned to UNDP’s corporate mandate and priorities for Swaziland.

Finding 1: UNDP interventions were aligned to needs of beneficiary constituents, including government and civil society

22. The interventions undertaken under the governance portfolio were well aligned to the priorities articulated in national development frameworks and programmes. There was a general consensus among stakeholders that there still remained some critical gaps on the implementation of the country’s Constitution. Although stakeholders viewed the issues from different perspectives, it was very apparent that there were significant differences on interpretation and application of the provisions contained in the Constitution.

23. Stakeholders noted that there were differences between the three arms of government - the executive, legislature and judiciary – which mainly evolved around the interpretation of the Constitution. Stakeholders from both the government and civil society also acknowledged that some of the country’s statutes and policies that were developed prior to the constitutional era were in conflict with the Constitution. Particularly noteworthy, were laws that were embedded in civil and traditional law that were inconsistent with the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution. For example, civil society groups observed the Constitution stated that all matters provided for in the constitution cannot conflict with the traditional way of life of Swaziland. In addition, there were also civil laws which affected women’s rights to property and inheritance.

24. With regards to the Bill of Rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution, some stakeholders were of a general view that government lacked capacity or sometimes political will to enforce these rights. Notably, stakeholders pointed to weak capacity in the Commission for Human Rights and Public Administration Integrity (CHRPA), as well lack of clarity between the demarcation of responsibilities between the CHRPA and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in combating corruption.

25. In the justice sector, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (most notably widows), still did not have adequate access to justice as provided for in the Constitution, and lack of capacity often resulted in delays in dispensing justice, sometimes for as long as 2-5 years.

26. UNDP’s outcomes and outputs were focused on five key areas of governance; (i) promoting transparency, (ii) enhancing accountability, (iii) combating corruption, (iv) engendering civic participation and human rights, and (v) support to legal and judicial reforms. These were the major areas that stakeholders identified as problematic, and therefore UNDP’s interventions under the governance programme were very relevant and aligned to the needs of its key constituents – government and civil society.
**Finding 2: The governance programme lacked specific strategic design and therefore interventions were (or appeared to have been) developed ad hoc**

27. While all the interventions may have been relevant, it was apparent that they had not been clearly thought out and situated within a pre-conceived game plan or theory of change model. Taking outcome 4.1.1 (Supportive policy and legal framework for improved governance in place) as an example; this is a vague statement, which allows a broad brush approach to programming such that anything and everything is relevant. However, it does not specifically define what should be achieved and how the resultant changes would be observed.

28. While this evaluation does not presume to be prescriptive, clearly it could be argued that since the national Constitution was established in 2005, the ‘legal framework for improved governance’ was already in place. The intention, most probably was to have a governance programme that would contribute to ‘harmonising and aligning’ national laws and policies with the Constitution. If this were the case, a strategic planning process anchored on a theory of change model would probably have identified a key component for the programme as establishment and support for a law review commission. Such an approach would have gone a long way in addressing the conflict between civil/traditional laws and the Constitution, as well as defining the boundaries of responsibility between the CHRPA and ACC, for instance.⁶

29. UNDP acknowledged this in some of its reports (Box 2). Several other examples clearly illustrate the ad hoc nature of interventions that inevitably affected UNDP’s contribution. Under outcome 4.2.1 (access to justice), UNDP supported the establishment of a small claims court (SCC). However, there was slow and limited progress because the relevant Act prescribed the Minister of Justice as the authority, while the Judiciary wanted it to be amended with the Chief Justice as the overseer of the SCC prior to the courts being used (APR 2013). In another example, UNDP also supported the parliamentary elections of 2013 through collaboration with the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC) and various civil society organisations. However, due to lack of a clearly defined programme strategy, there were delays and implementing partners faced variety of challenges, including denial of access at community level.

30. The lack of strategic design meant that the programme lacked internal coherence. Consequently, there was limited complementarity or synergy between individual interventions. In other words, while the interventions were individually relevant, some of them could not sufficiently demonstrate a direct cause-effect relationship between the activity and the outcome. Take for instance the intervention to develop an information technology (IT) strategy for the National Revenue Authority (NRA), there was only a very

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⁶ Note that at the time of writing, the Human Rights Act was not yet passed by Parliament.
remote association with UNDP outputs on transparency and accountability (4.1.1.2), but linking it to the outcome was even more difficult.

**Finding 3: The outcomes were aligned to the UNDP corporate strategy and comparative strength**

31. As articulated in its corporate strategic plan, UNDP work should evolve around four proposed outcome areas, among which is: *Citizen Expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance*.7

32. In this context, UNDP sees its role as that of assisting countries to maintain or secure peaceful democratic governance. This will be achieved through adherence to enabling processes, including:

- Context-specific responses to foster agreement among stakeholders and support peaceful governance processes that advance shared national goals.
- Supporting policies and capacities to foster more accountable and open governance in state institutions and in society to bring greater development benefits to citizens and increase their confidence and trust in public institutions.
- Strengthening integrity in public institutions, at the national and sub-national levels, especially as countries mobilize a growing share of their development expenditure from domestic resources.

33. In the case of Swaziland, the country was encumbered with challenges to meet the targets on the MDGs, including:8

- High prevalence of HIV and AIDS, with negative consequences of breakdown in social service delivery, reduction in household incomes, and a less-than-optimal national economic growth rate;
- High incidence of poverty, with about 63 per cent of the country’s 1.018 million people living below the national poverty line;
- Food insecurity and Nutrition Challenges due to successive years of drought attributed to climate change; multi-dimensional impacts of HIV and AIDS; dependence on production under rain-fed conditions; and declining use of improved agricultural technology.

34. Global experience indicates that without sound governance no country can expect to make sustained progress in human development and poverty reduction. There is a direct linkage between governance and MDGs. Achievement of the MDGs requires a conducive policy framework, sufficient resources and institutional capacity. All these are critical economic and political governance issues, and hence the achievement of the MDGs is crucially linked to good governance.

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8 Swaziland UNDAF 2011 – 2015.
Finding 4: The programme covers many areas of good governance but lacks strategic focus

35. Governance is a broad area with many components, some of which do not necessarily fit together under one programme. Under the current design, UNDP supports three major areas of governance (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Governance interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil and human rights</th>
<th>Political and democratic governance</th>
<th>Economic governance and service delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Support to HRCPA</td>
<td>- Support to Parliament</td>
<td>- Support for e-governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support for civic education</td>
<td>- Support to EBC</td>
<td>- Support to SRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support to MoJCA</td>
<td>- Voter education</td>
<td>- Support to ACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support to Swaziland Judiciary</td>
<td>- Representation of disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>Support to Ministry of Public Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Support to PFM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. Most of the interventions were related to building institutional capacities of service providers. Although UNDP developed partnerships with some civil society organisations as implementing partners, what is apparent from Figure 2 above is that there were no interventions specifically to develop their institutional capacities. It is therefore noteworthy that the UNDP corporate strategy identified strengthening of civil society capacity as a critical requirement.⁹

Enabling major governance processes

A vibrant, responsible and capable civil society could reinforce these changes and contribute more broadly to development. This will be enabled by the design of appropriate policy, legal and regulatory frameworks, testing and adoption of ideas for better governance within civil society itself, formation and/or strengthening of civil society networks and coalitions that can work on development issues, and constructive dialogue and partnering with government, the private sector and other non-state actors. This will help create an enabling environment for all social partners to grow in strength and contribute to a greater extent towards national development.

