**Mainstreaming Marine Biodiversity Conservation into Coastal Zone Management in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone**

**Project Terminal Evaluation**

**Draft Report**

**UNDP PIMS: 4002**

**GEF Project ID: 2251**

**March – July 2015**

**Country: Jordan**

**Region: Arab States**

**GEF OP/SP: BD-2**

**Implementing Partner: Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority**

Evaluator: Francis Hurst

**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

**ACT** Aqaba Container Terminal

**ADA** Aqaba Dive Association

**ADC** Aqaba Development Corporation

**AMP** Aqaba Marine Park

**ARA** Aqaba Regional Authority

**ASEZ** Aqaba Special Economic Zone

**ASEZA** Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority

**CBD** Convention on Biological Diversity

**EIA** Environmental Impact Assessment

**GAEAP** Gulf of Aqaba Environmental Action Plan

**GEF** Global Environment Facility

**GIS** Geographic Information System

**ICZM** Integrated Coastal Zone Management

**IUCN** The World Conservation Union

**JREDS** Royal Marine Conservation Society of Jordan

**MIS** Management Information Systems

**MoEnv** Ministry of Environment

**MoPIC** Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

**MPA** Marine Protected Area

**MSP** Medium Sized Project

**MSS** Marine Science Centre –Universities of Jordan and Yarmauk

**NGO** Non-governmental organization

**PERSGA** Regional Organisation for the Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

**PIF** Project Information Form

**PIR** Project Implementation Report

**PMU** Project Management Unit

**PPG** Project Preparatory Grant

**TOR** Terms of Reference

**UNDAF** United Nations Development Assistance Framework

**UNDP** United Nations Development Programme

**UNESCO** United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

**UNFCCC** United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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# **Executive Summary**

## Project summary table

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Project Title | **Mainstreaming marine biodiversity into coastal zone management in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone** | | | |
| **UNDP Project ID:** | 4002 | **Project financing** | ***at endorsement (Million US$)\**** | ***at MTE (Million US$)*** |
| **ATLAS Project ID:** | 00078516 | GEF financing: | 950,000 | 950,000 |
| **Country:** | Jordan | IA/EA own: | 50,000 | 50,000 |
| **Region:** | Arab States | Government: |  |  |
| **Focal Area:** | Biodiversity | Other: |  |  |
| **GEF Focal Area Strategic Program:** | BD-2 | Total co-financing: | 7,250,000 | 7,305,000 |
| **Executing Agency:** | Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) | Total Project Cost **in cash**: | 8,250,000 | 8,305,000 |
| **Other Partners involved:** | Royal Marine Conservation Society of Jordan (JREDS), Aqaba Marine Park (AMP), glass boat operators, diving operators | ProDoc Signature (date project began): | | 08/11/2011 |
|  | Planned closing date: 06/2014 | Revised closing date: 06/2015 |

## Project Summary

The Mainstreaming Marine Biodiversity Conservation into Coastal Zone Management (ICZM[[1]](#footnote-1)) project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), implemented by UNDP, and executed by the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA).

The Project Identification Form (PIF) was approved in January 2009, the Project Preparations Grant (PPG) approved in June 2009.

The project had a planned start date of June 2011 but was delayed five months until November 2011 (due to a delay in the Government of Jordan signing and endorsing the Project Document) with a proposed closing date of June 2014 which has been revised to June 2015. The project is aimed at mainstreaming biodiversity conservation in order to promote more effective and integrated management of the coastal zone in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). The strategy to achieve this goal has four stated primary components: development and improvement of knowledge-management systems for coastal and marine biodiversity, promotion of biodiversity friendly investment and development, improving institutional capacity for integrated coastal zone management and biodiversity conservation and coral reef protection.

From a biological perspective the coral reef ecosystems of the Gulf of Aqaba are the most significant feature of the marine environment in Jordan. These coral reefs are unique because they are the northern-most tropical reef systems worldwide, have a high diversity of marine taxa, and provide habitat for endemic and rare marine species. They also have the potential to be largely isolated from the effects of climate change as a result of their seclusion within the Gulf.

Therefore the marine environment of the Gulf of Aqaba is of global and is designated, along with the Red Sea, as a World Wildlife Fund (WWF) global 200 ecoregion on account of its marine biodiversity value. Home to both endemic and globally threatened species, the Jordanian reefs are an important reservoir or refugium for tropical reef species. In particular, the endangered Indo-Pacific humphead wrasse, *Cheilinus undulates* has been found in the vicinity of these reefs, as well as threatened species of marine turtles.

These four components of the project listed above were intended to “*lift the barriers identified earlier and currently preventing the required balance between biodiversity conservation and development decisions*”.

## Evaluation rating table

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Ratings**[[2]](#footnote-2)**:** | | | |
| **1. Monitoring and Evaluation** | ***rating*** | **2. IA& EA Execution** | ***rating*** |
| M&E design at entry | MS | Quality of UNDP Implementation | S |
| M&E Plan Implementation | S | Quality of Execution - Executing Agency | S |
| Overall quality of M&E | S | Overall quality of Implementation / Execution | S |
| **3. Assessment of Outcomes** | **rating** | **4. Sustainability** | **rating** |
| Relevance | R | Financial resources: | ML |
| Effectiveness | S | Socio-political: | L |
| Efficiency | S | Institutional framework and governance: | ML |
| Overall Project Outcome Rating | S | Environmental : | L |
|  |  | Overall likelihood of sustainability: | L |

## Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons

The ICZM project has been successful in mainstreaming biodiversity into coastal zone management in the ASEZ. It has achieved this to the full extent of the modest material and financial resources at its disposal and within a short period of time.

The initial project’s design contained a number of weaknesses. The Project Document was at times confusing and at others impenetrable (in particular the strategic results framework [SRF] provided a weak planning tool with poor choice of indicators) although it did provide a sufficient approach for the project to manage. Clearly there was some confusion in the design of the project’s SRF with indicators and baselines provided for the components but not for the outcomes[[3]](#footnote-3). For the purpose of the evaluation the components have been treated as outcomes because these have measurable indicators. However, the PMU, UNDP CO and ASEZA’s own strong human capacities have played an important role in overcoming these challenges and ensuring this was a success. With lesser human resources the project would likely have been much less successful due to the design weaknesses.

The project has been well-executed in an efficient manner with a number of notable successes such as the translocation of coral which was successfully carried out under very testing circumstances, the development of the web-based GIS, integration into regional programmes such as PERSGA, certification of beaches (including a public beach) and hotels for environmental standards, the development of the AMP management plan, integration of biodiversity (coral) monitoring into the State of the Coasts report, production of an eco-tourism strategy for the ASEZ, work with NGOs and CSOs, amongst many.

However, the TE argues that, for the purpose of fully mainstreaming biodiversity into coastal planning and management and building ecosystem resilience along Jordan’s twenty-seven kilometers of coastline it will be necessary to look more closely at the institutional structure of ASEZA and its written policy framework in order to achieve its stated policy objectives and its overall mandate and priorities. A “business case” can only ever be a component of the decision-making process and decisions about development which affect the coastal system will require a much broader set of issues (including culture, local livelihood security, local and national cultural identity, public access, risk reduction, resilience, etc.). There are risks in a dichotomous decision-making process based upon purely economic or financial criteria and a large assumption that markets behave reasonably and all businesses are smart.

The TE has some concerns that the Environment Fund (which was intended to provide finance for biodiversity conservation from fines, compensation payments and biodiversity off-setting measures) has not been fully utilized. In fact the fund is now named the Environment and Emergency Fund and while there is a clear framework for payments into the fund the dispersal of the fund is less specific. Therefore there is a risk that finances stemming from biodiversity off-setting could be spent in other areas in response to emergencies. Furthermore, in the four years of the project despite a number of infringements being taken to court the fund has not received any fines due to the lengthy legal processes.

The ICZM project has played an important role during a critical time. The timing of the project means that it has spanned a period during which the ASEZ has been under considerable pressure due to the global economic slowdown beginning in 2009 and the regional security situation. During this time the project has provided a focus for different groups both within ASEZA and externally to keep biodiversity on the agenda when otherwise it may have slipped.

The strong relationship between ASEZA, PMU and UNDP shows a commitment to environmental management and biodiversity conservation in the ASEZ which has played an important role in the success of this project and shows a clear desire to remain engaged in the environment in its broadest terms in ASEZ.

## Component or outcome ratings[[4]](#footnote-4)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Component/outcome | TE rating |
| Objective: To mainstream marine biodiversity conservation into the coastal management framework in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). | Satisfactory |
| Component/outcome 1: Knowledge management systems for planning and investment | Satisfactory |
| Component/outcome 2: Biodiversity friendly investment and development | Satisfactory |
| Component/outcome 3: Institutional capacity for Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and mainstreaming of marine biodiversity conservation | Marginally Satisfactory |
| Component/outcome 4: Coral Reef Protection | Highly Satisfactory |
| Overall results | Satisfactory |

Two recommendations are made:

**Recommendation 1 Financial Plan developed to support the AMP management plan:**

A simple financial planning exercise should be carried out with the AMP. This would entail:

1. Costing the various activities and developments required by the AMP Management Plan.
2. Determining the current expenditures on the management of the AMP including five years of historical data.
3. Identifying current sources of funding.
4. Identifying future sources of funding.
5. Identifying funding gaps.

**Recommendation 1**

**Follow up action:** Develop a Financial Plan and Strategy for the AMP Management Plan.

**Instigator:** ASEZA / ICZM project PMU.

**Implementer:** AMP.

**External assistance:** There are no project funds available for this exercise. It would be possible to carry out the exercise as an internal “self-assessment” however it would greatly benefit from an external facilitator to guide the process. ASEZA should consider financing this to obtain the maximum benefit.

**Timing:** Within six months

**Recommendation 2: The AMP completes a Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) for the AMP.**

This is a fairly straightforward process which can be carried out as a self-assessment exercise with the direction of the PMU. One should have been completed during the PPG but was not so there is no baseline but it is important to complete one now to establish a baseline for the AMP.

**Recommendation 2**

**Follow up action:** Provide AMP with a METT template.

**Instigator:** ICZM project PMU.

**Implementer:** AMP.

**External assistance:** None, possibly some guidance from the PMU.

**Timing:** Before the project closes.

**Future direction underlying the main objective:** The ICZM project has been successful in what it has achieved. However, ASEZA still does not have a planning system[[5]](#footnote-5) that measures all development and activities against its potential to reduce the ecosystems ability to continue to provide the goods and services necessary for life; which is the purpose of mainstreaming biodiversity into the coastal planning and management process.

Therefore, any future UNDP-GEF involvement in the ASEZ and with ASEZA should be led by a substantive scenario planning exercise. This would be an iterative process which could develop plausible future scenarios against which ASEZA policies and plans could be challenged to test their veracity.

This could take several forms; either as a standalone project or as specific scenario planning assistance to existing projects addressing social and environmental issues and disaster risk reduction.

Two lessons are drawn from the project:

**Worst practice:** The TE has stated repeatedly that the project’s design, while it provided a strategy which could equate more or less to mainstreaming, was confusing. However, it also appears to have fallen into the trap of trying to fix the “whole problem” without ensuring that it was fully resourced and had sufficient time.

A more realistic approach for a small project would be to focus on a single set of policy instruments such as those for providing information for biodiversity policies although this carries the risk that even though information is available, it is not acted on.

**Best practice:** There were significant challenges facing the project because of the poor quality of the Project Document. Ordinarily the TE would recommend that the inception phase should have stopped and used this part of the project cycle to adaptively manage it by substantially redesigning it.

However, a number of factors came into play. Firstly there was a protracted period between the design phase and the project start up, and secondly by the time the project did start those responsible for implementing it had not been part of the design phase, indeed several key positions were newly appointed. Thirdly when the project did start up the need to translocate the corals from the new port facility was urgent due to the international contract, it had to be done immediately or it would be destroyed.

A decision was made to proceed without revision to the strategy (although there were significant revisions to the budget across the components and outcomes). Ordinarily the TE would be highly critical of such a move but in this instance (and with hindsight) it appears to have been the correct decision under the circumstances. While the TE would not recommend every project faced with a similar dilemma to take such a course of action, in this instance it was possible because most of the key decision-makers already had experience of working together, they knew each other’s capabilities and they were supported by the institutional decision-making process.

This allowed the project (Implementing and Executing Agencies, PMU, etc.) to quickly analyse a situation, assess the risk and rapidly make a decision while always keeping an eye on the overall objective.

Had the project gone down the route of substantially redesigning the project (which admittedly would have been the TE’s preferred option after reading the Project Document prior to the field visit and validation) then it is likely that the project would have become “bogged down” and effectively disintegrated.

To extract a lesson from this it would be necessary to identify the selection of highly capable individuals for key positions, excellent communication within the project, the confidence to take decisions at different levels within the project based upon the understanding of the problem (and to recognise those decisions if they were wrong and correct them).

# 

# **1 Introduction**

## 1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

1. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) recognises that all their projects by their very nature are addressing complex systems and issues. As a result there is a high level of uncertainty when it comes to predicting the outcomes of interventions. Therefore the GEF works through a process of adaptive management on the understanding that project‘s designs and planning processes are invariably based upon a number of assumptions which may, or may not, hold true. Therefore the Terminal Evaluation (TE), as an integral part of the monitoring and evaluation process.
2. The key objectives of the TE are to determine the following:

* Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?
* Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?
* Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?
* Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?
* Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward:
  + Verifiable improvements in ecological status[[6]](#footnote-6);
  + Verifiable reductions in stress on the socio-ecological system; and/or;
  + Demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.

