

Assessment of UNDP's contributions towards Good Governance in Serbia (2011- 2015)

FINAL REPORT

12.03.2015

FINAL REPORT

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations	iv
Executive Summary.....	vi
Acknowledgments	xiv
I. Introduction	1
A. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation	1
B. Scope	1
C. Evaluation Criteria and Questions	1
D. Conceptual Framework	2
II. Development Challenge.....	4
III. UNDP Response and Challenge	18
IV. Contribution to results	20
A. Relevance	20
B. Effectiveness.....	23
C. Efficiency (in delivering outputs)	42
D. Sustainability (of Outcomes)	47
E. Impact	48
V. Conclusions and Recommendations.....	50

Table of Annexes and Figures

Annex 1: Terms of Reference	54
Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix	59
Annex 3: Revision of EQs	61
Annex 4: Global Challenges and Opportunities	65
Annex 5: Overview of Projects	68
Annex 6: List of Interviewees	69
Annex 7: List of Documents and Data Sources Consulted by the Evaluation Team	70
Table 1: Support for EU Membership	4
Table 2: Key macroeconomic trends in Serbia 2007-2015	5
Table 3: World Bank Doing Business Index 2015	5
Table 4: Budgetary allocations to Anti-Corruption Agency	6
Table 5: Serbia 1996-2013 Government Effectiveness Indicators	8
Table 6: 2000-2013 Serbia Rule of Law Indicator	12
Table 7: 2009-2013 CSOs Sustainability Scores for Serbia	12
Table 8: Serbia 1996-2013 Voice and Accountability Indicator	12
Table 9: 2008-2012 Open Budget Index - OBI Score for Serbia (out of 100%)	13
Table 10: 2012 Comparative Open Budget Index - OBI Western Balkans	13
Table 11: 2010-2014 Lack of Coping Capacity in Western Balkans	15
Table 12: CPD Outputs	18
Table 13: Projects List	18
Table 14: List of Outcomes	18
Table 15: Relevance of Project Objectives	21
Table 16: UNDP Corruption Benchmarking Surveys: Key Findings	33
Table 17: Review of reported Project Results	37
Table 18: UNDP 2011-15 CPD Outcome 2.1: Good Governance Strengthened	39
Table 19: UNDP Contribution to Outcomes	40
Table 20: Sample of a Result Chain with Use of an Intermediate Outcome Level	45
Table 21: Dimensions for Future UNDP Support	48
Table 22: Micro, Meso and Macro-Level Impact	49
Figure 1: Outcome Model	vii
Figure 2: Trends in Corruption Perception by Sector	11
Figure 3: Intermediate Outcomes and Outcomes	19
Figure 4: Parliament, MoF and media scrutinize budget more diligently	24
Figure 5: Executive manages public finances more effectively	25
Figure 6: State and citizens communicate more systematically and effectively with each other	26
Figure 7: More state organs are involved actively in anti-corruption activities	26
Figure 8: Public and private sectors discriminate less against women	27
Figure 9: Local governments provide citizens, NGOs and businesses with more equitable access to quality services	28
Figure 10: State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively	29
Figure 11: State organs allow and secure more rights and freedoms to citizens	29
Figure 12: UNDP Budget and Expenditure in the area of Governance	42
Figure 13: Network Graph Connecting Projects and Outcomes	47
Box 1: Corruption in Serbia and experienced by its population	9
Box 2: Journalists Investigating Procurement Fraud	36
Box 3: SMART Indicators in Results Frameworks - UNDP Guidelines	44
Box 4: Intermediate Outcomes - UNDP Guidelines	46

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	Anti-corruption Agency of the Republic of Serbia
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CoE	Council of Europe
COR	Commissariat for Refugees
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DACU	Development and Aid Co-ordination Unit
DG EEAS	European External Action Service
DG ELARG	General Directorate Enlargement
DGTTF	Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ECIS	Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
EM	Evaluation Matrix
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
EUROJUST	European Union's Judicial Co-operation Unit
EUROPOL	European Police Office
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GOS	Government of the Republic of Serbia
GRECO	Group of States against Corruption
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IR	Inception Report
IRB	Independent Regulatory Bodies
ISDACon	Information System for Co-ordination of the Development Assistance to the RoS
JA	Judicial Academy
LSG	Local Self Government
MIPD	Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHMR	Ministry of Human and Minority Rights
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoLSP	Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy
MoPALSG	Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self Government
MP	Member of Parliament
NAD	Needs Assessment Document
NARS	National Assembly of Republic of Serbia
NEMH	National Emergency Management Headquarters
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	National Integrity System (Transparency International)
NSO	National Statistical Office
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDP	Personal Data Protection
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PM	Prime Minister
PPO	Serbian Public Procurement Office
PUBFIN	UNDP Serbia Project: Strengthening Accountability of Public Finance
RACAB	Regulatory Authorities and Conformity Assessment Bodies
RBM	Results Based Management
RoL	Rule of Law
RoS	Republic of Serbia
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Process
SAI	State Audit Institutions of the Republic of Serbia
SCTM	Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities
SDC	Swiss Development Co-operation
SEE	South-East Europe
SEESAC	The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and

	Light Weapons
SEIO	Serbian European Integration Office
SEM	Mol Sector for Emergency Management
SIDA	Swedish International Development Co-operation
SIGMA	Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (OECD)
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Available, Relevant, Time-bound
SO	Serbian Ombudsman
SSR	Security Sector Reform,
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRAC	Target for Resource Assignment from the Core
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
WinMil	UNDP Serbia/SEESAC Project: Strengthening of Regional Co-operation on Gender Mainstreaming in Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans
WP	Work Plan
WPON	UNDP Serbia/SEESAC Project: Women Police Officers Network in South East Europe

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


According to the Terms of Reference the evaluation team is to "... perform the evaluation of Good Governance Strengthened outcome with corresponding outputs related to parliamentary development, anti-corruption, human rights, EU integration, public finance, disaster risk reduction and security system reform, as defined in the CPD 2011-2015." Although the country programme document (CPD) makes no explicit mention of support to the police and the military, specific security sector reform projects were included in the review. The evaluation developed an "outcome model", which formed the basis for this evaluation (see the chart on the next page). These were then further broken down on the level of each individual outcome.

Key Findings

This section reflects some of the main findings:

1. The pool of 13 UNDP governance projects and their country programme outputs are highly relevant to the RoS and GoS reform needs. They are well aligned within national priorities as the programme level country programme outputs are also aligned to a high degree with the UNDP 2008-2013 Strategic Plan. Moreover, the country programme outputs of the programme's development interventions are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.
2. The UNDP's approach of extending support to the national partners is much appreciated by all relevant stakeholders. The UNDP has a "go with the flow" approach to its support to strengthening governance in Serbia, which frequently is in direct response to the specific national reform needs while successfully bringing all relevant stakeholders on board. Against this backdrop, UNDP delivered all of its projects on time. Where delays occurred, these were owed to changes of government.
3. Main weaknesses regarding relevance are in the quality of domestic and donor strategies (too many parallel processes and documents), lack of vision, poor co-ordination and monitoring mechanisms, and the lack of committed resources. Moreover, the national goal „Support to the rule of law, democratization of society and sustainable economic development through the realization of public administration reform“ seems not sufficiently addressed by the UNDP governance programme. There was only limited support to Public Administration Reform. The area of rule-of-law and judiciary have received little attention. Overall UNDP resources were seemingly too little to achieve CPD outputs.
4. Within the governance area, stakeholders were involved in designing the CPD, but the European Union and its bodies was not involved to any significant extent. Subsequently, the EU did not commit significant funds to the UNDP programme. Given that UNDP rules do not permit the CO to bid for EU tenders, the cooperation between both organisations remained limited.
5. While "accountability" seems to have been an overarching theme for implementation of the UNDP programme, this is not reflected in the UNDP strategies. Moreover, the UNDP strategic documents fail to address the relationship between regional UNDP SEESAC programme and the UNDP country programme.

Figure 1: Outcome Model



6. Partners sought UNDP assistance for its flexibility. Rather than making firm commitments to the CPD and other UNDP planning documents, the public sector partners and beneficiaries preferred a quick, responsive, and flexible assistance from UNDP. The flux of public servants probably contributed to the ad hoc approach. While the EU accession realities further marginalized the role of UNDP in Serbia, the availability of pre-accession funds did not fully diminish it. EU funds oblige potential beneficiaries to specific administrative and strategic capacities that are not always

available. Hence the flexibility of UNDP assistance remained attractive to many Serbian partners.

7. From all of UNDP's governance outcomes, Outcome 1 (Parliament, MoF and media scrutinize budgets and expenditure more diligently) benefitted most from project synergies. Outcome 5 (Public and private sector organisations discriminate less against women) and Outcome 7 (State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively) are disconnected from the other six UNDP governance outcomes.
8. The UNDP governance component achieved an impressive number of results, mainly at the level of outputs. UNDP contributions to most of the intended system level outcomes have been significant, but progress toward these outcomes – let alone impact – has been modest and will require increased investments and partnerships in order to make a decisive step forward. The focus of future assistance can be on the strategic level, on the level of functions, which serve to implement those strategies, specific organizations, or specific types of change actions.
9. UNDP facilitated important NARS reform steps over the past years towards its increased oversight over the executive performance. The important role of the UNDP support to the NARS is generally recognized, and the scope and targeting of the UNDP project clearly indicates a high level of attribution to these pioneering reform steps of the NARS. The EU Progress Report also noted improvement of the NARS' oversight function for 2013.
10. UNDP facilitated the development of a new Anticorruption Strategy (2013-2018), adopted by NARS in 2013. The strategy focuses on good governance, strengthening of independent institutions, enforcing internal and external audit and control, protection of whistle-blowers, and addressing corruption in urbanism, spatial planning, judiciary, police, education and health.
11. Strategic partnerships. UNDP partnerships played an important role in contributing to the achievement of outcomes. In the absence of an explicit partnership strategy, UNDP partnerships are based on strategic documents, such as the UNDAF, CPD and CPD AP. These documents, however, commit mainly UNDP and do not entail specific contributions of other stakeholders. The documents highlight overall resource needs, so it is assumed that these resources would need to come from third parties.
12. Project partnerships. Partnerships that involve specific expectations are thus mainly project related. Project documents specify contributions, financial and in-kind, and obligations of partners in the areas of implementation and steering. In most projects, for instance, local partners need to appoint National Project Directors (NPDs), responsible for authorising project activities. These arrangements secure national ownership. NPDs are not accredited based on formal criteria, which in a politicized institutional environment such as Serbia risks that the incumbents frequently change or don't have the required qualifications. Accommodating UNDP project staff in host institutions has been effective in facilitating communication with partners and in increasing acceptance of UNDP support, and is a selling argument for UNDP in mobilising resources.
13. Partnerships with national and regional players. UNDP support was effective in strengthening partnerships among national institutions (e.g. parliament and the "independent" bodies, or inter-ministerial coordination in law-making). UNDP support was effective in strengthening partnerships among national institutions (e.g. parliament and the "independent" bodies, or inter-ministerial coordination in law-making).

14. Expectations of other donors toward UNDP are ambivalent. On the one hand, UNDP is perceived mainly as an "implementing partner" by donors interviewed. As "implementing partners", some donors prefer to use UNOPS or other implementers, because of their perceived clearer position/profile on the market. Nevertheless, UNDP Serbia has been successfully raising significant amounts of extra-budgetary funding from international donors, and from the Serbian government, in order to strengthen its governance programme in Serbia. Although significant, the resources were not sufficient to produce all "Country programme outputs".
15. UNDP has in place a number of instruments to monitor implementation of its projects. Their interconnections and functionality, in terms of monitoring project activities, is easily comprehended and assessed. However, monitoring for results on the outcome level might be further developed. It appears that the effectiveness of the system to monitor outcomes is limited by a number of factors. These include the frequent absence of SMART objectives, indicators, and targets and lack of linkages between the projects and program level. In fact, there is often an absence of causal links and chains showing inter-linkages between UNDP supported interventions, their delivery of development outputs, and their contribution to the achievement of those designed country level CPD Outputs.
16. There are particular gaps at the level of design and usage of intermediate (performance level) outcome indicators. Absence of such indicators in project designs likely further challenged effective monitoring for results towards the programme level, as well as potentially enabled an analytic disconnection between the development (interventions and projects) outputs and those programme level CP Outputs. Without regular monitoring for performance and project level results at the level of outcomes, the behaviour changes of the subjects of the UNDP projects' interventions, it was probably very difficult for the CO to assess if interventions were heading for the right programme results at the right speed. In the case of one large-scale project with the Ministry of Finance, UNDP failed to produce a single progress report over a period of more than five years.
17. Differentiating between the three impact levels (micro, meso and macro), one can conclude that there have been changes from outcomes at the micro level, to which UNDP's governance programme made a significant contribution. Impact on the meso level may be underway, but – with the exception of DRR – has not yet reached the macro level. This finding would call for a continuation of UNDP's current governance programme. Assuming that previous assistance has led to an increase of capacity among local institutions, stepping up the volume of the current programme may be a way of achieving macro level impact within a shorter time span.

Conclusions

In reviewing the above findings, the evaluation team arrived at a number of conclusions:

1. Focus on system. As the world becomes more complex and interdependent, the ability to think and act systemically, to analyse fields of forces and understand their joint causal effects on each other, and to abandon simple linear causal logic in favour of complex mental models will become more critical to learning and capacity development. Recognising these trends, UNDP Serbia has rightly been pursuing a systemic perspective to programming and implementation, and has successfully brought the most relevant stakeholders on board of its projects. This approach has yielded promising early results, which are yet to be consolidated. The fight against corruption will require substantial further support.

2. Partnerships. UNDP is appreciated by its partners because of (i) its ability to respond more timely to emerging needs/policies in the governance area than other agencies (e.g. SAI, ACAS), (ii) the joint development of projects, (iii) its permanent presence in Serbia and knowledge of the country context and culture, (iv) its network of regional and global offices and regional initiatives, (v) the approachability, enthusiasm and dedication of its staff, (vi) its non-partisan nature, (vii) the fact that as a UN member Serbia is an equal among other members, (viii) its readiness to provide small volume support avoids overstretching and undermining government capacity, (ix) the relatively short time lapse from idea to action, (x) the significant influence beneficiaries can have on project steering. Accommodating UNDP project staff in host institutions has been effective in facilitating communication with partners and in increasing acceptance of UNDP support, and is a selling argument in mobilising resources, but carries the risk of dysfunctional confluence in the relationship between UNDP and its national partners, at the expense of strategic goals. UNDP has performed some important support to co-ordination of work between the independent agencies and the NARS. On the national policy level, important changes took place in terms of the establishment of the new Secretariat for Public Policies. Stronger links and co-operation towards more co-ordinated public policies implementation between the Secretariat, GoS General Secretariat and SEIO are yet to be established and nurtured.
3. Profile and finance. UNDP Serbia has been successfully raising significant amounts of extra-budgetary funding from international donors, and from the Serbian government, in order to strengthen its governance programme in Serbia. UNDP Serbia is a particularly appealing partner to donors in areas that are deemed politically sensitive or where trust and non-partisanship are prerequisite for productive relationships and successful implementation. Still, the total resources dedicated to the government component were not sufficient to produce all "Country programme outputs" identified in the Country Programme Document. In some areas, resources were adequate, partly because of limited absorption capacity (e.g. Parliament, SAI, ACAS, SCTM). Given the withdrawal of most international donors in recent years, the supply side of such funding has declined, while a greater number of NGOs and consulting companies have established themselves in Serbia to offer governance related services. UNDP's current mix of mission based and revenue based organisational setup sends ambiguous messages to partners.
4. Programme coherence. From UNDP strategic documents it remains largely unclear how the regional UNDP SEESAC programme contributes to the UNDP country programme. Subsuming SEESAC activities within the governance areas under the programmatic aspects of gender equality and disaster risk underrates the significance of the SEESAC activities.
5. Strategic opportunities. There has been a lack of high quality domestic and donor strategies in Serbia. Too many parallel planning processes and documents, lack of vision, poor co-ordination and monitoring mechanisms, a disconnection between country programme outputs and activities, lack of committed resources, and a lack of understanding that planning means making choices, are all but few reasons why strategy implementation often failed. While the EU accession process was stated as the overarching theme for UNDP support, only few of UNDP's results were directly connected to concrete steps in this process (SAP, Specific Acquis Chapters). On the other hand, the incipient EU accession negotiations will generate new and more focused priorities, but also risks that important agendas receive less attention than they deserve. Further public administration and the rule of law reform steps and objectives are made priority for the 2014-2020 period. Both aspects open up opportunities for UNDP, if it remains observant and capable of identifying them and integrating them into its programmes.

6. Operational opportunities. The UNDP Serbia 2011-2015 governance component has achieved a sizable number of results, mainly at the level of outputs. UNDP contributions to most of the intended system level outcomes have been significant, but progress toward these outcomes – let alone impact – has been modest and will require increased investments and partnerships in order to make a decisive step forward.
7. Pursuing SMART results. The Country Programme Outputs identified in the Country Programme Document are generally rather unspecific and broad. Some of the indicators associated with those results do not allow measuring (e.g. “Improved resilience at all levels”), while performance against others (e.g. CPI) can hardly be linked back to UNDP performance.
8. Monitoring, evaluation and learning. While UNDP has a system in place to monitor projects activities and outputs, there is no effective system in place to monitor projects and programme performance against “CPD outputs”. Printouts of UNDP’s computerized project monitoring system have been instrumental for the evaluators to get an overview of UNDP assistance in some areas. In the case of a \$2.6 million project with the Ministry of Finance, project progress reports and knowledgeable interlocutors covering the implementation period starting in 2009 and on going in 2015 were unavailable – so that possible contributions of this project to outcomes could not be evaluated. Feedback based on incomplete data will ultimately be limited in its accuracy and hamper learning processes and UNDP’ ability to plan and steer its programmes in the face of increasingly interconnected development challenges. In sum, only about 0,5% of the combined budgets of all projects highlighted for particular attention under this evaluation were used for evaluation purposes. Even though this practice may meet corporate UNDP standards, the amount foreseen seems to be extremely low.
9. Capacity building. UNDP management of government funds can help attract more qualified experts and increase absorption capacity, but may undermine the use and development of government procedures.

Recommendations

There follow a number of recommendations for UNDP to consider based on the above findings and conclusions:

1. UNDP should continue to expose stakeholders, with its governance programmes, to opportunities to come together to deal with reform efforts that are intrinsically complex, nonlinear, and interconnected.
2. UNDP should remain fully conscious of its strengths and cultivate them by integrating them in its strategic and operational plans, and day-to-day management. The development of an explicit partnership strategy, which commits not only UNDP but also its partners, would be recommendable. UNDP should continue supporting its project personnel housed in government agencies and in institutions such as in the Public Procurement Office, National Assembly, and others. Given its experience and partnerships, UNDP should consider supporting closer coordination and cooperation between the central government bodies it has established working relationships with.
3. UNDP should ensure that its profile is perceived as clear and unique among potential donors, in order to succeed on an increasingly competitive market. UNDP should make clear each time it approaches a partner, which objective (mission or revenue) it pursues in the specific interaction. UNDP should consider bidding for projects where those qualities are required and represent a significant advantage over other organizations.

4. UNDP Serbia should revisit its strategic orientation in the subject matter areas currently covered by SEESAC, such as the police and the military. Similarly, UNDP should ensure that its support in the area of human rights strengthening becomes better integrated into its strategic frameworks.
5. UNDP should make the most of genuine UN agendas, such as in the areas of human rights and anti-corruption, and assist Serbia in dealing with its integration into the global economy. In order to strengthen its role, UNDP should contribute keenly to improving the integration of ODA efforts, via more systemic co-ordination, towards generating synergies and cost savings in the times of scarcer non-EU ODA financial presence.
6. UNDP should scale up its support, in particular in the following areas: (i) communication, co-ordination and co-operation between state institutions, in particular in the area of oversight; (ii) accounting and procurement at local levels (e.g. roll-out of initial support to five pilot municipalities); (iii) public internal financial control and further development of the public procurement portal; (iv) simplification of processes and citizen service delivery by municipalities; (v) promoting e-government (taxation, police, etc.), which may allow to a certain extent reconciling staff and budget constraints with improved service delivery; (vi) promoting investigative journalism; (vii) institutionalizing education of parliament staff; (viii) strengthening the scope, quality and interoperability of data management (political consensus, hardware and software); (ix) strengthening e-learning for PFM related tasks, in particular at local levels and regional centres; (x) measuring outcomes and impact of PFM/governance initiatives (trust and satisfaction, savings, volume of funds misused, number of judicial proceedings involving PFM issues, media reporting, etc.); (xi) NGO capacity building to absorb EU funds (e.g. task NGOs with monitoring progress of UNDP projects/programmes); (xii) support further capacity building to ACAS and other agencies in implementing the anti-corruption strategy and follow-up by parliament; (xiii) introduction and implementation of programme budget system; (xiv) national, regional and international conferences on accountability issues (NGOs, state bodies, regional organisations, etc.); (xv) support to local media capacity building after privatization in 2015; (xvi) implementation of UPR recommendations (e.g. needs assessment); (xvii) further support of women association in police etc. and (xviii) further support towards sustainable institutional gender equality mechanism in the Ministry of Defence – to name but a few opportunities.
7. UNDP should make greater efforts to define and agree indicators that meet common quality standards. Where planning cycles are too long to agree on results that are sufficiently specific, UNDP should reduce those cycles or provide possibilities and incentives for revising results and indicators (e.g. at mid-term) in consultation with partners and stakeholders.
8. UNDP should more frequently use SMART project level indicators and targets would certainly help this effort and intermediate outcome indicators. Since the “CPD outputs” most resemble outcomes, and the CPD results framework even requires that indicators be developed for their measurement, UNDP should consider making the monitoring of CPD country outputs obligatory. Enforcing a good monitoring practice in each project by using SMART monitoring elements and using the generated monitoring data would enable increased ability to measure achievement and contribution of those results towards the country outputs. UNDP Serbia should find ways to increase external feedback received on the success of its programmes. Involving NGOs in programme monitoring would be a cost effective way of measuring progress and promoting an evaluation capacity and culture in Serbia, which will also be required for the management of EU funds in the context of EU integration. In this context, UNDP should also consider assistance with introducing a culture and techniques of performance measurement of its partners in the public administration, which is part and parcel of the

programme budgeting approach the Serbian Governments is embarking upon, and the sector approach promoted by the EU.

9. In line with the provisions of the Paris Declaration, UNDP should ensure that government processes and procedures are used wherever possible and legally required. Where external factors, such as temporary austerity measures to stabilize the economy, are used to justify resorting to substitute government capacity, exit strategies should be agreed with government.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The evaluation team wishes to express its gratitude to the individuals and organizations cited in Annex 6 for their support to the assessment process. Others working in the field but not specifically mentioned also made valuable contributions to the broad understanding of the development context. In particular, the evaluators wish to express their gratitude to the UNDP Governance Team, for providing essential input and access to stakeholders, without which the assessment would not have been possible.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter introduces the rationale for the evaluation, including mandate, purpose and objectives, outlines the main evaluation issues including the expected contribution at the outcome level, addresses evaluability and describes the methodology used. The chapter refers to the outcome model presented in Chapter III and the evaluation matrix attached as Annex 2.

A. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

2. UNDP usually commissions outcome-level evaluations to find out how the organization has gone about supporting processes and building capacities that have, indeed, helped to make a difference. Outcome evaluations thus aim to identify which UNDP approaches have worked well and which have faced challenges, and to use lessons learned to improve future initiatives and generate knowledge for wider use – besides serving the purpose of holding UNDP accountable for the resources invested in its work.¹ The purpose stated in the TOR for this evaluation is consistent with these provisions, by involving four aspects:

- Support accountability of UNDP programmes
- Provide evidence of the UNDP contribution to outcome achievements
- Guide performance improvements
- Collect lessons learned for the next programming cycle

3. Generally, UNDP evaluations aim to enable managers to make informed decisions and plan strategically.² The stated objectives of the evaluation at hand are to:

- Enhance development effectiveness
- Assist decision-making and policy making
- Re-direct future UNDP assistance
- Systematize innovative approaches to sustainable human development

B. Scope

4. According to the Terms of Reference the evaluation team is to “... perform the evaluation of Good Governance Strengthened outcome with corresponding outputs related to parliamentary development, anti-corruption, human rights, EU integration, public finance, disaster risk reduction and security system reform, as defined in the CPD 2011-2015.” Although the country programme document (CPD) makes no explicit mention of support to the police and the military, specific security sector reform projects were included in the review.

C. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The revised main evaluation questions³ are summarized in the list below:

10. Are the “country programme outputs”, as identified in the CPD governance component, consistent with Serbian development priorities and UNDP mandate?
11. Which development outcomes were initially expected from UNDP led initiatives in the governance area?

1 UNDP. 2011. Outcome-level evaluation. A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators. New York.

2 UNDP. 2009. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, p. 127. New York.

3 The process leading to the revision is further detailed in Annex 3.

12. What progress toward achieving intermediate and originally expected outcomes has been made?
13. To what extent has UNDP support contributed to that progress?
14. How effective have UNDP partnerships been in contributing to the achievement of results?
15. Has the project or programme been implemented within deadline and cost estimates?
16. Have UNDP and its partners taken prompt actions to solve implementation issues?
17. Was there any identified synergy between UNDP initiatives that contributed to reducing costs while supporting results?
18. To what extent do UNDP initiatives in the area of Governance have potential for scaling up (or national application of regional initiatives) within the next country programme cycle?
19. What real difference have UNDP-led initiatives made to the beneficiaries?

5. These questions, and the more specific issues that derive from them, form a key component of the team's Evaluation Matrix (see Annex 2). In addition, specific questions were asked on the promotion of UN values from a human development perspective:

20. To what extent did UNDP support government in monitoring achievement of MDGs?
21. To what extent were UNDP initiatives in the area of governance designed to contribute to attainment of gender equality?
22. To what extent did UNDP support positive changes in terms of gender equality and were there any unintended effects?
23. How did the UNDP initiative take into account the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged to promote social equity, for example, women, youth, and disabled persons?

EQ 11-14 are implicitly addressed in responses to other evaluation questions and will not be treated separately, in order to avoid duplication in the text. Findings on EQ11 and 14 are reflected in paras 15-16 and in Table 18. Comprehensive responses to EQ12 and EQ13 can be found in paras 41 and 85, section 0, and in Table 18.

D. Conceptual Framework

6. Conducting this evaluation consisted essentially of two parts. The first part was an assessment of results achieved, including an analysis of the factors that may explain positive and negative attainments. The second, and more important part, focused on forward-looking recommendations for the programming of the future UNDP resources. In order to put these recommendations into a larger context and provide a prelude for the future, the team summarised the main current trends conditioning development worldwide (see Annex 4).

7. Identifying projects, programmes, policies and other modalities of technical co-operation (including, e.g., advisory and information services, or advocacy), being undertaken by UNDP, by partners, and by other organizations that may contribute to – or be a barrier to – achievement of the outcome is normally the last stage in developing an outcome model.⁴ In this case, the TOR already identified 13 projects as most important for the evaluation at hand (listed in Annex 5 with brief summaries), which have received greater scrutiny.

8. An outcome evaluation normally starts with developing an outcome model, as a theory of change. A key principle for developing an outcome model, particularly at the planning stage, or where no outcome model exists, is working downwards from the outcomes, not upwards from the activities. Given the absence of SMART outcomes, this principle could not be

⁴ UNDP. 2011. Outcome-level evaluation. A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, p.15. New York.

observed. Instead, the evaluation team developed the outcome model bottom-up, along the following sub-questions:

- Which project and non-project activities were supported by UNDP?
- Which outputs did these activities produce?
- Which intermediate outcomes were generated from those outputs?

9. A major component of the UNDP Governance portfolio presented to the evaluation team is implemented by the SEESAC regional initiative and seems to have little integration with the overall programme and is mainly operating at the regional level. A large part of SEESAC work is thus not relevant for the Serbia context.

10. A constraint to the evaluability of outcomes was the shortage of project or programme evaluations. Project evaluations normally provide a basis for the evaluation of outcomes and programmes.⁵ Only five evaluation reports for four different projects are currently available, of which one is a mid-term evaluation. In sum, about 0,5 % of the combined budgets of all projects highlighted for particular attention under this evaluation were used for evaluation purposes. This amount is average for UNDP expenditure on evaluation around the world,⁶ but seems to be rather low in comparison with other development agencies.

The UNDP has in place a number of instruments to monitor implementation of its projects. Their interconnections and functionality, in terms of monitoring project activities, is easily comprehended and assessed. However, monitoring for results on the outcome level might be further developed. It appears that the effectiveness of the system to monitor outcomes is limited by a number of factors. These include the frequent absence of SMART objectives, indicators, and targets and lack of linkages between the projects and program level. In fact, there is often an absence of causal links and chains showing inter-linkages between UNDP supported interventions, their delivery of development outputs, and their contribution to the achievement to those designed country level CPD Outputs.

⁵ UNDP. 2009. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, p.134. New York.

⁶ Baastel. 2014. Review of UNDP Evaluation Policy, p. 14. Gatineau.

II. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

11. EU accession process. Serbia's accession to the EU has been set as the top priority of GoS institutions since the changes of October 2000. However, the relations between the RoS and the EU during the period between 2000 and 2011 advanced at different speeds and intensities. This was a result of a challenging constitutional and political environment that dominated the FRY and later SU SaM public agenda and public policies. A lack of GoS institutional capacity for EU accession was gradually addressed through the formation of the European Integration Council in 2002 and SEIO (its mandate was updated in 2010 by the GoS decree) in 2004, when also the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (NARS) adopted the Resolution of EU Accession. Serbia officially applied for the EU membership in December 2009. In October 2011, the European Commission recommended making the country an EU candidate. Serbia received full candidate status in March 2012⁷. In December 2013, the EU approved opening negotiations on Serbia's accession in January 2014. The first Intergovernmental Conference was held in January 2014 in Brussels. In April 2013, the governments of Kosovo⁸ and Serbia completed the Brussels Agreement, which was hailed as a major step towards normalising relations, enabling the start of EU entry talks with Serbia⁹.

12. Communication of the accession process. The level of public awareness of the EU accession process and support to the needed reforms fluctuated during the 2000s (See Table 1). The table shows results of annual, end of each year, opinion polls related to how the electorate would vote in the event of a referendum with the question "*Do you support our country's integration with EU?*" were held tomorrow, how would you vote? Therefore a challenge to each government (media and civil society too) during the past years was to balance in front of the public the hopes and benefits of the accession and the eventual membership against the needed reforms and presumed austerities and perceived negative political and constitutional effects. SEIO communication activities, based on the Communication Strategy of the Government of Serbia for the Stabilisation and EU Accession of the SU SaM, have had positive effects on Serbian public's support regarding EU accession. The new accession approximation realities commanded the need for a new communication strategy, to provide information to the public not only about the accession prospects, but also about the immanent and significant changes to be made by the GoS in the period following the negotiation commencement. The new Communication Strategy for EU accession was to enable the GoS to establish a strategic framework for providing information to the public on EU accession.¹⁰

Table 1: Support for EU Membership

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
% „For“	69,9	72	61	65	61	51	41	41	46
% „Against“	12,3	8	13	14	13	28	31	31	19
% Not vote or d/k“	17,8	12	25	16	25	21	27	27	35
Source: SEIO11									

⁷ European Council, Council of the European Union. Serbia.

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/serbia/>

⁸ This label [i.e. "Kosovo"] does not prejudice the status of Kosovo and is in accordance with Resolution 1244 and the opinion of the ICJ on Kosovo's declaration of independence

⁹ The following is a link to an official EU Internet pages covering the news on Serbia and Kosovo reaching landmark deal http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413_eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm

¹⁰ The following is a link to the GoS document "Communication Strategy for the Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union ":

http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/communication_strategy_2011.pdf

¹¹ The following is a link to the GoS public opinion polling data: <http://www.seio.gov.rs/documents/nacional-dokumenta.223.html>

13. The state of the economy. The Serbian economy was adversely impacted by the 2008-2009 global economic crises and has since then been experiencing reduced economic growth compared to 2007. A gradual improving trend recorded in 2013 has come to a halt due to severe floods in April 2014 and strong fiscal consolidation measures that resulted in contraction of final consumption. The most telling indicators include the record country external debt level currently at about 80% of GDP, declining FDI figures, the staggering level of public debt that remains at 70% of GDP (2014), while the target is 45%. The budget deficit, currently estimated at 6% of GDP, significantly exceeds the 4.25% target agreed with the IMF. The Government of Serbia has in 2013 and now again negotiated an arrangement with the IMF to improve public finances. The following macroeconomic indicators portray a rather adverse economic picture (Table 2).

Table 2: Key macroeconomic trends in Serbia 2007-2015

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015 forecast
Real GDP growth %	5,4	3,8	-3,5	1,0	1,6	-1,7	2,4	1,1	1,6
Current acc. balance % of GDP	17,7	20,9	-6,2	6,3	8,5	11,5	6,1	6,1	4,7
Unemployment	18,1	13,6	16,1	19,2	23,0	23,9	21	21,6	22
GoS budget deficit/surplus % of GDP	-1,7	-1,7	-3,4	-3,7	-4,2	-5,7	-6,0	-6,0	-5,0
Serbian external debt % of GDP	60,2	64,6	77,7	84,9	76,7	85,9	87,7	78,9	
GoS public debt % of GDP	31,5	29,	34,7	44,5	48,2	59,3	0,85	62,5	69,2
Net FDI bil.EUR	2,46	2,19	1,74	1,11	2,21				

Source: National Bank of Serbia¹²

14. The underlying causes for this economic and public finance situation are many and of a pervasive nature. Serbian sustainable economic growth depends chiefly on foreign direct investments and external trade demand. Yet the former is experiencing a downslide while domestic companies are not competitive and innovative enough and perform at low productivity levels. Some of principal constraints to the markets functioning include negative assessments of the investment climate and business enabling environment due to weak economic and public finance governance, overregulation, poor business sophistication, massive idle public companies, misuse of state investment funds, poor labour elasticity and infrastructure and limited and expensive access to finance and a poor justice system. Poor public procurement practices, lack of strategic planning, lack of adequate financial control, etc. dominated as principle causes of the situation. When it comes to paying taxes for businesses, Serbia ranks 165 out of 210 countries, while for obtaining construction permits; Serbia ranks 186 in the World Bank's 2015 Doing Business Index (see Table 3).

Table 3: World Bank Doing Business Index 2015

Country	Rank
Macedonia	30
Bulgaria	38
Romania	48
Slovenia	51
Croatia	65
Serbia¹³	91
Bosnia and Herzegovina	107

Source: WB DB¹⁴

¹² The following is a link to macroeconomic statistical data provided by the National Bank of Serbia in a 2015 report: http://www.nbs.rs/export/sites/default/internet/english/18/18_3/presentation_invest.pdf

¹³ A link to full WB Doing Business 2015 results for Serbia:

<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/serbia>

¹⁴ This is a link to full WB Doing Business 2015 Report-Overview:

<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB15-Chapters/DB15-Report-Overview.pdf>.

15. Human development, social impact, education, health, and poverty. Serbia's UNDP HDI rank declined from 64 to 77 in 2013 out of 187 countries, placing the country below the regional average. Prior to that, between 1990 and 2013, Serbia's HDI increased from 0.726 to 0.745, an average annual increase of about 0.11 per cent. The 2013 score also reflects the negative social impact to vulnerable groups and the population at large especially in the underdeveloped municipalities of Serbia. The unemployment figures show a record high of over 20% (see Table 2) and as much as 50% for youth.

16. Tangible results of the GoS policies on the national level are yet to materialise. Vulnerable groups are at increasing risk of poverty, due to recent cuts in budgetary allocations for social services that resulted in further reduces access to services. Serious cuts in allocations to social services also include social security benefits, healthcare, and education. The budget allocation reductions also resulted in reduced pensions, social subsidies, closure of a number of healthcare institutions, and reduction in the number of healthcare and education employees. This burden shifting often finally increases women's unpaid family work, as women end up having to provide services previously delivered by public institutions (for the gender equality agenda please consult with para 41 of this report). Finally, all available relevant analyses agree that the realisation of economic and social rights needs effective public policy change and good governance extending needed services to all citizens in an equitable way.

17. Evolving ODA realities. As many bilateral donors are in the process of, or have already withdrawn from RoS, or are refocusing its programming away from the mainstream good governance themes, it becomes increasingly difficult for public sector institutions to acquire quick and flexible ODA funds necessary for their regular and reform activities alike. Often these bodies are reluctant, or lack strategic planning and organisational capacities, to apply for EU funds requiring elaborate application effort over a large time span. This is especially true for IPA II funds (2014-2020), which require more advanced sectoral coordination, planning and performance measurement. These evolving ODA realities are yet to be grasped and effectively tackled by all potential beneficiaries and implementers and partners alike.

Table 4: Budgetary allocations to Anti-Corruption Agency

In EUR	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Requested for its functioning in million EUR	1,667	1,581	1,789	1,680	1,928
Actually allocated in % of requested	100	100	100	100	88

Source: ACA

18. Public administration reform agenda, elections, and challenges. Early EU accession screenings show that for completing the negotiations, Serbia will need to make "considerable efforts" in the areas of agriculture & rural development (chapter 11), judiciary & fundamental rights (chapter 23), justice, freedom & security (chapter 24) and financial control (chapter 32), while its legislation in the area of environment (chapter 27) is deemed "totally incompatible" with the acquis.¹⁵ The screening process results immediately became key reform and public policy drivers that are now conditioning nearly all reform efforts, including the public administration reform, as embodied in a new strategy. Yet the Serbian political and electoral context (elections in 2012 and 2014) over the past years provided chief sources of challenges for any ODA focused on public administration reform and development. Besides frequent changes of leadership at the political and policy levels, ODA effectiveness was also impacted by limited change management and co-ordination capacities of the administration of the GoS, which is still overstuffed and under-resourced. In

¹⁵A link to an official EU information on RoS EU accession screening process:
<http://www.europa.rs/en/mediji/najnovije-vesti/2958/The+screening+starts.html>

2011, the number of ministries was reduced from 24 to 17. A merit based human resources management system is yet to be completed.

19. Since the year 2000, Serbia has been governed by political coalitions, which have distributed institutional and administrative power among the coalition members. Regularly placing large number of political party cadre in positions they are not necessarily qualified undermined merit based staffing in ministries. Since such staffing was done sharply alongside political party lines additionally disrupted reforms related policy implementation coherence. Effectiveness was further reduced by fragmentized organizational arrangements, insufficient co-operation between the institutions and frequent political appointments, as well as an incomplete and half-hearted decentralisation process.

20. Furthermore, concentration of decision-making responsibilities with the ever-changing politicians, rather than adequately delegating those responsibilities to the civil service, resulted in poor institutional continuity and policy coherence. An underperforming and at times complacent and ill coordinated administration further contributed to these difficulties. Ever since the adoption of the 2004 Strategy of Public Administration Reform Strategy (PAR), the GoS is nominally focused on some of these problems and on institutionalizing the principles of good administration. Its new 2014 Strategy of PAR and its recent draft Action Plan for 2015-16 reiterate the same objectives within the EU accession context.¹⁶ The most notable methodological change is related to the performance measurement at the outcome and impact levels with the so-called SMART indicators.¹⁷

21. Human Resources Management. A main cause of negative effects listed in chapter 13 (*Public administration reform agenda, elections, and fragmentation*) of the 2014 PAR Strategy, is inadequate management of human resources. To address this situation the GoS has established a Human Resources Management (HRM) service to provide more effective management of human resources. The 2011 Strategy for the professional development of human resources envisages preparation, establishment and delivery of general professional development program and the supervision over the implementation of special programs. This way, additional development of the HR management system of GoS is declared as one of the most important activities and priorities in the process of public administration reform. The rights and obligations of appointed employees were mainly regulated by the new 2014 Labour Law and the 2005 (amended in 2014) Law on Civil Servants.

22. Public policies co-ordination and effectiveness. Another main cause of negative effects listed in chapter 13 of the PAR strategy (*Public administration reform agenda, elections, and fragmentation*) is that the central policy system previously run from the General Secretariat (GS) of the GoS proved inadequate and the quality of policy development and implementation in ministries remained poor.¹⁸ Without an adequate system related to strategic planning, creation, co-ordination and implementation of public policies and functional public administration subsystems, the Secretariat of the Government was too weak to increase government effectiveness (see Table 5).

23. A number of reform efforts funded by IPA and bilateral ODA attempted to address the lack of policy coordination. These initiatives included strengthening strategic planning and

¹⁶ A link to a new draft PAR Action Plan for 2015-16 in English language:
http://www.mduls.gov.rs/doc/Draft%20PAR%20Action%20Plan%202.0_EN.docx

¹⁷ The acronym SMART stands for Specific – target a specific area for improvement; Measurable – quantify or at least suggest an indicator of progress; Achievable – specify goals that are reachable; Realistic – state what results can realistically be achieved, given available resources; and Time-related – specify when the result(s) can be achieved.

¹⁸ For more external assessment see page 2 of the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), joined OECD, SIGMA, and EU 2012 at:
http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Serbia_Assess_2012.pdf

monitoring and evaluation efforts within Ministries. At the centre of government, the GS of GoS attempted collecting and collating extensive information on national public sector strategies, annual plans and associated activities since 2009 in order to enable production of effective annual Government Work Plans. It was also originally intended to facilitate the creation, monitoring and evaluation of strategic and operational plans, however this failed to be fully accomplished. The next steps of this engagement were under discussion. However, eventually, after the 2014 elections, the new administration abandoned these efforts and created a new body called the “National Secretariat for Public Policies” (NSPP)¹⁹. The new draft PAR Strategy Action Plan foresees defining its role, specific functions and methodologies and capacity building as well the necessary changes of the Government Rules of Procedure and the Law on Budget System, in order to strengthen the system for management of public policies of the GoS in terms of increased capacities for planning, analysis, creation, adoption, monitoring and evaluation and co-ordination.

Table 5: Serbia 1996-2013 Government Effectiveness Indicators²⁰

higher = better														
1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
17.8	18.0	26.9	33.2	29.3	50.7	44.9	49.3	47.1	47.6	53.1	51.7	52.6	50.7	50.2

Source: The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators²¹

24. The state of public finances. A key aspect of improving public finances is related to the current public expenditure management practices. The SIGMA recommendations, related to the public expenditure management reform plan, focus on the following elements²²: strengthening the budget system legislation, responsible fiscal strategy, development of basic financial management capacities within line ministries and budget beneficiaries, and adhering to the financial impact assessments, as well as the inclusion of public internal financial control into the overall plan for reforming the public expenditure management. Further constraints to the public finance reform efforts, and ODA efforts - besides mentioned poor public expenditure management (see also para 14 of this report) - include a lack of policy co-ordination across the GoS, insufficient levels of accountability and transparency, overlap or unclear responsibilities, a poor record of preparing and executing plans, as well as an input based rather than outcome oriented nature of public expenditure management, and corruption-induced extra costs on citizens and businesses that distort decision-making. The specific role envisaged for GoS in this area is to enhance preventive and investigative aspects of the public spending cycle. These goals should be achieved especially through the development of horizontal and vertical accountability and co-ordination mechanisms in the area of public finances, contribution to the development of sound public financial management, and reducing opportunities for corruption. The specific roles of the Public Procurement Office (PPO) and the State Audit Institution (SAI) in the context of public finance management and reforms are described in greater detail in below paragraphs 28 and 31 respectively.

25. Anti-Corruption agenda. High levels of corruption and abuse of public office, and in general, have also remained part of Serbian political system and public administration. Corruption severely impacts all sectors of life in Serbia and negatively affects the quality of rule of law, legal certainty, economic development and overall stability and prosperity. The

¹⁹ For more on this plans see p.2 of the new draft PAR Action Plan for 2015-16 in English language at the following Internet address: http://www.mduls.gov.rs/doc/Draft%20PAR%20Action%20Plan%202.0_EN.docx

²⁰ A number of indicators are used to make this aggregate indicator. The full list could be found at this Internet page: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/c246.pdf>

²¹ For full figures and more external assessment see the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Report on Serbia 1996-2013 at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/c246.pdf>

²² For more external assessment see Support for Improvement in Governance and Management available at: http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Serbia_Assess_2012.pdf

government declared efforts to contain corruption are yet to show tangible results beyond initial large institution building, while Serbian media reports on corruption are scarce. In 2001, GoS established an Anti-Corruption Council. As an expert advisory body of the GoS, it has the mission to oversee all aspects of anti-corruption activities, to propose measures needed to fight corruption effectively, to monitor the implementation, and to issue suggestions for bringing regulations, programs and other acts and measures in this area. In 2003, Serbia and Montenegro signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The following box serves to share some data related to corruption in Serbia as experienced by its population. More data can be found in the effectiveness part of this report (see in particular para 83)

Box 1: Corruption in Serbia and experienced by its population

In 2011 Serbian citizens ranked corruption as the third most important problem, after unemployment and low standard of living. Some 13.7 per cent of Serbian citizens had either direct or indirect exposure to a bribery experience with a public official. More than half (52%) of bribes are paid in cash, one third (34%) as food and drink. The average cash bribe paid in Serbia in 2011 was around 165 Euro. In more than half (56%) of bribery incidents Serbian citizens initiate the payment; in 14 per cent of cases the bribe is explicitly requested. The main purposes of paying bribes in Serbia are to speed up a procedure (34%) or to receive better treatment (18%) and to finalize a procedure (18%). More than half of all bribe-payers in Serbia pay kickbacks to doctors (55%), more than a third to police officers (39%) and one in four to nurses (26%).

Source: 2011 UNODC Report

26. Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA). The GOS established an Anti-Corruption Agency in 2010 as an autonomous and independent state body. The ACA has preventive and operational competences in several areas, such as resolving conflict of interest of public officials in Serbia, controlling asset declarations of public officials, controlling the funding of political parties, monitoring the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, and dealing with complaints and whistle-blower charges.

27. National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) and GoS Co-ordination Body. The National Assembly adopted in July 2013 a new NACS for the period 2013 – 2018. The strategy involves more than 45 stakeholders. In September 2013, Government endorsed an associated Action Plan (NACS AP) for implementing the (NACS). Neither the strategy nor the action plan include significant commitments of financial resources. From its establishment in 2010, ACA has prepared three reports on the implementation of the old NACS and AP and one on the implementation of the new NACS and AP. In August 2014, the GoS also established a co-ordination body for implementing the national 2013 NACS.²³ This step may reflect an increased understanding that the means and methods to fight corruption must be cross-sectoral and extend across all relevant government institutions and bodies, as well as society at large. By bringing together all key stakeholders the GoS demonstrated resolve to address the issue of co-ordination.

28. Public procurement. The Public Procurement Office (PPO) was established on 15 January 2003 as an independent governmental body accountable directly to the PM. According to the 2013 Public Procurement Law, the main tasks of the PPO include: participating in drafting regulations pertaining to public procurement; providing consulting services to contracting authorities and bidders.²⁴ The Republic Commission for Protection of Rights in the Public Procurement Procedures was established under the auspices of the Public Procurement Office in 2003 as an autonomous and independent body. Its main role is to ensure the protection of bidders' rights and public interest in public procurement procedures. The 2013 PPL law changed the Commission's composition, strengthened Parliamentary control over its work, and equipped it with new authorities – such as the power

²³ A link to GoS NACS AP: <http://www.mpravde.gov.rs/en/vest/3369/the-anti-corruption-strategy-and-the-action-plan.php>

²⁴ A place to download the GoS 2013 Public Procurement Law: www.ujn.gov.rs/download/files/cms/attach?id=272

to adopt general legal standings, to issue fines for non-compliance with the rights protection procedure and non-implementation of its decisions, and to conduct misdemeanour proceedings.