⁹ UNDP Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017, page 28
4.2. Effectiveness in contribution to outcomes

37. This section presents an analysis of the evidence in response to the questions about the effectiveness of UNDP’s contribution to outcomes, including:

- Did the programme deliver on planned outputs, and to what extent did the outputs contribute to expected outcomes?
- What factors influenced the UNDP’s performance towards expected results?
- What was the contribution of partners to the outcome, and how effective were UNDP partnerships been in contributing to achieving the outcome?
- Were there any positive or negative, intended or unintended, results?

Finding 5: Although UNDP did not deliver on planned outputs, its interventions contributed towards the expected outcomes

38. Based on the official UN guidelines on results-based management (RBM), delivery of outputs is attributable to the organisational entity, and consequently, the entity is also accountable for delivery of outputs.\(^\text{10}\) Available data indicates that planned outputs were not delivered as per the defined indicators, although the efficacy of the indicators was questionable (Tables 2a – c).

39. A cursory review on the formulation of outputs and their attendant indicators shows a general weakness in application of results-based management principles. UNDP should have full responsibility and accountability for the delivery of its stated outputs. It therefore goes without saying that the output should comprise development changes that are within the realm of UNDP’s influence. Taking as an example Output 4.1.1 below, the implementation of constitutional provisions is clearly beyond the control of UNDP, and therefore if it is to be included as a desired result, then it should be pegged at outcome level. Similarly, the indicator about increasing the number of legal advisers in line ministries would be beyond UNDP’s control. If it was critical to have legal advisors in line ministries, then this should have been stated as an assumption, to which UNDP could allocate resources as part of its advocacy efforts to mitigate programme risk and manage assumptions.

40. Another notable and pertinent issue on the formulation of outputs and indicators is about their capability for measurement. While indicators have to be measurable in order to be useful, this does not mean that they should always be quantitative. The indicator has to demonstrate a plausible cause-effect association with the related output. For example, under output 4.3 it would appear that the output statement and indicators are stated vice-versa. Indicator (a) - # of civic education interventions - for example is most likely supposed to be UNDP’s activity rather than an indicator of its results. Similarly, the output statement ‘enhanced representation of target groups in parliament’ would be more likely to be useful as the indicator of the effectiveness of UNDP interventions. These issues are raised here not to distract attention from the assessment but to illustrate the limitations on the evaluation.

\(^{10}\) The UNDG handbook on results-based management defines outputs as “the products and services that result from the completion of activities within a development intervention within the control of the organization”.
Table 2 (a): CP Outcome 4.1. Supportive policy and legal framework for improved governance

| Indicator (a): # of reviewed pieces of legislation that are | Progress on indicators: Although the indicator is vague, 4 bills on justice sector, 27 legal instruments on CEDAW and 3 laws in ICT were reviewed. | Comments: The data conceals the fact that many crucial laws were still maligned with the Constitution. The planned review of the constitution was not done. |
| Indicator (b): % increase in the number of legal advisors in line ministries | Progress on indicators: This data was not monitored specifically. | Comment: UNDP does not have any control to increase # of legal advisors in line ministries |
| Indicator (c): # of state party reports compiled and submitted | Progress on indicators: The state and shadow Universal Periodic Review (UPR) report was submitted in 2011. The 2nd National Communication on the UNFCCC was completed in 2012. | Comments: The planned UPR Action Plan to address recommendations of report was not done; and the 3rd National Communication planned for 2013 was not done. Draft reports on the UNCSER and UNCR were initiated but not completed. |

Output 4.1.2. Public sector management enhanced for increased transparency and accountability

| Indicator (a): # of key government officials trained in PFM based on skills audit | Progress on indicator: The planned training was not undertaken | Comments: The PFM manual was developed, but the PFM bill was not passed so training could not be done |
| Indicator (b): Reviewed Aid Coordination Policy and effective aid management system in place | Progress on indicator: UNDP did not report any results, although an assessment was done | Comments: Government preferred to develop its own system without external support |
| Indicator (c): # of ACC and NRA staff trained in transparency and accountability, including leadership code of conduct | Progress on indicator: 40 senior government officials were trained | Comments: The ACC Policy and Action Plan supported by UNDP in 2011/2012 were yet to be implemented. 18 cases of corruption were investigated resulting in 2 convictions. A department in the Ministry of Health was also restructured as a result of a preventive audit by the ACC. |
| Indicator (d): # of advocacy campaigns and level of thematic dialogue sessions conducted | Progress on indicator: 7 campaigns were conducted against a target of 22 | Comments: |

Table 2 (b): CP Outcome 4.2. All citizens have access to justice

Output 4.2.1. Improved access to justice through strengthened capacity to ensure justice remedies

| Indicator (a): level of functionality of electronic file system for court systems | Progress on indicator: The electronic case management system was developed | Comments: The electronic system reduced backlog from about 5 years to less than 2 years of pending cases |
| Indicator (b): # of judiciary staff, law enforcement agencies and lawyers trained in addressing challenges in accessing justice | Progress on indicator: The annual targets established for each year were not achieved | Comments: Reported training was on the electronic case management system; not in the planned ‘accessing justice’ |
| Indicator (c): Level of knowledge on constitutional bill of rights among adult population | Progress on indicator: There were no activities developed on this | Comments: The set target was 50% but the baseline stated 100% awareness but not knowledge. This cannot be measured! |
| Indicator (d): Legal aid framework reviewed and streamlined to secure maximum access by deserving groups | Progress on indicator: The Legal Aid Policy and Bill were developed but still to be passed | Comments: |
| Indicator (e): More cases referred to CHRPA | Progress on indicator: The number of cases increased | Comments: Not clear whether increase in number of human rights cases is a success |
Table 2 (c): CP Outcome 4.3. People have full knowledge on all their rights

| Indicator (a): # of civic education interventions on importance of equal participation and representation of all parts of society supported | Progress on indicator: Some voter education activities were conducted belatedly. | Comments: The programme’s contribution is doubtful since only 1 female representative was elected, but not from the targeted constituencies. |
| Indicator (b): # of people from under-represented groups in leadership and election campaigning | Progress on indicator: See above. | The civic education interventions started very late towards the election period and were affected by a lack of policy with regards to the role of civil society vis-à-vis the EBC. |
| Indicator (c): # of candidates from under-represented groups including women, youth, disabled and PLHIV | Progress on indicator: See above. | |

41. Despite the weak delivery on outputs, a mapping of the programme’s interventions indicates that UNDP implemented quite a number of activities, many of which contributed towards the expected outcomes (Table 3).

