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Strengthening Disaster Risk Management Capacities in Lebanon

Outcome Evaluation Report
2009-14

February 2015

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Table of Content

Introduction	3
Evaluation Methodology	4
Summary	5
The Impact	8
Relevance	10
Sustainability	12
Effectiveness	13
Efficiency	12
Best Practices	13
Priority Needs	15
Exit Strategy	17
ANNEX I:	15
ANNEX II:	17
	21
	18
	22
	23

Introduction

Lebanon is vulnerable to disasters/crisis risks from multiple sources including natural hazards and human induced disasters.

During 2009-2012, UNDP implemented a project Disaster Reduction and Management in Lebanon to strengthen national capacities. The Project had five outputs as below:

- Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Unit established (policy and institution)
- National DRR strategy and systems developed and implemented (risk assessment, strategy, plan)
- National capacities at center and regional levels built (Training)
- Public awareness on DRR raised (media, education ministry, general populous)
- Gender integration into institutional framework and into regional and local plans

Upon completion of the Phase I, UNDP extended its duration from 2013-15 in order to achieve all outputs (since few were not completed by 2012), and also to expand the scope of the Project to address new priorities. The outputs for the extended period or Phase II are as following:

- Institutional mechanisms for DRM established with sufficient capacities to increase national resilience and disaster risks
- DRR considerations integrated into development planning of critical economic and social sectors to reduce vulnerability of development infrastructure and assets
- Local and community capacity for disaster risk reduction enhanced to reduce losses to life and property;

The intended outcome of the Project was to “mainstreaming disaster preparedness and management in national development framework strategies in Lebanon”.

Between the years 2009-14, the Project has spent USD 1,770,707.59. It has another USD 1,487,867 available to be spent in the remaining time period.

UNDP organized an Outcome Evaluation Mission in November 2014 with the objective to look at the Phase I and Phase II of the project and present recommendations covering following:

- Strategic Level: Identifying the future direction and prospects of UNDP Lebanon in this area post Phase 1 and II.
 - Practical Level: capacity gap assessment and options to fill these gaps through external support with a clear exit strategy;
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Evaluation Methodology

Numerous aspects make this Assessment distinct from a standard Project Evaluation. First, the fact that Phase - II of the project is yet not completed, posed a serious challenge in evaluating achievements of the Project. It means that all possible contributions of the Project and their effects on national system couldn't be assessed. Secondly the outputs of the Phase - I are different in nature from the outputs of the Phase - II. In actual implementation, various outputs of the Phase I were not completed during the planned period of 2009-2012 and numerous of them have been implemented during the Phase-II, especially the interventions related to establishment of Emergency Operations Centers and the Ministerial and Governorate DM Plans. A third challenge was posed by the fact that the direction of Phase II of the project was diverted mid-course from implementation of the planned outputs, which were more developmental in nature, to respond to the situation created by the Syrian crisis and therefore it is not possible to assess effects of the Project against the Planned outputs of the Phase-II, since no interventions were made against them. The interventions that

have been made under the project during the period of 2013-2014 are more in alignment with the Outputs 1 and 2 of the Phase-I.

Mindful of these limitations, the Evaluation Mission took it to review contributions of the Project to the achievement of the outcome, "mainstreaming disaster preparedness and management in national development framework strategies in Lebanon" and against the outputs of the Phase-1.

The Evaluation Mission has applied the standard UN Evaluation criteria for development projects, including: Impact, Effectiveness, Relevance, Efficiency and Sustainability to review the project contributions. In addition, the Evaluation Mission also looked at best practices, the national needs for further capacity development and an Exit Strategy.

In order to arrive at conclusions regarding the Project contributions, the Mission reviewed all necessary literature; the Project Documents, Project Progress Reports, project publications and unpublished outputs. The mission also reviewed some of the documents produced by project partners. The mission also reviewed the financial information of the project. The Mission held interviews with 28 national and local stakeholders including ministries, research institutions, Prime Minister's Office, parliamentarians, municipalities, NGOs, Lebanon Red Cross and other related agencies; e.g. police, the Armed Forces and the civil defense.

The mission also relied upon historical knowledge of the project and the country, which was an advantage to the mission, due to its engagement with the Project in Lebanon since its inception in 2009.

Summary

- The Project has achieved important results in improving national emergency response and disaster preparedness. As a consequence of the project, there is better coordination and cooperation amongst national agencies with regards to emergency response. Also the understanding of roles and responsibilities has improved amongst national stakeholders, which has led to reduced tension and enhanced trust. All stakeholders appreciate the role of DRM project in bringing them together and helping to improve disaster preparedness and response, through the development of a national disaster response plan, the drills, the training and the study visits. The stakeholders listed numerous examples of recent emergency incidents during which collaboration between agencies have been exemplary to the detriment of losses, unlike the past when they interacted in an atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust;
- Disaster preparedness has improved due to project interventions and especially with establishment of the National Coordination Committee (NCC) by the Prime Minister due to Project efforts. Certain stakeholders noted a cultural shift in national departments in the sense of an enhanced concern for disaster preparedness and risk issues;
- The project objectives are relevant to the Hyogo Framework of Action and to national needs concerning resilient and sustainable development. The project has provided a sense of direction to national stakeholders with regards to reducing human and



