Indpendent Review team

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review oF Country Programme document 2011-2015

United Nations Deveopment programme

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**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

1. UN—United Nations
2. UNDAF-United Nations Development Assistance Framework
3. CPD-Country Programme Document
4. CPAP-Country Programme Action Plan
5. WB-The World Bank
6. UNIDO-United Nations Industrial Development Organization
7. EU-the European Union
8. UNICEF-United Nations Children’s Fund
9. EO-Evaluation Office of the UNDP
10. SS-South-South
11. SPPU-Strengthened Partnership and PolicyUnit
12. CASS-Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
13. CAITEC-China Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation
14. IPRCC-International Poverty Reduction Center
15. CICETE-China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange
16. MOFCOM-Ministry of Commerce
17. PRI-Policy Research Institute
18. E & E- Energy & Environment
19. DRM-Disaster Risk Management
20. MEA-Multilateral Environmental Agreement
21. ICR-Industrial and Commercial Refrigeration and Air Conditioning
22. FECO-Foreign Economic Cooperation Office (within the Ministry of Environmental Protection
23. JP-Joint (UN) Programming
24. ROAR-Results Oriented Annual Report
25. GEF-Global Environmental Facility
26. PEG-Poverty/Equity & Government
27. CLS-Chinese Law Society
28. NPCLAC-National Peoples’ Congress Legislative Committee

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**Executive Summary**

***Background***

1. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at some point during its cycle of development cooperation with individual countries, undertakes a review or an assessment of impact of its stated objectives, targets to be achieved, and measurements for such targets, which is elaborated in a Country Programme Document (CPD). The CPD evolves from the broader UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the country. This review is concerned with the framework of cooperation between the Government of China and UNDP that runs from 2010-2015). Other project based evaluations are also conducted per corporate guidelines.
2. With respect to past cooperation and lessons learned (2006-2010), the UNDP Programme emphasized enhancing the capacities of the Govt. in planning, managing development in a more sustainable way and to sharing knowledge and experiences regionally and globally. Further, to better understand UNDP’s contribution to China’s sustainable development goals the UNDP Evaluation Office (EO) conducted in early 2010 an Assessment of Development Results (ADR), which was the second such exercise over this 30 year period of collaboration. This ADR concluded that the UNDP Country Programme was well aligned with the UN Development Assistance Framework for China (UNDAF) and with the national priorities and goals of China.
3. UNDP programmes, the ADR, noted, had been scaled-up and had played a catalytic role in many priority areas. The ADR also noted that compared with previous programming cycles, UNDP was shifting to upstream, strategic policy making interventions — also referred to as ‘soft interventions’, where advocacy, policy advisory services, capacity building for implementation, play a more prominent role. However, the ADR also did not discount the need for pilot experimentation in innovative areas such as urbanization, climate change, demographic change, which could then be scaled-up.

1. As such, this independently led review of the current Country Programme is based on six outcome areas agreed to by UNDP and the PRC, prior to implementation in 2011. They are as follows:
   1. ‘Deepen the reforms that address disparities, promote equitable distribution of public resources and foster equal access to social service and livelihood support’
   2. ‘Empower communities and civil society to participate in shaping China’s cultural, and socio-economic development’
   3. ‘The right of women to greater social and political participation and the live their lives free from discrimination and violence, is advance’
   4. Low carbon and other environmentally sustainable strategies and technologies are adapted widely to meet China’s commitments and compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreement’
   5. ‘The vulnerability of poor communities and ecosystems to climate change is reduced’
   6. ‘Deepen China’s engagement and participation in global, regional development partnerships to realize the MDGs and to address climate change’.
2. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) serves as the main counterpart of the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC) and UNDP in China. However, with respect to Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Montreal Protocol (MP) portfolio of projects, the Ministry of Finance serves as UNDP’s counterpart.
3. With respect to implementation, the China International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges (CICETE), is the primary implementing agency of MOFCOM for UNDP projects throughout the outcome areas, and through CICETE, works with a number of line ministries as cooperating partners (CP). This setup is unique for UNDP and only applies to China. However, there are also other governmental entities that are responsible for implementation, such as CAITEC, State Forestry Agency, State Oceanic Agency, NDRC and FECO[[1]](#footnote-2).
4. Results-based management was expected to be integrated across all UNDP supported programmes, and cross-cutting issues such as gender equality would be programmed and monitored throughout all programmes and aligned with the Results Framework of the CPD. Joint programming would also be encouraged with other UN agencies in keeping in line with individual mandates as reflected in the UNDAF for the cycle 2011-2015.
5. Reporting on the outcome areas are done through UNDP internal controls such as ATLAS as well as through an annual report called the Results Oriented Annual Report (ROAR). The ROAR highlights key findings and challenges programmatically, as well as analyzing the country situational context that existed prior to implementation of each consecutive year of the five-year cycle. This allows for assessing progress while understanding mitigating circumstances that could impact implementation such as natural disasters, or for example, slowdowns in the global economy which occurred in 2012-2013, as well as government imposed austerity measures, aimed at both export-led growth as well as attempting to curb internal corruption. The review team used the ROAR reports as a key informative component of evaluating this CPD, in addition to all the other means of verification and feedback, such as the meetings with government counterparts, donor and private sector partners.