Table 3: Contribution of interventions to outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>Intermediary activity results</th>
<th>Contribution to outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament of Swaziland</td>
<td>Orientation of members on committee system</td>
<td>UNDP contributed to develop capacity of these critical institutions for good governance, which have huge influence on legal and policy issues. They are key to service delivery and accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training of members on budgetary oversight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of strategic plan for Parliament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Prime Minister</td>
<td>Capacity building for e-Governance Transformation Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of e-Governance Operational Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inventory and mapping of IT systems in government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Innovation hubs for sustainable and inclusive development (University of Swaziland and Limkowing University)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Service</td>
<td>Develop Ministry strategic plan</td>
<td>UNDP contributed to develop service oriented systems in institutions that are the backbone for service delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop Service Charter and roll-out plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi Revenue Authority</td>
<td>Develop records and document management system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop IT strategy and implementation plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs</td>
<td>Develop Ministry strategic plan</td>
<td>UNDP contributed to strengthen capacity of the key institutions for the assurance of rights and justice for all. These institutions have influence on transparency and accountability of public officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(small claims court)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary of Swaziland</td>
<td>Establishment of small claims court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop electronic case management system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feasibility study and drafting legal aid bill and policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission of Human Rights and Public Administration</td>
<td>Prepare state party UPR report on human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop strategic plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country-wide awareness for human rights, including key sectors such as law enforcement, media, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption Commission</td>
<td>Develop anti-corruption policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop strategic plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training of staff in accountability and integrity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions</td>
<td>Intermediary activity results</td>
<td>Contribution to outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections and Boundaries Commission</td>
<td>Drafting of Electoral Bills</td>
<td>UNDP contributed to strengthen the electoral process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study tours to other countries</td>
<td>Activities also strengthened voice of disadvantaged groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organisations:</td>
<td>Civic and voter education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Leadership Development Foundation</td>
<td>Establishing baseline for human rights issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Council of Swaziland Churches</td>
<td>Civic and voter education on women empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CANGO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Finding 6: Effective contribution was affected by the programme’s lack of a strategy and plan to identify, monitor and mitigate risks and assumptions**

42. There were many interventions (in fact, majority of them) that were initiated but not fully completed. Some of the notable ones include:
   - The Public Financial Management (PFM) Act not passed since 2011.
   - ACC policy and strategic plan not implemented almost 2 years after completion.
   - Public Service Charter not implemented more than a year after it was developed.
   - Differences on who should exercise governance over the small claims court has stalled its implementation for almost 2 years.

43. Some of the delays were caused by changes in institutional leadership occasioned by the change in government following the elections of 2013. However, one of the major factors that appeared to have affected those interventions that were not completed as planned was the inconsistency between the enabling constitutional provision and the facilitating legal instrument. Many stakeholders actually noted that Swaziland had a dual governance structure, comprising the traditional chieftaincy and the national government; and further observed that the centre of authority often shifted between these two structures making it difficult to get things done on time.

44. However, these are all foreseeable risks that could have been anticipated, and therefore managed, if not proactively, then at least after they had occurred. UNDP guidelines\(^\text{11}\) direct that:

> “There will always be unexpected situations in programmes and projects. However, a proper planning exercise helps reduce the likelihood of these and prepares the team for dealing with them when they occur. The planning process should involve assessing risks and assumptions and thinking through possible unintended consequences of the activities being planned. The results of these exercises can be very helpful in anticipating and dealing with problems”.

\(^\text{11}\) UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results.
Finding 7: There was no formal coordination with other partners’ interventions

45. There was a partnership strategy articulated in the CPAP, in which UNDP planned to ‘...utilise its limited core resources as catalytic funding to leverage resources from (other) bilateral and multilateral partners; and nurture strong links with other in-country UN agencies, including through arrangements such as joint programming and cost sharing’.

46. However, analysis of the structure and content of most of the programme’s interventions indicates that UNDP acted as sole benefactor. In the exception of the partnerships that were developed with a few civil society organisations, there was no formal coordination with other entities working around the same outcomes. For example, there was no coordination with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) around its interventions on enhancing the juvenile justice system, which is closely aligned with the UNDP’s programme outcome on access to justice.

47. The European Union also had interventions under its European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (UIDHR) as well as in economic governance, focusing particularly on Public Financial Management. In fact, some stakeholders from the civil society sector observed there was no structured mechanism for collaboration with UNDP, and any such collaboration tended to be ad hoc. When asked what they considered to be UNDP’s value added and comparative advantage, most of the stakeholders interviewed tended to consider UNDP’s funding of projects/activities as its most significant contribution.

Finding 8: Programme interventions contributed to highlight critical gaps in the country’s legal and policy frameworks

48. Programme implementation was often hampered by various issues which mostly revolved around differences in the interpretation and application of the country’s legal and policy provisions. The following illustrative cases highlight some of the issues.

Case 1. The programme partnered with one particular civil society organisation to do civic and voter education. The CSO in question was targeting two constituencies to pilot its intervention model. However, the organisation was denied access to those communities by the traditional chiefs and regional governors, ostensibly because they had not been accredited by the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC). When consulted, the EBC said that the Constitution mandated it to oversee voter education, and as such, any entity wishing to conduct civic education should provide its syllabus and obtain accreditation. On the other hand, civil society argues that there was no such restriction in the Constitution; and besides, the EBC did not have a formal system for accrediting CSOs that wish to work at the community level.
Case 2. There is an apparent legal loophole whereby perpetrators of corruption could escape conviction on the technicality that the ACC has no constitutional mandate to investigate and prosecute alleged offenders. The technicality arises on the basis that the ACC was established by an Act of Parliament (prevention of Corruption Act) whereas the CHRPA was established by the Constitution, which overrides subordinate legislation. The ACC is therefore technically not constitutionally mandated for its functions in anti-corruption. At present however, the Human Rights Act and Leadership Conduct Bill have not been enacted, and the CHRPA does not have a Secretariat and therefore lacks institutional capacity for effective operation.

Case 3. The establishment of a small claims court was stalled because of differences over who should exercise governance oversight between the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the Judiciary Service. While this may appear to be an insignificant administrative issue, it has wider implications on access to justice for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. This should also be seen in the broader context of the alleged rift between the three arms of governance about their powers under the constitution.

49. As illustrated in the above cases, these issues emerged as critical risks to achievement of expected results. The absence of effective risk and assumption mitigation strategy also meant that UNDP missed an advocacy opportunity to establish a Law Review Commission. In addition, these risks also present an opportunity for UNDP to reconsider its strategy about how best to impact on service delivery at the lowest level of disadvantaged groups and individuals. This entails a comprehensive analysis and mapping of the governance architecture for service delivery that should assist UNDP to identify and appropriately balance its partnership and capacity-building efforts between the government and traditional chieftaincy.

