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**GOVERNMENTS OF ANGOLA, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA**

**GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (GEF)**

**UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)**

**UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES (UNOPS)**

**Implementation of the Benguela Current LME Action Program for Restoring Depleted Fisheries and Reducing Coastal Resources Degradation**

**(BCLME SAP-IMP)**

**TERMINAL EVALUATION**

**REPORT**

**Philip Tortell, *Consultant***

**January 2014**

***ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS***


***I wish to acknowledge the tremendous assistance I received from many individuals and organizations in carrying out this evaluation.***

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**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

APR Annual Project Review

BCC Benguela Current Commission

BCLME Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem

BENEFIT Benguela Environment and Fisheries Interaction and Training Programme

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CO Country Office (of UNDP)

DAC Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)

D-LIST Distance Learning and Information Sharing Tool

DoA Delegation of Authority

EA Executing Agency (for GEF purposes)

EAF Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries

FAO Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEF Global Environment Facility

HAB Harmful Algal Bloom

HR Human Resources

IA Implementing Agency (for GEF purposes)

ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea

IKM International Knowledge Management

IOC International Oceanographic Commission (of UNESCO)

IMO International Maritime Organization

IWC International Waters Cluster (of UNOPS)

IW:LEARN International Waters Learning Exchange and Resource Network

LME Large Marine Ecosystem

LoA Letter of Agreement

LogFrame Logical Framework Matrix

M&E Monitoring & Evaluation

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MTE Mid-Term Evaluation

NAP National Action Plan

NC National Coordinator

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OP Operating Programme (of the GEF)

PIF Project Identification Form

PIR Project Implementation Review

PM Project Manager

PMU Project Management Unit

ProDoc Project Document

PSC Project Steering Committee

RTA Regional Technical Advisor (of UNDP/GEF)

SAP Strategic Action Programme

SAP-IMP Strategic Action Programme implementation

SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment

Sida Swedish International Development Agency

SIP Stakeholder Involvement Plan

SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound

TCB Training and Capacity Building

TCBS Training and Capacity Building Strategy

TDA Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis

TE Terminal Evaluation

ToRs Terms of Reference

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

YP Young Professional

**PROJECT AND EVALUATION DESCRIPTOR**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PROJECT TITLE: *Implementation of the Benguela Current LME Action Program for Restoring Depleted Fisheries and Reducing Coastal Resources Degradation*** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **GEF Project ID** | 3305 | | | **PROJECT FINANCING (in US Dollars)** | | | | | | | |
| **UNDP Project ID** | 3849 | | |  | | | **At Endorsement** | | | **At Completion[[1]](#footnote-1)** | |
| **Countries** | Angola  Namibia  South Africa | | | **GEF Trust Fund** | | | **5,138,460** | | | **5,017,242** | |
| **IA/EA own** | | | 0 | | | 0 | |
| **Region** | Africa | | | **Governments** | | | 59,294,983 | | | 319,109,470 | |
| **GEF Focal Area** | International waters | | | **Others**  **Norway and Iceland**  **IKM, D-LIST, EcoAfrica** | | | 9,300,000  351,352 | | | 9,300,000  351,352 | |
| **GEF Operational Programme** | #8 Waterbody Based Programme (specifically its Large Marine Ecosystem Component) | | |
| **Executing Agency** | United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) | | |
| **Total co-financing** | | | **68,946,335** | | | **328,460,822** | |
| **Other partners** | - | | **Total Project Cost** | | | | **74,395,200** | | | **333,778,064** | |
| **PROJECT TIMEFRAME** | **CEO Endorsement date**  09 February 2009 | | | | **Original closing date**  28 February 2013 | | | | **Revised closing date**  31 December 2013 | | |
| **EVALUATION TIMEFRAME** | **Assignment start**  28 Oct 2013 | **Inception Report**  01 Nov 2013 | | | | **Prelim findings**  24 Nov 2013 | | **Draft report**  08 Dec 2013 | | | **Final report**  06 Jan 2014 |
| **EVALUATION TEAM** | Philip Tortell (International Evaluator) | | | | | | | | | | |

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**The Project**

This is the independent Terminal Evaluation of the project for the ***Implementation of the Benguela Current LME Action Program for Restoring Depleted Fisheries and Reducing Coastal Resources Degradation*** *(GEF ID 3305, PIMS 3849).* It is a project of the Governments of Angola, Namibia and South Africa with the support of UNDP/GEF. The project benefited from a grant of USD5.017 millionfrom the GEF Trust Fund and USD328.46 million in co-financing. UNDP was the Implementing Agency and the project was executed by UNOPS-IWC. The project started in February 2009, originally to last four years, however, it was extended to the end of December 2013.

The project comes under the International Waters focal area of the GEF, more specifically under Operational Programme #8 Waterbody Based Programme (Large Marine Ecosystem Component). The project Objective was – *To implement the BCLME SAP through the adoption of national policy reforms, the sustainable institutionalisation of a regional Commission, and the endorsement and ratification of a binding international Convention for the LME*  and this was expected to be achieved by targeting four Outcomes which focussed on: A Benguela Current Commission Infrastructure and Associated Convention; National Level Policy and Management Reforms; Sustainable Capacity for LME Management; and, Capture and Networking of Knowledge and Best Practices.

**The evaluation**

The Terminal Evaluation has been carried out according to the guidance and principles of UNDP, GEF and UNEG which require such an evaluation in the closing stages of a project for the benefit of the key stakeholders including GEF as the main source of funding, UNDP as the Implementing Agency and the Governments as the prime beneficiaries. It aimed to provide a comprehensive overall assessment of the project and critically assess achievements, administrative and technical strategies, issues and constraints. The methodology employed in this evaluation was planned and described in the Inception Report which was presented in the early stages of the mission.

Two basic tools were used in the search for primary data and information – firstly documents review, secondly face-to-face consultations. Face-to-face meetings were the preferred method of consultation and 22 persons were met and consulted. In addition, a further 25 persons were approached electronically (telephone or email). The scope of consultations ranged from those associated directly with project implementation and management (UNDP, UNOPS, PMU, BCC, consultants) which made up 47% and Government officials who made up 53%. Of those approached electronically, only a small minority responded. The TE extended to two of the three participating countries namely, Namibia and South Africa, and included meetings in Pretoria, Cape Town, Swakopmund and Windhoek. Visa difficulties prevented the evaluator from travelling to Angola and the need for translation, combined with the shortened timescale, may have had an impact on the number of stakeholders who could be directly engaged in particular those who required a Portuguese version of the draft report. The total lack of any consultation with Angolan stakeholders is considered as a significant limitation on this evaluation.

Following the gathering of data and information, the evaluation focused on analysis, discussion and drafting and a draft version of the report was delivered to UNDP and UNOPS to be translated and released for comments. The draft was refined to reflect comments received, and the final report produced.

**Key findings and Conclusions**

**Project design and relevance** The project was very relevant to the Benguela Current environment and the needs of the three participating countries. It arose out of an agreed Strategic Action Programme which was underpinned by a thorough and extensive Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis. It addressed six out of a total of 26 interventions listed in the SAP. In the LME context, this project was designed as a trailblazer because no other LME had achieved the setting up of a Commission and the adoption of a Convention. Perhaps because of these targets, the project was targeted at the upstream level and almost exclusively within the government sector. There was little or no involvement of the private sector and no opportunities were provided for meaningful participation at the community level. A shortcoming in project design is the lack of consideration of meaningful involvement of stakeholders from coastal communities, subsistence and artisanal fishers and other grassroots constituents. Project design was also faulty in terms of budget allocations to various Outcomes, and in particular the underestimation of project management costs and the costs involved in obtaining Outcome 1.

**Project implementation efficiency** The PSC was an effective governance body providing policy and guidance to the PMU and serving as a forum for cross-sectoral and transboundary consideration of project issues. The fact that its membership was almost identical to that of the BCC Management Board, coupled with the fact that the PMU and the BCC Secretariat were inextricably linked (by design), tended to obscure the boundaries between the project and the BCC. The PMU performed its functions well and the project was implemented efficiently, most of the time, in the eyes of the majority of stakeholders. But this view was not universal and the PMU performance was described as not consistent. At least in one instance, it made decisions which were beyond its competence – the demonstration projects and other community focussed activities were abandoned in favour of higher expenditure on Outcome 1. There is also the matter of project management costs which were reported to have increased well above the GEF guidance limit.

**Project results and effectiveness** The ProDoc targeted a ‘tried-and-tested’ LME Commission along with supportive regional and national structures, and an associated legal agreement for transboundary management of the BCLME underpinned by appropriate policy, legislation and operational practices at the national level; improved capacities and institutional strengthening; adequate financing mechanisms; more effective stakeholder participation throughout all sectors with a specific emphasis toward community inputs; and, knowledge products captured, distributed and replicated. At the end of the project, the BCC Secretariat is established and on a good footing and the Convention has been signed. But there is no national level instrument (NAPs) for the implementation of the SAP, and national policies, legislation and management practices have yet to be reformed to comply with the commitments under the Convention. Capacity has been enhanced but almost exclusively within upstream government levels. Stakeholder involvement, especially from community and grassroots level, was abandoned by the project in favour of other activities supporting Outcome 1. Information has been captured and networking has taken place, but there is no effective and functioning information management system to transcend sectors within each country or country boundaries. A very good foundation has been laid but real results have yet to happen. The TDA, the SAP, the Commission and the Convention are not results. Results will have been achieved if an affirmative answer can be given to the following two questions:

* Has the decline in fisheries been halted and reversed?
* Has ecosystem degradation been halted and reversed?

**Monitoring and evaluation** The project did have a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan but this was not recognized by the PMU. An M&E Officer was hired but according to the PMU, much of his time was devoted to familiarization with the project, and assisting with budget and work plan finalization. Some regular assessment of progress towards the project Objective and Outcomes did take place using a variety of monitoring tools. And, the results may have been used to guide project implementation and revise and refine implementation plans through adaptive management. However, project monitoring failed to pick up (or failed to act on the information) that an inordinate proportion of the project’s resources were being diverted to Outcome 1 and that other outcomes were suffering as a result. It also failed to pick up that a commitment to community involvement was not being addressed. And, that financial management was not robust enough to ensure that expenditure remained within allocated resources and GEF guidance limits. Ultimately, it is not so important whether monitoring is carried out – what is even more important is what you do with the results of monitoring.

**Sustainability and proposals for future directions** Rightly or wrongly, the project invested most of its resources (financial, time, expertise) into supporting the BCC Secretariat and in getting the Convention signed. This was right on one hand because these were prime targets of the project. But on the other hand, this was done at the expense of the other project targets, such as the policy and institutional reforms required at national level, and the outreach to a broader stakeholder base. Project integrity may have been jeopardized by the lower attention at the national level and sustainability may have been compromised. As early as November 2012, a full year before the planned project closure, the PM presented an Exit Strategy to the PSC which focussed very much on activities that need to be carried out (by someone, most probably the BCC Secretariat) in order to ensure sustainability. More recently, the PM provided a very thorough and detailed sustainability plan to the evaluator. This plan lists the achievements of each Output under each Outcome and identifies the action/s required to enhance the chances of sustainability. The project has carried out a structured approach to its winding down and while risks to sustainability remain, its efforts in this direction are commendable.

The following summary focuses on the key elements of the project, including all those that were required to be rated. They arise from the analyses made of the data and information obtained.

| **CRITERION** | | **SUMMARY COMMENTS** | **RATING** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PROJECT FORMULATION** | | | |
| Project concept and design | The project concept was straightforward and in response to the threat to the biodiversity of the large marine ecosystem posed by unsustainable harvesting. Project design has a number of flaws and shortcomings. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| Relevance | The project has been highly relevant to the needs of the three countries and the Benguela Current environment as well as to the GEF global objectives. | | **Highly Satisfactory (HS)** |
| Stakeholder participation in formulation | Stakeholder participation in the formulation of this project started during the BCLME Programme. It led to direct involvement in project planning and formulation by stakeholders leading to a detailed Stakeholder Involvement Plan which was to be implemented by the project. | | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION** | | | |
| Project Governance | The PSC was an effective governance body providing policy and guidance to the PMU and serving as a forum for cross-sectoral and transboundary consideration of project issues. | | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| Project Administration and Management | PMU performed well, most of the time, in the eyes of the majority of stakeholders, but its performance was not consistent. Project management costs were high. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Implementation Approach** | | | |
| Stakeholder participation in implementation | Out of 18 stakeholders identified, 11 were government agencies, six were from the private sector and one could be considered as community/ grassroots. This bias was aggravated further when stakeholder involvement and participation, particularly at community level, was not considered important enough and many activities were discontinued. | | **Unsatisfactory (U)** |
| Risk management | The project has recognized risks and addressed them in a number of ways but there have been some gaps in the risk management strategy. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Project finances** | | | |
| Financial planning and management | Partial explanations, possible flaw in project design with allocations to Outcomes, and apparent lack of control and sanction by the PSC, the IA and the EA for budget planning, management and efficiency | | **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** |
| Co-financing | In view of the large sums of money involved, much better detail is required | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Monitoring and Evaluation** | | | |
| M&E Design, Plan and Budget | The project did carry out some monitoring activities, but these were not necessarily according to the M&E Plan. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| Use of LogFrame and Adaptive Management | None of the four versions of the Logframe for this project contained all the required elements, however, the changes at Output, Activities and budget allocation level can be seen as examples of adaptive management. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Role and performance of IA and EAs** | | | |
| UNDP as the GEF IA | The UNDP Country Office in Namibia together with the UNDP/GEF RTA in Pretoria (since moved to Addis Ababa) provided adequate technical support. | | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| UNOPS as the EA | Although its role was questioned by some, stakeholders confirm a good working relationship with UNOPS. Inaction in the face of serious time constraints may have impacted the TE | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **PROJECT RESULTS** | | | |
| **Attainment of Objective and Outcomes** | | | |
| **Objective**: To implement the BCLME SAP through the adoption of national policy reforms, the sustainable institutionalisation of a regional Commission, and the endorsement and ratification of a binding international Convention for the LME | Taking the three products that were sought by the Objective as a measure of progress, only one can be said to have been achieved fully – the regional commission. Each of the other two has been partly achieved. However, knowing what the original Objective was targeting and in the acknowledgement that a project cannot be expected to adopt policy or ratify a convention, the overall effort has been commendable. | | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| **Outcome 1:** A Benguela Current Commission Infrastructure and Associated Convention | Only one out of three countries has ratified the Convention but it is not within the competence of a project to ratify a convention. The project has assisted with the drafting, supported the negotiations process, lobbied for its signature, provided justification for the countries to ratify, and facilitated the process – Outcome 1 has been achieved. | | **Highly Satisfactory (HS)** |
| **Outcome 2:** National Level Policy and Management Reforms | No reforms have actually taken place at national level and the project has merely influenced a “setting the scene” for reforms process. NAPs development process would have provided an opportunity to identify policies and management regimes that required reform but this opportunity has been missed. | | **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** |
| **Outcome 3:** Sustainable Capacity for LME Management | This Outcome was cluttered by Outputs which were not entirely relevant. The project has carried out numerous training activities, and it can be assumed that capacity has been enhanced, although this has not been measured. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Outcome 4:** Capture and Networking of Knowledge and Best Practices | Information put out which has raised awareness but extent of management is not known. Some distribution known to have taken place but no data management platform for storage and sharing data and info; no strong networks across boundaries, although some informal ones exist. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Sustainability** | | | |
| Institutional sustainability | Because of their preliminary nature, project activities in the area of policy and legislative reform, capacity building and institutional strengthening outside the government sector, and information management (apart from information distribution) are not assured and their sustainability is uncertain. | | **Moderately Unlikely (MU)** |
| Social sustainability | The social sustainability of project products, services and other benefits overall, is not assured without a significant effort on the part of the BCC, and this is not guaranteed. | | **Unlikely (U)** |
| Financial sustainability | Without continuing external aid funding, financial sustainability overall is not assured. | | **Moderately Likely (ML)** |
| Environmental sustainability | More research, survey, analytical work, management/remedial actions and monitoring are required as proposed under the SAP Policy Actions C, D and E before environmental sustainability of the BCLME can be assured. | | **Moderately Likely (ML)** |
| **OVERALL PROJECT RATING** | The project has partly achieved its Objective, completely achieved Outcome 1, and only partly achieved Outcomes 2, 3 and 4. The achievement of Outcome 1 has come at a cost to the other Outcomes. While the BCC Secretariat is now established and on a good footing and the Convention has been signed, there is no national level instrument (NAPs) for the implementation of the SAP, and national policies, legislation and management practices have yet to be reformed to comply with the commitments under the Convention. Capacity has been enhanced but almost exclusively within upstream and government levels. Stakeholder involvement, especially from community and grassroots level, was abandoned by the project in favour of other activities supporting Outcome 1. Information has been captured and networking has taken place, but there is no effective and functioning information management system to transcend sectors within each country or country boundaries. | | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |

**Recommendations**[[2]](#footnote-2)

**7.1** It is recommended to UNDP as the agency at the forefront of BCLME initiatives, to ensure that further support to the BCC or the governments from GEF or elsewhere should give priority to operationalization of the SAP and in particular it should actively involve other sectors apart from fisheries, and institutions from outside government in the private sector, relevant NGOs and coastal communities at grassroots level.

**7.2** It is recommended to GEF (UNDP to make representations to GEF) to reconsider its universal cap on acceptable project management costs. GEF could raise the limit but regardless of whether it does or not, it needs to acknowledge that different projects have different project management needs and set limits accordingly. GEF could also provide guidance for project implementers on what precisely constitutes project management costs.

**7.3** It is recommended to UNDP and the GEF that an Exit Workshop or similar event be made a mandatory activity of project closure, in the same way as the Inception Workshop is part of the project launch. The Exit Workshop must bring together project personnel (including past consultants) and those organizations and individuals who are identified as being in a position to continue with the work of the project. At the Workshop, the project needs to outline the work accomplished and the outstanding work that still needs to be done and identify whether these can “live” on their own, or require a champion. Consensus then needs to be reached on who is taking over the responsibility both for unfinished work as well as for products and benefits that need to be “adopted” and sustained by someone else. It is most important that to the extent possible, a source of funding support is identified to ensure financial sustainability.

**1 INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 Purpose of the evaluation**[[3]](#footnote-3)

This is the independent Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the United Nations Development Programme/ Global Environment Facility (UNDP/GEF) Project on ***Implementation of the Benguela Current LME Action Program for Restoring Depleted Fisheries and Reducing Coastal Resources Degradation*** which is a project of the Governments of Angola, Namibia and South Africa, executed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), with the support of the GEF through UNDP as the Implementing Agency. The evaluation, which is the subject of this report, was carried out by a sole evaluator.

According to the ToRs (Annex 1), the objective of the TE is to assess the achievement of project results (whether the Project has achieved its goal, objective and outcomes) and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP and GEF programming in the future.

To these could be added other objectives of the evaluator, such as:

* To provide a basis for decisions by UNDP, the Governments and the BCC on future projects with a focus on the Benguela Large Marine Ecosystem
* To identify the issues that will need to be considered in making those decisions

It is also meant to serve as an opportunity to critically assess administrative and technical strategies, issues and constraints. The evaluation sets about attempting to provide answers to the following questions:

* Did the project identify and respond to a real need in the region and in each of the participating countries? Did it respond to the GEF objectives? (= **relevance and design**)
* Did it do it well? (= **efficiency**)
* Did it achieve the targeted results? (= **effectiveness**)
* Will the results survive beyond the life of the project? (= **sustainability**)

**1.2 Scope and methodology**

**1.2.1 The GEF monitoring and evaluation principles**

In accordance with the monitoring and evaluation policy of the GEF[[4]](#footnote-4), this evaluation is guided by, and has applied, the following principles:

**Independence**  The Evaluator is independent and has not been engaged in the Project activities, nor was he responsible in the past for the design, implementation or supervision of the project.

**Impartiality** The Evaluator endeavoured to provide a comprehensive and balanced presentation of strengths and weaknesses of the project. The evaluation process has been impartial in all stages and taken into account all the views received from stakeholders.

**Transparency** The Evaluator conveyed in as open a manner as possible the purpose of the evaluation, the criteria applied and the intended use of the findings. This evaluation report aims to provide transparent information on its sources, methodologies and approach.

**Disclosure**  This report serves as a mechanism through which the findings and lessons identified in the evaluation are disseminated to policymakers, operational staff, beneficiaries, the general public and other stakeholders.

**Ethical** The Evaluator has respected the right of institutions and individuals to provide information in confidence and the sources of specific information and opinions in this report are not disclosed except where necessary and then only after confirmation with the consultee.

**Competencies and Capacities** The credentials of the Evaluator in terms of his expertise, seniority and experience as required by the terms of reference are provided in Annex 2

**Credibility** This evaluation has been based on data and observations which are considered reliable and dependable with reference to the quality of instruments and procedures and analysis used to collect and interpret information.

**Utility** The Evaluator strived to be as well-informed as possible and this ensuing report is considered as relevant, timely and as concise as possible. In an attempt to be of maximum benefit to stakeholders, the report presents in a complete and balanced way the evidence, findings and issues, conclusions and recommendations.

Furthermore, the rights and confidentiality of informants have been protected to the extent possible as required by the UNEG Guidelines[[5]](#footnote-5).

**1.2.2 Evaluation dimensions**

The evaluation exercise commenced with work from homebase in October 2013 and the Mission started on 12 November 2013 with my arrival in Johannesburg/Pretoria where I held consultations with stakeholders.