29. New Serbian parliamentarians' initiative against the corruption, GOPAC. In June 2013 a multiparty and nonpartisan group of MPs in the NARS was established as a national branch of the Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC). The GOPAC is an international initiative for encouragement and development of the scrutiny role and anti-corruption activities of MPs. The GOPAC enjoys increasing support in and out of the NARS. Their awareness activities so far aimed at contributing to the overall anti-corruption agenda. The chapter's establishment and its commitment to higher standards of transparency in the NARS and the GoS and to the creation of systems and instruments for combating corruption have been substantially supported by the UNDP and global GOPAC. While actively promoting establishment of a culture of transparency the chapter closely cooperates with the GoS Ministry of Finance, the GoS independent agencies such as SAI, ACA, etc., and the CSOs. The challenges include further development of the branch's role and functions as well as the issue of its financial sustainability.

30. Effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer for 2010 indicates that 17% of respondents, who were in contact with any of the listed institutions or sectors (education, judiciary, health care, police, licensing or registering services, tax services, customs, public utility companies), had given a bribe in the past year (at least once, directly or through household members).²⁵ Furthermore in 2012 the ACA conducted a research supported by IPA 2008 on "*Perception of public interest in the area of prevention and fight against corruption*". The research indicated that 18% of Serbia's population had participated in corruption, i.e. in bribe giving in the past year. Among them, there are more of those who claimed to have given bribe more than once in the past year than those who claimed to have given the bribe only once (ratio 10% to 8%). Some analysis concludes that the perceived level of corruption is even higher than it actually is. Therefore, for instance, according to the Global Corruption Barometer for 2010, citizens perceive political parties as very corrupt (average rating 4.1 on a scale of 0 to 5), judiciary (3.9) and public servants (3.8). According to the above ACA research, Serbian population regards Health Care Sector to be the most corrupt (35%); then Political Sector i.e. political parties and politicians (13%) as well as Justice Sector-Courts and Prosecutors' Offices (13%) and Police (8%). Besides this none-UNDP source, the actual benchmarking information and more up to date relevant data together with some longitudinal data could be found in the effectiveness part of this report. Figure 2 reflects comparable data from a different source.²⁶

²⁵ For full data related to the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer for 2010 visit: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010

²⁶ UNDP/CESID. 2014. Public Perception of Corruption in Serbia. Belgrade.

Figure 2: Trends in Corruption Perception by Sector



31. The State Audit Institution .The State Audit Institution (SAI) was established in 2005. Election of the members of its Council took place only in 2007. An initial significant increase in audit capacity was translated by 2012 into a three-fold increase in audit coverage with 47 audit reports published in 2011 compared to 11 in 2010. The audit reports were submitted to the National Assembly in December 2011.²⁷ In the interim, the SAI has regularly submitted an increasing number of reports to the NARS (66 in 2013, 134 audit reports in 2014).

32. Judiciary and the rule-of-law. Driven by its EU accession process and following the 2008 SAA, GoS agreed to the need of strengthening the rule of law and to improving the capacity, performance, efficiency, integrity, accountability, and professionalism of its justice sector. Gradually improving of the state of the rule of law in Serbia (see Table 6), that was taking place since the democratic changes in 2000, is still hampered by the ineffectiveness of the judicial sector. Most relevant analysis agrees that some of the key problems include weak independence, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the judiciary. Co-operation of the judiciary with law enforcement bodies over the fight against corruption and organised crime is still insufficient. Citizens are not sufficiently aware about their rights and share a low level of confidence in the judicial system. The legal framework needs to be further strengthened and aligned with EU standards. In 2013, NARS adopted an Action Plan (AP) for the Implementation of the National Judicial Reform Strategy for the Period 2013-2018. This framework elaborates key reform principles, their strategic objectives and long-term guidelines for achieving the strategic objectives. The AP also addresses the co-ordination of activities and monitoring the fulfilment of obligations in the judicial area regarding the process of the RoS accession to the EU. A Multi Donor Trust Fund for Justice Sector Support (MDTF-JSS) was set up at the request of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and donors. The objective of the MDTF is to provide a mechanism to pool donor contributions and to finance a coordinated work program to support the Ministry of Justice and justice sector institutions. The MDTF-JSS complemented support and technical assistance from the European Commission to GoS' justice sector. The over-arching objective of the MDTF-JSS is to facilitate Serbia's justice sector EU integration process, establish a justice sector performance framework, and strengthen aid co-ordination in Serbia's justice sector. In order to inform the negotiation process and plan specific next judicial sector reform steps GoS has committed to performing a Judicial Functional Review. The due review is also expected to generate international comparative lessons learned.

²⁷ For more external assessment see page 2 of the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), joined OECD, SIGMA, and EU 2012 at: http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Serbia_Assess_2012.pdf

Table 6: 2000-2013 Serbia Rule of Law Indicator

(higher = better)													
2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
8.1	8.1	19.6	19.6	28.2	19.6	36.4	37.3	37.0	41.2	41.7	46.9	44.1	44.5

Source: The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators²⁸

33. Civil society organizations (CSOs) and media. A range of CSOs and media emerged and developed under difficult political and economic times during 90's and 00'. Although highly dependent on Western aid and investments both significantly contributed the struggle to preserve some of the basic political and civic freedoms. Their role in supporting democratization effort and socioeconomic reform steps was also at times very important. However, most of CSOs still suffer from severe underfunding, poor organizational capacities and service provision, limited sustainability (see Table 7).

Table 7: 2009-2013 CSOs Sustainability Scores for Serbia

(1-7, lower = better)					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
CSOs sustainability	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.1
Legal environment	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.0	3.9
Organizational capacity	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2
Financial viability	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.2
Advocacy	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4
Service provision	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2
Infrastructure	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.5
Public image	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.4

Source: The USAID 2013 CSOs Sustainability Index²⁹

34. Media. Media is in a position similar to CSOs, experiencing a lack of full political freedoms, often in the form of self-censorship. The sluggish performance of the state in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media is captured in the World Bank's Voice and Accountability Index (see Table 8). Yet, the role of CSOs and media during the process of the EU accession process is widely recognized as very important and their participative and investigative capacities are sought to be enhanced. Therefore an increased level of participation of CSOs, as well as the level of media freedom, remains some of the most important means in improving overall democratic governance.

Table 8: Serbia 1996-2013 Voice and Accountability Indicator

higher = better													
1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2013
11.5	17.8	26.9	46.6	44.3	44.2	44.2	54.4	56.7	56.3	55.9	41.7	55.9	56.9

Source: The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators^{30,31}

35. Parliament and emerging independent government institutions. While the Serbian 2007 Constitution is mostly aligned with European standards of parliamentary democracy, some important inconsistencies with those standards remain. Despite the constitutional

²⁸ For full figures and more external assessment see the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Report on Serbia 1996-2013 at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/c246.pdf>

²⁹ The source and more figures and external assessment could be found at pages 195 and on of the USAID 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia June 2014 at:

<http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/E%26E%202013%20CSOSI%20Final%2010-29-14.pdf>

³⁰ For full figures and more external assessment see the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Report on Serbia 1996-2013 at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/c246.pdf>

³¹ A number of indicators are used to make this aggregate indicator. The full list could be found at this Internet page: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/c246.pdf>

division of powers, the NARS is yet to more effectively exercise some of its main functions. The generally poor quality of legislation leads to further difficulties for consolidating the rule of law, while its oversight function is yet to be fully strengthened in practice. Substantial criticism related to the slow pace of reform in the governance sector and the lack of more tangible results, particularly with the implementation of legislation, is continuously coming from EU.³² The situation with the GoS exercising its 'Power of the Purse' is also problematic. The former lack of budget audit in 2008 and 2010, and the absence of a citizens' budget and public engagement in the budget process, were some of the chief shortcomings. The Open Budget Index Score on GoS public finance, in their most recent report (2013), concluded that GoS *"provides minimal information to the public in its budget documents during the year."* For more information see Table 9.

Table 9: 2008-2012 Open Budget Index - OBI Score for Serbia (out of 100%)

	2008	2010	2012
Overall OBI Score	45% <i>"Provides some information to the public in its budget documents during the year"</i>	54% <i>"Provides some information to the public in its budget documents during the year"</i>	39% <i>"Provides minimal information to the public in its budget documents during the year"</i>
Pre-Budget Statement	YES	YES	NO
Executive Budget Proposal	YES	YES	YES
Citizens' Budget	NO	NO	NO
Enacted Budget	YES	YES	YES
In-Year Reports	YES	YES	YES
Mid-Year Review	NO	NO	YES
Year-End Report	YES	YES	YES
Audit Report	NO	NO	YES
Source: Open Budget Index Score³³			

36. Open Budget Index. The latest Open Budget Index Score report from 2013 also shows that GoS substantially worsened its comparative position in relation to other South East European governments, see Table 10.

Table 10: 2012 Comparative Open Budget Index - OBI Western Balkans

	2008	2010	2012
Albania	37	33	↑ 47
Bosnia and Herzegovina	44	44	↑ 50
Croatia	59	↓ 57	↑ 61
Macedonia	54	↓ 49	↓ 35
Serbia	45	↑ 54	↓ 39
Slovenia	73	↓ 70	↑ 74
Source: Open Budget Index Score³⁴			

37. Furthermore, the NARS's oversight of the executive function lacked sufficient organizational and financial capacities. The de facto dominance of the executive branch hindered development towards strengthening checks and balances, thus undermining public accountability mechanisms. The 2010 Rules of Procedures (Articles 83 and 84)³⁵ encompassed mobile committee sessions, public hearings, and audit reports reviewed in

³² Source: Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), joined OECD, SIGMA, and EU 2012-2014 reports: http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Serbia_Assess_2012.pdf

³³ For more external assessment see the Open Budget Index Score 2008, 2010, and 2012 Country Summary Reports for Serbia at: <http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=rs>

³⁴ For more information see Open Budget Index Score 2008, 2010, and 2012 Country Summary Reports for Serbia located at: <http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=rs>

³⁵ A link to new NARS 2010 Rules of Procedures: <http://www.parlament.gov.rs/national-assembly/important-documents/rules-of-procedure-%28consolidated-text%29/entire-document---rules-of-procedure.1424.html>

NARS. Before the introduction of these provisions, UNDP had piloted hearings and the mobile sessions since 2008. The 2010 Law of the National Assembly finally brought the long awaited budgetary independence to the NARS and created conditions for further development of its functions and further independence from the executive branch.³⁶ UNDP supported drafting both the law, and the new important articles of the NARS Rules of Procedures. The work of organizations such as ACA, SAI, Ombudsman, Commissioners and PPO is increasingly discussed in the NARS and its substance used for posing questions and scrutinizing the government cabinet, line ministries, and other parts of the GoS.

38. A number of challenges are posed to the efforts in support of increased governance effectiveness. Some of the key EU/SIGMA recommendations include strengthening the NARS and all other institutions and mechanisms exercising checks and balances, especially the “independent institutions” (Ombudsman, Commissioners, Supreme Audit Institution and Anti-corruption Agency), by granting constitutional foundations to those that do not have them.³⁷ Nonetheless, in comparison to other parliaments, even when granted constitutional foundations, the issue of effectiveness sometimes remains a challenge. Finally, strengthening the capacity of the NARS toward more effective oversight and scrutiny is perhaps the most important challenge. The recent 2014 report on how the NARS performs oversight of the executive by the Open Parliament Civic Initiative highlighted specific scrutiny mechanisms in need of further strengthening. These include more effective work in the committees, MPs’ questions, public hearings, MPs’ interventions, and increased political independence of MPs from the executive. Further efforts are on-going towards increased NARS transparency and higher level of accountability to the citizens of Serbia and adequately addressing the demands resulting from the transition and accession efforts.

39. Disaster Risk Reduction Management. The effects the 2014 floods and 2010 Kraljevo Earthquake are still present. The first one nationally on the economic and personal and every day levels and the second locally. Limited disaster risk reduction and response capacities at the national and local levels surfaced in both cases. After the collapse of the socialist era framework and institutions in charge of the DRR management, Serbia ended in a void that lasted for years. The weak national institutional framework, necessary legislative and policy documents, management structures and lines of responsibilities, co-ordination mechanisms, and lack of funds and political will, all contributed to this situation. In 2009, the GoS commenced the effort of reconstruction and modernisation of the disaster management system towards strengthened disaster preparedness and response mechanisms. The 2009 Law on Emergency Situations initiated this process under the co-ordination of the MoI Sector for Emergency Management (SEM), while the 2011 amendments on Emergency Situations paved the way for the implementation of disaster risk reduction concept. In 2011 The GoS adopted the Decision on appointment of the members of the National Emergency Management Headquarters (NEMH). Moreover in 2011, the NARS adopted the National Strategy in the field of emergency management and disaster risk reduction. The Action Plan for implementation has been in a draft stage since then. In 2012, the Ministry of Interior adopted the Guideline on the methodology for vulnerability assessment and emergency plans development. Finally in 2013 the widening of jurisdictions of the National Emergency Response HQ took place as well as expanding its forum to encompass other government and civic stakeholders and its GoS proclamation into a National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.

40. Still, much remains to be accomplished. An effective disaster risk response demands efficient co-ordination and full integration of GoS and civic stakeholders. Moreover, building

³⁶ A link to the new 2010 Law of the NARS:

<http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/eng/doc/2010/The%20Law%20of%20the%20National%20Assembly.zip>

³⁷ Source: Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), joined OECD, SIGMA, and EU 2012 report: http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Serbia_Assess_2012.pdf

normative, institutional, and organizational capacities and systematic efforts to analyse and reduce the causal factors of disasters takes time and funds. However this way established DRR concept and practice began to create conditions for more effective reduction of exposure to hazards, lessening vulnerability of people and property, provision of prudent management of land and the environment. Further development is expected to improve the GoS and the RoS readiness and early warning for hazardous events. For regional comparisons on disaster coping capacities, containing DRR readiness, see Table 11.

Table 11: 2010-2014 Lack of Coping Capacity in Western Balkans

lower = better			
	2010	2012	2014
Albania	5.3	↓ 5.2	↓ 5.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.8	↓ 5.4	↓ 4.8
Croatia	3.8	↓ 3.5	↓ 3.2
Macedonia FYR	4.3	4.3	↓ 4.0
Serbia	5	↓ 4.7	↓ 4.4
Slovenia	2.5	↑ 2.7	↓ 1.9
Source: 2015 Composite Index For Risk Management (INFORM) Report ³⁸			

41. Gender equality and Security Sector Reform (SSR). While all citizens, political appointees, public officials, and SSE personnel are formally granted equal rights, women remain largely marginalized and are frequently informally hindered from exercising their civil and professional rights. A number of laws and national strategies were adopted and passed by the NARS in order to regulate issues related to the gender equality:

- Law on Prohibition of Discrimination, which includes prohibition of gender-based discrimination (2009)
- Law on Gender Equality, which contains provisions for equal opportunities and special measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination based on sex and gender, in addition to a procedure for legal protection of persons exposed to discrimination (2009)
- Law on Employment and Insurance in Case of Unemployment, which also provides for gender equality and protection against discrimination (2009)
- Strategy for Prevention and Protection against Discrimination (2013)
- National Strategy for the Improvement of the Status of Women and Promotion of Gender Equality by 2015 (2009)
- National Action Plan for the period 2010-2015 on Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 from 2000 (2010)
- Reconfirming SSC 1889 called “Women and Peace and Security”, and condemned continuing sexual violence against women in conflict and post-conflict situations (2009)

42. The establishment of a robust normative and strategic framework was contrasted in SSR, Police and the Army, by fragmented institutional solutions and gradual implementation. Starting points in this process were a human resources policy reform for recruitment and retention of women personnel and an increase of women human rights and gender awareness of military and police personnel. In 2013 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Report issued to GoS particular observations and recommendations in line with the above goals and challenges, including:³⁹

- Continue raising awareness among women about their rights under the Convention

³⁸ For source for this data and more relevant information see 2014 Composite Index For Risk Management (INFORM) Report for Serbia located at: <http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=rs>

³⁹ The report can be downloaded from: http://www.refworld.org/publisher/CEDAW/CONC/OBSERVATIONS/SRB/52f3883b4_0.html

- Ensure the timely and effective implementation of its anti-discrimination laws
- Take measures to raise awareness about those laws among the general public, in particular among women from disadvantaged groups
- Take measures necessary to enact as soon as possible the draft law on free legal aid in order to enable women to claim their rights properly and satisfactorily
- Allocate substantial and sustained resources, both human and financial, to all national strategies, mechanisms and action plans aimed at the elimination of discrimination against women, especially disadvantaged women, and to ensure their effective implementation
- Take measures to harmonize its national strategies and action plans, in particular with those at the local level
- Enhance co-ordination between sectoral policymaking and implementation and horizontal and vertical co-ordination between the national and local levels, as well as to monitor and regularly evaluate the process of their implementation through reporting on progress achieved
- Accelerate the development of indicators and benchmarks as an integral part of a monitoring and evaluation system and to ensure their regular use to measure progress and address setbacks in the improvement of the situation of women.

43. National development agenda and ODA. The national development and EU accession processes have been scoped by a number of government's national planning documents and strategies, such as 2012 National Plan for Integration⁴⁰ and the 2007 National Sustainable Development Strategy⁴¹. In response to the demands resulting from the ongoing EU accession and from the overall reform process over the past years Serbia has undergone a difficult process of improving its public governance and management. Key objectives correspond to the themes listed in para 18 of this report. There are numerous challenges related to the agenda of increasing efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of parts of the public administration in Serbia in line with the Public Administration Reform Strategy and a number of other national strategies and programmes and in accordance with the requirements of the EU integration process.⁴² The GoS and SEIO created an Information System for Co-ordination of the Development Assistance to the RoS (ISDACon) that contains valuable data on donations and loans received from 2000 onwards and includes other numerous aspects of international co-operation.⁴³ Furthermore, the GoS issued via SEIO in 2009 a report on "Needs of the Republic of Serbia for International Assistance in the Period 2009-2011"⁴⁴ and in 2012 the "Action Plan for Programming and Reporting on EU funds and Development Assistance to the Republic of Serbia"⁴⁵. The 2011-2013 Needs Assessment Document (NAD) was prepared according to the new EU driven sector-based approach (see para 17 of this report). The NAD was structured according to eight sectors, each covering recent developments, strategic framework and sector priorities, measures, present activities, and future prospects and challenges. Indicators for monitoring were

⁴⁰ A link to the Plan: <http://www.seio.gov.rs/documents/national-documents.226.html>

⁴¹ A link to the Strategy: http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/serbia/nsds_serbia.pdf

⁴² A link to the Strategy: http://www.srbija.gov.rs/extfile/sr/45685/strategija_drzavna_uprava_cyr.zip

⁴³ More information on ISDACon could be found at: <http://www.evropa.gov.rs/Evropa/PublicSite/index.aspx>

⁴⁴ A link to a GoS document on The Needs of the Republic of Serbia for International Assistance in the Period 2009-2011:

http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/dacu/programiranje_%20medjunarodne_pomoci/needs_of_the_republic_of_serbia_for_international_assistance_in_the_period_2011_2013.pdf

⁴⁵ A link to the 2012 Action Plan for Programming and Reporting on EU funds and Development Assistance to the Republic of Serbia:

http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/medjunarodna_pomoc/programiranje_%20medjunarodne_pomoci/action_plan_programming%202012.pdf

developed at the later stage. Finally in 2014, the GoS issued National Priorities for International Assistance of the Republic of Serbia 2014-2017⁴⁶.

44. Co-ordination and future of development assistance to RoS. Effective ODA co-ordination remains a challenge in Serbia. Formed in 2007 within Ministry of Finance, DACU was relocated to SEIO in 2010. In the meantime most ODA managed co-ordination activities were seized and taken over by SEIO. Some individual institutions such as the NARS plan in 2015 to establish their own coordinating mechanisms to improve the current state of respective ODA co-ordination amongst the key ODA stakeholders in the realm of good governance. These include UNDP, OSCE, SIDA, SDC, USAID, etc. Being responsible for harmonization of activities in the area of planning, providing and using donations, EU funds and other forms of foreign development assistance, SEIO is currently improving its capacities to build partnerships with relevant stakeholders towards more effective planning and programming of development assistance. Key SEIO partners include various beneficiaries (especially the line ministries and the PM Office), central Government institutions (General Secretariat and new Secretariat for Public Policies), Ministry of Finance (due to the authority over co-financing), civil society organisations and development partners such as bilateral and multilateral donors. A new consultation mechanism at the level of PM cabinet with regular meetings including the above stakeholders, recently commenced and should enable wide participation in programming and monitoring of EU funds and other international development assistance. In light of the evolved ODA realities and the EU accession, (see para 17 of this report), EU funds represent the main source of assistance. Moreover, while the future of classic ODA is already changing, ways of alternative financing began to emerge. These include e.g. potential PPPs as well as transforming some so far only FDI relationships with investors from China, Arab States, and Russia into ODA partnerships. The new IPA II “sector approach” is intended to bring the following benefits over the 2014-2020 IPA II programming period:

- Improved co-ordination across ministries and other institutions within each sector and common understanding of the objectives, measures, and priorities
- Increased effectiveness of the strategic analysis regarding the medium-term planning
- Increased co-ordination and engagement of relevant socio-economic partners and civil society stakeholders
- Increased scope for harmonizing IPA and national programmes with the plans and on-going actions of bilateral and multilateral ODA stakeholders

⁴⁶ A link to the National Priorities for International Assistance of the Republic of Serbia 2014-2017: http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/medjunarodna_pomoc/programiranje_%20medjunarodne_pomoci/NAD_2014-2017_eng.pdf

III. UNDP RESPONSE AND CHALLENGE

45. Against the background of Chapter 2, this chapter explains what UNDP has done in response to the challenges described (purely descriptive, not analytical). The chapter provides the overarching outcome model to the extent possible, and specifies the results frameworks for the programme, programme area or projects (where available).

46. In the area of governance, UNDP has responded to development context described in the previous chapter by including in its Country Programme Document (CPD) and Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) six “outputs” (see Table 12). These outputs were operationalized by a number of projects and activities (Table 13), some of which were analysed more closely by this evaluation.

Table 12: CPD Outputs

2.1.1.	Support for reform, professionalization and modernization of the public sector at all levels
2.1.2.	Strengthened oversight function of parliamentary, independent and regulatory bodies
2.1.3.	Anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms strengthened
2.1.4.	National capacities strengthened to mainstream gender in public policies and practices
2.1.5.	The role of civil society in accountable and transparent governance enhanced
2.1.6.	Improve disaster preparedness and risk reduction and management framework

47. The review of strategic results and indicators on one hand, and actual activities and outputs on the other, revealed that some projects and immediate project results could not be logically linked to the strategic CPD outputs in a clear enough way. The project “Promoting Human Rights and Access to Justice for Social Inclusion and Legal Improvement” and activities concerning free access to information were among the most disconnected.