4.3. Efficiency

50. This section contains an analysis of the issues associated with the programme’s efficiency, including:
   - To what extent the programme delivered its planned budget.
   - The extent to which activities were effectively managed, including monitoring systems and periodic reporting on results.
Finding 9: Although the planned budget was delivered, expenditures deviated from the programme’s priorities to support transparency, accountability and voice

51. The programme had planned budget of $200,000 annually. Based on available expenditure data up to December 2013, the programme had 100% delivery rate on its planned core resources, but was unable to meet its targets for non-core resources (Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPAP Indicative Resources (US$)</th>
<th>Planned Annual Budget (US$)</th>
<th>Actual Annual Expenditures (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>144,800</td>
<td>144,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>244,886</td>
<td>262,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>253,594</td>
<td>235,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>643,280</td>
<td>643,123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Analysis of the planned budget allocations indicates that UNDP’s governance priorities were to support (i) transparency and accountability, and (ii) voice and citizen participation. Based on the budget allocations, Output 4.1.2. (Transparency and accountability) had 38% of total planned budget; while Output 4.3.1 (Voice and citizen participation) had 31.8% of the total planned budget (Table 5). The two outputs therefore had combined budget allocation of 69.8% (over two-thirds) of the governance programme budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Planned Budget ($)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Actual Expenditure($)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1  (Policy)</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>258,706</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>+23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2  (Transparency)</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>178,484</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1  (Justice)</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>113,463</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1  (Citizen voice)</td>
<td>268,000</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>192,522</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>844,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>743,175</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. Based on the above data, it could be surmised that public integrity was seen as a major priority area. The programme had therefore allocated the greatest portion of the planned budget to strengthen transparency of public institutions in the delivery of services, while also allocating the second largest chunk of the budget towards strengthening citizen voice and participation in order to hold public institutions to account.
However, Table 5 also indicates that actual programme expenditure on Output 4.1.1. (Support to policy and legal framework) was 34.8% of total programme expenditures, representing an increase of 23.2% from the planned budget allocation (Box 3). The actual expenditures on all other outputs were less than the planned budget for each respective output; with the largest decrease on Output 4.1.2 (Strengthening transparency and accountability). The two outputs (4.1.2 and 4.3.1) on transparency and citizen voice had combined budget allocation of 69.8% but their expenditures were 49.9% of total expenditures, a decrease of about 20%.

The gravitation of expenditures towards Output 4.1.1. (Support to policy and legal framework) in part reflects the ad hoc nature of the programme’s interventions. Many of the interventions that were supported in partnership with government ministries were not planned in advance; for example, the interventions with the Swaziland Revenue Authority. In addition, the national partners that were interviewed noted that UNDP would approach them to propose projects that could be supported, which is one of the direct consequences of the programme’s lack of its own logic (finding 2).

Finding 10: The interventions were of limited scale, but most of them experienced implementation delays

The majority of the interventions involved providing technical capacity, mainly in the form of funding a technical specialist or consultant to undertake a feasibility study, conduct training or to develop the institution’s strategic plan or policy framework. Other forms of support usually entailed facilitating institutional processes, including for example funding outreach and awareness activities for the CHRPA or ACC; and funding workshops for the EBC or Parliament.

Although UNDP operated under the national implementation modality (NIM), for most of the interventions implementing partners were given support in which payments were made directly to the service provider upon certification of satisfactory performance by the beneficiary partners. When asked whether this approach worked well compared to the model in which UNDP would provide cash advances in tranches, stakeholders said this was a better system because government disbursement were too cumbersome and would have caused implementation delays.

However, the direct payment support did not work quite well for some of the interventions, particularly with civil society partners. In one such instance, the implementing partner was engaged to undertake civic education at community level. Under the system of
reimbursing expenses, the implementing partner had to fund the expenses from their own resources and then submit a claim. However, the implementing partner was not always able to fund the expenses to facilitate community meetings, which had negative impact on the results.\textsuperscript{12} Stakeholders also noted that some of the interventions experienced delays. Some of the delays were due to slow response and preparation on the part of implementing partners, while some of the delays were from the UNDP side, particularly with regards to disbursement of reimbursements.

59. The nature of interventions also entailed minimum monitoring by UNDP as its role was primarily to provide funding, while quality assurance of the service was done by the implementing partners. This was the case where UNDP provided technical support through the hiring consultants. Payments to the consultant was done only after the implementing partners submitted a report of satisfactory services. One of the consequences of this was that the periodic programme reports tended to be focused mainly on the completion of activities. Thus for example, in the performance monitoring framework, planned activities would be included instead of reporting on progress based on performance indicators (Figure 4).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{performance_monitoring_framework}
\caption{Extracts from CPAP Performance Monitoring Framework}
\end{figure}

| Performance indicator: 4.2.1.1 (c) Level of knowledge on Constitutional Bill of Rights among adult population Target: 50\% of adult population | Performance report 2011: 32 communities reached and sensitized on human rights and the Constitution of Swaziland in particular the Bill of Rights. | Performance report 2012: The ICJ will facilitate training for Media on human rights. Uniform forces, National Court Presidents training will be conducted in 2013. The training will support the implementation of conventions which the country has recently ratified and promote the respect of human rights as well ensuring the right holders are protected. |

60. The example in Figure 4 above illustrates two challenges. Firstly, since UNDP was only funding implementing partner activities, it had limited control over the pace of implementation, hence the report in 2012 of what was planned for the following year, which in itself is not a result (nor is it performance). Secondly, there was poor selection of indicator (actually, this would be more appropriate as the output). A separate activity would be required to measure the ‘level of knowledge’ of the adult population, and this could not reasonably be done every quarter, hence this cannot be a performance indicator.

4.4. Sustainability

61. The sustainability of governance programmes depends largely on three factors (i) national ownership of processes and results, (ii) institutional capacities, and (iii) conducive

\textsuperscript{12} UNDP noted that the civil society organisation in question had failed to account for the advance payments, and so they had to resort to claims based on proof of expenditure.
legal and policy framework. This section contains the analysis of the assessment of sustainability, focusing on whether or not measures were put in place to ensure that programme processes and results will be continued after completion of interventions.

**Finding 11: The programme’s processes were likely to be sustainable due to strong national ownership combined with UNDP’s capacity building approach**

62. The programme’s interventions on building institutional capacities by strengthening the legal and policy framework as well as developing service oriented strategic plans, policies and service charter were grounded on strong national ownership. In fact, the management of the processes and quality assurance were provided by the national counterparts in respective institutions. There was continuous engagement of national partners at every stage in the implementation process, thereby ensuring full ownership by national counterparts. Although the technical experts that were hired to deliver programme outputs were engaged under UNDP contracts (for payment purposes), national partners said that they were involved in the recruitment processes, including interviews and evaluating the consultants’ performance.

63. The national counterparts that were consulted all said they felt that they were driving the programme processes. An illustrative example of the national ownership was on the development of the ACC strategic plan. In 2013, UNDP hired an international expert to develop the strategic plan for the ACC. However, the ACC were not satisfied with the consultant’s output and requested UNDP to revoke the contract due to non-performance.