***General Findings***

1. UNDP has been a strong and valued cooperating partner with the Govt. of the PRC since 1979. While the circumstances of development cooperation has changed over the past three decades, primarily due to China’s extra-ordinary economic growth and newly prioritized issues such as climate change and energy, UNDP remains the Government’s primary development cooperation partner and has shown the flexibility to adapt and evolve and strengthen technical capacities in order to respond to these emerging demands.
2. The Government in recent years, with its growing emphasis on South-South Cooperation (SSC) particularly values UNDP’s global presence, and the institution’s network of Country Offices. No other UN agency commands such a longevity of presence in countries’ throughout the entire globe, and especially in places where there is conflict and other geo-political concerns. As such, China’s new emphasis on being a key global presence, a knowledge hub for sharing lessons as well as deepening South-South cooperation, merges seamlessly with UNDP’s comparative advantages.
3. In this changing context of development cooperation, with UNDP also moving towards providing more ‘upstream’ and policy advisory services to its government counterparts, it would appear that the Government of China would like UNDP to advise and work with them in the future on large reformative, innovative ideas and initiatives. While clearly project based deliverables will continue, it was conveyed to the review team that UNDP might be spread ‘too thin’, in the context of having a few too many small, and perhaps less visible projects.[[2]](#footnote-3) In relation to the above, UNDP’s diffusiveness, could have negative impacts with respect adhering to its corporate mandate, areas of development cooperation with the government, resource mobilization and partnership building. The review team has found that some government counterparts and implementing partners, while they value UNDP, often are not sure of its precise area of expertise, technical and capacity building abilities. This lack of understanding could be ameliorated with perhaps less projects in the next cycle, a narrower focus on upstream work and through ensuring emphasis on active communication with implementing partners, direct counterparts as well as private sector partners.[[3]](#footnote-4)
4. The communications office has done very well in garnering both in-kind and direct budget resource mobilization, for example, through the use of social marketing techniques working with entities like the Baidu Group, as well as linking up with some programme teams, such as the E & E team on ‘Green Day’ public campaigns. The review team would hope that this linkage is structurally strengthened with respect to implementation of programmes.
5. The Results and Resources Framework (RRF) should be strengthened in the next cycle, aligning more effectively each Outcome, with appropriate indicators and baselines. Statistical data collection with respect to indicating baselines and thus having the means to measure progress could be problematic in some thematic areas, due to UNDP having to rely on official government statistics. One way to address this ‘gap’ could be in utilizing more precise language to describe the desired Outcome, or by narrowing expectations of results.
6. UNDP’s TRAC funds to help deliver programmes has gradually declined over this cycle, and has levelled off to $2.5 million per annum at the time that this review took place. Originally, the organization was expecting to receive an annual average of TRAC funds in the approximate area of $5.5 million. Meanwhile, Government cost-sharing has increased and now accounts for over 90% of non-Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Montreal (MP) programme funds. At the same time, unfortunately, bilateral donors who have contributed to UNDP programming budgets in the past such as the EU moved out of China around the beginning of the programming cycle.[[4]](#footnote-5) Nevertheless, some bi-lateral donors continue to remain interested in working with UNDP on South-South collaboration, and are currently doing so in some outcome areas, such as those related to Disaster Risk Reduction and the Environment.
7. This imbalance could create problems in the future with respect to UNDP’s influence on reform, policy and technical advice, given that TRAC money has become fairly insubstantial compared to the government’s financial input. According to feedback, the reliance on greater government cost-sharing has had some impact on programming and delivery in this cycle due to the dependence on a steady and reliable flow of government funds for programming, which at times has slowed or not been delivered on time during this cycle. This is especially so after 2013 when the Government imposed more strict measures on spending.
8. In terms of the six Outcome areas, except for Gender, the review team would conclude that they all achieved results to varying degrees and for varying reasons. Outcomes related to Poverty and Governance made significant contributions in over-turning unjust laws and in general helped build capacity and promote reform in the judicial and civil society areas. The Outcome related to Poverty performed exceptionally with regard to influencing policy on social safety nets as well in working with ethnic minorities.
9. The Outcome area for Gender had the least amount of visibility or contribution. There could be several reasons for this, one being that the Outcome language itself as reflected in the CPD--‘the right of women to greater social and political participation is advanced’, could be seen as too vague, while its related indicators and targets were difficult to verify due to reliance on government statistics[[5]](#footnote-6). The review team suggests that in the next cycle, priorities related to gender are made more modest, with corresponding results language more responsive to assessing impact. On the other hand, to consider mainstreaming gender throughout the new areas of support and not keeping it as a separate Outcome area.
10. The review team feels there was a great deal of impact on reducing gender inequality if viewed through a cross-cutting lens. The lack of activities of significant consequence could also be due to the partner chosen / assigned, which was the All China Women’s Federation (ACWF), or due to difficulties in implementing a large programme that was initially expected to involve all UN partners in the country. Nevertheless, the review team could not find discernible evidence to reveal that the Outcome yielded significant impact as expected per the CPD.
11. Outcomes 4 and 5, were deemed by the review team to have comparably achieved the greatest impact if one takes into account the amount of resources delivered, and projects implemented as well as positive impacts on policy and capacity building at national and local levels[[6]](#footnote-7).
12. It was also evident to the review team that these two outcome areas appear to have some overlaps in terms of programming and which made reporting on results unclear. Activities in both these outcome areas displayed both ‘downstream’ as well as ‘upstream’ work—a lesson perhaps that UNDP cannot always simply position itself as an ‘upstream’ agency, and that such nomenclature should be identified on a case by case basis.
13. With respect to Disaster Risk Management (DDR), a great part of the work, particularly with respect to response mechanisms, took place after a tumultuous event like the 2008 earthquake. As such results analysis of this kind should ideally be linked to the previous cycle. Nevertheless, lessons were learned, which have now been incorporated into programming at both policy levels, especially with regards to building capacity for resilience at the local level, with pilots being utilized to upscale lessons. DDR as currently programmed in some areas such as the work done in conjunction with DFID and involving Nepal and Bangladesh, could also be seen through the lens of South-South Cooperation.[[7]](#footnote-8)
14. SSC truly took off after the signing of an MOU between UNDP and the Government in 2010. Since then SSC work has become embedded as a key pillar of UNDP’s cooperation with the government. UNDP, in addition to continuing its partnership with the IPRCC for the China-Africa poverty reduction exchanges, has moved forward over the past two years to become an influential and credible policy voice with the government, such as issuing White Papers for Global and Regional Dialogues and helping to convene and promote multi-lateral cooperation in the South.
15. In terms of partnerships, the decline of bi-lateral partners, such as the European Union has impacted some Outcome areas, in particular, those related to poverty and governance. The Department for International Development (UK), Denmark, Australia and Norway remain as partners, although the first three contribute to regional cooperation, Norway is the only current bi-lateral partner that focuses solely on China’s domestic development.
16. Public-Private Partnerships with Coca-Cola, the Mary Kay Foundation, Baidu, the JaLa Group and others have worked well. UNDP could leverage the success stories of these partnerships to increase the pool of similar foundations and corporate entities that could contribute to future programming in the next cycle.
17. The CPD mentions that joint programming with other UN agencies will be prioritized. The review team has not encountered evidence, save for its pioneering work with UNAIDS, that this objective has substantially materialized, which as outlined in the EO guidelines for evaluation, is critical for achieving outcomes.
18. The reliance on CIETE as the main implementing body seems to at times to add a further layer of bureaucracy and thus impact timely implementation. It was conveyed during different discussions and by different partners that it would be preferable if these implementing arrangements are more streamlined in the next cycle with more direct contact enabled with the line ministries / cooperating partners and possibly if the pool of implementing agencies could be expanded to make implementation faster and more efficient. This feedback varied with regard to both internal and external discussions. Having said this, the review team feels that expansion of national counterpart implementing agencies, especially with regard to working with those who have policy influence would reap benefits.
19. With regard to programme implementation as a whole, the review team finds that given all of the challenges outlined above, the programme has responded well and contributed positively to China’s development priorities. Nevertheless, it would appear that on a structural basis, programme teams do not always necessarily work together or communicate progress or challenges after a project begins implementation.[[8]](#footnote-9)
20. More critically, it is clear that cross-cutting linkages did emerge during implementation. For example, with regard to poverty and environment, governance and climate change, and other thematic / sectoral areas. These linkages were usually not specifically mentioned in the CPD, or perhaps in the projects themselves as being of high significance and an important aspect of positive impacts, yet as the review team notes, they did emerge. . UNDP should ensure that these linkages are captured / reported better in the next cycle, and more specifically outlined as targets in the next CPD, in the results language section, as well as within the individual projects implemented within each Outcome area.
21. As such, gender mainstreaming, a priority as articulated in the CPD is not immediately evident. This could be an issue of reporting or capturing results and impact, and should be something that is better focused on when programming the next cycle.
22. Given UNDP’s vision of moving even further ‘upstream’, the Strengthened Partnership and Policy Unit (SPPU), becomes more critical within UNDP China’s programme implementation structure. This is especially true due to South-South cooperation cementing its place as the centerpiece of UNDP’s support to China. Given the importance of this unit, the review team has noticed some overlaps in roles and responsibilities as well as links to programmatic teams.