Table 13: Projects List


1	Enhancing anti-corruption efforts in Serbia
2	Youth Sleuth: Engaging Serbia's Youth to Fight Corruption through Investigative Journalism and Social Media
3	Strengthening Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN)
4	Advancing Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN2)
5	Finance Sector Policy Co-ordination Framework
6	Strengthening Accountability of Serbian Parliament
7	Strengthening Oversight Function and Transparency of Parliament
8	Promoting Human Rights and Access to Justice for Social Inclusion and Legal Improvement
9	Communicating EU in Serbia
10	Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Development
11	Kraljevo earthquake response
12	Strengthening of Regional Co-operation on Gender Mainstreaming in SSR in the Western Balkans (WinMil)
13	Women Police Officers Network in SEE (WPON)

48. In order to establish a clearer connection between project results and outcomes, the evaluation team developed a set of “intermediate outcomes”, which is represented in Figure 3. Based on these “intermediate outcomes”, the team then formulated eight “outcomes” (see Table 14). These eight outcomes relate fairly closely to the CPD outputs and form the basis for the analysis under this evaluation.

Table 14: List of Outcomes

1	Parliament, MOF and media scrutinize budgets and expenditure more diligently
2	Executive manages public finances (e.g. procurement) more efficiently
3	State and citizens communicate more systematically and effectively with each other
4	More state organs are involved actively in anti-corruption activities (more systemic approach)
5	Public and private sector organisations discriminate less against women (Security Sector)
6	Local governments provide more equitable access of citizens, NGOs and businesses to quality services
7	State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively
8	State organs allow and secure more rights and freedoms to citizens

Figure 3: Intermediate Outcomes and Outcomes



IV. CONTRIBUTION TO RESULTS

49. Against the background of Chapters 2 and 3, in this chapter we will analyse findings (without repeating information already provided). Also, we will minimize the mention of additional factual information regarding projects and programmes. Instead we will focus on providing and analysing evidence relating to the evaluation criteria, structuring our analysis on the basis of the main evaluation criteria.

50. In addressing the evaluation criteria, the narrative will respond to the corresponding questions identified in the evaluation matrix (see Annex 2) and provide a summary analysis of the findings. Partnerships play a key role in ensuring that primary stakeholders achieve outcomes. As such, all evaluation criteria will cover relevant aspects of partnership – i.e., how were they relevant; how effective were they in contributing to the achievement of outcomes; how efficiently were they managed; and how sustainable are they? We will, where appropriate, discuss crosscutting themes separately using the main evaluation criteria.

A. Relevance

51. This part of the report will assess the programme relevance. The main question is if the country programme outputs as identified in the CPD governance component are consistent and aligned with Serbian development priorities and UNDP mandate.

EQ1: Are the “country programme outputs”, as identified in the CPD governance component, consistent with Serbian development priorities and UNDP mandate?

52. The following is the list of the CPD outputs (country level objectives):

- 2.1.1. Support for reform, professionalization and modernization of the public sector at all levels;
- 2.1.2. Strengthened oversight function of parliamentary, independent and regulatory bodies;
- 2.1.3. Anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms strengthened;
- 2.1.4. National capacities strengthened to mainstream gender in public policies and practices;
- 2.1.5. The role of civil society in accountable and transparent governance enhanced;
- 2.1.6. Improve disaster preparedness and risk reduction and management framework.

53. The review of the Serbian development context and challenges (see Chapter II of this report), as well as the performed interviews and the programme's documents review show that there is a broad based consensus on the country programme outputs and that these align well with national development strategies and priorities. On the other hand, Serbian strategies are so numerous and broad that they can be used to legitimise almost any development activity.

54. Decision making on the selection of the country programme outputs were a subject of the UNDP led participatory and consultative process that included Serbian European Integration Office (SEIO) inputs into the CPD drafting. One of these inputs was SEIO's recognition that the UNDP plans and country programme outputs are fully aligned also with the Government of Serbia overall strategic priority in regards of EU accession. The process of CPD design and planning also included other various relevant stakeholders. Besides the SEIO the process also included the views of the NARS, Anti-corruption Agency, Serbian State Audit Institution, and other UNDP partners.

55. The 2011 CPD contains a situation and development needs analysis that formed a basis for planning continuing the previous UNPD governance support work along lines of the

Serbia priorities issued by GoS in 2009 (“The Needs of the Republic of Serbia for International Assistance in the Period 2009-2011”). Development themes such as Rule of Law and Public Administration Reform figure as the top two in this document. The stated specific priorities also included:

- Enhancement of professional development and institutional capacity of civil service at all levels
- Ensuring the transparent and accountable functioning of public administration
- Improving the EU integration process
- Ensuring conditions for increased efficiency of the public administration through support to the development and improvement of control mechanisms
- Strengthening financial management and control as well as capacities for internal and external audit
- Further strengthening CSOs’ capacities to participate in decision-making processes, to monitor and evaluate the implementation of policies, strategies and laws
- The fight against corruption and money laundering
- Building capacities of state authorities for the implementation of actions for the protection of safety and security of citizens with a special objective of urgent measures related to the Kraljevo Earthquake.

56. Closer scrutiny of the programme country programme outputs and projects objectives, against the above GoS’ priorities as well as the review of the Serbian development challenges (see Chapter II of this report), indicates a high degree of relevance of the UNDP governance programme and all its projects. Not only at the macro (national level) that the UNDP country programme outputs appear relevant, as shown above, but also at the micro (level of organizations) and meso (level of sectors) levels. Table 15 reviews the micro and meso level relevance.

Table 15: Relevance of Project Objectives

Projects	Specific Objectives (Per Pro Docs)	Why is relevant?
Enhancing anti-corruption efforts in Serbia	Strengthened corruption prevention capacities at national level and local for achieving the necessary standards and decreasing the levels of corruption as required under UNCAC and for EU accession.	Fully in line with the relevant GoS strategic documents and policy agenda, see paras 25-27 of this report on development challenges related to the corruption.
Youth Sleuth: Engaging Serbia’s Youth to Fight Corruption through Investigative Journalism and Social Media	Reduce corruption by raising public awareness and fuelling intolerance. It will do so by promoting investigative journalism in the public interest	As above. Also see para 33 of this report related to media and CSOs.
Strengthening Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN)	Enhance preventive and investigative facets of the public spending cycle through capacity development activities in three public institutions as well as capacity of media and CSOs to actively participate in the enhancement of accountability and transparency processes so as to become permanent part of monitoring and control mechanisms.	As above. Fully in line with national strategies, policies, and GoS efforts.
Advancing Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN2)	Develop horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms in the area of public finances, contributing to sound public financial management and decreased opportunity for corruption in Serbia, by advancing performance of state and non-state actors, both at central and local level for effective enforcement and prevention of the misuse of public funds	Fully in line with the relevant GoS strategic documents and policy agenda. See report para 24 on public finance.

Projects	Specific Objectives (Per Pro Docs)	Why is relevant?
Finance Sector Policy Co-ordination Framework	To improve policy process through creating a policy co-ordination framework and cohesive mechanisms that would optimally link strategic priorities as distinct as strengthening mechanisms and planning and forecasting, finalizing the privatization process, containing public-sector wages, controlling state aid, fostering free movement of capital, raising EU integration capacity and boosting information systems for data monitoring.	As above. See report parts 22 and 24, on policy co-ordination and public finance.
Strengthening Accountability of Serbian Parliament	Strengthen the capacity of the NA to be accountable to the citizens of Serbia, be able to address the demands of the transition period and to execute its oversight role more effectively	Fully aligned. See report para 24 on public finance.
Strengthening Oversight Function and Transparency of Parliament	Strengthen the oversight/scrutiny function, transparency and efficiency of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the representative role of local assemblies	As above. Fully in line with the GoS and NARS efforts and needs.
Promoting Human Rights and Access to Justice for Social Inclusion and Legal Improvement	Support for the UPR process for Serbia	Fully aligned.
Communicating EU in Serbia	Improve the Serbian citizens' awareness and understanding of the EU integration process and changes and reforms it requires through support the Serbian Government in designing a communications strategy for the Stabilization and Association Process	Fully in line with the relevant GoS strategic documents and policy agenda. See report para 22.
Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Development	Strengthen national institutional and DRR framework and institutional co-ordination through operationalization of National Platform and support to new legislative and policy documents	Fully in line with national needs and direct calls for help. See report parts 40 and 43 on DRR Management and national ODA needs.
Kraljevo earthquake response	To coordinate international aid, support to recovery efforts and planning and framework Development, support to recovery programming efforts and consolidation of needs assessments as well as the conduct of the risk assessment	As above.
Strengthening of Regional Co-operation on Gender Mainstreaming in SSR in the Western Balkans (WinMil)	Enhanced capacities of the MoD and gender equality mechanisms; Improved MoD HR policy reform; Increased gender awareness in military.	Fully in line with the international and national resolutions, laws, strategies, and efforts. See para 41 on the gender equality agenda.
Women Police Officers Network in SEE (WPON)	Increased awareness on the position of women in police forces in SEE and women's human rights;	As above.

57. The 2014 National Priorities for International Assistance of the Republic of Serbia for the period of 2014-2017 focus on governance and public administration reform themes within the EU accession context. These include enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, professionalization and modernization of public administration, improvement of public finance management, strengthening transparency and accountability of public administration, with an accent on improvement of Strategic Planning and Policy Co-ordination.

58. To conclude, the pool of 13 UNDP governance projects and their country programme outputs are evidently highly relevant to the RoS and GoS reform needs and are well aligned within national priorities as the programme level country programme outputs are also aligned to a high degree with the UNDP 2008-2013 Strategic Plan. Moreover, the country programme outputs of the programme's development interventions are consistent with

beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.

59. The UNDP's approach of extending support to the national partners is much appreciated by all relevant stakeholders. The UNDP has a „go with the flow “approach to its support to strengthening governance in Serbia. Much in a direct response to the specific national reform needs while successfully bringing all relevant stakeholders on board.

60. Main weaknesses may lie in the quality of domestic and donor strategies (too many parallel processes and documents), lack of vision, poor co-ordination and monitoring mechanisms, and the lack of committed resources. Moreover, the national goal „Support to the rule of law, democratization of society and sustainable economic development through the realization of public administration reform“ seems not sufficiently addressed by the UNDP governance programme. There was only limited support to Public Administration Reform. The area or rule-of-law and judiciary have received little attention.

61. It appears that resources for attaining the country programme outputs in the governance area were allocated on an ad hoc and gradual basis. The analytical depth of the CCA does not translate into commensurate project actions. The entire planning process is far too heavy for the limited resources (approx. 500,000\$ p.a. core funding for governance). Therefore, the overall UNDP resources were seemingly too little to achieve CPD outputs. In some areas, resources were adequate, partly because of limited absorption capacity (e.g. Parliament, SAI, ACAS, and SCTM).

62. Within the governance area, stakeholders were involved in designing the CPD, but the European Union and its bodies was not involved to any significant extent. Subsequently, the EU did not commit significant funds to the UNDP programme. Given that UNDP rules do not permit the CO to bid for EU tenders, the cooperation between both organisations remained limited.

63. While “accountability” seems to have been an overarching theme for implementation of the UNDP programme, this is not reflected in the UNDP strategies. Moreover, the UNDP strategic documents fail to address the relationship between regional UNDP SEESAC programme and the UNDP country programme.

64. The UNDP assistance was readily sought by the partners for its flexibility. Rather than committing to the CPC and other UNDP planning documents, the public sector partners and beneficiaries preferred a quick, responsive, and flexible assistance from UNDP. The flux of public servants probably contributed to the ad hoc approach. While the EU accession realities further marginalized the role of UNDP in Serbia, the availability of pre-accession funds did not fully diminish it. EU funds oblige potential beneficiaries to specific administrative and strategic capacities that are not always available. Hence the flexibility of UNDP assistance remained attractive to many Serbian partners.

65. Moreover, the EU funding focus was largely on projects related to speeding up Serbia's preparedness to meet the Copenhagen criteria, preparation for EU funds management and institutions, and other issues. Issues such as those related to e.g. rule of law, political process and public administration, were largely left out and subject of individual and limited ODA interests.

B. Effectiveness


66. This section pays particular attention to the criterion of effectiveness, demonstrating how UNDP initiatives have, or have not, contributed to the achievement of outcomes.

EQ2: Which development outcomes were initially expected from UNDP led initiatives in the governance area?

1. Parliament, MOF and media scrutinize budgets and expenditure more diligently

67. Strengthening the system of oversight institutions has been a key outcome intended by UNDP's governance programme component, as depicted in greater detail in Figure 4. In order to achieve this outcome, UNDP aimed at a number of intermediate outcomes, which involved mainly enhancing the production and use of external audit reports by various stakeholders and increasing the demand for accountability and transparency on behalf of the civil society. Six projects supported the achievement of this outcome altogether.


Figure 4: Parliament, MoF and media scrutinize budget more diligently



2. Executive manages public finances (e.g. procurement) more efficiently

68. Three intermediate outcomes relating to the area of procurement are intended to contribute to the achievement of better public financial management by the executive. Other intermediate outcomes involve the improved communication between the State Audit Institution, the National Assembly and local government, adherence to higher standards for public internal financial control and more compliance with financial management standards at the local level (see Figure 5).


Figure 5: Executive manages public finances more effectively



3. State and citizens communicate more systematically and effectively with each other

69. There are two intermediary outcomes, which aim at the improvement of communication between the state and the citizenry: the increase of exchanges between MPs and citizens (e.g. through public hearings), and a better communication of EU policies among government agencies (Figure 6).


Figure 6: State and citizens communicate more systematically and effectively with each other



4. More state organs are involved actively in anti-corruption activities

70. According to the model depicted in Figure 7, the greater involvement of state organs in the fight against corruption (i.e. a more systemic and thus probably more successful approach to fighting corruption) requires four outcomes at the intermediary level to be in place: (i) better coordination of AC actions, (ii) more whistle-blowers reporting on suspected corrupt acts, (ii) a larger number of investigative articles, and (iv) more use of evidence in criminal corruption cases used by judges and prosecutors.


Figure 7: More state organs are involved actively in anti-corruption activities



5. Public and private sector organisations discriminate less against women

71. Less discrimination against women by public and private sector organisations needs to necessarily include the police and military. According to the model provided in Figure 8, at the intermediary level, interventions need to ensure improved mechanisms for gender equality in the military, improved recruitment and retention of women in the military, a higher proportion of women employed in the police, and improved gender awareness and gender responsive policing in the police forces.

Figure 8: Public and private sectors discriminate less against women




6. Local governments provide citizens, NGOs and businesses with more equitable access to quality services

More equitable services provided by local governments necessitates that public services be evaluated (systematically) by better-informed citizens and the public servants at local levels become more accountable to citizens (see

72. Figure 9). There are a large number of outputs required to improve the accountability of public servants.


Figure 9: Local governments provide citizens, NGOs and businesses with more equitable access to quality services



7. State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively

73. The model displayed in Figure 10 shows that to effectively mitigate risk and potential adverse effects from disasters, at least four conditions need to be met: local government units need clear mandates; there needs to be increased investment in DRR systems; authorities should be better prepared to respond to disasters; and good coordination in special development situations.


Figure 10: State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively



8. State organs allow and secure more rights and freedoms to citizens

74. As the model depicted in Figure 11 demonstrates, safeguarding rights and freedoms of citizens will not be possible without accountable civil servants. It further requires that human rights standards are well aligned with international standards and those incidents of all kinds of discrimination among state institutions and economic actors are being reduced.

Figure 11: State organs allow and secure more rights and freedoms to citizens



EQ3: What progress toward achieving intermediate and originally expected outcomes has been made?

75. In this part of the report we deal with the programme effectiveness in contributing to the achievement of outcomes. We will pay particular attention to demonstrating how UNDP projects' initiatives have, or have not, contributed to the achievement of outcomes. Table 17 shows projects' outputs and outcomes per data generated from the UNDP's Atlas database and the project's reports.

76. Parliament, MOF and media scrutinize budgets and expenditure more diligently. The new 2010 Law on NARS and the new NARS Rules of Procedures widely opened the door for delivering ODA to the NARS reform efforts. The UNDP parliamentary support project seized the chance and developed a relevant and effective assistance scheme to NARS. This was the first ODA effort fully to be housed in the NARS premises. The NARS's President even officially declared the UNDP project as the priority. Key outputs included assistance to development of financial portal to the MoF and the Treasury, support to bringing in independent agencies to NARS and enhance NARS scrutiny capacities, establishment of GOPAC, support to NARS outreach and strengthening public hearings. In recognition to the project results UNDP was selected as the most relevant partner to support the most recent evolving initiative towards public participation in pre and post-legislative scrutiny. The full results related to the development of the web portal for tracking public expenditures other results are already tangible. Besides a more vigorous oversight performed by the NARS, the results include successful support to 5 pilot municipalities and the initial work on strengthening two-way communication with citizens. Also, bringing the important local agenda to the NARS scrutiny was one of the key results. A 2013 episode of a scrutiny effort resulted in a NARS committee request issues to the Ministry of Agriculture to apply for EU Rural Development funds for a given LSG after it failed to do so previously. Finally, the 2013 UNDP's survey confirmed that the respondents' attitudes towards the NARS significantly improved in 2013. On a more general scale, parliamentary oversight over the executive has improved, with the prime minister and deputy prime ministers participating in regular sessions of oral questions, the government presenting annual work programmes and ministers submitting quarterly reports to the corresponding committees. Parliament still needs to develop a genuine relationship with independent regulatory bodies, supporting their independence and promoting their findings. A committee of inquiry into Serbia's budgetary allocations to Kosovo was set up. Parliamentary committees have developed a more proactive approach. The SIGMA Assessment Report of 2014 concludes „the role of the Parliament in analysing the draft budget would be strengthened both by increasing its analytical resources and allowing it more time to scrutinize the budget documentation. Members of the Parliament are not aware of the usefulness of performance information in assessing the underlying reasons for the budget estimates for spending.“⁴⁷

77. Independent Regulatory Bodies. Independent Regulatory Bodies submitted annual reports, which were debated by the relevant committees before conclusions were examined by plenary. But parliament has still given only limited attention to their findings and recommendations. The State Audit Institution (SAI) is continuing to improve in capacity and scope, and has increased the number of completed audits covering the central government, local governments, public enterprises, and the National Bank of Serbia. The latest report of the State Audit Institution notes that SAI registered irregularities in public procurements worth about half a billion Euros, in auditing 122 entities in 2011. While the SAI filed a total of 462 charges involving 611 persons, final rulings have been reached in only 25 cases, with 23 convictions and 2 cases of dismissal of charges. In addition, SAI has issued more than 1500 recommendations in its reports to Parliament. In the area of external audit, the SAI published its first performance audit report in June 2014. The 2013 audit programme was implemented on time, but audit capacity is still insufficient to ensure full audit coverage. The SAI currently has around 175 audit staff, compared with 372 planned audit posts. Audit manuals in line with the INTOSAI standards are being developed.

78. Media investigations. There are concerns about deteriorating conditions for the full exercise of freedom of expression in Serbia. The EU Progress Report issued in October 2014 finds that „...there is a growing trend of self-censorship which, combined with undue influence on editorial policies, and a series of cases of intervention against websites, are

⁴⁷ OECD/SIGMA. April 2013. Assessment. Paris.

detrimental to freedom of the media and adversely affect the development of professional and investigative journalism” and that “Pending the full implementation of the newly adopted legislative package, the Serbian media continued to operate in a blurred legal environment which delayed the state’s withdrawal from media ownership, one of the cornerstones of the 2011 media strategy.”⁴⁸ Threats and violence against journalists, including cases of physical assault at local level, still remain a concern.

79. Executive manages public finances (e.g. procurement) more efficiently. According to the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment (2010), notable improvements had been made in the effectiveness of the treasury system, including the establishment of improved financial control and accountability arrangements and increased transparency in public finances.⁴⁹ Financial management control and internal audit are moving toward European Union (EU) standards, but there is still a significant need to build capacity in this area across government. Implementation of financial management and control is at an early stage and risk management is not applied systematically. Implementing legislation to better define managerial accountability still remains to be developed. Understanding of the managerial accountability principle and internal control standards at central and local levels and in publicly owned enterprises is still weak and needs to be further developed among senior managers. The centralised budget inspection function has yet to be developed and regulated in line with PIFC requirements. The 2013 SIGMA Assessment concludes that „although the CHU is the general provider of IA and FMC training, it cannot currently be considered a strategic driver for improving and developing it. This is partly due to its focus on training and development of technical information, with little interaction with FMC and IA staff in direct budget beneficiaries. The CHU has no clear and effective reporting system to provide the government with timely information on shortages and corrective measures necessary to implement IA and FMC systems in the public sector at a strategic level. There is an opportunity to free up resources of the CHU in shifting its training obligation to central civil service training centres, institutes and schools, while providing input into training curricula.”⁵⁰

80. Public Procurement. Parliament adopted in December 2012 a new Law on Public Procurement that came into effect on 1 April 2013. The Law envisages a series of novelties, including a stronger oversight role for the Public Procurement Office, stronger authority for the Commission for Protection of Rights in Public Procurement Procedures, introduction of citizens’ monitors, greater transparency and more use of e-tools, centralization of public procurement in certain sectors, etc. In the field of general principles, the Public Procurement Office (PPO) continued to adopt regulations and model documents for the implementation of the new Law on Public Procurement that entered into force last year. The government adopted three decrees and one decision concerning centralised procurement, procurement in the field of defence and security and common procurement vocabulary. The PPO recorded an increase in the use of the upgraded public procurement portal. Most of the measures prescribed by the new law and by the national strategy and action plan for the fight against corruption with a view to increasing transparency and preventing corruption and conflicts of interest in public tenders have been adopted. The national strategy and action plan for upgrading the public procurement system remain to be aligned with the new law. As regards the award of public contracts, the value of negotiated procedures conducted without prior notice decreased to 4% of the total value of public tenders in the first half of 2014, from 24% in 2012. The average number of bids per tender remained stable, at 2.7 in 2013 and in the first half of 2014 against 2.6 in 2012. Eight new posts were created in the PPO, but the Office faces difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified staff. Since the entry into force of the new Law on Misdemeanours in March 2014, the PPO initiated 26 misdemeanour

⁴⁸ European Commission. 2014. Serbia Progress Report. Brussels.

⁴⁹ See also OECD/SIGMA. April 2013. Assessment. Paris.

⁵⁰ OECD/SIGMA. April 2013. Assessment. Paris.

procedures against contracting authorities. Institutional cooperation on public procurement, including with audit, judicial and police institutions, is improving, but needs to be reinforced. In the field of remedies, the number of requests for protection of rights received by the Republic Commission for the Protection of Bidders' Rights (Republic Commission) increased by 39% from the entry into force of the new legal framework in April 2013 until the end of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012. The Republic Commission reached a total of 1.966 decisions in 2013 compared to 1700 in 2012. In 909 cases, public procurement decisions were partially or fully annulled. In 2013, the Republic Commission further built up its enforcement record by reviewing the implementation of 635 of its decisions and concluded that in 24 cases, the contracting authorities had not properly enforced them. It has continued to build up its administrative and enforcement capacity to a total of 54 employees. In general, there has been good progress in the field of public procurement. However, the capacity of the PPO needs to be strengthened further. A new strategy for upgrading the public procurement system for the period 2014-2018 has been adopted by GoS in October 2014, but lacking any financial commitments. Overall, alignment in the area of public procurement is moderately advanced. Concerns exist regarding the PPO's ability to deliver effectively on its increased activities and the expertise of contracting entities using the new procurement tools.⁵¹

81. UNDP support to GOPAC Chapter in NARS. The UNDP support to establishment and capacity development of GOPAC chapter in Serbia was instrumental. This enabled a new initiative towards increased accountability in public finances. GOPAC was very sound in executing its activities towards a primary objective to enhance oversight over public finances, through advocating for establishment of the electronic portal. UNDP has been also supporting other authorities in raising accountability in public finances. Through extended UNDP's TA, over 2000 public procurement officers have been certified country-wide while the SAI was equipped with 60 certified auditors and over 30 municipalities were trained in implementing audit findings. As a result, e.g. the PPO has noted in the first half of 2013 an impressive 45% drop in the number of negotiated procedures compared to the first half of 2012.

