

GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA - CIVIL SERVICE AGENCY

**Final Evaluation of Senior Executive Service
and Transfer of Knowledge Through
Expatriate Nationals in Liberia**

Final Report

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Acronyms

AfT	Agenda for Transformation
CDO	County Development Officer
CSA	Civil Service Agency
CSRD	Civil Service Reform Directorate
DfID	Department for International Development of the United Kingdom
EGIRP	Economic Governance and Institutional Reforms Project
GEMAP	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoL	Government of Liberia
HR	Human Resources
LECBS	Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support
LISGIS	Liberia Statistics and Geo-Information Services
MAC	Ministries, Agencies and Commissions
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MPEA	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PIC	Project Implementation Committee
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SES	Senior Executive Service
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

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Varney Arthur Yengbeh, Jr.

Monrovia, Liberia
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Executive Summary

The Government of Liberia through the Civil Service Agency commissioned two independent evaluation consultants to conduct a final evaluation of the Senior Executive Service and Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals Programmes in Liberia. This evaluation was undertaken by the aforementioned evaluation team from mid-December 2013 to March 2014.

Purpose

The main objectives of this evaluation were to a) identify and take stock of the challenges and opportunities (SWOT analysis) of the current programme implementation and performance in Liberia; b) assess and document significant impact, success stories, lessons learned, insightful findings and recommendations from key stakeholders based on its inception and the entire implementation process; and c) develop recommendations on whether or not there is need for continuation and how differently should a new programme be designed in the future, and should there be need for continuation. Project impact and contributions will also be assessed.

Methodology and approach

The SES and TOKTEN Programmes were assessed in accordance with six evaluation criteria: design and relevance, partnership strategy, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The evaluation team paid keen attention on evaluating the desired outcomes, strengths and weaknesses of the existing programmes. Success stories, lessons learned, and insightful findings and recommendations were also verified and documented. The evaluation also emphasized a participatory approach involving all stakeholders and key informants, which was evidenced-based and analytical. A qualitative method of data collection, utilizing mixed methods, was used. The mixed methods included desk reviews, the administration of semi-structured questionnaires, and open-ended interviews. The field assessment including County Development Officers, County Government Authorities, UNMIL Civil Affairs Officers was carried out in the following six counties: Bomi, Bong, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount, Margibi and Nimba counties. The Civil Service Agency, United Nations Development Programme and beneficiary institutions have been consulted on their perspectives of the two programmes.

Key Findings

The evaluation found that the SES and TOKTEN programmes were and still remain highly relevant to Liberia's post-conflict rebuilding priorities. The programmes are aligned strategically with and in support of achieving the national development priorities of the country. The current capacity support is focused specifically on the much needed capacity building of the Government of Liberia (GOL). There is therefore a need to continue the programmes with special emphasis on key strategic areas of targeted line Ministries, Agencies and Commissions (MACs).

The SES programme was effective in terms of the recruitment and deployment of 98 SES professionals in 29 MACs for initial period of 3 years. Qualified Liberian professionals were hired locally and internationally to perform certain contractual functions for the government at the national and country levels. The 98 SES professionals included fifteen (15) County Development Officers (CDOs) who were deployed in all of Liberia's fifteen (15) counties. Similarly, the TOKTEN Programme recruited and fielded one hundred twenty-nine (129) professionals in various

capacities within 26 government institutions for a period of 6 to 18 months. Together, this was an impressive reach in the provision of mid-level managerial and technical skills to support and build the capacity in the Civil Service at the national and county levels.

The programmes also achieved results in a more efficient and cost-effective manner by attracting qualified professionals in the Liberian Civil Service. The evaluation compared the expenditures of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes with those of the Economic Governance and Institutional Reforms Project (EGIRP) and Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). Both EGIRP and GEMAP relied heavily on international consultants as compared to the SES and TOKTEN Programmes employing the services of competent Liberian professionals.

The SES Programme has a formal monitoring and evaluation system for tracking progress towards achieving the desired outcomes, while a major constraint for effective implementation of the TOKTEN Programme was that it did not have an operational monitoring and evaluation system from 2006 to 2013. County authorities were especially disappointed with the level of regular monitoring and reporting. All professionals including County Development Officers also expressed grave frustration regarding inadequate maintenance of vehicles and other logistical support from the government.

The evaluation further revealed that the SES and TOKTEN Programmes are unsustainable due in large part to dependency syndrome on development partners and donor funding to meet the salaries and allowances of the professionals. Now is the time for the GOL to demonstrate strong political will, commitment and ownership to the programmes in the national budget. Thus, the GOL must now implement the exit strategy of the SES Programme consistent with a clear objective of integrating the professionals into civil service and available funding and other support in the future.

Conclusions

The evaluation found that the programmes were and still remain highly relevant and the right intervention to Liberia's post-conflict rebuilding process. General strategic areas did not get addressed because of insufficient attention and funding. The evaluators conclude that the current capacity building support could be strategic for and coherent with any programming in the future.

On the other hand, the evaluation found the programmes to be cash-strapped and unsustainable because they are mostly dependent on development partners and donors' support. As one key informant explains, "***It was a mistake not to ensure GoL financial commitment to the programmes from the initial stage.***" After eight years of capacity gains, Liberia now faces a potential threat of skilled professionals leaving if the current exit strategy is not implemented properly in a timely manner.

Donors and development partners did well and were generous in supporting the programmes over the years. With the ending of donors' funding on December 31, 2013, the GOL has made a significant contribution of US\$1.0 million through the national budget for salaries of the professionals and SES Secretariat for the period

from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014. At present, there are fifty-four (54) SES professionals assigned in 23 MACs that need to be integrated into the wage bill of the various government institutions. Funding requirement of US\$1.6 million is required from the national budget to integrate 54 SES professionals into the Civil Service as well as the SES Secretariat for a period of one year from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015.

Key recommendations

Given the desire to ensure the usefulness and relevancy of this report, the evaluators have divided recommendations into key strategic recommendations and detailed operational recommendations. This report highlights the following:

1) ***Strategic programme design:***

- a. Overall, the SES Programme recruited and deployed 98 professionals to strategic areas where they were most needed. The programme was highly relevant and the right intervention. The GOL should implement the exit strategy for the SES Programme aimed at ensuring planned government financial commitment to any future programming and reducing a complete reliance on donor funding.
- b. The GOL should expand the resource base of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes to ensure long-term ownership, support and sustainability. Of paramount importance is the consolidation and integration of all capacity building support from the public and private sectors as well as donor community into a broader programme including both SES and TOKTEN Programmes.
- c. The GOL should undertake concrete efforts to link the programme from the national level to county level to district level --- in support of national decentralization policy and implementation plan. It is critically important for all 15 counties to undertake and experience enormous challenges in management their own affairs in the face of decentralization reform including political, administrative, financial, and planning capacity, among others.
- d. Properly integrate the SES Programme into the Liberian Civil Service. The GOL should ensure that the SES programme is not seen as a programme outside of the Civil Service. This was the original purpose of the programme and it still remains critically significant for the future of programme. The GOL should provide the necessary budgetary support to integrate the SES professionals into Civil Service under the National Capacity Development Unit within CSA.

2) ***Strategic capacity building:***

- a. Anchor the programme to address the current capacity gaps and restructure the programme to be able to target the real needs and demand of MACs. To maximize the impact of the programmes in the future, a critical need assessment will be required to match programme support to planned incremental implementation of the Agenda for Transformation The GOL should identify unique skills and develop two to three core areas at each MAC.
- b. Create better merit-based remuneration and good incentives to attract, maintain and retain top-notch specialists. Pay professionals based on a merit-based compensation scheme to promote performance and productivity, as opposed to current flat rates for the three tier-positions (*Tier 1, 2 and 3*) across

- assigned beneficiary institutions. The aim should be to ensure more competition and productivity amongst professionals in the public sector.
- c. Design future programming around a more robust monitoring, supervision and reporting mechanism as a guaranteed form of effective performance management and programme sustainability.
 - d. Develop an effective communication strategy that will inform and educate all relevant stakeholders regarding programme implementation in order to enhance ownership and support by beneficiary institutions at national and county levels.
- 3) ***Detailed operational recommendations:***
- a. Adequate financial, logistical and human resources should be made available to strengthen the systematic monitoring, coordination and supervision of the programme implementation and the tracking of progress of assigned institutions and beneficiaries towards achieving desired outcomes.
 - b. Specialized training should be offered to enhance skills and knowledge of professionals for performance improvement as well as to review the overall achievements and productivity of the programme over the coming years.

1 Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The Government of Liberia through the Civil Service Agency commissioned two independent evaluation consultants to conduct a final evaluation of the Senior Executive Service and Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals Programmes in Liberia. The evaluation was carried out from mid-December 2013 to March 2014 by an evaluation team which consisted of:

- Mr. Varney Arthur Yengbeh, Jr. as Team Leader & Lead Consultant
- Mr. James A. Thompson, as Co-Lead Consultant

Mr. Yengbeh is President and CEO of Afrivision International. Mr. Thompson is Managing Director of Subah-Belleh Associates.

Since their inception, there have been two independent mid-term reviews of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes in 2010 and 2011 respectively. These mid-term evaluations found both SES and TOKTEN highly relevant programmes, even though they identified some challenges to be tackled. A major recommendation of the Independent Mid-Term Evaluation of the SES Programme was to adjust programme implementation for scaling up key activities, subject to available funding, continuation to consolidate the gains made so far. The SES Success Stories and Best Practices also presented detailed achievements and successes of the programme. Accordingly, the need to support implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and other reform initiatives justified the continuation of the programmes at the time. Today, there is a need to continue the programmes at the institutional level because as Liberia moves forward with implementing the Agenda for Transformation (AfT)¹ as well as reforming the Civil Service, it is critically important to ensure the consolidation and sustainability of all capacity gains and results achieved going forward. Toward this end, the Project Implementation Committee (PIC) agreed that a final evaluation of the projects be conducted.²

The purpose of this evaluation was intended to embody a results-focused review of impact, while drawing important lessons learned and documenting success stories from the inception of Programmes to determine significant contributions and provide insightful findings and recommendations.

¹ AfT is Liberia's full medium-term economic growth and development strategy from 2012 to 2017.

² Terms of Reference of the final evaluation of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Programs in Liberia. Government of Liberia. 2013.

1.2 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

In 2006, the Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf Government came to power in the midst of huge capacity challenges. This was no secret. Brain drain, or large-scale emigration of skilled people for better opportunities in other countries, had been underway for years, due primarily to the prolonged civil war in Liberia from December 1989 to August 2003. Many of the skilled Liberians who had remained in the country sought employment with the private sector and non-governmental organizations because of higher pay and better working conditions.

During the 14-year civil war, civil service pay and pensions remained virtually unchanged and was extremely low and unattractive when the new government came to power in 2006. Ministries, Agencies and Commissions (MACs) found it extremely difficult to do any productive work. The Government ran a huge risk of failure if nothing was done quickly to address this critical challenge. In 2007, the Government undertook a multi-pronged capacity initiative, not only to address urgent capacity needs, but to build a cadre of competent professionals who could drive the country development agenda, particularly the PRS.

The SES and TOKTEN Programmes became two of the most popular and far-reaching products of this capacity building initiative. They addressed critical human resource challenges in government, particularly the civil service, by staffing key positions in the public sector with qualified Liberian experts and professionals.

1.2.1 Overview and objectives of the SES Programme

The SES Programme was designed to address the enormous capacity challenges described above through the recruitment and deployment of a cadre of well trained, technically qualified, and highly motivated Liberian professionals recruited locally and from abroad. These professionals were expected to bring immediate credibility to the Civil Service and implement the reforms needed for development and sustainable change.³ The SES Programme drew inspiration from training and mentoring programmes in the United States, such as the Presidential Management Fellowship, a programme that placed gifted students at top levels of government, supported by a network of mentors and projects in neighboring Sierra Leone that attracted talented professionals.⁴

The SES Programme was established in 2007 and became functional in December 2008. The objectives of the SES Programme are to:

- (1) Attract and retain qualified professionals with requisite technical and managerial skills for strategic decision making and improved service delivery in the public service;
- (2) Generate massive, but optimally balanced ‘surge’ executive capacity needed to kick-start Government’s civil service reform efforts;
- (3) Provide a realistic platform for transforming the civil service into a more professional, effective and accountable organ (change agent) of a democratic government; and

³ Government of Liberia/Civil Service Agency, The SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE: demonstrating leadership in the development of Liberia.

⁴ Princeton Policy Paper

- (4) Advance the overall reform and development agenda of government by strategically placing SES personnel in line ministries, agencies and commissions.

1.2.2 Structure and Design of the SES Programme⁵

Organization. The SES Programme was designed to provide three tiers of professionals: the directorate tier, the middle executive tier, and the junior executive tier. It was envisaged that the Programme would recruit thirty (30) Tier One professionals, thirty (30) Tier Two technicians and forty (40) Tier Three specialists. A total of 100 professionals was expected to be recruited from within Liberia and abroad and deployed in relevant MACs.

The day-to-day operations of the Programme are carried out by a secretariat, which is headed by a project coordinator. The Programme is situated within the Civil Service Agency, which serves as an anchor for most capacity building initiatives of the government. The Secretariat has a Monitoring and Evaluation unit, which, in collaboration with beneficiary institutions, monitors and assesses the work of all SES professionals. At the kick-off in December 2008, sixty-five (65) professionals were symbolically inducted into the Civil Service, while an additional thirty-eight (38) were inducted into the Civil Service on July 14, 2009. Though the programme has accommodated 100 professionals, their recruitment and inclusion in the programme came in phases.

Recruitment. A rigorous recruitment and assessment process was installed, which ensured a transparent and competitive selection process. MACs requested professionals to filled specified positions. The Secretariat and the Project Implementation Committee (PIC) certified the positions by ensuring that they were in line with generally predetermined priority needs. Thereafter, vacancy notices were published and applications received and shortlisted, followed by expert panel interviews and selection. A number of local and international experts participated on the interview panels for different SES positions.