1. Through this process the TE will identify the strengths and weaknesses within the project, identify critical issues and propose any actions necessary to secure the outcomes where necessary. Therefore, the TE is an integral component of the GEF project cycle management and as such is intended not simply to audit the performance but importantly to ensure the project outcomes remain adaptive and experience and lessons shape future project interventions both within the participating country and within the global portfolio.
2. The evaluation process is independent of both UNDP and GEF and the opinions and recommendations in the TE report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the GEF, UNDP, Government of Jordan (GOJ), the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA), or the Project Management Unit (PMU) (see Annex 6), however, once accepted the TE becomes a recognized component of the project’s project cycle and documentation.

## Scope of the TE

1. The TE will consider the contribution of the entire project partners and stakeholders. The ToR will guide the TE in assessing the projects:
2. Performance; its design and the progress towards results
3. Adaptive management; its work planning, finance and co-financing, monitoring systems, risk management and reporting as well as assessing how much the project has been able to challenge any assumptions made during the design phase based upon experience and understanding and if this has been incorporated into the projects strategy.
4. Management arrangements; whether these have been efficient and effective.
5. The TE will, in accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToR) and in collaboration with the Project Management Unit (PMU) and project partners, analyse the strengths and weaknesses that have emerged in the project and deliberate on the optimal and most cost-effective strategies for any continued United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and GEF engagement with partners and processes post project.
6. It will consider the appropriateness of the design, quality of management, support from the Implementing Partner, response to changes in circumstances, support from the Implementing Partner, financial management (including co-financing) and the achievement of results.
7. The project area consists of Aqaba Governorate is located at the most south-western part of Jordan, approximately 340 km from Amman. The governorate, encompasses just over 6900 km2 comprising approximately eight per cent of Jordan's land area and its twenty-seven kilometre coastline accounts for approximately seven per cent of the total for the Gulf of Aqaba. The Aqaba Governorate hosts Jordan's only sea port (consisting of discrete container, ferry, fuel and phosphate terminals and a bulk goods port) and occupies a strategic location close to the cross roads of Europe, Asia and Africa (see Annex 9).
8. The evaluation took place between March and July 2015. The Evaluator had a total of twenty days of which six were in country (26th – 31st March) and two days travelling.

## Methodology

1. The process of evaluation began with a study of the considerable project documentation and background literature that is associated with any UNDP-GEF project prior to the field visits by the TE and a period of interviews and consultations with key project partners and stakeholders during the in-country mission.
2. The in-country mission consisted of focused meetings and discussions (in person and by electronic communications) with UNDP CO in Amman, the PMU in Aqaba, the ASEZA, and other stakeholders starting with a briefing of the purpose and the *process* of GEF monitoring and evaluation. The subject of these meetings focused on (but was not limited to) determining a number of key questions, based on the project’s intended outcomes, these were expanded by the TE as deemed appropriate. These included:

* Assessing overall performance against the project objective and outcomes as set out in the Project Document, project’s Logical Framework Matrix (SLFM or Strategic Results Framework [SRF]) and GEF increment, and other related documents;
* Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the project;
* Analyzing critically the implementation and management arrangements of the project;
* Assessing the progress to date and achievement of the outcomes;
* Reviewing how appropriate the planned strategies and plans for achieving the overall objective of the project within the timeframe were;
* Assessing the sustainability of the project’s interventions;
* Listing and documenting initial lessons concerning project design, implementation and management;
* Assessing the project relevance to national priorities (including achieving gender equality goals);
* Providing recommendations to strengthen the outcomes, ensure sustainability, and provide lessons learned from the process of implementing the project. In this case, given the considerable changes in circumstances currently taking place, this has placed significant emphasis on determining what plausible next steps might be taken to continue engagement with the process of mainstreaming biodiversity in Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Jordan.

1. At the end of the country mission the TE provided feedback to key project partners and a brief in particular the UNDP CO and PMU outlining the TE’s understanding of the project, the strengths and weaknesses, conclusions, critical issues and recommendations.
2. The principle output of the TE is this report which provides an account of the project, the key findings of the TE, the analysis and conclusions, key recommendations and documents the relevant lessons resulting from the project’s experience thus far.
3. GEF project evaluation requires the evaluation to provide ratings for the key components of the project on a six-point rating scale ranging from Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory and the likelihood of the project outcomes being sustainable post GEF funding on a similar rating scale ranging from Highly Likely to Highly Unlikely.

## Description of data collection and analysis

1. Initially the TE defined the scope of the TE’s inquiry through discussions with the UNDP and the PMU about the areas and extent of inquiry to be defined including the most suitable individuals and representatives of participating institutions and stakeholders to be interviewed, the sites selected for inspection and the scope of the documentation to be reviewed.
2. Data collection was then carried out through examination of the project’s documentation, the reports (technical and PIRs), agreements, minutes of meetings, and financial information, websites, etc., provided to the TE.
3. Interviews were held with individuals and representatives of institutions involved in the implementation of the project (see Annex 2) and where possible the current users of the resulting services and beneficiaries of the project’s outcomes. Due to the short time available to the TE no pre-prepared questionnaires or surveys were developed. Interviews proceeded with a brief description of the purpose and methods of the TE, the nature of the questions to be asked and established the independence of the evaluation. Interviewees were then asked a range of questions specific to their area of involvement after which the discussion was allowed to broaden out to all areas of the project.
4. Through this process of discussion with participants, the TE examined the key questions from the ToR. In particular the TE tried to determine whether the project’s approach was based upon a realistic understanding of the driving forces that shape coastal development and impact both positively and negatively on the ecology of Jordan’s Red Sea coastal ecology, to what extent the project adhered to the core GEF Biodiversity and Mainstreaming Focal Area values, to what extent generic guidelines can be developed from the project and, to what extent has the implementation of the project and various interventions followed an adaptive management approach.
5. Following this the TE analysed the findings in order to assess the project’s overall performance and impact and in particular, whether the project had demonstrated; a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements. Through this process the TE was able to:

*Critically analyze the project design:* the original design, the Project Document, was challenged against best practices and in light of the project’s experience to consider and changes in circumstances, whether there were flaws in its logic and approach or whether there were assumptions, known or unknown, that have not proven correct and to what extent the strategy was, in light of experience, a realistic means to achieve the objective.

*Place emphasis on constructive analytical dialogue:* with the project partners providing the project participants with an opportunity to explain the strategies applied to date, the challenges that had been faced and the inevitable nuances that affect a project. In this way the TE was able to deepen its’ own, and the partner’s, conceptual understanding of the key issues underlying the project and the driving forces that have shaped, and continue, shaping the socio-ecosystem along the Jordanian Red Sea Coast.

*Critically reflect on the measures of project success:* measuring progress and performance against the indicators provided in the project’s logical framework with the participation of the project partners and reflecting on their relevance and adequacy, and where these were in doubt, alternative or complimentary indicators could be identified and/or re-phrased and if necessary retro-fitted to measure the impact (although this proved to be not possible due to the confusing and complicated Project Document) and therefore more subjective indicators were used alongside the SRF indicators.

*Assess the project’s performance and impact to date:* analysing the performance and progress against the indicators and reasonably expected impacts of the project’s implementation.

*Provide an examination of process:* critically examine the project’s actions and activities to determine whether there was sufficient effort in ensuring that elements of capacity building and participation, establishing processes and mechanisms, etc., which internalize the project’s experience and contribute to sustainable outcomes, that would enable the targets to be achieved in the longer term took place or whether there was an element of project *expediency[[7]](#footnote-7)* in the execution.

*Synthesizing plausible future impacts:* using analytical methods to identify plausible future outcomes resulting from the impact of the project in the future.

*Jointly defining the conclusions and recommendations with the UNDP and the project staff:* ensuring that there was a common understanding of any weaknesses or shortcomings in the project’s implementation and understanding the reasons for, and the appropriate detail of, any remedial actions that might be necessary or future courses of action.

## Limitation and constraints of the Terminal Evaluation

1. Six days were spent in total in Jordan to carry out the interviews and consultations and site visits. The Evaluation was carried out by a single Evaluator. The Evaluator did not have Arabic language skills however it was jointly agreed with UNDP that this was acceptable and UNDP made very clear that if at any time during the evaluation this was considered to be a constraint, an independent translator would be provided immediately. In the event this was not necessary due to most of the interviewees having good English language skills. Where translation was necessary this was provided by the Project Manager and the Evaluator was confident that this was not a constraint or put at risk the integrity and independence of the TE at any time.

## Structure of the evaluation report

1. This report is structured in three parts:

* **Section 2** provides a description of the project including contextual information which is necessary to understand the key events which have unfolded and have to a large degree shaped the project, its performance and progress and might still effect the overall impact of the project. A key point in this section, and throughout the report, is a distinction between the project’s design and its implementation.
* **Section 3** consists of three sub-sections. **Section 3.1** provides the main findings of the evaluation and largely address the architecture of the project; its design, current operational status and management arrangements, etc. **Section 3.2** considers the projects performance, that is, how well it has been implemented and executed, in short, whether it is doing what it said it would do. **Section 3.3** considers whether the project is having an impact, that is, if it is doing what it said it would…..is it working? Is it actually having any effect on the barriers and threats to biodiversity conservation, particularly coastal conservation in the ASEZ.
* **Section 4** provides the main conclusions of the evaluation based upon the evidence, reasonable argument and the professional opinion of the Evaluator. This section identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the project against attaining the project’s stated outcomes and objective and proposes remedial actions where necessary to strengthen the project during the second-half of its implementation.

1. **Project description and development context**

## 2.1 Project start and duration

1. The ICZM project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and implemented by UNDP, executed by the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA).
2. The Project Identification Form (PIF) was approved in January 2009, the Project Preparations Grant (PPG) approved in June 2009.
3. The project had a planned start date of June 2011 but was delayed, due to a delay in the Government of Jordan signing and endorsing the Project Document[[8]](#footnote-8), for five months until November 2011 with a proposed closing date of June 2014 which has been revised to June 2015. The project is aimed at mainstreaming biodiversity conservation in order to promote more effective and integrated management of the coastal zone in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). The strategy to achieve this goal has four stated primary components: development and improvement of knowledge-management systems for coastal and marine biodiversity, promotion of biodiversity friendly investment and development, improving institutional capacity for integrated coastal zone management and biodiversity conservation and coral reef protection.

## Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority

1. ASEZA is a para-statal authority established in 2001 which replaces the usual Municipal government structures and institutions which is the normal form of local government in Jordan and as such replaces the roles and functions of the Municipality in the territory of the Special Economic Zone. ASEZA is institutionally organized into five Commissioners under a General Commissioner appointed by the Prime Minister. A key distinction between ASEZA and all other Municipalities in Jordan is that the executive of the former is appointed whereas the latter is elected.
2. ASEZA has special tax raising powers and replaces all of the ordinary Municipal functions related to coastal and land management.
3. Therefore ASEZA is under the Prime Minister and has an appointed Commissioner with a Board of Commissioners and five sector Directorates; Administrative and Financial Affairs, Infrastructure and Services Affairs, Economic Development and Investment Affairs, Customs and Revenue and Environment Affairs.
4. ASEZA is the National Executing Agency for the ICZM project with the PMU embedded in the organization albeit with a Project Manager (PM) employed through UNDP Jordan.

## The Jordanian Red Sea coast

1. From a biological perspective the coral reef ecosystems of the Gulf of Aqaba are the most significant feature of the marine environment in Jordan. These coral reefs are unique because they are the northern-most tropical reef systems worldwide, have a high diversity of marine taxa, and provide habitat for endemic and rare marine species. They also have the potential to be largely isolated from the effects of climate change as a result of their seclusion within the Gulf.
2. Therefore the marine environment of the Gulf of Aqaba is of global significance in having some of the northern-most reef systems in the Western Indo-Pacific and is designated, along with the Red Sea, as a World Wildlife Fund (WWF) global 200 ecoregion on account of its marine biodiversity value. Home to both endemic and globally threatened species, the Jordanian reefs are an important reservoir or *refugium* for tropical reef species. In particular, the endangered Indo-Pacific humphead wrasse, *Cheilinus undulates* has been found in the vicinity of these reefs, as well as threatened species of marine turtles.

## Problems that the project sought to address

1. The Jordanian coastline is only twenty-seven kilometres in length, the area is strategically important and the vast majority of all consumer goods and foodstuffs for the country are shipped through the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), both into Jordan and in transit for other regional destinations. There is also a small artisanal fishery in the Gulf of Aqaba which supports between eighty and a hundred boats. An emphasis on tourism development has seen a rapid increase in the number of hotels placing pressure on the coastline and reducing in some instances access to the public utility of these resources (e.g. through privatized beach fronts, etc.). Furthermore, the current population for Aqaba City is projected to increase by more than fifty per cent from approximately one hundred thousand to over one hundred and sixty thousand people by 2020, creating significant additional pressures on resources.
2. On shore developments are also affecting the fragile coastline and coral communities with pollution and accelerated run off during flash floods amongst other environmental challenges.
3. An initiative aimed at moving and expanding Jordan’s port facilities added urgency to the project for mainstreaming marine biodiversity conservation in the coastal management systems for the ASEZ. The development of port facilities entailed the likely destruction of coral communities of high conservation value near the southern Jordanian border[[9]](#footnote-9).
4. Therefore, the Jordanian coastline is subject to considerable resource pressure, particularly as this coast supports Jordan’s only seaport facilities. The high level and conflicting nature of pressure on the natural resources of Jordan’s coast poses significant challenges to effective management and conservation of this unique environment.

## Immediate and development objectives of the project

1. The project’s objective as stated in the Project Document was to *mainstream marine biodiversity conservation into the coastal management framework in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ)* by incorporating or mainstreaming *the principles of marine biodiversity conservation into the effective decision-making and management of the ASEZ[[10]](#footnote-10).*
2. To achieve this the project had four components:
3. Developing a knowledge management systems for planning and investment
4. Promoting biodiversity-friendly investment, including an economic evaluation of the Jordanian marine resources and introducing mechanisms such as eco-friendly certification, off-set schemes and other schemes through which relevant industries, particularly tourism, can finance coral conservation.
5. Building the institutional capacity of ASEZA in integrated coastal zone management (ICZM) and biodiversity conservation through the development of a “*comprehensive ICZM process*”.
6. Coral reef protection.
7. These components were intended to “*lift the barriers identified earlier and currently preventing the required balance between biodiversity conservation and development decisions*”.
8. A detailed analysis of the projects design will be given later (section 3.1).