23. Cost recovery issues appear to concern some partners including those in the private sector. The review team would suggest looking at ways to maximize programming resources while ensuring financial sustainability for a smooth and stable Country Office capable of delivering its mandate.
24. With regard to the above, it was conveyed to the review team that staff reduction, or stability could adversely impact current and future implementation. It would be critical to ensure stability as well as active engagement / communication with partners to the greatest extent possible. This is another example where ensuring that such things like SPARC are structurally made mandatory and put into place within internal management and programme meeting schedules. If programme and policy teams regularly interact this would be a positive outcome overall with respect to implementation as well as reporting on impact.
25. **Monitoring & Evaluation Guidelines [[9]](#footnote-10)**
26. A review conducted per the framework of the EO will seek to provide an objective assessment of contributions to development results, through assessing its programmes and operations, including advocacy and advisory services, knowledge management, technical services, coordination and partnerships. Review of a programme assesses what works and why, as well as what has not worked as well, and unintended consequences. This holistic approach should at the end, improve accountability, inform decision-making and allow UNDP to better manage for development results.
27. UNDP reviews are guided by the following:
    1. Human development and human rights, emphasizing the organization’s people-centered ideals
    2. United Nation system coordination and global partnerships
    3. National ownership, reflecting assistance based on national priorities and plans
    4. Managing for results----here the quality of programme design is critical, so that indicative results are clear, measurable, and can be monitored and evaluated
28. Likewise, norms, guide a review process and these include:
29. Independence—the review is structurally independent from operational management and the decision-making functions in the organization, so that the findings are free from undue influence, and are as objective to the greatest extent possible. To avoid conflict of interest, evaluators must not be directly involved in policy-setting, design, implementation or management of the review or during its aftermath.
30. Transparency-meaningful consultations with stakeholders is essential for the credibility and utility of the review
31. Ethics—any review should not reflect personal or sectoral interests
32. Impartiality-removing bias and maximizing objectivity are critical for the credibility of the review and its contribution to knowledge.
33. Utility-an review is a management discipline that seeks to provide information to be used for evidence-based decision-making. The interpretations of findings should be grounded in the realities of the country and programme context, with recommendations practical and realistic.
34. Since this is an ‘outcome’ review it would be useful to use this definition as described by the EO rather than an ‘output’ or ‘project-based’ evaluation. Outcome reviews look at the projects that are implemented in each of the Outcome areas of the Country Programme. Outcomes are actual or intended changes in development conditions that intervention(s) seek to support. The contribution of several partners is usually required to achieve an outcome. For example, if one takes judicial reform as a desired outcome, this would be shown to be as successful by a reduction in the backlog of cases. Project-based evaluations tend to focus on outputs while this review, as with larger strategic planning frameworks, emphasize impacts and results holistically, including collectively assessing the projects that are designed to help achieve a particular Outcome.
35. **Outcome Findings**
36. The ROARs produced for this cycle were for 2011, 2012 and 2013. As such with regard to this review, projects that contributed to each outcome area, were either closing from the previous cycle, or commencing implementation at the onset and towards the middle of the cycle (in some Outcome areas). As noted earlier, some outcome areas became more emphasized such as Outcomes 4 and 5, while others rose to greater prominence as the cycle progressed, such as Outcome 6 .
37. It must be emphasized that the UNDP’s TRAC allocations which the organization expected to receive and which thus informed the design of the CPD, did not materialize. The review team feels this did impact programming and implementation, including weakening the organization’s leveraging capacity in all areas.
38. Therefore some programming choices and emphasis had to be made within the Outcome areas, although Outcomes 4 and 5, nonetheless benefited from having access to Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Montreal Protocol (MP) funds.
39. Projects related to **Outcome areas 1 and 2**---**Poverty and Governance**, saw the core of their impacts during the early part of the cycle. However, some critical impacts could be attributed to UNDP interventions within these two areas.
40. For example, UNDP contributed to the PRC’s Government’s reform agenda with respect to social inclusion and protection schemes, convening policy dialogues and drawing on international expertise through its global network to share knowledge and success stories from other nations
41. The organization has also been influential in supporting China’s move towards designing a multi-dimensional measure of poverty. UNDP’s assistance was prominent in helping the government shift its growth-centered indicators, to a system that includes social protection, environmental justice and amending laws that are arbitrarily enforced. 23 of 50 new indicators were incorporated in the Govt’s 12th Five Year Plan and pilot tested in 15 provinces.
42. Through its emphasis on governance monitoring, and with respect to rural and urban governance and its relation to climate change and poverty reduction, UNDP’s policy influence directly contributed to the PRC’s ten-year Rural Poverty Reduction and Development Strategy, which emphasized the multi-dimensional nature of poverty. This is one good example of multiple cross-cutting areas at work.
43. In this context, it must be noted that while for reporting purposes projects’ may have to be placed within a particular area, the review team has noticed this reporting inconvenience often de-emphasizes the cross cutting nature of the overall portfolio, which may not have been explicitly or intentionally mentioned in the CPD or in the projects implemented within each Outcome area.
44. Social protection and inclusion, especially for migrant workers was yet another ‘soft assistance’ impact result. It involved working with the Ministry for Civil Affairs, to promulgate a new policy on promoting social inclusion strategies for migrant workers and their families who move to urban settings. This policy was adopted in 2012. A Handbook on Community Organizations and Participatory Development was produced and is now being utilized in multiple provincial and urban settings.
45. One of the more visible impact areas where UNDP’s influence was felt, was through a UNDP sponsored policy study which provided recommendations to the government on aspects of universal social protection schemes, including a new policy on residential certification. Additionally, approximately 10,000 ethnic minorities received value added advisory services on improving livelihoods and income, with UNDP’s support.
46. In 2011, at the very beginning of the cycle, a White Paper was produced by the government with respect to making significant progress in the area of legal reform. UNDP actively supported the development of this policy document with advisory help. The paper highlighted the rising demands for greater participation by the people, as well as, furthering legislative reform, strengthening legal institutions and legislation and in monitoring implementation of the law. In another area, through UNDP support, judges as well as litigants have received training at local levels on their knowledge of land rights, particularly with respect to environmental protections. Here is another example of cross cutting areas at work, with respect to linking governance, with the environment and poverty reduction, as well as in reforming legislation.
47. The ‘‘RE-Education through Labor Systems’ (RTLS), was a particularly harsh penal law used for arbitrary detention for offences not taking place under the Criminal Code Act. UNDP, partnering with the Chinese Law Society (CLS) worked with the government to help abolish this law in October 2013.
48. An area that should be highlighted is UNDP’s work in this cycle in helping ethnic communities. Partnering with CICETE, UNDP provided ethnic minority communities advise on broadening income generation and creating alternative livelihoods. UNDP’s methodology was first piloted in Hainan province, working with provincial entrepreneurs and has now been replicated in other communities nation-wide, including in Yunnan province with regard to handcraft weavers. Overall it is estimated that this work and partnership with government has resulted in 4,000 direct beneficiaries to date. While in a nation of 1.3 billion people, this may seem insignificant, the key to assessing impact in this area is to view it through its replicability effect and impact on beneficiaries. Additionally, this result shows clear cross-cutting dimensions with respect to poverty reduction and gender equality.
49. Under the auspices of a regional initiative managed by the Asia Pacific Regional Centre (APRC), UNDP pioneered a programme on LGBT people in China. The first aspect of this programme was a consultative effort, where UNDP brought together hundreds of LGBT people from all over China for a national consultation that led to the first UN report on LGBT people and civil society in China. On the basis of this report a three year programme is currently being set-up which focuses on supporting civil society, policy changes, new research and advocacy on LGBT issues. UNDP also scaled-up its work in the area of legal-aid and access to justice by supporting the Daytop Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Center in providing legal aid to persons living with HIV or marginalized groups such as drug users, sex workers and LGBT people.  These groups are often the most stigmatized in society and face discrimination in receiving basic healthcare as well as challenges to accessing education and finding employment. UNDP also worked jointly with UNAIDS on holding another national dialogue on provision of legal services to people living with HIV.
50. The pioneering work on LGBT manifests the ‘trust’ UNDP has with the government, as it is a sensitive issue on a socio-cultural dimension. Moreover, without using the term ‘human rights’ it is clear that this initiative addresses the ‘rights’ of those discriminated against and most marginalized in society. Moreover this work in the LGBT area is the first example of a joint UN initiative that the review team encountered during this review.[[10]](#footnote-11)
51. Significant progress was made in 2011 in the area of public administration reform (PAR), with the launch of the reform of 1.26 million Public Service Units (PSUs). These units are responsible for delivery of health, education and social services in China. UNDP’s role in helping to launch this initiative was an upstream one, providing cutting–edge research to the government, convening dialogues, and helping to help clarify and differentiate the role of govt., the private sector and the PSUs in these service delivery areas.[[11]](#footnote-12)
52. Also in 2011 there were 3 major policy breakthroughs with respect to greater civil society participation. For the first time the role of CSOs in the provision of public services by the government was emphasized as a national priority. The MCA promulgated a decree regarding formal registration of civil society groups and simplified the process of registration. Temporary rules were also issued which clarified the criteria for recognition of national social organizations, applications of which were then considered on a case by case basis.
53. As a whole these reforms significantly improved the structural and administrative framework under which China’s 400,000 registered entities had hitherto been governed and laid an enabling environment for registering the other estimated 1.3 million civil society groups.