64. However, much as the programme’s policy and capacity-building interventions were relevant, the evaluation noted that the interventions were not based on a specific and targeted capacity needs assessment. This constituted a major weakness, which manifested itself through the ad hoc approach that characterised the programme’s implementation. For example, after developing the Public Service Charter, it was later realised that the Ministry did not have a strategic plan within which to situate its performance standards. Similarly with the SRA, after developing the Document and Records Management system, it was later decided that the system’s effectiveness required a broader IT strategy framework in order to operate as integrated platform.

65. Another consequence resulting from the lack of capacity needs assessment was the difficulty experienced with monitoring indictors and measuring results. Many of the programme’s outputs and indictors were centered on ‘improving capacity’, but without a capacity needs assessment, no specific baselines were established, making it difficult to measure progress and performance.

**Finding 12: The programme had no clear exit strategy and sustainability plan for continuing its results at the level of public services**

66. As already discussed above, good governance is not an end in itself, but rather an intermediary result towards better access and delivery of public services. It is because of this dimension that good governance programmes have to include interventions targeting service
providers (duty-bearers) as well as service beneficiaries (rights-holders). It follows therefore, that building institutional capacity to improve service delivery cannot by itself ensure sustainability at the results level. There is a corresponding need to ensure that the rights-holders continue to access those services in a sustainable manner.

67. There was no exit strategy to address how the programme’s interventions with civil society and the accrued benefits at community and individual level would be continued after completion of UNDP’s support. Clearly, there was an assumption that when service providers have institutional capacity, then services will continue to flow, which is much like looking at one side of an equation. There is a difference between sustaining programme processes (providing services) and sustaining the programme’s results (accessing of benefits). Planning for the programme’s sustainability should therefore be an upfront activity involving assessing the risks to sustainability and identifying what requires to be sustained and how that will be sustained (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Programme sustainability plan

V. GOOD PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNT

68. The governance programme was implemented in partnership with national counterparts, including government and civil society. This section identifies the good practices and lessons learnt, that should help to inform future programme design and implementation.

69. UNDP developed strong partnership with national counterparts from the government sector. National counterparts were satisfied with the level of engagement, and said that they felt empowered and in control of the processes. Establishing a strong partnership with national counterparts promotes national ownership, which is consistent with UN values on aid effectiveness, and is also critical for sustainability. However, the programme did not establish an equally strong partnership with civil society. This was a critical gap, in that it does not acknowledge that good governance is not an end in itself, but a means towards effective and efficient service delivery. Governance is therefore ‘a compact between rulers and the
ruled’, implying that both have responsibilities to the other and they are mutually accountable to each other. In the service delivery paradigm, for example, the government is responsible for delivering public services, but the public also has a duty to pay for the services.

Lesson # 1. Good governance entails mutual responsibility and accountability between providers and users of the services. If the governance programme is understood as a means to an end, then national ownership should also be defined from the perspective of both providers and users of services.

70. In the context of establishing a conducive legal and policy environment for good governance, UNDP supported the development of strategic and action plans for various institutions, including Parliament, ministries of Justice and Public Service, as well as for the independent commissions. This was a particularly good practice as it enabled the targeted institutions to clearly articulate a roadmap to guide them in implementing relevant laws and policies. However, most of the strategic plans were not yet being implemented, due to factors beyond the control of UNDP (but some of which could have been planned for if a comprehensive risk assessment had been done).

71. The programme strategy was centred on building institutional capacity of service providers, including support for development of conducive legal and policy environment and strengthening their operational systems through development of strategic and action plans. This was also a sound strategy in a context where some of the institutions, such as the commissions, were in their nascent stages. However, the interventions were not founded on comprehensive capacity needs assessment. Consequently, many of the programmes capacity development outputs were not implemented, with a possible risk that some of them may not be implemented at all.

Lesson # 2. In spite of the good intentions of all stakeholders and partners, there may arise events that could prevent the programme from progressing as planned, or from successful completion. The negative impact of risk, can only be mitigated if a comprehensive assessment of the risks and assumptions is done at the time of programme planning, combined with continual monitoring during implementation.

72. Implementing partners were required to submit progress reports on a quarterly basis, and programme management also compiled these reports into an annual progress report, as per UNDP guidelines. This was a good practice which provided UNDP with an opportunity to make necessary adjustments and decisions if activities were not delivering expected results or progress was moving slower than planned. However, the reports did not always tell the complete story about the programme’s progress towards expected outputs and outcomes, partly because the selected indicators were either inadequate or inappropriate, and partly because there were no tools to monitor performance and progress towards results.
Lesson # 3. Principles of results-based management are a critical factor in designing the programme. These principles entail that programmes should be based on a clear logic model with well-defined theory of change. The formulation of expected results (outputs and outcomes) as well as their associated indicators also impacts on the programmes capability for effective monitoring and evaluation.

73. UNDP leveraged its comparative advantage as the UN agency mandated to support good governance at the country level, as well as its convening power as a trusted partner to engage national counterparts at various levels. However, programme outcomes were not defined in a manner that would enhance the scope for partnering with other development partners. Consequently, the interventions did not have sufficient scale for significant difference at impact level.

74. Opportunities for broader engagement were missed, including for example, advocacy for a comprehensive law review to harmonise laws with the Constitution. Although the programme developed a partnership with a number of civil society organisations, there were no interventions specifically aimed to build capacity of civil society. In addition, the traditional chieftaincy was not specifically targeted as a key constituency in the governance paradigm. As a result, UNDP achieved a high delivery rate on its core resources but hardly met the planned target for non-core resources.

Lesson # 4. Building partnerships provide UNDP with an opportunity to improve its effectiveness. Partners not only help expand the resource base, but will also increase the scope and depth of the governance programme through increased scale, and wider reach to intended beneficiaries. This can create the critical mass required to achieve developmental impact, and in that regard can also be a powerful tool for advocacy.

75. UNDP rightly recognised that the impact of its interventions should be felt at the community and individual levels, and collaborated with civil society organisations to increase its reach. However, civil society stakeholders observed that their engagement was on ad hoc basis, with no structured framework defining the form and content for collaboration. There was some mention of establishing a governance consortium in the performance monitoring framework of 2013, but no further mention of it in subsequent reports. However, there is a Gender Consortium jointly facilitated by UNFPA and CANGO.

76. The governance consortium, if established, could form the basis for a long term sustainability plan. Through the consortium, civil society capacity can be developed to continue work on the governance outcomes beyond UNDP’s programme interventions.
Lesson # 5. Sustainability of programme results cannot occur in a vacuum. There has to be a well-thought out plan that clearly defines what needs to be sustained, how and by whom it will be done. This structured approach will help UNDP to make an objective assessment of the additional resources, capacities and partnerships that should be developed to sustain the programme results.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Conclusions

77. Although there was a general consensus on the relevance of the ‘governance’ programme, it was very difficult to understand whether stakeholders were talking about the same thing. It was apparent that stakeholders had very diverse expectations spreading seamlessly across areas such as constitutionalism, civil and political rights, public administration, human rights, public service delivery, judiciary services and democratic governance.