Performance. The work of SES professionals was designed to be performance-driven. Accordingly, SES professionals were required to provide regular, verifiable performance reports to the Programme. The Programme provided that those who do not meet performance requirements are deemed to no longer add value to the civil service could be removed or relocated. To enforce performance standards, SES Programme M&E staff followed and reported on the work of professionals in all assigned beneficiary institutions across the country. These monitoring reports, together with regular performance reports from the professionals, signed by their supervisors, provided the information needed to regularly make decisions regarding the statuses of the various professionals.

Remuneration. The Programme designed the remuneration to be a more attractive package than that in place for regular civil servants. This was intended to attract the “best and brightest.” Thus, at the take-off point, the remuneration package was, as follows:

⁵ Exit Strategy of the SES Programme. Government of Liberia - Civil Service Agency.

Table 1 Remuneration of the SES professionals

Tier	Number of Professionals	Remuneration (US\$)
1	30	3,000
2	30	2,000
3	40	1,000

Source: SES Secretariat

This remuneration was prepared as a lump sum, all-inclusive package, but with a one-off grant for individuals relocating from overseas. Additional types of awards and incentives were proposed to be available to the beneficiaries as deemed necessary. Such additional incentives were to include salary increases and performance-related allowances as the PIC and the MACs may have prescribed. In addition to all monetized allowances, adequate support facilities and amenable conditions of service were to be addressed, which were to include equipment support, suitable working environment, professional development activities, amongst others.

As stipulated in the SES Performance Document and subject to the approval of the Director-General of the Civil Service Agency, the heads of relevant MACs and the PIC, some non-monetary rewards were promised to be part of the Performance Rewards. This was to be a way to recognize hard work, innovation, and selflessness of SES professionals at the work place. These incentives were to include certificates and citations for hard work; study tours, public recognition of achievements and innovations; and projecting achievements and highlighting success stories as case studies for use by other professionals, including SES employees and institutions.

Programme Funding

As evidenced in Table 2 below, the SES Programme was financed by donors and development partners including the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Government of Germany (GIZ), Government of Greece, Government of Sweden, Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom, and UNFIP/Humanity United. This support covered salaries and relocation benefits for SES professionals and operational costs of the Secretariat. Total funding of the Programme was estimated initially at US\$9 million. However, donor funding received to date amounted to US\$8.4 million, leaving a shortfall of US\$600,000.

Table 2 SES Programme Funding by the different donors

Donor	Funding Support (2008-2011)
World Bank	\$2,300,000
Government of Germany	\$1,700,000
USAID	\$1,500,000
Government of Sweden	\$1,000,000
UNFIP/Humanity United	\$1,000,000
UNDP	\$800,000
Government of Greece	\$100,000

TOTAL	\$8,400,000
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Source: SES Secretariat

Programme Status

As shown in Table 2 above, the SES Programme was a multi-donor effort that funded the hiring and deployment of 100 Liberian professionals in the Civil Service. To date, a total 98 SES professionals were hired and deployed in different positions in twenty-nine (29) MACs, while two recruits did not accept their assignments. Of the 98 professionals, fifteen (15) County Development Officers (CDOs) are assigned in all 15 political sub-divisions of the country.

1.2.3 Overview and objectives of the TOKTEN Programme

At the global level, the TOKTEN Programme was initiated by UNDP in 1977 to counter the effects of "brain drain" in developing countries by temporarily bringing back talented expatriate nationals to their home countries based on the spirit of volunteerism. TOKTEN consultants are expatriates from developing countries who volunteer to return to their country of origin for short periods of time between two weeks to three months to share the expertise they have gained abroad in research, academic, public or private institutions. TOKTEN consultants can work in a range of technical fields and specializations. The TOKTEN Programme is unique in that it utilizes emigrants' understanding of their origin countries and expertise acquired abroad to transfer knowledge and skills. The Sixth International TOKTEN Conference held in Beijing (May 2000) highlighted that TOKTEN is a unique and valuable concept, and a powerful expression of volunteerism among expatriate nationals under the United Nations umbrella.

TOKTEN consultants volunteer their services and thus forego professional fees. They are motivated by a desire to give something back to their countries of origin, and contribute to its development. The receiving institutions can be governmental agencies, academic and research institutions, NGOs and private sector companies in countries of origin. The TOKTEN Programme covers the travel costs and provides consultants with a daily allowance and medical insurance while on mission. Experts are traced through a database of emigrant professionals and graduates. The global objectives of the TOKTEN Programme are to:

- Reduce the impact of brain drain by utilizing the services of highly qualified national expatriates;
- Transfer the latest know-how and cutting edge technology through national professionals working in the developed world. These professionals include some of the top scientists, engineers, doctors, economists, environmentalists, and business executives working in the developed world; and
- Pass on to the private sector knowledge of the latest technical know-how, business and management practices with the assistance of expatriate consultants.

At the national level, the TOKTEN Programme was set up in Liberia in 2006, upon signing a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Development Programme. The intent was to facilitate the short-term recruitment of professional expatriate nationals, as well as those locally available to serve in key capacities in the government institutions to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in

the public sector. The programme also intended to help reduce the effects of the brain drain and assist TOKTEN professionals transfer up-to-date technology and expertise gained by working in developed countries, convey the latest technological know-how and business and management practices, and promote institutional capacity building and advance policy formulation and management. This was Liberia's second experiment with TOKTEN; a TOKTEN Programme was successfully run in the early years of the war. To date, 129 TOKTEN professionals have been fielded into relevant MACs under the current programme. The specific objectives of the TOKTEN Programme in Liberia were to:

- In the **short term**: repatriate Liberian nationals to support nation building through the revitalization of government institutions;
- In the **long term**: consolidate democracy and peace building and to ensure the sustainability of government operations through the availability of require human capacity in key institutions.

1.2.4 Structure and Design of the TOKTEN Programme⁶

Recruitment. TOKTEN applications are based on institution-specific needs. TOKTEN consultants are recruited based on requests from the institutions needing their services. The institutions will typically submit to the TOKTEN Programme request to fill a position for which they need a TOKTEN professional, along with the resumes of an individual(s) they have identified as qualified to fill the position. The PIC will then vet the submission and accept/reject the proposed candidates and notify the requesting institution. TOKTEN does not follow the regular recruiting process as TOKTEN professionals are volunteers who offer their services to return home and provide short-term professional services to the nation building process.

Performance. TOKTEN Consultants are required to prepare quarterly personnel performance reports at the assigned beneficiary institutions. These reports are usually approved by their supervisors and submitted to the TOKTEN Programme Office. Due to the absence of an established M&E system in the TOKTEN Programme, these reports have provided critical information needed to assess the work and progress of the professionals, based on previously set work targets. The professionals must also provide regular updates on work tasks completed within a specific timeframe to the date of reporting. The report must also indicate how the achievements of each professional contribute to the national development agenda.

Remuneration. TOKTEN professionals volunteer their services and thus forego professional fees. Their motivation is a desire to give something back to Liberia, their country of origin, and, thus, contribute to its development. On the other hand, TOKTEN professionals are provided with an allowance to cover accommodation for the duration of their assignment plus a return air ticket and medical insurance while on duty. As shown in the Table 3 below, the amount of allowance received by a TOKTEN professional was based on whether or not the individual was hired either locally or internationally.

Table 3 Allowances for the different types of TOKTEN professionals

Type of Professional	Allowance (US\$)
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⁶ Exit Strategy of the SES Programme. Government of Liberia/Civil Service Agency.

Locally-recruited	2,500
Internationally-recruited	3,500

Source: TOKTEN Programme

Programme Funding

The TOKTEN Programme was estimated at US\$2,070,600. USAID contributed the amount of US\$1.0 million while UNDP provided US\$0.2 million. There was a funding gap of \$870,000. Additional resources were required to support more professionals to join the critically needed reconstruction and development process.

Table 4 TOKTEN Programme Funding by the different donors

Donor	Funding Support
USAID	\$1,000,000
UNDP	\$200,000
TOTAL	\$1,200,000

Source: TOKTEN Programme

Programme Status

The TOKTEN Programme was initially executed between July 2006 and June 2009. A second phase was implemented from July 2009 to December 2010, a period of 18 months. The objective was to identify and deploy over 30 highly qualified professionals, from the Diaspora and locally, into the public sector. Based on a request from the GOL to extend the TOKTEN Programme until the end of the implementation of the PRS on 31 December 2011, USAID and UNDP agreed to an operational extension until 31 December 2011 and closure on June 30, 2012. At the moment, the TOKTEN Programme does not have any professionals or volunteers anywhere due to lack of funding. Only two TOKTEN professionals are still working as staff members of the Programme Management Team.

To date, 129 TOKTEN professionals have served the Government in a mixture of position across the public sector. Key beneficiary institutions included the Legislature, Governance Commission, Law Reform Commission, JFK Hospital, Civil Service Agency, University of Liberia, National Aids Control Program, Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health, Public Works, Justice, Defense, State, Planning and Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Commerce & Industry.

1.2.5 Programme Management and Coordination

To effectively coordinate the projects and activities of all institutions participating in this process, the SES and TOKTEN Programmes are being implemented under special arrangement through UNDP DEX Service Centre. A Project Implementation Committee (PIC) was established to ensure transparency and accountability in the programme implementation. The PIC comprises Civil Service Agency (*Chair*), United Nations Development Programme (*Co-chair*), Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs, Ministry of State through the Liberian Reconstruction & Development Committee, and Governance Commission. The day-to-day operations of the Programme are handled by a Secretariat which is headed by a Project Coordinator along with support from an Administrative Assistant.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

The evaluation used a participatory approach, involving all stakeholders in discussions regarding the impact, challenges, and way forward for the SES and TOKTEN Programmes. An overall qualitative method of data collection, utilizing mixed methods, was used. The mixed methods included desk reviews, the administration of semi-structured questionnaires, and open-ended interviews.

1.3.1 Approaches

This evaluation has been guided by three-fold approaches:

1. *Desk review* provided secondary data for this evaluation. During the inception phase, the desk study specifically covered relevant documents, including SES Mid-Term Independent Review Report (2010), TOKTEN Evaluation Report (2011), SES GIZ Report (2013), SES Exit Strategy, etc. Some monitoring field reports, internal strategy documents, and project budget and expenditure reports were also reviewed.
2. *Semi-Structured Interviews*: Several interviews with individuals at national and county levels, using semi-structured questionnaires, were also carried out. Interviews were held both in Monrovia, Montserrado County and in six other counties, where the programmes are being implemented in both national and local assigned beneficiary institutions. Local government authorities, county development officers and UNMIL Civil Affairs were interviewed during the field visits to the six counties.
3. *Open-ended Interviews*: Open-ended interviews were conducted with high-level officials of the GoL, development partners and SES and TOKTEN Programme Managers. These interviews followed a broad outline that allowed an open discussion about the relevance and outcomes of the two programmes.

1.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

The majority of SES professionals and assigned beneficiary institutions are based in Monrovia, Montserrado County. All relevant stakeholders were consulted through individual interviews. Additionally, the data collection phase included field visits to the following six counties: Bomi, Bong, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount, Margibi and Nimba counties. The selection of each county was based on recommendation from CSA, due to strategic partnership and on-going project support and/or capacity building initiatives.

- **Monrovia, Montserrado County** (both evaluation consultants): 7 days
- **Margibi, Bong and Nimba Counties** (Lead Consultant): 4 days, including travelling
- **Bomi, Grand Cape Mount and Gbarpolu Counties** (Co-Lead Consultant): 4 days, including travelling

Targeted Interviewees

Data collection targeted different individuals and institutions, including SES and TOKTEN professionals, programme managers, policy and decision makers, local

government authorities, and donors, among others. The individuals/institutions were targeted in the following format:

- *Consultative meetings and interviews* with key stakeholders, including CSA and UNDP, provided primary data for an overall contextual analysis of programme implementation decisions and results of each programme at various levels.
- *Local county authorities, county development officers, heads of assigned beneficiary institutions and UNMIL Civil Affairs provided information* on the analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the programmes at county level. These stakeholders were expected to help the evaluation team to identify challenges and lessons learned and synergistic effects from the implementation of the programmes at the local level.
- *All respondents from the Government of Liberia (GOL) provided inputs on* experiences of the current SES and TOKTEN programmes *and future thinking and plans regarding the programmes as well as overall strategies* to deepen and sustain its capacity building initiatives across public sector institutions.
- *Consultations with donors* gave the evaluation team their perspectives on the necessity and achievements of the programmes. They also indicated their views and positions regarding the future of the two programmes.

All respondents, including SES and TOKTEN professionals and their assigned institutions, played a crucial role in helping the evaluation team to assess the programmes, based on the evaluation criteria. Questionnaire/interview guide were used to ascertain the strengths, weaknesses, challenges, and lessons learned programme delivery, including the management, monitoring and oversight function such as knowledge transfer and management imperatives. The evaluation team paid keen attention to respondents on how to address the challenges and opportunities of the existing programme. Success stories, lessons learned, and insightful findings and recommendations were validated and documented.

Data Analysis

Because the evaluation utilized a generally quantitative methodology, the data from responses and desk reviews were analyzed using content analysis techniques, after identifying specific themes that answered a variety of research questions from the evaluation team.

1.4 SCOPE OF WORK

As stipulated in the Terms of Reference (TOR), the general assignment was to conduct a final evaluation of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programmes in Liberia. Specifically, the main objectives of the assignment were to:

- a) Identify and take stock of the challenges and opportunities (SWOT analysis) of the current programmes implementation and performance in Liberia;

- b) Assess and document significant impact, success stories, lessons learned, insightful findings and recommendations from key stakeholders based on its inception and the entire implementation process; and
- c) Develop recommendations on whether or not there is need for continuation and how differently should a new programme be designed in the future, and should there be need for continuation. Project impact and contributions will also be assessed.

1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation was limited by the unavailability of main programme documents and information. The lack of programme reports also constrained the consultants in terms of gaining insights into the programme implementation as well as end-of-programme status vis-à-vis their objectives and experiences. In this regard, the evaluation did not cover every conceivable area of interest to all stakeholders. The evaluation team focused specifically on addressing some of the critical issues which will inform key evaluation questions regarding the continued relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency, lessons learned, local ownership, and sustainability of the programmes.