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1. During this cycle UNDP has also assisted the government with pilot testing of the 2000 Law on Legislation, raising awareness through public consultations and dialogues. In addition, significant progress has been seen in the National Judicial Reform Plan. There are only approximately 200,000 qualified lawyers in China and as such there is a glaring gap in improving judicial efficiency, increasing public awareness on rights and responsibilities, access to legal counsel and legal empowerment of the public in general. This is recognized by the government as a potential hindrance to growth and stability. Strengthening the judiciary in all aspects of governance appears to be an area where the government’s priorities and UNDP’s strengths mesh well together and is thus a potentially larger thematic focus for the next cycle.
2. Partnering with Legislative Affairs Council of the National Peoples’ Congress, UNDP provided technical support to promulgate China’s first social assistance law which focused on the protection of vulnerable groups. Approximately 250 million people are expected beneficiaries with minimum living allowances as well as rural and welfare support. Here again, we see cross-cutting themes in terms of governance and poverty, as well as gender.
3. With respect to **Outcome 3**, as the Review team has noted there appears at face value to have less visible and unclear results. This could be due to a variety of reasons, including better capturing results as well as the fact that the envisioned partnership with the All China Women’s Federation did not really materialize as planned, being originally framed as a larger UN framework programing partnership. Therefore, at least in terms of results, it appears that within the outcome itself there was no significant impact when compared to the other outcome areas.
4. However, it is clear when reviewing the reporting literature that there were many ‘indirect results’ within the other outcome areas where gender concerns were positively impacted, including the work with ethnic minorities and CSOs, as well as in the environmental and climate change areas and the pioneering work on LGBT issues. UNDP should reconsider its focus on gender in the next cycle and determine whether it should remain as a separate outcome area or be clearly mainstreamed within the other outcome areas.
5. **Outcome 4** would appear to have had comparatively the greatest total impact within this current programming cycle. There are many reasons for reaching this conclusion, including the fact that the outcome had the largest portfolio of projects implemented as well as having the largest pool of funding to deliver given its it linkages and access to GEF and MP funds[[12]](#footnote-13). In addition to the large portfolio and funding levels, there were also significant impacts seen in several areas of UNDP support, including influencing national policy. This in turn led to local level regulatory reform and capacity building to implement these policy changes.
6. Outcome 4 also appears to demonstrate more ‘downstream’ work than any other outcome area due to the nature of the projects implemented within this outcome. This would mean that in the next cycle, UNDP, may need to more clearly define its upstream focus versus activities and projects that will have more visibility and impact at the local level and are not directly related to influencing national policy.
7. For one, UNDP has been particularly effective in advocating for mitigating climate change and has taken a lead role within the UN system on advising the government on issues related to the environment. As a consequence of programme implementation, policy and capacity barriers for the sustained and widespread adoption of low carbon and other environmentally sustainable strategies and technologies have been removed and capacity to implement local climate change action plans for mitigation and adaptation, as well as sustainable development has improved.
8. One good example of UNDP’s policy influence can be seen in advocacy for reform in the air conditioning sector. 16 companies have now agreed to utilize more efficient air conditioners, resulting in a targeted slowdown of emissions aimed at approximately 35.4 million tonnes of reductions by 2015. The ROARs also indicate that progress has been made in reducing HCFC Consumption throughout the reporting years. Results also show that company contracts signed with FECO in 2012 are expected to achieve a total reduction of 165 ozone depletion potential (ODP) tonnes, equating to 60% of the outlined target.
9. Among its existing portfolio, **PCCP (Provincial Programmes for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in China)** is considered to be a flagship project that has had a significant impact in terms of evaluating the programme, as it has strengthened national capacity for mitigating climate change. The PCCP aims to support the Government of China in translating its National Climate Change Programme into ground-driven action by developing local policies, institutional frameworks, partnerships and implementation capacities with local bodies. Due to such efforts of UNDP programmes such as the PCCP, climate change adaptation lessons have been incorporated at the provincial level. This is one clear example where policy influence has driven local level implementation actions.
10. Another influential project that stood out during the review is that of **Barrier Removal of Energy Efficiency Standard and Labeling**, a regional project involving 6 countries in Asia with China taking the lead. The objective of the project is to harmonize E&E standards for six electric appliances in the six countries, and to set up a regional E&E Alliance. This is another example where work in one sector helps drive South-South cooperation.
11. Under the MP portfolio, the **Yantai Demonstration Project** in the Industrial and Commercial Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Sector is another project that has seen policy impact. The project has helped the government adopt a new technology strategy which has not only already phased out 250 tonnes of HCFC but has also witnessed significant gains in energy efficiency and safety performance.
12. The Sector Plans of **HCFC Phase-out in the Industrial and Commercial Refrigeration and Air Conditioning (ICR) Sector** (stage I compliance for 2013-2015 targets) and the **Solvent Sector Plan for HCFC Phase-out** in China (stage I compliance for 2013-2015 targets) have also been influential in advancing policy, norms and standards. The ICR sector plan is one of the biggest sector plans in China’s HCFC phase-out strategies. It is estimated that around 8,450 tonnes of HCFC will be phased out during the current programming phase. The Solvent Sector Plan is also influential as it will phase out more than 630 tonnes of HCFCs. Both plans have resulted in energy-saving production and a safer working environment in most big and medium-sized medical devices manufacturers in China.
13. Under the biodiversity portfolio, the **Institutional Strengthening (IS) Project** under the China Biodiversity Partnership Framework (CBPF) has had key results. The objective of this framework is to facilitate synergies of all relevant partners (including line ministries, international organizations, local communities, academies and private sector) in guiding their actions to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss to China’s sustainable development strategies over a 10 year period. UNDP projects within the biodiversity portfolio under the CBPF include the 6 wetland MSL Projects. UNDP’s role in supporting the CBPF has been appreciated by the MOF and the IPs.
14. It has been suggested to the REVIEW TEAM, and noted in the earlier sections, that the organization take another look at institutional arrangements for partnership and implementation in the next cycle. One example identified that had bottlenecks in Outcome 4 is the green lights project (incandescent phase-out) under the GEF portfolio which has not yet been implemented as scheduled due to internal government restructuring, even though this project could potentially have had the most impact within the entire portfolio..[[13]](#footnote-14)
15. Outcome 4 has benefited the most due to leveraging funding from GEF / MP pools and has worked at both policy and local levels, demonstrating what UNDP can do best, in terms of influencing policy and building capacity for implementation downstream. However, Outcome 4 is also potentially constrained by inflexibilities of programming in terms of hewing to UNDP strategic corporate frameworks due to reliance on GEF / MP funds and the stipulations of focus that come with this source of funding. While GEF / MP funds are indeed welcome, and have played and will play a critical role for the government and UNDP, the GEF / MP portfolio unavoidably makes up for a large part of the UNDP budget. Having said this, UNDP, however, is still in a good position to try and mobilize non-core funding to work on issues related to E & E with respect to their own corporate mandate, given emerging space (particularly within the governance area which has opened up during this cycle).
16. With respect to **Outcome 5**, approximately 12 projects are being programmed during this cycle, and of these, the majority are related to Disaster Risk Management (DRM). However, it would appear that Outcome 4 and 5 share some overlaps with the REVIEW TEAM determining (and this conclusion confirmed by programme staff) that there could be about 21 projects listed under Outcome 4 that could very easily in terms of language and focus, fall within the category of Outcome 5.
17. Outcome 5, given its typology of focus, has shown the most cross-cutting dimensions of UNDP’s work overall with respect to also impacting Outcome 1 with their early recovery and livelihoods support efforts; Outcome 2, in empowering communities and enhancing the role of civil society in DRM; Outcome 4, in particular, linked to the bio-diversity issue, and Outcome 6 with respect to SSC.