From Johannesburg I travelled to Cape Town and continued consultations with South African stakeholders. Following this, I visited Swakopmund and met with BCC officials as well as Namibian stakeholders. I then went to Windhoek to continue my consultations with Namibian stakeholders as well as the PMU and the UNDP CO in Windhoek as the lead UNDP office. Visa difficulties prevented me from travelling to Luanda for consultations with Angolan stakeholders and to participate in the Final PSC meeting. Although I approached Angolan and other unavailable stakeholders electronically, there were few responses and none from Angolan stakeholders. My Preliminary Findings to the PSC were presented in absentia on 27 November 2013.

The mission ended in Windhoek on 26 November 2013.

A detailed schedule and time line for the entire evaluation assignment is in Annex 3.

**1.2.3 Evaluation criteria, performance standards and questions**

The evaluation assessed project performance against the following criteria and standards and sought answers to the questions[[6]](#footnote-6) in the following table:

**Table 1. Evaluation scope and dimensions**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **OBJECTIVE[[7]](#footnote-7), OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS** | **QUESTIONS ARISING** |
| **Objective:** To implement the BCLME SAP through the adoption of national policy reforms, the sustainable institutionalisation of a regional Commission, and the endorsement and ratification of a binding international Convention for the LME | Has the SAP been implemented?  Is this illustrated by –   * *the adoption of national policy reforms,* * *the sustainable institutionalisation of a regional Commission* * *the endorsement and ratification of a binding international Treaty for the LME* |
| **Outcome 1:** A Benguela Current Commission Infrastructure and Associated Convention | Has the BCC been established?  Has the Convention been adopted? |
| **Output 1.1** A Permanent Regional Commission with all requisite structures and functions | Has the BCC been established?  Does it possess requisite structures and functions? |
| **Output 1.2** A legally binding multilateral Convention, Regional Action Plan and associated guidelines, protocols and codes of Conduct | Has the Convention been adopted?  Is there a Regional Action Plan?  Are there protocols and codes of conduct? |
| **Outcome 2:** National Level Policy and Management Reforms | Have reforms been carried out at national level? |
| **Output 2.1** National Structures established in support of a Benguela Current Commission (BCC) | What national structures have been established to support the BCC? |
| **Output 2.2** Enactment of National Policy and Legislative Reforms | What national policies and legislation have been enacted? |
| **Outcome 3:** Sustainable Capacity for LME Management | Is there adequate capacity for LME management, and is it sustainable? |
| **Output 3.1** Implementation of a Training and Capacity Building Strategy | Has TCBS been implemented? |
| **Output 3.2** National and regional strategies for sustainable financing in support of the LME approach of the BCC | Are there national and regional strategies for sustainable financing? |
| **Output 3.3** Partnerships to support the LME management approach | What partnerships are there to support LME management? |
| **Output 3.4** Coordination and implementation of the Stakeholder Involvement Plan (SIP) | Has the SIP been implemented? |
| **Outcome 4:** Capture and Networking of Knowledge and Best Practices | Have knowledge and best practices been captured?  Is there knowledge networking? |
| **Output 4.1** Procedures for the capturing, transferring and replicating of knowledge, lessons and good practices | Are there knowledge management procedures? |
| **Output 4.2** Partnerships and networking with LMEs and relevant initiatives | What partnerships have been established with other LMEs?  What networking is taking place? |

According to GEF guidance[[8]](#footnote-8), when rating the project’s outcomes, *relevance* and *effectiveness* were considered as critical criteria – satisfactory performance on relevance and effectiveness was essential to satisfactory performance overall. This means that the overall project rating could not be higher than the lowest rating on relevance and effectiveness.

**1.3 Approach and Methodology**

**1.3.1 The basis for evaluation**

The basis for a terminal evaluation is the ProDoc which is the signed contract for delivery of certain agreed results, products and services. Signatories bind themselves through the ProDoc and are accountable on that basis. As noted by GEF, “*the results framework included in the project appraisal document submitted to the GEF for approval/endorsement by the CEO establishes project outcome expectations. At the time of project completion, these ex-ante expectations generally form a yard stick for assessment of outcome achievements*.”[[9]](#footnote-9) In particular, the Logical Framework Matrix (LogFrame) captures the essence of the ProDoc and the project. In the case of this evaluation, the LogFrame has changed during the life of the project and the one adopted as the basis for the evaluation is that incorporated in the ToRs.

**1.3.2 The approach adopted**

The evaluation process comprised three phases. The first phase was one of data and information gathering. It started with a review of relevant documents made available electronically by the Project Management Unit. In addition, relevant websites were also visited and studied. Soon after my arrival in the region, I received additional documentation. Following this, I embarked on a broad programme of consultations with key stakeholders in two of the three participating countries. The aim was to capture as broad a catchment of views and opinions as possible within the time available. Electronic contact was made with those who, for a number of reasons, could not be met in person.

The second phase focused on analysis, discussion and drafting. This phase started with the delivery (in absentia) of Preliminary Findings to PSC members. The work continued from home base and this phase concluded with the production of a draft version of the report which was forwarded to UNDP, UNOPS and the PMU to be translated and released for comments.

The third and final phase refined the draft in the light of the comments received, and produced this final report. Information provided by the comments received was used substantially in revising the draft and where there was a difference of opinion between the comment and the original text, this has been acknowledged in a footnote.

Guidance provided by GEF and UNDP, was adhered to in undertaking this terminal evaluation. As noted in the Acknowledgements, the evaluator benefited greatly from the wide spectrum of views, opinions and advice that he received during the course of his work.

**1.3.3 Data collection**

Two basic tools were used in the search for primary data and information – firstly documents review, secondly face-to-face consultations. Face-to-face meetings were the preferred method of consultation and were carried out with a wide catchment of stakeholders. Triangulation was used to ensure that empirical evidence collected from one source, for example documentation such as reports, was validated from other sources, for example through interviews. Sometimes, the information was not available in document form and only available from consultations. In this situation, the evaluator sought to corroborate opinions expressed and information given, by posing the same questions to more than one consultee. Anecdotal evidence was taken into account only if in the judgment of the evaluator the information was important and the source was considered reliable. In such cases, the possible limitations of this information have been noted.

The Terms of Reference provided an extensive list of documents for review, and the response to the evaluator’s request for additional documents was in most cases swift by the PMU. References to documentation are noted in this report, in most cases in footnotes. The full list of documents reviewed and/or consulted is in Annex 5 which also contains a short list of the websites that were visited and reviewed.

I met with 22 persons in all and in addition I approached a further 25 persons electronically (telephone or email). The scope of consultations ranged from those associated directly with project implementation and management (UNDP, UNOPS, PMU, BCC, consultants) which made up 47% and Government officials who made up 53%. Of those approached electronically, only a small minority responded. The TE extended to two of the three participating countries namely, Namibia and South Africa, and included meetings in Pretoria, Cape Town, Swakopmund and Windhoek.

Interview protocols were described in the Evaluation Inception Report and most meetings followed the same pattern, namely, a brief introduction on the purpose of the mission followed by an identification of the relationship that the consultee had with the project, if any, and his/her views on the project. Particular emphasis was placed on whether the consultee felt that the project had achieved its Objectives, whether it had done this effectively and as required, and whether the project’s products and benefits were likely to be sustainable (= the basic evaluation questions). The evaluator gave an undertaking that the sources of information will not be disclosed unless this was important for the report and in such cases, only with the agreement of the source.

The approach adopted did not rely on sampling and all who could be interviewed and wished to be interviewed were interviewed. However, the scope of consultations was left very much in the hands of the PMU and I am very aware of the fact that I did not meet any stakeholders from the private sector, NGOs or from coastal communities. In addition, a bias crept into the selection of interviewees through my inability to travel to Angola and no Angolan stakeholders were met with or consulted. The methodology was seen as culturally sensitive and appropriate and the reliability of the information received is not in question. The spread of interviewees, across genders and circumstances served to enhance the validity of the information obtained.

A full list of persons met and consulted by the evaluator as well as those contacted electronically is to be found in Annex 6.

**1.3.4 Stakeholders’ engagement in the evaluation**

The approach adopted was participatory and inclusive and it was based on an effective dialogue with stakeholders particularly those implementing the project and those benefiting from the project. Templates designed specifically by the evaluator were provided to the Project Manager with guidance on how they were to be completed. They covered aspects such as budgets and financial management, monitoring and adaptive management, implementation of responses to MTE recommendations, and self-assessment of progress towards the project Outcomes and targets.

Furthermore, the Project Manager was invited to accompany the evaluator in all his consultation meetings but in spite of reassurances that this would not jeopardize my independence, the invitation was declined.

The above and other efforts aimed to make this a shared exercise rather than one imposed from outside the project. However, while the data gathering was carried out in a participatory manner, the analysis and the conclusions reached and the recommendations made, represent the independent views of the evaluator alone.

**1.3.5 Evaluation boundaries and limitations**

The evaluation has had to face some limitations.

The time scale for the evaluation was compacted by UNOPS into eight weeks. This was because while starting later than planned because of administrative exigencies, the evaluator was constrained to deliver by the same original deadlines. This created difficulties by restricting the time available for comments on the draft and may have prevented stakeholders from making comments.

The need for translation, combined with the shortened timescale, had an impact on the number of stakeholders who could be directly engaged in particular those who required a Portuguese version of the draft report.

One lesson that came out of the MTE was not learnt by the IA and this led to a serious barrier for the evaluation. This related to problems with obtaining an Angolan visa which had been encountered before and which were mentioned in the MTE Report. These problems recurred and the evaluator was not able to obtain an Angolan visa in the time available and with the support available, in spite of the effort by many parties. The result was a significant limitation on the evaluation since no Angolan stakeholders could be met in person and the evaluator could not present his Preliminary Findings to the PSC meeting (which was in Luanda) as required by the ToRs. The TE has therefore been carried out without any participation of any Angolan stakeholders.

Logistic support from the PMU was not as comprehensive as usual for a TE. In addition, the PM was very busy not only with closing down the project but also with planning and resource mobilization for the next phase and other tasks and was unable to accompany the evaluator. This was compounded further by the travel itinerary and the sequence of visits which placed the meetings with the PM and the PMU and that with the UNDP lead office as among the last meetings to be held by the mission. While this presented as a possible limitation initially, it was overcome primarily through the telephone support from the PMU with logistics, and the flexibility and kindness of those I met with in helping out with appointments that had not been confirmed and with transport.

Finally, as noted above, the scope of those met and consulted in person may have constituted a limitation on this evaluation. I did not meet anyone from Angola, or from the private sector, or from coastal communities. The PM stressed that due to delays in appointing the Evaluator, the time available was inadequate to obtain his participation and that of important stakeholders in consultations. He further indicated the challenge of securing meetings with important stakeholders during this time of year (November) as institutions wrap up for 2013 and mobilise plans for 2014.

These difficulties posed challenges for the evaluation, and while, as noted, most were overcome and did not constitute limitations on the evaluation, it was not entirely so and the evaluation may have suffered as a result.

**1.3.6 The rating system**

GEF guidance requires certain project aspects to be addressed by a terminal evaluation and a commentary, analysis and rating is required for each of:

Project concept and design

Stakeholder participation in project formulation

Implementation approach

Monitoring and evaluation

Stakeholder participation

Attainment of Outcomes and achievement of Objective

These aspects, which form the framework of the core sections of this report, are augmented as considered necessary to also address issues that arose during the evaluation.

Each of the aspects has been rated separately with brief justifications based on findings. In addition, various other project elements have also been rated, as has the project as a whole.

The standard GEF rating system was applied, namely:

**Highly Satisfactory (HS):** The project has no shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency

**Satisfactory (S):** The project has minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency

**Moderately Satisfactory (MS):** The project has moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency

**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):** The project has significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency

**Unsatisfactory (U):** The project has major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency

**Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):** The project has severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency

The rating of various elements of the project is necessarily subjective but it is carried out according to GEF guidance and ethics, and based on the experience of the evaluator. A score of Highly Satisfactory is not common (around 4%)[[10]](#footnote-10) since it can only be applied in situations which are exceptional and where no improvement is possible. At the other end of the scale, a score of Highly Unsatisfactory (HU) is also not common (1%) and the greater part of projects and project elements are rated in the Satisfactory (S) to Moderately Satisfactory (MU) quartile (76%).

**1.4 Structure of this report**

The evaluator made an effort to keep this report brief, to the point and easy to understand. It is made up of four substantive parts guided by the structure and scope in the ToRs which reflect GEF generic guidance[[11]](#footnote-11) and is according to the standards established by UNEG[[12]](#footnote-12). It arises from the information and data obtained and recorded as it arose and which was then collated according to the major divisions of this report which reflect the evaluation questions.

Following the executive summary that encapsulates the essence of the information contained in the report, the first part provides the introduction and the background to the assignment. It starts with the purpose of the evaluation, exactly what was evaluated and the methods used. This is followed by a brief introduction to the project.

The next part is the main substantive part of this report and comprises four inter-related sections. It presents the findings of the evaluation exercise in terms of the basic project concept and design, its implementation, administration and management, its achievements, results and impacts, and the potential for sustainability of the products and services that it produced. The findings are based on factual evidence obtained by the evaluator through document reviews and consultations with stakeholders and beneficiaries.

The third part is the conclusions section which gathers together a summary of the ratings given and conclusions that had been reached throughout the rest of the report based on factual evidence and/or the balance of opinion in the search for answers to the evaluation questions. It then augments them to create a cohesive ending arising from the investigation. This section in turn leads to the final section comprising the recommendations.

A number of annexes provide supplementary information.

**2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT**

**2.1 The project that is being evaluated**

The UNDP/GEF Project on ***Implementation of the Benguela Current LME Action Program for Restoring Depleted Fisheries and Reducing Coastal Resources Degradation*** is a project of the Governments of Angola, Namibia and South Africa, executed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), with the financial support of the GEF through UNDP which served as Implementing Agency.

GEF support amounted to US$5.138 million with some US$69 million pledged in co-financing. The Project was approved by the GEF in February 2009 and was planned to run for four years but it was extended for a further 10 months to December 2013.

The project Objective was changed during the life of the project and the final version was incorporated in the ToRs for this evaluation. This final version, which is the focus for the evaluation, is very clear and specific. The Objective wording is helpfully specific through its three goals and should be comparatively easy to determine the extent to which it has been achieved. However, the wording of the four Outcomes is not as helpful and the evaluation will need to go down to the level of the outputs to assess progress.

At the policy and strategic levels the project was guided by the Project Steering Committee (PSC) which monitored progress in project implementation, provided strategic and policy guidance, and reviewed and approved work plans and budgets.

Day-to-day operations and management responsibility lay with the Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Windhoek, Namibia and headed by the Senior Project Manager, Nico E. Willemse. At the country level, Maria Sardinha served as National Coordinator for Angola, Frederik Botes was National Coordinator for Namibia, and Gcobani Popose was National Coordinator for South Africa.

A Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) was conducted in April to June 2012 and the overall project assessment was Moderately Satisfactory (MS).

**2.2 Socio-economic context**[[13]](#footnote-13)

The Benguela Current region comprises four countries - Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Lesotho but Lesotho was not one of the participating countries in the project. The three countries sharing the common Benguela Large Marine Ecosystem and its resources, are very distinct politically and socio-economically. There are cultural differences, different institutional approaches and different working languages, English and Portuguese.

With a mean annual primary productivity of 1.25kg C/m2 p.a., the BCLME is one of the four most productive upwelling systems in the world. In addition to being extremely productive biologically, the BCLME also offers many prominent economic opportunities. According to research conducted by the project[[14]](#footnote-14), in 2011, the oil and natural gas industry (primarily in Angola) accounted for 90% of the BCLME marine economy, which was estimated at US$267 billion annually. Diamond mining on‐shore, near‐shore, and off‐shore, accounted for approximately 7.5% of the BCLME marine economy. Fisheries are important nationally in Angola and Namibia and although less so in South Africa they are vital to all coastal communities even though they account for less than 2.5% of the economy in the BCLME region.

In **Angola**, approximately 6 million people live in the coastal area, some 48% of the total population, at a density of 11 persons/km2. Of the four countries in the region, Angola has the highest population growth rate at 1.97%, and the lowest literacy rate, estimated at only 40%. The population consists primarily of Africans (75%), with small portions of the population being made up of Europeans (1%), people of mixed African and European background (2%), and others (22%). In addition to the indigenous population, Angola also provides a haven for refugees from its neighbouring country, the DR Congo. At the same time, many Angolans live as refugees in neighbouring states. The economy of Angola has been severely disrupted by 30 years of civil war, and GDP per capita is estimated at US$656. By far the largest contributor to the economy is the production of oil and gas off the coast, contributing 54% of the total GDP in 2001, while agriculture, forestry and fishing contributed 8%. Furthermore, of the total agricultural production, fisheries accounts for only a few percent, and is thus not an important component of the Angolan economy.

**Namibia** is primarily a desert country, and has the lowest population density (2 persons/km2) of the four countries within the Benguela Current region with an estimated 32% of the total population living within the Benguela region. The literacy rate is estimated at 76%. The population consists primarily of Africans (87.5%), with small portions of the population being made up of Europeans (6%), and people of mixed African and European background (6.5%). Namibia has a relatively diverse economy that does not rely heavily on any one sector. Fishing and fish processing contribute a total of 4% to the GDP and GDP per capita is estimated at US$1,667.

**South Africa** has an interesting socio-economic history, having recently become free of the apartheid regime which effectively excluded the majority of the population from being active, participating citizens. Since the change to democracy in 1994, many reforms have taken place in attempts to normalise the country. These reforms are still going on and South Africa can still be considered a country in transition. Of the four countries in the region, South Africa has the largest total population, estimated at 44.9 million people, of which 15.5 million live in the Benguela region at a density of 37 persons/km2. Of the urban population (30% of the total), approximately half reside in the two major coastal cities of Cape Town and Durban. Population growth is low, at only 0.01% and the literacy rate is relatively high at 82.2%. The population consists primarily of Africans (75.2%), with smaller proportions of the population being made up of Europeans (13.6%), people of mixed African and European background (8.6%), and Asians (2.6%). South Africa has the strongest and most diverse economy of the four countries in the Benguela Current region. GDP per capita is estimated at US$3,714 and a number of sectors contribute to the GDP. Agriculture, forestry and fishing contribute a total of 4% to the GDP. Fisheries are largely marine, producing an estimated 600,000 tonnes of fish each year, and employing some 27,000 people.

**2.3 Problems that the project sought to address**

According to the PIF, the impetus for this project was the major decline in fish catches throughout the BCLME region. The ProDoc suggested that fishing pressure was an important factor but not the only one, and noted the negative effects of pollution (land- and marine based) on water quality as well as food quality and safety; and this was in turn expected to have further knock-on effects on predator-prey interactions, as well as overall species and habitat diversity within the ecosystem.

GIWA[[15]](#footnote-15) characterised the LME as severely impacted in terms of chemical pollution, solid wastes, radionuclides, and hazardous spills. Marine mammals and coastal birds were generally threatened or endangered, alien species were being introduced via ballast and bilge water as well as aquaculture activities, and habitat destruction was negatively modifying the coastline. These impacts threatened the balance within the food-web and could have serious consequences for the fisheries and associated regional biodiversity. As far back as 1999, the Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA)[[16]](#footnote-16) identified “*chronic and catastrophic deterioration”* in water quality as a primary concern. It was also noted that harmful algal blooms (HABs) frequently occur off the coasts of all three countries, and there was a high pollution risk associated with seabed mining and the petrochemical industry (in terms of both exploration and production). Rapid development and expansion along the coast was creating pollution ‘hotspots’ in all three countries.

The ProDoc quoted the TDA and identified the following ***specific threats*** arising from the above problems:

* + 1. A decline in commercial fish stocks and non-optimal harvesting of living resources:
    2. Uncertainty regarding ecosystem status/yield in a highly variable but commercial important environment
    3. Chronic and potentially catastrophic deterioration in water quality which is threatening the stability of the ecosystem and its living resources
    4. Habitat destruction and alteration resulting in decline of commercial or food-chain species and reduction in inshore nursery areas
    5. Loss of biotic integrity and threats to biodiversity (including endangered and vulnerable species) that constitute vital components of the LME
    6. Inadequate human and infrastructure capacity to assess the health of the ecosystem and its components
    7. HABs and low-oxygen events that directly impact on the welfare of living marine resources.

Furthermore, the ProDoc identified the following ***principal generic root causes*** of these threats:

a) The complexity of the ecosystem, the high degree of variability, and the need for greater understanding

b) Inadequate capacity development and training

c) Poor legal framework at both the regional and national levels

e) Inadequate planning at all levels

f) Insufficient public involvement

g) Inadequate financial mechanisms and support

Finally, the ProDoc listed the following four ***barriers*** which are standing in the way of the countries’ efforts to address the threats:

**Barrier 1**: Absence of a regional structure and management mechanism for the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem.

**Barrier 2**: Absence of effective national level resource and institutional arrangements, and need for associated policies and legislation to support a regional management mechanism.

**Barrier 3**: Inadequate long-term sustainable capacity to undertake and maintain management practices and activities for the Large Marine Ecosystem (either at the national or regional level).

**Barrier 4**: Poor access to appropriate knowledge and best practices.

It is these four barriers that the project addressed.

**2.4 Expected results**

The primary results foreseen by the ProDoc were two – a ‘tried-and-tested’ LME Commission along with supportive regional and national structures, and an associated binding international legal agreement for transboundary management of the BCLME and its globally important fisheries.