## Baseline indicators

1. The Project Document established a number of baseline indicators. While there were objective-level indicators, below this in the logical hierarchy of the strategic results framework the indicators were, unusually, associated with the four components and not the outcomes. This confusion is compounded by reporting on co-financing by four outcomes (actually components) and when the SRF includes the staggering number of nine outcomes[[11]](#footnote-11) listed in the SRF it is reasonable to state that this was not a good SRF. For the purpose of this evaluation the component indicators have been used as outcome indicators, a situation which is less than satisfactory because the components contain more than one outcome in some instances. The implications of this will be discussed further in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.

## Table 1 Indicators and baselines

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Objective / Component | Indicator | Baseline |
| Objective: To mainstream marine biodiversity conservation into the coastal management framework in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) | Coral cover | 400 Ha. |
| Proportion of soft to hard coral | 2 : 98 – 5:95 |
| Component 1: Knowledge management systems for planning and investment (2 outcomes) | ASEZA annual report comprises section on status of marine and coral BD | Environment performance and indicators reported against |
| Proportion of new developments taking into account information generated by ASEZA’s MIS | At least half of the 14 planned developments |
| Component 2: Biodiversity friendly investment and development (3 outcomes) | Green key/Blue flag certification obtained during the lifetime of the project | No certified schemes |
| Total Value Added of Corals to the Jordanian economy increases by 20% at end of project from a baseline of 3Million JD (2009 estimates) | 3 million JD |
| Reduced coral damage from anchoring/cruise line density | N/A[[12]](#footnote-12) |
| Component 3: Institutional capacity for Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and mainstreaming of marine biodiversity conservation (3 outcomes) | Environment revenue/total revenue | 1% in 2008 |
| Component 4: Coral reef protection (1 outcome) | Coral reefs slated for destruction are protected through a programme of transplantation to a suitable site | No baseline and no targets given |

## Main stakeholders

1. The principle stakeholders in the ICZM project appear to have been largely institutional.

## Table 2 Stakeholders listed in Project Document

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Type** | **Stakeholder** | **Role in project** |
| **Government Organization** | ASEZA Environment Directorate-EIA unit | Co-financing and hosting PMU, leadership, staff time, technical assistance (e.g. mapping and GIS), participation in training, participation in developing studies, reports and guidelines (e.g. Aqaba ecotourism guidelines). |
| ASEZA-Environment and Investment Commissions |
| ASEZA Community Development Unit |
| ASEZA GIS Unit |
| ASEZA MIS Unit |
| ASEZA Tourism Directorate |
| Aqaba City Services |  |
| Aqaba Marine Park | Leadership (Technical and Operational Focal Point), technical assistance, staff time, participation in training, participation on coral translocation, advocacy, conservation education and awareness. |
| Prince Hamza Oil Spill Combating Centre (PHOSCC) | Participation |
| Royal Jordanian Navy | Participation |
| **Quasi-Non-Governmental Organization[[13]](#footnote-13)** | Aqaba Container Terminal |  |
| Aqaba Development Corporation/Aqaba Ports Corporation | Co-financing payment for coral translocation |
| Ben Hayyan Aqaba International Laboratories | Participation, technical assistance |
| **Non-Governmental Organizations** | Aqaba Dive Association | Participation (e.g. training, workshops) |
| Aqaba Cooperative Maritime Society for Glass Boats | Participation (e.g. training, workshops) |

## Expected results

1. The Project Document, in part due to the confusing way the SRF is laid out and in part due to the poor coherence of the overall document presents a very ambitious set of results. The presentation of these results perhaps gives some insight into the differing expectations from the project and the driving forces which created the Project Document or design. This states that:

*“There are a range of direct and indirect positive effects which will arise from the implementation of the project. The most direct effect that the project will have is in the preservation of coral reefs currently slated for destruction at the site of the new port near the international border with Saudi Arabia. The associated results of this direct intervention include:*

* *Marine biodiversity conservation;*
* *An increase in technical capacity;*
* *Improved integration of biodiversity concerns in investments and development;*
* *Improved awareness of the importance of marine biodiversity; and,*
* *The potential for positive spin-offs for tourism in general and eco-tourism specifically”[[14]](#footnote-14).*

1. The document then goes on to list a “*more extensive and up-to-date geospatial system*” and a “*baseline of coral ecosystem conditions*” which while useful do not amount to mainstreaming *per se.*
2. The outcomes, as opposed to the components of the SRF provide the best insight into the intended results from the project. These are listed as:

**Outcome 1:** *Spatial planning and sharing of benefits from marine resources informed by sound knowledge*

**Outcome 2:** *Trends in status of marine biodiversity documented and causes of changes identified*

**Outcome 3:** *Marine biodiversity and ecosystem services accounted for within the ASEZ decision-making[[15]](#footnote-15)*

**Outcome 4:** *Tourism sector contributes to marine biodiversity conservation*

**Outcome 5:** *Public understanding pressures political commitment for strengthened marine biodiversity conservation*

**Outcome 6:** *Negative impacts on biodiversity from coastal development minimized*

**Outcome 7:** *Benefits of marine biodiversity equitably shared*

**Outcome 8:** *Capacity to ensure implementation of effective ICZM strengthened (measured by changes in results of UNDP’s capacity development scorecard)*

**Outcome 9:** *Southern reef translocated using globally recognized best practices, and all other natural reefs under long-term protection*

1. It is possible to extract from the Project Document a reasonable but highly ambitious strategy to mainstream biodiversity into the coastal management in the ASEZ. However, this is at times confusing, for instance citing the project’s compliance with the Paris Declaration[[16]](#footnote-16),[[17]](#footnote-17), and hard to follow it describes a much larger project than is reflected in the resources and time available because it had a total GEF grant of just US$ 950,000 and three years in which to achieve this.
2. Furthermore, while the first three components can be described as mainstreaming activities, the fourth component is arguably not related to mainstreaming but of a technical nature (coral translocation.
3. It is not unreasonable to speculate that there were two, not necessarily closely aligned results expected from the project at the point of its design. The first being an institutional desire on the part of ASEZA to effectively and efficiently translocate the coral from the port construction site and the second on the part of the GEF to see coastal conservation mainstreamed specifically into the economic processes. These were then married into one project.
4. **Findings**
5. It would be an oversimplification to present the ICZM project as just being the product of a weak design and an exemplary implementation. While both are true statements of the ICZM project the ASEZ is a complex issue to which UNDP and the GEF-funded project were responding to and the comments below by the TE should be considered against this background and in particular to section 3.1.6 which deals with the UNDP’s comparative advantage in implementing GEF projects.

## Project design and formulation

1. By combining an analysis of the Project Document and the documentation which has come from the implementation phase of this project it becomes clear that there are two sides to the ICZM project; a design which appears to have raised expectations of a much larger project (larger than the resources and time given to it[[18]](#footnote-18)) and one which, while it provides a reasonable strategy for mainstreaming also includes elements such as the coral translocation which are essentially technical aspects of conservation management (i.e. moving coral).
2. It also relies heavily on developing a “business case” for marine conservation and the risks in relying so heavily on developing a persuasive argument based upon such a case will be examined further in this report.
3. The weaknesses in the design can be starkly contrasted with a very efficient and effective implementation. All in all this makes the task of evaluating the project very challenging. This analysis (of the project’s design) appears to be supported by the CEO Endorsement Document which also challenges the project’s design over these matters[[19]](#footnote-19). The responses from the project design[[20]](#footnote-20) are less than satisfactory and it is not clear why the project was approved without some revision to address these issues. A presumption might be that the process had gone so far down the line and the urgency of the impending construction of the port facilities overrode any concerns about the project’s design.

### Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)

1. As has already been discussed in the last section, there were some considerable weaknesses in the Project Document’s SRF and the project’s logic or strategy. While there is probably no such thing as a “normal” SRF in this instance the differences between what one would ordinarily expect to find and the actual structure of the SRF produced in the document are worthy of note.
2. Firstly related to the SRF, the terminology used in the document is inconsistent, with the terms *components* and *outcomes* being interchangeable. Normally a component would be one or more outcomes amounting to a coherent part of the overall strategy. In this case they appear to have been treated as outcomes themselves even though the four components include nine outcomes, which in itself is an extraordinary number of outcomes expected from one intervention.
3. The SRF has indicators associated with the components but in the opinion of the TE there are no indicators for the outcomes (see Table 1). While the SRF does have statements included in the indicator column for each of the nine outcomes these do not amount to viable indicators because they are either restating outputs and targets or deliverables and there are no baselines or targets associated with them. This also applies to some extent to the indicators associated with the component-level although the latter do have recorded baselines. In short, and in layperson’s terms; it is a bit of a mess.
4. Arguably this should have been addressed during the inception phase but, for the avoidance of doubt, the SRF had passed review by the UNDP Regional Technical Adviser, by the GEF Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) and by the GEF Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Therefore it would be unreasonable to expect the UNDP CO and the PMU to challenge the SRF during the febrile period of the project’s start-up[[21]](#footnote-21). It should also be noted that, despite the fact that the SRF is a monitoring tool and critical for adaptive management, projects naturally defer to its contractual function and, in the experience of this evaluator, it is extremely difficult, sometimes impossible, for a CO and a PMU to make changes to the SRF. Had this project had a mid-term review (MTR) it is likely that the SRF would have been challenged because an evaluator is often in a stronger position to do so than the CO and PMU.
5. While the SRF is reasonable tool for monitoring a project’s performance and impact there is a contradiction between the adaptive management function and the contractual or audit function. In terms of successful outcomes the former is more important and a SRF which provides a clear logical hierarchy for the project’s intervention can be very valuable to the PMU. In this instance the SRF does not provide a clear logical hierarchy for the project’s stated purpose, indeed it appears to be something of an afterthought. For instance the fourth component is a stand-alone project in itself and has very little bearing on mainstreaming *per se[[22]](#footnote-22)*.
6. It is not possible to recreate the rationale behind these decisions because the early documentation surrounding the project’s formulation (e.g. PIF, etc.) is not available, there was a change in UNDP personnel immediately prior to the project starting and neither was the PMU involved in the project’s formulation. However, it is worthy of note that, despite these quite considerable drawbacks the project has been able to give a very good account of itself although this would have been made much easier for them had there been a good SRF in place.
7. More widely relating to the project’s strategy, while it is reasonably clear and understandable what the project objectives was it is less clear exactly how it was going to do it without affecting the decision—making structure within ASEZA. Furthermore, the large number of outcomes (nine in total) meant that in some instances one outcome was relying on a single output which was addressing an expansive and complex issue. For example, *Outcome 3.2: Benefits of marine biodiversity equitably shared:*

*“The purpose of this outcome is to ensure that the marine and coastal resources of Gulf of Aqaba are shared equally for the benefit of the local Aqaba population and visitors to the area. This includes consideration of the activities already occurring in the region such as glass boat operations, diving activities, the Marine Park and MSS to be in balance with the development of new resort and port facilities.*

***Output 3.2.1:*** *Existing CZM plans updated and formal ICZM process established to oversee implementation of ICZM activities and ensure marine biodiversity needs are addressed.*

***Activities:***

*3.2.1.1 Identify value of resources provided by marine biodiversity through stakeholder workshops and consultation, including NGOs and community groups.*

*3.2.1.2 Review and update the existing CZM plan and ensure appropriate and adequate public beach and accessible dive sites for all users are available;*

*3.2.1.3 Promote cross-sectoral initiatives to improve communication and conflict resolution between stakeholders to deliver mutually compatible benefits;*

*3.2.1.4 Develop a targeted, structured program for implementing the CZM plan; and*

*3.2.1.5 Conduct and promote an inclusive and equitable participatory process for balancing social, marine biodiversity conservation and economic components of the coast”.[[23]](#footnote-23)*