The strategic nature of DRM work is both responsive as well as innovative. It is responsive with respect to dealing with natural disasters, ensuring that they can have access to Trac 3 funds during an emergency.[[14]](#footnote-15) In this regard one could say that once disaster strikes the DRM programming is the most flexible and opportunistic. As such it seeks to use the opportunities gained by being partners to the government on response strategies to change attitudes and behaviors as well as policies in order for communities to be better prepared and to also improve resilience for future disasters. DRM work as evidenced in this cycle is clearly not exclusively implemented in the ‘top down’ category of programing.

1. Some of the positive results that emanated from implementation of projects under Outcome 5, include:

* Making risks more visible and facilitating evidence-based policy, development, planning and decision-making by building and sharing knowledge
* Mainstreaming of comprehensive risk management into development via innovative approaches and pilot initiatives
* Ensuring broader public participation and empowerment of both genders in community based risk management and climate change adaptation
* Facilitating China’s participation in international and south-south cooperation via effective trilateral cooperation and knowledge sharing in disaster risk reduction, preparedness and climate change adaptation.

Activities undertaken under Outcome 5 probably impacted the local level more than any other outcome area. For example reporting over the years 2011-2013 show that there was significant progress on increasing the number of pilot communities working on DRM and resiliency building.

There is prima facie evidence that the integration of gender, vulnerability assessments, risk reduction and adaptation to climate change into local development planning and service delivery in support of poor communities has been promoted as a result of programme implementation within Outcome 5. Thus demonstrating again that capturing the successes of cross-cutting programming is essential with respect to design and monitoring. However, formal reporting mechanisms do not always easily enable this, thus it would be useful in the next cycle to ensure that wording of cross programming is specifically included and able to be captured in the annual reports. Regardless if they were planned or not, these are good lessons for the future.

Among the existing portfolio of programmes, the **Post Wenchuan EQ ER&DRM** project is considered by the review team to have had significant impact, including supporting the early recovery of the poor population affected by the earthquake. One clear impact is seen with the government now integrating disaster risk reduction thinking into its national poverty alleviation strategy. Again, we witness how two areas can have solid results and build upon despite not being initially part of inter-linking projects.

Another impact project is the **CBDM Asia** regional project financed by DFID.. It is currently the largest programme (in terms of funding) within this portfolio and also shows clear SSC linkages The objective of this project is to strengthen cooperation between China, Bangladesh and Nepal to share lessons and through this knowledge exchange, enhance each nation’s capacity/policy for community-based disaster management. As previously mentioned, the China Biodiversity Partnership Framework (CBPF) is also an influential project that significantly contributes to Outcome 5.[[15]](#footnote-16)