In recognition that neither the Commission nor the Convention could exist in a vacuum, the ProDoc saw an end-of-project situation where policy, legislation and operational practices had been amended and realigned at the national level in order to ensure a more regional transboundary management approach to the LME; capacities would have been improved for sustainability through training and institutional strengthening; financial mechanisms would have been adopted alongside partnership agreements; there would be more effective stakeholder participation throughout all sectors with a specific emphasis toward community inputs; knowledge products would have been captured and distributed and replicated both within the BCLME region and beyond. All this would have been linked to an appropriate networking mechanism for LMEs.

By end-of-project, the ProDoc foresaw a halt to, and reversal in, the decline of fisheries within the BCLME along with effective conservation and management measures to mitigate degradation of the ecosystem as a whole. This was expected to be hailed as one of the world's first effective responses to depleted fisheries within a discrete ecosystem through a transboundary LME management structure, supported and made operational by functioning and effective transboundary and national level institutions.

**2.5 Baseline – departure points**

In identifying the above problems, causes and barriers as the existing situation, the ProDoc established a sort of baseline, even if not overtly. It also has a section on Baseline Analysis which covered adequately the socio-economic context for the project as reported above. It then referred to the TDA and the predecessor BCLME Programme for technical aspects of the baseline, and this is seen as very appropriate by the evaluator.

Unfortunately, the LogFrame in the ProDoc did not provide Baselines, but the version attached to the CEO Endorsement Request, did. However, these related solely to the Outputs and there were still no Baselines for either the Project Objective or the four Outcomes. It is also noted that the Baselines provided for the Outputs were not very useful because the LogFrame did not have Targets. In other words it is not possible to appreciate what the project was departing from and where it aimed to get to.

These shortcomings were partly rectified in the version of the LogFrame which was appended to the Inception Workshop Report. This version did provide a Baseline and Targets (including mid-term targets) for the Project Objective. However, there were still no Baselines or Targets for the Outcomes.

**2.6 Main stakeholders**

This project followed on the BCLME Programme as a second phase. It was being formulated as its predecessor was being wound down. It therefore benefited from the mobilization of stakeholders that had been carried out by the Phase 1 project. Stakeholders had been actively involved and were the ones requesting a second phase. However, it must be noted that with its focus on the TDA and SAP, the Phase 1 project was oriented almost exclusively towards technical and scientific investigations and the higher level policy arms of governments. This meant that the stakeholders were scientists and senior level government decision-makers.

This was recognized in the ProDoc which has a substantial discussion on stakeholders as well as a Stakeholder Participation Plan. The ProDoc stated that the formulation of this project presented an opportunity to “*reach out and involve “new” stakeholders who were not previously involved in the BCLME Programme*” and it identified these as:

* Resource users - private sector stakeholders from sectors such as fishing, mining, and offshore oil and gas
* Ground level/ grassroots stakeholders such as coastal community members

The ProDoc then goes on to identify the key stakeholders for this project, and these are listed in the following table –

**Table 2. Stakeholders identified in the ProDoc**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **COUNTRY** | **STAKEHOLDERS IDENTIFIED IN TEXT** | **STAKEHOLDERS IDENTIFIED IN STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT PLAN IN ANNEX (duplicate entries removed)** |
| **Angola[[17]](#footnote-17)** | * Ministry of Urban Affairs and Environment * Ministry of Fisheries * Ministry of Petroleum * The petroleum industry * Artisanal fishers | * National Natural History Museum * Independent University, Faculty of Engineering Sciences and Technology * Provincial Dir. for Agriculture, Fisheries and Environment – Benguela * Directorate for Environment – Environmental Quality Dept Ministry of Urban Affairs and Environment * National Fisheries Research Institute * Institute for Development of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture * National Directorate for Infrastructure and Market Survey, Min Fisheries * Environmental Department, Ministry of Petroleum * Ecological Youth of Angola * Action for Rural Development and Environment * Sonangol PP (private sector) * Luanda Port Authority * UNDP |
| **Namibia** | * Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources * Ministry of Mines and Energy * Ministry of Environment and Tourism * Ministry of Works, Transport, and Communication * Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry * Chamber of Mines * The petroleum sector | * Polytechnic of Namibia * University of Namibia * Sam Nujoma Marine & Coastal Research Centre – SANMARC, Henties Bay * Namibia Maritime and Fisheries Institute (NAMFI) * Kuisebmund Secondary School – Walvis Bay * Municipality of Walvis Bay * Luderitz Town Council * Erongo Regional Council * Meteorological services of Namibia * Directorate of Geological Survey * Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources – various Directorates * Ministry of Trade and Industry * Fisheries Observer Agency * National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia (NAMCOR) * Namibia Port Authorities (NAMPORT) * Nampower (Kudu Project) * South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO) * Coastal Environmental Trust of Namibia * Confederation of Namibian Fishing Associations * Hanganeni Fishing Association * Tullow Group -Kudu Gas Group * De Beers Marine Namibia * Marine Tour Association of Namibia * Namibia Coast Conservation and Management Project (NACOMA) * Benguela Environment Fisheries Interaction & Training Programme (BENEFIT) |
| **South Africa** | * Dept Environmental Affairs and Tourism * Fishing associations * The mining sector | * Cape Peninsula University of Technology * University of the Western Cape, Dept of Biodiversity and Conservation Biology * University of Cape Town, Department of Oceanography * Provincial Department of Tourism, Environment and Conservation, Northern Cape * Namaqua District Municipality * City of Cape Town * West Coast District Municipality * Knysna National Lake Area, SANParks * SANCOR (South African Network for Coastal and Oceanic Research), National Research Foundation * Richtersveld Community Conservancy * Friends of DST * Masi Fundise * International Ocean Institute * De Beers Marine * HHS Development and Environmental CC * Anchor Environmental Consultants cc * EcoAfrica Environmental Consultants * DLIST-Benguela |

The above were expected to be the stakeholders and participants in the SAP-IMP project. Section 3.4 and Section 4.3 below analyse the extent to which this was carried out.

**3 FINDINGS: PROJECT DESIGN – RELEVANCE**

**3.1 Project concept and design**

The project concept was straightforward and in response to the threat to the biodiversity of the large marine ecosystem posed by unsustainable harvesting. It also reflected the need to overcome weak institutions and lack of coordination between the three states. In its efforts to address the barriers, the project employed the same successful model as had been applied elsewhere in GEF International Waters projects namely, assisting the governments to set up a regional entity and drafting a convention and protocols as mechanisms for cooperation on the management of the shared resources of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem. However, it has to be acknowledged that in the LME context, this project was to be a trailblazer because no other LME had achieved the setting up of a Commission and the adoption of a Convention – both targets of the present project.

The project was targeted at the upstream level and almost exclusively within the government sector. There was little or no involvement of the private sector and no opportunities were provided for meaningful participation at the community level. The ProDoc has a very strong bias towards fisheries to the detriment of other sectors but does bring in other stakeholders into its discussion.

The budget appears adequate for the work envisaged but the four-year timeframe may have been too short.

Project design is best illustrated by the LogFrame and in the case of this project there are at least four versions of the LogFrame, none of which is complete and this constitutes a design flaw. The LogFrame is discussed fully in Section 3.3 below. A further shortcoming in project design is the lack of consideration of meaningful involvement of stakeholders from coastal communities, subsistence and artisanal fishers and other grassroots constituents. This is contrary to GEF requirements and this is discussed in Section 4.3 below. A further design flaw is the apparent clumping of unrelated Outputs under Outcome 3.

As will be discussed in Section 4.4.1, project design was also faulty in terms of budget allocations to various Outcomes, and in particular the underestimation of project management costs and the costs involved in obtaining Outcome 1.

Project design is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

**3.2 Relevance to the Region and to each of the countries**

Relevance, according to the OECD[[18]](#footnote-18) is a measure of the extent to which the objective and outcomes of a project are consistent with “*beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.*” In other words, does the project address the identified threats and barriers? Is it bedded within the UNDP Country Programmes? Does it contribute to the GEF global objectives?

The three Governments recognized that the Benguela LME is both globally and nationally highly significant and its ecological integrity and productivity were under threat. In particular its fisheries resources were diminishing. With the support of GEF through UNDP, they carried out technical and scientific investigations (TDA) which led to identified priorities for action (SAP). They set up a joint management mechanism (BCC) and committed themselves to cooperation (Convention). This project arises from the TDA and was meant to address priorities identified in the SAP. As such it is highly relevant to the needs of the three countries and the region.

The project is also seeking global benefits as targeted by the GEF. Under OP#8 GEF sets priority on changing sectoral policies and activities responsible for the most serious root causes or needed to solve the top priority transboundary environmental concerns. It also seeks the reduction of stress to the international waters environment. The project is highly relevant in particular to its Large Marine Ecosystem component.

It can be concluded that the project has been highly relevant to the needs of the three countries and the Benguela Current environment as well as to the GEF global objectives, and relevance is rated as **Highly Satisfactory (HS).**

**3.3 The Logical Framework Matrix (LogFrame)**

A project is a planned and strategic attempt to progress from the existing situation (the baseline) to the targets (outcomes) as a contribution towards the Objective. This is done through an orderly deployment of Inputs (skills and know-how, finances and time) which carry out Activities and obtain Outputs. The Outputs are not the Targets; it is the Outcomes that are the Targets. In order for the project to be successful a number of pre-conditions and Assumptions must be fulfilled and the possibility that they may not be fulfilled constitutes a Risk. While it is easy to know when Outputs have been obtained (Outputs are tangible results), in the majority of cases, it is difficult to know whether Outcomes have been achieved and Indicators may be necessary.

All these elements – Baseline, Inputs, Outputs, Targets, Outcomes, Assumptions, Risks, and Indicators – make up the Logical Framework Matrix (or Strategic Results Framework) – all the elements are essential and the LogFrame is not functional if even one is missing.

Apart from being a visual summary of the project, the LogFrame should also be an effective tool for project managers and those monitoring and evaluating its progress. A weak or incomplete LogFrame needs to be rectified. Even a fully functional LogFrame needs to remain as a “living” document and may need to change with changing circumstances and the passage of time. An evolving LogFrame provides the foundation for adaptive management and this is investigated below.

As the MTE mentioned, there are four versions of the LogFrame and these are compared in the table below.

**Table 3. Comparison of the four versions of the LogFrame**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **LOGFRAME** | **ELEMENTS PRESENT** | | | | | **COMMENT ON CHANGES AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT** |
| **INDICATORS FOR OBJECTIVE** | **INDICATORS FOR OUTCOMES** | **BASELINES** | **TARGETS** | **RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS** |
| **From original ProDoc** | YES, ONE | NO | NO | NO | YES | None of these changes appear to have come about as a response by management to changing circumstances and they are not signs of adaptive management. Rather they are examples of slack drafting |
| **From CEO Endorse Request** | YES, ONE | NO | YES | NO | YES |
| **From Annex to Inception Workshop Report** | YES ONE | NO | YES | YES | YES  WITH RISK RATING |
| **From ToRs for this evaluation** | YES ONE | NO | YES | YES | NO |

The above changes to the scope and completeness of the LogFrame do not constitute adaptive management. However, other changes have been carried out at the Outputs, Activities and budgetary inputs levels and these could be claimed to be examples of adaptive management which is seen by UNDP[[19]](#footnote-19) as the ability of the project management to respond to unexpected challenges and opportunities in a flexible, positive, optimising manner. Management is adaptive when it anticipates external and internal challenges (identification of risks); responds effectively and swiftly; and, takes account of the different opinions of the stakeholders and uses them to improve the project implementation strategies. As explained by the PMU[[20]](#footnote-20), the changes were necessitated by the pursuit by the project of its prime result as in Outcome 1 – this is accepted by the evaluator. The only question that remains regarding these changes is who were they approved by. The evaluator was unable to determine the approval process, but is willing to accept that this was done through the Annual Work Planning process and covered by discussion at the PSC meetings.

It needs to be stressed that the above explanation does not apply to the changes in the Objective wording and this is discussed in Section 5.1.1 below.

In conclusion, it is noted that none of the four versions of the Logframe for this project contained all the required elements, however, the changes at Output, Activities and budget allocation level can be seen as examples of adaptive management. The rating is **Moderately Satisfactory (MS).**

**3.4 Stakeholder participation in project formulation**

As noted a number of times, this project followed as a second phase of the BCLME Programme which, with significant stakeholder participation had carried out the TDA and produced the SAP. It is therefore accurate to say that stakeholder participation in the formulation of this project started during the BCLME Programme.

However, more specifically, the ProDoc treats the matter of stakeholder participation in some detail. As noted above (Section 2.6) there was a thorough process applied to identify likely stakeholders and then they were surveyed to determine their interest in the project, how they felt they could participate and barriers that stood in the way of their participation. It can be said that the most direct involvement in project planning and formulation by stakeholders was in identifying how they wished to participate in project implementation. This led to a detailed Stakeholder Involvement Plan which was to be implemented by the project.

Stakeholder involvement in project formulation is rated as **Satisfactory (S)**.

**3.5 Risks and risk management**

The subject of risks has been tackled a number of times in this project. It started with the ProDoc which identified a number of risks, rated their severity and included abatement measures. These are shown in the following table which also includes an update by the PMU on whether the risk materialized.

**Table 4. Risks and abatement measures as identified in the ProDoc and updates as reported by the PMU**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **RISK (TAKEN FROM THE PRODOC)** | **PMU COMMENTS ON MITIGATION, WHETHER THE RISK EVENTUATED, AND WHAT ACTION THE PROJECT TOOK** |
| 1 The *risk* is that the 3 countries may not in fact agree on these measures - 1) all three countries agree with the need for a BCC at the regional level that will have responsibility for the adoption of policy and setting of management objectives for the BCLME as a single tripartite entity, and 2) the countries are willing to negotiate and adopt a formal and binding Treaty between themselves in support of this BCC and which specifies an overall ecosystem approach to the BCLME and how this would be embraced and delivered | The risks did not materialise. The project supported the countries and the BCC with a consultant who drafted and facilitated regional negotiations for the convention, ministerial conferences that approved progress and, the eventual signing on 18 March 2013.  The Focal Ministers from all three countries have shown consistent support while other ministries such as minerals exploration and production, maritime affairs and transport have shown increased visibility and presence in the Commission. |
| 2 *Another risk* is the possibility that a change in political regime within the region or within individual countries could result in reduced support for, or possible withdrawal from, the Commission and Treaty. Efforts to reduce the risk of political withdrawal are ongoing and will be embedded in the project design. BCLME programme spent targeted efforts on demonstrating the economic and social advantages of the overall ecosystem approach through a regional policy and governance body like the Commission (e.g., economic studies on LME management). Further, one of the defined functions of the SAP Implementation process supported by this project will be to ensure that all stakeholders, including policy and decision-makers, are well-informed and sensitised in this area, which will provide stronger protection against political withdrawal | The risks did not materialise. Through support for SAP implementation and in particular, the institutionalisation of the Commission, Ministerial Conference meetings, the development, negotiation and signature of the Convention, and the revision of the SAP, the project secured the audience and participation of key management and decision making stakeholders. Ministers convened three times during the lifespan of the project; the first time to pledge support for the Commission as a vehicle to enhance food, income and job security, the second time to endorse the convention process and to confirm their support for signature and ratification and, the third time to sign the Convention.  Hence, even though all three countries experienced changes at the political level, the momentum was still kept through engagement of senior managers and decision makers.  The long-term commitment is further evidenced by confirmed co-finance of US$ 319,109,470. |
| 3 Conflicts between the participating countries over shared resources and their appropriate exploitation and management could create sufficient friction and disagreement that they could represent *a risk* to the Treaty and to national commitments. However, such a risk is considered to be low and project is designed to support and strengthen the BCC‘s role to arbitrate and defuse any such conflicts or disagreements at the highest policy level so as to provide clear political guidance to senior civil servants, line managers and operation level personnel to ensure resolution and cooperation - one of the purposes and primary functions of BCC. Strengthening the arbitration function of the BCC will contribute to minimize and manage the potential risk of conflicts and support the countries to negotiate sensibly within the context of the legal Treaty that the Project aims to deliver | The risk did not materialise. The success with the convention process, sensitisation about ocean governance and the need for policy harmonisation to enable implementation of the convention generated further awareness about the need for joint management. Instead, the project supported the review of survey methodology for Cape hakes which recommended calibration factor to enable data integration, developing a joint management and national management plans for Angola and Namibia for horse mackerel and, national management plans for the Orange River Mouth estuary for Namibia and South Africa.  The project gave limited support to South Africa to finalise a Policy on the National Environmental Management of the Ocean, dubbed “Ocean Policy”. During this support, the project drew on the SA experience and the IOC/ UNESCO guide and developed a Policy Brief on Ocean Policy as harmonisation tool. |
| 4 There is a risk that trained personnel will seek better salaries and working conditions within the private sector and will then be lost to the government institutions affiliated with the BCLME Programme. In this context a realistic TCB Strategy was developed during Project preparation that clearly identifies target personnel and institutions. Such a Strategy will also look at TCB from the point of view of practical needs and not attempt to deliver training at too high a level when clearly basic understanding and techniques may need to be embraced first of all. TCB will also be undertaken within the overall concept of a regional partnership so that those countries and institutes that are more advanced can extend assistance to those that are in greater need. The only real resolution to the need to Train-and-Retain‘ and not lose newly-trained personnel is to negotiate openly with industry and the private sector to prevent this situation arising. Again, this would be built into a TCB Programme as a specific activity and a very real need | This risk still persists and cannot be mitigated. No matter how much training and capacity building, the mode/ deliver and/ or frequency, people would still choose to leave if they are offered a better bottom line. Unless basic remuneration packages increase in certain parts of the public sector, this problem will persist and result in staff deficiencies in some countries.  The project supported the implementation of the TCB Strategy, development of a Policy and the start of the process to update the 2009-2012 Strategy. The Regional Training Officer resigned in September 2013 and the process has stalled since.  Capacity development focused on introducing and developing basic understanding of concepts such as the socio-ecology of fisheries management, dubbed “fisheries management mis-matches”, Responsible Fisheries, the Ecological Risk Assessments, ocean governance and EAF. |
| 5 Another risk always exists associated with identifying and securing sufficient and appropriate long-term financial support for the Commission. Other pressing domestic economic and social issues in all three countries might amplify this risk, *if the regional commission of this kind is perceived by politicians and decision-makers as detached from the regional (economic) development.* Fortunately, such risk has been significantly lowered by the significant efforts put by the BCLME Programme. The proposed project will ensure to keep decision-makers informed of the relationship between the LME and economic welfare in order to impress on them the need to secure and to commit long-term financial support. The domestic benefits versus costs of regional action versus inaction will be clearly elaborated at the political level. Furthermore, the Project intends to build the partnerships beyond just government and particularly with the private sector, which will not only increase opportunities for greater financial support but will also lock governments into their financial commitments more securely and, indeed, more willingly. | The risk did not materialise. The three focal ministries have been paying the annual fees to the Commission since 2009 at an annual rate of increase of 23%. The funds cover the operations of the Secretariat. From 2014 the salaries of the Ecosystem Coordinator and the Regional Training Officer will also be funded by the government as these have been donor-support till 2013.  In addition, the Ministers have also endorsed the Secretariat to establish partners and seek support from donors for the work of the BCC to promote development, growth and security of livelihoods. To strengthen commitment, the project enhanced stakeholders’ knowledge about the LME by doing an economic valuation of extractive resource sectors and, a scoping exercise for a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) of the BCLME. The latter introduced the non-fisheries sectors, their impacts on the environment, future plans and social and economic contributions.  The Ministers who signed the convention were delegated by the Presidents of the countries. Hence, their speeches were on behalf of nations and states and confirms long-term sustainable commitment for the BCC. |
| 6 One possible minor risk is the absence of an effective coordination body for the networking process but this merely requires discussion and negotiation, and suitable  entities exist certainly within the BCLME region (the PCU and the Commission) and for the African continent itself (e.g. NEPAD). Supporting one of the pioneer regional commissions established for the sustainable management of a LME and its associated resources, the project is expected to generate valuable lessons for others; therefore, it is designed to collaborate throughout its implementation with those regional (and global) coordination bodies for active information sharing and exchange of experiences | The risk did not materialise. The project participated in various regional and global initiatives and networks that enabled sharing the experience of SAP implementation and institution building as well as more operational and management related lessons. Corporate image and brand development and mainstreaming and the power of communication have also been shared as lessons and good practices. The networks and forums include; the Global LME Consultative Committee, ICES Working Group for LME Best Practices (of which SAP IMP is co-chair till Jul 2015), the Global Oceans Forum which staged Oceans Day at UNFCCC CoP 17 and at Rio+20, Abidjan Convention, the Africa LME Caucus (of which BCC is the chair), EAF Nansen Project Steering Committee, of recent the World Ocean Council (ocean business stewardship), IW:LEARN (as an important vehicle and platform), the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and, NOAA. The project supported BCC participation in a NEPAD hosted Africa think tank meeting on a strategy for African fisheries and, the project solicited interest from NEPAD and FAOs, Fisheries Partnership (NFFP) Project with no progress as they had a long inception during 2012. |

Of the six risks identified in the ProDoc, five did not materialize and the PMU provided a good record on why and how these risks were kept at bay through actions of the project. As noted by the PMU, the risk that did materialize, namely the loss of trained personnel, is still current and while the solution is known (better remuneration packages, according to the PMU), no action is known to have taken place towards it.