Another limitation was *the timing of the evaluation during the 2013 Christmas and 2014 New Year Holidays*. This schedule did not permit the evaluation team to readily meet and interview stakeholders. Even where interviews were scheduled, the timing either did not allow the team to meet those selected for interviews or had to reschedule several interviews. Going to conduct the field assessment in the six counties proved particularly challenging within the short window available for such interactions. Most local government authorities, county development officers, donors and development partners were engaged either with other official business or on their annual vacation during the period.

1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This evaluation report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 is a presentation of the introduction and background in which the purpose of the evaluation, programme description, methodology and approach, scope of work and limitations of the evaluation are discussed. Chapter 2 presents the impact results and findings of the evaluation as well as an analysis of the design and relevance, partnership strategy, programme effectiveness, programme efficiency, sustainability, strengths and weaknesses, and success stories and constraints. In Chapter 3, conclusions on the relevance of the current capacity support and lessons learned are presented. Finally, Chapter 4 provides separate strategic recommendations and detailed operational recommendations for on-going capacity support and continued programming in the future.

2 Impact Results and Findings of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes in Liberia

2.1 INTRODUCTION

At the end of 14-year protracted civil war in 2003, Liberia was and still remains a fragile state due mostly to the unwarranted destruction of basic infrastructure, deaths and massive exodus of thousands of highly qualified professionals and workforce from the country. Second, the poor state of the economic conditions further exacerbated the post-conflict situation which, in turn, also created disincentives to attract the best and brightest Liberian talents locally to the public sector and the country at large.

The results of the evaluation presented here bring together the perspectives of the Government of Liberia and other relevant stakeholders consulted by the evaluation team on the experiences and outcomes of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes in the country. Respondents assessed the programmes in terms of: a) design and relevance, b) partnership strategy, c) effectiveness, d) efficiency, e) success stories, f) sustainability, g) strengths and weaknesses, and h) lessons learned. Accordingly, the evaluation has been informed by the analysis of respondents' viewpoints.

2.2 DESIGN AND RELEVANCE

Programme Design

Both the SES and TOKTEN Programmes were designed to: reduce the impact of the brain drain on Liberia, insert much needed capacity in pursuit of the development agenda of the Government, and facilitate long-term capacity building through knowledge transfer. SES professionals were expected to be integrated into the Civil Service at the end of the programme. An assessment of the design of the two programmes revealed that they were effective in the approach to attracting highly skilled Liberians at home and abroad to serve in critical areas of need. An open and competitive recruitment process enhanced the validity of this effort and the chances of acquiring the best qualified individuals available.

In addition, the structures for programme implementation proved ideal and largely effective. Programme secretariats managed the operations of the programme, while a project implementation committee, made up of GoL and Partners, provided policy guidance and leadership. Programme monitoring and evaluation within the Secretariat provided an effective link between beneficiary institutions and the programme and ensured an open performance management process with adequate checks and balances between the professionals and institutions in which they served and the Civil Service Agency and partners.

Perhaps the most challenging areas of the programme was the lack of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) functions within the TOKTEN Programme and financial management between the programmes and the UNDP. The lack of M&E system within TOKTEN meant that it was impossible to follow the work of TOKTEN professionals in their areas of assignment. The only reliance available to the programme was reports submitted by the professionals. The secretariat lacked resources to follow-up and support professionals as well as verify their performance in their assigned institutions. Financial management arrangements for the two programmes, on the other hand, contained layers of control that made disbursements very slow; in many instances, TOKTEN professionals even went without pay for a month or more.

Relevance

There was a general consensus among all stakeholder groups—beneficiary institutions, professionals, and development partners—that the SES and TOKTEN Programmes were highly relevant to the priorities of Liberia, especially in those early days of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf Administration, when public sector institutional capacity was alarmingly low and desperate for intervention in the post-conflict situation at the national and county levels. Moreover, the programme interventions were designed properly to provide a surge of capacities in critical priority areas of need for the government with particular emphasis in support of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and other related reforms. Beneficiary institutions also affirmed that the programmes not only addressed capacity needs of the government in general, but was particularly responsive to the needs of assigned institutions to help restore a lost professional culture in the public service.

The GOL was supported through the SES and TOKTEN programmes to bring back home Liberian expatriate nationals from the Diaspora as well as recruited locally skilled professionals to serve at the national and county levels. Stakeholders agreed that SES and TOKTEN professionals offered enormous support to their assigned institutions and helped to address the urgent capacity challenges faced at the time and thereafter. For example, one of the most visible areas in which SES professionals were highly credited with making a huge difference was in the strengthening of county administrations. A GoL partner agreed with the relevance of the Programmes to county development in the following way:

The assignment of County Development Officers to the counties was like a revolution in county development administration. These guys have made a huge difference.

- UNMIL Civil Affairs

The evaluation team assesses that the programmes were and still remain significant for Liberia's rebuilding process and they align with and in support of achieving national development priorities of the country.

2.3 PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

The overall partnership strategy of the SES and TOKTEN programmes was generally effective. The programme implementation strategy was designed in a way that ensured a collaborative working relationship between the GOL, development partners, and the donor community, with the aim of building direct surge of capacities in the public sector and enabling the GOL to take full national ownership for the implementation of its national development agenda. Key strategic partnerships were formed with central government institutions, county government administrations, development partners and donors with a singular view to achieving the desired outcomes of the programmes.

Accordingly, the total of ninety-eight (98) SES professionals were hired and deployed in twenty-nine (29) Ministries, Agencies and Commissions (MACs) in Liberia. The GOL assigned SES and TOKTEN professionals to relevant MACs at the national level while the County Development Officers were assigned to the fifteen (15) political sub-divisions of the country. The major national stakeholders were Civil Service Agency (CSA), Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA), assigned MACs and county government authorities. The development partners and donors were the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Government of Germany (GIZ), Government of Greece, Government of Sweden, Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom, and UNFIP/Humanity United.

Together, the SES and TOKTEN professionals including County Development Officers were expected to deliver tangible results by driving the Poverty Reduction Strategy and policy reforms. This was mostly achieved at the national level while the programme evolved as per the specific needs of each county at the county level. On the other hand, shortcomings in broad participation, coordination and effective communication caused a serious challenge in the partnership strategy. The evaluation revealed that there was and still remains a level of suspicion on the part of some MACs while CSA was partly ineffective in coordinating the activities of Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA), local governments through the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and other assigned national government institutions.

For nearly eight (8) years, the GoL and partners implemented TOKTEN and SES programmes under institutional arrangements that provided a role for all in project implementation and decision making as well as continued funding for the two programmes. The GoL hosted the Programmes as well as managed their day-to-day implementation through a secretariat mechanism, while all stakeholders worked together to provide policy guidance and support through the Project Implementation Committee (PIC). On the other hand, UNDP managed the flow of funds for programme implementation and reported to the PIC.⁷

⁷ The Government of Liberia through the Civil Service Agency served as chair of the Project Implementation Committee (PIC), while the United Nations Development Programme was the co-chair.

2.4 PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS

During the programme period from 2006 to 2013, there was a formal monitoring and evaluation system to track the desired outcomes and results of the SES Programme. The TOKTEN Program however did not put an M&E system in place. To validate the effectiveness of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes, the evaluation team held extensive discussions with the SES Programme Coordinator and other relevant stakeholders to determine the effectiveness of the two programmes at the output and activity levels. The evaluation team further asked the different stakeholders to what extent the different programmes had achieved its target outputs. There was a strong agreement amongst respondents that the SES and TOKTEN programmes mostly achieved its main objectives and desired outcomes from 2006 to 2013.

The evaluation found that the SES Programme used a transparent and competitive recruitment process. On the other hand, the TOKTEN Programme was remarkably different because the President and Ministers could request the employment of individuals. According to the mid-term independent evaluation of the TOKTEN Programme in 2011, there was limited documentary evidence of a competitive process for the vast majority of applications... It was *“not possible to know whether or not the expert had been subject to a competitive process, or the manner of the expert’s recruitment.”*⁸ As a result, the TOKTEN Programme began a merit-based recruitment of the professionals.

According to the Implementation Completion and Results Report on the Emergency Senior Executive Service Project (World Bank, 2011), ninety-eight (98) Liberian professionals were hired on performance contracts and deployed in twenty-nine (29) beneficiary MACs as well as in 15 counties countrywide.⁹ The recruitment and deployment of the County Development Officers was fully achieved in the fifteen (15) counties with the capacity to serve the county government administrations and to strengthen governance structures. By June 2011, the TOKTEN Programme recruited 77 Liberian professionals locally and abroad on short-term contracts of 6-18 months through funding from United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰ Overall, the TOKTEN Programme fielded 129 professionals in various capacities within 26 beneficiary institutions in the country.

This was an impressive reach in the provision of mid-level managerial and technical skills to support and build the capacity in the Civil Service at the national and county levels.

2.5 PROGRAMME EFFICIENCY

The SES and TOKTEN Programmes achieved results in an efficient and cost-effective manner by attracting qualified professionals in the Civil Service. Alternatively, another option would have been for the GOL to recruit and deploy national and international consultants. This however would have been very expensive as well as likely undermined the National Capacity Development Strategy of Liberia. By recruiting and deploying

⁸ Independent Mid-term Evaluation of Second Phase of Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Project. Republic of Liberia. November 2011. P. 10.

⁹ Implementation Completion and Results Report on the Emergency Senior Executive Service Project. Report No. ICR2098. World Bank. 2011, p. 2; Exit Strategy of the Senior Executive Service. Civil Service Agency.

¹⁰ Ibid.

skilled Liberian professionals, the GOL provided a suitable opportunity for its own citizens and expatriate nationals to perform critical functions in the nation building process within a post-conflict setting.

The SES Programme offered reasonable salaries to 15 CDOs to attract them work in the 15 counties of Liberia. On the other hand, non-salary expenditures such as workshops, trainings, travel allowances, office supplies, vehicle rentals, among others accounted for only 10 percent of the initially budgeted at US\$25,000.¹¹

Second, internationally recruited consultants for the Economic Governance and Institutional Reforms Project (EGIRP) and Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) were far more expensive as compared to the SES Programme. The EGIRP and GEMAP engaged the services of international consultants to perform critical functions on behalf of the GOL. The international consultants and advisors were paid US\$100,000 annually or a total of US\$300,000 for 3 years, while SES professionals were paid an amount ranging from \$12,000 to US\$36,000 per year or between US\$36,000 to US\$108,000 for 3 years.¹² A similar finding was reported that the TOKTEN professionals were paid monthly USD\$2,500 for locally recruited and US\$3,500 for internationally recruited. Their contracts varied from 6 to 18 months.¹³

Thus, the SES and TOKTEN Programmes were more efficient and cost-effective as compared to the EGIRP and GEMAP. Through the services of SES and TOKTEN professionals, the GOL achieved the desired outcomes at reasonable human and financial resources. To the extent these programme were successful, the evaluation found that dependency syndrome on donors and development partners could be a risk in the future.

2.6 SUSTAINABILITY

Although the SES and TOKTEN programmes were highly relevant and designed suitably in accordance with Liberia's priority capacity needs from 2006 to 2013, the evaluation revealed a limited capacity for local ownership and sustainability on the part of assigned government institutions and direct beneficiaries / professionals.

Based on current commitments, the SES and TOKTEN Programmes are unsustainable due to a total reliance on development partner and donor funding to meet the salaries and allowances of the professionals. As shown in Table 5 below, the 2nd Phase of the SES Programme (First Phase ended in 2011) is entirely funded by donors/partners, while the TOKTEN Programme has no donor funding at this time and, as a result, it has effectively ended, except for the maintenance of two programme management staff. The current funding limitation means that only wages are mostly covered while critical logistical and technical support largely unattended.

Table 5 SES Programme Funding by the different donors and professional categories

¹¹ Ibid. p.16.

¹² Ibid. p. 16.

¹³ Ibid. p. 17.

Donor	Amount In USD	Allocation of Funding Per Professional Categories				
		SES Pros	Wages	Logistics	Technical	Materials
World Bank	1.7 million	(Tier 2) - 42	1,515,000	185,000	-0-	-0-
GIZ	1.5 million	(Tier 1) - 11	1,500,000	-0-	-0-	-0-
USAID	350,000	(Tier 1) - 19 (Tier3) - 20	350,000	-0-	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	3.550 million	92	3,365,000	185,000.0	-0-	-0-

Source: SES Secretariat

In the face of dwindling donor support, the SES Programme designed an exit strategy in order to address the issue of sustainability of the programme. The goals of the exit strategy are:

- To design a plan for the disengagement of donors' support while sustaining the huge positive impacts that the SES programme has already accomplished;
- To maintain a corps of motivated professionals, more energized to transfer skills, drive the reforms and make greater impacts; and
- To ensure that the SES programme continues to be relevant as a "surge capacity" component of the Civil Service of Liberia, even beyond donors' exit.

While the objectives of the exit strategy are clear and represents the general consensus of all partners on the way forward for the programme, its implementation hinges on funding, an area in which the GOL has demonstrated limited commitment and success during the life of SES and TOKTEN programmes. In fact, the design of the SES Programme provided that after 3 years of operation, SES professionals would have been integrated within the broader civil service.

In the absence of external support, respondents observed that the future remains uncertain in terms of programme sustainability due to several underlying factors:

- The GOL has not fully taken ownership of the SES programme by providing the necessary budgetary support and other resources to absorb SES professionals and county development officers.
- Poor economic condition, slow civil service reform, low salary levels for the civil service as compared to much higher pay levels for SES and TOKTEN professionals
- Animosity caused by huge salary differentials between SES and TOKTEN professionals on the one hand and other locally-qualified Liberian professionals not participating in the programmes, on the other hand. Current salaries and benefits of regular civil servants, including directors, are still generally below those of SES professionals.
- The GOL is yet to implement its medium term pay strategy, which will see a new pay and grade system installed. In the absence of this, it is difficult to anticipate a different mechanism for absorbing SES professionals at the levels of the current wages.
- Long-term development and high productivity must be driven internally by Liberian themselves. Otherwise, poor work attitude and negative mindset of Liberians will make the programme to be unsustainable in the future.
- All of these above are disincentives for the sustainability and long-term productivity of the programmes.

2.7 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Stakeholders were asked to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes in Liberia. The aim is to understand and identify the extent to which different aspects of the programmes can be built upon in the future and what weaknesses would need to be overcome. The key strengths and weaknesses identified by respondents are presented below.