1. The review team would note that the effectiveness of UNDP’s contribution to the PRC through its DRM work depends on the quality of expertise and sustainable resources, including the human and financial resources of UNDP. It would appear that during this cycle some of the expected funding resources did not materialize. For example, the **Guangxi-Subproject** was withdrawn due to a decline of TRAC funds. Unclear funding for committed projects could potentially have a negative impact on UNDP’s good standing and credibility in the future, if funds for actual programming cannot be mobilized or relied upon as expected.
2. **Outcome Six** is a relatively new but critically important area for UNDP which will only grow in future cycles. Prior to the signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation between UNDP and the PRC in 2010, UNDP had no formal SSC strategies or explicit programming linkages. However, the organization did support SSC type work, and one could say, spearheaded the move towards formalizing SSC given its collaboration with the PRC Government through the initiation of and support to the IPRCC in 2006[[16]](#footnote-17).
3. Over the past three years, since the signing of the MOU, the Government through collaboration with UNDP, has sought to become a global convener of knowledge gathering and sharing with SSC becoming a key pillar of UNDP’s support to the government.
4. This escalation of involvement reflects not only the PRC Government’s appreciation of UNDP as a global convener, where the Government’s achievements and goals are highlighted, but also a recognition of UNDP’s global and regional networks through which knowledge and cooperation, particularly South-South Cooperation can assist all of the Global South. Indeed in recognition of the increase of the influence of the Global South, the UNDP Global Human Development Report of 2013 makes clear this increasing influence of Southern nations, such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and others as key players in both economic and global governance.
5. South-South cooperation (SSC) is a critical area for UNDP to expand its work with government, and perhaps go beyond poverty, trade and agriculture. However, this is evolving as well. China’s role, contribution and participation in regional and cross-border development partnerships for South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation have deepened and extended into other areas. This is particular true with regard to climate change, environmental sustainability and DDR, and latterly to issues of global governance.
6. The evidence from the review shows that China has continued to lead the way on South-South cooperation (SSC) and that the UNDP CO has been sufficiently flexible and adaptable to such changes. The UNDP CO continues to enjoy a comparative advantage in rapidly mobilizing technical expertise from the South in response to requests of the government, as well as being the primary convener for such exchanges and dialogues.
7. The review team concludes that as SSC becomes even more prominent in future cycles, UN joint programming could also see benefits, and this, potentially, could lead to even greater coordination of UN agencies in China, and be a lesson to other countries in the region. Moreover, the greater the coordination, the better the impact of programming and perhaps enable more opportunities for resource mobilization.
8. However, presently SSC is still mainly dominated by a one way direction of knowledge sharing, from China to other countries. China could also benefit from dialogues and exchanges in some fields, such as in good public sector management, anti-corruption (which has become an important area for the government), gender equality and others. One good example is the partnership and annual conference with ASEAN, where within this regional bloc many good lessons on governance could be found.[[17]](#footnote-18)
9. **Programme Management and Implementation**
10. Programme management has been good, with management having to reset programme priorities due firstly to the decline in funding from Headquarters, then due to the austerity measures imposed by government from 2013 onwards.[[18]](#footnote-19) At the beginning of this cycle, TRAC resources were committed at $32 million, while at the end of this cycle this figure was not expected to exceed $18.2 million.
11. The total budget has been reduced from a high of $76 million at the onset of the cycle in 2011, levelling off to $50 million as of 2014 and is expected to remain at this current level through 2015. TRAC resources have reduced from $5.5 million to the current levels of $2.5 million annually. Overall, expectations with regard to total budgetary support, particularly from HQ, have not been realized; nor have the projections for overall delivery during this cycle. Delivery is projected around 60% and this is partly due to the austerity programmes imposed by the government in 2013 to counter the overall global economic slowdown.
12. The ebb and flows of funding streams appear to have impacted programme implementation, including those that may have been planned as pipeline initiatives. This appears to be particularly true for Outcomes 1 and 2.
13. As noted in the CPD, joint programming with other UN agencies has not materialized, although there are approximately twenty other UN agencies working with the government. Given expected resource constraints in the next cycle, and that bilateral donors are increasingly providing aid for regional and global programming, it would make practical sense, in the China development context to engage in more joint initiatives in the next cycle.
14. Suggestions have been made throughout this review about ensuring stronger, structural linkages between programmatic and policy teams within UNDP’s internal staff structure. The review team would suggest this is a small, yet practical way to more efficiently implement programmes. Similarly, we see the communications unit as an integral part of programming, especially with regard to messaging, and they should be structurally integrated and linked with each programme team.
15. Staff stability is critical and ensuring- to the extent possible a counterpart deals with the same staff member throughout the programmatic cycle is critical for sustainability and credibility. Moreover, given the cultural heritage of China, seniority appears to produce more results and furthers greater communication. In this respect, aligning staff, according to need, priority and importance of programmes will be important.
16. **Current Situational Context**
17. When the current CPD was in the design stage (around 2009-2010), the development priorities of the Government are in general still relevant today. These, included, addressing environmental sustainability and climate change, promoting a low carbon green economy, more equitable and participatory development and deepening China’s visibility in global governance.
18. Since structural reforms to the economy were instituted in 1979, China has shown remarkable progress in reducing poverty and rapidly increasing its Human Development Ranking. According to the fairly universally accepted benchmark of purchasing parity of $1.00/day, thenceforth adjusted to $1.25 per day, China has managed to bring over 500 million people out of poverty. Driving this achievement has been an acceleration of economic growth (particularly during the past 10 years), where China has managed to sustain an average GDP growth of close to 9% per annum. UNDP China has performed well with respect to achieving most of the MDGs.
19. Along with economic growth, China, in recent years, has realized the importance of good governance and instilling the principles of good public sector management to ensure that benefits of growth are distributed more equitably and to reduce corruption, an inevitable outcome of a growing economy. China, along with India is unique for its geographical and population size, and due to these factors, governance of such large economies require institutionalizing appropriate norms and standards as well as adherence to the rule of law.
20. However, along with growth come unintended consequences. China has one of the largest Gini Co-efficient ratios, standing at close to .47 and approaching the levels of inequality heretofore seen perhaps only in Latin America. The government is clearly concerned about this growing gap between the wealthy and the poor, and, as historically seen, the greater the inequality, the greater the chances of political instability and greater demands for more political participation in decision-making. While the country has done exceptionally well in reducing poverty over the past decade, it remains per capita, a low MIC, and as such there is much to be done on the domestic level, in particular the need to address growing disparities on both an income and consumption level, especially if the nation’s 2020 vision of zero poverty is to be attained.
21. However income disparities are not only sectoral but found within urban centers as well, where it is estimated that almost 70% of China’s population will live by the year 2050. Some of these cities will be twice or three times as large as the largest city in many other countries. As such, a focus on urban governance is very much a niche area for UNDP. With more than 2/3 of the population living in urbanized settings, negative outcomes with respect to ageing and elderly populations in rural areas, breakdown of family networks and values as well as impact on agricultural outputs could occur. Moreover, China continues to face the reality of poverty with respect to ethnic minorities as well a focus on developing western regions of the country that contain the poorest of the poor.
22. Gender inequality remains important on both a political as well as an economic level. A continued focus is needed on creating more employment opportunities for women as well as ensuring their inclusion in decision making at all levels.[[19]](#footnote-20)
23. China remains a country that is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, including earthquakes, floods, and drought. In this context, this would naturally be an area that requires continued prioritization and ensuring close linkages with focus areas on environment and climate change.
24. Disaster risk reduction and mitigation is a clear area for furthering South-South cooperation where China could also learn a great deal with regard to rapid response mechanisms from other countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and others. South-South Cooperation is clearly the lynchpin of the PRC Government’s priority to become a key player in both the global arena as well as a valued partner of ideas with other regional groupings such as ASEAN. This is where domestic and international policy meet and where mutual benefits to all can accrue. In this regard, UNDP’s network and its reputation as a ‘knowledge broker’ and ‘neutral partner’ are highly valued with respect to furthering UNDP-China cooperation.
25. With respect to implementation, while influencing policy reforms, UNDP should ensure it continues to build capacity for implementation at the local level. While the government wants UNDP to bring big ideas to the table, at the same time, local level pilots that can be scaled up, or provide lessons for policy making remain important and the next cycle should be guided by these two criteria.
26. **Recommendations**
27. The following recommendations made by the review team are based on a) desk review of literature provided by the UNDP Country Office; b) Discussions with both CO staff and government and private sector counterparts (recommended by the CO); c) ten days of meetings in Beijing, including follow up briefings; d) Global, regional and national reports, including the latest NHDR and Global HDR, and finally e) feedback of the CO staff including Senior Management during the presentation. This feedback was followed by an initial approval by the CPD Review Team of a draft structure of the report.
28. These recommendations are for internal consumption and discussion that the review team hopes will help guide the drafting process for the new CPD cycle which will commence implementation in 2016. These recommendations are intended to only guide the internal discussion and are not prescriptive with respect to either programming or implementation. Moreover, they are not intended to recommend a review of staffing and any reference to staffing within the Country Office are mentioned only with reference to help assist in ensuring more efficiency in the implementation of the next five-year programme.
29. The Government of the People’s Republic of China very much values the support of the UNDP over the past three decades and looks forward to UNDP being an integral part of its national and international development priorities. In this context, it is vital that UNDP ensures adequate resources, technical expertise, and continues to play the role of knowledge broker in responding rapidly and efficiently to the Government’s development objectives.
30. Given this fairly unique reliance on government cost-sharing for programming, the review team would recommend looking into diversifying its partners and pools of funds to enable more independence and impact and to ensure a smoother flow of delivery. Bringing more to the ‘table’ in terms of funds for programming would also enable UNDP to have more leverage in terms of influencing policy and enabling reforms that are aligned with corporate mandates.
31. UNDP has made great inroads attracting private sector partners such as Coca-Cola, the Mary Kay Foundation, the Baidu Group, Jala and others. Sustaining and expanding this pool of external, non-traditional donors will be critical and should be made a priority. This expansion is more critical if the total budget is expected to remain at approximately $50 million per year with much of that coming from the government and the GEF. The review team feels even with ‘traditional’ donors and partners, increasingly moving out of working directly in China (such as the European Union) that with the right mutual incentives which match with the development interests of bi-laterals, UNDP could re-attract donors, and even perhaps utilize more regional (that have begun in this cycle) and global mechanisms to include those partners that wish to remain engaged in supporting China’s national development priorities and South-South cooperation.[[20]](#footnote-21) China, will no doubt remain a critical nation for many other nations to continue engagement on all fronts.
32. The review team feels that, given budget constraints and to maintain maximum impact and influence, UNDP should reduce its Outcome areas in the next cycle. At maximum four areas should be prioritized, with three being an optimal number. Doing so will help mitigate diffusion of resources, ensure greater policy impact and contribute to efficiency through more impactful cross-cutting approaches to achieve objectives that are in concurrence with both UNDP’s own corporate strategic plan and the Govt. of China’s priorities which will soon be elaborated in its 13th five year plan. Suggestions for incorporating outcome areas while maintaining alignment are illustrated in Figure 1.