1. This single output equated to an entire project, at least a small project (under US$ one million) if not a full sized GEF project (FSP). It might be argued that this was supported to some extent by other project components, outcomes or even outputs. However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny if one considers the necessary logical sequencing of events which would need to take place (e.g. valuing the ecosystem resources, building a platform for participation, building capacity, advocacy, etc., which would have had to take place sequentially and not concurrently). With just three years to accomplish all of these tasks it is the project equivalent of making a cake by pouring all the ingredients in at the same time, putting it in the oven and expecting it come out already iced with lighted candles on it. There is no room for error, absorption and those inevitable events (such as the four changes in Chief Executives of ASEZA) experienced during the lifetime of any GEF project.
2. Secondly it appears, at least on paper, to rely heavily on the making of a “business case” for conserving coastal biodiversity, but this would assume that there *is* a “business case” to be made, and that this “business case” can compete with the lure of investment, that there is a level playing field in the decision-making process, and the pressures placed upon decision-makers by events (such as the 2009 global economic slowdown) would override the sort of strategic thinking necessary to calculate trade-offs. For this to begin to filter through to the decision-making process would require considerably more time than was available to the project[[24]](#footnote-24). Further, there is an unstated assumption that decisions relating to development are made purely on economic or financial grounds whereas the reality is that such decisions are more likely to be made based on a much broader and inherently *political[[25]](#footnote-25)* range of variables.
3. Inherent in this approach are numerous value judgements and assumptions, a typical example of which might be; the dismissive attitude of the Project Document to the artisanal fishery because of its low monetary value and low volume of catch even though the fishery currently supports between eighty to one hundred boats.
4. Thirdly the institutional structure of ASEZA is such that the project was arguably in the wrong position within ASEZA (see section 2.2) and unable to influence the institutional structure. While ASEZA has considerable and impressive planning capabilities within the Directorate of Planning, along with the capabilities of the other four Directorates, the structure of the organisation compartmentalises these capacities which seems to prevent them from being integrated in a manner which would be necessary for, for instance, the development *and implementation* of an integrated coastal zone management plan.
5. When this is coupled with what appears to be an increasingly corporate mandate of ASEZA (as compared to the much broader mandate of a Municipality), that is; planning is development led and not necessarily based upon the ecosystems ability to support growth or a wider set of social policies (e.g. public access to the beach front) then it becomes extremely difficult for the project and the Directorates themselves to achieve the outcomes expressed in the Project Document. No matter how hard it tried the project was always going to have a limited impact because integrated coastal zone management (including the mainstreaming of biodiversity) needs to be *ex ante* and not *ex post* whereas within the current structure and function of ASEZA ICZM is effectively added after investment planning due to the structure of the five Directorates and the drive to attract investment.
6. Lastly the translocation of the coral from the new port site to the Aqaba Marine Park was undoubtedly an enormous and time-consuming undertaking for a small project, it was carried out skilfully and earlier in the project than planned (in the first year rather than the second). The project made the greatest use of the exercise to build local capacities and raise awareness and support for coral conservation. It needed some judicious “juggling” of the project’s work planning and resource commitment necessitating rapid decision-making and considerable support from the UNDP CO. For the avoidance of doubt, had the project not stepped in at this point, backed up by the CO, it is likely that much of the coral scheduled for translocation would have been destroyed or incorrectly translocated resulting in a low survival rate of transplanted corals.
7. However, it is hard to see the linkages between the fourth component and the mainstreaming objectives of the project *per se.* Clearly there are linkages with the Environmental Fund and ensuring that developers paid for the coral translocation but not actually moving the coral. A reasonable speculation might be that ASEZA wanted the sort of technical expertise (experience in coral translocation is not readily available globally) which a UNDP-GEF project can provide and therefore there was a compromise to include this aspect of coral conservation within a mainstreaming project. This would be supported by the project’s budget because there was no allocation from the GEF grant for this entire component. It remains that this component was always going to be more consuming of project resources, in particular the time and energies of the PMU, with very little mainstreaming benefits to show from it, no matter how skilfully and efficiently it was carried out by the project.

### Assumptions and risks

1. The Project Document provided a risk matrix and project responses which was adequate but not particularly useful. For instance it phrases three of the risks in a way that describes how the particular issue might impact on the project and its outcomes (e.g. Development of southern port and new tourist resorts take place so rapidly that negative environmental impacts on coral reefs cannot be mitigated) whereas the remaining six risks listed are simple sentences (e.g. *Institutional Capacity in Information Management*) which provide very little indication of how this particular issue is a risk to the project *per se*.
2. While this may seem pedantic on the part of the TE *institutional capacity in information management* is not a risk. “*Weak institutional capacity in information management”* or “*information management constrains decision-making”* might be a risk to which the project can respond but the former is, for all intents and purposes, a simple label. The reason that it is raised here is that it may be an indication that there were was insufficient analysis going into the project design and perhaps, that the design had already set out on a course of action for the project based on preconceived views of what was necessary (e.g. building a business case for coral conservation). All of which might lead the TE to believe that the project design may not have been providing many of the right answers because it was asking the wrong questions.

## Table 3 Project Document risk, ratings and TE assessment

| **Project Document Risks** | | | **Terminal Evaluation** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Risk** | **Risk Rating** | **Risk Mitigation Measure** | **TE comment** |
| Development of southern port and new tourist resorts take place so rapidly that negative environmental impacts on coral reefs cannot be mitigated | **H** | * ‘Business case’ for coral reef and marine diversity conservation and standards for environmentally friendly tourism operations should trigger a shift towards more sustainable operations * Media campaign will increase appreciation of marine biodiversity and ecosystem services by both government and civil society * Translocation project will adhere to World Bank/GEF Targeted Coral Reef Research guidelines on reef restoration; advance feasibility study undertaken and appropriate technical expertise brought in. | This risk was correctly identified but its impact on the project (not just the marine resources) does not appear to have been flagged. In the event this did happen and was extremely disruptive for the PMU and the UNDP CO because they had to rapidly mobilize (with no allocation in the GEF budget for this component). To expect the “business case” to have triggered a response in this instance was less mitigation and more wishful thinking. In the event the project did remarkably well, making decisions quickly and generally making the right decisions under the circumstances starting with moving this component to the first year of the project and delaying, to a large extent, the other activities. A clearer identification of this risk would have provided a large contingency (always unpopular with GEF) to allow the PMU to deal with such a situation.  What was not identified in the project’s assessment of risks is the danger that translocation, when combined with any off-setting mechanism, may now become the action of first resort rather than the last. Any “business case” for coral reef and marine diversity conservation needs to be nested within a very clear policy and regulatory framework where the trade-offs between economic growth and ecosystem resilience can be clearly measured and not based simply upon a narrow set of financial or economic parameters. On the surface this exists but in reality the driving force behind decision-making in ASEZA is investment or economic growth. This remains a considerable risk. |
| Spatial plan not implemented or recognized because of economic pressure for development and insufficient capacity | **H** | * Plan formally endorsed and made publicly available * Media campaign to convey messages on biodiversity values and co-opt sector’s support for conservation * Mechanisms established to ensure that MSS, ASEZA and other relevant agencies work together * Capacity built for improved implementation | This was a considerable risk and what was not foreseen at the time of the project’s design was the additional pressures which would be brought to bear on ASEZA resulting from the 2009 global economic crisis providing an overriding incentive to favour investment. Certainly the newly established database has contributed to reducing this risk. While the project has built capacities it is worth questioning just how the project was going to do this in the time available and bring the results of this capacity building to bear on the planning process. ASEZA has quite remarkable human resources apparently quite capable of implementing a spatial plan but what seems to be a barrier to this is the internal structure of the organisation, its departmental hierarchy and the fact that each Commissioner brings a change in direction and to some extent to the mandate of the organization. To this extent the structure of ASEZA is compartmentalized with some Directorates possibly having greater influence or power than others (e.g. in relation to attracting investment) and this makes it difficult for the MSS and ASEZA and other relevant organizations to work together in a coherent manner. |
| Continued inequality in access to marine resources, with local residents needs subjugated to the demands of the foreign tourism industry | **M** | * Marine spatial plan developed in a participatory manner with input from all stakeholders including NGOs and community groups (i.e., JREDS, the Marine Park, glass boat and diving operators) * Zoning to ensure adequate public beach and accessible dive sites for all users | The project has played an important role in striving for equality in access to marine resources. However, the original project design did not provide sufficient resources nor a mechanism to enable this. To really have been effective the project would have had to haven institutional reform mandate which it did not. While this has reduced the effectiveness of the project it is important to state that without the project in place there would have likely been a greater erosion of local residents and other resource user’s rights in favour of foreign tourism investment and other inward investment. A good example of this can be seen in the support and raising the profile of the Marine Park. |
| Institutional Capacity in Information Management | **M** | * Identified gap at project preparation phase * Capacity needs assessment conducted at outset of Project * Project outcome focused on developing GIS infrastructure and technical capability | These two risks are poorly articulated with little description of how they might impact on the project. They could even be mitigation measures. To some extent this was a lesser risk as was the subsequent risk below. In many aspects ASEZA has excellent capacities and certainly where there were technocratic deficiencies the project was filling these gaps. However, the more pressing risk was not the institutional capacities but the institutional organization and the way that ASEZA is established and structured. There is an existing and quite advanced policy framework in Jordan and a striking feature of the country as a whole is the excellent individual technical capacities which makes the country stand out in the region. The risk here was that the project, because of its position in the institution and the structural organisation of the institution, would be unable to bring these excellent technical capacities to bear on the decision-making process. Within the ASEZA Directorates, it would appear to the TE, that within the ASEZA Directorates many individuals are very clear on what needs to be done and where the strengths and weaknesses are but because ASEZA appears to have a largely investment-led mandate and does not have an internal policy framework which lends itself to holistic land management the Directorates appear unable to influence the planning decision so that the trade-offs between investment and ecosystem resilience can be reasonably made. Therefore the risk has been, and continues to be, that ecosystem resilience (or goods and services) is mostly traded off against development, or more accurately investment projects. |
| Institutional capacity in environmental management | **M** | * Identified as a gap in capacity- the EIA process is theoretically strong but additional human and infrastructure resources required * Third component of the project is aimed at developing institutional capacity |
| Socio-economic effects on local communities | **M** | * Improved coastal zone management practice will result in greater resource sharing * Greater communications with developers as potential employers for improved coordination of training opportunities for locals * Identification of resource limitations through improved information management and intra-governmental coordination * Increased public participation in EIA permitting process, biodiversity conservation activities, consultation workshops will serve to improve communications and identify risk areas for consideration | As above, the risk is not well-phrased in the sense that it does not describe the manner in which these might pose a risk, and indeed, to whom, the project, the local communities, the project’s outcomes? It is too vague and reinforces the impression that the project design was poorly executed and to some extent half-finished. Without articulating the nature of the risk is impossible to adequately describe an appropriate mitigation measure.  In fact the mitigation measures appear to be much greater than what the project, with its limited resources and time available could actually deliver. This was probably compounded by the distracting task of moving the corals in the first year. |
| Intra governmental cooperation | **L** | * Intra governmental agency liaison by the Project Management Unit * Scrutiny of coordinated activities by the Project Board * Overview of coordinated activities by the Project Steering Committee | Intra governmental cooperation is not normally considered a risk in a project but might better be described as a mitigation measure. Therefore one must assume that the Project Document is referring to a lack of cooperation. In which case the mitigation measures set out are quite reasonable. |
| Accidental and illegal activities | **L** | * Improved public awareness of the importance of marine biodiversity conservation * Improved professional awareness (among commercial resource users) of the importance of marine biodiversity conservation | Similarly this risk is incompletely phrased. The mitigation measures appear quite weak in the sense that they do not refer to enforcement and the courts and appear to relate to resource users and the “public” but not necessarily to investment developments.  Much was made in the project’s design about the Environmental Fund which was later changed to Emergency and Environmental Fund which gave wider uses for the monies held in the fund (into which fines for accidental or illegal activities damaging the environment are paid) which could reduce the resources available for biodiversity conservation and in the event no environmental revenues have been collected from a number of infringements within the Marine Park as all of these violation cases are still at court. |
| Exceptional climatic conditions | L | * Identification and protection of resilient reefs * Introduction of ecosystem-based management with spatial planning * Introduction of performance monitoring and adaptive management * Monitoring of coral reef transplantation and coral health surveys | This risk while still not completely described is in many ways easier to understand. Presumably extreme climatic conditions or more likely weather events could cause incidents of coral bleaching or storm damage etc. In which case the risk and the mitigation measures are quite reasonable. |
| **Overall Risk Rating** | **M** |  |  |

### Lessons from other relevant projects

1. The Project Document does not mention the incorporation of experience from other GEF projects or similar relevant projects in the region. The closest the TE can find is the incorporation of best practice and internationally recognised guidelines on the translocation of coral[[26]](#footnote-26). At the time of the project’s design there was a growing body of project experience on mainstreaming which could have been used to shape the design of the project but there is little indication that this has filtered through to the design. For instance the Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley / Red Sea Flyway[[27]](#footnote-27) which was being designed around the same time as the ICZM project clearly stated that “*mainstreaming projects have been shown to require long timeframes in order to build national constituency and ownership. It provides new challenges to traditional conservation projects*” and therefore, “*a timeframe of ten years and two phases has been selected for project implementation*”[[28]](#footnote-28). Admittedly ten years and two phases for a GEF project is unusual but it does indicate that there was experience available indicating that mainstreaming takes time and three years is unlikely to have the sorts of impacts expected by the Project Document. This is not to say that a three-year project cannot have a useful impact on the process of mainstreaming, as this project has demonstrated, but the full expectations of the Project Document were unlikely to be realised within this timeframe[[29]](#footnote-29), in particular the issue of making a “business case”.

### Planned stakeholder participation

1. The Project Document provided what might be considered an unusual and very one-sided account of the stakeholders which arguably reflects a very technocratic bias to the project’s design. There is a comprehensive list of institutional or technocratic stakeholders and even two user groups; the Aqaba Dive Association (ADA) and the Aqaba Cooperative Maritime Society for Glass Boats (ACMSGB), however, there is no representation of a broader set of non-state actors. Although the Project Document refers to a Stake Holder Involvement Plan[[30]](#footnote-30) and a Stakeholder Engagement Plan[[31]](#footnote-31) no such plan exists within the document. A *Consultation and Liaison Strategy* is provided in Annex 4[[32]](#footnote-32) of the Project Document but this hardly provides a platform for participation and appears to relegate the “general public” to a group which should be informed and made aware rather than encouraged to engage in any meaningful participation with the project. Given that that outcome 2.3 was intended to increase *public understanding [so that it] pressures political commitment for strengthened marine biodiversity conservation* it might have been expected to have some mechanism which would allow the “public” to participate in the project more effectively.
2. Because this was a mainstreaming project and that it was addressing a resource that has high public utility at least for recreational purposes it is surprising that the many fishing boat owners and a wider public appear to have been excluded from the very design, indeed the Project Document comments somewhat disparagingly that (section underlined for emphasis):

*“Stakeholders for this project include governmental, non-governmental (NGO) and private sector organizations with specific interests in the Aqaba coastal zone. In general there is regard and concern expressed for the existing and future marine biodiversity (species, communities, habitats) of the Gulf of Aqaba among most sector players. However, the primary exceptions to this observation are the general public. There is little obvious consideration shown by the beach users with regards to the disposal of litter when at the seaside. Solid waste management is noted as a significant issue for the Marine Park, and the Diver NGOs consulted indicated that they regularly organize and participate in frequent underwater clean-ups to respond to the problem”*

1. Despite this Output 3.1.1 *Marine spatial plan for the ASEZ, identifying user rights allocations and regulations, developed and approved with full public consultation and participation,* was clearly intended to address some of these wider public use issues. This is fairly typical of the Project Document which gives the impression of jumping from one issue to another without describing a coherent approach. Perhaps this is because it ignores what is arguably the main issue, at least in terms of mainstreaming; ASEZA is in a position which is normally filled by a Municipality but ASEZA has a more corporate structure and function with a clear mandate to stimulate investment in the ASEZ. Within this arrangement it is challenging to achieve a wide public participation, more so when the organisation is under stress due to the 2009 global economic situation and has a high turnover of Chief Executives (four in the space of this project).
2. While ASEZA has a number of stated environmental policy objectives[[33]](#footnote-33) (e.g. environmental, water, energy conservation, discharge) there are no specific policy documents describing the means to operationalise these, thus despite the extraordinary human resources the organisation has there is no stated strategy into which biodiversity can be mainstreamed.
3. While it is reasonable to assume that the most pressing threat to coastal biodiversity came from the development pressures largely within the control of ASEZA it seems a little unfair to denigrate the general public’s stake in the project’s outcomes as little more than littering the beach and suggests that the project’s *design* was taking a very narrow and selective approach towards mainstreaming (see section 4)[[34]](#footnote-34).