- development losses from multiple disasters and crises by focusing on preparedness. The project methodology of operating from the Prime Minister's Office has proved very
- useful in providing leadership, ensuring effective multi-sectorial, multi-stakeholder cooperation and in raising profile of risk issues at the highest echelons of power; e.g. the PCM, the presidency and the parliament;
- Ensuring sustainability has been a challenging area whereby the context in which the project was set up dictated that the project takes a more of a service delivery approach instead of adopting an institutional development approach. The Project has engaged itself into planning and organizing multiple small and big activities acting like a national institution; e.g. public awareness and training. This approach doesn't prove very useful in the longer term, knowing that projects have limited lifespans and the processes and capacities can't be sustained if they are not institutionalized within relevant national bodies/entities;
- Although the Project has proved very effective in raising awareness about the need for an effective disaster risk management system, promoting a culture of learning, facilitating cross-fertilization amongst different departments/stakeholders and serving as a platform for collaboration between



international and stakeholders, the Project however has not succeed in achieving the most important objective of establishing a national disaster management institution and revamping of the national policy. This is due to multiple external factors primary being the political deadlock that has curtailed the functions of legislative entities such as the parliament;

- The implementation of project has been slower than planned, due to numerous factors. These include the funding (initially lack of it), the shifting political scenarios in Lebanon (unpredictable changes in governments) and lately the Syrian refugee crisis. In addition to those external factors, the thin-spread approach by the Project team has also caused delays. The involvement of project team in direct management of all project activities has not only resulted in delayed implementation, but also in diverting energies from bigger picture. A more efficient approach could be adopted concerning the management of awareness and training activities by subcontracting relevant institution/s. The Project team could then focus more on strategic

objectives; e.g. the lobbying and advocacy with the parliamentarians and the PCM to get approval of the national disaster management authority and the DRR policy;

- The project adopted numerous best practices, including south-south and north-south cooperation, basing policy development upon analysis of experiences of other countries, and taking advantage of numerous global opportunities to benefit Lebanon. The most important best practice that the project adopted was its approach in supporting the National Task Force for preparation of the National Disaster Response Plan. Instead of a technocratic and consultant heavy approach, the project adopted a process oriented and consultative approach to facilitate the National Task Force of multiple stakeholders in the development of the Plan. This platform and process of the NTF is certainly a best practice, not only for Lebanon, but also across the region and even globally. The continuous interaction amongst the NTF members, in addition to producing the output, has allowed national stakeholders to learn about the mandates,

resources and challenges that each one of them is facing. By removing the feelings of mistrust amongst them, which mostly existed due to lack of sharing, the process has allowed them to develop collegial relations, and formulate a de facto national platform. Most improvements seen in coordination and collaboration amongst stakeholders in Lebanon can be attributed to the process and platform of the NTF. UNDP Lebanon shall be proud to share its achievement in this regard with others. Now when the Prime Minister has formed the National Coordination Committee (NCC), the members of the NTF serve as a technical support group;

- Going forward there are substantive national needs that requires addressing. Therefore the continuation of the project is very much desirable. The most important needs include: i) the establishment of the national focal point institution, ii) the approval of a disaster risk management oriented policy, iii) micro-zonation studies/local level risk assessments to facilitate integration of DRR into ministerial and municipal development programming which has started in 2014 through the engagement of key ministries, iv) improvement of early warning dissemination,

v) human resource development at ministerial and municipal levels, vi) enhancement of physical capacities of the selected ministries and high risk municipalities, and vii) and integration of DRR into ministerial and municipal development planning;

- In terms of Exist Strategy, the Project certainly needs to continue for another 3-5 years after 2015. However, the project requires a major shift in its approach. It needs to move away from the awareness-raising model. In the past five years, awareness-raising has been the key thrust. Continuation of generic awareness-raising activities would not help to achieve risk reduction and it would also create a dependency amongst government circles by giving a false impression of safety provided by awareness-raising activities of the project. The Project must target institutionalization of capacities in prioritized institutions and stakeholders. It also needs to focus on integration of DRR into development. Along the above change in approach, the establishment of the National focal point institution would be the most important benchmark as a way of Exit Strategy;





The Impact

- The effects of a disaster risk management programme can be determined at three levels. The first and most important aspect to measure is whether as a result of the project (along other complimentary interventions) the vulnerability of society has reduced and resilience increased? At the secondary level we can measure whether the Project has helped to transform the institutional system and the legislative environment. At the tertiary level we can measure whether the project has improved performance of target institutions or individuals in the immediate term? The Mission focused on assessing the impact of project upon transformational change at the institutional and policy level and the immediate improvements in the performance of target institutions and entities.
 - The mission concludes that the project has achieved positive results in terms of improving performance of the target national institutions.
 - Emergency management has improved in the country due to the project interventions.
- The stakeholders noted the examples of the management of Syrian Refugee crisis, the bomb blasts that have rocked Beirut since the Syrian crisis (e.g. the Shatah explosion in May 2014, the explosion at Iran embassy) and the storm that hit the country recently. The stakeholders noted that unlike the past, the coordination, information sharing and cooperation on sharing of resources was much better than a few years before, amongst the national response agencies. As a result the agencies reached at incident sites in a timely manner and fatalities were lesser than they could be in a non-cooperative environment.
- Disaster preparedness has also improved due to efforts made by the project through the formulation of the National Disaster Response Plan under the umbrella of the National Task Force. The extended plan formulation exercise has helped the stakeholders to develop a better understanding about roles and responsibilities of different organizations and it has created a culture of collegiality amongst participating individuals. The simulations organized under the project helped the stakeholders to evaluate their capacities, identify gaps and improve their effectiveness for emergency response. The formation of the National Coordination Committee (NCC), which can be attributed

to the Project advocacy with the Prime Minister's office, has helped to establish a functioning national platform for emergency preparedness and response. The officials who designed the National Disaster Response Plan now serve as technical advisors to the National Coordination Committee on issues of disaster preparedness and emergency response.