Risks are also considered in three out of the four versions of the LogFrame. These are risks pertaining to the Objective and specific Outputs (none considered for the Outcomes) and they are merely listed with no indication on what the project proposes to do about them (no mitigation measures).

It is interesting to note that while the risks in the LogFrames from the ProDoc and the CEO Endorsement Request are the same, the risks in the LogFrame from the Inception Report are different, they seem to be aligned more to the Indicators rather than the Outputs and each is assigned a rating. According to the minutes of the Inception Workshop, it was decided to “*insert a risk management column*” to “*suggest means to mitigate and manage identified and validated risks*”.

In the event, while the wording of the risks/assumptions was changed, there was no indication of the “*means to mitigate and manage*” the risks. In fact, the so-called risks in all three of the LogFrames where they do appear, are often the simplistic reverse/obverse of the wording in the respective output as in the following three examples –

**Table 5. Examples of ineffective risks from the LogFrames**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **INDICATOR** | **RISK** |
| |  | | --- | | Regional strategies and guidelines for policy and legislative realignment in place | | Risk of the strategies and guidelines not being accepted, adopted and implemented at national levels |
| BCC Convention in place by end of December 2012 | Risk that the Convention will not be ratified by the end of the project due to delays caused by national processes and systems |
| Original SAP revised and gaps addressed | Risk that the consideration of recommendations for SAP revisions are delayed |

These so-called risks are not a serious attempt at identifying what might hinder the successful execution of the project and achievement of the Outcomes and they serve no useful purpose.

Risks are also meant to be considered in the PIRs. PIR2010 has a section headed “Critical Risks” under which it lists one single risk, namely, that “*institutional systems and processes required for Convention negotiations and consultations delay the signing and ratification of the Convention before end of Project*”. The PIR proposes “*Determine and define the process and protocols in each country for the negotiation, consideration and approval of legally binding multilateral instruments ... Develop a road map for the Treaty process … ensure that all stakeholders are well informed well in advance of consultation and negotiation meetings ... Support each national government and stakeholders at national level with national consultations and to prepare for regional consultation and negotiation meetings*” as mitigation measures. Unfortunately, these mitigation measures have not worked since at the time of writing the risk has materialized and it is unlikely that the Convention will be ratified before the end of the project, certainly not by all three countries. Under the circumstances, it would have been appropriate for subsequent PIRs to provide an update on the situation and for the final PIR to propose measures to be incorporated in the project’s Exit Strategy.

In the event, the Critical Risks tab is missing from PIR2011; the PIR2012 provided to the evaluator is incomplete; and the section on Critical Risks in PIR2013 is blank.

Risks were also brought up at each PSC meeting starting with PSC-01 which made a decision that “*PMU, BCC and UNDP to review and update the project risks, and incorporate risk assessment/ management in project implementation, monitoring and reporting*”. A matrix was provided to PSC-02, and at PSC-04b risks were discussed at some length and depth, and the very impressive Risk Log matrix was updated. This was repeated at PSC-05 and again at PSC-06. While risk management featured regularly at the PSC meetings, most of the discussion seemed to focus on the rating provided for probability and impact, and these were revised as an update. Rarely was there discussion on what the project should do about a particular risk.

The project has recognized risks and addressed them in a number of ways but there have been some gaps in the risk management strategy. Risk management is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

**3.6 Linkages between the project and other interventions**

A table provided by the PMU to the evaluator lists 42 partners. The majority of the partners are organizations with similar interests, many of them academic institutions, but they also include other projects as well as NGOs. Of the partners, only four were engaged by the project through a formal MoU or LoA, and the relationship with the rest was varied. The greater majority (71%) of those listed, are noted as related to the BCC and at the other end of the scale, Angola is related to a mere 4% of those listed. The SAP is listed predominantly as the focus area for the partnerships. This is followed by the SP, then by Training and Capacity Building and then Data and Information Management. The table also includes consideration of “the way forward” which augurs well for sustainability. From the information provided, the project appears to have forged very good partnerships with a large number of institutions. However, it is noted that most of the partnerships are either for research or training in the fisheries sector and there is little if anything in sectors such as pollution control, marine transport, marine mining, environmental quality, ecosystem approach. Neither are there any partners in the area of coastal community involvement, artisanal fisheries and similar grassroots stakeholders.

**4 FINDINGS: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION – EFFICIENCY**

**4.1 Project governance**

The Project Steering Committee (PSC) is recognized as the highest governance level for a project and must have the necessary authority and power. It plays a key role in setting policy for the project, monitoring project performance, providing guidance and directions to the PM and other project stakeholders, and supports UNDP which, as the GEF IA, has the ultimate accountability for delivery of project products and the administration of project funds.

The PSC for this project comprised an attendance of about 25 persons. This included various observers as well as UNDP, UNOPS, and the BCC Secretariat and PMU personnel who attended *ex officio*. All country members were senior government officials (Fisheries, Environment, Petroleum, Transport). Seven meetings were held over the almost 5 years[[21]](#footnote-21) of the project, at a venue in one of the participating countries on a rotational basis. Meetings were held back to back with the BCC Management Board since most of the individuals were members of both.

From minutes of meetings made available to the evaluator, the meetings appear to have been very well run, efficient but without excessive formality. Discussion seemed extensive and executive decisions were made which provided clear guidance to the Project Manager. Among the salient issues that came up for discussion at various PSC meetings were the following –

**PSC-01 June 2010, Namibia** LogFrame placed on agenda but not discussed, no explicit approval of the changes, although there was reference to the informal discussion at the Inception Workshop the day before.

**PSC-02 March 2011, S Africa** Discussion on need to involve communities; Demo sites taken for granted however not approved because criteria for selection had not been discussed. LogFrame mentioned but then the discussion seemed to drift on to other matters. NAPs mentioned.

**PSC-03 May 2012, Angola** MTE discussed and noted that evaluator could not consult with Angola because of no visa; Exit Strategy discussed. PM recommended to UNOPS to allocate project management costs across all 4 Outcomes. Revised SAP and TDA discussed and may take the place of NAPs. PM recommended that Demo sites be dropped but UNDP urged caution.

**PSC-04a June 2012, Namibia** Presentation by MTE consultant - Concern expressed about the reduced stakeholder (community) involvement. Warning regarding changing LogFrame too much.

**PSC-04b Nov 2012, S Africa** Management response to MTE discussed. Warning that unless this project achieves what it set out to achieve, follow-up by GEF is unlikely. Exit strategy, sustainability and closure discussed. Good discussion of risks – Risk Log matrix appended. NAPs mentioned as part of delivery commitment of NFDS. BCC sustainability after project discussed. Warning regarding lack of stakeholder involvement.

**PSC-05 May 2013, Namibia** Budgets discussed at some length. BCC sustainability after project closure. Risk log was discussed and appended. Dates for the TE were discussed with reference to time constraints. Actions associated with project closure – financial + assets + etc.

**PSC-06 November 2013, Angola** PM presented final round up of project achievements and PMU congratulated. Sustainability at Outcome and Outputs level discussed and referred to BCC Management Board. Detailed life-of-project financial reporting. Status of project risks. Project closure timeline, transfer of assets. Terminal Evaluation – Preliminary Findings discussed. Potential future funding for BCC discussed.

From the records available, the PSC was an effective governance body providing policy and guidance to the PMU and serving as a forum for cross-sectoral and transboundary consideration of project issues. Attendance was good and the manner in which the meetings were conducted indicates a high level of commitment.

Overall project governance is rated as **Satisfactory (S)**.

**4.2 Management arrangements**

The ProDoc noted that following the first phase of the BCLME Programme, it was now time *to funnel and focus resources through the BCC* while still retaining a small and independent PMU for the SAP-IMP Project in order *to administer funding and resources, coordinate project implementation and to provide technical advice to the Secretariat of the Commission*.

The PMU comprised a Project Manager and an Administrative Officer, and it was initially co-located with the BCC in Windhoek. Its primary function, as prescribed by the ProDoc, was the day-to-day management and administration of the Project, including supervision of activities and deliverables, hiring and contracting of GEF-funded staff, procurement and disbursement (the PM had DoA up to USD50,000), budget management, reporting, evaluation and monitoring. In addition, the Project Manager also served as a technical advisor to the BCC Secretariat and worked closely alongside the Executive Secretary.

The PMU was augmented by the three National Coordinators and, for some time at least, a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. The PSC later approved the hiring of three Young Professional Associates (YPA) to relieve the PMU and National Coordinators from administrative and logistical duties so they could focus on substantive matters. By the time of the TE, the M&E Officer, two of the National Coordinators and the YPA from South Africa had left. The matter of staff retention right up to project closure was discussed at PSC meetings, and considered as a risk but no mitigation was identified. However, a suggestion was made to the evaluator which could help retain staff – individual contracts should contain a clause which provides the equivalent of 2-3 months salary on severance if the staff member stays until project closure. This is seen as providing some support while the staff looks for a new contract and encourages them to stay on until project closure.

Unfortunately, there was no opportunity for the evaluator to observe the relationship and rapport that project personnel had with stakeholders but from all accounts (with some exceptions) the PMU was held in high regard – according to one consultee, “*they have kept the ship afloat*” with reference to BCC. The exceptions to this were few, but plausible – the performance of the PM was described as inconsistent and that of the Admin Officer was also seen as uneven at times. There was also a comment that the PMU tended to rely too much on consultants when it may have been more efficient to use local expertise brought together as a working group.

In his brief dealings with the PMU, the evaluator experienced a good level of efficiency; and although this was coloured somewhat by the lower than usual logistic support, the evaluator supports the general consensus regarding PMU efficiency and competence.

The decision to co-locate the PMU within the BCC offices provided an excellent opportunity for collaboration and mutual support with the Secretariat and satisfied the Objective and Outcome 1 of the project. But this was lost when the BCC Secretariat relocated to Swakopmund and the PMU did not follow.

The PM and the Administrative Assistant participated in two project management training sessions at UNOPS HQ in Copenhagen. The M&E Officer joined for the second visit. While these were appreciated by the participants, it was felt that they were not sufficient for project managers to build their operational knowledge and knowhow. The project team also attended a training workshop on the APR/PIR process arranged by UNDP Namibia in Windhoek. This was found to be very useful as it gave clear guidance on what information is required and what is not.

The PMU satisfied its reporting obligations through regular and up to date Quarterly Self-Audits and Procurement Reports to UNOPS and a complete electronic filing system was maintained for all project transactions, procurements and recruitments, including a complete asset inventory with approved asset disposal. According to the PMU, the project achieved 90% implementation of decisions and agreed actions by the PSC.

The issue of project management costs is discussed in Section 4.4.1 below. However, it needs to be recorded here that UNDP (both the Country Office and the UNDP/GEF RTA) expressed alarm at the apparent blow-out in project management costs and requested UNOPS to elaborate on the reasons for this. As can be seen in the discussion, UNDP postulates that the high costs are the result of mis-allocation.

In spite of the above shortcomings, project management and administration are rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** overall.

**4.3 Stakeholder participation in project implementation**

Stakeholders are defined by Sida[[22]](#footnote-22) as “*Agencies, organisations, groups or individuals who have a direct or in-direct interest in the development intervention or its evaluation*” and as evidenced in the ProDoc and as discussed above (Section 2.6), this broad width of stakeholder definition was adopted during project formulation. Following an extensive survey of those considered to be project stakeholders, a detailed workplan was drawn up for stakeholder involvement and its implementation was estimated to cost USD470,000. This is considered a good “investment” by the project because, as OECD-DAC says, “*Technical expertise alone cannot provide access to all necessary and useful information and most key issues need to be considered by a wide range of stakeholder groups*”.[[23]](#footnote-23)

These principles are also espoused by the GEF which states that “*Effective public involvement is critical to the success of GEF-financed projects. When done appropriately, public involvement improves the performance and impact of projects.*”[[24]](#footnote-24) GEF policy[[25]](#footnote-25) on public participation was adopted as far back as 1996.

In response to a request from the evaluator, the PMU provided the following record of stakeholder involvement in project implementation.

**Table 6. Stakeholder involvement in project implementation according to the PMU with comment from the evaluator**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **STAKEHOLDERS IDENTIFIED IN PRODOC** | **EXTENT OF INVOLVEMENT AND IN RELATION TO WHICH OUTCOME**  **ACCORDING TO PMU** | **EVALUATOR COMMENT ON MODE OF CONSULTATION** |
| **ANGOLA** |  |  |
| Ministry of Urban Affairs and Environment | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in 1 ministerial conference meeting and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1.  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional consultations/ workshops; receiving information about SAP via group email. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Ministry of Fisheries | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in all ministerial conference and management board/ PSC meetings and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1;  Participated in consultations for the economic valuation of ecosystem goods, the strategic environmental assessment, and management planning for horse mackerel – Outcome 2;  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Ministry of Petroleum | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in all ministerial conference and management board/ PSC meetings and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1;  Participated in the development of ToRs for the SEA scoping study and the consultation process; economic valuation of ecosystem goods – Outcome 1.  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Petroleum industry | Participation in the project inception meeting in Angola – Outcome 5;  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting. | Info Updates/Access |
| Artisanal fishers | Participation in the project inception meeting in Angola – Outcome 5;  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; | Info Updates/Access |
| Fishers | Participate in the Ecological Risk Assessment (ERAs) of important fisheries. | Direct input  Direct participation |
| Ministry of Transport | SIP interventions include: Sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; participation in convention signing ceremony; receiving information about SAP via group email. | Info Updates/Access |
| Youth members | Direct participation in the first BCC Youth Summit which culminated in the establishment of the Benguela Ocean Youth Network and a declaration by the Youth. The declaration was delivered during the opening of the 2013 Annual Science Forum. | Info updates/ access Direct participation |
| BP Angola | Participated in a meeting with the project and BCC. The company is exploring offshore exclusive prospecting licenses for oil in Namibia and is getting to know stakeholders and their relationship to the marine environment. They learned that the BCC is a key stakeholder to engage early in the process. The project learned about the marine research and underwater observation work being done by BP Angola and their partnership to the Ministry of Fisheries and Petroleum. | Info updates/ access |
| **NAMIBIA** |  |  |
| MFMR | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in all ministerial conference and management board/ PSC meetings and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1;  Participated in consultations on EAF, the economic valuation of ecosystem goods, the strategic environmental assessment, and management planning for horse mackerel (Outcome 2). National fisheries strategy development, co-financed by the project, that involved more than 200 stakeholders – Outcomes 1, 2, 3 and 4;  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in all ministerial conference and management board/ PSC meetings and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1;  Participated in consultations on the economic valuation of ecosystem goods, the strategic environmental assessment, and management planning for horse mackerel (Outcome 2).  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in 1 ministerial conference and 2 management board/ PSC meetings – Outcome 1;  Lead ministry for the development of a management plan for the Orange River Mouth (ORM) estuary, supported by the project – Outcome 2;  Participated in consultations on the economic valuation of ecosystem goods, the strategic environmental assessment, and management planning for horse mackerel (Outcome 2).  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Ministry of Works, Transport, and Communication (MWTC) | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in all ministerial conference and management board/ PSC meetings and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1;  Led a project supported intervention for coastal sensitivity mapping and hosting an IMO-supported sub-regional conference on oil spill. Participated in discussions for a partnership between IMO and BCC;  Participated in consultations on the economic valuation of ecosystem goods, the strategic environmental assessment, and management planning for horse mackerel (Outcome 2).  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Min Agric, Water & Forestry | Participation in the project inception meeting. | - |
| Confederation of Namibian Fishing Associations | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level – Outcome 1;  Participated in all ministerial conference and management board/ PSC meetings and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1;  Participated in conference to develop a national fisheries strategy, co-financed by the project, that involved more than 200 stakeholders – Outcomes 1, 2, 3 and 4;;  Participated in consultations on the economic valuation of ecosystem goods, the strategic environmental assessment, and management planning for horse mackerel (Outcome 2).  Fishing companies participated in the Responsible Fisheries training and Ecological Risk Assessments as part of EAF.  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Chamber of Mines | Information shared about the SEA scoping study, the BCC and the work of the Commission. | Info Updates/Access |
| Petroleum sector (especially, Kudu offshore gas field) | No direct participation. The PSC member from the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) coordinates all such matters and kept the project abreast of developments, while keep her colleagues informed as well. | - |
| De Beers Marine Namibia and NamDeb | Participated in the Annual Science Forum of the BCC and in project consultations for assignments;  The project gave and introduction to the SAP, the BCC, the Convention and the BCC approach to fostering partnerships with the private sector. The project mentioned that the BCC would like to seek a partnership with the diamond mining sector and their participation in a Business Leadership Forum (BLF) in 2014. De Beers Marine Namibia seconded a staff member to further discussions on a partnership and the BLF. | Info updates/ access Direct participation |
| Youth members | Direct participation in the first BCC Youth Summit which culminated in the establishment of the Benguela Ocean Youth Network and a declaration by the Youth. The declaration was delivered during the opening of the 2013 Annual Science Forum. | Info updates/ access Direct participation |
| **SOUTH AFRICA** |  |  |
| Department of Environmental Affairs and  Tourism (DEAT) | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Participated in the review of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme at national level and participated in the regional validation workshop – Outcome 1;  Participated in all ministerial conference and management board/ PSC meetings and in the signing ceremony of the convention – Outcome 1;  Participated in consultations on EAF, the economic valuation of ecosystem goods, the strategic environmental assessment, and management planning for horse mackerel (Outcome 2).  Lead ministry for national Ocean Policy development process, co-financed by the project – Outcome 2;  Lead ministry for the development of a management plan for the Orange River Mouth (ORM) estuary, supported by the project – Outcome 2;  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; project inception meeting; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Fishing associations | Participated in a stakeholder consultation held for the Western Cape while fishing companies participated in the Responsible Fisheries training and Ecological Risk Assessments as part of EAF. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input |
| Mining sector | As part of the national task group involved in convention development, consultation and negotiation – Outcome 1;  Petroleum Agency South Africa (PetroSA) has been very active in the MB and the PSC;  Participated in 1 ministerial conference and 2 management board/ PSC meetings – Outcome 1;  Department of Minerals, as member of the BCC Minerals and Extractive Resources WG, participated in developing the ToRs for the SEA scoping study;  SIP interventions include: sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; participation in regional working groups. | Info Updates/Access  Direct Input  Direct participation |
| Ministry of Transport | SIP interventions include: Sharing the BCC newsletter, including national activities; participation in convention signing ceremony; receiving information about SAP via group email. | Info Updates/Access |
| Elands Bay Fishing Community | Target pilot community in the Western Cape for development of a Local Economic Development (LED) Plan with project and IKM support’ | Info updates/ access Direct participation |
| Youth members | Direct participation in the first BCC Youth Summit which culminated in the establishment of the Benguela Ocean Youth Network and a declaration by the Youth. The declaration was delivered during the opening of the 2013 Annual Science Forum. | Info updates/ access Direct participation |

The above table records that out of the 25 stakeholders identified, 11 were government agencies, nine were from the private sector and five could be considered as community/grassroots although including three entries for a single youth event.

With reference to the GEF policy quoted above, if “public” is interpreted as the broad scope of stakeholders, in the case of this project, public involvement in project implementation has not been very high.

According to the ProDoc, stakeholders surveyed during project formulation identified three modes of participation, namely –

* *Information Updates and Access* **–** There was a strong desire to be kept informed.
* *Opportunities for Input/ Consultations* **–** Stakeholders wanted to be given opportunities to provide input and comments to project processes.
* Opportunities for *direct participation in project implementation*. For example, some educational institutions expected to be involved directly in project work.

The above table shows that of the 11 government stakeholders, eight participated fully (Info Access**,**

Direct Input and Direct Participation), two received information and one did not participate at all. From the private sector, three participated fully, seven merely received information and one did not participate at all[[26]](#footnote-26). The stakeholders from community/grassroots level received information and only one provided input.

To this needs to be added the valiant efforts of IKM/DLIST[[27]](#footnote-27) to facilitate stakeholder participation, and information capture and dissemination, in spite of the questionable revisions to their terms of engagement and the reduction in available funding and time. One of the principal areas of work within the scope of the IKM contract with potential for stakeholder involvement, were the demonstration projects at community level which were first floated at the Inception Workshop. They were subsequently noted as within the ToRs for IKM which stated – *“… it is envisaged that DLIST BCLME will augment its proven community empowerment, capacity building and information sharing techniques by applying intense empowerment efforts in four demonstration sites (two in Angola and one each in Namibia and South Africa), with the aim of empowering communities at these pilot sites in the context of the BCC*”.

When the abandonment of the demonstration projects was raised by the evaluator, the PM explained that the project (although he acknowledged that it was his personal decision as PM) decided to commit substantive additional resources to ensure that the BCC becomes fully operational and that the Convention process runs smoothly. This additional expenditure on Outcome 1 led to the reduction in some other elements of the project, among them the demonstration sites and activities towards Outputs 3.4 and 4.1. Thus, in spite of the lengthy and detailed consideration in the ProDoc including an impressive survey and Stakeholder Involvement Plan, the commitment entered into at the Inception Workshop,[[28]](#footnote-28) the repeated warnings at PSC meetings, the conclusions and recommendation of the MTE, and the overarching policy of the GEF, stakeholder involvement and participation, particularly at community level, was discontinued.