78. The CPD provides an indication of the scope of governance programme as;

Proposed interventions will support the implementation of the constitution, strengthen the capacity of governance institutions (parliament, the anti-corruption commission, human rights and public administration commission, and the judiciary), and promote participation by citizens through opening space for public dialog.

79. However, a look at subsequent interventions suggests that the programme supported diverse interventions, including in (i) democracy and political governance (Parliament, EBC, voter education, political representation of disadvantaged groups), (ii) civil and human rights (CHRPA, Judiciary services, MoJCA), (iii) economic governance (OPM: e-governance, SRA, Ministry of Public Service, PFM). Some of these areas do not necessarily fit together under one programme in a meaningful way.

80. The inter-relation and sometimes inseparability of the government institutions from traditional chieftaincy often complicates issues. Without clearly unpacking and targeting specific areas of focus, the governance programme faced challenges of accessing and making an impact at the community and individual levels.

81. Programme performance may also have been inadvertently affected by the operations strategy of the country office. The country office implements its interventions under a single umbrella CPAP. This may have its own merits, particularly in the context of staffing levels and similar considerations. However, it also means that an integrated programme such as governance will not have a dedicated programme document, and also consequently it is executed without a targeted theory of change model of its own. This limits management’s capabilities to effectively monitor and mitigate programme risks and assumptions.
On the whole, the programme’s interventions were relevant and contributed to the broader outcome to ‘strengthen national capacities for promotion and protection of rights’.

6.2. Recommendations

In view of the foregoing analysis and lessons learned, the evaluation recognises that good governance is a necessary condition for mutual accountability in the delivery of public services, and therefore also for human and social development. The evaluation therefore recommends that UNDP should continue its support for good governance in Swaziland. However, in order to enhance its impact in the governance sector, the evaluation also recommends that UNDP should consider the following six specific recommendations.

**Recommendation 1. UNDP should focus its governance programme on areas where it has the greatest comparative advantage to achieve the greatest impact**

Good governance covers a broad array of issues that may be inter-related but also very different in content and scope. The country office should identify and focus on a strategic governance area where it has the most comparative advantage to make significant impact. This requires the country office to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the governance issues and challenges in Swaziland, do a thorough analysis of its comparative advantages, and mapping the focus areas of development partners. This exercise should help UNDP to identify its niche and develop a programme with strategic focus on areas where it can make the greatest impact.

Majority of stakeholders noted the complexity of the dual governance system in Swaziland as a major challenge. They observed that the demarcations between the traditional chieftaincy and government were often obscure, sometimes with the same individuals playing both roles at different levels. Stakeholders also observed that this was further compounded by a weakened civil society sector, which lacked capacity for effective advocacy and for holding government to account. As part of its strategic focus, UNDP should therefore strengthen advocacy and build capacity of civil society, by leveraging its comparative advantage “as a trusted partner working across sectors and with multiple stakeholders, often on sensitive issues.”

**Recommendation 2. UNDP should develop independent programme document for the integrated governance programme**

A key weakness affecting UNDP’s effectiveness in the governance sector was due to lack of strategic theory of change, and strategy to monitor and mitigate governance-specific risks and assumptions. It appears that this weakness is not specific to the governance programme alone, since UNDP implements all its interventions under the broad umbrella of the CPAP. However, by definition the CPAP spans across several programme areas, including poverty.

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reduction, environment, HIV/AIDS; and will therefore outline how these programmes are
linked together, but may not contain sufficient detail about individual programmes.

87. A focused governance programme with multiple interventions spanning across several
sectors (public service, justice, human rights, elections, etc.) would require that there should
be a dedicated programme document that serves as its specific road map. The programme
document should contain a clear articulation of the programme’s theory of change, including
critical risks and assumptions for the programme’s success.

**Recommendation 3. UNDP should strengthen capacity and practice of results-based
management in programme design and implementation**

88. RBM rests on clearly defined accountability for results and requires monitoring and self-
assessment of progress towards results, including reporting on performance. This requires
that there should be a performance monitoring framework based on appropriate, adequate
and measurable performance indicators.

89. UNDP should consider one of two options. The first option is to engage the services of
an RBM/M&E expert to assist with developing an evaluable programme based on clear
results, monitoring and evaluation (RME) framework. However, it is generally accepted as a
good management practice that the planning and monitoring functions should be undertaken
by the programme managers, while evaluation should be outsourced to independent
evaluators. In this regards therefore, the second option is for UNDP to engage technical
expertise to review the RME framework prior to the programme’s implementation. This will
provide UNDP with independent review on the formulation of expected results (outcomes
and outputs) and associated indicators, so that the programme can be implemented and
performance monitored on the basis of appropriate and adequate parameters.

**Recommendation 4. UNDP should adopt the strategic capacity development approach in
designing and developing interventions**

90. Most of the governance interventions had overall objective to strengthen institutional
capacity of relevant line ministries and independent commissions. In that regard, UNDP
developed a good practice that included supporting development of strategic plans and
policy implementation frameworks. However, it was apparent that many of the interventions were
not based on a comprehensive capacity needs assessment; and no capacity evaluation was undertaken at the end of the interventions to assess the effectiveness and application of acquired capacity.

91. Global UNDP practice recognises that a country's capacity resides at the enabling
environment, organisational and individual levels, and its policy, programme and
implementation support addresses capacity assets and needs at all three levels. “Experience
shows that attempts to address capacity issues at any one level without taking into account the others, are likely to result in developments that are skewed, inefficient and, in the end, unsustainable”14. UNDP should therefore adopt the strategic capacity development approach, including specific capacity needs assessment.

**Recommendation 5. UNDP should develop and strengthen strategic partnerships with other actors in the governance sector**

92. Although UNDP had identified several strategic partners for the governance programme, none of them were effectively developed. For example, within the UN system, there was no formal collaboration with UNICEF, supported the judiciary in the area of juvenile justice, which is closely linked with the programme’s outcome 4.2 on access to justice. Similarly, the planned partnership with the Commonwealth Secretariat and European Union was not developed, ostensibly due to changes in their programme priorities. More importantly, UNDP did not develop a strategic partnership with civil society other than as implementing partners.

93. With expected difficulties in accessing funding in the future, and in view of the complexity of the architecture of governance in Swaziland, UNDP should develop, implement and follow through on its partnership strategy.

**Recommendation 6. UNDP should develop and implement an exit strategy and sustainability plan for all interventions**

94. Although many programme interventions were completed with delivery of planned outputs such as strategic action plans, many of them lacked implementation. UNDP was therefore able to close such interventions with end of project report indicating successful completion and delivery of results. However, since programme outputs and outcomes are formulated in the context of changes in the development situation, when such intermediary outputs are not implemented, programme outputs could therefore not be considered as delivered, thereby impacting negatively on UNDP’s contribution to outcomes.