- The establishment of Emergency Response Centers at the national, ministerial and regional levels under Phase-II of the project would further boost national capacities for effective emergency preparedness and response.
- The impact of the Project is quite visible from the fact that in previous years, an atmosphere of competition and mutual distrust existed amongst agencies concerned with disaster management in the country; namely the High Relief Committee, the Civil Defense, the Armed Forces, the Red Cross and the ministries. However, now an environment of collegiality, cooperation and mutual response can be noted in conversations with the same stakeholders;
- A few stakeholders claimed that a cultural shift is taking place in Lebanon due to the awareness raising activities of the project and unlike the indifference of past, now a culture of preparedness is taking root in official planning environment, where ministries and departments take into consideration disaster risk concerns. This cultural shift can be clearly noted amongst some departments, while not amongst all. The examples of positive change were reported by the CDR, the Saida Municipality and the National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW). For example the CDR representative reported that the body now conduct disaster risk assessment and disaster mitigation studies for all their mega projects that it implements; dams, bridges and roads. Issue of disaster risk reduction is also addressed in the National Land-use Master Plan, although the Plan predates

the DRM project and can't be attributed to the project. The Saida Municipality has also made Disaster Risk Reduction a priority in its regular planning. It has implemented numerous actions in this regards. For example, the assessment of risk conducted (at a cost of USD 60,000), removal of the garbage mountain (at a cost of USD 40 million), construction of the Breakwater Wall to protect the old city from windstorms (at a cost of USD 2.5 million with funding from Finance), moving of the Civil Defense and Red Cross offices to a safe location from the coast so as to reduce storm risks to their offices and functioning, Saida DM Plan, distribution of brochures to schools and general public awareness events, setup of an emergency room at the municipal office to deal with rains and wind storms, setup of a GPS system. Saida is also part of the EU neighborhood programme for the cross border cooperation. Matn Kaza has also implemented certain disaster preparedness activities on its own; e.g. a disaster management committee, an industrial risk survey of 52 municipalities, and a mobile operations vehicle to monitor potential disasters/crisis and coordinate response, truck owners training about relief deployment, awareness raising programme at Sacred Heart School and installation of a hotline. The implementation of the GARD programme at Beirut international and military airports has also triggered regular planning and simulations by stakeholders for earthquake preparedness;

Relevance

The objectives of the Project are in line with the five priority areas of the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), which are: i) Making DRR a national priority, ii) strengthening risk information systems, iii) Using knowledge innovation, education to build a culture of public safety iv) Reduce underlying risk factors, and v) Strengthen disaster preparedness. However the emphasis of the project on Priority Area 4 of the HFA: ‘Reducing underlying risk factors,’ has not been fully addressed. This Priority Area is concerned about integrating disaster risk reduction concerns into development planning so as to mitigate hazards and reduce vulnerabilities of people, infrastructure and assets. The project however did propose preparatory interventions; e.g. the national risk assessment and the national DRR strategy, to enable the reduction of underlying risk factors at a later stage. The Phase-I focused more on establishment of the national institution, the risk information systems and disaster preparedness. The Phase II of the project concerned more with ‘Reducing the Underlying Risk Factors,’ however the interventions proposed couldn’t be implemented until now. This emphasis of the project is justifiable as an important first-step given the complete lack of capacities for disaster risk management in the country. The project objectives are in line with the UNDP’s global Strategic Plan in which the Area of Work 3 is concerned about Resilience Building against natural and human induced hazards and risks.

The Project objectives are fully in alignment with national needs. At the time of project inception, no national disaster risk management system existed in the country. High Relief Committee (HRC) remained the only body concerned with multi-sectorial coordination, but its mandate remained limited to post disaster loss compensations. All departments and ministries worked in an isolated manner and a strong mistrust existed amongst stakeholders.



The communities lacked awareness about disaster risks, disaster preparedness and risk reduction and a culture of disaster risk reduction didn’t exist in the country. The project objectives addressed the needs articulated by national stakeholders concerning the establishment of a national institution responsible for disaster risk management and improving national preparedness capacities, as well as raising awareness of generic public. Given the lack of a national institution for DRR in the country the project objectives remain valid to date.

At one level the project methodology in delivering results has been very effective, which was to operate from the Prime Minister’s office, through a small DRM Unit to facilitate coordination and collaboration amongst national stakeholders to deliver different outputs of the project. The location of the DRM Unit in the Prime Minister’s office played a significant role in mobilizing the ministries, departments, and other stakeholders. To get traction from national stakeholders wouldn’t be challenging (if not impossible) if the project didn’t operate from the PM office. The stakeholders find the Project extremely relevant because it has helped the country to



respond to numerous challenging crisis situations in an effective manner, unlike the past when timely and effective government response was missing due to ineffective national focal point and the competition and lack of communication amongst concerned institutions.