Strengths

Overall, the respondents agreed that the SES and TOKTEN programmes in Liberia were a positive development with several significant and positive impacts at the national and county levels. The key strengths of the SES and TOKTEN programme included:

- ✓ **Ability to recruit high-level professionals to serve in the public sector:** The design and implementation mechanism of the programme have attracted a good number of top-notch professionals to the public service, where such professionals would not readily opt for employment. It was done through a transparent, competitive and credible vetting process. This resulted into the introduction of much-needed surge capacity and exceptional talents at the national and country levels.
- ✓ **Strong commitment of GoL, donors and development partners to the programmes over the years:** Since 2006, the government, donors, and development partners have been consistently committed to supporting the programme. Development partners and donors have been generous up to now. There is even a sense of willingness for them to continue support beyond the current period, particularly if a feasible exit strategy is put in place and implemented.
- ✓ **Results-focused programme design that built accountability into the performance of professionals:** An M&E mechanism allows the programme management team of the SES Programme to monitor the performance of professionals. This allows effective decision making regarding their status. It also helped to ensure consensus between the programme and the beneficiary institutions on the performance of the professionals, avoiding conflict caused by subjective analysis and improper demands for sacking or changing professionals by beneficiary institutions.
- ✓ **Seasoned programme management experience:** SES professionals were deployed in 29 beneficiary institutions in all 15 counties, while TOKTEN professionals also assigned in 26 government institutions. These professionals supported every key sector and initiative of the government. Additionally, the SES Programme accounted for a total of US\$13,050,000 while the TOKTEN Programme spent US\$1.2 million. The evaluation revealed that the unique combination of funding and solid experience of managing the two programmes and professionals over the past years is an invaluable asset under the current implementation mechanism. It therefore offers a firm foundation for future success.
- ✓ **Promotion of diversity:** A cohesive blend of both local and Diaspora Liberians in the same endeavor has advanced diversity among Liberian professionals.

- ✓ **A reservoir of skilled human capital and experiences:** Both the SES and TOKTEN Programmes offer collectively the best available human capital to deal with any form of development challenges and the professionals are making huge positive impacts on Liberia's development agenda. SES and TOKTEN professionals made significant contributions in terms of technical support and policy reforms at the national level while the county development officers worked diligently with local government authorities to promote the county development agenda at the county level.

Weaknesses

A close examination of the design, strategy and implementation processes of the SES and TOKTEN programmes revealed some major shortcomings, as follows:

- ✘ **Lack of effective feedback mechanisms for professionals regarding their performance evaluation and the general programme evaluation:** SES and TOKTEN professionals provide reports on their output and experiences and such reports usually have to be validated by their supervisors within their assigned beneficiary institutions. SES professionals are further monitored by programme M&E staff. The evaluation however revealed that performance review feedbacks were generally not provided the professionals. Accordingly, areas and suggestions for improvements were unknown to them.
- ✘ **Counter-productive effect of flat-rate pay that fits all:** SES and TOKTEN professionals are paid salaries and allowances respectively. According to most professionals, these payments are kept constant for the entire duration of their assignment regardless of individual contributions, performance and tenure. This has de-motivated some professionals who have served over a long period and it needs to be reviewed.
- ✘ **Lack of benefits for professionals:** Apart from salary/allowances and a one-time resettlement allowance for those from the Diaspora, SES and TOKTEN professionals were not given any employment benefits. Lack of medical insurance is of particular concern and emphasized the most by professionals.
- ✘ **Lack of professional development opportunities for professionals:** SES and TOKTEN professionals do not benefit from any form of capacity enhancement. This is a serious shortcoming given the enormity of the development challenges the professional must address and the need for them to be adequately prepared. Without the proper knowledge and skills to address any particular challenge in beneficiary institutions, the professionals are most likely unable to address critical development issues. This can sometimes spell the difference between success and failure.
- ✘ **Inability of programmes to ensure effective mentoring and transfer of knowledge from professionals to others:** Mentoring and knowledge transfer can ensure long-term capacity building in beneficiary institutions. This was a key requirement of SES and TOKTEN professionals. However, mentoring and transfer of knowledge was largely unsuccessful because people in MACs demonstrated little or no interest and capacity to absorb. Second, this has not been sufficiently stressed in the management of programme implementation. Accordingly, it has been an area of very limited or no activity for the professionals because they are either overwhelmed by work or their assigned beneficiary institutions have no mechanism in place for making this possible.

- ❏ **Inadequate programme funding:** The programmes have experienced huge funding gaps that have not been filled throughout the period of implementation. This has affected programme effectiveness in a lot of ways, including the hiring and maintenance of the planned number of professionals on all tiers and the management of the programmes, according to programme managers.
- ❏ **Total dependence on donors and partners due to weak GoL commitment to provide sufficient funding of the programmes:** There is little or no evidence of government’s commitment to assuming a prominent role in funding the programmes, despite close to eight years of operation. This translates into donor dependence which has already created a huge challenge in the way of programme sustainability and the programme exit strategy – the planned phasing out of the programmes. Absence of ownership of the programmes on the part of key MACs also remains a major challenge due to lack of political will and support of the programmes. Any political failure at the national level is likely to create a negative effect at the local levels.
- ❏ **Limited resources and logistical support for the work of professionals:** According to the programme design, professionals were expected to receive some level of support in carrying out their work. It however was unclear as to the source of the necessary support, which eventually compromised the need for beneficiary institutions to take full responsibility for the SES and TOKTEN professionals assigned to them. Thus, the poor quality and inadequacy of logistics supplied to professionals and county development officers likely undermined individual performances at the national and county levels respectively.
- ❏ **Weak communication strategy:** Effectively communicating the programmes between the CSA and assigned beneficiary institutions was found to be an area of much weakness. Silent resistance still remains a serious challenge and the programmes may be seen as a burden by some MACs. As a result, beneficiary institutions showed no ownership for the professionals and did not even budget for their work.

2.8 SUCCESS STORIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Overcoming the huge capacity challenges faced by the new government in 2006 is adequate testament to the success of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes. According to Jonathan (Yoni) Friedman (2012), *“lack of training and experience at all levels of government, from ministers to office helpers, threatened the President’s ability to translate plans into action... Sirleaf needed to recruit highly skilled people for top leadership positions in order to build capacity in the middle and lower ranks.”*¹⁴

The recruitment and deployment of SES and TOKTEN professionals created an intended surge of critically needed capacity that turned the situation around. The professionals provided an improved public sector capacity, thereby making wide-ranging contributions to governance, management and reforms.

¹⁴ Jonathan Friedman. Building Civil Service Capacity: Post-conflict Liberia, 2006-2011. Princeton University. August 2012. P. 1.

This evaluation has identified some success stories of the two programmes and presents them on two levels: some generalized impact results and other individual contributions in public service.

2.8.1 General Impacts

Success Story 1: *Massive Improvements in County Development Administration*

Prior to the deployment of *County Development Officers*, county administrative and technical capacities were extremely weak across all 15 counties. County governments lacked the capacity to develop project proposals, monitor project performance, and reporting. They also lack basic administrative, financial and organizational skills as well as the capacity for monitoring development initiatives. County Development Officers created a massive seed change in county administration, development planning and management. Various development issues and outstanding achievements included:

- Improved office management, including introduction of employee record keeping and good time management practices
- Project planning, monitoring, database development, maintenance and coordination
- Reporting – administrative and project
- Implementation of County Development Agenda

Success Story 2: *Leadership in Improved Institutional Management and Reforms*

SES and TOKTEN professionals made significant contributions to changing a poor management culture that was entrenched in all public institutions. The professionals introduced a positive professional culture and work practices that challenged many to change old habits. The aim was for these professionals to create the needed capacity, drive the implementation of the PRS and other reform activities, and maintain the impacts achieved. Public sector reforms, already started by the Governance Reform Commission in 2004, would now become firmly rooted in all beneficiary public institutions through the services of SES and TOKTEN professionals. The Civil Service Agency was and still remains a pivotal institution in embracing this kind of effort going forward.

Prior to benefitting from SES and TOKTEN Programmes, the CSA was at its very lowest ebb. The central government agency responsible for human resource management did everything but manage human resources (HR). The institution lacked the structure and programmatic orientation of a central HR institution; the primary task undertaken at all levels of the CSA was the processing of personnel action notices (PAN) for new civil servants. In fact, the institution was poorly regarded and lacked influence. Things had to change. The CSA not only needed to reform itself, but needed to lead a reform of the entire civil service of Liberia. This was where SES and TOKTEN professionals were crucial and did the business. The following achievements and experiences of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes are highlighted:

- Internal reform of the CSA, creating a new operational structure that reflects its role as a central HR management agency.

- Development of Civil Service Reform Strategy (with support of DfID), leadership of civil service reforms, and/or the implementation of the Strategy, through the Civil Service Reform Directorate (CSRD) managed by SES professionals.
- Pension System Reform through the work of a TOKTEN professional.
- Establishment of a robust human resource management information system and biometric identification system. This system is successfully documenting all legitimate civil servants and addressing the aged-old problem of ghost employees on the public sector payroll. The entire system was designed and managed by SES professionals.
- National Transport Policy and Transport Master Plan through the work of SES professional.
- National Industrial Policy and Implementation Plan through the work of SES professional.
- Establishment of control over the public sector payroll. Through the work of SES professionals, the CSA is now in total control of the public sector payroll.
- A former TOKTEN professional, who served as technical advisor to the Director-General, is now the Director-General of the CSA.
- Management and coordination of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes through the services of SES and TOKTEN professionals themselves.

Success Story 3: *Policy Development and Management*

A 2010 Mid-Term Independent Review of the SES Programme provided a clear picture of the impact of the SES on public policy development and management. It was reported that “significant contributions have been made to policy management and to policy formulation. The GEMAP and the PRS formulation were cross-sectoral efforts and preceded the recruitment of the SES. To facilitate the latter, each strategic area or pillar concludes with a performance matrix outlining the strategic objective, indicators, delivery date and responsible lead agency or ministry. Responsibility for monitoring and ensuring that the PRS deliverables are on track at the national and sub-national levels, however, has largely been assumed by the SES. The mission found SES personnel tasked with this key responsibility at every host institution visited.” The Report further identified the key roles SES professionals played in development policy management by assuming key roles in relevant institutions: “At the national level, SES recruits have been strategically placed in positions of Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, Development Economist, and Economic Analyst in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA). Within host institutions, they frequently serve as focal points for key pillars of the PRS framework. At the local administration level, they serve as county development officers for the MPEA and as county statistics officers for Liberia Statistics and Geo-information Services (LISGIS).” Beyond the era of the PRS, SES and TOKTEN professionals continued to make significant contributions to the AfT, the government medium-term economic growth and development strategy.

2.8.2 Specific Impacts of SES and TOKTEN Professionals

Job Creation - Helped the Ministry of Labor develop a plan for employment officers in each of Liberia's 15 counties and undertake a labor market survey to identify available job and skills, which aided employers and potential employees in job and people search.

Debt Management - Helped negotiate the restructuring of Liberia's debt and prepared Liberia's 2009/2010 debt management strategy and presented that strategy to Cabinet. The strategy was one of the benchmarks under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC).

HR Management – Revised the National Civil Service Training Manual, assisted with the development of a Performance Management Manual for the Civil Service, developed Succession Planning Training Manual for the Civil Service, and provided technical services and HR expertise in recruitment.

Office Management: Developed and implemented attendance system and good records management system, especially at county level. For example, office management of central county administration was chaotic in River Gee prior to the intervention of an SES professional.

Local Development Planning – SES professional applied knowledge and training in development planning to assist all 15 counties prepare their County Development Agendas.

Agricultural Development - At the Ministry of Agriculture, an SES professional was responsible for the creation of the Livestock Bureau.

Natural Resource Management – The following was reported and confirmed: Most land crises in the country are created by untrained surveyors. Currently, due to the arrival of SES personnel, college graduate at this profession within the Ministry of Land, Mine and Energy has risen from three (3) to 40.

2.8.3 Main Challenges

Over the five (5) years of operation, the SES and TOKTEN Programmes faced numerous challenges, many of which required strategic interventions.

Institutional Challenges

Misunderstanding of the Intent of the Programme and Priority Setting

There was extremely low capacity in the public service when the SES Programme was launched in 2008. Therefore, many people mistakenly saw the programme as a panacea for the problems at various government institutions. This situation produced two major challenges. First, institutions seeking professionals through the programmes prepared and submitted long “shopping lists” which had to be cut substantially. However, the decision as to what and where to cut was fraught with arguments and a lot of back-and-forth engagements. This usually made the process unnecessarily time-consuming. Second, the

SES professionals were usually overwhelmed by the volume and nature of work challenges thrown at them. They were expected to be “experts” at everything. *This was mentally challenging for the professionals, while managing expectations also posed a major concern for the programme.* The overall approach had serious consequences for the effective and efficient roll-out of the programme and the near immediate impact it was expected to make. In fact, the whole new process was resolved through consensus building on priority needs among MACs, given the understanding that the SES professionals will support their priority technical needs for implementing PRS.

Poor Beneficiary Orientation

There was a slow sense of ownership realization by public entities benefitting from the SES Programme. This affected the initial speed and impact of the effort. Whereas SES professionals were recruited to serve MACs, based on their own needs and requests, many entities saw them as owned by the CSA and not as a part of their own internal structures. Accordingly, the assigned beneficiary institutions failed to budget for their work and provided very little to the professionals in terms of incentives. In fact, no institution budgeted for the absorption of SES professionals into their HR system beyond the funding period of the program. Their needs and challenges were more often than not referred to the CSA. This situation may have resulted from communication challenges.

Integration with the Civil Service

This has been an area with the greatest challenge for the GOL. For this, an exit strategy was developed. However, the cardinal issue remains matching the current salaries of SES and TOKTEN professionals within a civil service that pays way below the level of current SES/TOKTEN salaries.