**Figure 1 Suggested New Framework for 2016-2020 Cycle**

Vice,Accountability,Rule of Law

Reduce gender inequality and empower

Reduce Conflict and Natural Disasters

Early Recovery

Global Debates

Reduce gender inequality and empower

Global debates

Institutions for service delivery

Inclusive Growth and Development

Early Recovery

Reduce Conflict and Natural Disasters

1. While considering ‘merging’ the current outcome areas, ensuring better structural communication between programme teams and with policy advisors based in the SPPU, would be a clear added benefit. Currently, there is a basis for discussion on a monthly basis through the SPARC mechanism, however, it appears to the review team, that this remains more ad hoc rather than structurally mandated. The review team believes that strengthening coordination and communication within all units of the office can only assist in better implementation overall.
2. The review team recommends that serious thought be given to mainstreaming gender throughout the various programme areas, rather than continue to maintain its status as a separate outcome. Further, this mainstreaming should be captured in a stronger more results-oriented fashion in the next cycle.
3. If Gender is to be maintained as a separate outcome area then the language explaining the results to be expected should be less vague. More focus should also be placed on truly prioritizing and the measurable of gender inequality differentials within the country and where UNDP can make a discernible difference vis-à-vis UN Women or other agencies.
4. UNDP could also consider E&E as a cross cutting area in the next cycle, while maintaining its stand-alone status. This is primarily due to its core funding sources as well as technical dependence on the GEF. Successful or influential implementation of the portfolio under outcome 4, if it remains linked to GEF in the next cycle should have some flexibility to embed priorities with those of government that go beyond GEF stipulated areas.
5. In general, the RRF should be strengthened across all outcome areas. While verifiable data collection remains problematic, UNDP could help alleviate this reporting issue through a more thorough process of aligning indicators with baselines and targets, as well ensuring that the results language is less vague.
6. Thought should be given to promoting SSC cooperation as a crosscutting issue during the next cycle for most outcome areas, particularly in the areas of poverty alleviation, environmental and energy issues and disaster management/climate change adaptation.
7. South-South cooperation will be the centerpiece of UNDP’s support to China. However the review team feels that the current context of South-South exchanges tend to focus more on issues centering on trade, with lessons on poverty reduction, evidencing a more one-way ‘lessons learned’ focus. Issues centering on disaster risk reduction would show a more balanced approach, where China also benefits. The review team feels that the next generation of SS exchanges move towards other issues, such as those focusing on alleviating income disparities, inequality, ensuring social safety nets, urbanization, public sector management, women in legislative and executive positions, etc. These are just a few examples of where cooperation and learning can enable a two-way exchange. The China-ASEAN annual forum is one such venue where ‘good governance’ can be prioritized and be a safe venue to discuss more sensitive issues such as anti-corruption or ‘rights’.[[21]](#footnote-22)
8. It is essential that in the next cycle that staff movements with respect to working closely with counterparts or roles be kept stable. This is critical for credibility as well as to ensure job security which in turn would naturally lead to better results in implementation.
9. During discussions with various counterparts, it was often noted that China has all the requisite laws but implementation or capacity to administer or apply the law is weak. In this regard, the review team would recommend that while maintaining its ‘upstream’ approach in key areas, local level capacity building to implement regulations and ensure access to justice is made a priority in the next cycle, either within the governance area, or through other cross-cutting methods.
10. One recommendation with respect to structural communication is to ensure that the communication team is fully aware of the different programmes and thus can be of greater assistance to programme teams in helping communicate their achievements. This could also potentially help in mobilizing resources.
11. UNDP should seek where possible to source technically-oriented implementing partners and move away or reduce the influence of traditional implementing partners. This would also improve efficiency in implementation.
12. While the organization has clearly worked more with influential think tanks such as CAITEC and IPRCC, the review team suggests this engagement is deepened, including engaging with PRI, a think tank that is part of the Prime Minister’s advisory group. Focusing on think tanks that are influential with reform agendas should be part of this larger strategy of implementation
13. One influential body that UNDP should put more emphasis on is the NPCLAC. Although to date, the NPC may have been considered a ‘rubber stamp’ entity, the review team feels that the Legislative Arm can make a difference in terms of adopting or amending laws and this can only help further reforms with respect to ‘voice and participation’, one of the new MYFF areas for 2014-2017.

**Annex 1: List of People at Debriefing Session**

Christophe Bahuet, Country Director

Patrick Haverman, Deputy Country Director

Hannah Ryder, Deputy Country Director

Ge Yunyan, Operations Manager

Carsten Germer, Team Leader

Yang Fang, Team Leader

Mengying Ren, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator

Guo Sha, Finance Specialist

Liang Jing, HR Analyst

Ma Chaode, Programme Manager

Zhang Weidong, Programme Manager

Wu Peng, Programme Manager

Jade Mizutani, Programme Manager

Wang Dong, NHDR Coordinator

Emily Davis, Policy Officer

Hillel, International Consultant

Jackie Cheng, National Economist

Maria Chen, Senior Climate Change Advisor

Abigail Wright, Consultant

Ira Ovesen, UN Coordination Specialist

Yang Lin, UN Coordination Analyst

Qin Yi, Executive Associate

Li Liping, Programme Associate

Li Jing, Programme Assistant

**Annex 2: List of Meetings**

27 August - 5 September 2014

**Wednesday, 27 Aug.**

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| **14:30 AM – 15:30 AM**  **15:30 PM – 16:30 PM**  **16:30 PM – 17:30 PM**  **Thursday, 28 Aug.**  **9:00 AM – 10:00 AM**  **10:00 AM – 10:30 AM**  **10:30 AM - 11:30 AM**  **13:30 PM – 14:00 PM**  **14:00 PM – 15:00 PM**  **16:00 PM – 17:30 PM**  **Friday, 29 Aug.**  **9:00 AM – 10:00 AM**  **10:10 AM – 11:00 AM**  **11:00 AM – 12:00 PM**  **14:30 PM – 16:00 PM**  **16:00 PM – 16:30 PM**  **16:30 PM – 17:00 PM**  **Monday, 1 Sept.**  **8:30 AM – 9:30 AM**  **9:30 AM – 10:30 AM**  **13:30 PM – 14:00 PM**  **14:00 PM – 15:00 PM**  **15:30 PM – 16:00 PM**  **16:00 PM – 17:00 PM**  **Tuesday, 2 Sept.**  **09:00 AM – 10:00 AM**  **10:00 AM – 11:00 AM**  **12:00 PM – 13:00 PM**  **13:30 PM – 14:00 PM**  **14:00 PM – 15:00 PM**  **15:45 PM – 16:15 PM**  **16:15 PM – 17:00 PM**  **17:00 PM – 17:30 PM**    (**canceled)** | **Discussion on detailed work plan of CPD Review**  Participants: Patrick Haverman (PH), Yang Fang (YF), Mengying Ren (MR)  Venue: Third Floor Meeting Area  **Briefing with Senior Management**  Participants: Christophe Bahuet (CB), PH, YF, MR  Venue: Small Meeting Room  **Interview with Disaster Management (DM) Team**  Participants: PH, YF, DM team members  Venue: Small Meeting Room  **Interview with South-South Policy Unit**  Participants: PH, Merriden Varrall, Emily Davis, Hillel Loew  Venue: Merriden’s Office  **Transfer from UNDP to CAITEC**  **Interview with CAITEC**  **Participants:** Emily Davis, Wang Luo, Mao Xiaojing,  **Venue:** CAITEC Main Building Room 219  **Contact:** Xiaojing (Shelly) Mao <[shelly.mao@sohu.com](mailto:shelly.mao@sohu.com)> 15712856968  **UNDP Contact:**  Emily Davis  **Transfer from UNDP to CICETE**  **Interview with CICETE**  **Participants:** PH, Wang Weili (DDG), Divisional Heads  **Venue:** CICETE  **Contact:** Chen Feiran <[chenfeiran@cicete.org](mailto:chenfeiran@cicete.org)> 84000633  **Interview with Energy & Environment (EE) Team**  Participants: PH, Carsten Germer (CG), EE team members  Venue: Small Meeting Room  **Interview with Poverty/Equity & Governance (PEG) Team**  Participants: Gu Qing (by skype), PEG team members  Venue: Small Meeting Room  **Transfer from UNDP to MOF**  **Interview with MOF**  **Participants:** Ma Chaode (tbc), Guo Wensong (Div. Chief, Dept. International Cooperation), Wu Yaling  **Venue:** MOF  **Contact:** Wu Yaling  **Tel:** 68552097  **Writing & Discussion**  **Interview with SPPU - Domestic Policy Issues**  **Participants:** Jackie Hoi-Wai Cheng  **Venue:** Third Floor Meeting Area  **Interview with UNDAF Consultant**  **Transfer from UNDP to FECO**  **Interview with FECO**  **Participants:** CG, Yu Lifeng, Divisional Heads  **Venue:** FECO, 7th Floor Rm.722  **Contact:** Yi Weihong (82262097); Li Hongtao (82268636)  **Transfer from UNDP to CASS**  **Interview with CASS**  **Participants:** Dr. Zhang Ying, Associate Professor of Institute for Urban Development and Environment, CASS  **Venue:** CASS, 8th floor of MCC Building  **Contact:** Dr. Zhang Ying <[zhangying\_cass@163.com](mailto:zhangying_cass@163.com)>  **UNDP Contact:** Wang Dong  **Transfer from UNDP to Norwegian Embassy**  **Interview with Norwegian Embassy**  **Participants:** Bert, Ms. Kristin Iglum (Counsellor, Development) <[ki@mfa.no](mailto:ki@mfa.no)>  **Venue:** Norwegian Embassy, 1Dongyijie, Sanlitun, Beijing  **Contact:**  Ms. Liu Ying Lang <[yinglang.liu@mfa.no](mailto:yinglang.liu@mfa.no)>  **Tel:** 8531-9622, 186-1286-1726  **UNDP Contact:** Fan Shuhua  **Transfer from UNDP to NDRC**  **Interview with NDRC**  **Participants:** Bert, Wang Shu (Deputy Div. Chief, Climate Change Dept.) 68501553  **Venue:** NDRC-2 (2nd Floor, Conf. Room 4)  **Contact**: 6850 2938  **UNDP Contact**: Zhang Weidong; Fan Shuhua  **Follow up meeting with Patrick**  **Transfer from UNDP to Full-link Plaza**  **Interview with Coca Cola**  **Participants:** Ms. Zhang Huaying, Vice President - Sustainability  **Venue:** Rm. 1702 Full-link Plaza, No. 18 Chaowai Ave.  **Contact:** Ms. Tian Wenhong, Director - Sustainability, [jatian@coca-cola.com](mailto:jatian@coca-cola.com)  **Tel:** 138-0110-8902  **UNDP Contact**: Zhang Weidong  **Interview with SPPU Unit – Lou Ya**  **Interview with Global Issues – Renfei Liu**  **Interview with Finance Unit**  **Interview with MOST**  **Participants:** Zhang Weidong, Li Hong Gang, Deputy Divisional Chief, Dept. High-Tech) 58881535  **Venue:** MOST  **Contact:** Ms Wang, Rongfang, 58881320; Mr. ZHU Xinghua, Tel: 58881321; 13501126813  **UNDP Contact:** Zhang Weidong;Fan Shuhua |