The project has provided a sense of direction and leadership to national stakeholders by allowing them to define a national disaster response plan and understand the mandates of each other as well as by building trust amongst them.

In the Phase II, the project reinforced its relevance to the national context by shifting the focus to the situation created by the Syrian refugee crisis and the related security incidents; e.g. bomb blasts etc.

In terms of relevance of activities to proposed output targets, although most activities are relevant, however the activities proposed under “Output 3: Building National Capacities at Central and Regional Levels”, didn’t fully address the Output targets. A narrowly defined approach to capacity development was proposed, focusing on training. A comprehensive capacity

development shall include: i) development of policies/procedures/guidelines, ii) institutional strengthening, iii) physical capacity (equipment, infrastructure, assets), iv) human resource development, v) and financial capacity. The activities proposed under Output 3 focused only on human resource development, while ignoring four (4) very important elements. The result of this skewed approach to CD has been that although awareness of ministries, Mohafzas and municipalities has increased, however their capacities to implement disaster risk reduction remain limited.

Sustainability

The sustainability of the processes and benefits of the project is a big question mark. Although the project has created a great dynamism amongst Lebanese institutions and mobilized most stakeholders, however there seems to be lack of clear thinking to ensure that capacities developed under the project and processes introduced could be continued over the long term, after the completion of project.

The Project Document lacked a clearly defined strategy to ensure sustainability. The Project team as well didn't adopt a strategic approach to institutionalize activities and processes in target entities and departments. Given the fact that the project implementation has been ongoing for more than five years, it would have been possible to institutionalize numerous processes in the regular programmes of stakeholders; e.g. the activities related to training, education and public awareness. The project has worked with most stakeholders; e.g. the ministries, universities, research institutions, municipalities, media, private sector, parliament and civil society organizations. It would have been possible with some effort to integrate training, education and awareness activities into the media, the ministry of education, the universities, the Armed Forces training institute and the National Institute of Administration amongst others. Similarly the tools like the DesInventor, the E-Library, the Risk Profile must have a host institution, which could put them to use, as well as ensure regular updating of information provided there in.

It appears that the Project team kept its focus on delivering outputs, but didn't take a long term view towards institutionalization of the processes and benefits. If sustainability was desired, a different approach to implementation was needed. This would have included: i) identification of institutions/stakeholders interested to host certain activities/processes, ii) entering into agreements with those institutions, iii) and their

capacity development through training of trainers and production of relevant educational, training and awareness materials.

The absence of a national focal point institution for disaster risk management certainly poses a major challenge to ensure sustainability of processes and activities. The establishment of the institution would have certainly contributed greatly towards sustainability.

In the above context, there is a risk that upon the end of project, the momentum that has been created would be lost or greatly minimized. Therefore, it is crucial that UNDP continues its support to the Government and people of Lebanon in the medium term, so as to ensure that the significant amount of work that has been done is not completely lost.

Going forward however, UNDP needs to establish clear goals and targets concerning sustainability of processes and benefits for disaster risk management. This would require the identification of right partner institutions and reaching a strategic understanding with those partners to achieve certain targets concerning sustainability.



Effectiveness

Although the project has made numerous positive contributions to improvement of national system for disaster risk management, however, the Project has not been successful in achieving the most important objective of establishing a national institution for DRM. The approval of a national legislation by the parliament and a national institution could have significantly strengthened national capacities however this objective could not be achieved. The reasons behind the failure of Project to achieve this objective lie in the complex political dynamics of the Lebanese government system, which makes it virtually impossible to achieve consensus amongst political interests and parties. Therefore in spite of consistent efforts and advocacy by the Project to the Prime Minister's office and the parliament, so far neither the national policy could be approved nor an institutional setup.

The Project has been also weak in institutionalizing concepts of disaster mitigation and prevention at central or regional and local levels. This is attributed partly to the lack of a clear approach in the Project design and partly due to lack of strategic planning by the Project team. Therefore most ministries and departments have still not

integrated the concept of DRR into their regular development planning, except a few cases (the CDR, the Saida municipality). In such cases it can be considered more a random effect than the result of a planned effort.

The project also shifted its focus from the objectives of Phase II (2013-15), which required the project to focus more on "Reducing the Underlying Risk Factors" by integrating DRR into development planning. However, due to the impact of Syrian refugee crisis and the need to improve national emergency response capacities, the Project changed its focus mid-term and has rather focused on establishing Emergency Operations Centers and developing disaster management plans at ministerial and Mohafza levels. This means that objectives of the Phase-II couldn't be achieved, as planned.

The project has however made significant contributions towards achieving its objectives about disaster preparedness and public awareness etc. A few examples of this are prescribed as below:

- The project has raised the debate about revamping of the national system at the highest echelons of power, including the Prime Minister's office, the Presidency of Ministers and the parliament. Over the years, the project has presented numerous

proposals to the Prime Minister's office concerning this issue, a few of which have been also discussed by parliamentary committees. Although the government has yet not approved the proposed changes, however, most political office bearers recognize the need for improving the system, which is an achievement of the project.