82. State and citizens communicate more systematically and effectively with each other. The State Ombudsman continued to be active and recorded an increase in the number of citizens' complaints, related mostly to economic, social and cultural rights and administrative procedures. There was a decline in the follow-up of the Ombudsman's recommendations by the authorities, especially those requiring systematic changes. The Equality Protection Commissioner's office has continued to be active in raising awareness on discrimination and existing mechanisms for protection against discrimination and received an increased number of complaints from citizens. The Commissioner for Protection of Equality received 465 citizens' complaints, and issued 56 opinions, 117 recommendations and 3 opinions on laws in 2012. It filed charges for violation of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination in 5 cases and issued 19 warnings and announcements. Upholding the GoS EU accession process UNDP supported implementation of the EU accession communication strategy (previously adopted through UNDP assistance). The strategy helped politicians communicate to the citizen the need for reforms and the expected end results more successfully and coherently. As a result of the strategy implementation citizens support to the accession process increased after two consecutive downward cycles, by 9 % and scepticism decreased by 7 % (SEIO, July 2013).

83. More state organs are involved actively in anti-corruption activities (more systemic approach). Serbia has not been able to improve its scoring under the Corruption Perception index of Transparency International, although a positive trend was recorded in the UNDP semi-annual Corruption Benchmarking Survey (Table 16). The survey noted that

⁵¹ OECD/SIGMA. April 2013. Assessment. Paris.

household incidence of corruption had decreased compared to results from June 2012. Enforcement efforts were stepped up as well. In 2013, authorities started investigations in 24 privatization cases for which the Anticorruption Council had raised concerns and 115 criminal charges have been raised so far. In addition, a new National Anticorruption Strategy has been adopted in July 2013 and an Action Plan was approved later that year. The strategy and action plan involve 9 sector, 48 institutions and approximately 600 activities. An inter-ministerial coordination mechanism was put in place in August 2014 to oversee their implementation. According to the EU Progress Report of October 2014 „the implementation of the national strategy on the fight against corruption for the period 2013-2018 and its related action plan have yet to mirror the strong political impetus to fight corruption. Several measures were delayed and key developments are expected in the short to medium term, in particular laws on whistle-blower protection and legislative changes in the field of conflicts of interest. Monitoring and coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy and action plan have yet to yield results. A track record on effective verification of asset declarations and checks on party funding needs to be established. Corruption remains prevalent in many areas. Significant efforts are needed not only to enhance and fully enforce the legal framework for the fight against corruption but also to back these reforms with appropriate resources. Inclusiveness of stakeholders throughout the process should be guaranteed. The new inter-ministerial coordination mechanism put in place in August 2014 is a positive initial step but its impact on the ground remains to be assessed. Attention needs to be paid to providing the Anti-Corruption Agency and Anti-Corruption Council with sufficient resources and to ensuring the follow-up to their proposals and recommendations.”⁵²

Table 16: UNDP Corruption Benchmarking Surveys: Key Findings

2010 ⁵³	2011	End 2012	End 2013	Mid 2014
Cca. 33% of respondents indirectly experienced corruption; 13% of respondents report their personal involvement	33-39% of respondents indirectly experienced corruption; 11-16% of respondents report their personal involvement	20 % of respondents indirectly experienced corruption; 8% of respondents report their personal involvement	19 % of respondents indirectly experienced corruption; 8% of respondents report their personal involvement	Cca. .21% of respondents indirectly experienced corruption; 9% of respondents report their personal involvement.
Doctors, police officers and state administration employees perceived as most corrupted.	Doctors, police officers and civil servants perceived as most corrupted.	Doctors and police officers perceived as most corrupted.	Doctors, police officers and civil servants perceived as most corrupted.	Doctors, police officers perceived as most corrupted.
The average bribe: 255 EUR.	The average bribe: 178 EUR.	The average bribe: 168 EUR.	The average bribe: 205 EUR.	The average bribe: 134 EUR.

84. In relation to law enforcement, the Prosecution for Organised Crime and Corruption has raised indictments against 168 persons in 2013, which is a substantial increase from the 81 indictments raised in 2012. Leaks to the media about on-going investigations, in breach of the presumption of innocence, remain an issue of serious concern and should be investigated and processed in line with the law. The number of investigations launched in 2013 by the Special Prosecutor for Corruption and Organised Crime in high-level corruption cases remained about the same (at 147 new investigations, compared with 140 in 2012). Final convictions remained rare and high-profile cases remained at risk of political interference. Further efforts are needed to establish a track record of investigations,

⁵² European Union. 2014. Progress Report for Serbia.

⁵³ UNDP Corruption Benchmarking Survey could be found here:

http://www.rs.undp.org/content/serbia/en/home/library/democratic_governance/corruption-benchmarking-survey--february-2013.html

prosecution and final convictions, in corruption cases, including high-level cases. Law enforcement bodies and prosecution need to become more proactive. Lack of internal capacity and expertise in financial investigations and asset recovery, together with a lack of technical equipment for special investigative measures, hamper the effectiveness of investigations. Institutional cooperation between law enforcement agencies has improved to a certain extent, but needs to be developed further.⁵⁴

85. Public and private sector organisations discriminate less against women.

Regarding equal opportunities between women and men, legislation with regard to the dismissal of pregnant women and women on maternity leave, sexual harassment and inequality in promotion and salaries needs is still inadequate. Administrative capacity on gender equality issues remains weak. The legal and institutional framework to protect women and children's rights was further improved. Measures to tackle domestic violence and gender inequality at the workplace remain to yield effective results. Concerning women's rights and gender equality, parliament ratified in October 2013 the Council of Europe 'Istanbul Convention' on fighting violence against women. The catalogue of criminal offences has yet to be harmonised with the Convention. The Gender Equality Directorate in the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy has been transformed into a division within the Department for planning and development affairs. Resources and better coordination of the national machinery for promotion of gender equality remain inadequate. Despite some improvements, the Roma population, and especially Roma women, remain the most discriminated against in the labour market. The two UNDP SEESAC projects were aimed to work on supporting integration of the gender perspective in army and police through supporting regional cooperation in achieving gender equality in police and the military institutions in SEE). While the national Women Police Network in Serbia is yet to be established some important awareness steps in a challenging institutional environment were made along the lines of the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on Women. Guidelines for Gender Sensitive Policing were developed that contributed to the draft Police Law in Serbia. On the other hand a new committed was supported to prioritizing gender equality in the RoS AF as well as raising awareness of police officers on gender equality. This resulted in an establishment of a nascent gender focal points network in the GoS AF.

86. Local governments provide more equitable access of citizens, NGOs and businesses to quality services.

Overall, the public administration system remains fragmented, with unclear lines of accountability and low policy development and coordination capacity. Recruitment and promotion need to be further reformed and developed to achieve a transparent, merit-based civil service system. Much recruitment is still conducted through non-transparent procedures. Follow-up of the recommendations of independent bodies needs to be built into the system. Administrative and management capacity at local level continues to be weak and significant disparities between municipalities persist. There has been little progress with regard to accountability and service delivery. The National Council for Decentralisation and the inter-ministerial Municipal Finance Commission remained inactive and none of the tools needed to monitor functions delegated to municipalities have so far been developed. The legislation on municipal finance needs to be properly implemented with regard to calculation of the transfers earmarked by line ministries. Consultation of local authorities on new legislation that has local implications remains limited. Red tape, parafiscal charges and difficulties in obtaining construction permits remained major obstacles to more dynamic business creation and expansion.

87. State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively. Substantial progress was made towards the objective of effective mitigation of risk and potential adverse effects from disasters. Key progress steps were made in regard to improved institutional and regulatory environment as well as cooperation among disaster risk

⁵⁴ European Union. 2014. Progress Report for Serbia.

management authorities and specialized agencies. To that end very important was the UNDP support to the new legislation change and the National HQ for Emergency Management (NEMH) and SEM at Mol capacity building. Also, LSGs got a clearer mandate while a number of the municipalities became actively involved in building their DRR capacities. A number of UNDP supported DRR mechanisms such as the new database are soon to become operational and all the institutional conditions are met in order for improved coordination among the key national and local stakeholders. UNDP support to the national Platform was very important to its 2013 proclamation and international recognition. The 2015 Composite Index also detected the increase of RoS Coping Capacity for Risk Management (INFORM) Report. In fact, according to this index, RoS made, of all its neighbours, one of the biggest leaps forwards in this area, see Table 11.

88. State organs allow and secure more rights and freedoms to citizens. Good progress can be reported in information society and media with the adoption of the package of three laws implementing the 2011 media strategy thus further aligning Serbia's legal framework with the *acquis*. The holding of the pride parade in Belgrade on 28 September without major incident marked a substantial step towards the effective exercise in Serbia of human rights in general and LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) rights in particular. Notwithstanding the government's good preparatory work for this event, enhanced political support for the promotion of fundamental freedoms is needed. Discriminatory statements, intimidation and violence still occur without substantial political reaction or appropriate follow-up by authorities.⁵⁵ An action plan for the implementation of the anti-discrimination strategy has been adopted in October 2014. A national mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the UN human rights bodies' recommendations remains to be adopted.

89. Freedom of Information. Concerning freedom of expression, a package of three laws - the Law on Public Information and Media, the Law on Electronic Media and the Law on Public Service Broadcasting was adopted in August 2014, following an inclusive consultation process with the active participation of media associations during the preparatory phase albeit under urgent procedure. The laws' adoption represents a significant positive development. Their implementation will be crucial for achieving the goals of the 2011 Serbian media strategy. The commission specially tasked to look into unresolved cases of murdered journalists from 1999 and 2001 has made progress in its work, with new details relating to one particular murder surfacing and three persons charged so far. The Regulatory Body for Electronic Media has stepped up activity related to content monitoring but its independence needs to be strengthened. Access to information of public interest is generally functional, although disclosure of some documents followed only after intense public pressure. As regards access to information and protection of personal data, the trend of increasing numbers of requests from citizens continued in 2013, with the public becoming better informed of their rights. The office of the Commissioner for Free Access to Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection should dispose adequate resources for the tasks of the Commissioner. The legal framework remains to be fully aligned with EU standards.⁵⁶

90. While some criminal charges were filed for incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred and intolerance, final convictions remain rare. The GoS implementation of the Judicial Reform Strategy benefited from UNDP support. UNDP issued the GoS with evidence-based inputs for enhancing the efficiency of the judiciary related to this implementation. Specific issues included human rights and access to justice that are covered by the first GoS EU accession negotiation chapters. Moreover, UNDP assisted the GoS and facilitated the implementation of the UPR recommendations. Key UNDP support was related to the establishment of a necessary implementation mechanism.

⁵⁵ European Union. 2014. Progress Report for Serbia.

⁵⁶ European Union. 2014. Progress Report for Serbia.

EQ4: To what extent has UNDP support contributed to that progress?

91. UNDP has directly facilitated important NARS reform steps over the past years towards its increased oversight over the executive performance. The important role of the UNDP support to the NARS was recognized numerous times throughout the span of this evaluation process and the scope and targeting of the UNDP project clearly indicates a high level of attribution to these pioneering reform steps of the NARS. The EU Progress Report also noted improvement of the NARS' oversight function for 2013.

92. UNDP has directly facilitated development of a new Anticorruption Strategy (2013-2018), adopted by NARS in 2013. The strategy focuses on good governance, strengthening of independent institutions, enforcing internal and external audit and control, protection of whistle-blowers, and addressing corruption in urbanism, spatial planning, judiciary, police, education and health. Also, per UNDP recommendations the GoS drafted a Law on whistle-blowers protection. The July 2014 UNDP Corruption Benchmarking Survey indicated that the efficiency of GoS was commended by 64% of respondents, compared to 58% in 2012. Moreover, 30% of respondents recognized GoS anti-corruption efforts. Finally, UNDP supported over 100 journalists from local and national media trained in gender, minority and conflict sensitive reporting and subsequently produced over 1000 articles and 20 documentaries on the subject. The story in Box 2 illustrates how combining interventions aiming at improving procurement legislation and bodies, and strengthening investigative journalism, can eventually lead to positive outcome level results.

Box 2: Journalists Investigating Procurement Fraud

Journalists promoted through UNDP's governance programme investigated a case of procurement fraud at "Apoteka Beograd", supplying medicaments to the 1.8 million citizens of Serbian capital. Like other public pharmacies, it was founded by local government and financed through public funds. The investigation revealed that over a period of 10 years, the pharmacy broke the public procurement law (PPL). The Public Procurement Office was determined to end this breach of law and ordered that all public pharmacies must comply with the PPL. In order to prove that what in fact prevented them from abiding by the law were complicated public procurement legal procedures, "Apoteka Beograd" stopped all the drug purchases. This led to a shortage of drug supplies, which lasted for more than a month, affecting the health and already tight family budgets of Belgrade citizens, who had to buy drugs from private pharmacies instead of receiving it through health care system. The investigation showed that the public pharmacy company has been charging National Health Insurance Fund (RFZO) full price of drugs procured, but paying only half that price to suppliers, withholding the difference. These funds were used in a non-transparent way, mostly for projects conducted by the city government with little or no control by the representatives of the citizens. The investigative journalists managed to expose the mechanism of embezzling money from the state fund and redirecting it to the city budget. It also became apparent that executive changes within the pharmacy usually meant the change of the main supplier, which pointed towards possible corruption. After public pressure and media attention, a new tender was announced and carried out. The pharmacy, however, still attempted to circumvent the rules. The two main criteria for choosing the supplier were price and a discount for deferred payment. The pharmacy was thus ranking the price twice, favouring those offering special discounts. The story eventually contributed to changing how public pharmacies procure medication. Tenders are now conducted regularly, contrary to previous practice, when no public procurements were used at all. A framework agreement allows the pharmacies to choose one particular supplier, or a group of suppliers for a period of time. After the story was published, some high executives were replaced. The director of the Belgrade public pharmacy company left her position and is now the first person of the pharmaceutical company, which had previously been her main supplier.

93. UNDP assistance to GoS related to its EU accession communication strategy implementation (previously adopted through UNDP assistance) appears to be a key factor to these positive steps in terms of the more effective GoS communication performance and the increased citizens' support to the accession process.

94. SEESAC/UNDP has directly facilitated important GoS DRR reform steps over the past years. The GoS made a substantial progress towards the objective of effective mitigation of risk and potential adverse effects from disasters. Establishment of the NEMH and 2013 proclamation of the Platform earned international recognition. The role of the

SEESAC/UNDP support to these developments was instrumental and widely recognized. Moreover, over the time the SEESAC/UNDP was seen and sought as most relevant and capable partner and supporter.

Table 17: Review of reported Project Results

Projects	Results generated from Atlas and projects' reports
Enhancing anti-corruption efforts in Serbia	International best practices on whistleblowing captured and promoted in Serbia; UNDP expertise retained for drafting Law on Protection of Whistle-blowers; RTA index promoted in Serbia; Best international practice captured and promoted throughout Serbia; Citizens charters drafted and promoted throughout Serbia; Citizens charters piloted on the local level.
Youth Sleuth: Engaging Serbia's Youth to Fight Corruption through Investigative Journalism and Social Media	Analysis of educational institutions conducted. Data presented to the ACA with a view to supporting young journalist education; Young Journalists selected for internship with NGOs; NGO Criteria for the Call for Proposal developed; 10 young journalists selected and 3 grants awarded to selected NGOs; Trainings of young journalists organized; Innovative web portal developed for collecting information; Continuous mentoring of young journalists implemented; Investigative stories published in social media by young trained journalists.
Strengthening Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN) Advancing Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN2)	Over 1200 Public Procurement Officers certified; Study and recommendation on improving organisational structure of PP units in pilot towns presented; Green procurement concept paper produced and presented; NGO grant scheme mini projects evaluated and audited.
Finance Sector Policy Co-ordination Framework	Action Plan for Capacity Development for EU Integration completed and officially adopted by the Ministry's top management; Action Plan for Harmonization of Project Financing completed; New ICT Strategy of the Ministry completed; By-laws of the Law on Foreign Exchange Operations drafted; Recommendations of Functional Review conducted in 2011 implemented; Report on major privatization initiatives in Serbia produced and adopted by the Ministry; Needs Assessment necessary to carry out tax system reform conducted; Explanation of the amendments of the Public Debt Law drafted and adopted by the Ministry; Enhancement of the business environment, especially of the start-up businesses, ensured.
Strengthening Accountability of Serbian Parliament Strengthening Oversight Function and Transparency of Parliament Note: More results are yet to be added to Atlas. Atlas is updated once a year.	Established National GOPAC Chapter in the NARS; Established a separate NARS account to cover for public hearings, mobile committees' sessions and equipment purchase; Assigned sectorial focal points related to portal, budget, GOPAC, outreach etc.; The NARS's President declared the UNDP project the priority; UNDP was selected as the most relevant partner to support the most recent evolving initiative towards public participation in pre and post-legislative scrutiny; System Analyses conducted for developing the web portal for tracking public expenditures; Situation Analyses conducted of Municipal Assemblies and 5 pilot municipalities selected; Initial work on strengthening two-way communication initiated; Conducted a series of scrutiny trainings; Supported a series of public hearings and mobile committee sessions in NARS; Performed workshop on mobile parliament outreach on the local level; The NARS' Bulletin supported towards strengthening transparency and outreach; Conducted a study visit of the NARS to the Austrian Federal Chancellery related to the Developing Standards for Public Participation in the NARS; Developed synergies with other UNDP projects and other UN agencies

Projects	Results generated from Atlas and projects' reports
	and partners.
Promoting Human Rights and Access to Justice for Social Inclusion and Legal Improvement	<p>Strengthened capacities of selected institutions to contribute to peaceful and tolerant societies;</p> <p>Strengthened capacities of selected institutions and organizations of the National HR Protection Systems in Europe and CIS to use their mandate and available resources for the development of long-term strategies to promote and protect human rights at the national level;</p> <p>Increased capacity of UNDP's Country Offices to support National Engagements with International Human Rights and Justice Principles and Mechanisms;</p> <p>Increased capacity of UNDP's Country Offices in supporting national partners for improving Rule of Law and Access to Justice service delivery.</p>
Communicating EU in Serbia	<p>The June 2012 SEIO Survey results show 49% citizens would vote for entering EU; 25% would not vote for entering EU;</p> <p>There is a 2% decrease in support for the EU, but also 3% decrease in opposition to EU membership, thereby reducing the polarization gap in the society;</p> <p>Support to the EU among young people is dropping, according to CeSID research;</p> <p>The quality of media reports regarding Croatian challenges on EU path improved, making parallel with Serbian paths in September 2012;</p> <p>Improved the GoS structures co-ordination resulting from sustained SEIO and UNDP efforts;</p> <p>Communicating EU priorities on the local level improved as a result of SEIO and UNDP efforts;</p> <p>Completed creation of multimedia packages for LSGs;</p> <p>Organised "Applied nostalgia" photo exhibitions in LSGs on comparing Belgrade and one EU capital;</p> <p>Organised presentation of "Arguments for Europe" in LSGs.</p>
Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Development	<p>Recovery Training conducted for 45 representatives of the National HQ for Emergency Management and selected Municipalities;</p> <p>Gender and DRR Study completed;</p> <p>DRR training for UNCT and Contingency Training for UN CT conducted.</p>
Kraljevo earthquake response	<p>Coordinated international aid in special development situation;</p> <p>Developed recovery planning and framework;</p> <p>Supported recovery programming efforts;</p> <p>Performed consolidated needs assessments;</p> <p>Conducted risk assessments.</p>
Strengthening of Regional Co-operation on Gender Mainstreaming in SSR in the Western Balkans (WinMil)	<p>Signed a Joint Declaration committing 4 representatives of MODs in the Western Balkans to the implementation of project activities and achieving project results;</p> <p>Gender Focal Points institutionalized in the GoS MoD and regional level meetings;</p> <p>Initiated baseline research on the position of women in the armed forces in the WB;</p> <p>Small scale projects developed and performed a Study Trip for Decision makers to Sweden;</p> <p>Three women took part in career development training;</p> <p>Development of Train the Trainers program initiated;</p> <p>Strengthened capacities of Gender Focal Points;</p> <p>Finalized regional baseline survey on the position and role of women and recommendations issued for revision of HR policies endorsed by the MoDs;</p> <p>Raised gender awareness of the representatives of the MoDs and AFs;</p> <p>Increased access to women in the military to specialized courses.</p>
Women Police Officers Network in SEE (WPON)	<p>Completed workshops for WPON members to advocate for gender equality in SEE police services;</p> <p>Published in 8 languages and disseminated across SEE Guidelines for Gender Sensitive Policing with an Emphasis on Recruitment, Selection and Professional Development of Women in Police Services;</p> <p>Organized public presentations and discussions on the implementation of the WPON Guidelines;</p> <p>Implementation of Guidelines supported through two training workshops in Bosnia and Herzegovina;</p> <p>Production of promotional material for both associations in BiH to raise the</p>

Projects	Results generated from Atlas and projects' reports
	visibility of women police officers in Albania State Police; Third Annual meeting of WPON Council held in Sofia, Bulgaria; WPON Work plan for 2013 developed and a new Executive Committee elected; Establishment of two women police officers associations in BiH supported.

95. All the above listed projects' results were confirmed and discussed during the evaluation process interviews – with the exception of the "Finance Sector Policy Co-ordination Framework" project, for which no meaningful data could be obtained. The following table shows the programme level results. This results framework is situated in the UNDP 2011-15 CPD.

Table 18: UNDP 2011-15 CPD Outcome 2.1: Good Governance Strengthened

Country Outputs	Indicator	Baselines	Targets 2015	Results
Outcome: Good governance strengthened	Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI)	2009: Serbia CPI 3.5 ⁵⁷ rank 83/180	CPI increased to 5	2010: 3.5 78/178 2011: 3.3 86/183 2012: 39 (3.9) ⁵⁸ 80/174 2013: 42 (4.2) 72/175 2014: 41 (4.1) 78/175
	Public confidence in legislative, executive, judiciary and regulatory bodies	2008/9: Low public confidence in national institutions Parliament 8%; Judiciary 10%	Public confidence increased	"NARS trust: 2011/12/13: 16/23/24% ↑ "Judic' trust: 2011/12/13: 18/16/21% ↑
2.1.1. Support for reform, professionalization and modernization of the public sector at all levels	World Governance Indicators, WGI, World Bank: Government Effectiveness Indicator	2008: -0.2822 ⁵⁹	2015: 0.5	2011: 52.6 2012: 50.7 2013: 50.2 2011: -0.10 2012: -0.11 2013: -0.10
2.1.2. Strengthened oversight function of parliamentary, independent and regulatory bodies	WGI: Voice and accountability	2008: 0.19 (2008: 0.25) (2008: 56)	Not determined	2011: 56 2012: 56 2013: 57 2011: 0.27 2012: 0.18 2013: 0.29
	WGI: Regulatory quality	2008: 0.20	Not determined	2011: 53 2012: 51 2013: 51 2011: 0.03 2012: -0.08 2013: -0.07
2.1.3. Anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms strengthened	WGI: Control of corruption	2008: -0.157	2015 above 0	2011: 52 2012: 48 2013: 51 2011: -0.25 2012: -0.31 2013: -0.27
2.1.4. National capacities strengthened to mainstream gender in public policies and practices	MDG 3 indicators	Women's employment 43.3% Men's employment rate 58.7% % of women in national	50% decrease the genders economic inequalities Increase the % of women at all levels of decision-	2014: 42% of women and 58% of men are employed 2012: 25% are women of the members of the

⁵⁷ Scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean)







⁵⁸ The new 2012 system expanded the scale from 10 to 100, thus e.g. the 2012 for Serbia score 39 could be interpreted and compared against the baseline as 3.9.