The PM strongly defended this “*tough decision*” in the interest of what was seen as the prime objective of the project and he considered “*the coupling of policy and community level interventions as flawed*”. The evaluator cannot deny the paramount importance of the project Objective, and its three targeted products namely, National policy reforms, a Regional Commission and a Convention. The evaluator also agrees that while it may not be a flaw in project design, the manner in which stakeholder participation was brought into the project framework is anomalous and this is discussed below in Section 5.2. However, it must also be noted that in view of its policy on public participation, the GEF is unlikely to have approved the project without the commitment to public/stakeholder participation as in the ProDoc, and as subsequently confirmed in the Inception Workshop.

Stakeholder participation in project implementation is rated as **Unsatisfactory (U)**.

**4.4 Project finance**

**4.4.1 Budget planning, management and efficiency**

This is not a financial audit and the focus of the evaluation is on the planning and management of financial resources made available by the GEF. The following table shows the original allocations from the ProDoc, updated according to information obtained from the PMU, and with comments from the evaluator.

**Table 7. GEF allocations to Outcomes from the ProDoc and the PMU (in USD)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOME** | **ORIGINAL BUDGET**  **FROM PRODOC** | **LATEST TOTAL EXPENDITURE** | **CREDIT REMAINING** | **EVALUATORS COMMENTS** |
| **Outcome 1:** A Benguela Current Commission Infrastructure and Associated Convention | 1,195,623 | 1,944,307 | (748,684) | 63% overspent. Justified by PMU as needed to cover unforeseen costs associated with setting up and supporting the BCC and the negotiations required for the adoption of the Convention. |
| **Outcome 2:** National Level Policy and Management Reforms | 947,800 | 619,062 | 328,728 | 35% underspent. In view of the fact that few if any reforms have been achieved it raises the question on what might have been the result had the original allocation been spent. |
| **Outcome 3:** Sustainable Capacity for LME Management | 1,559,190 | 710,803 | 848,387 | 54% underspent. Went from being the major item of expenditure to the second lowest item. Was this a flaw in project design? A radical change in project targets? Or an example of adaptive management? |
| **Outcome 4:** Capture and Networking of Knowledge and Best Practices | 946,007 | 730,330 | 215,677 | 23% underspent. These funds could have gone into setting up an information management system at BCC Secretariat, comprising a metadatabase through which stakeholders could share data and info across boundaries. |
| **Project Administration and Management** | 489,840 | 1,012,739 | (522,899) | 107% overspent. Some of these expenses could have been shown under one or more of the Outcomes[[29]](#footnote-29). Discussed below. |
| **TOTALS** | **5,138,460** | **5,017,243** | **121,217** |  |

The changes are illustrated graphically in the figure below.

The changes in allocation to the respective Outcomes and Project Management are significant and appear to have taken place without any fuss. No explicit discussion can be found in either PSC minutes or PIRs on the need for these changes in allocation. Had such a discussion taken place, it may have focussed on questions such as –

* Will the lowered expenditure place the Outcome in jeopardy? (in the case of Outcomes 2 and 4 this seems to have happened because neither Outcome has been achieved fully)
* Was there an alternative source of funding? (such as one of the co-financing sources)
* Does the expenditure go beyond GEF guidance? (in the case of Project Management costs it certainly did)
* Did no one notice that Project Management costs were creeping well beyond the 10% limit imposed by the GEF?

The figures for Project Management expenses have generated explanations from the PMU and from UNDP, but inexplicably not from UNOPS.

The PMU[[30]](#footnote-30) advised that expenditure was inflated by unforeseen expenses between 2011 and 2013 as listed in the following table advised by the PMU which also contains comments by the evaluator.

**Table 8. Unforeseen expenses allocated to Project Management**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **SUPPORT** | **AMOUNT (USD)** | **COMMENTS BY EVALUATOR** |
| Young Professional Associate –Nam (PMU) | 23,372.50 | This is rightly a Project Management cost |
| Young Professional Associate –Nam (Swakopmund) | 20,372.63 | It is debateable whether these should be under Project Management or elsewhere |
| Young Professional Associate –SA | 15,504.38 |
| Monitoring and Evaluation Officer | 48,869.88 | This is rightly a Project Management cost |
| Full-time English/Portuguese Translator | 72,369.00 | These are rightly a Project Management cost |
| Full-time English/Portuguese Translator | 45,357.36 |
| Communications Consultant | 95,852.17 | It is debateable whether these should be under Project Management or Outcome 4 |
| Corporate Branding Consultant | 59,560.17 |
| BCC Chief Finance Office ( 10.5 months) | 48,611.50 | This is more appropriately placed under Outcome 1 |
| **TOTAL** | **429,869.59** |  |

As can be seen from the comments in the final column, only some 50% of the above expenses are rightly Project Management costs. However, even if some USD200,000 are deducted from the Project Management costs, over-expenditure is still of the order of 66% and still 16% of the total GEF budget.

UNDP also postulates that expenses have been misallocated and brings up the following three possible areas of error.

**Table 9. Causes of apparent high project management costs according to UNDP**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNDP VIEW** | **EVALUATOR’S RESPONSE** |
| The total time of the project manager is charged under PM.   This should not be the case.  We expect the project manager to spend up to 10% of his time in pure project management related activities (putting the budget together, furnishing progress report, etc.) with his remaining time to be spent on more technical and substantive issues related to other Outcomes.  Also, even his time spend on logistical issues to organize a regional workshop, etc., we consider it as a time spent on Outcome, not PM, for which that particular workshop was required. | There is no doubt that some of the output of the Project Manager can be assigned to one or more Outcomes (in this case, especially Outcome 1). However, 10% seems to be an underestimation of the proportion of his time that needed to be spent on project management. Unless the job description in the ProDoc changed significantly before it became ToRs, a closer estimate would see the Project Manager’s time being spent some 75% on project management and 25% on distinct Outcome work[[31]](#footnote-31). |
| Other HR costs (Young Professionals, National Focal Points, etc.) are recorded all under PM.  This also should not be the case.  I assume YP spent almost no time on PM (they should be assisting PM on delivering the outcomes).  Much of NFP’s time are also spent towards outcomes.  Again, their time spent on PM should be very limited (just their contribution to progress reports and time spent on planning, etc.) | The Young Professional attached to the PMU appears to be working fully on project management duties in support of the PM and the Project Administrator and it should be a requirement that the National Focal Points do not work on any specific Outcome. |
| Travels costs for PM, BCC ES, NFPs are charged under PM.  Unless they are traveling to attend a PSC meeting or an internal planning meeting, their travels should be charged to relevant outcomes, not under PM.  I understand most of internal planning meetings were held back-to-back with some other technical/regional workshops; thus, travel costs charged under PM should be limited | It is accepted that it is likely that travel costs could be allocated more transparently to specific Outcomes. Unfortunately, while this may reduce the costs of project management it might inflate further the costs of Outcome 1 which are already high and overspent by 63%. |

While better transparency and more accurate allocation for project costs are desirable, project implementers should not be driven to such lengths in order to remain within an arbitrary limit for project management costs. It is widely accepted from experience that it is not possible to retain project management costs within the GEF limit, certainly not for a regional project involving a number of countries and therefore a lot of travel. Therefore, project planners and IAs should make provision for the real costs of project management by supplementing GEF funds with co-financing. In addition, GEF should consider a review of its project management cost limits so it can take into account that some types of projects have a justifiably higher cost for project management.

In spite of the above explanations, which do not provide a total explanation, and in recognition of the possible flaw in project design when the original allocations were made to Outcomes, and the apparent lack of control and sanction by the PSC (apart from approvals at the Annual Work Plan level), the IA and the EA budget planning, management and efficiency are rated as **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**.

**4.4.2 Co-financing**

As required by the ToRs, this evaluation was required to assess the situation regarding co-financing for the project and the evaluator sought the basic information first from the ProDoc and then specifically from the PMU by providing a template table to be filled in and returned. The following table comprises the information available.

**Table 10. Comparison of cofinancing amounts as pledged in the ProDoc and as delivered according to the PMU**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **CO-FINANCING PARTNER** | **TYPE** | **AMOUNT PLEDGED AS**  **IN PRODOC** | **AMOUNT REALIZED TO**  **DATE** |
| Government of Angola | Government partner | 9,015,607 | 63,626,808 |
| Government of Namibia | Government partner | 32,897,325 | 136,580,205 |
| Government of South Africa | Government partner | 17,382,052 | 118,902,457 |
| IKM | NGO | 351,352 | 351,352 |
| Government of Iceland | Bilateral donor | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Government of Norway | Bilateral donor | 8,800,000 | 8,800,000 |
| **TOTALS** |  | **68,947,334** | **319,109,470[[32]](#footnote-32)** |

The amount of cofinancing delivered is more than 450% higher than the amount pledged and this is due totally to the commendable increase in the contributions from the three governments.

At the request of the PSC, the PMU tracked co-financing in some detail and achieved a much better understanding of co-financing than is usual. However, the figures provided to the evaluator do not match the above amounts and from what can be worked out, Angola contributed USD3,054,498 (plus the cost of research vessels at USD60,000,000), Namibia contributed USD81,290,475, and South Africa contributed USD13,878,037, making a total of around USD158.25 million (around half of the figure in the table above). In view of the large sums of money involved, it is important that better detail is provided. However, UNDP finds the GEF requirement for accurate tagging of co-finance as a very tedious process which requires a significant allocation of time, and wonders what the benefit and added value is of such a commitment.

Rating for co-financing is **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

**4.5 Monitoring and evaluation**

**4.5.1 Monitoring plans at entry level**

The GEF requires that all projects must include *“a concrete and fully budgeted monitoring and evaluation plan by the time of Work Programme entry for full-sized projects”*. [[33]](#footnote-33)

The M&E Plan required by GEF should comprise a number of minimum requirements as in the following table. The table was provided by the evaluator as part of the self-assessment approach and comprises the Project Manager’s perspective on the requirements, as well as the evaluator’s summary comments on the way that the project is seen as having satisfied these elements.

**Table 11. GEF M&E minimum requirements**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **GEF M&E REQUIREMENTS** | **PMU RESPONSE** | **EVALUATOR’S OBSERVATIONS** |
| SMART indicators for project implementation, or, if no indicators are identified, an alternative plan for monitoring that will deliver reliable and valid information to management | * Indicators were defined during project development. * Revised at inception to ensure SMART elements are embedded and targets are agreed; * Revised at mid-term evaluation to adjust for operational environment and opportunities for assistance with policy revision; * Project used indicators to report to PSC and based on changes in the operational environment made recommendations for adaptive management. | It seems as if Indicators have been used as targets and the project set out to achieve the Indicators rather than the Outcomes. This would not have been so bad if Indicators are SMART vis-à-vis the Outcomes, but that is not the case.  It also seems that the adaptive management practiced by the project involves changing the Indicators to retrofit them to circumstances. |
| SMART indicators for results (outcomes and, if applicable, impacts), and, where appropriate, corporate-level indicators | * Indicators were defined during project development. * Indicators at output and outcome levels and corporate level indicators about the BCC’s institution building, structures and staffing. | None of the four versions of the LogFrame has any Indicators for the Outcomes. Outputs do not need Indicators |
| A project baseline or, if major baseline indicators are not identified, an alternative plan for addressing this within one year of implementation | * Baselines were defined for each of the indicators in the logical framework during inception and revisited at mid-term. | There were no Baselines in the original LogFrame and defining them at Inception is the right thing to do. However, Baselines are not meant to be “re-visited” |
| An M&E Plan with identification of reviews and evaluations which will be undertaken, such as mid-term reviews or evaluations of activities | * No M&E Plan in place as this is incorporated under the overall reporting function of the project; * A M&E Officer was hired and much of his time was devoted to familiarization with the project, assisting with budget and work plan finalization for 2013, hence little time on actual M&E functions; * The project will make recommendations to the BCC for an integrated M&E Plan for the Commission; | There is a good M&E Plan in the ProDoc but obviously it was not used by the PMU. Using the M&E Officer as described is not good use of staff resources. GEF is not as interested in someone else’s plan. |
| An organizational setup and budgets for monitoring and evaluation | * This is defined in the project document and budgets have been revised and adjusted as necessary; * The project will make recommendations to the BCC on budgets for M&E; | M&E Plan in the ProDoc identifies responsible parties and estimates a budget of USD362,800 for M&E. It would have been useful to learn how this has been “revised and adjusted” |

Planning for Monitoring and Evaluation at entry level was **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

**4.5.2 Monitoring tools**

A range of tools was employed by the project to monitor project progress and achievement – which tool was used depended on who was using it.

UNDP personnel used the “back-to-office” report format following their visits to project locations. The visits usually coincided with PSC meetings (which were the main purpose of the visit) and the reports often focussed on matters that came up for discussion at the PSC meeting. While they could be claimed to provide a degree of oversight of the project activities, back-to-office reports were not the most effective monitoring tools.

The Project Steering Committee meetings could be seen as a monitoring tool. The meetings were at regular intervals, and the PM reported on project progress. The basis for the PM’s reporting to the PSC was the latest project Quarterly Progress Report and through their regular frequency and format, QPRs served as an effective tool for monitoring project progress.

UNDP satisfies its accountability to the GEF through the annual Project Implementation Review (PIR). Four PIRs have been prepared by the Project in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013.

As the first one, PIR2010 introduced Indicators for Outcomes, with Baselines and Targets, but these are not effective and will be discussed below in Section 5.2. In PIR2011, the UNDP CO entry is vacant and PIR2012 is incomplete. PIR2013 is the final PIR and it is overly positive in the way it reports on achievements of some targets such as national reforms under Outcome 2, the NAPs, National Monitoring Programmes, Stakeholder Participation and knowledge management.

Finally, the GEF-IW Tracking Tool can be considered as a further monitoring tool. It would seem that the project produced three Tracking Tools, the first in April 2011 as part of the PIR, some two years after project implementation started. The next Tracking Tool was a year later in June 2012 and a final one was produced in 2013. It is not felt that the project has used the GEF-IW Tracking Tools to their best advantage.

**4.5.3 Comprehensive assessment of M&E**

A more specific indication of a project’s compliance with the GEF M&E expectations is provided by the instrument of assessment used by the GEF itself which states that *– a project needs to be in compliance with all the critical parameters and needs to perform sufficiently well on all the parameters together. To be classified as compliant, projects are required to score at least a 2 (on a scale of 1 to 3, with 3 being the highest) on each of the critical parameters and to have an aggregate score of 26 out of a maximum of 39*.[[34]](#footnote-34)

**Table 12. Instrument for assessment of M&E Plans for the comprehensive project**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **PARAMETERS** | **RAW RESPONSE AND POSSIBILITIES** | **PROJECT SCORE** |
| 1 Is there at least one specific indicator in the LogFrame for each of the project objectives and outcomes? | Yes 3  No 1 | 1 |
| 2 Are the indicators in the LogFrame relevant to the  chosen objectives and outcomes? | Yes 3  Yes, but only some are relevant 2  No 1 | 2 |
| 3 Are the indicators in the LogFrame sufficient to assess achievement of the objectives and outcomes? | Sufficient 3  Largely Sufficient 2  Some important indicators are missing 1 | 1 |
| 4 Are the indicators for project objectives and Outcomes quantifiable? | Yes 3  Some of them are 2  No, or not shown how indicators could be quantified 1 | 2 |
| 5 Has the complete and relevant baseline information been provided? | Yes, complete baseline info provided 3  Partial info but baseline survey in 1st year 2.5  No info but baseline survey in 1st year 2  Only partial baseline information 1.5  No info provided 1 | 1.5 |
| 6 Has the methodology for determining the Baseline  been explained? | Yes 3  No 1 | 1 |
| 7 Has a separate budget been allocated to M&E  activities? | Yes 3  No 1 | 3 |
| 8 Have the responsibilities been clearly specified for  the M&E activities? | Yes, and clearly specified 3  Yes, broadly specified 2  No 1 | 2 |
| 9 Have the time frames been specified for the M&E  activities? | Yes, for all the activities 3  Yes, but only for major activities 2  No 1 | 3 |
| 10 Have the performance standards (targets) been  specified in the log frame for the project outputs? | Yes, for all the outputs 3  Yes, but only for major outputs 2  No 1 | 3 |
| 11 Have the targets been specified for the indicators  for project objectives and outcomes in the log frame? | Yes, for most 3  Yes, but only for some indicators 2  No 1 | 2 |
| 12 Are the specified targets for indicators of project  objective and outcomes based on initial conditions? | Yes, for most 3  Yes, but only for some of the indicators 2  No 1 | 2 |
| 13 Do the project documents mention having made a  Provision for mid term and terminal evaluation? | Yes, both mid term and terminal evaluation 3  Only terminal evaluation 2.5  Only mid term evaluation 1.5  No information provided 1 | 3 |
| **TOTAL** | | **26.5** |

The project does not score well on Indicators and Baselines but is reasonably sound in other aspects. The aggregate score is equal to the minimum aggregate score of 26 points as set by GEF.

The evaluator concludes that the project did carry out some monitoring activities, and these were not necessarily according to the M&E Plan. Overall rating for the design and planning of M&E is confirmed as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

**4.5.4 The Mid-Term Evaluation**

A Mid-Term Evaluation was carried out in April-July 2012 and the overall project rating was Moderately Satisfactory (MS).

The MTE rated progress towards the Objective and Outcomes according to the set criteria as in the following table.

**Table 13. MTE ratings per focal issue**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **EVALUATION ISSUE** | **RATING** |
| Achievement of objectives and planned results | Marginally Satisfactory |
| Attainment of outputs and activities | Marginally Satisfactory |
| Cost-effectiveness | Satisfactory |
| Impact | Marginally Satisfactory |
| Sustainability of the Project | Marginally Satisfactory |
| Stakeholder participation | Marginally Unsatisfactory |
| Country ownership | Satisfactory |
| Implementation on the ground and implementation approach | Marginally Satisfactory |
| Financial Management and Planning | Satisfactory |
| Replicability | Marginally Satisfactory |
| Monitoring and evaluation | Marginally Unsatisfactory |

Country ownership and financial management rated the highest scores, whereas stakeholder participation and M&E rated the lowest.

Following its conclusions as represented by the above ratings, the MTE made 11 recommendations (some of which were made to more than one party), four each to the Project Manager and the Project, three to the PMU and one each to UNOPS and UNDP. The Recommendations together with their respective management responses, were provided in a template to the PMU with a request to provide an update on the actual action taken in response to the MTE recommendations. The full table is in Annex 7 together with comments from the evaluator.

Only one recommendation appears to have been rejected and three were accepted and acted upon while two were accepted partly. There were also another three which, while accepted, did not produce the desired result. Two recommendations are seen as having been evaded.

It would seem that no significant change resulted from the MTE and its sound recommendations. Many of the issues identified by the MTE lingered on right up to this evaluation.

**4.6 UNDP as Implementing Agency**

As Implementing Agency, UNDP, through its Country Office in Namibia acting as the lead office, was responsible to the GEF for the timely and cost-effective delivery of the agreed project outcomes. It achieved this through its understandings with the three Governments and the BCC and its contractual arrangements with UNOPS as the Executing Agency. UNDP had an obligation to ensure accountability, and its efforts in this respect for this project were spearheaded by the Country Office in Namibia supported by the RTA. As IA, UNDP was responsible for monitoring progress and reporting back to the GEF. This responsibility was shared with the Executing Agency and was exercised through full participation in PSC meetings, consideration of AWP and Budgets, visits to project sites and the annual PIR.

The Country Office in Namibia was supported by the UNDP/GEF Regional Office in Pretoria (since moved to Addis Ababa) which also provided technical support to UNOPS as the EA and to the Governments’ GEF Operational Focal Points. It assisted the executing agency with the recruitment of senior project personnel, approved the project inception report and terminal report, reviewed budget revisions prior to signature, followed up closely on implementation progress, assured the eligibility of project interventions in light of GEF policy guidance and approved project design, represented UNDP/GEF on the PSC, and approved annual PIRs, including performance ratings, for submission to GEF. To fulfil these responsibilities, the RTA remained fully engaged in the project implementation and in close communication with UNOPS, the lead UNDP CO, the Implementing Partners and the PMU.

UNDP performance as Implementing Agency for this project is rated as **Satisfactory (S)**.

**4.7 UNOPS as Executing Agency**

The Executing Agency for the project was UNOPS-International Waters Cluster. This role was carried out according to a generic but formal, written agreement between UNDP and UNOPS but there was no specific MSA (Management Services Agreement) written for this project.

IWC is the dedicated UNOPS cluster for IW projects. According to UNOPS, it provides specialized services to partners such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Bank and it is executing over 30 international waters projects on behalf of these partners in more than 100 countries, amounting to approximately USD148 million[[35]](#footnote-35). IWC claims to have specialized expertise in overall project management, procurement, human resources, budget and finance, and payments and it serves as a neutral management agent able to concentrate the discussion away from political issues and on to the technical and managerial aspects. IWC makes available a broad range of specialized management tools for the successful management of projects and carries out regular training in identified areas with the Project Management Units in the field. A solid management basis with appropriate guidelines and tools has been set up in UNOPS over the past 5-6 years and this has earned UNOPS ISO 9001 certification[[36]](#footnote-36).

As the EA for the project, UNOPS-IWC was responsible for the timely, effective and efficient execution of the agreed workplan and approved budget and the wise use of the resources available so as to achieve the project Objective and Outcomes. As EA, UNOPS also carries out the hiring, contracting and procurement, etc, and financial management in general. UNOPS has a comparative advantage in project management which it does with more efficiency and effectiveness than other agencies and this is a large part of the value added that they bring to a project. UNOPS was also responsible for monitoring of project progress and it did this primarily through the PMU as well as through participation in PSC meetings. In addition, IWC carried out monitoring missions to the region but no formal reports were produced. IWC was not involved in the production of PIRs except for the provision of some financial data.