- The Project has enhanced national capacities for emergency response and preparedness through numerous interventions and results, including preparation of the national disaster response plan, training, regular simulations, and establishment of the emergency operations centers. As a result of the project efforts, the Prime Minister established the National Coordination Committee (NCC) as the focal point for disaster response, which has helped to improve multi-sectorial coordination and collaboration. The project support to the National Task Force in framing the National Disaster Response Plan has also significantly contributed towards developing a national community of practice of practitioners of disaster preparedness. It has helped to reduce mistrust and build collegial relations amongst numerous departments.
- As a result of the project, contrary to past experience, cross fertilization amongst stakeholders has increased about learning and teaching each other. For example the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Civil Defense and the Lebanese Red Cross have been conducting orientation sessions for member departments of the NCC in order to raise their awareness about the mandate and resources available with them. They have also conducted training programs for each other on certain subjects; e.g. the training by the Armed Forces about forest fires and the school and university preparedness training by the Civil Defense, the Armed forces and the Red Cross.
- The Project has promoted a culture of learning from management of disaster events

amongst national stakeholders; the member departments of the National Coordination Committee and the NTF. Such lesson learning sessions have been organized after the Achrafieh building collapse and the Alexa storm.

- The Project is serving as a platform for cooperation between international and national stakeholders. The project has facilitated international agencies concerned with disaster risk management and emergency response to engage with the National Coordination Committee and its predecessor the National Task Force and share global best practices and global standards about emergency preparedness, response and disaster risk reduction. A few examples include the facilitation of support from Switzerland, France, Italy, UNISDR, UNHCR and UNOCHA.
- The work with the National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) is very effective in promoting synergies between gender, women's development and disaster risk reduction. This has involved capacity development of a wide range of stakeholders concerning gender and women's development ; e.g.; The Lebanese Council of Women; The National Committee for the Follow up on Women Issues; the Lebanese Council to Resist Violence against Women; the League of the Lebanese Woman's rights; The Lebanese Women Democratic Gathering; Working Woman League in Lebanon; Lebanese NGO Forum; KAFA (Enough) Violence and Exploitation; Lebanon Family Planning Institution; Amel association; René Mouawad Foundation; Hariri Foundation; Al Mabarrat Association; Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Association; and Imam Al Sadr Foundation. The project support has included training and grants programme to support women's NGOs to raise awareness of at-risk women in affected regions.



Efficiency

The costs estimated for the Phase-I of Project were 788,660 USD, while for the Phase-II, they are estimated as USD 4,786,538. It must be noted that costs estimated for five outputs of the Phase-I didn't correspond to deliverables. The costs were calculated much lower. An overall budget figure was provided by the consultant without providing any breakup of detailed costs for each output or activity. Against this context of low budget estimate, UNDP upon inception of the Project launched a parallel effort to mobilize resources in order to achieve the objectives. The project by the end of 2012 had spent USD 1,182,910.61 (for the period of 2009-12). During the Phase II, between January 2013 and November 2014 according to available information, the project has spent another USD 587,796.98. The project has another USD 1,487,867 available to be spent in the remaining time period of almost 1 year.

A simple analysis of the above spending pattern indicates that during the Phase I, the project actually exceeded the spending target. During the Phase II, however the spending has been much behind the targets. With only 1 year left in completion of the Phase II, a total of USD

1,487,867 million of available funding still needs to be spent, which appears an unrealistic target given the past trends. A possible explanation behind the lack of achievement of spending targets appears the sudden and overwhelming commitment of funding by donors in the mid and end of the second year of the Phase II, while in the first year the project suffered from a lack of funding. Going forward, the project will need to adopt innovative and more efficient approaches to achieve delivery targets.

In the first 3 years of its implementation (2009-2012), many planned targets couldn't be achieved during the said period; e.g. establishment of the Emergency Operations Centers at national, ministerial and regional levels and the preparation of disaster management plans by ministries and Mohafzas. A key reason behind this might be the lack of needed funding during the first Phase for the EOCs etc. These outputs are being delivered in year 5 of the project during the Phase II. Another reason for delayed delivery of the Project outputs is the large size of deliverables. The outputs prescribed in the Project Document of the Phase I, realistically required a five year time period instead of the 3 years that were proposed in the project design.

However, it must be noted that the project management approach also affected timely delivery of certain outputs. The Project team

opted to implement most activities directly. It especially bogged down in the organization of dozens of awareness events, training and drills. This led to investment of significant time on micro activities and resulted in diverting attention from the bigger picture of achieving objectives. A more efficient management approach would have required that certain deliverables of the Project could have been sub-contracted. This could have significantly reduced the delivery burden from Project team. For example, institutions like the Red Cross, the CNRS, a media house or other academic bodies could have been sub-contracted to implement the public awareness campaign. The project approach to organize awareness raising sessions for schools and universities also seems arbitrary. It is not possible for the project to reach out to all schools in Lebanon or all higher educational institutions. It would have been a better option to adopt an institutionalization approach and engage with the Ministry of Education to introduce DRM concepts into school and college curricula. Through a training of trainer's approach, faculty and staff of the ministry could have been trained, who could then deliver the awareness-raising sessions to teachers and schools on regular basis. This would have on the one hand required less time investment by the Project team and on the other also offered an opportunity to institutionalize and achieve sustainability.

The delivery of certain sub-outputs is partial; e.g. DRM planning by ministries (output 1.3), the implementation of training strategy (output 1.4), and the establishment of EOCs in all governorates (output 1.5). Certain sub-outputs planned under Phase I are yet to be delivered; e.g. the Disaster Management System Information Database (Output 2.2) and Local databases (Output 2.3.).