⁵⁹ (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong))

Country Outputs	Indicator	Baselines	Targets 2015	Results
		government 18% % of women MPs 22.0% % % of women on municipal assemblies 21%	making to at least 30% Develop a system to protect female victims of violence Establish a system of prevention of violence against women	government 2013: 28% ⁶⁰ of LSG assemblies were women 2014: 33.6% are women MPs
2.1.5. The role of civil society in accountable and transparent governance enhanced	Civil Society Index (CSI) - composed of five dimensions of civil society engagement	Influencing public policy 1.0; Holding state and private corporations accountable 1.5; responding to social interest 1.5; Empowering citizens 1.7; Meeting societal needs 1.7	Increase the impact dimension	Sustainability Scores for Serbia, see report Table 7, show a marginal improvement over the 2009-2013 period.
2.1.6. Improve disaster preparedness and risk reduction and management framework	Strengthened disaster preparedness and response mechanisms	Disaster risk response lacks efficient co-ordination and integration (Efficient and fully operational sector for emergency management	Progress made, hard to precisely measure ⁶¹ . However, the Composite Index For Risk Management (INFORM) shows some improvement, see Table 11 in the report.
	Improved resilience at all levels (yes/no)	No national platform for disaster reduction	Fully functioning and integrated national platform for disaster risk reduction	Yes, established; unknown if 'fully functioning...'



Table 19 summarises our evaluation of UNDP contributions to governance outcomes.

Table 19: UNDP Contribution to Outcomes

Outcome (what stakeholders do differently)	UNDP Contribution
1. Parliament, MOF and media scrutinize budgets and expenditure more diligently	
2. Executive manages public finances (e.g. procurement) more efficiently	
3. State and citizens communicate more systematically and effectively with each other	
4. More state organs are involved actively in anti-corruption activities (more systemic approach)	
5. Public and private sector organisations discriminate less against women (Security Sector)	
6. Local governments provide more equitable access of citizens, NGOs and businesses to quality services	

⁶⁰ See 2014 report <http://www.otvoreniparlament.rs/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Publication-Towards-Open-Parliament.pdf>

⁶¹ See <http://www.unisdr.org/partners/countries/srb>

7. State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively	
8. State organs allow and secure more rights and freedoms to citizens	

EQ5: How effective have UNDP partnerships been in contributing to the achievement of results?

96. Importance of partnerships. Generally, as national outcomes (which require the collective efforts of two or more stakeholders) are most important, planning, monitoring and evaluation processes should focus more on the partnerships, joint programmes, joint monitoring and evaluation and collaborative efforts needed to achieve these higher level results, than on UNDP or agency outputs.⁶² UNDP partnerships played an important role in contributing to the achievement of outcomes.

97. Strategic partnerships. In the absence of an explicit partnership strategy, UNDP partnerships are based on strategic documents, such as the UNDAF, CPD and CPD AP. These documents, however, commit mainly UNDP and do not entail specific contributions of other stakeholders. The documents highlight overall resource needs, so it is assumed that these resources would need to come from third parties.

98. Project partnerships. Partnerships that involve specific expectations are thus mainly project related. Project documents specify contributions, financial and in-kind, and obligations of partners in the areas of implementation and steering. In most projects, for instance, local partners need to appoint National Project Directors (NPDs), responsible for authorising project activities. These arrangements secure national ownership. NPDs are not accredited based on formal criteria, which in a politicized institutional environment such as Serbia risks that the incumbents frequently change or don't have the required qualifications. Accommodating UNDP project staff in host institutions has been effective in facilitating communication with partners and in increasing acceptance of UNDP support, and is a selling argument for UNDP in mobilising resources.

99. Partnerships with national and regional players. UNDP support was effective in strengthening partnerships among national institutions (e.g. parliament and the "independent" bodies, or inter-ministerial coordination in law-making). UNDP support was effective in strengthening partnerships among national institutions (e.g. parliament and the "independent" bodies, or inter-ministerial coordination in law-making). In the case of WINMIL, and to a lesser extent the WPON, SEESAC/UNDP facilitated some important transfer from regional to national context, enabled by good MOD and SEESAC/UNDP partnership, while preserving the partner ownership over the project and its results. In the cases of anti-corruption and Parliament support, being the 'implementing partner' for UNDP often meant lending an "extra pair of hands" rather than helping to build capacity and fully confirming outcomes, ownership and sustainability. Despite its timely support to emerging needs, UNDP is often losing out to other less capable actors because of its insufficient own funding.

100. Donor perceptions. Expectations of other donors toward UNDP are ambivalent. On the one hand, UNDP is perceived mainly as an "implementing partner" by donors interviewed. As "implementing partners", some donors prefer to use UNOPS or other implementers, because of their perceived clearer position/profile on the market. If these perceptions differ from the perception UNDP has of itself, adjustment on either side would be necessary in order to facilitate cooperation. On the other hand, in the area of anti-corruption,

⁶² PME Handbook, p14

UNDP's leadership of an informal donor group was much appreciated. Trust seems to play a limited role in building partnerships with donors. Despite a global „trust fund“ agreement, a donor's finance department is reluctant to provide funds for projects without having payments linked to (external) audits. Some donor representatives expressed that they would view it worth considering for UNDP to participate in competitive tenders. A number of other factors have facilitated UNDP's ability to engage in partnerships and thus contributed to the achievement of outcomes:


- UNDP's ability to respond more timely to emerging needs/policies in the governance area than other agencies (e.g. SAI, ACAS)
- The joint development of projects
- UNDP's permanent presence in Serbia and knowledge of the country context and culture,
- UNDP's network of regional and global offices and regional initiatives
- The approachability, enthusiasm and dedication of its staff
- UNDP's non-partisan nature
- The fact that as a UN member Serbia is an equal among other members
- UNDP's readiness to provide small volume support avoids overstretching and undermining government capacity
- The relatively short time lapse from idea to action
- The significant influence beneficiaries can have on project steering

C. Efficiency (in delivering outputs)

EQ6: Has the programme been implemented within deadline and cost estimates?

101. UNDP Serbia has been successfully raising significant amounts of extra-budgetary funding from international donors, and from the Serbian government, in order to strengthen its governance programme in Serbia. The development of total core and extra-budgetary resources and expenditure is depicted in Figure 12.

Figure 12: UNDP Budget and Expenditure in the area of Governance⁶³



102. Although significant, the resources were not sufficient to produce all “Country programme outputs” identified in the Country Programme Document. In some areas,

⁶³ Source: <http://open.undp.org>, accessed on 27.12.2014

resources were adequate, partly because of limited absorption capacity (e.g. Parliament, SAI, ACAS, SCTM tend to be overloaded with donor-driven support). Given the withdrawal of most international donors in recent years, the supply side of such funding has declined, while a greater number of NGOs and consulting companies have established themselves in Serbia to offer governance related services. UNDP Serbia is a particularly appealing partner to donors in areas that are deemed politically sensitive or where trust and non-partisanship are prerequisite for productive relationships and successful implementation.

EQ7: Have UNDP and its partners taken prompt actions to solve implementation issues?

a) What mechanisms does UNDP have in place to monitor implementation? Are these effective?

The UNDP has in place a number of instruments to monitor implementation of its projects. Their interconnections and functionality, in terms of monitoring project activities, is easily comprehended and assessed. However, monitoring for results on the outcome level might be further developed. It appears that the effectiveness of the system to monitor outcomes is limited by a number of factors. These include the frequent absence of SMART objectives, indicators, and targets and lack of linkages between the projects and program level. In fact, there is often an absence of causal links and chains showing inter-linkages between UNDP supported interventions, their delivery of development outputs, and their contribution to the achievement to those designed country level CPD Outputs.

103. UNDP has several mechanisms in place to monitor implementation, which comprise a system. One of them is UNDP corporate monitoring system called Enhanced RBM (ERBM) that enables CO's and HQ to track progress at the project and outcome level. The ERBM also requires from the CO management to consider and define the ingredients needed for the delivery of the programme thus enabling actions and resources, and considering risks. These are subject to agreement and approved by UNDP's Regional Bureau and the CO's are held accountable for delivering what was pledged.

104. There is also the Atlas Project Management Module (PMM) that serves for storing projects' report on quarterly basis. In fact, all projects have to report on pre-established annual targets. Atlas PMM also contains risk and issue logs, which can be used for risk management, knowledge sharing and learning. However, reportedly, a lack of sound reporting formats that could be generated from Atlas PMM limits the usage of its logs. Instead, issues and risks are reportedly being discussed during the programme meetings when the appropriate risk management responses agreed. Moreover, the ERBM platform contains features that require the COs to establish annual management results and to report on them. However these systems allow no access to none UNDP staff, such as e.g. partners from the NARS. Regular management meetings related to the performance measurement are additional part of the system as is the projects level reporting such as, but not limited to, the end of the projects reporting. The evaluation team received an Atlas PMM generated report on the projects' objectives, baselines, targets, and results. This report covers for the projects' results period until the end of 2012. Moreover, in an absence of a comprehensive and RBM friendly content management platform, the project level data is also captured and stored throughout implementation period in various formats and in various repositories. Thus a wealth of collected relevant news articles, partners' reports, feedback, observations could be found in various inboxes, Word documents, Excel sheets etc. Finally, important parts of the system are annual Results-Oriented Annual Reports (ROARs) that contain various reporting data related to the theme of good governance reform efforts in RoS. Many of the data is directly relevant to the UNDP interventions and very telling of its successes.

105. However, certain elements and outputs of the above monitoring system such as some project level objectives, baselines, targets and results, as well as the programme level baselines and targets do not meet the SMART criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound). These are found in the projects' reports delivered to the evaluation team, in the Atlas PMM generated report, and in the reviewed ROARs, for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013. These project reports, reportedly, are demand driven and come in various formats as requested by various donors. Thus, reportedly, there is sometimes the inconsistency in reports' content.

Box 3: SMART Indicators in Results Frameworks - UNDP Guidelines

The 2011 UNDP's Outcome-Level Evaluation Companion Guide on usage of different layers of results and SMART indicators: *"a good results framework can provide an effective blueprint for a given initiative, not only defining different levels of results, but also specifying SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) indicators, baselines and targets. Looking at a results framework should permit a reader to understand what is to be achieved, when and by whom."*

106. The challenges related to the implementation of ODA in RoS such as complex political and development context, institutional changes after elections, instability of partnerships as the partners are changing, and sometimes the instability of specific reform priorities, often makes difficult for ODA to set firm SMART objectives, indicators, and targets. This could have contributed to the above situation and made the programme implementation more flexible and at times perhaps only possible. The 2011 UNDP's Outcome-Level Evaluation Companion Guide recognises that the *"Results frameworks tend to be abstractions, reflecting a linear logic of cause and effect, which does not necessarily correspond to the more organic and iterative nature of real development."* However the guide still reiterates the content of the above text box, the different layers of results and SMART usage is a good practice.

107. During the planning stage in 2010 the UNDP developed a country level programming results framework, called *Results and resource framework for Serbia 2011-2015*, which is attached to both important UNDP planning documents: *The Country programme document for the Republic of Serbia 2011-2015* and the *UNDP Country Programme Action Plan for the Republic of Serbia 2011-2015*. The two documents were issued to the evaluation team at the beginning of the evaluation process as the two key programme documents. This results framework contains important good governance programme level country programme outputs with corresponding indicators, baselines, and targets. However the CO does not regularly report on all of these in ROARs or elsewhere, as it is not obliged to do so. Reportedly, this was not a corporate requirement. In turn no regular monitoring per most of these indicators and targets is taking place.

108. The regular reports on project level monitoring data, mostly none-SMART, are collected and used for some sort of analysis. However, it is very difficult to link those data with the programme level monitoring data, which is not always - apart from a certain extent in the ROAR - collected and analysed. This way it is very difficult for the CO to effectively monitor and assess its governance related projects' progress towards programme level targets, as on the latter the CO does not sufficiently have to monitor or report on.

109. However, the reported on Atlas PMM projects' level performance data is being analysed, together with the data in the ERBM platform, by staff individually and during the regular meetings. Most of the programme staff is Prince 2 certified and knowledgeable of international project management standards. This way the staff and the CO use this data not only for demonstrating accountability in its ROARs but also for learning and enabling improved programming and implementation at the project and programme level. Moreover, the CO is close to re-introducing internal quarterly progress reporting that will enable more

concise exchange of relevant monitoring data. Finally, the learning partially also takes place during the portfolio reviews and regular programme meetings, as mentioned above.

110. Also reviewed were those available planning documents related to the 13 projects placed in the good governance UNDP portfolio. These mainly include individual project Pro Docs. These were mostly free from individual project result frameworks but with references to elements of monitoring system that projects inconsistently followed up in a sense of drafting appropriate impact chains and theories of change. However, most of the reviewed Pro Docs include some SMART objectives, indicators, baselines and targets.

111. Inevitably, some of the project documents ended not identifying important causal links and chains showing inter-linkages between UNDP supported interventions, their delivery of development outputs, and their contribution to the achievement of intermediate outcomes (performance level) and outcomes, and on to eventually contributing to those designed country level outcomes (related to "CPD Outputs"). Consequentially the project outputs are sometimes confused for outcomes of the projects, i.e. no differentiation was always made between outputs and outcomes. In other words, outcomes were not always designed and sought. The outcome model shown in Figure 3 of this report offers illustration of Intermediate Outcomes that are all related to the projects' outputs and results listed in Table 17 where some of the actual projects' outputs and results are listed. Close observation of the content of the Table 17 reveals that a number of items are actually activities and outputs rather than the intermediate outcomes, i.e. the results.

Table 20: Sample of a Result Chain with Use of an Intermediate Outcome Level

UNDP Projects	UNDP Outputs	Intermediary Outcomes	Outcomes	CPD "Output"
7. Strengthening Oversight Function and Transparency of Parliament	Support to establishment and capacity building of scrutiny teams (incl. GOPAC, Public hearings) delivered;	More scrutiny of public policies including budget and expenditures exercised by Parliament.	Improved public policies including allocation of public resources	2.1.2. Strengthened oversight function of parliamentary, independent and regulatory bodies

112. There are particular gaps at the level of design and usage of intermediate (performance level) outcome indicators. Absence of such indicators in project designs likely further challenged effective monitoring for results towards the programme level, as well as potentially enabled an analytic disconnection between the development (interventions and projects) outputs and those programme level CP Outputs. Without regular monitoring for performance and project level results at the level of outcomes, the behaviour changes of the subjects of the UNDP projects' interventions⁶⁴, it was probably very difficult for the CO to assess if interventions were heading for the right programme results at the right speed.

113. Intermediate outcomes are the critical middle layer of any effective good governance development measurement framework. These are normally very useful as they describe results that are directly attributable to the interventions. Measuring for results at the intermediate outcome level, by using performance indicators, is very appropriate for the public sector reforms support interventions as these demonstrate the (behavioural) change in outcomes attributable to the specific UNDP supported intervention. This way all stakeholders are enabled to determine the effectiveness of the interventions. This way also is enabled tracking progress towards country outcomes, assessing the achieved change,

⁶⁴ Or, as described by the 2011 UNDP's Outcome-Level Evaluation Companion Guide the outcomes "...normally relate to changes in institutional performance or behaviour among individuals or groups. Outcomes cannot normally be achieved by only one agency and are not under the direct control of a project manager".

ensuring the right mix of delivered outputs, and even assess cost-effectiveness. Hence, this middle layer is crucial to measurement of the implementation process.

Box 4: Intermediate Outcomes - UNDP Guidelines

This is the 2011 UNDP's Outcome-Level Evaluation Companion Guide take on the importance, function, and purpose of the Intermediate Outcomes. *"The outcome model identifies the outcome that is the focus of the evaluation, the activities of the UNDP, partners and others that may affect it, the influence of major external factors, and possible unintended outcomes. It may also show intermediate outcomes that would be evident before longer-term outcomes, and which might be used as benchmarks that progress is being made towards the achievement of longer-term outcomes. Such intermediate outcomes could, in fact, be used as a basis on which to conduct mid-term evaluations. They may also lend themselves particularly well to ascertaining contribution to the achievement of complex social change..."*

114. Each outcome-level evaluation relies on availability and the use of SMART monitoring data. These in this case have apparently not been collected consistently since there was not established a fully-fledged monitoring system to track SMART performance indicators and targets especially at the intermediate outcome and outcome levels. In fact, the absence of full and SMART monitoring data decreased the programme and project managers of an adequate and regular means of self-assessment and correction. Furthermore, it also probably decreased those performed project evaluations capacity to more effectively assess information on the process of implementation and potential projects' specific and attributable achievements along.

115. With such a results framework it was challenging to understand and remain informed of what is to be achieved, when and by whom, and in turn to measure it and know if achievements towards the set country programme outputs are accomplished or not and to what level. As noted on the page 7 of the 2011 UNDP Guide on Outcome Level Evaluation "...the results framework is a planning tool, it provides the basis for on-going monitoring, in particular of outputs and the progress made towards the achievement of outcomes. Where they exist, results frameworks are also the starting point for any evaluation."

116. In absence of adequate results framework's data that includes SMART data at the planning and implementation stages and in order to perform this evaluation the evaluation team attempted to retrospectively define the intervention intentions of the programme (see Chapter II and the presented Outcome Model). In this way it was attempted to understand the interconnected nature between the interventions and projects outputs, intermediate outcomes, and country programme outputs.

EQ8: Was there any identified synergy between UNDP initiatives that contributed to reducing costs while supporting results?

117. The analysis of synergies is focusing on the outcome level, i.e. projects and indicatives synergize when they support the same outcome. A negative correlation between quality and cost must be assumed. Synergies that help reduce cost will normally not increase quality, and vice versa. In order to visualise synergies, Figure 13 shows a directed network graph with two types on nodes: projects and outcomes. Nodes depicting projects are coloured red, while project nodes are in green. The layout is based on the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm. The algorithm ensures that projects (nodes) that share more synergies are situated closer to each other, while projects that have less synergies with each other are further apart from each other. The size of a node represents the number of links incident upon that node (degree centrality). The chart demonstrates that at the outcome level, all projects are connected to at least one other project and hence synergize. Projects with larger nodes produce greater synergies and are more central to the achievement of UNDP governance outcomes. Projects 1 (PRO1: Enhancing anti-corruption efforts in Serbia) and project 3 (PRO3: Strengthening accountability of public finance (pubfin)) synergize the most.

Figure 13: Network Graph Connecting Projects and Outcomes



118. From all of UNDP's governance outcomes, Outcome 1 (OUT1: Parliament, MoF and media scrutinize budgets and expenditure more diligently) benefits most from project synergies. Outcome 5 (Public and private sector organisations discriminate less against women) and Outcome 7 (State organs mitigate risk and potential adverse impact from disasters more effectively) are disconnected from the other six UNDP governance outcomes.

D. Sustainability (of Outcomes)

EQ9: To what extent do UNDP initiatives in the area of Governance have potential for scaling up (or national application of regional initiatives) within the next country programme cycle?

119. In order to put these recommendations into a larger context and provide a prelude for the future, the team summarised the main current trends conditioning development worldwide (see Annex 4).

120. The UNDP governance component has achieved an impressive number of results, mainly at the level of outputs. UNDP contributions to most of the intended system level outcomes have been significant, but progress toward these outcomes – let alone impact – has been modest and will require increased investments and partnerships in order to make a decisive step forward. The focus of future assistance can be on the strategic level, on the level of functions, which serve to implement those strategies, specific organizations, or specific types of change actions (see Table 21). While some potential work in the next country programme cycle could include the existing initiatives scaling up others paved the way for potentially new important and doable initiatives.

Table 21: Dimensions for Future UNDP Support

Focus on strategy	Strategies, policies, laws: e.g. anti-corruption strategy, public administration reform strategy
Focus on function	Functions: control, oversight, regulatory, communication, coordination, procurement, service delivery, monitoring, evaluation
Focus on organisations	Organizations: local government, media, NGOs, "independent" agencies, judiciary
Focus on actions	Change: simplification, standardization, computerization, training, certification

121. More specifically, future UNDP support in governance could focus on the following areas:

1. Communication, co-ordination and co-operation between state institutions, in particular in the area of oversight
2. Accounting and procurement at local levels (e.g. roll-out of initial support to five pilot municipalities)
3. Public internal financial control and further development of the public procurement portal.
4. Simplification of processes and citizen service delivery by municipalities
5. Promoting e-government (taxation, police, etc.), which may allow to a certain extent reconciling staff and budget constraints with improved service delivery
6. Promoting investigative journalism
7. Institutionalizing education of parliament staff
8. Strengthening the scope, quality and interoperability of data management (political consensus, hardware and software)
9. Strengthening e-learning for PFM related tasks, in particular at local levels and regional centres
10. Measuring outcomes and impact of PFM/governance initiatives (trust and satisfaction, savings, volume of funds misused, number of judicial proceedings involving PFM issues, media reporting, etc.)
11. NGO capacity building to absorb EU funds (e.g. task NGOs with monitoring progress of UNDP projects/programmes)
12. Support further capacity building to ACAS and other agencies in implementing the anti-corruption strategy and follow-up by parliament
13. Introduction and implementation of programme budget system
14. National, regional and international conferences on accountability issues (NGOs, state bodies, regional organisations, etc)
15. Support to local media capacity building after privatization in 2015
16. Implementation of UPR recommendations (e.g. needs assessment)
17. Further support of women association in police etc. and (xvii)
18. Further support towards sustainable institutional gender equality mechanism in the Ministry of Defence

























E. Impact

EQ10: What real difference have UNDP-led initiatives made to the beneficiaries?

122. Impact can be conceived as a projection of programme outcomes onto the lives of the citizens of Serbia. We therefore differentiate between eight impact scenarios, matching the eight outcomes reviewed in this evaluation. In order to make a more detailed analysis possible, we differentiate between micro-level impact, meso-level impact, and macro-level impact. Micro-level impact describes the real change outcomes cause within single organisations (e.g. a government agency). Meso-level impact concerns changes within a sector or governance domain (e.g. the between ministries). Macro-level impact represents systemic, long-term changes, which involve several governance domains and are thus difficult to reverse.

123. Differentiating between the three impact levels (micro, meso and macro), one can conclude that there have been changes from outcomes at the micro level, to which UNDP's governance programme made a significant contribution (see Table 22). Impact on the meso level may be underway, but – with the exception of DRR – has not yet reached the macro level. This finding would call for a continuation of UNDP's current governance programme. Assuming that previous assistance has led to an increase of capacity among local institutions, stepping up the volume of the current programme may be a way of achieving macro level impact within a shorter time span.

Table 22: Micro, Meso and Macro-Level Impact

Impact Micro (what the new behaviour achieves within single organisations)	Impact Meso (what the new behaviour achieves within the sector or domain)	Impact Macro (what the new behaviour achieves nationwide)
Cost savings and quality improvements among some budget users 	Cost savings and quality improvements among a majority of budget users 	Long-term trend toward cost savings and quality improvements among all budget users 
Cost savings and quality improvements among some budget users 	Cost savings and quality improvements among a majority of budget users 	Long-term trend toward cost savings and quality improvements among all budget users 
Resolution of grievances of some communities 	Systematic resolution of grievances and inclusion of citizens in decision making in a majority of communities 	Systematic resolution of grievances and inclusion of citizens in decision making in all government decision making 
Discovery of and follow-up on some corruption cases 	Discovery of and follow-up on corruption cases across government sectors (e.g. health, education, construction) 	Systematic prevention and prosecution of corrupt acts in Serbia 
Higher proportion of women employed in the military and police forces 	Higher proportion of women in leadership positions in government 	More women in leadership positions in government and the economy 
High quality responsive services provided by some municipalities 	Similar standards of high quality responsive services provided by all municipalities 	Similar standard of high quality responsive services provided by all state bodies 
Less damage from disasters in some areas 	Less damage from disasters countrywide 	Continued long-term trend toward less damage from disasters countrywide 
More effective protection of specific human rights (e.g. access to information) 	More effective protection of specific human rights by all state organs. 	Systematic protection of all human rights by all governance domains. 