Lack of Progressive Pay System and Benefits for professionals

SES and TOKTEN professionals were paid salaries at flat rates over the entire duration of their performance contracts. These payments did not take into account individual contribution, performance and tenure. Worse, no benefits were attached. This situation meant that all professionals in the same category, regardless of background/qualification, tenure, and performance/achievements, received the same basic pay for a period of 3 years. This was an area of serious motivational challenge and cited by all professionals as a problem with the design of the programmes.

Internal Management Integration

There were internal CSA challenges with the management of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes. Many within the CSA did not see the programmes as part of the institution. This had implication for cooperation, programme support, resource sharing and distribution. For example, SES and TOKTEN professionals were not entitled to regular CSA benefits, even though they were regularly called upon to participate in regular CSA work outside their terms of reference.

Operational/Management Challenges

Funding

The concept of the SES Programme was initially greeted with numerous signs of present and future funding commitments from the donor community. This enthusiasm meant that funds were forthcoming. However, as the program progressed, funding became a huge challenge as some donor commitments were not turned into cash. In fact, the initial funding requirement of US\$9.6 million fell short by US\$1.2 million (12.5 percent). Only US\$8.4 million pledged initially by donors was actually committed in cash from 2008 to 2011. During a second round of funding, several donors provided an additional amount of US\$3.55 million. All funding from the donor community to the programme ended effectively on December 31, 2013.

In 2011, the GOL made its first contribution of US\$260,000 to the programme. For the period from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014, the GOL has also provided an amount of US\$1.0 million through the national budget for salaries of the professionals and SES Secretariat. At present, there are fifty-four (54) SES professionals assigned in 23 MACs that need to be integrated into the wage bill of the various government institutions. Total funding requirement of US\$1.6 million is needed from the GOL budget for the integration of 54 SES professionals into the Civil Service as well as the operation of the SES Secretariat for a period of one year from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015.

The evaluation found that the ending of donor funding and insufficient public funding of the programme have affected the implementation of broader exit strategy for more long-term sustainability and ownership of the SES Programme. The current plan calls for the integration of the SES professionals in the Civil Service under the National Capacity Development Unit with national budgetary support. Otherwise, there is a huge risk to all capacity gains through the potential departure of SES professionals when the current funding of their salaries runs out.

It is noteworthy that an Independent Mid-Term Evaluation of the SES Programme, the SES Success Stories/Best Practices Documents, and the Final Evaluation published present detailed achievements and successes of the programme. These reports have all recommended continuity at the institutional level because as Liberia moves forward with implementing the AfT, and as efforts to reform the Civil Service accelerates, it is certainly important to ensure the consolidation and sustainability of the recent capacity gains and results achieved going forward.

Fund Management

Fund management was assessed to be not so efficient. According to program managers, procurement and payment processes were slow and caused numerous delays in operations, including the salary payments to SES and TOKTEN professionals. One major concern was that UNDP could have done a better job in the management and distribution of funds in a more efficient and timely manner.

Suspicion and Resentment due to Pay Disparity with Regular Civil Servants

From the inception, and for a while into the programme, SES and TOKTEN professionals faced serious resentments at their various places of assignment. Pay disparity between the SES/TOKTEN professionals and civil servants and other officials with whom they worked created a lot of resentment and led to work dumping on the professionals. Many

civil servants and officials felt that the huge pay differentials between them and the SES professionals represented some form of inequity and, thus, led to negative reactions, which affected their ability to carry out their work. This obviously compromised the basic purpose of SES professionals into these institutions. Many SES professionals explained how they were refused offices, given no resources, and even accused by some of coming to take their jobs.

I had to sit under a tree near the office for days because I was not allowed to enter the building. Someone thought that I had come to take his job and kept me away.

- County Development Officer

The people would just dump everything on me because they felt we were getting all the money and so they thought we should have done all the work.

- County Development Officer

Transfer of Knowledge

SES and TOKTEN professionals were expected to transfer knowledge. This was an essential part of the programme; this injection of capacity was expected to have a multiplier effect through such knowledge transfer. However, no formal knowledge transfer activities were possible for the following main reasons:

- The resentment of SES professionals meant that an attempt at training others was impossible.
- SES professionals realized that it was difficult to teach many of the persons they met in positions of interest in their various assigned areas because there were many performance and professionalism issues and the lack of a learning culture and trainable professionals.
- Most organizations lacked a continuing learning infrastructure that allocated time and resources to staff development.
- Because of their intimidating and overwhelming workloads, many SES professionals could not manage time to engage others in organized learning activities.

Individual Challenges

Two key individual challenges faced the professionals. They had to do with upholding high professional standards and reporting.

Upholding High Professional Standards

To succeed, SES professionals had to be different—upholding the highest standards of honesty and professionalism. This is an area of personal and professional challenge that some professionals found very difficult to meet and had to exit the Programme.

Meeting Reporting Requirements

SES and TOKTEN professionals were required to do regular quarterly reporting. However, reports were most times not submitted on time to allow timely programme

management decisions. This situation was, however, not always the fault of the professionals. Because their reports had to be endorsed by their managers in their assigned institutions, they had to first submit to them for such endorsement. This endorsement is always important for program management decisions because these reports always provided a piece of history regarding the performance of the professionals. However, in many instances, said endorsement took too long, making it difficult for programme managers to sufficiently and timely appraise the professionals and make the appropriate decisions.

The importance of this process was highlighted a few times when contrary to endorsed performance reports, some supervisors in institutions to which professionals were assigned attempted to have the professionals changed, citing poor performance. The endorsed performance reports always serve to settle such misunderstandings.

Motivation

Many professionals reported motivational challenges working in institutions that resented them, especially because of the pay differential and fear of job loss on the part of some officials. Motivational challenges also arose due to the lack of benefits and incentives for the professionals, including performance pay and benefits.

3 Conclusions

3.1 ALIGNMENT WITH THE CURRENT STRATEGY

Overall, the evaluation team concludes that the current capacity building support is highly relevant and the right intervention in terms of Liberia's capacity priorities and strategies. The evaluation revealed that there are general areas that are not addressed due to lack of sufficient attention and funding, but could be strategic for and coherent with any programming in the future.

Considering the magnitude and nature of the capacity problems inherited by the newly elected Liberian Government in 2006, the SES and TOKTEN Programmes can be credited for creating a climate of "surge capacity" which the current Liberian Government has benefited from by undertaking any meaningful development. Judging from the wide-ranging interventions of SES and TOKTEN Programmes, it is inconceivable how the Government would have overcome the numerous capacity challenges faced by Liberia at the time. The creation of a "surge" effect was not only a sound approach under those urgent circumstances, but the results had far-reaching effects on a broad public sector agenda by a small cadre of competent professionals. SES and TOKTEN Programmes restored a culture of professionalism in the public sector.

There was strong agreement across all stakeholders that the programmes made a substantial contribution towards achieving tangible results. The professionals tackled some of the most challenging socio-economic development issues across the country. They provided mid-level managerial leadership and technical skills which brought about numerous reforms such as public sector reform, civil service reform and county development agenda at the national and country levels. It is noted that highly motivated and qualified professionals can make considerable impact in the public service.

Despite their undisputed impact, the programmes were found to be cash-strapped and unsustainable. Most respondents expressed overwhelming fears and concerns that the programmes are too important to have been totally donor-dependent. As one key informant explains, "***It was a mistake not to ensure GoL financial commitment to the programmes from the initial stage.***" Thus, aspects of the Programmes may be discontinued because the resources and some of the conditions for implementing an exit strategy are not yet available. The current situation is that the SES Programme has run out of donors' support, while the TOKTEN Programme can no longer field professionals due to the lack of funding as well.

Close to eight years of capacity gains, the GOL was and still remains incapable of maintaining all 15 CDOs and other SES professionals without further donor support. This situation presents only one hard reality which will necessitate number of SES professionals to take their exit from public service. Of great significance is the fact that

the CDOs must be kept in their roles in the counties. Otherwise, there will be a huge blow for the counties. At the national level, the GOL must make every effort to encourage and retain as many SES professionals as possible. The real implication is that the GOL must therefore take full responsibility to own, support and sustain the programme.

3.2 LESSONS LEARNED

The evaluators conclude once more by highlighting the main lessons that have emerged as a result of implementing the SES and TOKTEN Programmes in Liberia. Among the most important lessons learned included the following:

- **Ensure adequate political will at the highest level to implement and sustain the programmes:** Effective national capacity building programme will largely succeed depending on the political will and commitment of political leaders and the government at large. Without the requisite political will, programmes such as the SES and TOKTEN will not succeed. Political will is required for ensuring an open recruitment process, for public sector institutions to accept new skills and ideas, paying professionals above regular civil service employees, and integrating the programmes into the national budget to ensure sustainability without further donor support.
- **Ability to exercise patience is paramount:** Working in close collaboration with political leaders and appointed officials often requires SES and TOKTEN professionals to exercise tremendous patience in the face of whatever development partners may want. Most professionals agreed that proactive planning is usually better in terms of strategy and tactic.
- **National ownership and sustainability:** Direct beneficiaries (e.g. assigned government institutions and professionals) can greatly enhance national ownership and sustainability by demonstrating purposefully the proposition of equality and commitment to the nation rebuilding process. Otherwise, internal resistance and other underlying negative factors will likely undermine programme implementation.
- **Widen human resource search sources in post-conflict situations:** Post-conflict countries cannot rebound without tapping into human capital including locally qualified talents and expatriate nationals from the Diaspora. The vetting and recruitment process must be competitive, credible and transparent to attract and retain qualified candidates in order to reverse brain drain into brain gain. Women candidates must also be encouraged to apply and participate in the selection process. It is important to place qualified professionals in the right positions within government institutions. Mentoring and training is key to build the capacity and skills of people as well as strengthening institutional capacity of the government. The evaluation revealed that such approaches can attract an array of professional talents that will not normally be available for employment in the public sector.

- **Active women participation will require concrete efforts:** Programme planners must undertake deliberate efforts to ensure gender equality by recruiting competent women for capacity building programmes in post-conflict settings. Otherwise, the evaluation found that the participation of women could be extremely limited as evidenced in the current programmes in the country.
- **Secure adequate funding from multiple sources including national budget and adopt best-fitted practices in the beginning:** It is imperative to secure sufficient funding from multiple sources including commitment in government budget from the beginning as well as to adopt best-fitted international practices from other countries where similar programmes have proven successful. Without any government commitment, a capacity building programme may fail due in part to insufficient financial support and technical assistance in post-conflict settings.
- **Robust monitoring and evaluation system:** Effective monitoring system, coordination and networking is paramount for successful implementation of capacity building programmes at the national and local levels. CSA needs to be proactive in directly engaging assigned government institutions and monitor the programmes regularly.
- **Demand-driven capacity building support:** The GOL must reassess and identify the core capacity needs or existing capacity gaps to align with the function of at relevant MACs as well as properly pay professionals so as to attract the best talents. Top leadership matters vastly to foster the same development orientation at the national and county levels.
- **Leveraging workforce diversity:** Sound leadership, teamwork, and the importance of having a diverse workforce are transferable applications that could be relevant across government institutions and the private sector.
- **Strengthening capacity at local levels:** Capacity challenges can be addressed adequately with the injection of support for quality recruitment and attractive pay packages. This was evident by the deployment of highly qualified professionals as County Development Officers in all 15 counties of Liberia.

4 Recommendations

Given the desire to ensure the usefulness and relevancy of this report, the evaluation team has divided recommendations into key strategic recommendations and detailed operational recommendations.

4.1 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

4) *Strategic programme design:*

- e. Overall, the SES Programme recruited and deployed 98 professionals to strategic areas where they were most needed. The programme was highly relevant and the right intervention. The GOL should implement the exit strategy for the SES Programme aimed at ensuring planned government financial commitment to any future programming and reducing a complete reliance on donor funding.
- f. The GOL should expand the resource base of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes to ensure long-term ownership, support and sustainability. Of paramount importance is the consolidation and integration of all capacity building support from the public and private sectors as well as donor community into a broader programme including both SES and TOKTEN Programmes.
- g. The GOL should undertake concrete efforts to link the programme from the national level to county level to district level --- in support of national decentralization policy and implementation plan. It is critically important for all 15 counties to undertake and experience enormous challenges in management their own affairs in the face of decentralization reform including political, administrative, financial, and planning capacity, among others.
- h. Properly integrate the SES Programme into the Liberian Civil Service. The GOL should ensure that the SES programme is not seen as a programme outside of the Civil Service. This was the original purpose of the programme and it still remains critically significant for the future of programme. The GOL should provide the necessary budgetary support to integrate the SES professionals into Civil Service under the National Capacity Development Unit within CSA.

5) *Strategic capacity building:*

- e. Anchor the programme to address the current capacity gaps and restructure the programme to be able to target the real needs and demand of MACs. To maximize the impact of the programmes in the future, a critical need assessment will be required to match programme support to planned incremental implementation of the AFT. The GOL should identify unique skills and develop two to three core areas at each MAC.
- f. Create better merit-based remuneration and good incentives to attract, maintain and retain top-notch specialists. Pay professionals based on a merit-based compensation scheme to promote performance and productivity, as opposed to current flat rates for the three tier-positions (*Tier 1, 2 and 3*) across assigned beneficiary institutions. The aim should be to ensure more competition and productivity amongst professionals in the public sector.

- g. Design future programming around a more robust monitoring, supervision and reporting mechanism as a guaranteed form of effective performance management and programme sustainability.
- h. Develop an effective communication strategy that will inform and educate all relevant stakeholders regarding programme implementation in order to enhance ownership and support by beneficiary institutions at national and county levels.

4.2 OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- c. Adequate financial, logistical and human resources should be made available to strengthen the systematic monitoring, coordination and supervision of the programme implementation and the tracking of progress of assigned institutions and beneficiaries towards achieving desired outcomes.
- d. Specialized training should be offered to enhance skills and knowledge of professionals for performance improvement as well as to review the overall achievements and productivity of the programme over the coming years.

5 Annexes

ANNEX 1 – DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Government of Liberia. 2008. Bringing the talent home: How transfer of knowledge through expatriate nationals (TOKTEN) is helping reconstruction in Liberia. Civil Service Agency.

Government of Liberia. 2009. Senior Executive Service: Monitoring and Evaluation Field Report on visit to Bomi, Gbarpolu and Grand Cape Mount Counties. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 8pp.