Going forward the Project team may want to adopt strategies that are more efficient and effective. It may want to keep the focus on strategic objectives and may sub-contract certain activities that require more time, but are less effective in achieving the development objectives of the project. The team may want to invest more time on planning to achieve the strategic objectives;

e.g. the establishment of the national DRM institution. This may include engaging with the political parties, the parliamentarians, ministers etc. It may involve producing analytical studies, seminars, advocacy, lobbying. The team might consider engaging firms/individuals which have experience in successful advocacy or lobbying for approval of laws from parliament or Prime Minister's office.



Best Practices

During the course of its implementation, the project has introduced numerous best practices. A few key best practices are described below.

1. Support to the National Task Force in formulation of the National Disaster Response Plan: During 2010-12, the Project provided support to the National Task Force (an entity representing multi-sectorial stakeholders from national to local) to prepare the National Disaster Response Plan. Previously, three national disaster response plans existed in Lebanon, namely the Plan of the High Relief Committee, the Plan of the Civil Defense and the Plan of the Armed Forces, while each one of them claimed its plan being the National Plan. These plans remained essentially single agency owned plans, since they were not prepared through a participatory process and not even shared with other institutions. In order to address this situation, the Project undertook lobbying with the key national stakeholders and it provided technical support to the NTF to formulate a commonly agreed National Disaster Response Plan with inputs from all ministries, departments and concerned organizations.

Instead of adopting a technocratic approach of focusing upon the output, the project adopted a process oriented approach in facilitating the development of the Plan. Thus it continued to host weekly meetings of the National Task Force (aided by a national consultant), to allow the stakeholders to brainstorm, clarify, argue and agree on the substance of the Plan and the roles of different stakeholders in different phases etc. During this period the Project also organized numerous training sessions for members of the formulating committee, including study visits to other countries. The platform of the National Task Force for the first time in Lebanon allowed national stakeholders to come together concerning issues of disaster preparedness. The NTF through a consultative process over a period

of two years produced a National Framework and Plan for Disaster Response. This platform and process of the NTF is certainly a best practice, not only for Lebanon, but also across the region and even globally. The continuous interaction amongst the NTF members, in addition to producing the output, has allowed the national stakeholders to learn about the mandates, resources and challenges that each one of them is facing concerning disaster preparedness and response. By removing the feelings of mistrust amongst them, which mostly existed due to lack of sharing, the process has allowed them to develop collegial relations, and formulate a de facto national platform. Most improvements seen in enhanced coordination and collaboration amongst stakeholders in Lebanon can be attributed to the process and platform of the NTF. UNDP Lebanon shall be proud to share its achievement in this regard with others. Now when the Prime Minister has formed the National Coordination Committee (NCC), the members of the NTF serve as a technical support group.

2. Another good practice the Project adopted, which has greatly mobilized national stakeholders, is the idea of promoting South-South and North-South Cooperation. Throughout its implementation, the project focused upon exposing the Lebanese stakeholders and decision makers to best practices on disaster risk management from the Asian and European regions. This included study visits and participation of the Lebanese officials in numerous regional and global forums. In addition to providing learning opportunities to Lebanese officials, such study visits have helped to build networking and partnerships amongst Lebanese and European municipalities; e.g. Venice-Byblos and Geneva-Baalbeck. Now numerous municipalities are implementing ideas learnt through their exposure to other cities.

3. The project has also taken advantage of global opportunities to benefit Lebanon. These include the partnership with the Making Cities Resilient Campaign and with the UNOCHA, France and Italy. In partnership with UNISDR, the project has reached out to over 250 Lebanese cities to enroll them in the Making Cities Resilient



Campaign. This has helped to leverage training and awareness-raising of municipalities about disaster risk reduction issues. Also Lebanon has emerged as the country with highest number of municipalities enrolled in the Resilient Cities Campaign. The partnerships with UNOCHA, UNHCR and other international stakeholders has also allowed the project to introduce globally agreed standards and practices on disaster preparedness and risk reduction to Lebanon.

4. The project has also applied good practice in proposing the institutional revamping of Lebanon. The project carried out an analysis of disaster risk management systems of numerous countries including: Turkey, USA, Italy, Iran, Pakistan, India, Philippines and Japan. Based upon an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of those systems, the Project prepared proposals and submitted to the Council of Ministers and the Parliament for revamping of the Lebanese disaster risk management system.

Priority Needs

In addition to project interventions, numerous crises that have hit Lebanon in recent years have helped to awareness of stakeholders about disaster risks and the need for adopting a proactive approach to address them. The different training, drills and study visits that the DRM project has organized have also helped to improve the response and to an extent preparedness in terms of better coordination and a better understanding of each other's mandates and resources. However the country still has substantive gaps in capacity with regards to disaster management and disaster risk reduction.

- Most important of them is the lack of a national focal point institution to lead the works in the country related to disaster management and disaster risk reduction. The High Relief Committee and the National Coordination Committee are but rootless forums for coordination. They lack institutional foundation to perform the numerous tasks

that are required of an effective national entity on a regular basis. In the absence of such institution, numerous entities are performing a stop gap role; e.g. the DRM Unit, the office of the Secretary General of the HRC and the Advisor to Prime Minister on DRR amongst others. However all of them are offering temporary solutions and lack the institutional foundation. Numerous stakeholders are frustrated about continued inability of the Lebanese government to set up a national focal point institution. In the absence of such an institution (armed with suitable legislative powers and human, physical and financial resources), Lebanon will continue to suffer from inertia. Typically such institutions in other countries perform the tasks of policy making, monitoring the implementation of policies, training, awareness raising, issuance of technical guidelines for application by stakeholders, dissemination of early warning and the coordination of actual emergency response and recovery after crisis/disaster. Such an institution requires significant number of staff and other physical and financial resources to deliver on its mandate.