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

124. The following conclusions and recommendations are judgements based on evidence provided in Chapter 4. They are pitched at a higher level and are informed by an overall, comparative understanding of all relevant issues, options and opportunities. They do not provide new evidence or repeat evidence contained in earlier chapters. Some recommendations may be more strategic while others may be more action-oriented.

125. Focus on system. As the world becomes more complex and interdependent, the ability to think and act systemically, to analyse fields of forces and understand their joint causal effects on each other, and to abandon simple linear causal logic in favour of complex mental models will become more critical to learning and capacity development. Recognising these trends, UNDP Serbia has rightly been pursuing a systemic perspective to programming and implementation, and has successfully brought the most relevant stakeholders on board of its projects. This approach has yielded promising early results, which are yet to be consolidated. The fight against corruption will require substantial further support. **Recommendations:** UNDP should continue to expose stakeholders, with its governance programmes, to opportunities to come together to deal with reform efforts that are intrinsically complex, nonlinear, and interconnected.

126. Partnerships. UNDP is appreciated by its partners because of (i) its ability to respond more timely to emerging needs/policies in the governance area than other agencies (e.g. SAI, ACAS), (ii) the joint development of projects, (iii) its permanent presence in Serbia and knowledge of the country context and culture, (iv) its network or regional and global offices and regional initiatives, (v) the approachability, enthusiasm and dedication of its staff, (vi) its non-partisan nature, (vii) the fact that as a UN member Serbia is an equal among other members, (viii) its readiness to provide small volume support avoids overstretching and undermining government capacity, (ix) the relatively short time lapse from idea to action, (x) the significant influence beneficiaries can have on project steering. Accommodating UNDP project staff in host institutions has been effective in facilitating communication with partners and in increasing acceptance of UNDP support, and is a selling argument in mobilising resources, but carries the risk of dysfunctional confluence in the relationship between UNDP and its national partners, at the expense of strategic goals. UNDP has performed some important support to co-ordination of work between the independent agencies and the NARS. On the national policy level, important changes took place in terms of the establishment of the new Secretariat for Public Policies. Stronger links and co-operation towards more co-ordinated public policies implementation between the Secretariat, GoS General Secretariat and SEIO are yet to be established and nurtured. **Recommendations:** UNDP should remain fully conscious of its strengths and cultivate them by integrating them in its strategic and operational plans, and day-to-day management. The development of an explicit partnership strategy, which commits not only UNDP but also its partners, would be recommendable. UNDP should continue supporting its project personnel housed in government agencies and in institutions such as in the Public Procurement Office, National Assembly, and others. Given its experience and partnerships, UNDP should consider supporting closer coordination and cooperation between the central government bodies it has established working relationships with.

127. Profile and finance. UNDP Serbia has been successfully raising significant amounts of extra-budgetary funding from international donors, and from the Serbian government, in order to strengthen its governance programme in Serbia. UNDP Serbia is a particularly appealing partner to donors in areas that are deemed politically sensitive or where trust and non-partisanship are prerequisite for productive relationships and successful implementation. Still, the total resources dedicated to the government component were not sufficient to produce all "Country programme outputs" identified in the Country Programme Document. In some areas, resources were adequate, partly because of limited absorption

capacity (e.g. Parliament, SAI, ACAS, SCTM). Given the withdrawal of most international donors in recent years, the supply side of such funding has declined, while a greater number of NGOs and consulting companies have established themselves in Serbia to offer governance related services. UNDP's current mix of mission based and revenue based organisational setup sends ambiguous messages to partners. **Recommendations:** UNDP should ensure that its profile is perceived as clear and unique among potential donors, in order to succeed on an increasingly competitive market. UNDP should make clear each time it approaches a partner, which objective (mission or revenue) it pursues in the specific interaction. UNDP should consider bidding for projects where those qualities are required and represent a significant advantage over other organizations.

128. Programme coherence. From UNDP strategic documents it remains largely unclear how the regional UNDP SEESAC programme contributes to the UNDP country programme. Subsuming SEESAC activities within the governance areas under the programmatic aspects of gender equality and disaster risk underrates the significance of the SEESAC activities. **Recommendations:** UNDP Serbia should revisit its strategic orientation in the subject matter areas currently covered by SEESAC, such as the police and the military. Similarly, UNDP should ensure that its support in the area of human rights strengthening becomes better integrated into its strategic frameworks.

129. Strategic opportunities. There has been a lack of high quality domestic and donor strategies in Serbia. Too many parallel planning processes and documents, lack of vision, poor co-ordination and monitoring mechanisms, a disconnection between country programme outputs and activities, lack of committed resources, and a lack of understanding that planning means making choices, are all but few reasons why strategy implementation often failed. While the EU accession process was stated as the overarching theme for UNDP support, only few of UNDP's results were directly connected to concrete steps in this process (SAP, Specific Acquis Chapters). On the other hand, the incipient EU accession negotiations will generate new and more focused priorities, but also risks that important agendas receive less attention that they deserve. Further public administration and the rule of law reform steps and objectives are made priority for the 2014-2020 period. Both aspects open up opportunities for UNDP, if it remains observant and capable of identifying them and integrating them into its programmes. **Recommendations:** UNDP should make the most of genuine UN agendas, such as in the areas of human rights and anti-corruption, and assist Serbia in dealing with its integration into the global economy. In order to strengthen its role, UNDP should contribute keenly to improving the integration of ODA efforts, via more systemic co-ordination, towards generating synergies and cost savings in the times of scarcer non-EU ODA financial presence.

130. Operational opportunities. The UNDP Serbia 2011-2015 governance component has achieved a sizable number of results, mainly at the level of outputs. UNDP contributions to most of the intended system level outcomes have been significant, but progress toward these outcomes – let alone impact – has been modest and will require increased investments and partnerships in order to make a decisive step forward. **Recommendations:** UNDP should scale up its support, in particular in the following areas: (i) communication, co-ordination and co-operation between state institutions, in particular in the area of oversight; (ii) accounting and procurement at local levels (e.g. roll-out of initial support to five pilot municipalities); (iii) public internal financial control and further development of the public procurement portal; (iv) simplification of processes and citizen service delivery by municipalities; (v) promoting e-government (taxation, police, etc.), which may allow to a certain extent reconciling staff and budget constraints with improved service delivery; (vi) promoting investigative journalism; (vii) institutionalizing education of parliament staff; (viii) strengthening the scope, quality and interoperability of data management (political consensus, hardware and software); (ix) strengthening e-learning for PFM related tasks, in particular at local levels and regional centres; (x) measuring outcomes and impact of

PFM/governance initiatives (trust and satisfaction, savings, volume of funds misused, number of judicial proceedings involving PFM issues, media reporting, etc.); (xi) NGO capacity building to absorb EU funds (e.g. task NGOs with monitoring progress of UNDP projects/programmes; (xii) support further capacity building to ACAS and other agencies in implementing the anti-corruption strategy and follow-up by parliament; (xiii) introduction and implementation of programme budget system; (xiv) national, regional and international conferences on accountability issues (NGOs, state bodies, regional organisations, etc); (xv) support to local media capacity building after privatization in 2015; (xiv) implementation of UPR recommendations (e.g. needs assessment); (xvi) further support of women association in police etc. and (xvii) further support towards sustainable institutional gender equality mechanism in the Ministry of Defence – to name but a few opportunities.


131. Pursuing SMART results. The Country Programme Outputs identified in the Country Programme Document are generally rather unspecific and broad. Some of the indicators associated with those results do not allow measuring (e.g. “Improved resilience at all levels”), while performance against others (e.g. CPI) can hardly be linked back to UNDP performance. **Recommendations:** UNDP should make greater efforts to define and agree indicators that meet common quality standards. Where planning cycles are too long to agree on results that are sufficiently specific, UNDP should reduce those cycles or provide possibilities and incentives for revising results and indicators (e.g. at mid-term) in consultation with partners and stakeholders.

132. Monitoring, evaluation and learning. While UNDP has a system in place to monitor projects activities and outputs, there is no effective system in place to monitor projects and programme performance against “CPD outputs”. Printouts of UNDP’s computerized project monitoring system have been instrumental for the evaluators to get an overview of UNDP assistance in some areas. In the case of a \$2.6 million project with the Ministry of Finance, project progress reports and knowledgeable interlocutors covering the implementation period starting in 2009 and on-going in 2015 were unavailable – so that possible contributions of this project to outcomes could not be evaluated. Feedback based on incomplete data will ultimately be limited in its accuracy and hamper learning processes and UNDP’ ability to plan and steer its programmes in the face of increasingly interconnected development challenges. In sum, only about 0,5% of the combined budgets of all projects highlighted for particular attention under this evaluation were used for evaluation purposes. Even though this practice may meet corporate UNDP standards, the amount foreseen seems to be extremely low. **Recommendations:** UNDP should more frequently use SMART project level indicators and targets would certainly help this effort and intermediate outcome indicators. Since the “CPD outputs” most resemble outcomes, and the CPD results framework even requires that indicators be developed for their measurement, UNDP should consider making the monitoring of CPD country outputs obligatory. Enforcing a good monitoring practice in each project by using SMART monitoring elements and using the generated monitoring data would enable increased ability to measure achievement and contribution of those results towards the country outputs. UNDP Serbia should find ways to increase external feedback received on the success of its programmes. Involving NGOs in programme monitoring would be a cost effective way of measuring progress and promoting an evaluation capacity and culture in Serbia, which will also be required for the management of EU funds in the context of EU integration. In this context, UNDP should also consider assistance with introducing a culture and techniques of performance measurement of its partners in the public administration, which is part and parcel of the programme budgeting approach the Serbian Governments is embarking upon, and the sector approach promoted by the EU.

133. Capacity building. UNDP management of government funds can help attract more qualified experts and increase absorption capacity, but may undermine the use and development of government procedures. **Recommendations:** In line with the provisions of the Paris Declaration, UNDP should ensure that government processes and procedures are

used wherever possible and legally required. Where external factors, such as temporary austerity measures to stabilize the economy, are used to justify resorting to substitute government capacity, exit strategies should be agreed with government.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference	United Nations Development Programme	
--------------------	--------------------------------------	---

Title: Evaluators (Outcome evaluation) – International and National
Programme: Country Programme Document (2011-2015)
Reporting to: Deputy Resident Representative
Duty Station: Belgrade, Serbia
Duration: 21 October 2014– 31 January 2015 (app. 40 working days within this period)
Contract Type: Individual Contract (IC) – for free lance consultant or Reimbursable Loan Agreement (RLA) - if the consultant is working with institution or government or university - (output based consultancy)

Background

a. Purpose

To assess UNDP contributions towards the progress made on **Good Governance** outcome achievements

b. Objective

To enhance development effectiveness, to assist decision making, to assist policy making, to re-direct future UNDP assistance, to systematize innovative approaches to sustainable human development

c. Background Information

The current Country Programme Document (CPD) for the Republic of Serbia (2011-2015), addresses priorities identified in the main developmental strategies of the Republic of Serbia at the time (e.g. National Plan for Integration, the National Sustainable Development Strategy) and is fully aligned with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2011-2015.

The CPD covers three core areas: sustainable and inclusive development; accountability and governance; and, energy and environment. All three areas promote capacity development among governmental and non-governmental counterparts, and mainstream human rights and gender.

UNDP in Serbia is looking for evaluators who will assess UNDP's contributions towards the progress made on **Good Governance Strengthened** outcome achievements, in order to:

- Provide evidence to support accountability of programmes and for UNDP to use in its accountability requirements to its partners
- Provide evidence of the UNDP contribution to outcome
- Guide performance improvements
- Collect lessons learned for the next programming cycle

Duties and Responsibilities

a. Scope of work

UNDP Serbia invites applications from qualified consultants in order to perform the evaluation of **Good Governance Strengthened** outcome with corresponding outputs related to **parliamentary development, anti-corruption, human rights, EU integration, public finance, disaster risk reduction and security system reform**, as defined in the CPD 2011-2015.

The CPD does not refer to security system reform. It does not mention police nor military.

The evaluation should assess the extent to which programmes, project, soft assistance, partners' initiatives and synergies among partners contributed to its achievement.

To help focus evaluation objectives, the following evaluation criteria will apply: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of development efforts.

The evaluation should assess what works and why, highlight intended and unintended results, and provide strategic lessons to guide decision-makers and inform stakeholders.

Two evaluators (one international and one national) will jointly perform the evaluation.

International evaluator will be responsible for the overall quality of the report and will assess efficiency, sustainability and impact that UNDP interventions had on Good Governance outcome.

International Evaluator will:

- Prepare inception report with evaluation matrix*
- Focus on the general evaluation criteria and
- Prepare the Final Report** with the Executive Summary

National evaluator will be responsible for assessing the relevance and effectiveness and to provide respective written inputs for the report.

National Evaluator will:

- Contribute to the preparation of the inception report
- Support organization of interviews with key stakeholders
- Focus on the analysis of Serbia's development context during last five years in the governance area
- Incorporate received beneficiary satisfaction feedback into the Final Report

The Evaluators will review, analyze and provide conclusions and recommendations on the following:

- Was the outcome achieved or not;
- What progress toward the outcome has been made;
- Estimate the degree of UNDP's contribution to that progress;
- What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving the outcome;
- The degree to which the projects within governance portfolio have been successfully implemented during last five years and desired outputs achieved;
- What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness;
- Assessment of external factors affecting the UNDP's work in governance area, and the extent to which the UNDP has been able to adapt and/or mitigate the effects of such factors;
- Has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective;
- The extent to which the target beneficiaries have benefited from UNDP activities;
- The level of beneficiaries' and partners satisfaction with respective UNDP's work and results;
- The potential for continuation or up scaling of UNDP's work in respective area within the new Country Programme cycle.

b. **Methodology**

The evaluation approach has to respond to standard international practices in outcome evaluations. The proposed steps in conducting the evaluation are:

- Review of projects' documentation, monitoring records and progress and other relevant output and outcome reports;
- Initial meeting with UNDP Programme Team to agree the specific design and methods for the evaluation, what is appropriate and feasible to meet the evaluation purpose and objectives. Agree on the evaluation questions that will need to be answered, given limitations (e.g. data) ;

- Organization of interviews with key staff involved in the project implementation;
- Prepare inception report with evaluation matrix*;
- Discussions with members of the Programme Team and beneficiaries of UNDP interventions to assess relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of development efforts, take note of beneficiaries' perceptions of accomplishments and potentials for further development and provide suggestions for management response to evaluation findings. Objectively verifiable data should be collected whenever available, to supplement evidences obtained through interviews and focus group discussions;
- Prepare Draft Report and present it to the Programme Team, Government counterpart(s) and beneficiaries;
- Incorporate received feedback into the Final Report;
- Prepare the Final Report** with the Executive Summary.

A following set of information sources about the project will be made available to Evaluators:

- Project documents:
 1. Enhancing anti-corruption efforts in Serbia
 2. Youth Sleuth: Engaging Serbia's Youth to Fight Corruption through Investigative Journalism and Social Media
 3. Strengthening Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN)
 4. Advancing Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN2)
 5. Finance Sector Policy Coordination Framework
 6. Strengthening Accountability of Serbian Parliament
 7. Strengthening Oversight Function and Transparency of Parliament
 8. Promoting Human Rights and Access to Justice for Social Inclusion and Legal Improvement
 9. Communicating EU in Serbia
 10. Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Development
 11. Kraljevo earthquake response
 12. Strengthening of Regional Cooperation on Gender Mainstreaming in Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans (WinMil)
 13. Women Police Officers Network in South East Europe (WPON)
 14. 14. Annual reports
 15. Progress reports
 16. Media reports
 17. Project evaluations
 18. Key documents (strategies, policy papers, monitoring reports, surveys etc.) produced by the UNDP in Serbia

* Inception report and evaluation matrix formats will be provided at the mission's outset (Annexes III and IV of this ToR)

** The final report must include, but not necessarily be limited to the elements outlined in the quality criteria for evaluation reports (Annex I constitutes integral part of this ToR)

c. **Deliverables and Timeline**

It is expected that the evaluation will be completed within 40 working days, with the following deliverables due:

Deliverables	Duration	Deadline
Inception report including work plan and evaluation matrix prepared and accepted	10 days	10 days upon signing the contract
Draft Evaluation Report on approximately 30 pages prepared and accepted	20 days	Early January
Draft Evaluation Report presented to the Programme Team, Government counterpart(s) and beneficiaries	1 day	Mid January
Final Evaluation report (30 pages) with Executive Summary (2 pages) prepared and accepted	9 days	3 days upon receiving comments from UNDP on the draft report

Evaluators are expected to visit two municipalities nearby Belgrade.

Travel costs (transport, accommodation and living costs) will be reimbursed to the consultant on a lump-sum basis.

Payments for the deliverables will be made in up to three installments (inception report, draft report, final report), upon billing by the consultant and subject to quality review, clearance and acceptance by UNDP Deputy Resident Representative.

The criteria of utility, credibility, and relevance/appropriateness will be used for assessing the quality of the evaluation report:

- The report has to be written in clear language (English)
- The Executive Summary should be an extremely short chapter, highlighting the evaluation mandate, approach, key findings, conclusions and recommendations.
- The information in the report has to be complete, well structured and well presented
- The information in the report has to be reliable i.e. well documented and supported findings
- The information in the report has to address priority or strategic information needs
- Recommendations have to be concrete and implementable
- Human rights and gender equality perspective has been taken into account

The evaluation has to be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the [Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation](#). Code of conduct is enclosed as Annex II and constitutes integral part of this ToR.

Skills and Competencies

- Excellent analytical skills;
- Displays ability to synthesize research and reach empirically based conclusions on related subject;
- Strong writing skills;
- Proven capacity to produce reports;
- Displays capacity to provide experienced advice on best practices;
- Possesses knowledge of inter-disciplinary development issues;
- Focuses on result for the client and responds positively to feedback;
- Good application of Results-Based Management;
- Good communication, coordination and facilitation skills;
- Consistently ensures timeliness and quality of work;
- Treats all people fairly without favourism;
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability;
- Demonstrates integrity by modeling ethical standards.

Qualifications and Experience

Education:

- Masters or equivalent in relevant field of Law, Political and Social Sciences, Economy or similar.

Work experience:

- Minimum 5 years of relevant professional experience, preferably in international/multilateral development context;
- Experience in evaluating and monitoring technical cooperation and development activities and projects.

Knowledge:

- Excellent understanding of Serbia's socio-economic situation and developmental challenges;
- Understanding of main policies, legislation and institutions;
- Familiarity with the EU accession process;
- Familiarity with the UN(DP) evaluation policy, norms and standards;
- Knowledge in the use of computers and office software packages and handling of web based monitoring systems.

Personal qualifications:

- Ability to organize and motivate team, deliver when working under pressure and within changing circumstances;
- Consistently approaches work with energy and a positive, constructive attitude;
- Excellent interpersonal skills.

Language:

- Excellent knowledge of written and spoken of English and Serbian (for national evaluator only).

Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix

Criteria/Sub-criteria	Questions to be addressed by evaluation	What to look for	Data sources	Data collection methods
Relevance	Are the "country programme outputs", as identified in the CPD governance component, consistent with Serbian development priorities and UNDP mandate?	<p>Is there a broad based consensus on the "country programme outputs"?</p> <p>How do the "country programme outputs" align with national strategies?</p> <p>What analysis was performed in designing the CPD?</p> <p>To what extent have stakeholders been involved in designing the CPD?</p> <p>Were the resources allocated sufficient to produce the "country programme outputs" in the governance area?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 (extended to 2013) ● 2005-2010 CPD evaluation ● CCA, UNDAF, CPD, CPAP ● Records from CPD consultations UNDP programme/project documents ● UNDP programme/project Annual Work Plans ● Programmes/projects/ thematic areas evaluation reports ● Government's national planning documents ● National Plan for Integration ● National Sustainable Development Strategy, ● National Millennium Development Goal (MDG) report ● Human Development Reports ● MDG progress reports Government partners ● EU progress reports ● Interviews with beneficiaries ● SEIO: "Needs of the Republic of Serbia for International Assistance In the Period 2009-2011" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Desk reviews of secondary data ● Interviews with government partners ● Interviews with NGOs partners/service providers ● Interviews with funding agencies and other UNCT ● Interview with civil society in the concerned sector ● Interviews with relevant UNDP staff ● Interviews with related parliamentary committees ● Related Constitutional bodies such as Human Rights, Women Rights, etc. ● Field visits to selected projects
Effectiveness	Which development outcomes were initially expected from UNDP led initiatives in the governance area?	<p>Which project and non-project activities were supported by UNDP?</p> <p>Which outputs did these activities produce?</p> <p>Which intermediate outcomes were generated from those outputs?</p> <p>Which external factors may facilitate or hinder the process of achieving development outcomes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Project/programme/thematic areas evaluation reports ● Progress reports on projects ● UNDP staff Development partners Government partners ● Beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Desk reviews of secondary data ● Interviews with UNDP staff, development partners and government partners, civil society partners, associations, and federations
	<p>What progress toward achieving intermediate and originally expected outcomes has been made?</p> <p>To what extent has UNDP support contributed to that progress?</p>	<p>Which changes in individual and organizational behavior can be observed in the area of good governance?</p> <p>What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving the results?</p> <p>What were the unintended results</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Project, programme, thematic areas evaluation reports ● Progress reports on projects ● UNDP staff ● Development partners ● Government partners ● Beneficiaries ● UNDP Annual Reports (ROARs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Desk reviews of secondary data ● Interviews with government partners, development partners, UNDP staff, civil society partners, associations, and federations ● Field visits to selected projects

Efficiency	How effective have UNDP partnerships been in contributing to the achievement of results?	<p>(+ or -) of UNDP initiatives?</p> <p>Which roles, activities, and results did the groups having a stake in the outcome(s) expect UNDP to undertake and achieve?</p> <p>Which formal and informal partnerships did UNDP engage in to pursue the achievement of results?</p> <p>How did the partnerships combine complementary expertise, knowledge and experience?</p> <p>What would have happened if a programme or project had not been delivered in partnership?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MUOs with donors, government, civil society, private sector • Cost Sharing agreements, project documents • Joint statements • Public Media • UNDP staff • Development partners • Government partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk reviews of secondary data • Interviews with government partners, development partners, UNDP staff, civil society partners, associations, and federations • Field visits to selected projects • “Digital footprint” and communication reports
	<p>Has the project or programme been implemented within deadline and cost estimates?</p> <p>Have UNDP and its partners taken prompt actions to solve implementation issues?</p> <p>Was there any identified synergy between UNDP initiatives that contributed to reducing costs while supporting results?</p>	<p>What have been the total financial resources mobilized for UNDP's contributions in the Good Governance outcome area?</p> <p>Were results achieved on time?</p> <p>Have there been time extensions on the project?</p> <p>What impact has political instability had on delivery timelines?</p> <p>What mechanisms does UNDP have in place to monitor implementation? Are these effective?</p> <p>Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme documents • Annual Work Plans • Evaluation reports • ATLAS reports • Government partners • Development partners • UNDP staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk reviews of secondary data • Interviews with government partners and development partners and relevant UNDP staff
Sustainability	To what extent do UNDP initiatives in the area of Governance have potential for scaling up (or national application of regional initiatives) within the next country	<p>Which UNDP initiative's are in line with the UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014–17?</p> <p>What is a degree of national/local ownership of UNDP</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014–17 (Country Office alignment sheet) • Programme documents • Annual Work Plans • Evaluation reports • UNDP staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk reviews of secondary data • Interviews

Impact	programme cycle?	initiatives? Which thematic areas are currently trending in Serbia and other countries? Which initiatives might attract further funding? What impact has political instability and public servants' flux to sustainability?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor agencies • EU screening results 	
	What real difference have UNDP-led initiatives made to the beneficiaries?	What has happened as a result of UNDP-led initiatives in the area of governance?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey reports • Evaluation reports • ROARs • UNDP impact narratives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk reviews of secondary data • Interviews with government partners, development partners, UNDP staff, civil society partners, associations, and federations • Field visits to selected projects

PROMOTION OF UN VALUES FROM A HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE

Criteria/Sub-criteria	Questions to be addressed by evaluation	What to look for	Data sources	Data collection methods
Supporting policy dialogue on human development issues	To what extent did UNDP support government in monitoring achievement of MDGs?	What assistance has the UNDP support in the area of governance provided to government in promoting the human development approach and monitoring MDGs? How effective has this support been?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documents • Evaluation reports • HDR reports • MDG reports • National Planning Commission • Ministry of Finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review of secondary data • Interviews with government partners
Contribution to gender equality	To what extent were UNDP initiatives in the area of governance designed to contributions to attainment of gender equality? To what extent did UNDP support positive changes in terms of gender equality and were there any unintended effects?	Provide example(s) of how the UNDP-led initiatives in the area of governance contribute to gender equality. Can results of UNDP-led initiatives in the area of governance be disaggregated by gender?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documents • Evaluation reports • UNDP staff • Government partners • Beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review of secondary data • Interviews with UNDP staff and government partners • Observations from field visits
Addressing equity issues (social inclusion)	How did the UNDP initiative take into account the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged to promote social equity, for example, women, youth, disabled persons?	Provide example(s) of how UNDP-led initiatives in the area of governance take into account the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, for example, women, youth, disabled persons. How has UNDP programmed social inclusion into the initiative?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documents • Evaluation reports • UNDP staff • Government partners • Beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review of secondary data • Interviews with UNDP staff and government partners • Observations from field visits

Annex 3: Revision of EQs

Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation stipulate the following questions, to address the evaluation objectives:

- Was the outcome achieved or not?
- What progress toward the outcome has been made?
- Estimate the degree of UNDP's contribution to that progress?
- What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving the outcome?
- The degree to which the projects within governance portfolio have been successfully implemented during last five years and desired outputs achieved?
- What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?
- Assessment of external factors affecting the UNDP's work in governance area, and the extent to which the UNDP has been able to adapt and/or mitigate the effects of such factors;
- Has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
- The extent to which the target beneficiaries have benefited from UNDP activities?
- The level of beneficiaries' and partners satisfaction with respective UNDP's work and results.
- The potential for continuation or up scaling of UNDP's work in respective area within the new Country Programme cycle.