Government of Liberia. 2009. Senior Executive Service: Monitoring and Evaluation Field Report on visit to Montserrado and Margibi Counties. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 6pp.

Government of Liberia. No date. The Senior Executive Service: demonstrating leadership in the development of Liberia. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 10pp.

Government of Liberia. 2010. SES Success Stories: Faces Behind Civil Service Reform in Liberia. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 30pp.

Government of Liberia. 2010. Mid-term Independent Review of the Senior Executive Service Program: Leadership for Change. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 69pp.

Government of Liberia. 2011. Independent Evaluation of the Second Phase of the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Project. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 37pp.

Government of Liberia. 2013. Standard Letter of Agreement between the United Nations Development Programme and Civil Service Agency on the Implementation of Senior Executive Service (SES) when UNDP serves as Implementing Partner. LOA-02-2013-6. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 12pp.

Government of Liberia. 2013. Senior Executive Service Joint Quarterly Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (2013). Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 3pp.

Government of Liberia. 2013. Senior Executive Service (SES) – Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Report for 2012. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 11pp.

Government of Liberia. No date. Exit Strategy of the Senior Executive Service Programme. Monrovia: Civil Service Agency. 32pp.

UNDP/OSI/USAID 2008, Mid-term independent evaluation of the Liberia emergency capacity building support (LECBS) and TOKTEN projects

United Nations Development Programme. 2010. Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Project. Revised Project Document. 10pp.

United Nations Development Programme. 2012. Assessment of development results: evaluation of UNDP contribution - Liberia.

World Bank. 2011. Implementation Completion and Results Report (TF-91041) on a grant from the Trust Fund for Liberia (TFLIB) in the amount of USD2.30 Million to the Republic of Liberia for a emergency Senior Executive Service Project. Report No. ICR2098. 42pp.

Petersen, B.L. & Lars, E. P. 2013. Capacity development of central state institutions in fragile, DIIS Report 2013:27.

Friedman, J. 2012, Building civil service capacity: post-conflict Liberia, 2006-2011. Accessed on 4 February 2014 at <https://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/policynotes/view.xml?id=203>

ANNEX 2 – INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONS CONSULTED

LAST Name	First Name	Sex	Position	Organization	Location
ALLEN	Dr. C. William	M	Former Director-General	Civil Service Agency	Monrovia
BARTEE	Dennis	M	County M&E Officer	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs	Robertsport, Grand Cape Mount County
BERNARD	Dr. Puchu Leona	F	Deputy Director-General for Human Resource Management	Civil Service Agency	Monrovia
DAGADU	Hon. Christina	F	Superintendent	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Sanniquellie, Nimba County
DUNCAN	Hon. Victoria Worlobah	F	Development Superintendent	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Kakata, Margibi County
GBILIA	Gbovadeh	M	Senior Technical Advisor to the Director-General	Civil Service Agency	Monrovia
GEEGBAE	Ignatius A.	M	Administrative Assistant for TOKTEN Programme	Civil Service Agency	Monrovia
HERBERT	Hon. Christian	M	Former Transport Economist, Deputy Minister for Rural Development	Ministry of Public Works	Monrovia
HOWARD	Augustus	M	Human Rights Officer/OIC	UNMIL Civil Affairs	Tubmanburg, Bomi County
JABER	James A.	M	County Development Officer	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs	Sanniquellie, Nimba County
JEFFY	William S.	M	County Development Officer	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs	Tubmanburg, Bomi County
KAMARA	Stanley	M	Former National Economist, Assistant Country Director/Sustainable Economic Transformation	United Nations Development Programme	Monrovia
KOLLIE	Tinatua Calvin	M	County Development Officer	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs	Gbarnga, Bong County
MONGER	Samuel R.	M	Industrial Policy Advisor	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Monrovia
REEVES	Wanneh	F	Program Coordinator, TOKTEN Program & Director, Training & Career....	Civil Service Agency	Monrovia
RUMONGI	Jean Bosco	M	Civil Affairs Officer	United Nations Mission in Liberia	Gbarnga, Bong County
SAYON	Alfred C.	M	SES Programme Coordinator	Civil Service Agency	Monrovia
SHERIFF	Hon. Anthony Boakai	M	Development Superintendent	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Gbarnga, Bong County
SILWAL	Bhuvan	M	Civil Affairs Expert	United Nations Mission in Liberia	Kakata, Margibi County

SLAH, JR.	Bryant J.	M	County Development Officer	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs	Kakata, Margibi County
TOLIVER	Emulus A.	M	Resident Engineer	Ministry of Public Works	Gbarnga, Bong County
TORAY	Gibril Allan	M	Head of Field Offices	United Nations Mission in Liberia	Sanniquellie, Nimba County
TORORI	Cleophas O.	M	Deputy Country Director/Programme	United Nations Development Programme	Monrovia
UREY	Joseph M.	M	Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Gbarnga, Bong County
WERNER	Hon. George K.	M	Director-General & Chairman, SES & TOKTEN Project Implementation Committees	Civil Service Agency	Monrovia
WILSON	Henrique B.	M	Former Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator – Poverty Reduction Strategy	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs	Monrovia
YORLAY	Hon. Teko Tozay	M	Development Superintendent	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Sanniquellie, Nimba County

ANNEX 3 – LISTS OF SES AND TOKTEN PROFESSIONALS AND BENEFICIARY INSTITUTIONS

Current SES Professionals and Beneficiary Institutions				
No.	Name	Position	Ministry/Agency	Monthly Pay
1	Morris Kanneh	Land Reform Coordinator	Land, Mines & Energy	\$3,000
2	James K. Mulbah	Planning, HR Dev. Officer	Land, Mines & Energy	\$1,000
3	Stanley Ford	Sr. Management Consultant	Lib. Institute Pub. Admin	\$3,000
4	Shadi A. Abdu-Baki	Information/Recor Specialist	Civil Service Agency	\$3,000
5	Daniel Poawalio	Head, Reform Directorate	Civil Service Agency	\$3,000
6	Retta Vincent	Director/Employment service	Civil Service Agency	\$2,000
7	Alexander Bassey	Database Specialist	Civil Service Agency	\$2,000
8	George T. Wilson	Management Services	Civil Service Agency	\$2,000
9	Mahdea G. Beleka	Management Services	Civil Service Agency	\$2,000
10	George Wah	Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist	Civil Service Agency	\$2,000
11	Gibson Doepoh	Database Analyst	Civil Service Agency	\$1,000
12	Kou Dorlea	Legal Counsel	Ministry of Justice	\$3,000
13	Zedrous Kokeh	Legal Research	Ministry of Justice	\$2,000
14	Cllr. Yamie Q. Gbeisay	Public Defense Lawyer	Supreme Court	\$3,000
15	Atty. James Pierre	Legal research Lawyer	Supreme Court	\$3,000
16	Richmond Harding	High Way Engineer	Ministry of Public Works	\$3,000
17	Samuel Nagbe	M/E Specialist	Ministry of Public Works	\$3,000
18	Busheben Keita	Contract Mgt. Specialist	Ministry of Public Works	\$3,000
19	Samuel Monger	Industrial Policy Advisor	Ministry of Commerce	\$3,000
20	Anthony V. Kesselly	Pub. Policy Advisor	Office of the VP	\$3,000
21	Moiffie Kanneh	Legal Advisor	Ministry of Transport	\$3,000
22	Faith Morris	Management Consultant	General Services Agency	\$3,000
23	Edwin Fahnbulleh	Program Analyst	General Services Agency	\$2,000
24	Ibrahim Nyei	Program Analyst	Governance Comm.	\$2,000
25	Kotatee Williams	HR Specialist	National Housing Auth.	\$2,000
26	Kemah H. Forkpah	Director of Libraries	CNDRA	\$2,000
27	Leo J. Wilson	Budget Economist	Ministry of Finance	\$2,000
28	Sampson Snoh	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
29	William S. Jeffy	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
30	Martin Lincoln	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
31	Stanley Sheriff	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
32	Mulbah Harris	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
33	Sidiki Quisia	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
34	James Bull	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
35	Kollie M. Sorsor	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
36	Bryant Slah	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
37	Joseph N. Kpanie	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
38	Tinatua C. Kollie	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
39	Stephen F. Guzeh	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
40	James A. Jaber	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
41	Tobias Wiah	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
42	Jimmy Bocay	County Dev. Officer	Min. of Planning	\$2,000
43	Sieana Abdul Baki	Program Officer	Ministry of Gender	\$2,000
44	Lydia Mai Sherman	Social Welfare Coord.	Ministry of Gender	\$2,000
45	Atty. Naomie Gray	Legal Counsel	Legal Advisor, MoS	\$2,000
46	Harry G. Wonene	M & E Director	Min. of Agriculture	\$1,000

47	V. Simmons Kidka	HR Development Officer	Min. of Youth & Sports	\$2,000
48	J. Bryant McGill	Program Officer	Min. of Youth & Sports	\$1,000
49	J. Marwolo Sonnie	Project Manager	Ministry of Post	\$1,000
50	D. Nalon Kaine	Director, Technical Service	Ministry of Post	\$2,000
51	Cllr. Amos Y. Bartu	Environmental Lawyer	Environ. Protection Ag.	\$2,000
52	Julius K. Sele	Program Mgt. Advisor	Monrovia City Corp.	\$3,000
53	Kofa W. Konwro	HR Analyst	Nat'l Housing Authority	\$1,000
54	Zayzay Slonglo	Technical Manager, LVD	Forestry Dev. Authority	\$3,000
SES Secretariat				
55	Alfred C. Sayon	Program Coordinator	Civil Service Agency	\$2,500
56	Isaac Gorvego	Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	Civil Service Agency	\$2,000
57	Walter A. Baker	Program Accountant	Civil Service Agency	\$2,000
58	Ela Boe Karto	Administrative Assistant	Civil Service Agency	\$1,000
59	Wallie Howard	Drivers (3 drivers @ \$275)	Civil Service Agency	\$825
-	Gormondeh Zekieh			
61	Abraham Sherman			
62	Victor Quatey	Office Assistant	Civil Service Agency	\$200
63	Operational Cost (Insurance, internet, fuel, maintenance, stationery & supplies, etc.,)		Civil Service Agency	\$5,000
TOTAL				\$131,525

Source: SES Secretariat

TOKTEN Beneficiary Matrix 2007-2013

№	Name	Sector	Start Date	Duration (end date)	Location/Placement After TOKTEN
1	Charles McClain	Agriculture	1-Jan-10	30-Jun-10	Dep Minister, Agriculture
2	D. Abugarshall Kai	Agriculture	1-Feb-08	30-Jul-08	Still in Liberia- contract ended with MOA
3	Daniel E. Browne	Agriculture	1-Jan-10	31-Mar-11	Went back to Diaspora
4	Joseph F. Johnson	Agriculture	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-11	Now Deputy Minister, Defense
5	Arthur T. Summerville	Agriculture	1-Jan-11	31-Dec-11	Still with MOA-integrated
6	John T. Newmah	Agriculture	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-11	Abroad for Advanced studies
7	Eric S. Tokpah	Agriculture	1-Oct-10	31-Aug-12	TOKTEN contract ended; still at MOA
8	Roseline H. Swaray	Agriculture	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-11	Now with Ministry of Education
9	Dr. Victor H. Sumo	Agriculture	1-Nov-10	15-Jun-12	Still with MOA-integrated
10	J. Hodo Bedell	Agriculture	1-Nov-10	30-Apr-11	N/A
11	Dexenous G. Tuah	Agriculture	1-Nov-10	30-Apr-12	Still with MOA-integrated
12	Hassan Kiawu	Agriculture	1-Jan-11	30-Jun-12	Still with MOA- integrated
13	Tamba Yamba Boakai	Agriculture	15-Dec-10	15-Dec-11	No longer with MOA- still in country
14	Aaron G. Marshall	Agriculture	1-Mar-11	31-Aug-12	TOKTEN contract ended; still at MOA
15	Mafoi Metzger	Agriculture	15-Dec-10	15-Dec-11	Still with MOA- integrated
16	James T. Moore	Agriculture	1-Mar-12	31-Aug-12	TOKTEN contract ended; still at MOA
17	Aldolphus Jacobs	Education (Admin)	1-Nov-10	30-Sep-12	TOKTEN contract ended; head of MCSS
18	Dr. Michael Slawon	Education (Admin)	20-Nov-06	28-Feb-08	Director, Higher Ed, MOE
19	D. Klay Quie (Rev)	Education (Basic)	1-Oct-11	30-Sep-12	TOKTEN contract ended; still at MOE
20	Advertus Orea Wright	Education (Basic)	1-Oct-11	30-Sep-12	TOKTEN contract ended; still at MOE
21	Precious Brownell-Dennis	Education (Basic)	1-Oct-11	30-Sep-12	TOKTEN contract ended; still at MOE
22	Mayaedah Kemeh-Gama	Education (technical-Special)	1-May-11	30-Apr-12	Still with MOE-integrated
23	E. Tyson Lewis	Education (technical-Special)	1-Jan-13	31-Dec-13	Went back to the Diaspora
24	Dr. Alfred Amah	Education (tertiary)	15-Aug-08	31-Dec-08	Deceased
25	Dr. Emmett Dennis	Education (tertiary)	1-Jul-06	31-Dec-06	Now President of University of Liberia
26	Dr. Alpha Bah	Education (tertiary)	1-Jul-09	31-Dec-09	Still with the University of Liberia-integrated
	Dr. Alpha Bah	Education (tertiary)	1-Mar-10	31-Aug-10	
27	Dr. Billy C. Johnson	Education (tertiary)	1-Jul-09	30-Jun-10	Now with JFK as Chief Medical Officer
28	Dr. Charles K. Mulbah	Education (tertiary)	1-Dec-07	31-May-08	NA
29	Dr. Emmanuel Torpor	Education (tertiary)	1-May-07	30-Apr-08	Remain with the University of Liberia-integrated
30	Dr. James Kiazolu	Education (tertiary)	1-Oct-09	3-Mar-11	Remain with the University-integrated
31	Stephen Kaifa	Education (tertiary)	1-Sep-07	25-Mar-08	Went back to the Diaspora
32	Mitchelle Stubblefield	Education (tertiary)	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-11	Remain at the University of Liberia
33	Etta Witherspoon-Acolatse	Education (tertiary)	1-May-11	31-Oct-11	Went back to the Diaspora
34	John T. Woods	Education (tertiary)	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-11	Remain with the University of Liberia
35	Dr. Roland C. Massaquoi, Sr.	Education (tertiary)	1-Nov-10	31-Oct-11	Remain with the University of Liberia
36	Dr. Vuyu Kanda Golakai	Education (tertiary)	1-Nov-10	30-Apr-12	Remain with the University of Liberia
37	Dr. Albert Coleman	Education (tertiary)	1-Nov-10	30-Apr-11	Did not take up a TOKTEN assignment
38	Dr. Walter Wiles	Education (tertiary)	1-Jun-11	30-Nov-11	Went back to the Diaspora but has returned and is at the University of Liberia
39	Dr. Wede Elliot-Brownell	Education (tertiary)	15-Jun-10	15-Dec-11	Went back to the Diaspora
40	Dr. Yar Donlah Gono	Education (tertiary)	15-Jan-11	15-Jul-11	Remain with MOE, President Nimba Com College-integrated
41	Dr. Ophelia Weeks	Education (tertiary)	1-Feb-11	31-Jul-11	Went back to the Diaspora
42	Arabella Greaves	Health	1-Oct-06	31-Mar-08	NA
43	Dr. Wannie-Mae Scott	Health	1-Jul-06	31-Dec-07	Remain at the JFK as Chief Administrator