- Although the DRM project has supported the production of a number of risk information products; e.g. the digital library, the DesInventor, the national risk profile, the national flood hazard map, however, Lebanon still lacks sufficient amount of risk information that could guide the action of national ministries and municipalities for integrating DRR into their regular development planning; e.g. land use planning, urban planning, infrastructure development etc. It is understood from interviews that the CNRS is producing a national seismic risk map as well, which would help to partially fill the gap of risk information at the national level. In the next stage Lebanon needs to produce local level risk maps for selected high risk regions and municipalities so that based on this information stakeholders could take measures to reduce exposure and vulnerability. The exposure and vulnerability of population to disaster and crises risks

has certainly multiplied in the areas that are hosting Syrian refugees. The increased number of refugees means higher rates of exploitation of natural resources (water, forest, land) and higher chances of tension and localized conflicts over the utilization and control of natural resources as well as over limited employment opportunities. Therefore micro-scale risk assessments are essential in the refugee hosting municipalities, so as to draw up plans for disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention.

- The early warning continues to be an area of weakness in Lebanon in the absence of an effective national meteorological service, since the Lebanon meteorology concerns itself only with providing forecasts to the Beirut airport. It lacks forecasting infrastructure and trained man power, as well as related information technology to make applicable forecasts. CNRS is working to establish and expand its own hazard forecasting network. In the absence of a national focal point institution for DRR, the dissemination of early warning to relevant national and local stakeholders and the communities would remain an area of important concern.
- Human resources appear an important area of weakness and concern. All stakeholders have expressed the need for more training. However the training that each ministry and stakeholder requires is specialized and not generic only. It appears that in the previous phases more training has been conducted about generic aspects; e.g. disaster preparedness, emergency response. More training needs to be conducted about specialized subjects with specialized agencies; e.g. flood mitigation training for departments related to water, agriculture, environment, housing and infrastructure issues. Earthquake mitigation training for departments related to urban development, housing, infrastructure development, transport and municipal authorities etc. The stakeholders also found the simulations and drills very useful in developing their response



capacities and improving collaboration and coordination. Therefore the continuation of such simulations and drills would be a useful contribution.

- As previously mentioned the awareness levels of all key stakeholders have significantly increased due to the earlier work done by the DRM project, especially concerning emergency response. However, the physical and technical capacities of ministries and municipalities remain rather weak in the areas of search and rescue, evacuation, fire-fighting, and medical first aid. Except for the Beirut Fire Brigade Service, the other municipalities lack sufficient machinery, equipment and transportation facilities to provide effective emergency support. In most cases the available trucks, fire tenders, ambulances are worn out, which require repairs or new procurement. The municipalities also lack the related rescue equipment, fire-fighting equipment (cutters, ropes, ladders, cameras, telescopes etc) and the IT infrastructure (e.g. satellite radio, computers, scanners, TV, printers etc). Some of this IT infrastructure is being provided by the DRM project at present to few ministries and municipalities. However, the demand in other municipalities remains high. Certain stakeholders requested specialized equipment for emergency response; e.g. the Ministry of Energy and Water's request for supply of Mobile Water Kits for emergency

supplies, Containers for water supply for forest fires, Securing of potable water infrastructure. Similarly the Ministry of Transport and Public Works mentioned the need for restoration of the monitoring capacities of the Maritime Search and Rescue Centre. The center was destroyed due to the 2006 Israel war. Therefore now it lacks capacities to monitor the vessel traffic navigation in the Lebanese sea. This poses is a major threat to maritime and overall security of Lebanon, since any dubious vehicles can make it to the country without being alerted. The center requires to procure equipment to restore its monitoring capacities.

- Most ministries and municipalities have not started the process of integrating DRR concerns into their regular development planning. Unless the sectorial ministries and the municipalities adopt disaster risk reduction approach into their regular development work, the reduction of societal vulnerability and enhancement of resilience won't be achievable. The reasons behind the lack of action by ministries and municipalities include: the lack of relevant risk information (e.g. micro-zonation maps for flood and earthquake risks), the lack of technical orientation about the process for integrating DRR into development, and a continued follow-up. Therefore a crucial next step is to first of all produce/provide necessary risk information (local risk maps for high risk areas), provide basic orientation to ministries and municipalities about DRR integration and formulate a mechanism to engage them in a continued process for few years.

Exit Strategy

Most stakeholders have highlighted the need for continuity of the project in the medium term, especially until establishment of the national focal point institution for DRR. The stakeholders believe that unless a national institution is put in place, the closure of the DRM project would adversely affect the gains that have been made, in terms of heightened national awareness and commitment. The project closure may soon bring the country back to the situation of 2009. As mentioned earlier, in the absence of a national institution the project is serving as a stop gap entity.