### Replication approach

1. The project has been able to demonstrate a quite effective replication approach largely on the strength and activity of the PMU. The Project Document makes a case for the translocation of corals as a means of mitigating the effects of climate change. Undoubtedly the process of moving the coral from the port site to the Marine Park has built local capacities in this area which will have numerous future uses in conserving coral, albeit with the caveat that translocation might be seen as a mitigation measure in an increasing number of coastal developments.
2. The project has been a continuous contributor of various experiences to the Regional Organisation for the Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (PERSGA) and the Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment (CAMRE) which has had and will continue to have a lasting effect on marine conservation in the region.
3. It is much harder to judge the claims made in the Project Document that the economic evaluation would:

“*also produce lessons and establish the practice of looking into the values of ecosystems and their elements through the broader lens of local, social, economic and financial contribution to the economy rather than their strict ecological and biological value. The testing of this approach through this project will enable (i) the development of local capacities, within economists, to undertake such assessments; (ii) the testing of communication approaches for decision-makers to fulfil the dual goals of socio-economic development and environment conservation; (iii) the establishment of public-private sector partnerships as well as the determination of offset values on the basis of factual data.*”[[35]](#footnote-35)

1. Firstly, because the economic valuation of corals and marine biodiversity has still to be carried out[[36]](#footnote-36) and secondly because this was expecting much from a single study which, even with the best will in the world, would likely provide highly contestable data which would then have to be contrasted with other economic and financial data; which might itself be biased in favour of a specific outcome or development. An example of this is the apparent dismissal of the artisanal fisheries in the Project Document because of its low monetary value despite the fact that there are more than eighty boats involved in this[[37]](#footnote-37).
2. For the economic valuation to have such an impact in terms of replication it would have required a much larger project, to be clear this is not a criticism of the implementation, because there are too many “loose ends” in the statement from the Project Document. For instance; “*the establishment of public-private sector partnerships as well as the determination of offset values on the basis of factual data”* requires a more comprehensive definition of (presumably) biodiversity offsetting and if offset values were to be determined it would require a watertight fund into which these values might be paid for the sole use of further biodiversity conservation. However, the Environment Fund[[38]](#footnote-38) within ASEZA was changed to the Emergency and Environment Fund which appears to allow a much broader use of the fund than it was originally intended. Thus any offsetting risks becoming a “monetization” of biodiversity without the certainty of reinvestment in conservation.
3. The TE raises this here because, notwithstanding the project’s success during implementation the project design needs to be critically examined. As just stated, there were many “loose ends” and expectations of a much larger and more strategically (within ASEZA) placed project which meant that, even though the project has performed very well, it was never going to live up to the expectations expressed in the Project Document.
4. However, the project has managed to replicate its experience and through collaboration with PERSGA in particular, it has contributed considerably to coastal conservation issues in the region through good example and effective communication.
5. Within ASEZA it has been highly appreciated by the Directorates of Environment, Planning and Tourism in particular which are likely to continue to expand the project’s impact.

### UNDP comparative advantage

1. At the beginning of this section the TE stated that it would be an oversimplification to present the ICZM project as just being the product of a weak design and an exemplary implementation. This is because conservation, and the development and implementation of conservation projects, is very far from an exact science. In fact many GEF projects, because they are dealing with highly complex, unpredictable socio-ecological systems, have so many compromises incorporated within their design, and are under-resourced, and inevitably they are rushed in their development, so that by the time they are squeezed into a GEF operational programme mould (in this case mainstreaming) it almost appears that biodiversity is sometimes retrofitted to a project. To be clear, the ICZM project was not as bad as this. But it is a feature of these projects, not as a result of incompetence but due to the very complex nature of conservation and the limits of resources available during the project design phase.
2. It is within this complex, highly dynamic and unpredictable environment that UNDP gains a comparative advantage. In this case the Country Office has had an enduring relationship with Aqaba stretching back to the 1990s, UNDP was well-known to almost all of the players and has access to a network of national specialist expertise. Furthermore, it is able to make strategic decisions at critical times and without causing delays. UNDP clearly recognises the strategic importance of Aqaba as part of Jordan’s overall approach to biodiversity conservation.
3. All this added up to considerable support to the PMU, and to ASEZA as well resulting in considerable trust between the different parties which makes for effective implementation. Therefore this has allowed the project to overcome many of the difficulties which otherwise would have affected it due to the weak Project Document.
4. Perhaps the best example of this can be seen in the first year with the translocation of the effected coral from the new port site. Originally scheduled for the second year this considerable undertaking was brought forwards to the first year (beginning in during the inception phase). This rescheduling of such a large undertaking had all the potential to derail the project however, in the event UNDP was able to rapidly mobilise resources and importantly, make critical decisions without hesitation, so that the PMU could work closely with all the parties and the project executed a very effective translocation programme.
5. Other examples of this way of working and the strengths of the CO are evident in the effective working relationship between the CO, PMU and ASEZA which involves considerable trust between parties. This trust is the result of UNDP having a strong “on the ground” presence in Jordan which is closely aligned with the national development aspirations through the Country Programme Action Plan and many years of working closely together.
6. As has been already stated the project preparation phase of the ICZM is fairly impenetrable but during the implementation it is broadly agreed by all stakeholders that the UNDP CO has been closely involved in the project, has made strategic decisions at the right time but has avoided micro-managing the project, trusting rather in the PMU and the Executing Partner.
7. The UNDP Country Programme provides a broad mandate for the agency which is aligned with the national priorities through the UNDAF. This provides a mandate for the CO to address issues which invariably affect mainstreaming projects such as poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters and gender which can easily be side-lined when the focus is on biodiversity but are core subjects of UNDP involvement in a country, yet all are issues that directly affect biodiversity conservation and are in turn affected by the ecosystem.
8. Lastly the accessibility and involvement of UNDP staff in the project is an important feature. For the various partners these individuals within UNDP are not remote nor distant but have taken a keen and pragmatic interest in the project and are well known and respected by the numerous partners.

### Linkages between other interventions in the sector

1. The project has been integrated with other initiatives in the Red Sea region most notably through involvement with PERSGA which is the regional organisation with a mandate to conserve marine ecosystems of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. ASEZA is the national Focal Point for Jordan and the AMP manager is the Technical/Operational Focal Point. There were considerable synergies between the work PERSEGA have been engaged in, particularly PERSEGA’s new full-sized World Bank (WB)-GEF project *Strategic Ecosystem Management of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden* which was seen as a potential for connection and synergies in the field of environmental monitoring.
2. PERSGA has used the project’s approach for the web-GIS based system and both project and PERSGA have ensured that their databases are compatible for future integration as a regional database system.
3. Joint monitoring events and activities have been carried out with PERSGA in both Aqaba and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
4. The technical capacities of ASEZA and the project were clearly recognised when the project was requested to comment on the newly established WB-GEF project’s first work plan and also as a measure to avoid any duplication of efforts. This recognition of the ICZM project extended to the Project Manager being part of the new project’s Steering Committee.
5. The project also collaborated with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in Advanced International training Programmes on “Integrated Sustainable Coastal Zone Management) for the Middle East and North African Region”. The programme was especially designed for qualified personal who were in positions to drive change or reform processes at different levels in their parent organisations. The training helped establish regional networks, assumes that the recipient organisation is open to change and receive training in enhanced methods of working.

### Management arrangements

1. The project management arrangements set out in the Project Document[[39]](#footnote-39) are confusing.
2. The ICZM project was nationally executed through ASEZA. The Project Document gave two reasons for this decision, that; *(i) ASEZA requested the proposal; [and] (ii) has the mandate and institutional set up to deliver on the objective of the project*. To this the TE can add that ASEZA has significant internal human resource capacities within the relevant Directorates and constitutes the primary planning organisation for the ASEZ.
3. UNDP, the Implementing Agency was responsible for project assurance and “high-level oversight”.
4. The project was directly managed by a PMU embedded within ASEZA and consisting of a Project Manager (Management Advisor in the Project Document) and a Project Assistant. ASEZA appointed a National Project Director to whom the PMU was responsible. The Project Document provided Terms of Reference (ToR) for these positions and none others, including the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and the Project Board (PB)[[40]](#footnote-40). During the Inception Workshop a decision was made to not form a PSC because the brief description of its responsibilities were very similar to the PB and a Project Advisory Committee (PAC) was established instead.
5. The description of the management arrangements in the Project Document are not very clear. While the management arrangements have not affected the implementation and execution of the project it is important to stress that this has more likely been down to the good working relationship between the different players and the skills and integrity of the individuals and institutions involved and not necessarily “good luck”; and certainly not good design. This last point is important because good management arrangements are critical to the smooth implementation of GEF projects. In the event the management arrangements put in place at the beginning of the project have worked very well.

## Project Implementation

1. The TE has commented at length on the weaknesses contained in the project’s design and of the impenetrable nature of the Project Document. The implementation phase of the project can be sharply contrasted against the weak design in its efficiency and professionalism. To some extent this has overcome a number of the problems which could have carried over from the design phase into the implementation.

### Adaptive management

1. The UNDP guidance for conducting UNDP-GEF Terminal Evaluations describes adaptive management as “*changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation*”.
2. In this sense the project has not made any significant changes to the project design nor its outputs and it is questionable just how much adaptive management can take place in any three-year project given the bureaucratic procedures which this would entail; it would need to have an extremely confidant, even brave, PMU in order to challenge the design and achieve these changes in such a short space of time. Perhaps it is possible in a “single-issue” project which might be more focused, for instance if the project were just translocating the coral (component 4), but the fact is that it was a complicated and overburdened project which the PMU was expected to implement.
3. In theory the project should have critically examined the objectives and made significant adaptations to the project because they were too ambitious; but the reality is that projects *per se* do not have the luxury of time to sit back, critically asses the design and then begin the procedures of making significant changes to the strategy. The period between the Project identification Form (PIF) approval (16.01.2009) and project approval (10.05.2011) was twenty-eight months, almost as long as the project was scheduled to last. Not unusually personnel in key positions had changed and the circumstances had changed starting with the global economic events in late 2009 and critically, the start of the port facilities development which meant that the coral translocation, a significant undertaking, had to begin immediately and not as planned in the second year.
4. The Project Document had underestimated the project resources needed for this activity. While there was no allocation of the GEF fund for component 4 the time and energy required from the PMU which this component required appears to have eclipsed all the other components during the first year.
5. In this context the project has been remarkably adaptive. Section 3.1.6 highlighted the UNDP comparative advantage and it is in this rapid decision-making process, obtaining approvals and individuals taking risks where the project’s adaptive management is most apparent. Without the close relationship between the PMU, PB and UNDP CO this would not have been possible.
6. It might be argued that this undertaking was merely shifting one activity to an earlier date, but in reality it meant delaying many of the other project activities and then ensuring that these could catch up once the translocation had taken place, so it involved some calculated risks which in the TE’s analysis were the most reasonable course of action and resulted in an extremely successful operation which the project was able to make the most of in terms of awareness and gaining support from various parties as well as significantly building local capacities.
7. Therefore it is possible for the TE to conclude that the project has been adaptive in its management.

### Partnership arrangements

1. Section 3.1.4 has already commented that the stakeholder arrangements in the Project Document were inclined towards institutional partners and there was little provision for a broad public participation in the project.
2. However, during the implementation of the project the PMU has actively opened up the participation making it more inclusive of local non-institutional and non-state actors. Working with the AMP and the aquarium at the Marine Science Station there has been a conscious effort to open up participation in the project making it more inclusive.
3. As is common with many GEF projects what rudimentary stakeholder engagement plan existed in the Project Document did not adequately define what “the local community” or “local resource users” were and therefore there was no structure or mechanism available for their representation in the project. The project has strived, with considerable success, to address this deficiency but has not had the resources, nor the time, to really get to grips with the process of identifying mechanisms that would allow the different non-state and non-institutional stakeholders to participate on a more equitable basis. The TE recognizes that the PMU (and the various Directorates in ASEZA) also recognize this and the project has clearly acted as a catalyst to promote discussion on this issue which is an important role of any project.
4. Institutionally the partnership arrangements have worked well. The involvement of the AMP has raised the status and profile as well as better defining its role in coastal management, of the Marine Park (greatly facilitated by the close and productive working relationship between the PMU and the Aqaba Marine Park Director as the project Operational Focal Point) within the overall organization of ASEZA although it is not clear whether this higher profile will be affected by the institutional restructuring which is scheduled in the next year.
5. Additionally the PMU has developed a strong partnership with some of the relevant units within the ASEZA Directorates (e.g. the EIA Unit, GIS Unit, MIS Unit) which has been a benefit of embedding the PMU within ASEZA.
6. The project has established very good working relationships with most of the other partners (e.g. the Royal Marine Conservation Society of Jordan (JREDS), the Aqaba Cooperative Maritime Society for Glass Boats and the University of Jordan and the Aqaba Dive Association. While these organizations had been identified in during the project preparation grant (PPG) phase the strong technical capacities and interpersonal skills of the PM have been an important aspect in building these partnerships.
7. Regional partnerships arrangements have been largely and quite logically through PERSGA and have been discussed at length in sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.7 and all which is added here is that the very strong technical capacities of the PMU have increased the project’s credibility with regional partners.