TOKTEN Beneficiary Matrix 2007-2013

№	Name	Sector	Start Date	Duration (end date)	Location/Placement After TOKTEN
	MacDonald				
44	Ayele Ajavon-Cox	Health	15-May-08	16-Nov-08	Remained with the JFK as Dental Director
45	David Logan	Health	1-May-07	31-Jan-08	Still at the MHSW
46	Dr. Daniel Toweh	Health	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	NA
47	Dr. Francis Nah Kateh	Health	1-Jul-10	31-Aug-12	TOKTEN contract ended; still at the JFDRRH
48	Dr. Louise Kpoto	Health	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	NA
49	Dr. Robert Dennis	Health	15-Jan-07	13-Jun-08	Went back to the Diaspora
50	Maima D. McQueen	Health	1-Jan-10	30-Jun-10	Transition to LECBS but has gone back to the Diaspora
51	Mrs. Vera Cooper	Health	15-Jan-07	14-Jul-08	Still with JFK as Finance Director
52	Sodey Lake	Health	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	Still with MOHSW at JFDRRH
	Sodey Lake	Health	15-Dec-10	15-Jun-12	
53	Dr. Ivan Cammanor	Health (AIDS Commission)	1-Oct-09	31-Mar-11	Still with the National AIDS Commission
54	Dr. Benedict B. Kolee	Health	15-Dec-10	15-Jul-12	Still with MOHSW at JFDRRH
55	Thomas F. Kpelewah	Health	15-Dec-10	15-Jul-12	Still with MOHSW at JFDRRH
56	Nyanquoi Kargbo	Health	1-Nov-10	31-Oct-11	Still at the MHSW as Registrar General, LMDA
57	Catherine Cyvette Gibson	Infrastructure/MCC	1-Apr-10	30-Sep-10	Still at the MCC
58	Edsel Smith	Infrastructure/Public Works	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-09	Transition to SES and into GOL as Dep Minister, MPW
59	Klahn-Gboloh Jarbah	Infrastructure/Public Works	15-Oct-07	14-Apr-08	Still in Liberia-Private venture
60	Mr. William Towah	Infrastructure/Public Works	1-Mar-07	31-Aug-08	NA
61	Benjamin Wolo	Infrastructure/Telecom	1-Jul-06	14-Mar-08	Still with Libtelco as Managing Director
62	Mr. Winston Beysolow	Infrastructure/Transport (Air)	1-May-07	31-Jan-08	Went back to the Diaspora
63	Botoe K. Zinnah	Infrastructure/Public Works	1-Apr-11	30-Sep-11	Still at the MoPW
64	Ellen Pratt	Infrastructure/MCC	1-May-11	31-Oct-11	Still with MCC
65	Frederick L. M. Gbemie	Security/Rule of Law	1-Apr-10	31-Mar-11	In the Private Sector
66	Mozart Chesson	Security/Rule of Law	1-Oct-09	30-Jun-12	Went back to the Diaspora
67	Rose Stryker	Security/Rule of Law	1-Feb-10	31-Jan-11	Transition to GoL as Dep Inspector, LNP
68	David Ziama	Security/Rule of Law (Defense)	1-Oct-09	31-Mar-10	Still at the Ministry of Defense
69	Annie Wesley-Swen	Security/Rule of Law (Justice)	1-Apr-07	30-Sep-08	Transitioned to UNMIL
70	Adolph W. Yancy	Security/Rule of Law (LNP)	1-Jan-10	30-Dec-10	Still at the LNP
71	Samuel F. Dakana	Security/Rule of Law (LNP)	1-Jan-10	31-Dec-10	Transition to GoL as Training Commandant, LNP
72	Simeon F. Frank	Security/Rule of Law (LNP)	1-Jan-10	31-Dec-10	Still at the LNP
73	Boom Menine Wilson	Planning/ Econ & Com (MPEA)	1-May-10	15-Jul-11	Transition to GoL as Comptroller General, Ministry of Finance, R.L
74	J. Kose Kpedebah	Planning/ Econ & Com (MPEA)	1-Apr-11	30-Sep-11	Still in Liberia
75	Gulu Gwesa	Planning/ Econ & Com	1-Sep-11	29-Feb-12	TOKTEN Contract ended; with MOCI
76	Jackson Wonde	Planning/ Econ (Labour)	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	Got integrated in to GOL as Dep Min of Labour and MPEA respectively; now Deceased
	Jackson Wonde	Planning/ Econ (Labour)	1-Nov-08	30-Apr-09	
77	Kehleboe Gongloe	Planning/ Econ (Labour)	1-Dec-07	31-May-08	Transitioned to GoL as Assistant Minister MoL
78	James F. Kollie	Planning/ Econ (MPEA)	15-Jun-09	15-Dec-10	Now Deputy Minister of Finance (GoL)
79	Mr. Alvin Atta	Planning/ Econ (MPEA)	1-Apr-07	31-Mar-08	Still at the MoPEA
80	Sunny Nyemah	Planning/ Econ (MPEA)	15-Nov-09	15-Nov-10	Now Dept of PADM, Universty of Lib
81	Cyril Allen Jr.	Planning/ Econ&Com (NIC)	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	Now with MRU Secretariat, MPEA
82	Amos T. Kofa	Planning/ Econ &Comm (MPEA)	1-Apr-07	31-Mar-08	Now works for EU's VPA project in Liberia

TOKTEN Beneficiary Matrix 2007-2013

Nº	Name	Sector	Start Date	Duration (end date)	Location/Placement After TOKTEN
83	Bigboi Yanquoi	Planning/ Econ & Comm (MPEA)	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	Now with EU as National Authorizing Officer at MPEA
84	Chara Itoka	Planning/ Econ & Comm (MPEA)	1-Mar-10	30-Apr-11	In country (Private Sector)
85	Cllr. Patrick Sendolo Wonzon	Planning/ Econ&Comm (MPEA)	15-Oct-07	14-Apr-08	Now Minister of Lands, Mines & Energy
86	Djuteh A. Clarke	Planning/ Econ &Fin (CBL)	1-Mar-08	31-Aug-09	Still with the Central Bank of Liberia
87	Sam Russ	Planning/ Econ &Finance	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	Transitioned to LECBS now Deputy Minister at LME
88	Dorothy D. Johnson	Planning/Econ&Com (LISGIS)	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-11	Went back to the Diaspora
89	Stephen Y. Mambu	Planning/ Econ&Com(MOCI)	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-12	TOKTEN Contract ended; with MOCI
90	Edward M. Eesiah	Planning/ Econ/(MPEA)	1-Oct-11	30-Sep-11	Now with Ministry of Finance
91	Angelique Weeks	Planning/ Economic&Finance	14-May-07	13-Nov-08	Now Head of Lib Telecom Authority
92	Bayogar A. McCritty	Planning/ Economic&Finance	15-Aug-08	31-Dec-09	Commissioner at Lib Telecom Authority
93	Andrew S. Allakamenin	Planning/Econ&Com(MOCI)	1-Nov-08	30-Apr-09	Still in Liberia (Private Sector)
94	William Bako Freeman	Planning/Econ&Com(MOCI)	1-Oct-06	30-Apr-07	Went back to the Diaspora
95	Kelvin Sebwe	Pub Adm (Youth & Sports)	1-Jan-10	30-Jun-10	Still in Liberia- works with LFA
96	Christopher Neyor	Pub Adm&Gov (State)	1-Jul-06	31-Dec-07	Still in Lib- formerly head of NOCAL
97	Ernest Bruce	Pub Adm&Gov (CSA)	15-Dec-08	15-Jun-10	Went to Copyright Office
98	Theresa Stubblefield Jordan	Pub Adm&Gov (CSA)	1-May-09	31-Oct-10	Still in Liberia (Private Sector)
99	Gbovadeh G. Gbiliala	Pub Adm & Gov (CSA)	June 2013		Still at the CSA
100	Angela Cassell-Bush	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	1-Jan-10	31-Dec-09	Now Dep Minister, Finance
101	Dr. Augustine Konneh	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	1-Sep-09	31-Aug-10	Still with MOFA as head of FOSI
102	Ethel Davis	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	1-Jan-10	30-Jun-10	Now with Liberia's Foreign Mission
103	Henry Fahnbulleh	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	Now in Legislature
104	James Mayson	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	1-Sep-07	28-Feb-08	Deceased
	James Mayson	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	7-Oct-08	7-Apr-09	
105	Mohammed A. Nyei	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	7-Oct-08	7-Oct-09	Now with Liberia's Foreign Mission
106	Ms. Shirley Brownell	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	7-Oct-08	7-Apr-09	Transitioned to LECBS; now Deputy Min MoS
107	Albert George	Pub Adm&Gov (Forg Affrs)	1-Oct-10	31-Mar-11	Still with the MoFA
108	Nyankor Matthew	Pub Adm&Gov (GAC)	1-Mar-10	31-Mar-11	Transitioned to SES; still GAC
109	Dr. Dominic N. Tarpeh	Pub Adm&Gov (Gov Com)	1-Apr-10	31-Mar-11	Still with Governance Commission-integrated
110	Albert S. Sims	Pub Adm&Gov (Legislature)	1-Apr-10	30-Sep-10	With the Private sector in Liberia
111	Willie Givens	Pub Adm&Gov (MICAT)	1-Oct-09	31-Mar-10	Went back to the Diaspora
112	J. Marwolo Sonnie	Pub Adm&Gov (Post)	1-Oct-07	31-Mar-08	Transitioned to SES; still MPT
113	Yini Guava Sahn	Pub Adm&Gov (Post)	1-Jan-09	30-Jun-10	Went back to Diaspora
114	Aloysius T. Jappah	Pub Adm&Gov (State)	1-Oct-07	15-Dec-08	Went back to Diaspora
115	Mr. Cyrus Badio	Pub Adm&Gov (State)	1-Apr-07	30-Sep-08	In Liberia with the NOCAL
116	Richard Klah	Pub Adm&Gov (State)	1-Mar-07	29-Feb-08	In Liberia with the Commercial Court
117	T. Sampson Quioh	Pub Adm&Gov (State)	1-Apr-10	3-Mar-10	Still at the GC
118	Tianna Sherman-Kesselly	Pub Adm&Gov (State)	1-Mar-10	31-Aug-31	Private sector in Liberia
119	Kau Kidau Joseph	Pub Adm&Gov (State)	1-May-10	31-Oct-10	In Liberia with the Maritime Authority
120	Benjamin Johnson	Public Adm&Gov(CSA)	1-Oct-07	7-Apr-09	In Liberia with the University of Liberia
121	Dr. Puchu L. Bernard	Public Adm&Gov (CSA)	1-Oct-10	30-Sep-11	Transitioned into GoL- Dep Director, CSA
122	Cllr. Alexander B. Zoe	Pub Adm & Gov (NEC)	1-Apr-11	30-Sep-11	Private Sector- in Liberia
123	Cllr. Othello S. Payman	Pub Adm & Gov (NEC)	1-Apr-11	30-Sep-11	Private Sector- in Liberia
124	Elizabeth Rose-Amidjogbe	Pub Adm&Gov(Law Refm)	1-Apr-11	31-Mar-12	Went back to the Diaspora

TOKTEN Beneficiary Matrix 2007-2013

Nº	Name	Sector	Start Date	Duration (end date)	Location/Placement After TOKTEN
125	Wanneh Clarke	Public Adm&Gov(CSA)	15-Jan-11	15-Dec-12	TOKTEN Contract with ongoing at CSA
126	George K. Werner	Public Adm&Gov(CSA)	1-Jun-11	31-Dec-12	TOKTEN Contract ended; remain as Director-General of CSA
127	Candance Sawyer	Natural Resource Management (MLME)	1-Apr-11	31-Mar-12	Went back to the Diaspora
128	Saah A. David, Jr.	Natural Resource Management (FDA)	15-Jun-11	30-Sep-12	TOKTEN Contract ended; remain at FDA
129	Moseray Momoh	Natural Resource Management (FDA)	1-May-11	30-Sep-12	TOKTEN Contract ended; returned to private sector

Source: TOKTEN Programme

ANNEX 4 – QUESTIONNAIRES

SES and TOKTEN Programmes (2006 – 2013)

Final Evaluation

INTERVIEW GUIDE / QUESTIONNAIRE

For Donors and GoL/CSA

You have been selected as a key source for input for a final evaluation of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes. The evaluation is designed around the following objectives:

- a) To identify and take stock of the challenges and opportunities (SWOT analysis) of the current programmes implementation and performance in Liberia and
- b) To assess and document significant impact, success stories, lessons learned, insightful findings and recommendations from key stakeholders based on its inception and the entire implementation process.