95. UNDP should develop a specific exit strategy that clearly articulates what it expects to leave behind after its interventions, and how these results will be sustained over time and by whom. While building institutional and individual capacity provides a venue for sustainability, there will often arise other intervening factors that could militate against the continuation of programme processes and results. A sustainability plan assists UNDP to undertake a systematic assessment of potential risks and thereby develop a specific risk mitigation strategy that will ensure sustainability of results.
ANNEX 1. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1. End of Project Evaluation: Towards a greater citizenry participation in Swaziland.
3. Quarterly Progress Reports (various).
## ANNEX 2. INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

### UNDP and development partners

1. Dessalegne, I. (Mr)  Resident Representative  UNDP
2. Dlamini, A. (Mr)  Programme Officer  European Union
3. Lukhele, S. (Ms)  Programme Finance  UNDP
4. Mavuso, M. (Ms)  Assistant Representative  UNFPA
5. Nasidi, K. (Mr)  Deputy Resident Representative  UNDP
6. Ntshangase, S. (Ms)  Programme Analyst  UNDP

### Government and other national partners

7. Dlamini, K. (Ms)  Head, Management Analyst  Public Service Ministry
8. Dlamini, M. (Mr)  Secretary to Cabinet  Prime Minister’s Office
9. Gija, (Chief)  Commissioner  EBC
10. Hlophe, L. (Ms)  Registrar, Supreme Court  Swaziland Judiciary
11. Khoza, E. (Mr)  Focal person, UN Programmes  Parliament of Swaziland
12. Lukhele, Z. (Mr)  Head, Justice, peace and recon.  Council of Swaziland Church
13. Magagula, L. (Mr)  Director, Records/Documents  Swazi Revenue Authority
14. Magagula, V. (Mr)  Director, Info Technology  Swazi Revenue Authority
15. Manana, N. (Ms)  Assistant Director,  Public Service Ministry
16. Masilela, S. (Mr)  Under-Secretary  Ministry of Justice
17. Masuku, M. (Mr)  Under-Secretary  Public Service Ministry
18. Masuku, S. (Mr)  Chairperson  CHRPA
19. Maziya, R. (Mr)  Director  LDF
20. Ndlangamandla, E. (Mr)  Director  CANGO
21. Nxumalo, E. (Ms)  Information Manager  Parliament of Swaziland
22. Nxumalo, V. (Mr)  Permanent Secretary  Prime Minister’s Office
23. Phakathi, J. (Ms)  Public Relations Officer  ACC
24. Wamala, S. (Ms)  Investigations Officer  ACC
ANNEX 3. GOVERNANCE AND GENDER PORTFOLIO EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Post Title: Governance and Gender Outcome Evaluation

Country of Assignment: Swaziland

Start Date: 16 June 2014 Duration: 30 Days

BACKGROUND and CONTEXT

The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) is a five year framework defining mutual cooperation between the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) covering the period 20011-2015. It is prepared based on the development opportunities and challenges identified in the United Nations Common Country Assessment (CCA) and outlined in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2011-2015, which takes into account, various United Nations Conferences, Conventions and in particular Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It also draws lessons and progress made during the implementation of the previous Country Programme – the 3rd Country Cooperation Framework for the period 2006 – 2010, and national development priorities as outlined in the National Development Strategy (NDS) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Plan (PRSAP). The CPAP, prepared in close consultation with key stakeholders, defines the broad outlines of the Government and UNDP common development interventions, within agreed financial and programme parameters.

The goal of the Country Programme is to contribute to the realization of Swaziland’s Vision 2022 as articulated in the NDS and PRSAP and attainment of the MDGs by improving quality of life of the population. The UNDP Country Programme for Swaziland supports implementation of the four outcomes of the 2011-2015 UNDAF, targeting areas where the organization has comparative advantages and demonstrated capacity. In this respect, UNDP focuses on: poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, HIV and AIDS, environmental sustainability and climate change and Governance and Gender portfolio and gender equality.

UNDP Swaziland has completed three years into the CPAP 2011 – 2015. As indicated above one of the UNDP key programmes is the Governance and Gender portfolio results area. To measure the impact of this programme, UNDP Swaziland as per Evaluation Plan approved by the Executive Board will carry out an outcome evaluation. This programme has 4 outcomes:

- Development of supportive policy and legal framework for increased access to rights and improved Governance fully supported.
- Citizens have increased access to justice
- People have increased knowledge on their rights
- Development of legal and policy frameworks promoting gender equality effectively supported.

EVALUATION PURPOSE

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP’s Governance and Gender programme results contributed, together with assistance of partners, to a change in development conditions at the country level as articulated in the country programme document.
Specifically the purpose of the evaluation is to;

- Measure impact of the UNDP Governance and Gender portfolio
- Provide substantive input and direction to the formulation of future programmes and project strategies
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in Swaziland
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the county level
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

**EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE**

**Objective of the Outcome Evaluation.** The objective of the outcome evaluation is to measure UNDP’s contribution to the following outcomes; policy and legal framework, access to justice, people knowledge on their rights, public sector management and legal and policy frameworks promoting gender equality, with a view to fine tuning the current UNDP Governance and Gender programme, proving the most optimal portfolio balance and structure as well as informing the next programming cycle. The evaluation will assess how UNDP Swaziland Governance and Gender programme results contributed to a change in development conditions in collaborations with other key actors in the Governance and Gender area in Swaziland.

A consultant working under the guidance of the UNDP, CPAP Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and the Government Coordinating Authority is required to undertake the evaluation. More specifically, the evaluation shall assess the following:

(i) The processes and achievements made during the first three years of implementing the Governance and Gender Programme with a focus on contributing factors.
(ii) The relevance of the progress made in terms of the UNDP outputs (including an analysis of both project activities and soft-assistance activities.
(iii) What contribution UNDP has made or is making to the progress towards the achievement of the outcome (including an analysis of the partnership strategy)
(iv) Identify future intervention strategies and issues. Most importantly, the outcome evaluation should be forward-looking by making recommendations for future programming strategies.
(v) Identify strategies for citizen’s involvement/participation on issues of Governance and Gender in the future.

**Evaluation Scope**

The evaluation will cover UNDP Governance and Gender programme in Swaziland. It will examine the extent to which outcomes have been achieved. This outcome evaluation will assess progress towards the outcome, the factors affecting the outcome, key UNDP contribution to outcomes and assess the partnership strategy and its contribution towards achievement of the UNDAF 2011 – 2015 Governance and Gender results.

Specifically, the evaluation will focus on the following;

**Outcome status:** Determine whether or not the outcome has been achieved and if not, whether there has been progress made towards its achievement, and also identify the challenges to attainment of the outcome. Identify innovative approaches and capacities developed through UNDP assistance. Assess the relevance and adequacy of UNDP outputs to the outcome.
**Underlying factors**: Analyse the underlying factors beyond UNDP’s control that influenced the outcome including opportunities and threats affecting the achievement of the outcome. Distinguish the substantive design issues from the key implementation and/or management capacities and issues including the timelines of outputs, the degree of stakeholders and partners’ involvement in the completion of outputs, and how processes were managed/carry out.