### Feedback from monitoring and evaluation activities used for adaptive management

1. The project’s SRF was not a useful document for monitoring progress and adapting management accordingly (see section 3.1.1). However, the project has made intelligent use of the document and has been able to keep track of the “bigger picture”.
2. As has been stated already the most febrile adaptive activity took place during the first year with component 4 (coral translocation). During this first year the PMU in particular, but all of the core project partners (e.g. ASEZA, UNDP, AMP, etc.) had to “think on their feet”[[41]](#footnote-41) with quick and efficient negotiations between the PMU, PB and UNDP senior personnel in order to get the project moving, which it did so successfully.
3. The first point in the project cycle was the inception phase where several key decisions were made including establishing a project Advisory Committee rather than the Steering Committee because there was significant duplication in the roles of the Steering Committee and the Project Board[[42]](#footnote-42). It would appear that the Advisory Committee has been more accessible and dynamic than a Steering Committee would have been and has allowed the project to react quickly to changes in circumstances, particularly in areas such as getting the funds for the translocation released from the Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC) and in UNDP providing seeding finance at critical times to component 4.
4. The PIR provide a realistic and pragmatic account of the way in which the project was unfolding. Identifying weaknesses in the project design, proposing practical solutions and at time proposing new ideas to enhance the impact of the project (e.g. the development of a system of interns drawn from graduates of the University of Jordan to work at the AMP jointly building capacity of the interns and the AMP).

### Project finance

1. The financial aspects of the project have been accurately reported and the project was audited once in December 2013 (see 3.2.5) when no issues were found by the Auditor[[43]](#footnote-43).
2. The project design issues carried through to the finance of the project and the budget had to be considerably modified during the implementation. It is reasonable to conclude from this that the local capacities for some of the activities were very much overestimated during the project design and insufficient budget allocation was provided. Furthermore, assumptions about local capacities for specific activities[[44]](#footnote-44) were overestimated so that component 4 had no budget allocation from the GEF fund and thus when international expertise had to be brought in, the incremental benefit, it had to be met from another component’s budget line (US$ 20,000 from component 1). Similarly, the cost of other activities was in a number of instances underestimated in the original budget.
3. Such budget revisions can on occasion derail a project as lengthy negotiations take place. However, this appears not to have happened with good justifications made for any revisions and a smooth and efficient decision-making process keeping the project moving. As a result three revisions were made in successive years. The largest revisions have affected component 1 which included a number of costly activities and outputs (e.g. the marine spatial plan: US$ 40,000; preparation of the State of the Coasts Report: US$ 70,000; establishing a database system: US$ 35,000; etc.). Table 4 provides an account of the Project Document budget against the actual budget execution.

### Co-financing

1. The project’s co-financing is also confusing. In common with many GEF project designs there is inadequate explanation of the co-financing (cash and in-kind) to fully assess whether it was realistic or not. To be clear the project has been co-financed and those in-kind (and in most instances cash) co-financed items have been provided. For instance there is no doubt that the PMU had a well-resourced office with sufficient space and equipment, logistics and support from ASEZA, especially the staff from the AMP and the Environment Affairs Directorate and support and time allocated by the ASEZA Focal Point have been more than sufficient. To the extent that the TE is satisfied that the level of co-financing expected of a small-sized GEF project has been provided.
2. However the TE raises the issue of co-financing because figures were included in the Project Document which were unrealistic and appear to have been accepted at the time without questioning. For instance component 4 has a figure of US$5,700,000 (in-kind) which equates to the entire off-set payment from the port development to compensate for the need to destroy coral reefs. As this was in-kind co-financing it must have been clear that an exercise which would need to bring in external expertise was going to need a cash component to support it if there was nothing allocated in the GEF fund even though this would have been an ideal way to demonstrate the incremental benefits of GEF funding. In the event the translocation cost US$350,000 in cash (co-financing) and US$ 20,000 (GEF fund component 1) making a total of US$ 370,000 although the TE believes that this amount could be more because there was in all likelihood considerable in-kind support by ASEZA, and in particular from the AMP, to this exercise.
3. In all it leaves the TE with a feeling that GEF is at times too demanding of projects and project partners of co-financing commitments and too readily accepts co-financing commitments which are very hard to demonstrate with any certainty at the point of evaluation without picking through the minutiae of other institutions budgets. As a result there is a distorted picture of the levels of biodiversity conservation financing.
4. The co-financing is confusing and it is difficult to determine what has and has not materialised because the TE suspects that the original figures were over-inflated. For instance the US$3,700,000 in-kind contribution to component 4 was in-kind but in actual fact US$350,000 in cash was provided for the coral transfer which was probably more useful than the in-kind support but would not cover the engagement of external technical expertise and by all accounts the project had to struggle to get this released from the Environment Fund. Therefore the project has reported co-financing of US$7,250,000 (in-kind) and US$375,000 (cash) from the Government of Jordan (GoJ). However, the Project Document reported co-financing from the GoJ of US$7,250,000 (in-kind). Therefore the TE has subtracted the cash amount provided for the coral translocation from the in-kind sum reported by the project to give a total GoJ co-financing of US$6,900,000 (in-kind), and US$350,000 (cash).
5. The project has also leveraged approximately US$30,000 (cash) from IUCN as a contribution to the economic valuation of the coral reef systems. See Table 5.

## Table 4 Project Document budget versus actual budget execution

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome** | **project Document** | **TE** | **%of total** | **Variation** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** |
| **1** | **175,000.00** | **465,311.71** | **17.5%** | **+ 165%** | **4,345.94** | **41,648.09** | **97,347.87** | **307,529.81** | **14,440** |
| **2** | **394,000.00** | **156,524.22** | **39.4%** | **- 60%** | **0** | **23,326.69** | **30,553.85** | **36,643.68** | **66,000** |
| **3** | **286,000.00** | **219,890.18** | **28.6%** | **- 23%** | **6,708.28** | **77,136.68** | **55,137.28** | **52,856,46** | **28,051.48** |
| **4\*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Project Management** | **145,000.00** | **157,869.73** | **14.5%** | **+9%** | **1,233.78** | **44,609.25** | **51,753.48** | **45,273.22** | **15,000** |
| **TOTALS** | **1,000,000** | **999,595.84** | **100%** | **-** | **12,288.00** | **186,720.71** | **234,792.48** | **442,303.17** | **123,491.48** |

* US$ 20,000 was effectively spent on this component although the International Technical Expert for coral translocation was paid through component 1.

## Table 5 Co-financing

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Source | Type | Amount reported in Project document (US$) | Amount reported by PMU at TE (US$) | Amount reported by TE (US$) | Comment by PMU | Comment by TE |
| Government | Cash | Nil | 375,000 | 375,000 | 350,000 paid “ultimately’ by ASEZA to cover the cost of the coral translocation  25,000 was paid by ASEZA as a contribution to the monitoring program we have proposed to include the new translocated coral sites | The TE agrees that this is cash co-financing and was effectively leveraged by the project because the Project Document did not report any cash co-financing |
|  | In-kind | 7,250,000 | 7,250,000 | 6,900,000 | 3.5 yrs. It covered:  Offices for project, logistics, support staff from AMP from the concerned sections, time allocated by the ASEZA’s focal point estimated as a one full working day a week, Transportation provided in so many events for participants in the project’s activities. | The TE considers that this estimate is too high as a result of including the full amount of the Environmental Fund in the Project Document and is an artifact of the pressure on the project design phase to provide unrealistic levels of co-financing. However, the PMU was fully resourced. |
| IUCN | Cash | Nil | 30,000 | 30,000 | This is our estimate, given that they are doing the assignment we offered them for 40,000 while the real cost of the work done by their side is around 70,000. | This is effectively leveraged cash co-financing to carry out one of the most important activities in the project (the economic valuation) which was under-budgeted in the Project’s design. |
|  | Total cash + in-kind | 7,250,000 | 7,655,000 | 7,305,000 |  |  |

1. Really it shouldn’t be this complicated and the Project Document provides a less than satisfactory explanation of the co-financing which when added to the delay between project design and the project start-up must have been very confusing for the PMU. However, the TE is satisfied that there has been co-financing of sufficient quantity provided to the project to accomplish the tasks within the timeframe and that the differences in the PMU reporting and the TE are due to the confusion in the Project Document and the project has actually leveraged cash co-financing (US$405,000) above that reported in the Project Document.
2. Lastly the Project Document reports both the entire GEF fund and the UNDP (US$50,000) financing of the project management, the latter also reported in the project budget, as co-financing reinforcing the TE’s impression that the Project Document was something of a mess.

### Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation

1. A standard UNDP-GEF monitoring and evaluation plan was provided in the Project Document (see Table 6). However, the weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation framework from the Project Document have already been discussed at length (section 3.1.1) and at the start of the project these are assessed as being below that which one would have expected in a Project Document on the basis that:

* There were no indicators associated with outcomes (the indicators were at the component level).
* The SRF does have statements included in the indicator column for each of the nine outcomes but these do not amount to viable indicators because they are either restating outputs and targets or deliverables and there are no baselines or targets associated with them. If we are to take all the statements written in the indicator column of the SRF then the project has a total of sixty-six indicators, arguably too many.
* The SRF included an unusually large number (nine) of outcomes. While the outputs have to a large extent provided a “tick-box” enabling the project to monitor project progress and performance the combination of a large number of “indicators”, indicators with baselines and targets at the component level but lacking the same at the outcome level, poorly phrased indicators and the inclusion of what are essentially targets or quite possibly outputs as indicators (especially at the output level) mean that the SRF lacks the strategic clarity and logic necessary for it to be a useful tool in determining the impact that the project was having or indeed, in articulating the project’s strategy in a coherent manner.
* A GEF Tracking Tool (Objective I Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool for Protected Areas) for the AMP should have been included with the Project Document as should as should a GEF Objective II Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Production Landscapes/Seascapes and Sectors. These were not filled during the PPG. The latter has been carried out for the TE but there is no baseline.

1. However, a number or monitoring and evaluation points were missing from the Project Document table (although they were covered in the text of that document), for instance the GEF Tracking Tool[[45]](#footnote-45), Project Board[[46]](#footnote-46) and Tripartite Reviews. Other shortcomings with the framework which suggest that there was insufficient thought involved in developing it relate to the budgeting for monitoring and evaluation. Yearly audits are required by the plan but it only allocates US$5,000, sufficient for only one audit procedure[[47]](#footnote-47). Furthermore, although the SRF required a
2. Therefore the SRF lacked sufficient clarity to make it a useful monitoring and evaluation tool leading the TE to conclude that at the project’s start up the monitoring and evaluation plan was less than satisfactory and in places (e.g. the annual audit) it was not sufficiently budgeted for.
3. A project as complicated as the ICZM project might have benefited from a mid-term review (MTR) by enhancing the adaptive management, providing an independent and external viewpoint on the project and addressing some of the weaknesses resulting from the PPG phase. However, given that the project was only three years in duration there would be little that a MTR could suggest changing because there simply would not have been sufficient time or resources to make any changes, once again indicating that there were a number of structural weaknesses in the project’s design.
4. The Project Steering Committee was never formed, instead its roles and responsibilities were given to the PB because the two roles were considered to be very similar with members from the same organizations (UNDP, ASEZA and MoPIC (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation) sitting on each both structures and the TE concludes that this was a reasonable and adaptive decision. There have been regular meetings of the PB (see Table 6) which appear to have provided an effective oversight to the PMU taking strategic decisions on issues such as the State of the Coasts report.
5. Despite these shortcomings the implementation of the monitoring and evaluation plan has been good. While the inception phase could have challenged the Project Document, particularly the SRF, more vigorously, section 3.1.1 sets out the arguments against this, namely the difficulties in making changes to a SRF once a project has started. Any such course of action would likely have caused significant delays and in this case, and delays would have resulted in the loss of corals due to the port construction which could not be halted.
6. The PIR are detailed and coherent and provide a clear picture of the feedback from the project and how this was influencing the decision-making process. There is clear evidence that the PB has been following monitoring reports (both the PIR and the *ad hoc* reports) and basing their decisions on these. This is seen in the early rapid response to component 4 (coral translocation), the inclusion of coral monitoring in the State of the Coasts report, the use of academic institutions to drive the fisheries work, etc., and on the whole the TE is in agreement with the self-evaluation ratings provided in the PIR.
7. While the PIR have been discussed at the level of the PB the results have also been shared and discussed amongst the various units within the ASEZA, which has been a time consuming (but useful) activity for the PMU.
8. Table 6 provides an account of the main monitoring and evaluation events during the project.