Reports from various stakeholders confirm a good working relationship with UNOPS with the exception of financial management processes which were seen as being too lengthy and likewise for the provision of DSA. However, on further probing, the evaluator learnt that the time taken to process payment requests was no longer than could be expected.

Some interviewees resented the fee charged by UNOPS to execute the project because they saw this as a means through which UNOPS capacity and expertise in project management at its Copenhagen headquarters was being strengthened. The evaluator was told that the equivalent of this fee should remain in the region to fund execution responsibilities at a local institution, thus accruing benefits to the region.

As the EA, UNOPS was required to carry out this terminal evaluation according to guidance provided in UNDP and GEF manuals. The possible limitations on the TE which were discussed in Section 1.3.5 above need to be noted here since they arise from UNOPS action or inaction. For example, following the ignominy surrounding the inability of the MTE evaluator to obtain an Angolan visa, UNOPS failed to act and the situation repeated itself with this TE. This was in spite of advice from the PM that the TE contract should be let as early as possible to allow enough time for visa processing among other things. In the event, the TE contract was signed on 24 October 2013 and against the advice of this evaluator, the final delivery date was set as 31 December 2013. This constricted timeframe (together with the usual constraints at this time of the year) was inadequate for visa processing, the necessary field work, the production and translation of the draft report, allowance of an adequate period for comments on the draft, translation of some of the comments, and revision of the draft in the light of comments received to produce the final report. A further example of the EA inaction was the manner in which repeated requests for advice on the delivery date by this evaluator failed to elicit any response.

The performance and delivery of UNOPS as Executing Agency is seen as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

**5 FINDINGS: RESULTS ACHIEVED – EFFECTIVENESS**

**5.1 Achievement of the Objective**

**5.1.1 Versions of the Objective**

As noted in the discussion above on the LogFrame, there are two versions of the Objective for this project and the CEO Endorsement Request has both versions – one in Annex A which is the same as the version in the ProDoc and a different one in the same document (on page 1)[[37]](#footnote-37). This different version is the one that survived through the Inception Workshop where it did not seem to command any explicit discussion. It is not known whether project implementers were aware of the two versions[[38]](#footnote-38), who proposed the change or why and, more importantly, who approved it. This version has guided the implementation of the project. It is also the version in the ToRs for this evaluation and is the one adopted for this evaluation.

The following table contrasts the two versions of the Objective and comments on the significance of the change, the focus for deliverables, and the circumstances surrounding the change.

**Table 14. Comparison of the two Objectives available for the project**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **VERSION AND WORDING** | **SIGNIFICANCE, FOCUS AND DELIVERABLES** |
| **From the LogFrame in the CEO Endorsement Request, Annex A, p.24 (Dec 2008) and the LogFrame in the ProDoc (Apr 2009):**  *The implementation of a Strategic Action Plan that builds on a foundation of scientific and technical studies and evolving partnerships, and uses these to inform policy, legislative and management decisions at the regional and national level* | Seeks SAP implementation. The rest is mainly descriptive but there is an indication of some deliverables – policies, legislation and management, at regional and national level.  This Objective would be achieved if the SAP is implemented. It is only required to **inform** policy, legislative and management decisions. |
| **From the Project framework in the CEO Endorsement Request, p.1 (Dec 2008), the LogFrame in Annex B of the Inception Report (Aug 2010) and the ToRs for this evaluation (Sep 2013):**  *To implement the BCLME SAP through the adoption of national policy reforms, the sustainable institutionalisation of a regional Commission, and the endorsement and ratification of a binding international Convention for the LME* | Seeks SAP implementation. Very specific deliverables:   * National policy reforms * Regional Commission * Convention   This Objective would be achieved if policy reforms are **adopted**, a regional Commission is **institutionalized** and a Convention **endorsed and ratified**. |

The difference is very significant. The original Objective only sought to **inform** policy, legislative and management decisions. Whereas the revised Objective sought the actual **adoption** of policy reforms, the **institutionalization** of the BCC, and the **endorsement** and **ratification** of the Convention.

Taken literally, the original Objective can be claimed to have been achieved fully; but the revised Objective has only been partly achieved. It can also be noted that the original Objective was more realistic because while projects can inform, they cannot adopt policy or ratify conventions.

**5.1.2 Progress towards the Objective**

The changed Objective, adopted for project implementation since the Inception Workshop was …

*To implement the BCLME SAP through the adoption of national policy reforms, the sustainable institutionalisation of a regional Commission, and the endorsement and ratification of a binding international Convention for the LME*

At the time of project development, the SAP[[39]](#footnote-39) that the Objective was targeting had six Policy Actions and a number of discrete interventions under each as in the following table.

**Table 15. Scope of the SAP current at the time of project development**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **SAP POLICY ACTION** | **INTERVENTION** | **ADDRESSED BY PROJECT** |
| A. Sustainable management and utilization of living marine resources | a) Regional structure | **✓** |
| b) Joint surveys and assessments | - |
| c) Harmonising management of shared stocks | - |
| d) Assessment of non-exploited species | - |
| e) Regional mariculture policy | - |
| f) Socio-economic analysis | - |
| g) Fishery conservation measures | **✓** |
| h) Code of conduct for responsible fisheries | - |
| B. Management of mining and drilling activities | a) Regional consultation framework | **✓** |
| b) Policy harmonisation | - |
| c) Cumulative impact assessment | - |
| d) Coordination of actions relating to offshore exploration and production of oil and gas | - |
| C. Assessment of environmental variability, ecosystem impacts and improvement of predictability | a) Development of environmental early warning system | - |
| b) Baseline establishment | **✓** |
| c) Improving predictability of extreme events | - |
| d) Harmful algal blooms (HABs) | - |
| e) Climate change | - |
| D. Management of pollution | a) Harmonising environmental quality objectives | - |
| b) Oil pollution contingency plans and regional policy | - |
| c) Implementation of MARPOL 73/78 | - |
| d) Marine litter | - |
| E. Maintenance of ecosystem health and protection of biological diversity | a) Vulnerable species and habitats | - |
| b) Ballast water policy | - |
| c) Marine biological diversity conservation | - |
| F. Capacity strengthening | a) Strategic plan for capacity strengthening | **✓** |
| b) Implementation of strategic plan for capacity strengthening | **✓** |

In the event, the project only addressed explicitly six action initiatives that had been identified under the SAP. Other themes and initiatives may have been brought in under some of the project Outcomes and Outputs, but only indirectly. So, while it can rightly be claimed that the project has addressed its Objective because it implemented six initiatives from the SAP, six out of 26 is hardly impressive.

The original LogFrame and that which introduced the new Objective provided the same single Indicator to assist with the measurement of progress towards the Objective.

**Table 16. Critique of the indicator selected for the Objective**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **INDICATOR FOR THE OBJECTIVE** | **CRITIQUE BY THE EVALUATOR** |
| An effective regional and national capacity established and sustainable that will manage the LME in a cooperative, transboundary manner | This Indicator is so generic and vague that it requires Indicators itself!!! In fact, it is not very helpful in trying to determine whether the Objective has been achieved. It is not SMART.  The Objective sought three products:  Adoption of national policy reforms  Institutionalization of a regional Commission  Endorsement and ratification of Convention  But the Indicator set about to measure regional and national capacity to manage – it is a mis-match.  It is only partly **Specific** to the Outcome and could be claimed to relate to the Commission. It is difficult to **Measure** (how do you know whether it is “effective” and “sustainable”) and while it may be **Achievable** it may not be easy to **Attribute** it to the project. “Effective capacity” is not really **Relevant** to the Outcome and probably difficult to **Track**. And it is not **Time-bound**. |

Setting aside the unhelpful Indicator, and taking the three products that were sought by the Objective as a measure of progress, only one can be said to have been achieved fully – the regional commission. Each of the other two has been partly achieved. However, knowing what the original Objective was targeting and in the acknowledgement that a project cannot be expected to adopt policy or ratify a convention, the overall effort has been commendable and merits a rating of **Satisfactory (S)**[[40]](#footnote-40).

**5.2 Project Outcomes**

The four Outcomes targeted by the project were:

1. A Benguela Current Commission Infrastructure and Associated Convention
2. National Level Policy and Management Reforms
3. Sustainable Capacity for LME Management
4. Capture and Networking of Knowledge and Best Practices

As is evident from the above, Outcome 1 covers products 2 and 3 of the Objective; Outcome 2 covers product 1 of the Objective. In other words, if Outcomes 1 and 2 are achieved, the Objective would have been achieved. Outcome 3 enhances the chances of sustainability of the three Objective products whereas Outcome 4 provides the outreach for the Objective and one of the manifestations that BCLME is being managed in a transboundary manner. It is safe to say that each of the four Outcomes is relevant to the Objective and that each will make a contribution towards it.

Normally, Indicators are adopted in the LogFrame to assist with monitoring and evaluation of progress towards the Outcomes. For this project, none of the four versions of the LogFrame had any Indicators for the Outcomes and it was left to PIR2010 to adopt Indicators for each Outcome. In the following table, the Indicators for each of the four Outcomes are critiqued for their usefulness in assessing progress towards the respective Outcome. Then, the evaluation questions which arise from the Outcome wording, are brought in as posed to the PMU together with the PMU response. This is supplemented by information provided in the PMU’s Project Terminal Report. The last column carries the evaluator’s observations and assessment of progress towards the Outcome and rates the achievement.

**Table 17. Analysis of the activities, targets and indicators for the Outcomes, and progress achieved**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **OUTCOMES** | **INDICATORS FROM PIR2010[[41]](#footnote-41)** | **CRITIQUE OF THE INDICATORS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE OUTCOME** | **EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS BY THE PMU SUPPLEMENTED BY INFORMATION FROM THE PMU PROJECT TERMINAL REPORT** | **EVALUATOR’S COMMENTS AND RATINGS** |
| **Outcome 1:**  A Benguela Current Commission Infrastructure and Associated Convention | 2. BCC national and regional structures and functions in place  3. BCC Convention in place by end of December 2012  4. Regional strategies and guidelines for policy and legislative realignment in place  5. Regional Monitoring and Assessment Programme in place  6. Updated 5-year BCC Science Programme and year 1 work plan in place | Five indicators for one outcome is too many. But these are not really indicators of whether the Outcome has been achieved – they are targets, outputs and activities. 2 and 3 are simplistic and have no added value. 4, 5 and 6 are not relevant – even if they are “achieved” the Outcome may not be achieved.  They are not SMART Indicators.  2 and 3 repeat the obvious and are **Specific** to the Outcome but 4, 5 and 6 are not. They are probably **Measurable** and they may be **Achievable** but it may not be easy to **Attribute** them to the project. 4, 5 and 6 are not **Relevant** to the Outcome (in fact, 4 is relevant to Outcome 2). They are all easy to **Track** because they are, in effect, tangible outputs.  In fact, this Outcome probably did not need Indicators. | ***Has the BCC been established?***  Yes, fully operationalized with all requisite roles and structures  ***Has the Convention been adopted?***  No, while it has been signed by all three, only Namibia has ratified  ***Summarized from Project Terminal Report (based on Outputs) –***  National structures achieved with the appointment of National Coordinators; NISGs piloted in Namibia, considered uncertain, discontinued.  Regional structuresachieved. Positions in BCC defined and filled until November 2011 when Secretariat relocated to Swakopmund;  BCC Data and Information Manager position vacant since Dec 2011, Regional Training Coordinator vacant since Sep 2013.  A prototype Regional State of the Ecosystem Information System (SEIS) delivered to BCC but no further progress to finalise and operationalize. Comprises key thematic areas including; fisheries, oceanography, pollution and oil spill incidents, extent of outfalls from coastal towns, minerals exploration and production and the extent of coastal development. In partnership with NACOMA and SPAN projects revised national core set of environmental indicators (NCEI) for the coastal zone and national coastal parks.  TDA/SAP and Science Programme revised and Implementation Plan in place.  BCC Convention signed by all three but ratified only by Namibia to date.  Scoping study for a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) carried out together with economic valuation of the extractive sectors in the BCLME. | The Outcome sought the infrastructure for the BCC, and a Convention and the project has delivered on both counts.  In spite of the unhelpful Indicators the evaluator is aware of the project’s success with this Outcome. Even if only one out of three countries have actually ratified the Convention, the project can be said to have been as successful as it could have been – it is not within the competence of a project to ratify a convention. The most it can do is assist with the drafting, support the negotiations process, lobby for its signature, provide justification for the countries to ratify, and facilitate the process – the project has done all this and Outcome 1 is rated as **Highly Satisfactory (HS).** |
| **Outcome 2:** National Level Policy and Management Reforms | 7. National Focal Institutions (NFIs) in place and functioning (hosting the NCs)  8. National Action Plans in place by the end of 2011  9. National strategies and guidelines for policy and legislative realignment in place  10. IW indicators under implementation through National Monitoring Programmes.  11. IW indicator data incorporated into BCC State of the Ecosystem Information System (SEIS)  12. National Inter-sectoral Stakeholder Groups (NISGs) in place and participating in the SAP IMP Project  13. BCC policy, planning, research and management instruments endorsed at national level | Seven Indicators for one Outcome are excessive. But, same as above, these are not really indicators of whether the Outcome has been achieved. Only 13 is relevant to the reforms sought.  Even if they were Indicators, they are not SMART. 8, 9 and 13 are **Specific** to the Outcome but the rest are not. 9, 11 and 13 are too vague, but the others are probably **Measurable**. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13 should be **Achievable** but in fact they have not all been achieved. 13 in particular may be difficult to **Attribute** to the project. Only 13 is **Relevant** to the Outcome. Most are possible to **Track**. Not all are **Time-Bound**. | ***Have reforms been carried out at national level?***  Yes, to limited extent  ***Summarized from Project Terminal Report (based on Outputs) –***  National Focal Institutes (NFIs) in each country in and cover the operations of the Secretariat;  No formal National Action Plans (NAPs) are in place; the rationale for NAPs was questioned;  A final draft Ocean Policy for South Africa as a tool to harmonise national level policies and legislation that pertains to the use of and access to the marine environment;  Support to Namibia’s Law Reform and Development Commission to revise the Marine Resources Act to incorporate the transboundary management of living marine resources and the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF);  Draft National Management Plans for Angola and Namibia and, a draft Joint Management plan for horse mackerel;  Inter-calibration to enable the integration of Cape hakes survey data from different vessels to derive a holistic assessment of the stock;  Support to Namibia to develop a long-term strategy for the development of the fishery and aquaculture sectors, includes incorporation of joint management of transboundary stocks and EAF;  Scoping study for a Strategic Environmental Assessment which shows the activities, resultant impacts and future development plans for the fisheries, shipping and transport, industrialisation, coastal infrastructure and tourism sectors in the BCLME;   * None of the above has been approved at the national and/ or bilateral levels but are strategic in setting the scene for national and bilateral policy, institutional and management reforms in the BCLME. | The Outcome sought reforms in policy and management approach at national level, presumably to allow the implementation of commitments under BCC at national level – i.e. National Action Plans (NAPs) to give effect to the SAP with policies and legislation revised/amended to reflect Convention and other commitments. Such reforms would also permit harmonization of approach and joint monitoring as a foundation for joint management.  As noted by the PMU Terminal Report, no reforms have actually taken place at national level and the only result that the project can claim is that it has influenced a “setting the scene” for reforms process. NAPs development process would have provided an opportunity to identify policies and management regimes that required reform but this opportunity has been missed.  Progress towards Outcome 2 has been **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**  This rating gives credit for the supportive and preparatory work carried out by the project; but also reflects the fact that no reforms took place and no NAPs were prepared |
| **Outcome 3:** Sustainable Capacity for LME Management | 14. BCC Regional TCB Strategy in place  15. Number of partnerships for long-term sustainable TCB through mentoring, skills sharing, staff exchanges and in-service training.  16. Resource Mobilisation and Partnership Strategy in place by end of 2012  17. Percent of stakeholder participation and involvement activities successfully implemented by 2014  18. BCC Business Plan in place by 2012  19. Government contributions to BCC as commitment to its long-term financial sustainability  20. National Sustainability Strategies in place (outlining financial commitments to the BCC)  21. Number of regional and international partnerships (with agreements annexed and a work plan and budget for the first year) in place by 2014.  22. Number of national partnerships (with agreements annexed and a work plan and budget for the first year) in place by 2014 | Once again far too many Indicators for one Outcome – three to four real Indicators is all that is needed.  This Outcome definitely needs Indicators since capacity is notoriously difficult to evaluate without a prior assessment to establish the baseline.  But these are not really indicators of whether the Outcome (Capacity) has been achieved – they focus on misplaced Outputs instead of the Outcome.  14 and 15 are **Specific** to the Outcome but none of the others are. All but 17 and 19 are probably **Measurable**. While they may all be **Achievable**, it may not be easy to **Attribute** them to the project. Only 14 and 15 are **Relevant** to the Outcome. All but 21 and 22 should be possible to **Track**. 21 and 22 are impossible to gauge since they relate to a time-scale that goes beyond project closure. | ***Is there adequate capacity for LME management, and is it sustainable?***  Yes, but high staff losses are experienced in some cases as people go for greener pastures  ***Summarized from Project Terminal Report (based on Outputs) –***  Implementation of a Training and Capacity Building (TCB) Strategy for the BCC. But, national consultations have not been completed in Angola and South Africa as part of a training needs analysis to update the TCB Strategy.  Partnerships with University of Namibia to support training in EAF. MoU with the Namibia Fisheries Institute for capacity development in Responsible Fisheries Management; MoU with the University of Cape Town for the implementation of EAF and capacity development in EAF; MoU with the University of the Western Cape to support capacity development in various areas that still needs to be mutually identified.  Partnership with the IMO and its Global Initiative for Western, Central and Eastern Africa (GI WACAF) for demonstration activities in oil spill cooperation and reduction of impacts from ballast water;  MoU with the World Wildlife Fund based in Cape Town for implementation of EAF; Agreement with the Danish Technical University to improve skills and capacity in stock assessment and identification using genetics and ageing of fish; MoU with the Norwegian/ FAO-funded EAF-Nansen Project which builds capacity for EAF at national and regional levels. University of Bergen for capacity building and research in fisheries, responsible oil exploration and production and ecosystem modelling. MoU with the Scottish Association of Marine Science (SAMS) for capacity building and research fisheries, responsible oil exploration and production and ecosystem modelling; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil – partnership for capacity building through exchanges and mentoring between Angolan and this Brazilian institution.  Draft Resource Mobilisation and Partnership Strategy developed to BCC in August 2012. A draft Business Plan was delivered.  The project supported the BCC with the establishment of 11 partnerships and networks, particularly the Africa LME Caucus; A partnership agreed with IMO and the Global Initiative for Western, Central and Southern Africa (GI WACAF) to enhance capacities for regional cooperation in transboundary oil spill response, and reduction of impacts from ballast water. Collaboration with the GEF-funded Orange-Senqu River Basin Project (OSRB) on the identification and address of potential impacts from the altered flow of the Orange-Senqu River on the BCLME. MoU with the Namibia Coast Conservation and Management (NACOMA) Project to support revising a standard national core set of environmental indicators (NCEI) for the marine and coastal environments of Namibia. MoU with the Norwegian-FAO funded EAF Nansen Project for iconducting Ecological Risk Assessments (ERAs), establishing a baseline and data gaps to address the human dimension of fisheries and, to review institutional setups of the fisheries authorities and recommend institutional reforms to enable EAF implementation at national level; MoU with the Danish Technical University (DTU) to improve stock assessment and identification methodology and approaches to improve the identification and assessment of transboundary fish stocks. Collaborative partnership with the ACP Fish II Programme for the development of national and a joint management plans for horse mackerel for Angola and Namibia. The project supported the BCC’s Data and Information Manager (DIM) to participate in partnership meetings and events. Partnership with the University of Bergen (UB) in Norway. A MoU with the Scottish Association for Marine Science (SAMS) is in place.  The following partnerships at the national level have been supported:  No national partnerships are in place for Angola  Namibia: UNAM, NAMFI, NACOMA Project (*details above*);  South Africa: UWC, UCT, WWF (*details above*).  Coordination and Management of Stakeholder Participation  Given the number of events sponsored and co-sponsored and that some have been cancelled, the project has achieved at least 80% implementation success;  The participation of stakeholders were guided by the project’s Stakeholder Involvement Plan (SIP) of 2008 while contemporary trends in social media and the use of economic valuation to foster buy-in from stakeholders have been tested. In addition, UNOPS contracted International Knowledge Management (IKM) to support stakeholder participation and engagement through DLIST.  Progress on the broad areas proposed to enhance stakeholder awareness.  *Process update newsletter, including national activities*  *New stakeholders briefing meeting/symposium*  *National and regional sectorial working groups*  Email listservs/ group email lists  *On-line discussion forums* – IKM has been delivering this via DLIST  Web-based information sharing tools  Lessons learned meetings or consultations  *Communication strategy development and implementation* *International Workshop Fund*  *Training and capacity building partnerships* – *see results above.*  Strategic and milestone events directly hosted or co-hosted by the project;   * + Regional Inception meeting;   + Nationa inception in Angola;   + National meetings of the Convention Task Groups;   + Four regional convention negotiation meetings (Nam, SA, Ang, Nam)   + EAF meetings/ workshops (Tracking Tool, Human Dimension, and Institutional review)   + Stakeholder meeting in Luanda to form the National Task Group   + Climate change workshop   + Annual science forum (2010 and 2011)   + National Fisheries Conference in Namibia to develop a strategy that incorporates joint management of shared stocks and institutionalisation of EAF. This was strategic given Namibia is the middle country that shares commercially important stocks with Angola and South Africa;   + Stakeholder meetings in Walvis Bay and Windhoek on BCC, SAP, Convention, DLIST and public participation;   + Stakeholder meeting in Cape Town on BCC, SAP, Convention, DLIST and public participation;   + Oil Spill Contingency Planning workshop in Luanda;   + Two Ministerial Conferences, five MB and two EAC meetings. The MCs issue *Communiqués* that define the strategic interventions of the Commission;   + Two Ocean Day celebrations in Namibia;   + The signing of the Benguela Current Convention, 18 March 2013;   + Regional and national consultations for; development of the Data and Information Policy and Protocol, development of a Training and Capacity Building Policy, formation of the Finance and Administrative Committee (FAC), conducting the scoping study for a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), the economic valuation of the extractive sectors; management planning for the ORM estuary and horse mackerel and, for the revision and updating of the TDA/ SAP and Science Programme;   + BCC’s participation in UNFCCC CoP, Rio+20, the GEF STAP Meeting, World Ocean Council’s Sustainable Oceans Summit, two Biennial GEF IW Conferences, annual participation in the African LME Caucus, ICES WGLMEBP and Global LME Consultative meetings in Paris, and the first GEF IW Science Conference. | The Outcome sought capacity for LME management on a sustainable basis. It did not ask for resource mobilization, or partnerships, unless these are for capacity building. Neither did it ask for stakeholder participation. By placing these activities under this Outcome, project design diluted the importance of the Outcome and denigrated resource mobilization, partnerships and stakeholder participation.  This evaluation is focussing on the Outcome and while not denying that resource mobilization, partnerships and stakeholder involvement are crucial activities for the project to pursue, they should have been elsewhere.  In assessing this Outcome, it must be remembered that training is not capacity. Having said that, and acknowledging that the project has carried out numerous training activities, it can be assumed that capacity has been enhanced, although this has not been measured.  Progress towards this Outcome is considered as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Outcome 4:** Capture and Networking of Knowledge and Best Practices | 23. Number of information packages developed and distributed annually (information on topics, distribution list, etc. captured as part of monitoring)  24. Number of lessons and best practice documents produced and distributed annually (information on themes/ topics covered, distribution list, replication, etc. captured as part of monitoring)  25. Concept Paper (outlining objectives, approach, participation, etc.) on African LME Network in place. Agreed work plan and budget for African LME Network establishment.  26. Number of international networking and partnership agreements (with detailed terms of references for partnerships) in place. | This is the right number of Indicators for an Outcome.  This Outcome needs Indicators to help determine what system has been established and how it has functioned.  23 and 24 are almost SMART Indicators. 25 is less so because it is less relevant to the Outcome and in effect it is an output. 26 is also almost SMART.  All four are **Specific** to the Outcome and all are **Measurable**. While they may all be **Achievable**, there has to be reference to Baselines and Targets. It should be possible to **Attribute** them to the project. All are are **Relevant** to the Outcome. All can be **Tracked** and with Targets, can determine when they have been reached. | ***Have knowledge and best practices been captured?***  Yes. Some knowledge and best practices have been captured and shared.  ***Is there knowledge networking?***  Knowledge networking has been taking place more at the regional and international levels among planners, scientists/ technicians and managers involved in ocean or LME issues.  ***Summarized from Project Terminal Report (based on Outputs) –***  IKM developed and delivered the procedure for the capturing, transferring and replication of knowledge, lessons and good practices. The procedure was tested but these have not been branded and disseminated;  Project did not achieve the desired success in this area.  BCC website operational for almost three years (but offline for some months in 2013).  DLIST web-based platform refurbished in 2010 and accessible since. Offers a distance learning course in Coastal Environmental Engineering.  The project delivered 100% of information that has been critical for improve management and policy making; Summary of BCC Science Programme results shared with line ministries in 2011.  The project disseminates 100% of all materials at project, BCC and other events and via the website.  African LME Caucus established;  The project supported BCC to collaborate with the Global Oceans Forum to stage and participate in Ocean Days hosted during the UNFCCC CoP in Durban and the Rio+20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.  Networking and/ or partnerships established with other (non-LME) relevant  The IMO’s Global Initiative for Western and Central Africa (GI WACAF) has extended its geographic scope to cover that of the Abidjan Convention. GI WACAF therefore now includes the BCLME countries and is a network of country and industry focal points who work together to improve capacities for oil spill contingency planning and response. BCC and IMO will enter into a partnership for 2014-2015 to pilot a cooperative approach and to reduce impacts from ballast water | The Outcome sought the capture and recording of knowledge and best practices and their sharing through a network platform. The Targets appear fuzzy.  The evaluation is looking to see the extent to which knowledge and best practice have been captured (recorded, archived, managed) - there has been information put out which has raised awareness (see for example Annex 8 for a list of project “publications”), but extent of management is not known.    The evaluation is also looking for proof that knowledge and best practice have been networked (distributed, made accessible) - some distribution known to have taken place but no data management platform for storage and sharing data and info; no strong networks across boundaries, although some informal ones exist[[42]](#footnote-42).  This Outcome has been partly achieved **Moderately Satisfactorily (MS)** |
| **Overall conclusions and ratings:**  The project has partly achieved its Objective, completely achieved Outcome 1but only partly achieved Outcomes 2, 3 and 4. The achievement of Outcome 1 has come at a cost to the other Outcomes. While the BCC Secretariat is now established and on a good footing and the Convention has been signed, there is no national level instrument (NAPs) for the implementation of the SAP, and national policies, legislation and management practices have yet to be reformed to comply with the commitments under the Convention. Capacity has been enhanced but almost exclusively within upstream and government levels. Stakeholder involvement, especially from community and grassroots level, was abandoned by the project in favour of other activities supporting Outcome 1. Information has been captured and some networking has taken place, but there is no effective and functioning information management system to transcend sectors within each country or country boundaries. The project has achieved a Satisfactory rating for the Objective, a Highly Satisfactory rating for Outcome 1, a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for Outcome 2 and Moderately Satisfactory ratings for Outcomes 3 and 4. The overall rating for project effectiveness is **Moderately Satisfactory (MS).** | | | | |