**Strategic Positioning of UNDP**: Examine the distinctive characteristics and features of UNDP’s Governance and Gender programme and how it has shaped UNDP’s relevance as a current and potential partner in Swaziland. The Country Office (CO) position will be analysed in terms of communication that goes into articulating UNDP’s relevance, or how the CO is positioned to meet partner needs by offering specific, tailored services to these partners, creating value by responding to partners’ needs, mobilizing resources for the benefit of the country, not for UNDP, demonstrating a clear breakdown of tailored UNDP services and having comparative advantages relative to other development organizations.

**Partnership Strategy**: whether UNDP’s partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective. What partnerships were formed? What was UNDP’s role? How did the partnership contribute to the achievement of the outcomes? What was the level of stakeholder’s participation? Examine the partnership among UN Agencies and other donor organizations in the relevant field.

**Lessons Learnt**: Identify lessons learnt and best practices and related innovative ideas and approaches, how efficiently programme planning implementation and management were carried out. This will include assessing the extent of organizational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanism used by UNDP in supporting the programme. This will support learning lessons about UNDP’s contribution to the Governance and Gender outcome so as to design a better assistance strategy for the programming cycle.

**EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

The evaluation should to the highest extent possible provide responses to the following research questions using the following evaluation criteria (Guidance questions):

**Relevance**:

- Extent to which UNDP support is relevant to Swaziland Vision 2020 and Governance and Gender portfolio priorities of Swaziland.
- Extent of the progress towards the achievement of the Governance and Gender portfolio programme outcomes.
- Extent to which human rights principles and standards are reflected or promoted in the Programme.
- Extent and in what ways are the concepts of gender equity and equality and other cross-cutting issues reflected in programme.
- Extent of inter-linkages among the outcome interventions i.e. between programme areas, with other UN agencies/development partners, etc.

**Effectiveness**

- Extent of UNDP’s effectiveness in producing results and whether these will be achieved within the planned time frame.
- Extent of UNDPs support towards promoting gender equality, capacity development, advocacy on Governance and Gender issues and policy advisory services.
- Extent of UNDPs contribution to human and institutional capacity building of partners as a guarantee for sustainability beyond UNDP interventions.
- Extent of UNDP partnership with civil society and private sector in promoting democratic and corporate Governance and Gender portfolio in Swaziland.
- Assessment of UNDP’s ability to advocate best practice and desired goals; UNDP’s role and participation in national debate and ability to influence national policies on legal reforms and human rights protection.
- Assessment of the capacity and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the UNDP Governance and Gender portfolio in view of UNDP support to the government.

Efficiency of implementation

- How much time, resources, capacities and efforts it takes to manage the portfolio and where there are the gaps if any. More specifically, how do UNDP policies, practices, decisions, constraints; capabilities affect the performance of the Portfolio? Has UNDP’s strategy in producing the outputs been efficient and cost-effective?
- Are sound financial and equipment management procedures practiced? Are the financial, human and material resources managed responsibly and efficiently?
- Extent of monitoring and evaluation systems and processes utilized to contribute to increased programme efficiency.

Sustainability:

- Extent to which achievements made so far are sustainable. Specifically, is it likely that programme achievements will be sustained?
- Extent to which involved counterparts are willing and able to continue programme activities on their own, integrate the programme to current practices and/or the target population and extent to which resources been allocated by the counterparts into programme activities
- Provide preliminary recommendations on how the Governance and Gender portfolio can most effectively continue to support partners in improving service delivery in a long term perspective
- Provide recommendations for improvement of the Governance and Gender portfolio for the remaining period of the CPAP extent to which the programme has developed/strengthened the human and institutional capacities so as to ensure sustainability

METHODOLOGY

The outcome evaluation will be carried out through wide participation of all relevant stakeholders including the UN, government institution and beneficiaries, field visit to selected project sites; briefing and debriefing sessions are envisaged. Based on the objectives mentioned above, the consultant will propose a methodology and plan for the assignment, which will be approved by the UNDP and Evaluation team. However, it is recommended that the methodology should take into account both quantitative and qualitative data namely
Desk Review

i. Review all relevant documents, including UNDAF, country programme document, country programme action plan (CPAP), project documents, annual work plans, progress reports, annual reports. This will assist in giving a description of the intended outcome including baselines for the outcome and indicators and benchmarks used. This will inform the evaluation of whether change has taken place.

ii. Validation of information about status of the outcome. This could be done through holding meetings and interview with relevant stakeholders including implementing partners of the programme to seek their perception on the programme and determine if they perceive any change has happened.

iii. Undertake a critique of the outcome formulation itself and corresponding indicators and recommendations be made on how the outcome statement can be improved in terms of conceptual clarity.

iv. Conduct field visit identified projects

v. Conduct data collection and analysis

Primary Data Collection Data will also be collected through conducting interviews with key informants, focus group discussions with project beneficiaries and other stakeholders.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The following outputs are expected by the end of the consultancy;

i. Initial Work-Plan (to be submitted with EOI)

ii. Inception Report Draft Governance and Gender Outcome Evaluation Report Validation workshop Final endorsed report incorporating comments from stakeholders.

iii. The final report must include, but not necessarily be limited to the elements outlined in the quality criteria for evaluation reports (see Annex 7 of PME).

EXPERTISE AND QUALIFICATION OF THE CONSULTANT

The Consultant should be knowledgeable and experienced in conducting outcome evaluations and have strong background on Governance and Gender issues. A least possess a minimum of a Master’s Degree in Social Sciences, law, with strong background in participatory evaluation of development programmes. Have expertise in cross-cutting issues of gender equality and human rights. Specifically the consultant should have proven experience and skills in the following areas;

* 10 years’ experience in conducting programme evaluations;
* Sound knowledge and practical experience in programme development, planning and implementation in the area of governance
* Extensive research and analytical skills;
* Excellent writing and oral communication;
* Facilitation and management skills and
* Possess leadership skills and be a team player.
* Knowledge of UN system and UNDP

The consultant will specifically:

* Take the overall responsibility for technical quality of the evaluation/assessment.
* Prepare quality study instruments including: interview schedules and guides, field visit checklists.
* Ensure that field work and other survey activities are undertaken in accordance with the work plan.
* Coordinate quantitative and qualitative data analysis and report writing.
* Prepare inception and final report which will include incorporating comments received from the stakeholders,
* Disseminate report findings to stakeholders as organized by the UNDP Country Office

**Submission of Applications:**

Interested consultants are invited to submit detailed CV’S and Expression of Interest (EOI) marked Governance and Gender Outcome Evaluation to UNDP Offices, 5th Floor Lilunga House, P. O. Box 261, Mbabane or e-mail application to Registry.sz@undp.org on or before the 6th June 2014.