Therefore although an exit strategy is not recommended at this stage relating to potential closure of the project, however, a transition in the project strategy is certainly needed. The creation of the national focal point institution is the most important next step towards which the project shall invest its energies and resources. The two tracks that are available in this regard are: the creation of a new institution (e.g. a national disaster management authority), or the expansion of the existing Secretariat of the High Relief Committee. The project must pursue both options, although the creation of a new institution looks more challenging task, given the political complexities of Lebanese situation. Therefore in the coming months, the Project must work with the PCM and the office of the Prime Minister to get approval for expansion of the Secretariat of the High Relief Committee and revamping of the mandate of the High Relief Committee. If a functional Secretariat of the HRC is established, it would create its own justification and it might justify the subsequent revamping of the mandate of the HRC.

Going forward, the Project must limit its role as a direct service provider, which it has been doing in the past; e.g. implementation of a public awareness campaign etc. The project must instead focus upon capacity development concerning the implementation of various outputs. The Project must plan to transfer capacities and processes to rightly identified

partner institutions so that they could continue during and after the life of project. Institutional capacity development is a long term undertaking, but it can only happen, if started. It may take the project next 3-5 years to develop capacities of certain partner institutions to perform certain DRM functions. Capacity development requires a clear road map for each target institution and sustained hand holding.

It is important that the project select right partners for the next phase and then make investments on them. In the first phase the project took a broad view of the issue and engaged with almost all relevant stakeholders. Now is the time to get more strategic and undertake more long lasting work. Aside from the creation of national focal point institution, the Project needs to work closely with the following institutions to develop national capacities:

- Parliamentarians
 - Presidency of the Council of Ministers
 - Center for Development and Reconstruction
 - High Council for Urban Planning
 - CNRS – National Centre for Scientific Research
 - National Institution of Public Administration
 - Armed Forces Training Institute
 - Lebanese Red Cross
 - Selected ministries: Energy and Water, Transport and Public Works, Environment, local government etc
 - Selected Municipalities: 3-5
-



ANNEX I:

Definition of Evaluation

United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)

Evaluation is a systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability - as set out in the Evaluation Policy.

As a member of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), IEU contributes to professionalizing the evaluation function and uses evaluation best practices in line with the 2005 United Nations Evaluation Group's (UNEG) Norms and Standards, as set out in the Evaluation Policy and the Evaluation Handbook.

DAC Criteria

When evaluating programmes and projects, the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) Criteria should be considered, as laid out in the DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance. Additional criteria, such as Partnership or Innovation can be, and often are, included.

The DAC Criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Sustainability

A. Relevance

The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.

In evaluating the relevance of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

1. To what extent are the objectives of the programme still valid?
 2. Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
 3. Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended impacts and effects?
-

B. Effectiveness

A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

In evaluating the effectiveness of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

1. To what extent were the objectives achieved/ are likely to be achieved?
 2. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
-

C. Efficiency

Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the inputs. Is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.

When evaluating the efficiency of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

1. Were activities cost-efficient?
 2. Were objectives achieved on time?
 3. Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?
-

D. Impact

The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The examination should be concerned with both intended and unintended results and must also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms of trade and financial conditions.

When evaluating the impact of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

1. What has happened as a result of the programme or project?
 2. What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?
 3. How many people have been affected?
-

E. Sustainability

Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

When evaluating the sustainability of a programme or project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

1. To what extent did the benefits of a programme or project continue after donor funding ceased?
2. What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme or project.

20. General Mounir Moukhalalati, Beirut Fire Brigade
 21. Ms. Raghida Nehme, Ministry of Social Affairs
 22. Mr. Chadi Karam, Advisor to the Prime Minister
 23. Mouhamad Kabbani, Member Parliament
 24. Mr. Fadi Hamdan, DRM Consultant
 25. Ms. Marlin Brax, CNRS
 26. Mr. George Kettaneh, Secretary General, Lebanese Red Cross
 27. Mr. Ali Gharib, Ministry of Electricity and Water
 28. Representative, Ministry National Commission of Lebanese Women
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ANNEX II: Stakeholder Interviews

1. Mr. Luca Renda, Country Director UNDP
2. Mr. Fadi Abilmona, Programme Manager UNDP
3. Ms. Nathalie Zaarour, Project Manager, DRM Project
4. General Mouhamad Kheir, Secretary General High Relief Committee
5. Dr. Ibrahim Chahrour, Centre for Development and Reconstruction
6. Dr. Chadi Abdallah, CNRS
7. Ms. Sawsan Bou Fakhreddine, DRM Project Chief Technical Officer
8. General Maroun Hitty, Ministry of Defense
9. Mr. Fadi Comair, Director General Hydraulic and Electrical Resources of Lebanon
10. Mr. Abdul Hafiz Kaissi, DG Land and Maritime, Ministry of Public Works
11. Mr. Moustapha Hijazi, Municipality of Saida
12. Dr. Bahji Arbid, Advisor to Minister of Public Health
13. Mr. George Bou Moussa, Head of Operations Civil Defense
14. Ms. Sonia Khoury, Ministry of Education
15. Ms. Reem Badran, Ministry of Education
16. Ms. Marleine Haddad, Kaemakam Metn
17. Ms. Joumana Orabi, Civil Aviation
18. Mr. Omar El Solh, Municipality of Baalbek
19. Mr. Joseph Bou Samra, Director General of Roads, Ministry of Transportation and Works



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Resilient nations.*

UNDP is the UN's global development network, advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. We are on the ground in 177 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and our wide range of partners.