**5.3 Mainstreaming of UNDP corporate goals**

“Mainstreaming” is not something that you achieve; it is a process through which something that would otherwise be marginal is brought into the core business and main decision-making process of an organization. UNDP has adopted a number of corporate goals, mostly reflecting the Millennium Declaration, and there is a commitment that these should become mainstreamed into all its functions and interventions. The most relevant for a project such as this are gender equality, alleviation of poverty and safeguarding human rights and there is a commitment that these become an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, programmes and projects of the organization. It is therefore incumbent on an evaluator of a UNDP project to assess the extent to which the project took on board these UNDP goals.

The ProDoc barely mentions **gender**[[43]](#footnote-43). In fact it is only mentioned three times, all in relation to IKM’s ToRs as a sub-contractor. The project does not have an overt genderperspective and according to PIR2010, the mandatory UNDP gender marker is rated as “0”, and it goes on to provide figures that show that project personnel are divided 50/50 among women and men. PIR2011 confirms that no gender or social needs assessment has been carried out and that the project does not specifically target women or girls as key stakeholders. PIR2013 confirms that the project did not specifically target gender issues, but also notes that although there has been no specific targeting of women as beneficiaries, two significant milestones of the project have been realised through female majority leadership. The national convention negotiation task groups of all three countries were women who are in senior management roles in government while, two of the three ministers who signed the convention are women. The PSC of the project also has close to 50% female representation and during the BCC Youth Summit, 40% of the participants were female. Many more examples exist which demonstrate the three governments’ objective to improve women's representation in management and decision-making roles.

The ProDoc did recognize the level of **poverty** among its grassroots stakeholders and beneficiaries. For example it notes that at the time of project formulation, in South Africa “*some 20,000 households living in poverty depend on line-fish catches for about 9% of their household income*”; that in Angola, “*95% of the population live in poverty (under US$1 per day) or extreme poverty (less than 76 US cents per day)*”; that “*The countries have already accepted and noted the linkages between ecosystem health, food security, and the overarching challenge of poverty alleviation. The dependence of coastal populations on marine resources for their subsistence and for income generation demonstrates to politicians and decision-makers the importance of maintaining the ecological integrity within the LME*”; it pledges that “*the Project will also assist the countries in meeting their commitments to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly Goals 1 (Eradication of Poverty and Hunger)* …”; and it finishes with the over-arching statement – “*Poverty is still predominant in many areas, especially in Angola, and coastal fish catches are a subsistence requirement still for many coastal communities*.” In view of the serious attention given to poverty in the ProDoc, it is surprising that in its implementation, the project side-lined the coastal communities, and failed to listen to their request for a meaningful role in the decisions being made to manage the resources that they depend on for their subsistence.

**Human rights** are just mentioned in passing, twice in the ProDoc, and the project cannot be seen as having considered, let alone mainstreamed, human rights in its operations and implementation.

**5.4 Impacts**

The achievement of Outputs which lead to Outcomes is assessed by LogFrame analysis which is mainly carried out by the Project M&E System, and confirmed by the TE with reliance on good Indicators. The conversion of Outcomes to Impacts often requires an Intermediate stage and this is assessed mainly by TE methodology. It is predicated by Assumptions, and is dependent on Impact Drivers which include Relevance, Sustainability and Catalytic effects.

**5.4.1 Impacts at the national level**

The project focused very strongly on Outcome 1 whose products were of a regional nature. However, its work which has been predominantly upstream within the government sector, has no doubt led to a number of Intermediate Impacts at national level – capacity, awareness, demonstrations, governance frameworks, tools and methods. The next step to achieve truly national level impacts is dependent on the manner in which those that will inherit the legacy of the project extend its area of operations to a broader constituency of stakeholders, especially the private sector and those at community level. It is also dependent on the extent to which the regional agreements will be internalized at national level. In particular, the conversion of the SAP into National Action Plans will be a significant step towards national level impacts.

**5.4.2 Regional impacts**

The Benguela Current LME is a regional resource shared by three countries. The benefits of the BCLME are shared, but so are the problems. It is therefore imperative that the entire LME is managed in an integrated manner; and for this to happen, there must be an effective, cooperative framework on a regional basis.

This project has been instrumental in the setting up and strengthening of the Benguela Current Commission and its Secretariat as well as in facilitating a regional Convention. These products, together with the updated TDA and the revised SAP, do not constitute regional impacts but they serve as the foundation from which truly regional impacts can arise. For example, regional agreements on migratory fish stocks, pollution control, marine traffic, ballast waters, etc, have the potential to create significant regional impacts.

**5.4.3 Global environmental impacts**

The project addressed the GEF Operational Programme #8: Water body based Operational Programme, specifically its LME-oriented component, which aims for a comprehensive approach towards the sustainable management of the international waters environment. The goal of OP#8 is to assist countries in making changes in the ways that human activities are conducted in a number of sectors so that the particular waterbody and its multi-country drainage basin can sustainably support human activities. All three governments have been party to the BCLME Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA) that has been carried out and updated with GEF support and the formulation, adoption and revision of the Strategic Action Programme (SAP). This project has addressed priority threats/barriers to the BCLME, namely, the uncoordinated approach and weak institutional basis for the management of marine resources, in particular the threatened fisheries resources.

These targets fit well within the outcomes expected by OP#8 which include the long-term commitment on the part of governments, IAs, donors, and the GEF to leverage the intended sectoral changes to address the root causes of complex environmental problems.

The ample resources of the BCLME, its transboundary nature and the threats it is facing give it a global dimension and any benefits accruing to the LME are global benefits.

**5.5 Sustainability**

**5.5.1 The need for sustainability**

GEF has invested over USD20 million on the Benguela Current initiative and to date it is not easy to discern any results or impacts. The SAP-IMP project, in spite of its name, was still a purely foundational project – preparing the way for impacts to be achieved. It invested the greater part[[44]](#footnote-44) of its resources in terms of time, experts’ efforts, energy, and funds, into Outcome 1 which was the support to the BCC Secretariat and the adoption of the Convention. Like the majority of GEF-IW projects at this stage of their development, its results and impacts have yet to be achieved. It is therefore crucial that the foundation that has been laid down is sustainable.

It is also important to record that the SAP-IMP project is something of a pioneer as the first one to target a commission and convention for a Large Marine Ecosystem. As such, it could serve as a model for other regions and governments and as such, its potential for replicability is very important.

The ProDoc has a sub-section on Sustainability and makes numerous references to sustainability, applied mostly to the resources of the LME, particularly fisheries. Other forms of sustainability discussed apply to the BCC, and also sustainability of the SAP (which features as part of the Goal of the project) and the project products. In its discussion on sustainability, the ProDoc claims that four Outputs under Outcome 3 have been “*specifically designed to focus on addressing the need for sustainability ….. the most critical and important to the long-term maintenance and continuation of the BCLME Programme and its management mechanism*”. The four Outputs seek: capacity, finances, partnerships and stakeholder participation. The placement of these four activities under Outcome 3 was discussed in Section 5.2 where it was described as diluting the importance of the Outcome and denigrating resource mobilization, partnerships and stakeholder participation. However, if this apparent mis-match is set aside, these four activities are acclaimed as an effective mechanism for sustainability.

The ProDoc dedicates a sub-section to Replication although there are fewer references to replication than sustainability and virtually all are focused on Outcome 4, Output 4.1 in particular. There is reference to IKM and DLIST as well as IW:LEARN as partners/mechanisms which will help replication. However, apart from knowledge capture and broadcasting and a reference to feedback being possible through the DLIST website, the ProDoc gives the impression that replication is not something the project can take an active interest in.

The following discussions explore the extent to which sustainability and replication have been secured by the project (PMU, PSC, EA and IA).

**5.5.2 The exit strategy**

The project (PMU, PSC) has addressed the need for an exit strategy seriously. As early as November 2012, a full year before the planned project closure, the PM presented an Exit Strategy to the PSC-04b meeting.

As can be seen from the table below, the Exit Strategy focussed very much on activities that need to be carried out (by someone, most probably the BCC Secretariat) rather than on what the project is going to do towards a logical hand-over and to whom, to ensure sustainability of its products and services.

**Table 18.**  **Exit Strategy as presented by the PM to PSC-04b, from the minutes of the meeting**

|  |
| --- |
| * Invest in activities that will have long lasting value for the BCC and the countries. * Ensure the Strategic Plan, Business Plan and Resource Mobilisation and Partnership Strategy are accepted by BCC and are based on current resources available from governments and the potential from donors. * Have a signed and ratified Convention in place – this will give the BCC and countries higher bargaining power with donors as it demonstrates further commitment. * Address realistically the human resource needs of the Commission – i.e. will it work without National Coordinators? If so, how? * What is the BCC – a science or governance organisation? This will to a great extend define its scope of work and the required resources. Focus purely on transboundary resources? * Formalise partnerships with entities that have known resources and activities to support the Commission. * Review and verify the risks identified by the project and face them in a realistic manner – e.g. What if the Convention is not signed and/ or ratified? What if governments become too stretched with business as usual and there is diminishing participation in BCC structures, functions and activities? * Ensure the quality of project outputs so they can be meaningful and useful to the BCC and countries – e.g. SEIS and ecosystem goods and services valuation. SEIS was developed in 2006/07 by the BCLME Programme and is still not complete due to lack of data and information. * Prioritise instruments that set a standard for operating in the BCLME: e.g. standard for sea water quality, harmonised EIA frameworks, code of conduct for responsible mining, protection for nursery and spawning areas, etc. * Capitalise on available GEF support to implement activities that can ascertain the status of resources and look in particular at stress reduction and improving the environmental status |

More recently, the PM provided a very thorough and detailed sustainability plan to the evaluator. This plan lists the achievements of each Output under each Outcome and identifies the action/s required to enhance the chances of sustainability.

The project has carried out a structured approach to its winding down and while risks to sustainability remain, its efforts in this direction are commendable.

**5.5.3 Institutional sustainability**

The project has strived to build institutional capacity at the BCC Secretariat and this was done through continuous support both financial and in terms of expertise. It has also built capacity primarily in the fisheries sector but only within government institutions. With the closure of the project serious doubts have been expressed to the evaluator about the viability of the BCC Secretariat. In particular, there is concern about its communication function, its data management capabilities, and its monitoring and evaluation functions. This is all compounded by difficulties that the Secretariat appears to have in recruiting and retaining good staff.

There is also concern that at the time of writing, the Governments have not yet decided explicitly to replace and fund the in-country Coordinators which were hired by the project. This will create more difficulties for the operation of the BCC Secretariat because of a lack of a “gateway” at country level.

In an effort to dispel these concerns and enhance the chances of sustainability, the PM proposed to the PSC-4b and the BCC that they should consider which project outcomes and outputs should be *sustained in order to reach the desired impact* and listed the following:

* Ratified Convention – when the extended IA terminates, this will determine if the Commission exists or not;
* BCC Secretariat – ensure finance and admin policies are of good standard and are implementable; ensure sustainable funding for the operations; ensure salaries that can attract high quality Angolan and South Africa candidates; seek appropriate exemptions and immunities from the Namibian government;
* Harmonise policies and laws – as part of regional and international commitments (protocols and conventions) – proactively address instruments between and among countries that enable a practical approach for transboundary resources management; This is the mandate of the Commission and without country support and commitment it may only remain something that is talked about but does not exist;
* Public Private Partnerships – based on government policies, formulate a policy for PPPs for BCC that aims purely to make the operations of the Commission sustainable. The private sector shows interest – “strike while the iron is hot”;
* Strategic instruments – achieve full ownership of the draft Strategic Plan, Business plan and RMP Strategy so these can be used to market the BCC and attract resources

This, together with the documents and measures discussed above, is seen as sound advice and augurs well for the institutional sustainability of the main project products namely, the BCC Secretariat and the Convention and their sustainability is seen as **Likely (L)**. Similarly, the sustainability of institutions dealing with fisheries management is also seen as **Likely (L)** primarily as a result of the capacity building carried out and the partnerships fostered by the project. However, because of the shallow extent to which they were carried out, project activities in the area of policy and legislative reform, capacity building and institutional strengthening outside the government sector, and information management (apart from information distribution) are not assured and their sustainability is seen as **Moderately Unlikely (MU)**.

**5.5.4 Social sustainability**

The project did not bring in under its *aegis* some significant sectors – these include the private sector in general, the mining sector, pollution management exponents, artisanal fishers, coastal communities. It did not build any capacity among society at large and there is little, if anything, to be sustained. The exception to this might be the efforts it took to involve youth through a Youth Summit which took place in June 2013. However, this was the only event lower than the many upstream meetings, workshops, and similar events. The demonstration projects, mentioned in the Inception Workshop Report did not take place and the decision was made to downscale the community involvement activities.

The social sustainability of project products, services and other benefits overall, without a significant effort on the part of the BCC, is seen as **Unlikely (U).**

**5.5.5 Financial sustainability**

The evaluator was assured that adequate financial resources were available for the BCC Secretariat to fund staff positions[[45]](#footnote-45). However, there is widespread concern among stakeholders about the funds required to operationalize these positions. The evaluator was told “*sustainability is not assured, because finance is not secure.*”

Key government institutions in all three countries, see project interventions to be part of their core function and they expect to be able to continue these through their institutional budgetary resources and through existing donor funding. However, this is easier said than done and without continuing external aid funding, financial sustainability overall is considered as only **Moderately Likely (ML)**.

**5.5.6 Environmental sustainability**

This was an environmental project and the security of environmental sustainability should be a foregone conclusion. However, one of the major Policy Actions identified in the SAP namely, Maintenance of Ecosystem Health and Protection of Biological Diversity, was not addressed by the project.

More research, survey, analytical work, management/remedial actions and monitoring are required as proposed under the SAP Policy Actions C, D and E before environmental sustainability of the BCLME can be assured.

Environmental sustainability needs to also take into account the changing climate. Research is required to devise strategies to overcome the negative impacts of climate change and it is good to note that BCC has reached agreement with FAO on just such an intervention.

Without a fair degree of further research, investigation and analysis, environmental sustainability is seen as **Moderately Likely (ML).**

**6 CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY RATINGS**

**6.1 Conclusions**

**6.1.1 Project design and relevance**

The project arose out of the TDA investigations and the SAP identification of priorities and as such, it was very relevant to the needs of the three countries and the BCLME.

Project design aimed to remove the four barriers that had been identified namely,

* Absence of a regional structure and management mechanism
* Absence of effective national level institutional arrangements, and associated policies and legislation
* Inadequate long-term sustainable capacity either at the national or regional level
* Poor access to appropriate knowledge and best practices

In doing so, it addressed six out of a total of 26 interventions listed in the SAP. In hindsight, and in spite of attempts in the ProDoc to rectify the situation, project design remained focussed very much on the fisheries sector and within government upstream levels.

In the LME context, this project was designed as a trailblazer because no other LME had achieved the setting up of a Commission and the adoption of a Convention. Perhaps because of these targets, the project was aimed at the upstream level and almost exclusively within the government sector. There was little or no involvement of the private sector and no opportunities were provided for meaningful participation at the community level. A shortcoming in project design is the lack of consideration of meaningful involvement of stakeholders from coastal communities, subsistence and artisanal fishers and other grassroots constituents. Project design was also faulty in terms of budget allocations to various Outcomes, and in particular the underestimation of project management costs and the costs involved in obtaining Outcome 1.