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| **Criteria** | **Rating[[48]](#footnote-48)** | **Justification** |
| Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry | MARGINALLY SATISFACTORY | The project’s SRF was less than satisfactory presenting a confusing mix or components, outcomes and outputs with indicators against the components (but not the outcomes) which were of themselves very weak. Indicators were given against the outputs but there were no baselines established and they were poorly phrased often being no more than restating targets. The SRF lacked the coherence and clarity to provide a strategic view of the project and what it was trying to achieve. |
| Implementation | SATISFACTORY | One option to overcome these weaknesses might have been to drastically revise the SRF during the inception phase but in the TE’s experience this would have caused critical delays and given that there was an urgent need to begin translocating the coral due to the start-up of port construction the project took the right decision to retain the SRF without revision. During the implementation monitoring has been diligent both in tracking performance and change (through the two PIRs) and thus merits a higher rating than the design does. |
| Overall quality of monitoring and evaluation | SATISFACTORY | The project has done well to overcome the challenges of the original SRF |

## Table 6 Monitoring and evaluation framework and budget (source Project Document)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Type of M&E activity | Responsible parties | Budget US$ Excluding project team staff time | Time frame | Actual at TE |
| Strategic Planning Matrix (Annual Work Plan) | Project Team  UNDP-CO | 0 | Annually, first SPM immediately following approval of the project | Nov, 2011 (3-year WP)  Dec, 2012  Dec, 2013  Dec, 2014 (annual WPs) |
| Baseline and End-of Project Study of Project Indicators | * PMT * Hired experts | 45,000 | Start and end of project. |  |
| Measurement of Means of Verification for Project Progress and Performance (measured annually) | * Overseen by UNDP-GEF RCU, NPD and Management Advisor * Counterpart organizations in the field or hired Consultants on needs basis | Part of the SPM’s preparation. | Annually, prior to APR/PIR and to the definition of Annual Work Plans | * Feb, 2012 * Sep, 16, 2013 |
| APR-PIR | * PMT * UNDP-CO | 0 | Annually | Jun, 2013  Aug, 2014  Final PIR in preparation |
| Steering Committee Meetings | * NPD supported by Management Advisor * UNDP-CO | 0 | Following Project IW and held regularly | Mar, 2012  Nov, 2013  Dec, 2014  SC was replaced by Project Board meetings |
| Technical Reports | * PMT * Hired Consultants | As part of project activities | To be determined by Project Team and UNDP-CO | May, 2012  Sep, 2012  Mar, 2013  Oct, 2013  Sep, 2014  Feb, 2015 |
| Final External Evaluation | * PMT * UNDP-CO * External Consultants | 25,000 | At the end of project implementation | Mar – May 2015 |
| Terminal Report | * NPD with support from Management Advisor * UNDP-CO | 0 | At least one month before the project’s end | In preparation at time of TE |
| Lessons Learned | * PMT * UNDP-CO (suggested formats for documenting best practices, etc.) * External Consultant | 10,000 | Yearly | Sent and discussed End of each quarter and included in the Terminal Report |
| Audit | * UNDP-CO * PMT * External Auditor | 5,000 | Yearly | Mar, 2014 |
| Visits and monitoring activities to the project’s sites (UNDP staff travel costs to be charged to IA fees) | * UNDP-CO * Government Representatives | 20,000 | Yearly | Dec 14-16, 2011  Jan 9-10, 2012  Feb 28, 2012  Feb 6, 2012  May 10, 2012  Sep 13, 2012  Nov 28, 2012  Mar 7, 2013  Jul 31, 2013  Sep 14, 2013  Nov 16,2013  Jan 23, 2014  Mar 30,2014  Aug 19, 2014  Feb 25, 2015  Dates of Selected monitoring missions by UNDP-CO and others (MOPIC) to the project sites |
| TOTAL indicative COST Excluding Project Team staff time and UNDP staff and travel expenses. | | US$ 105,000 |  |  |

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### UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation/execution, coordination and operational issues

1. UNDP CO was the Implementing Agency through the Country Office in Amman. The strong linkages between UNDP and ASEZA have resulted in an effective working relationship. This has been particularly important in areas such as the coral translocation. For instance there is a political element to the relationship between ASEZA and the ADC and during the first year of the project UNDP was able to use its “soft power” to assist ASEZA and ensure that the resources that were to be made available for the translocation were released in a timely fashion.
2. The TE found that UNDP had been particularly responsive to the PMU making regular visits to the project site (see Table 6), liaising closely with MoPIC and the Ministry of Environmental Affairs (MEA)
3. While the project was nationally executed the PM was directly contracted by the UNDP and an early decision between the Implementing and Executing Partners to adopt the UNDP financial modality for bidding procedures[[49]](#footnote-49) greatly accelerated the process as it would appear that the UNDP procedures are more streamlined than those of the ASEZA.
4. UNDP has taken a keen interest in the project and has stated that it has a continued interest in supporting biodiversity conservation and environmental management along Jordan’s Red Sea Coast as well as an interest in the ASEZ.
5. As a result, risks (such as the issues arising over the coral translocation during the first year of the project) have been dealt with in a timely and effective manner.
6. Furthermore, UNDP have had a pivotal central role in incorporating the overlapping responsibilities between the MEA (the focal point) and the ASEZA (whose jurisdiction is confined to the ASEZ. This has been particularly important in ensuring the integration of crosscutting issues such as the CBD (ensuring that the project actively contributed to preparing the National Report), updating the NBSAP and successfully urging ASEZA to become a contributor and Member of the State of the Environment Report.
7. Therefore it is reasonable to state that during the project’s implementation UNDP have taken an active and appropriate supporting role in managing risks, sharing the responsibility of decision-making and assuring the quality of project execution.
8. Execution of the project was through national execution by ASEZA. ASEZA as an institution has considerable organizational capacities which have also resulted in an effective execution of this project. Execution has been adaptive, the example of the procurement procedures given earlier is an example of this flexibility in order to maintain progress. Section 2.2 described the structure of the ASEZA and it is important to stress that it replaces the roles and functions of a Municipality in the ASEZ (or Aqaba Governorate). However, the Chief Executive Officer is appointed and not elected. While it is there to replace the duties normally carried out by a Municipality it is apparent that there is a strong emphasis on economic development and in particular inward investment into the ASEZ.
9. Like any mainstreaming project the coordination was complex within the ASEZA because the scope of the project cut across five Directorates (the AMP, GIS, planning, tourism and environment). However, this broad scope within the Authority allowed the maximum exposure of the institution to the project’s activities and the largest number of staff to engage in the capacity building activities.
10. Within ASEZA the project was nested as a member within a “projects family” (mostly funded by other donors and agencies) which met regularly to investigate synergies and avoid duplication and ensure the smooth allocation of ASEZA staff time (it is important to remember that apart from the PMU the ASEZA staff had regular and considerable workloads in addition to the project activities).It is reasonable to state that the ASEZA has provided sufficient resources for the project and it is important to also note that a large component of the co-financing (mostly for outcome 4 as part of the off-set payment for coral translocation) was effectively outside the control of the ASEZA because the funds were controlled by the Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC) which enjoys considerable autonomy.
11. The relationship between ASEZA and UNDP has been characterized by considerable cooperation and trust and in many ways the integration of ASEZA into national biodiversity conservation efforts and responsibilities towards international conventions (e.g. the CBD National Report and the updated BNBSAP, inclusion in the State of the Environment Report, etc.) has been as a result of this close relationship.
12. With the PMU firmly embedded in ASEZA the organization has provided very adequate office facilities, equipment, and supporting staff and ensured that the project activities were integrated into the regular work planning of the organization.

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| **Criteria** | **Rating** | **Justification** |
| Project implementation | SATISFACTORY | Strong linkages with the Executing Partner have resulted in an effective working relationship. UNDP has also provided considerable “soft power” support to the project especially at a political level which has ensured that co-financing has been provided in a timely manner. UNDP has also proved adaptive (e.g. in applying its own procurement procedures to the project) and has been innovative In ensuring the project’s impacts are up-scaled to a national level (e.g. by supporting the collaboration between the MEA and the ASEZA on issues such as the CBD National Report, etc.). |
| Project execution | SATISFACTORY | ASEZA has exceptional human and intellectual resources. It has provided very adequate resources to the PMU which is firmly embedded in the organisation. There has been considerable cooperation between ASEZA and UNDP which has been characterised by flexibility in arrangements. ASEZA has had to manage a complex process of coordination across at least five main Directorates which it has done ably and efficiently. |

## Project Results

1. The project results can be defined as the positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen changes to and effects produced by a development intervention. In GEF terms, results include direct project outputs, short to medium-term outcomes, and longer term impact including global environmental benefits, replication effects, and other local effects.
2. Ordinarily a TE would use the indicators provided in the SRF against the project’s predicted results and measure to what extent these had been achieved. However, due to the weaknesses in the project’s design and in particular the SRF, in this instance such an approach is unlikely to provide a realistic measurement of progress and impact. For instance the selection of two biological indicators (coral cover and the proportion of soft to hard coral) as an indicator to measure the achievement of the project objectives is wholly unrealistic and characteristic of a number of GEF projects designed around this time which included biological indicators even though measuring ecological process over such short periods of time (e.g. three or even five years) is fraught with difficulties, much less attributing any change detected to the intervention of a project (see section 3.4).
3. Therefore the TE will also have to rely on a number of other means (as well as the SRF) to validate the results of the ICZM project. A Theory of Change (ToC) approach might ordinarily be applied to overcome these difficulties but in this instance the TE feels that it is more useful to include the driving forces which are shaping the ASEZ, to consider the UNDP involvement and commitment and to ask:

* Has the project has done what it was contracted to do (i.e. has it delivered the outputs)?
* What is the quality of these outputs?
* Do these outputs contributed to reaching the outcomes (not necessarily in achieving them but falling within the broad “sphere” of the outcome)?
* Has the project moved the *process* (i.e. biodiversity conservation) in a direction which makes conservation or ecosystem resilience more likely?

1. While this is, broadly speaking, the approach followed by a ToC analysis in this instance it does not constitute a full ToC but it does allow the TE to examine the achievements of the project without always comparing these with the various ambitious expectations of the Project Document. Such an analysis would be extremely unfair on the project and would miss the very important things this project has done towards mainstreaming marine biodiversity in the coastal management framework in the ASEZ. Therefore it is possible to determine whether the situation *vis a vis* mainstreaming biodiversity into the coastal management framework is better or worse and whether, if it is better, this constitutes good value for money.

### Overall results (attainment of objectives)

1. Therefore, the TE provides a measurement against the attainment of the SRF indicators, baselines and targets with the proviso that there were a number of quite significant weaknesses in the SRF. To overcome this the TE has used the indicators provided in the SRF[[50]](#footnote-50) as best as possible. However, the attainment of the targets can be further cross-referenced with other, more subjective evidence from the TE; such as key individual’s understanding and attitude towards marine conservation (e.g. during the field visit to Aqaba senior personnel in ASEZA were actively involved in clean-up campaigns of public beaches during their spare time as part of the Blue Flag approach) and the level of knowledge, understanding and debate encountered during interviews. In this way the TE can combine subjective and objective criteria to apply a rating to the project which is both fair and can be upheld.
2. The project objective; *to mainstream marine biodiversity conservation into the coastal management framework in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ)* was too ambitious an objective for a three year project with the material resources available to it. Ordinarily it might be possible to unpick the objective‘s indicators and targets from the SRF to determine whether the project had created sufficient change for this to be achieved in the future[[51]](#footnote-51). However, the SRF indicators are essentially biological and, as has been discussed in section 3.3, cannot reliably be attributed to a project intervention on these (three-year) timescales. A more useful set of indicators might reflect a suite of internal ASEZA environmental policies incorporating various national (e.g. National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP)), regional (e.g. PERSEGA) and global (e.g. the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) or similar) principles and practices along with some indication that future planning was based upon ecosystem resilience rather than investment led. Table 7 provides a detailed account of the project’s achievements by component (equivalent to outcomes). To reduce the opportunity for confusion the outputs are provided in a separate table as Annex 10.

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| **Criteria** | **Rating** | **Justification** |
| Overall results | SATISFACTORY | The project has delivered the outputs with a high degree of efficiency and to a high standard. It has moved the process of integrating biodiversity into coastal zone management in the ASEZ in a very positive way. Six of the SRF outcome indicators are Satisfactory, one indicator is Highly Satisfactory and one is Marginally Satisfactory. A remaining indicator (related to the economic valuation of coral resources) was not completed at the time of the TE but the project had engaged IUCN to carry out the work. This organisation has completed a very credible similar study in Egypt and was also providing an estimated US$30,000 in co-financing, |