This assignment is being carried out by a team of independent evaluation consultants:

Name	Institution	Email	Telephone
Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.	Afrivision International	vyengbeh@yahoo.com	+231 886 514 552
James A. Thompson	Subah-Belleh Associates	jimmyathompson11@gmail.com	+231 886 365 966

The purpose of this interview guide is to provide quantitative and qualitative data to the evaluation. There are 16 questions on the programme from 2006 to 2013. Please give you us your frank assessment, based on the questions asked and any additional information you may have, which can be of relevance to this exercise. **All interviews and questionnaires will be treated in the strictest confidence.** They will not be passed on to anyone. Information will be aggregated according to stakeholder group, synthesized, and presented in a report to Civil Service Agency. If direct citations are used, the identity of the respondent will be kept anonymous. **Your views are extremely valuable for this exercise.**

IDENTIFICATION	
Your LAST Name:	
Your First Name:	
Position:	
Organization:	
Location:	
Your email:	
Your telephone:	
Sex:	() Male () Female
Please indicate which programme area(s) you will be responding to:	Senior Executive Service (SES)
	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)

Date:	
-------	--

Interviewed by: _____

Most Significant Change

Thinking about all the effects that this programme area had from 2006 to 2013, what, in your opinion, has been the most significant change of all? Why is this change important?

SES	
TOKTEN	

Design and Relevance

Was the programme area relevant and responsive to the priority capacity needs of the Government of Liberia (GOL) and the country from 2006 to 2013?

Were the programme interventions designed around the priority capacity needs of the beneficiary institutions?

Strategy

Did the programme area have an effective delivery strategy from 2006 to 2013?

Were the direct beneficiaries (*Assigned beneficiary institutions*) satisfied with the type and quality of service delivered through the implementation of the programme area from 2006 to 2013?

Was the programme implementation based on the original thought and design of the programme in 2006/07?

Effectiveness

Did the programme area achieved its desired outcomes from 2006 to 2013?

Did the programme area put in place effective management, monitoring system and oversight functions towards achieving expected results and measuring progress from 2006 to 2013?

Efficiency

Did the programme area achieved results at reasonable costs in terms of human and financial resources from 2006 to 2013?

Degree of Change

Did the programme area make substantial contribution to the National Capacity Development Strategy in Liberia from 2006 to 2013?

Sustainability

Did the programme area put in place an effective exit strategy and the programme will be sustained beyond the period of donor funding/support?

Please identify the strengths and weaknesses of the programme area from 2006 to 2013, as you see them:

What were the main challenges with implementing the programme?

What lessons were learned from this programme area from 2006 to 2013 that might have generic application?

What recommendations would you make for the next phase?

Is there anything else you would like to tell us?

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS EVALUATION!

SES and TOKTEN Programmes (2006 – 2013)

Final Evaluation

INTERVIEW GUIDE / QUESTIONNAIRE *For Beneficiary Institutions*

You have been selected as a key source for input for a final evaluation of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes. The evaluation is designed around the following objectives:

To identify and take stock of the challenges and opportunities (SWOT analysis) of the current programmes implementation and performance in Liberia and

To assess and document significant impact, success stories, lessons learned, insightful findings and recommendations from key stakeholders based on its inception and the entire implementation process.

This assignment is being carried out by a team of independent evaluation consultants:

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The purpose of this interview guide is to provide quantitative and qualitative data to the evaluation. There are 16 questions on the programme from 2006 to 2013. Please give you us your frank assessment, based on the questions asked and any additional information you may have, which can be of relevance to this exercise. **All interviews and questionnaires will be treated in the strictest confidence.** They will not be passed on to anyone. Information will be aggregated according to stakeholder group, synthesized, and presented in a report to Civil Service Agency. If direct citations are used, the identity of the respondent will be kept anonymous. **Your views are extremely valuable for this exercise.**

IDENTIFICATION	
Your LAST Name:	
Your First Name:	
Position:	
Organization:	
Location:	
Your email:	
Your telephone:	
Sex:	() Male () Female
Please indicate which programme area(s) you will be responding to:	Senior Executive Service (SES)
	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)
Date:	

Interviewed by: _____

Most Significant Change

Thinking about all the effects that this programme area had from 2006 to 2013, what, in your opinion, has been the most significant change of all? Why is this change important?

SES	
TOKTEN	

Did your institution fully understand the programme objective, strategy, and how your institution could benefit from it?

Was your institution consulted in the development/design of the programme?

Did your institution determine how you wanted to benefit from the programme?

Did you get the capacity support you needed? Did the programme adequately respond to your need?

If yes, can you please give us a few examples of how your institution benefitted?

On the whole, given the experience of your institution, please identify the strengths and weaknesses of the programme area from 2006 to 2013, as you see them:

What were the main challenges with benefitting from/participating in and/or implementing the programme, in general?

What lessons were learned from this programme area from 2006 to 2013 that might have generic application?

What recommendations would you make for the next phase?

Is there anything else you would like to tell us?

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS EVALUATION!

SES and TOKTEN Programmes (2006 – 2013)

Final Evaluation

INTERVIEW GUIDE / QUESTIONNAIRE *For SES and TOKTEN Professionals*

You have been selected as a key source for input for a final evaluation of the SES and TOKTEN Programmes. The evaluation is designed around the following objectives:

To identify and take stock of the challenges and opportunities (SWOT analysis) of the current programmes implementation and performance in Liberia and

To assess and document significant impact, success stories, lessons learned, insightful findings and recommendations from key stakeholders based on its inception and the entire implementation process.

This assignment is being carried out by a team of independent evaluation consultants:

Name	Institution	Email	Telephone
Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.	Afrivision International	vyengbeh@yahoo.com	+231 886 514 552
James A. Thompson	Subah-Belleh Associates	jimmyathompson11@gmail.com	+231 886 365 966

The purpose of this interview guide is to provide quantitative and qualitative data to the evaluation. There are 16 questions on the programme from 2006 to 2013. Please give you us your frank assessment, based on the questions asked and any additional information you may have, which can be of relevance to this exercise. **All interviews and questionnaires will be treated in the strictest confidence.** They will not be passed on to anyone. Information will be aggregated according to stakeholder group, synthesized, and presented in a report to Civil Service Agency. If direct citations are used, the identity of the respondent will be kept anonymous. **Your views are extremely valuable for this exercise.**

IDENTIFICATION	
Your LAST Name:	
Your First Name:	
Position:	
Organization:	
Location:	
Your email:	
Your telephone:	
Sex:	() Male () Female
Please indicate which programme area(s) you will be responding to:	Senior Executive Service (SES)
	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)
Date:	

Interviewed by: _____

Most Significant Change

Thinking about all the effects that this programme area had from 2006 to 2013, what, in your opinion, has been the most significant change of all? Why is this change important?

SES	
TOKTEN	

Recruitment and Deployment

When did you join the programme?

Can you briefly describe the recruitment process and give your opinion about it?

Were you recruited for the position you applied for?

Please describe your posting to the institution and the settling-in process. Was it easy settling in? What were the challenges?

Work

Did you find the job challenging?

Did you have the right mix of qualification and experience for the job?

Were you evaluated? How often?

Did you always agree with the outcome of the evaluation?

How would you describe your performance? Did it meet the expectation of the institution? If yes, how did you know it did?

Achievements

What would you consider as your achievements?

Can you give specific examples of how you helped your assigned institution bridge a capacity gap and/or solve a specific problem? Can we publish this information? If no, why not?

For the Future of the Programme: Strengths, Weaknesses, Challenges, Lessons Learned from Current Programme

On the whole, given your experience working in the programme, please identify the strengths and weaknesses of the programme area from 2006 to 2013, as you see them:

What were the main challenges with benefitting from/participating in and/or implementing the programme, in general?

What lessons were learned from this programme area from 2006 to 2013 that might have generic application?

What recommendations would you make for the next phase?

Is there anything else you would like to tell us?

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS EVALUATION!

ANNEX 5 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANT PROCUREMENT NOTICE Request for two Local Consultants

Consultancy Assignment Information

Duty Station: Monrovia

Description of the Assignment: TOKTEN & SES: Final Evaluation, lessons learned and results focused review of project impact and potential redesign considerations.

Period of Assignment: 1.5 Months (6 weeks) Proposals should be submitted at the following addresses by email to ac_sayon@yahoo.com; and to iteflehgeegbae@yahoo.com no later than 17:00 hrs (GMT) on 18th October 2013.

Any request for clarification must be sent by standard electronic communication to the address or e-mail indicated above.

Background

The TOKTEN¹⁵ & SES¹⁶ Projects are two of several initiatives devised by Government of Liberia and partners to strengthen national capacity, especially by addressing the critical human resource challenges in government, particularly, the civil service. It is part of the GoL's¹⁷ multi-pronged capacity development initiative designed to facilitate the staffing of qualified experts into key positions in the civil and public services. The TOKTEN programme was initiated in Liberia in May 2006 for an original duration of 18 months with support from UNDP and USAID. The SES programme was launched in March 2007 but had a slow start in terms of implementation. Actual implementation began in December 2008. However, after an independent midterm evaluations were conducted, the projects continued. The programmes have recruited over 250 Liberian professionals to build surge capacity of the government in critical sectors. Since their inception, there have been over two independent reviews, mostly terminal evaluations. These evaluations identified some challenges to be tackled, but given timing and the evolving context only few successes stories could be shared, lessons learned and impact measured. The independent evaluation of the projects in 2008 & 2010 found both TOKTEN & SES highly relevant programmes, and called for adjustments in implementation with recommendations for scaling up its activities, subject to available funding, continuation to consolidate the gains made so far up to a point where the Government of Liberia can absorb the beneficiaries into its budget. Additionally, GoL requested that, given the continued need for TOKTEN & SES professionals to support implementation of the PRS and other reform initiatives including the Agenda for Transformation.

Toward this end, the project implementation committee has agreed that a final evaluation of the projects be conducted. This evaluation will embody a results focused review of impact, while drawing an important lessons and documenting success stories. This evaluation is seen as an opportunity for the project to gather and document success stories, lessons learned during implementation and evaluating the project from its inception to determine its contribution and impact and offer insightful findings and recommendations. It is against this background that services of a consultancy (preferably a local consulting firm), are needed. The expected deliverables include: a detailed work plan; a desk-based study to compliment a field based evaluation and review; a presentation of the preliminary findings and direction to stakeholders-PIC at the end; a draft final report; a final report; a final presentation of the findings and recommendations to PIC. Where possible, outputs should

also include: Policy relevant recommendations and how to implement them - including resources requirements and the sources.

The key outcome expected as a result of the consultancy is to support the CSA. PIC and partners to coordinate a final evaluation and results focused review of the TOKTEN & SES in terms of lessons learned, project impact, and documentation of success stories. The consultancy involving two consultants (one lead), is required to:

Support a process of consultation with stakeholders (beneficiaries and donors) to develop a comprehensive account of programme management, programme performance, challenges, lessons, successes, and contributions.

Guidelines/methodology

The Final Evaluation and results focused review of impact and lessons learned will involve both *meta evaluation* and *direct evaluation* techniques based on interviews, a review of macro data and project documentation including progress reports and evaluations, an analysis of regular monitoring data, a review of select outputs, reports, national plans such as the national capacity development, the New Deal and other instruments of relevance to the reforms and transition in Liberia as a whole. This will be complemented by triangulation and attendance at a one day workshop where the consultant will interact with beneficiary institutions and professionals to get a semblance of the success stories, challenges, lessons, and contributions they made. The structure of interviews/questions for the evaluation should reflect an intention to ascertain the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, positioning, strategies, processes, and instruments of project delivery including the management, monitoring and oversight functions such as knowledge transfer and management imperatives. It should provide clear evidence to suggest whether or not there is need for continuation and how differently should the programme be designed in the future, and should there be need for continuation.

The following are the main elements of the methodology:

- *Semi-Structured ‘Insider’ Stakeholder Individual Interviews and one day workshop* Individual Interviews with relevant government agency officials particularly the members of PIC that are beneficiaries of the TOKTEN & SES projects.
- *Semi-Structured “Outsider” Stakeholder Group or Individual Interviews:* With donor agencies, project personnel, and staff of related projects/programme.
- *Field Visits to selected beneficiaries in the Health, Education, and Agriculture sectors.*
- *Review of Documentation including national plans* and budgets as well as sectoral reports pertaining to the sectors covered by the TOKTEN & SES projects.

Deliverables by consultants --- 6 weeks	Timeframe	Payment
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<p>Inception Report and Formal Presentation The first two weeks require the consultant to gather progress reports & documents, and drafting an outline to highlight the complete work plan for the consultancy assignment and to consolidate and present the preliminary findings and information. The consultant would solicit the feedback and point of view to the relevant stakeholders and review all secondary data to finalize the road ahead. The consultants would also attend a one day workshop and conduct a presentation.</p>	End of week 2	25% of total contract sum
Circulation and validation of the Draft Report containing a proposed draft of an acceptable concept paper and TOR for successor programme. The consultants would take into account feedback and suggestions.	End of week 4	35% of total contract sum
Final Report and a Formal Presentation containing success stories, lessons, contributions and challenges since the programme inception in 2006.	End of week 6	40% of total contract sum

Requirements for experience and qualifications:

- Advanced University degree in economics, business, social science or a related relevant field;
- Proven and demonstrated experience of the formulation review and evaluation of programme;
- Familiarity with the National Capacity Development Strategy (NCDS), the PRS, and successor strategy- the Agenda for Transformation. Familiarity of the international Development Partner approaches and programming related to capacity development particularly with regard to the different quick win capacity development programmes;
- Ability to work independently but in collaboration with a variety of stakeholders;
- Technically sound in drafting and editing reports;
- Excellent communication and writing skills in English;
- Strong analytical skills;
- Adaptability and flexibility, client orientation, confidentiality, initiative, concern for accuracy and quality;
- Computer literate; and
- Experience of similar work in other countries, especially African countries is highly desirable.

Documents to be included when submitting the proposals

Interested individual consultants must submit the following documents/information to demonstrate their qualifications:

Proposal:

Explaining why they are the most suitable for the work (1 page).

Provide a brief methodology on how they will approach and conduct the work (1 page).

Personal CV including past experience in similar projects and at least 3 references.

Deadline for all applications is Friday, October 18, 2013 at 5:00PM.