**6.1.2 Project implementation efficiency**

The PSC was an effective governance body providing policy and guidance to the PMU and serving as a forum for cross-sectoral and transboundary consideration of project issues. The fact that its membership was almost identical to that of the BCC Management Board, coupled with the fact that the PMU and the BCC Secretariat were inextricably linked (by design), tended to obscure the boundaries between the project and the BCC.

The PMU performed its functions well and the project was implemented efficiently, most of the time, in the eyes of the majority of stakeholders. But this view was not universal and the PMU performance was described as not consistent. At least in one instance, it made decisions which were beyond its competence – the demonstration projects and other community focussed activities were abandoned in favour of higher expenditure on Outcome 1. This was in spite of the lengthy and detailed consideration in the ProDoc including an impressive survey and Stakeholder Involvement Plan, the commitment entered into at the Inception Workshop, the repeated warnings at PSC meetings, the conclusions and recommendation of the MTE, and the overarching policy of the GEF.

There is also the matter of project management costs which were reported to have increased well above the GEF guidance limit to reach almost 20% of total GEF expenditure. Explanations of mis-allocation provided by the PMU and UNDP may reduce this figure, but probably to not much less than 16%. But regardless of whether there was mis-allocation or not (which illustrates careless book-keeping) it should have been noticed that project management costs were creeping well beyond the 10% limit imposed by the GEF and better control and sanction should have been exercised by the PSC, the IA and the EA.

**6.1.3 Project results**

The ProDoc targeted two prime products from the project – a ‘tried-and-tested’ LME Commission along with supportive regional and national structures, and an associated binding international legal agreement for transboundary management of the BCLME and its globally important fisheries. These would be underpinned by appropriate policy, legislation and operational practices at the national level; improved capacities through training and institutional strengthening; adequate financing mechanisms; more effective stakeholder participation throughout all sectors with a specific emphasis toward community inputs; and, knowledge products captured, distributed and replicated both within the BCLME region and beyond.

At the end of the project, the BCC Secretariat is established and on a good footing and the Convention has been signed. But there is no national level instrument (NAPs) for the implementation of the SAP, and national policies, legislation and management practices have yet to be reformed to comply with the commitments under the Convention. Capacity has been enhanced but almost exclusively within upstream and government levels. Stakeholder involvement, especially from community and grassroots level, was abandoned by the project in favour of other activities supporting Outcome 1. Information has been captured and networking has taken place, but there is no effective and functioning information management system to transcend sectors within each country or boundaries between countries.

Since BENEFIT was launched in 1995, followed by the BCLME Programme, and on to the SAP-IMP Project, a total of 18 years have passed and more than USD20 million has been invested by the GEF. A very good foundation has been laid but real results have yet to happen. The TDA, the SAP, the Commission and the Convention are not results. Results will have been achieved if an affirmative answer can be given to the following two questions:

* Has the decline in fisheries been halted and reversed?
* Has ecosystem degradation been halted and reversed?

It is essential that support, from GEF and elsewhere, be continued to protect the investment that has been made in the BCLME and achieve the above ultimate results.

**6.1.4 Monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring is the repeated, regular measurement or observation of a pre-determined parameter in a strictly consistent manner. It records departures from the baseline as well as trends away from or towards established targets. Analysis of the data obtained from monitoring can be used to predict and forecast outcomes and corrective action can be implemented before impacts become irreversible.

The project did have a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan but this was not recognized by the PMU. An M&E Officer was hired but according to the PMU, much of his time was devoted to familiarization with the project, and assisting with budget and work plan finalization. Some regular assessment of progress towards the project Objective and Outcomes did take place using a variety of monitoring tools. And, the results may have been used to guide project implementation and revise and refine implementation plans through adaptive management.

However, project monitoring failed to pick up (or failed to act on the information) that an inordinate proportion of the project’s resources were being diverted to Outcome 1 and that other outcomes were suffering as a result. It also failed to pick up that a commitment to community involvement was not being addressed. And, that financial management was not robust enough to ensure that expenditure remained within allocated resources and GEF guidance limits. Ultimately, it is not so important whether monitoring is carried out – what is even more important is what you do with the results of monitoring.

**6.1.5 Sustainability**

Rightly or wrongly, the project invested most of its resources (financial, time, expertise) into supporting the BCC Secretariat and in getting the Convention signed. This was right on one hand because these were prime targets of the project. But on the other hand, this was done at the expense of the other project targets, such as the policy and institutional reforms required at national level, and the outreach to a broader stakeholder base. Project integrity may have been jeopardized by the lower attention at the national level and sustainability may have been compromised.

As early as November 2012, a full year before the planned project closure, the PM presented an Exit Strategy to the PSC which focussed very much on activities that need to be carried out (by someone, most probably the BCC Secretariat) in order to ensure sustainability.

More recently, the PM provided a very thorough and detailed sustainability plan to the evaluator. This plan lists the achievements of each Output under each Outcome and identifies the action/s required to enhance the chances of sustainability. The project has carried out a structured approach to its winding down and while risks to sustainability remain, its efforts in this direction are commendable.

Ideally, either through the use of remaining project funds or through new funds to be made available for follow-up by UNDP, an Exit Workshop should be organized. The Exit Workshop must bring together project personnel (including past consultants) and those organizations and individuals who are identified as being in a position to continue with the work of the project. These must include the BCC Secretariat and key government organizations (beyond fisheries) as well as exponents of the private sector and coastal communities. At the Workshop, the project needs to outline the work accomplished and the outstanding work that still needs to be done. It is also necessary to identify the products/benefits/results achieved by the project and whether they can “live” on their own, or require a champion. Consensus then needs to be reached on who is taking over the responsibility both for unfinished work as well as for products and benefits that need to be “adopted” and sustained by someone else. It is most important that to the extent possible, a source of funding support is identified to ensure financial sustainability.

The Exit Workshop can be compared to the Inception Workshop. The latter serves to launch the project, whereas the former closes it and ensures sustainability.

**6.2 Summary of assessments made and ratings awarded**

The following summary focuses on the key elements of the project, including all those that were required to be rated. They arise from the analyses made of the data and information obtained according to the evaluation matrix in Annex 4.

| **CRITERION** | **SUMMARY COMMENTS** | **RATING** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **PROJECT FORMULATION** | | |
| Project concept and design | The project concept was straightforward and in response to the threat to the biodiversity of the large marine ecosystem posed by unsustainable harvesting. Project design has a number of flaws and shortcomings. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| Relevance | The project has been highly relevant to the needs of the three countries and the Benguela Current environment as well as to the GEF global objectives. | **Highly Satisfactory (HS)** |
| Stakeholder participation in formulation | Stakeholder participation in the formulation of this project started during the BCLME Programme. It led to direct involvement in project planning and formulation by stakeholders leading to a detailed Stakeholder Involvement Plan which was to be implemented by the project. | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION** | | |
| Project Governance | The PSC was an effective governance body providing policy and guidance to the PMU and serving as a forum for cross-sectoral and transboundary consideration of project issues. | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| Project Administration and Management | PMU performed well, most of the time, in the eyes of the majority of stakeholders, but its performance was not consistent. Project management costs were high. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Implementation Approach** | | |
| Stakeholder participation in implementation | Out of 18 stakeholders identified, 11 were government agencies, six were from the private sector and one could be considered as community/ grassroots. This bias was aggravated further when stakeholder involvement and participation, particularly at community level, was not considered important enough and many activities were discontinued. | **Unsatisfactory (U)** |
| Risk management | The project has recognized risks and addressed them in a number of ways but there have been some gaps in the risk management strategy. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Project finances** | | |
| Financial planning and management | Partial explanations, possible flaw in project design with allocations to Outcomes, and apparent lack of control and sanction by the PSC, the IA and the EA for budget planning, management and efficiency | **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** |
| Co-financing | In view of the large sums of money involved, much better detail is required | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Monitoring and Evaluation** | | |
| M&E Design, Plan and Budget | The project did carry out some monitoring activities, but these were not necessarily according to the M&E Plan. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| Use of LogFrame and Adaptive Management | None of the four versions of the Logframe for this project contained all the required elements, however, the changes at Output, Activities and budget allocation level can be seen as examples of adaptive management. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Role and performance of IA and EAs** | | |
| UNDP as the GEF IA | The UNDP Country Office in Namibia together with the UNDP/GEF RTA in Pretoria (since moved to Addis Ababa) provided adequate technical support. | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| UNOPS as the EA | Although its role was questioned by some, stakeholders confirm a good working relationship with UNOPS. Inaction in the face of serious time constraints may have impacted the TE | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **PROJECT RESULTS** | | |
| **Attainment of Objective and Outcomes** | | |
| **Objective**: To implement the BCLME SAP through the adoption of national policy reforms, the sustainable institution-alisation of a regional Commission, and the endorsement and ratification of a binding international Convention for the LME | Taking the three products that were sought by the Objective as a measure of progress, only one can be said to have been achieved fully – the regional commission. Each of the other two has been partly achieved. However, knowing what the original Objective was targeting and in the acknowledgement that a project cannot be expected to adopt policy or ratify a convention, the overall effort has been commendable. | **Satisfactory (S)** |
| **Outcome 1:** A Benguela Current Commission Infrastructure and Associated Convention | Only one out of three countries has ratified the Convention but it is not within the competence of a project to ratify a convention. The project has assisted with the drafting, supported the negotiations process, lobbied for its signature, provided justification for the countries to ratify, and facilitated the process – Outcome 1 has been achieved. | **Highly Satisfactory (HS)** |
| **Outcome 2:** National Level Policy and Management Reforms | No reforms have actually taken place at national level and the project has merely influenced a “setting the scene” for reforms process. NAPs development process would have provided an opportunity to identify policies and management regimes that required reform but this opportunity has been missed. | **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** |
| **Outcome 3:** Sustainable Capacity for LME Management | This Outcome was cluttered by Outputs which were not entirely relevant. The project has carried out numerous training activities, and it can be assumed that capacity has been enhanced, although this has not been measured. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Outcome 4:** Capture and Networking of Knowledge and Best Practices | Information put out which has raised awareness but extent of management is not known. Some distribution known to have taken place but no data management platform for storage and sharing data and info; no strong networks across boundaries, although some informal ones exist. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |
| **Sustainability** | | |
| Institutional sustainability | Because of their preliminary nature, project activities in the area of policy and legislative reform, capacity building and institutional strengthening outside the government sector, and information management (apart from information distribution) are not assured and their sustainability is uncertain. | **Moderately Unlikely (MU)** |
| Social sustainability | The social sustainability of project products, services and other benefits overall, is not assured without a significant effort on the part of the BCC, and this is not guaranteed. | **Unlikely (U)** |
| Financial sustainability | Without continuing external aid funding, financial sustainability overall is not assured. | **Moderately Likely (ML)** |
| Environmental sustainability | More research, survey, analytical work, management/remedial actions and monitoring are required as proposed under the SAP Policy Actions C, D and E before environmental sustainability of the BCLME can be assured. | **Moderately Likely (ML)** |
| **OVERALL PROJECT RATING** | The project has partly achieved its Objective, completely achieved Outcome 1, and only partly achieved Outcomes 2, 3 and 4. The achievement of Outcome 1 has come at a cost to the other Outcomes. While the BCC Secretariat is now established and on a good footing and the Convention has been signed, there is no national level instrument (NAPs) for the implementation of the SAP, and national policies, legislation and management practices have yet to be reformed to comply with the commitments under the Convention. Capacity has been enhanced but almost exclusively within upstream and government levels. Stakeholder involvement, especially from community and grassroots level, was abandoned by the project in favour of other activities supporting Outcome 1. Information has been captured and networking has taken place, but there is no effective and functioning information management system to transcend sectors within each country or boundaries between countries. | **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)** |

**7 RECOMMENDATIONS**

**7.1 Issue:** GEF has invested over USD20 million in the Benguela Current LME, primarily on its threatened fisheries resources and while this has been justified since BCLME is breaking new ground at the institutional and political commitment level, the time has come to extend the project activities beyond the institutional framework and the upstream foundational work and accelerate the implementation of the SAP.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended to UNDP as the agency at the forefront of BCLME initiatives, to ensure that further support to the BCC or the governments from GEF or elsewhere should give priority to operationalization of the SAP and in particular it should actively involve other sectors apart from fisheries, and institutions from outside government in the private sector, relevant NGOs and coastal communities at grassroots level.

**7.2 Issue:** GEF limits on project management costs are a challenge and in some cases unrealistic. It is also unreasonable to treat all projects as equal regardless of design and scope – they are not.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended to GEF (UNDP to make representations to GEF) to reconsider its universal cap on acceptable project management costs. GEF could raise the limit but regardless of whether it does or not, it needs to acknowledge that different projects have different project management needs and set limits accordingly. GEF could also provide guidance for project implementers on what precisely constitutes project management costs.

**7.3 Issue:** Many projects come to an end without an effective Exit Strategy. In fact, many Project Managers are not really sure of what an Exit Strategy entails. Much effort goes into handing over project physical assets but rarely is there the equivalent effort in handing over the intellectual assets created by the project.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended to UNDP and the GEF that an Exit Workshop or similar event be made a mandatory activity of project closure, in the same way as the Inception Workshop is part of the project launch. The Exit Workshop must bring together project personnel (including past consultants) and those organizations and individuals who are identified as being in a position to continue with the work of the project. At the Workshop, the project needs to outline the work accomplished and the outstanding work that still needs to be done and identify whether these can “live” on their own, or require a champion. Consensus then needs to be reached on who is taking over the responsibility both for unfinished work as well as for products and benefits that need to be “adopted” and sustained by someone else. It is most important that to the extent possible, a source of funding support is identified to ensure financial sustainability.

1. Figures as supplied by PMU and reflecting projected total up to the end of the project [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The same numbering for recommendations as in the full report has been retained so as to avoid confusion. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Taken from the evaluation Terms of Reference [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Global Environment Facility (2006) *The GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy*. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) (2007) *Ethical Guidelines for Evaluators*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Taken from the Evaluation Matrix which is in Annex 4 and which was prepared at the commencement of the contract and delivered as part of the Inception Report. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. As will be discussed in Section 5.1.1, and in view of changes to the Objective wording, this evaluation has used the version that was made available in the ToRs. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Global Environment Facility (2008) *Guidelines for GEF Agencies in Conducting Terminal Evaluations.* GEF Evaluation Office. Evaluation Document No.3 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. GEF Evaluation Office (2009) *Annual Performance Report 2008*. GEF Council Paper GEF/ME/C.35/Inf. 5, May 28, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. GEF Evaluation Office (2009) *Annual Performance Report 2008*. GEF Council Paper GEF/ME/C.35/Inf. 5, May 28, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office (2008) *Guidelines for GEF Agencies in Conducting Terminal Evaluations*. Evaluation Document No.3. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group (2005) *Standards for Evaluation in the UN System*. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Taken primarily from : Rohr, Nicole E (2008) *The Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem: A Social, Cultural, and Ecological Profile*. National Marine Fisheries Service, Large Marine Ecosystems Program. Presented in partial fulfilment of EVS 614; and Pochazka, K. et al (2005) *Global International Waters Assessment Benguela Current*. GIWA Regional Assessment 44. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), with the GEF and Kalmar University. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. An economic valuation of the extractive sectors of the BCLME was commissioned by the project with Prof. Rashid Sumaila from the University of British Columbia serving as the lead economist [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Pochazka, K. et al (2005) *Global International Waters Assessment Benguela Current*. GIWA Regional Assessment 44. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), with the GEF and Kalmar University. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem Programme (BCLME) (1999) *Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA) -* *A regional commitment to the sustainable integrated management of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem by Angola, Namibia and South Africa.*  UNDP, Windhoek. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. With apologies for using the English version of the names of institutions [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation (2002) *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*. OECD, Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See for example <http://www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fregionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th%2Fpractices%2Fenergy_env%2Fdocuments%2F2MSPAdaptiveManagementREV.ppt&ei=vJ-YUpL6OIP9ygOluIHIBQ&usg=AFQjCNHzThLYaH0v0NcMzsAOkhp_BDo0MQ&bvm=bv.57155469,d.bGQ&cad=rja> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The PM further indicated that the matter was discussed at PSC-4a in June 2012 and a revised LogFrame was presented. The evaluator could not confirm such a discussion from his review of the minutes. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The project obtained CEO endorsement in February 2009, National Coordinators were hired in June 2009 and the PM commenced duties in January 2010. The project’s original closing date was February 2013 but it was extended to December 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Sida, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden (2007) *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*. Originally produced by the Network on Development Evaluation, a subsidiary body of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. OECD-DAC (2001) *The DAC Guidelines* ***-*** *Strategies for Sustainable Development: Guidance for Development Co-operation.*  OECD, Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See <http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef/node/2024> [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. GEF (2012) *Policy on Public Involvement in GEF Projects*. Policy: GEF/PL/SD/01, updated 08/13/2012, originally endorsed by the GEF Council at its seventh meeting in April 1996. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. A parastatal exponent advised the evaluator that the petroleum sector would have benefited from the project had it addressed issues such as migratory marine mammals. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. As noted in the ProDoc, IKM/DLIST were pre-selected as the implementation partner by the External Project Appraisal Committee, *to be responsible for the management and day-to-day tasks required to achieve Outcome 4*. Subsequently, according to the contract issued to IKM by UNOPS in 2010, they were to provide technical assistance support to the project for the achievement of Outputs 3.4 and 4.1. In the event, the original contract with IKM was not renewed after the first year because of “*no sufficient resources to further engage*” (see for example PSC-03) and after a protracted period of negotiation, a replacement contract was issued with inadequate time remaining. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. The Inception Workshop noted - *Furthermore, and very importantly, the Project through IKM will support three pilot projects among local communities in Angola, Namibia and South Africa to raise awareness and empower people at the* *grassroots level about the BCC, the Convention development process, the Project and the impact of people on the marine and coastal environments. This will enable local people to participate in project activities and to meaningfully contribute to BCC and Project activities that have impact on their lives*.” [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. The PMU advised the evaluator that they had made representations to UNOPS HQ regarding this – reallocations were needed from Outcome 1 and from Project Management to better reflect what the funds have been spent on. UNOPS indicated that this will be done before project end, but no such adjustment has been seen by the evaluator. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The PMU also provided a similar explanation to the one provided by UNDP and discussed below namely, that costs have been misallocated. This does not create a sense of credibility for financial management. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. While not agreeing entirely with this calculation by the evaluator, the PM advised that from the time when UNOPS achieved ISO certification, his administration load tripled and a minimum of 50% of his time goes to project administration and management [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. This total figure is as supplied by the PMU who have been advised by the evaluator that the figures do not add up. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See - <http://gefweb.org/MonitoringandEvaluation/MEPoliciesProcedures/MEPTools/meptstandards.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. GEF Evaluation Office (2009) *Annual Performance Report 2008*. GEF Council Paper GEF/ME/C.35/Inf. 5, May 28, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. see <http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Factsheets/English/focus-areas/GBL_FAFS_IW_EN.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. To a number of stakeholders, the ISO certification (which has led UNOPS to pull back many functions to HQ in Copenhagen) has resulted in longer processing times for procurement and disbursement and an alienation from the project locality. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. It should also be noted that the box that is meant to contain the Objective in the PIF is blank. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The PM assured the evaluator that the Objective that has been used for implementation has been the same throughout and no changes were carried out or even envisaged. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. BCLME Benguela Current large Marine Ecosystem (2002) *Strategic Action Programme*. Originally published November 1999; Updated November 2002 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The PM endorsed the rating, but also commented that a) the BCC established a record of negotiating a treaty over a total of 11 days and four meetings and we had time to consider signing and ratification. In some parts of the world negotiation takes decades; b) South Africa’s internal process for ratification is completed as announced at the PSC while actual ratification can only be recorded once the Minister of International Cooperation personally deposits the convention to the Minister of Fisheries of Namibia; c) the Ocean Policy supported for S.A. was approved by parliament and while the interventions were limited, they were strategic to mobilise the principles of the convention and the mandate of BCC. The project’s real achievement is having raised awareness and understanding for the need to harmonise institutions, policies and management practices to ensure sustainable social and economic benefits from the LME. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. According to the PM these Indicators relate to the Outputs and not the Outcome, however, in PIR2010 they are presented as Indicators of the Outcome. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The PM advised that the project meant to support the BCC’s Data and Info Manager (DIM). The process did get going, but when the DIM resigned and the position remained vacant, the PSC was informed of the situation and agreed that activities should resume once the DIM is on board for sustainability. Unfortunately, the position remained vacant right up to project closure. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. The evaluator rejects the PM’s submission that it was only after the ProDoc was developed that the UNDP raised their focus on gender, poverty reduction, etc, and notes that these issues were promoted very strongly in the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 (see <http://www.undp-aap.org/resources/projects/undp-strategic-plan-2008-2011-accelerating-global-progress-human-development> ) and in earlier documents which were current at the time of project start-up. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Outcome 1 is reported as having received 38% of the total GEF budget and 47% of the funds spent on the four Outcomes. If adjustments are made to the funds ascribed as having been spent on Project Management, most of the movement is likely to be towards Outcome 1 which will increase its share of the GEF resources. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. As the PM noted - the BCC has secured US$16 million for 5 years for SAP implementation; a donor conference is planned for Apr 2014 together with a private sector forum. Norway has indicated interest to finance an extension of the science programme. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)