The TOR also stipulates that to help focus on evaluation objectives, the following evaluation criteria will apply: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of development efforts. Covering these aspects required additional questions. Based on this fact, and findings in the inception phase, the evaluation team reformulated the evaluation questions, as described in the subsequent paragraphs.

Relevance

Since the TOR do not include an explicit question on programme relevance, the evaluators will add the question "Are the "country programme outputs", as identified in the CPD governance component, consistent with Serbian development priorities and UNDP mandate?" to the evaluation questions.

Effectiveness

Outcomes usually explain why an organization embarks on a certain programme. Outcomes are thus behavioral changes that result from project or programme outputs. They are important elements of a theory of change as they link outputs to impact. Further analysis of and response to the question "Was the outcome achieved or not?" requires well-defined outcomes that are SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound). A review of strategic documents in the inception phase and ensuing discussion with UNDP showed that outcomes meeting those criteria were not available. The evaluators therefore replaced this question by asking, "which development outcomes were initially expected from UNDP led initiatives in the governance area?" This reformulation made it necessary to change the usual approach to developing the outcome.

In the absence of well-defined outcome level objectives, the evaluators first concentrated on the review of progress at the level of outputs and intermediary outcomes. For this purpose, the original question "what progress toward the outcome has been made?" was reformulated into "what progress toward achieving intermediate and originally expected outcomes has been made?" This question is followed up upon by the question "to what extent has UNDP support contributed to that progress?" - Which was only a slight rephrasing of the original question.

The original question “what factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving the outcome?” becomes a sub-question. This question covers the original question into “what factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?” The original question on the “the degree to which the projects within governance portfolio have been successfully implemented during last five years and desired outputs achieved?” was split up into two sub-questions under the criterion of effectiveness, namely “which project and non-project activities were supported by UNDP?” and “which outputs did these activities produce?”

In order to address the aspect of efficiency, the evaluators proposed to add the questions “were results achieved on time?” and “was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?” to the evaluation questions. The question on the “assessment of external factors affecting the UNDP’s work in governance area, and the extent to which the UNDP has been able to adapt and/or mitigate the effects of such factors” will be addressed where appropriate, but did not appear to add sufficient value as an evaluation question in its own right and instrumental in achieving the evaluation objectives.

Partnerships are integral to the achievement of outcomes, requiring dedicated analysis by any outcome-level evaluation. Outcomes can usually only be achieved in partnership with others. The question “has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?” is therefore most relevant. Outcome evaluations are greatly facilitated not only by well-documented partnerships, but also by the level of preparedness and active engagement of such partners in the evaluation process. It appeared, however, that UNDP had no such strategy in place. There exists a document entitled “United Nations Country Partnership Strategy”, but this document appears to be an agreement between the UN and the Serbian government rather than a strategy that would help UNDP to reach out to a broad enough range of partners to ensure optimal co-ordination, co-operation and complementarity of its assistance. The original question therefore was reformulated into “how effective have UNDP partnerships been in contributing to the achievement of results?” - accompanied by a number of subquestions.

Efficiency

The criterion of efficiency is not tackled by the original evaluation questions. The evaluation team therefore added three questions to examine this criterion:

Has the project or programme been implemented within deadline and cost estimates?
Have UNDP and its partners taken prompt actions to solve implementation issues?
Was there any identified synergy between UNDP initiatives that contributed to reducing costs while supporting results?

Sustainability

The evaluation team maintained the original question “to what extent do UNDP initiatives in the area of Governance have potential for scaling up (or national application of regional initiatives) within the next country programme cycle?” and broke it down into a number of subquestions.

Impact

In compliance with the TOR, the evaluation team reviewed the extent to which target beneficiaries benefited from UNDP activities. In particular, the team analysed, what real difference the UNDP activities in the area of Good Governance made to beneficiaries, and rephrased the evaluation question accordingly. In this context, the evaluation team refrained from formally investigating the level of beneficiaries’ and partners’ satisfaction with

respective UNDP's work and results. Given the subjective nature of this question, it this question was removed from the original set of main evaluation questions.

Annex 4: Global Challenges and Opportunities

Global multipolar system. The world is becoming increasingly integrated and complex, and changing at increasing speed. Geopolitics has been re-emerging as a central theme, with potential wide-ranging consequences for the global economy, politics, and society. An illustration of these changes has been the increasing tension between Russia and the West. A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. According to a study by the Pew Research Centre, almost half of respondents across all regions believe China has overtaken the US as the world's leading superpower, or will eventually. A dynamic between Japan and China – fuelled by a significant loss of trust, rising nationalism, weak institutions and maritime disputes – affects the world's second and third largest economies, and threatens to directly involve the largest, the United States. Rising nationalism and a deepening disbelief in multilateralism, on the other hand, have made it more difficult to address these challenges.

Global security. The Iraq War was declared formally over in December 2011. In Afghanistan, combat operations were declared over in December 2014, though several thousand international troops remain in the country to provide support to Afghanistan's military. In general, however, interstate conflict with regional consequences has increased in recent years. In response to rapid gains made in Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an international coalition has launched airstrikes in support of the Iraqi Armed Forces and Kurdish fighters. The activities of ISIS have also attracted sizeable numbers of citizens of European countries to fight alongside its troops. Taking part in the conflict is further radicalizing these groups, posing the threat to carry the jihad to their native countries.

Diminishing trust in government. Since 2011 there has been an erosion of trust in political institutions and processes around the world. In 2014, the Edelman Trust Barometer showed global trust in business at 58%, while trust in government has sunk to 44%. This is a substantial shift from 2009, where business had to partner with government to restore trust, and represents important consequences for policymakers seeking to maintain the legitimacy of their institutions. The long-term global trend toward decreasing voter turn-out has further continued in recent years.⁶⁵ The diminishing trust in governments also benefits rogue players, such as guerrilla and terror organizations.

Global economic crises. The 2010s began amidst a global financial crisis that started in the late 2000s. The on-going Eurozone debt crisis started in May 2010 and continues with a global recovery. Along with the recovery, major stock indices hit five-year highs in 2013, and have continued to rise slowly. Economic issues, including inflation and an increase in commodity prices, sparked unrest in many lower-income countries, however. In some countries, particularly those in the Arab world, political unrest evolved into socioeconomic crises. These developments set off numerous revolutions, including those in Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia in 2010, and Libya, Syria, Yemen and Egypt.

Energy policies. Global energy governance has been increasingly affected by individual national interest considerations of actors. The nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011 has led many nations to re-formulate their energy strategies and policies. Despite the lingering economic crises, global energy consumption has been continuously growing since 2009. On the other hand, the scarcity of resources is leading to a seller's market, increasing the bargaining power of producer states. The rise of emerging economies and powers intensifies the potential of conflict between producer and consumer markets.

⁶⁵ Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2014. Voter Turnout Database.

Internet and mobile communications. In 2011, the global number of Internet subscribers surpassed the two billion mark, while the number of mobile cellular subscribers exceeded five billion. A major threat stemming from the mass use of modern communications technologies is the vulnerability of people's personal information (and organizations' operational information) of being collected (or stolen) by numerous players (including corporations, governments and criminal organizations) and used for nefarious purposes.

Climate change and water stress. Climate change has led to increases in the severity and intensity of sudden onset natural disasters, particularly those related to weather (storms, hurricanes, cyclones, flooding). Irreversible climate effects compromise the world's arable land and water sources. World food prices spiked to all-time record high levels in 2008 and again in 2011. The world is facing increased water stress, driven by population and economic growth, land use changes, increased climate variability and change, and declining groundwater supplies and water quality. Today, around 1.2 billion people live in areas of physical scarcity, while another 1.6 billion people, or almost one quarter of the world's population, face economic water shortage (UN-Water).

Population growth and consumption. World population has increased by 400 million in the period 2011 - 2015. Europe has been facing increasing immigration pressure from Africa and parts of Asia where the youth bulge outweighs the demand for labour. In countries with a shrinking working-age population, economic output declines if productivity per capita does not grow to compensate for the smaller workforce. European countries with very low fertility rates and large numbers of young people emigrating to find work are particularly affected by this phenomenon. Migration may help allay labour market demands in Europe, but it also adds the issue of integration to the political agenda, with implications for social cohesion. Economic growth in emerging economies, the rise of a global middle class, population growth, changing population structures, the use of natural resources and environmental damage, all affect global consumption levels and patterns. An expanding 'consuming class' has significant impact on demand for certain goods and services.

Globally widening access to education. As more and more societies across the world are transitioning away from industrialised towards knowledge-based economies, access to tertiary education, and its overall quality, are becoming essential predictors of power and economic prosperity. The evidence suggests that the gap between developing and high-income countries may close when it comes to future access to education, increasing the pressure on societies in high and middle income country to compete with a growing global elite.

Economic recovery. The short-term outlook for Serbia and other countries in the region has been uncertain. All economies of the region (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania) reported negative developments of macroeconomic indicators. Serbia's fiscal deficit and a high level of public debt could further suffer due to restricted credit, lack of FDIs, negative trade balance, and slow economic recovery. On the other hand the downside risks are also noteworthy given that the RoS has relatively small economy.

EU slowdown and RoS' enlargement prospects. Similar as elaborated in chapter 1 of this report, potential weak recovery prospects in the Eurozone could lead not only to further economic problems for the RoS but also could impact the EU enlargement policy and speed, which in turn could slow down the ongoing RoS EU accession process. Over the past period RoS was in a situation of having to absorb the effects of the global economic crisis while at the same time has generated the efforts towards the EU candidacy. It also notable that the effects of a possible "Quick admission" would possibly have multiple negative economic and governance consequences.

Migrations, trafficking, and borders control. The global challenges related to migrations management, control of trafficking, and border control over the past years became an important part of the GoS agenda. The 2013/14 international asylum seekers crises in Serbia preceeded by the post conflict challenges related to those internally displaced persons are but few illustrations. Moreover the EU requirements over the past years related to the flux of emigrants from the RoS to the EU further underlines these challenges.

New potential partners to GoS. The global economic crises mainly affected the Western countries. By 2010 the share of the US, EU and Asia in the global financial sector losses amounted to 57% and respectively 39% and 4%⁶⁶. A number of other economies and countries were less affected and remained increasingly open to bilateral co-operation with the GoS. In fact, the RoS could be supported by a number of none EU and Western financial institutions. Most recently Sberbank from the Russian Federation offered to Serbia funding towards its public administration reform. Some other potential partners from China or Arab countries could also follow the suite. Thus, while the future of classic Official development assistance (ODA) is already changing (see para 44) the ways of alternative financing could begin to emerge. These include e.g. potential PPPs as well as transforming some so far only FDI relationships with investors from PR of China, the Arab States, the Russian Federation, and some other countries into new ODA partnerships. However, recent economic crises may reduce the Russian Federations' imports absorption while its co-operation propensity could be limited in the case of RoS by its EU accession obligations.

⁶⁶ Source of this data and fore more related figures and external assessment see 2010 paper The World Economic Crises and Impact on Serbia in the Context of its Association with the EU available at the following Internet address: <http://facta.junis.ni.ac.rs/eao/eao201001/eao201001-01.pdf>

Annex 5: Overview of Projects

#	Project Name	Short Project Description
1.	Enhancing anti-corruption efforts in Serbia (Mar 2011- Dec 2012)	The project was focused on strengthening corruption prevention capacities at national and local levels for achieving the necessary standards and decreasing the levels of corruption as required under UNCAC and for EU accession.
2.	Youth Sleuth: Engaging Serbia's Youth to Fight Corruption through Investigative Journalism and Social Media (Jun 2012- Nov 2013)	The project was focused on reducing corruption by raising public awareness and fuelling intolerance to it by promoting investigative journalism in the public interest. More specifically, the project sought to establish open source online gathering and dissemination of information on corruption; to develop lead stories and other content through electronic and social media; and to enhance measurement of public sentiment and behaviour on corruption.
3.	Strengthening Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN) (Jan 2010- Jun 2013)	The project was focused on enhancing preventive and investigative facets of the public spending cycle through capacity development activities in three public institutions as well as capacity of media and CSOs to actively participate in the enhancement of accountability and transparency processes so as to become permanent part of monitoring and control mechanisms.
4.	Advancing Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN2) (Jan 2014- Dec 2015)	The project is focused on development of horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms in the area of public finances, contribution to development of sound public financial management and decrease of opportunities for corruption in Serbia, by advancing performance of state and non-state actors, both at central and local level for effective enforcement and prevention of the misuse of public funds.
5.	Finance Sector Policy Co-ordination Framework (Sep 2009- Dec 2015)	The project is focused on improving policy process through creating a policy co-ordination framework and establishment of cohesive mechanisms that would optimally link strategic priorities as distinct as strengthening mechanisms and planning and forecasting, finalizing the privatization process, containing public-sector wages, controlling state aid, fostering free movement of capital, raising EU integration capacity and boosting information systems for data monitoring.
6.	Strengthening Accountability of Serbian Parliament (Mar 2009- May 2011)	The project was focused on strengthening the capacity of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia to be accountable to the citizens of Serbia, be able to address the demands of the transition period and to execute its oversight role more effectively.
7.	Strengthening Oversight Function and Transparency of Parliament (Aug 2012- Aug 2015)	The project is focused on strengthening the oversight/scrutiny function, transparency and efficiency of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the representative role of local assemblies Support for the Universal Periodic Review - UPR process for Serbia.
8.	Promoting Human Rights and Access to Justice for Social Inclusion and Legal Improvement (2012-2014)	The project included three small scale initiatives related to the support for the Universal Periodic Review -UPR process for Serbia. These were focused on strengthening capacities of selected institutions in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States -ECIS to contribute to peaceful and tolerant societies.
9.	Communicating EU in Serbia (Oct 2010- Oct 2011)	The project was focused on improving Serbian citizens' awareness and understanding of the EU integration process and changes and reforms it requires through support the Serbian Government in designing a communications strategy for the Stabilization and Association Process.
10.	Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Development (2010 – 2012)	The project was focused strengthening national institutional framework through adoption of necessary legislative and policy documents; improvement of inter institutional co-ordination through establishment of operationalization of National Platform; and development of a new programme in DRR to mobilize resources for co-ordination with sister agencies.
11.	Kraljevo earthquake response (2010 – 2011)	This Special Development Situation project was focused on co-ordination of UN Response and Recovery effort related to the Kraljevo earthquake. Its components included Co-ordination of international aid; and Recovery Planning and Framework Development. The later consisted of Consolidation of Needs Assessments; Preparation of a Recovery Framework; and Conduct of Risk Assessments.
12.	Strengthening of Regional Co-operation on Gender Mainstreaming in Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans (WinMil) (2012-2015)	The project is focused on enhancing capacities of the Ministry of Defence related to Gender Equality Mechanisms; Improving Human Resource Policy Reform for Recruitment and Retention of Women Personnel; and increase of gender awareness of military personnel in the MoDs and Armed Forces.
13.	Women Police Officers Network in South East Europe (WPON) (2009-2013)	The project was focused on rising awareness on the position of women in police forces in SEE and women's human rights; Developing capacity for Gender Responsive Policing Practices in SEE; and developing capacity for Gender Responsive Policing Practices in SEE.

Annex 6: List of Interviewees

Name	Organization	Name	Organization
1. Daniel Varga	UNDP	30. Filip Mitrovic	Municipality of Pancevo
2. Jelena Manic Petronikolos	UNDP	31. Jelena Pavlovic	PPO
3. Steliana Nedera	UNDP	32. Jasna Plavsic	PPO
4. Bojana Balon	SEESAC	33. Gordana Mohorovic	Office for Human and Minority Rights
5. Slobodan Boskovic	SEESAC	34. Stanko Lekic	MoD
6. Danijela Djurovic	SEESAC	35. Goran Bujisic	MoD
7. Ivan Zverzhanovski	SEESAC	36. Jovanka Saranovic	MoD
8. Biljana Ledenican	UNDP	37. Natasa Mrdak	MoD
9. Mirjana Radakovic	NARS	38. Tatjana Visaski	Institute for Strategic Research
10. Dubravka Filipovski	NARS	39. Brankica Potkonjak Lukic	MoD
11. Mladen Mladenovic	NARS	40. Ksenia Djuric Atanasievski	MoD
12. Sinisa Biljman	UNDP	41. Srdjan Smiljanic	NARS
13. Neven Dobrijevic	UNDP	42. Branko Marinković	NARS
14. Branko Cecen	CINS	43. Jelena Vasiljevic	Mol
15. Ivana Djuric	SEIO	44. Snezana Vojcic	SIDA
16. Petar Vasilev	SDC	45. Veljko Radunovic	Municipality Of Vracar
17. Iva Vasilic	SAI	46. Ivan Baras	Mol
18. Gordana Arackic Nikolic	EU Delegation	47. Katarina Jovanovic	Mol
19. Jelena Divljak	EU Delegation	48. Nemanja Nenadic	TI Serbia
20. Milica Bozanic	ACA	49. Danilo Pejovic	TI Serbia
21. Zarko Petrovic	UNDP		
22. Goran Cvejic	MoF		
23. Olivera Puric	UNDP		
24. Predrag Jovanovic	PPO		
25. Uros Stojkovic.	PPO		
26. Zorica Vukelic	SCTM		
27. Jana Pavlovic	SCTM		
28. Aleksandar Popovic	SCTM		
29. Igor Pucarevic	SCTM		

Annex 7: List of Documents and Data Sources Consulted by the Evaluation Team

UNDP Country Programme Document 2011-1015
UNDP Country Programme Action Plan 2011-1015
UNDP Results Oriented Annual Reports for 2011, 2012, 2013
Pro docs for 13 projects in the UNDP Governance portfolio
UNDP strategic plan 2008-2011
UNDP strategic plan evaluation 2008-2013
Various progress, training and final reports for the 13 projects in the UNDP Governance portfolio
Various documents related to the programme monitoring, meetings notes, portfolio reviews, and presentation of results
Various documents and print screens generated from the UNDP systems
Final evaluation report for project: Enhancing anti-corruption efforts in Serbia
Final evaluation report for project: Youth Sleuth: Engaging Serbia's Youth to Fight Corruption through Investigative Journalism and Social Media
Final evaluation report for project: Strengthening Accountability of Serbian Parliament
Final evaluation report for project: Strengthening Accountability of Public Finance (PUBFIN)
Mid-term evaluation Report for project: Strengthening Oversight Function and Transparency of Parliament
Report on the Implementation of the Universal Periodic Review Follow Up Project UPRF 2014
Law on emergency management and Law on its amendments and supplements
National DRR Strategy
Study on Gender in DRR
Guidance on establishment of the National Platform as per HFA
National risk assessment methodology of the Republic of Serbia
Women Police Officers Network in SEE Guidelines for Gender Sensitive Policing
The Position of Women in the Armed Forces in the Western Balkans
Establishing the Southeast Europe Women Police Officers Network Research findings
Firearms Possession and Domestic Violence in the Western Balkans: A Comparative Study of Legislation and Implementation Mechanisms
Swedish Strategy for Co-operation with Serbia
Swiss Strategy for Co-operation with Serbia
SIGMA reports on Serbian public administration reform
Doing Business Index
Global Integrity Index
Open Budget Partnership
WB Doing Business
Composite Index for Risk Management (INFORM)
WB Worldwide Governance Indicators
Corruption Perception Index
The USAID CSOs Sustainability Index
CSO Sustainability Index
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer
PPO, a study by the UN Center for public procurement capacity development on PPO assistance to the pilot cities in Serbia
2012 New case study on decentralization versus centralization in local government procurement files
UNDP Serbia MDG Barometer
2014 Strategy of Public Administration Reform (PAR) in the Republic of Serbia
Draft 2015 Action Plan for Strategy of Public Administration Reform (PAR) in the Republic of Serbia
2011 UNDP Guidance on Outcome Level Evaluation

WB Feature Story: Insuring for the Future: Mitigating the Impacts of Natural Disasters in South East Europe
 GoS/SEIO public opinion polling data: <http://www.seio.gov.rs/documents/national-documents.223.html>
 National Bank of Serbia 2015 Report on Key macroeconomic trends in Serbia 2007-2015
 Strategy of Regional Development of the Republic of Serbia
 BTI 2012 Serbia Country Report
 2013 Serbia Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/51b847aa4.html>
 2011 UNODC Report ON Corruption in Serbia
 2013 RoS National Anti-Corruption Strategy
 Action Plan for RoS National Anti-Corruption Strategy
 2013 Public Procurement Law
 Various docs on Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC)
 ACA research on Perception of public interest in the area of prevention and fight against corruption
 Action Plan for the Implementation of the 2006 National Judicial Reform Strategy
 2006 National Judicial Reform Strategy
 2010 NARS Rules of Procedures
 2010 Law of the National Assembly
 2014 NDI report on NARS performance
 2014 Open Parliament report NARS oversight performance
 2011 National Strategy in the field of emergency management and disaster risk reduction
 Various documents on National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction
 2013 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Report
 2012 National Plan for Integration
 2009 The Needs of the Republic of Serbia for International Assistance in the Period 2009-2011
 2012 Action Plan for Programming and Reporting on EU funds and Development Assistance to the Republic of Serbia
 2014 National Priorities for International Assistance of the Republic of Serbia 2014-2017