**Wednesday, 3 Sept.**

**Thursday, 4 Sept.**

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| **8:45 AM – 9:30 AM**  **9:30 AM – 10:30 AM**  **10:30 AM –11:30 AM**  13:15 PM – 14:00 PM  **14:00 PM – 15:00 PM**  15:00 PM – 16:00 PM  **16:00 PM – 17:00 PM**  **9:00 AM – 10:00 AM**  13:30 PM – 14:00 PM  **14:00 PM – 15:00 PM**  **18:00 PM**  **Friday, 5 Sept.**  **09:00 AM –12:00 PM**  **14:30 PM - 16:30 AM** | **Transfer from UNDP to MCA**  **Interview with MCA**  **Participants:** Mowei Qiu, Lai Hongzhou (Div. Chief, Dept. Disaster Relief)  **Venue:** MCA  **Contact:** Lai Hongzhou  **Tel:** 58123150; 1368 1078 777  **UNDP Contact**: Yang Fang  **Interview with MCA (GED)**  **Participants:** Liao Ming (Dept. Social Welfare), Li Jingjing  **Venue:** MCA  **Contact:** Li Jingjing  **Tel:** 58123070, 18612227630  **UNDP Contact:** Li Liping  **Transfer from UNDP to NPCLAC**  **Interview with NPCLAC**  **Participants:** Stella, Li Yupeng  **Venue:** NPC  **Contact:** Li Yupeng  **Tel:** 138 1092 3572  **UNDP Contact:** StellaLo  **Transfer from NPCLAC to MOFCOM**  **Interview with MOFCOM**  **Participants:** Hillel, Lou Ya, Hannah Ryder, Guo Zehua  **Venue:** MOFCOM  **Contact:** Guo Zehua <[guozehua@mofcom.gov.cn](mailto:guozehua@mofcom.gov.cn)>  **UNDP Contact:**  Lou Ya  **Interview with Mary Kay**  **Participants:** Eric Sun  **Venue:** UNDP Small Meeting Room  **Contact:** Eric Sun 13701096094  **UNDP Contact**: Yalin Wang  **Transfer from UNDP to IPRCC (office car tbc)**  **Interview with IPRCC**  **Participants:** Lou Ya, IPRCC colleagues  **Venue:** IPRCC  **UNDP Contact:** Lou Ya 18810287966  **Talk with Communications team – Zhang Wei**  **Preparation for Debriefing**  **Debriefing with Senior Management and concerned colleagues**  **Participants:** CB, PH, Team Leaders, PMs, MTM members  **Venue:**  Large Conference Room, UN Compound |

1. The GEF and MP portfolios currently account for close to ½ of UNDP’s annual programme budget. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. This conveyance should be taken in the review team’s view with caution as small projects or pilot initiatives can and have been successfully up scaled, replicated and influenced policy. The ADR of 2010 also confirms this. The review team feels this feedback might be related to decreasing TRAC funds and how UNDP’s contribution could have more impact at the policy level, as well as related to UNDP being the primary broker of knowledge within the UN system. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. This current programming cycle implemented over 100 projects. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Currently only two bilateral donors continue to work with UNDP—DFID and the Norwegian Embassy. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. For example another indicator within the gender outcome was reducing domestic violence. The review team is unclear why within the Gender Outcome area this issue was given prominence vis-à-vis other gender equality issues, nonetheless, UNDP had difficulty in assessing impact in this area due to the absence of reliable data. This contributed to the review team’s conclusions that the Gender outcome area had the least amount of impact although clearly it would appear that through other programming areas and projects, the overall goal to reduce gender inequality was positively impacted. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. However, it is also clear that due to large size of GEF funds available, climate change and MP projects, (the latter, which is provided through the Global Multi-Lateral Fund (MLF)), became more demonstrably visible during this programming cycle. Moreover, as noted, much of the programming in the other Outcome Areas, especially those relating to poverty and governance, began in the previous cycle and ended early in this cycle. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Thus as the review team continues to note, there are lessons for applying more focus in the next cycle in terms of ‘bundling’ outcome areas and in fact reducing them, as there are overlaps with regard to both programming and reporting [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. It should be noted that UNDP China has taken steps to ensure inter-team collaboration with the establishment of the SPARC meetings where each proposal is being reviewed twice before finalization by representatives from each programme team. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines for UNDP, 2011, issued by the Evaluation Office [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Although outcome evaluation note that partnerships are key to achieving results at the outcome level and while the CPD also reinforces this by stating joint programming will be an important part of implementation, this LGBT initiative appears to be the only joint programming result that materialized during this cycle. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. As the review team had noted earlier much of the initial actives that contributed to the poverty and governance outcome areas were probably initiated in the previous cycle, but resulting impacts were reported against in the very early stages of this cycle (2011-2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. There are 31 projects currently implemented under current portfolio, including some projects under formulation [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. At times, such delays in implementation are most often cited with respect to projects that CICETE is a partner. However, the issue of delay is perhaps more complex. Regardless, in the next cycle, the review team would recommend a more in-depth look at ‘good’ versus more ‘challenging’ implementing arrangements and look and what worked best and for what reasons. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. TRAC 3 funds are UNDP Corporate fund that are available to be disbursed to Country Offices for emergencies such as natural disaster responsiveness. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Although the results on the latter are formally reported against Outcome 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. The IPRCC initiative which is now in its second phase began in 2006 with UNDP’s help. It is now a well- established institution that does multiple things that relate to South-South cooperation, but was initially started as means to provide knowledge and lessons to countries and policy makers in Africa on poverty reduction strategies. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. The review team believes that countries such as Malaysia and Singapore who are ASEAN members could have a lot to offer in terms of better governance as well with respect to lessons on gender equality, and many other areas. Also with respect to issues of one-way cooperation, there is evidence to suggest that more African countries are also investing now in China, and this could be a direct or in-direct result of SSC work. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. The austerity measures were imposed by government for mainly two reasons to reduce inflationary concerns with respect to export led growth as well as to curb corruption which has become a priority. The latter is the area where UNDP could bring its technical and policy advice to bear in helping the government and as such deepening engagement on previously sensitive issues within the good governance framework. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Currently there are no women in any of the highest bodies of decision-making. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. One way to attract donors might be to re-assess the typology of implementation partners and be flexible to the extent possible. Other issues include cost-recovery concerns, while regional mechanisms, or trilateral cooperation have clear worked—e.g. with respect to DFID and DRM. The SSC issue is also one that has cross-country dimensions and as such could be used to employ more flexible and perhaps easier implementation and funding access. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Regional programming and regional institutions and mechanisms have always been considered a way to discuss sensitive issues in a ‘safe space’. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)