## Table 7 Assessment of objectives and outcomes

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Objective & outcome** | **Indicator** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Results (March 2015)** | **TE comments and rating** |
| Objective: To mainstream marine biodiversity conservation into the coastal management framework in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). | Coral cover | 400 Ha. | 400 Ha. | Coral cover along the coast has been maintained, however although not all coral communities have been translocated from the new port area, the rehabilitation and the utilization of the nurseries established by the project have contributed to the conservation of coral cover almost as is in comparison with the baselines data. | **Satisfactory**: there has been no more loss of coral area. However, as discussed (sections 3.3 and 3.3.1) biological indicators provide little utility in assessing the performance and impact of a project over these timeframes. However, based upon an aggregation of the component indicators the TE can reach a reasonable conclusion that with time and resources available there has been sufficient progress towards the objective. Although significant barriers remain (e.g. the structure and remit of ASEZA), addressing these was largely outside the mandate of the project. However, the TE judges the situation with regard to the project objective more positive at the end of the project than it was at the start. |
|  | Proportion of soft to hard coral | 2 : 98 – 5:95 | 2 : 98 – 5:95 | No significant change in this proportion as indicated from the ongoing monitoring program, the findings of the coral translocation and the findings of the state of coast Report | As above |
| Component 1: Knowledge management systems for planning and investment | ASEZA annual report comprises section on status of marine and coral BD | No environment section in ASEZA’s report | Environment performance and indicators reported against | ASEZA has not been producing annual reports during the time that the project has been implemented. However, with the agreement of the PB the State of the Coast Report will include this data, the first having been completed during the project. This will be produced every five years and provides a more accessible source of data and is a better forum to account for the effectiveness of coastal management. | **Satisfactory:** State of the Coast Report is completed by now and will be the tool used to track changes in the status of coastal resources. |
|  | Proportion of new developments taking into account information generated by ASEZA’s MIS | Less than 1% | At least half of the 14 planned developments | Six developments and two proposals (e.g. the fish farming project) have benefited from the data and information generated and compiled by the project.  The GIS/Web-based database system is ready by now and replaced the ASEZA’s MIS which has not been functioning since the commencement of the project. | **Satisfactory:** more than half of planned/ongoing developments have benefited so far from the information generated by the newly established database system. It is envisaged that all new development projects will be benefiting and referring to these information particularly in EIA preparation or site selection. |
| Component 2: Biodiversity friendly investment and development | Green Key/Blue Flag certification obtained during the lifetime of the project | No certified schemes | At least 5 by end of the project | Six hotels have since project inception obtained Green Key status and four private beaches obtained “Blue Flag Beach” status. This has been made through supporting the efforts made by the Royal Marine Conservation Society of Jordan - the national representative for the Foundation for Environmental Education) in its endeavor to increase the number of hotels and beaches under international biodiversity (and environmentally)-friendly certification schemes.  The first public beach, [Abu Hmeid – Aqaba Marine Park] to obtain “Blue Flag Beach “status in Jordan. The project has particularly initiated water quality monitoring along that beach as requested by the certification scheme as well as in setting the proper design of some of infrastructure which will be implemented and installed by ASEZA. | **Satisfactory:** the project has done remarkably well with this aspect of component 2. Ten certificates- more than the set target - have been obtained. Three other certificates are to be issued having been initiated during the project life time and will be issued a few months after the project completion.  Importantly the first “Blue Flag Beach” status to be issued to a public beach in Jordan was initiated through the project and received considerable support from the project to overcome the difficult challenges that a public beach faces when compared to private beaches. This has been a considerable achievement by the project and the AMP.  Blue Flag and Green Key certification can attract greater number of visitors (although European and North American studies suggest a much weaker linkage) and the loss of Blue Flag can have economic repercussions[[52]](#footnote-52) suggesting a degree of motivation and sustainability. Clearly the environmental benefits from maintaining beach quality and managing hotels in a more environmentally sensitive manner will have a positive impact upon biodiversity. However, these indicators are essentially targets and do not in themselves amount to a coherent outcome. Nonetheless they this has been a significant achievement and the comment refers to the SRF and not the project’s efforts *per se.*  The impact of these certification schemes has been greatly enhanced by the Aqaba Ecotourism Development Plan which provides, amongst other aspects such as practical guidelines and in the absence of any other policy statements an effective policy document, the necessary context to reinforce the certification schemes. |
|  | Total Value Added of Corals to the Jordanian economy increases by 20% at end of project from a baseline of 3Million JD (2009 estimates) | 3 million JD | 3.6 million JD | This to be determined by upon the completion of the economic valuation. | **N/A at TE**: contract for study underway at time of TE.  However, the TE notes that the project has engaged the IUCN Regional Office to undertake the study and this office has recently carried out a similar study along Egypt’s Red Sea Coast which was of high quality. Furthermore, the contracted party will contribute considerable funds as co-financing which will go a long way to overcome the meagre resources budgeted in the original Project Document. |
|  | Reduced coral damage from anchoring/cruise line density | N/A | TBD | No major coral damage from anchoring/cruise line density reported since the commencement of the project due to the existing mooring buoys which have succeeded almost completely in halting anchoring particularly by glass bottom boats with just two minor accidents with a very localized effect and damage having been reported during the project. | **Satisfactory:** coral damage from anchoring/cruise line density is not common anymore due to the existing mooring buoys and the surveillance and control by both the AMP rangers and the environmental police. |
| Component 3: Institutional capacity for Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and mainstreaming of marine biodiversity conservation | Environment revenue/total revenue | 1% in 2008 | 5% at end of project lifetime | No funds received from “environmental violations”. Although the marine park has recorded a number of violations during the project life, no environmental revenues have been collected as all of these violation cases are still at court. | **Marginally Satisfactory:** no funds have been received from “environmental violations”. However, the AMP has recorded a number of violations during the project life all of these violation cases are still at court. If these violations cases are prosecuted successfully the 5 per cent target will have been achieved.  Concerns still remain that the Environmental Fund has been renamed the Environment and Emergency Fund and while there are clear regulation pertaining to the collection of fines and penalty payments there appears to be a weak regulatory framework relating to the disbursement of the fund and it is not clear whether revenues raised through this fund will remain entirely at the disposal of biodiversity conservation and mitigation measures.  For instance, of the US$5,700,000 (in-kind) committed as co-financing in the Project Document for component 4 US$350,000 was provided for the coral translocation. While this was adequate for that particular task it does not equate to the full amount of the off-set payment for the port construction. |
| Component 4: Coral Reef Protection | Coral reefs slated for destruction are protected through a programme of transplantation to a suitable site | No baseline given | No target given | 75% of the coral community in the new port site are saved from construction and operation of the port.  An average of 80% growth rate has been recorded for translocated coral through three main monitoring missions.  A team of ten staff from the AMP are now qualified and capable to do similar coral translocation exercises.  Knowledge and experience gained through this component has been successfully applied and a similar case has been replicated in other projects (e.g. the newly constructed gas terminal). | **Highly satisfactory: c**oral reefs slated for destruction for any reason are being protected through a translocation to sites within the AMP. Translocation has been adopted as a measure to protect corals from any potential impact, given that knowledge and experience are available now at AMP.  The TE is cautious that translocation may be seen as a measure of first resort particularly if priority is given to investment over ecosystem resilience in the planning process. With only twenty-seven kilometers of coastline there is a limit to how much can be off-set or translocated[[53]](#footnote-53). While the translocation exercise carried out by the project has thus far been very successful (in terms of quantity, survival, capacity building and raising awareness) translocated corals will remain extremely vulnerable for many years to come and translocation should always be seen as the measure of last resort. |

### Relevance

1. Relevance is defined as the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.
2. The ICZM project is very relevant to GEF 4 Strategic Objective 2: *To Mainstream Biodiversity in Production Landscapes/Seascapes and Sectors* in particular Strategic Programme 4: *Strengthening the Policy and Regulatory Framework for Mainstreaming Biodiversity* and to a lesser extent Strategic Programme 5: *Fostering Markets for Biodiversity Goods and Services* in the sense that it was carrying out a valuation of ecosystem goods and services and introducing certifications schemes such as the Green Key and Blue Flag classification for beaches.
3. Arguably it was also addressing Strategic Objective 1: *To Catalyze Sustainability of Protected Area Systems*, Strategic Program 2: *Increasing Representation of Effectively Managed Marine Protected Areas in Protected Areas Systems* through its involvement in strengthening the AMP through the development of a management plan, capacity building, .
4. It was also closely aligned with the UNDP UNDAF and CPAP (2013 – 2017) in particular Axis 3, 4.3: preserving the environment, 4.21: promoting biodiversity and ecotourism and 4.22: supporting Jordan’s obligations to the Rio Conventions but it was also cross-cutting in a number of areas designed to support governance and civil society development in the Kingdom.
5. Nationally the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Country Programme and Action Plan (CPAP) are closely aligned with the Jordanian priorities stated clearly in the National Agenda document (2006 – 2015) and the Executive Development Programme (2011 – 2013) and are therefore considered to be relevant to national policy priorities and objectives as well as specific national policy instruments such as the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan[[54]](#footnote-54) (NBSAP) which places emphasis on governance as the backbone of a successful NBSAP, enhancement of the role of national coordination mechanisms, the encouragement of improved inter-institutional collaboration, the adoption of a courageous financing strategy, the enhancement of the participation of national and local stakeholders, and finally, investment in the new generation of biodiversity decision makers, practitioners, and beneficiaries all issues on which the project was touching.

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| **Criteria** | **Rating** | **Justification** |
| Relevance | RELEVANT | The project’s objectives, outcomes and many of the outputs sit well within the GEF 4 Strategic Objective 2, incorporate elements of Strategic Objective 1 and are aligned with the UNDP Jordan CPAP and national priorities. |

### Effectiveness

1. Effectiveness[[55]](#footnote-55) is the extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance[[56]](#footnote-56). The project has managed to make a number of important changes in the way that biodiversity, and in particular corals, are integrated into the planning process (e.g. the State of the Coast report, the GIS/web-based database system, the introduction of beach certification schemes, etc.). Part of this has been due to the high caliber of the PMU and the support given to it by the Implementing Agency, as well as the evident willingness of the national Executing Agency (ASEZA) to get behind various aspects, particularly within the relevant Directorates and has likely been enhanced by the selection of good partners, the building of trust at this level and the partnerships.

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| **Criteria** | **Rating** | **Justification** |
| Effectiveness | SATISFACTORY | Within the resources and time available the project has provided a number of key planning instruments, conducted a number of critical studies, developed a certification system and eco-tourism guidelines and built capacities within ASEZA and a number of NGO partners, all of which are prerequisites for mainstreaming biodiversity into coastal planning. |

### Efficiency

1. Efficiency is the measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.
2. The same arguments can be used to understand the efficiency of the intervention, providing certain components of the enabling environment necessary to integrate biodiversity into coastal zone management is a reasonable approach and has been done with the best possible utilization of project human, material and financial resources. However, if there is not the appetite for institutionally restructuring the principle planning authority (ASEZA) (see section 3.1.1) then the approach taken by the project is the most efficient approach and it has been both effective and efficient in ensuring that the process has moved forwards and in the right direction within the constraints (material and temporal) of the project design.
3. Therefore, the TE remains concerned that while these are all credible components necessary for mainstreaming biodiversity into coastal zone planning the current structure and function of ASEZA reduces this efficiency. This is partly due to the lack of specific policy instruments and partly due to the structure of the authority itself. The stated policies of ASEZA while highly commendable are not necessarily supported by, or framed within, substantive policy documents but, in the main, exist as specific regulations determining the effects of development on the environment. As regulations these are important but they are essentially absolute and do not provide the direction for development in the ASEZ which would allow it to move from a situation of investment-led development to one which is determined more by the ecosystem’s capacity to remain resilient. The current structure (i.e. of a Board of Commissioners with five sector Directorates) does not provide for an effective and *integrated* planning process which one might find with a hierarchical structure based upon an executive with a substantive planning unit and subordinate directorates within the planning unit, thereby more efficiently integrating the different sectors into one integrated plan.
4. It is beyond the mandate of the TE to state whether this would be a more suitable structure for ASEZA but rather to argue that it would provide a more efficient (and effective) means to integrate biodiversity into the planning process. It is also understandable that a GEF project would not necessarily tackle such an issue and certainly not unless it had the resources normally invested in a FSP (e.g. more than two million US$) and under the circumstances and given the resources available to it the project has been remarkably efficient. This issue is raised here only because it lays the basis for some of the recommendations made by the TE regarding the future engagement of UNDP in the ASEZ.

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| **Criteria** | **Rating** | **Justification** |
| Efficiency | SATISFACTORY | All of the outputs are necessary prerequisites for mainstreaming biodiversity into coastal planning and therefore represent progress towards achieving an impact. The TE does note that the expectations of the project document exceed the time and resources available to the project (from the GEF fund because to influence the larger co-financed amount sufficiently would have required greater GEF resources and above all else more time) and has argued that the most effective and efficient way to achieve the overall objective would have needed a mandate to assist ASEZA with restructuring the organisation. |

### Country ownership

1. Country ownership of the project and its outcomes is defined by UNDP as the relevance of the project to national development and environmental agendas, recipient country commitment, and regional and international agreements where applicable.
2. The Project Document made a convincing case for the national ownership of the project and its outcomes which the TE broadly concurs. There is a broad support for improved management practices, improved access to information and protection of the unique coral habitats in the ASEZ. There is a high level of recognition that the coral reefs in the area are one of a number of strong draw cards for the international tourist trade and, that they are at threat.
3. It is less clear whether there is “a widely held view that the most adequate approach for their conservation is through valuation and broad endorsement by different user groups as opposed to conservation through protection”[[57]](#footnote-57). The ASEZ is far more complex and the cultural and societal aspects of issues of public and private access to resources are high on the agenda of many stakeholders so that a simple economic equation and subsequent comparison between the different monetary values of either investment or a resilient ecosystem does not adequately represent the mix of views, nor the deep concern of many and diverse groups of state and non-state stakeholders.
4. However, there is clearly a strongly held view by all sectors of society that something needs to be done and this project follows on from a number of previous initiatives (e.g. GAEP 1996 – 2002, GEF/UNDP/IBRD; the ongoing GEF/UNDP/UNEP/WB supported PERSGA Strategic Action Programme, etc.). Interestingly the initiatives that have addressed biodiversity have on the whole been, if not donor driven then, donor supported, although this should not be seen to reflect the level of country ownership and the ASEZA and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) have taken a keen and active interest in the project.
5. The project is consistent with and responds to a number of national policies and international obligations such as the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the National Programme of Action for the Protection of Marine Environment from Land-based Activities (NPA 2008) amongst others.
6. The coral translocation was very clearly “nationally owned” not just because of the urgent need to re-locate the coral at the start of the project but in the subsequent awareness that if raised locally and nationally and a pride in a job well done.

### Mainstreaming

1. The project has produced a number of important results which are necessary components of the process of mainstreaming and as such it should be judged a success. It has also catalysed the discussion surrounding biodiversity and development, in particular investment-led development along the Jordanian Red Sea Coast which is, in itself, an important facet of any project. The TE can point to a number of these (for a full account see section 3.3.1 Table 7), such as the inclusion of monitoring data in the State of the Coasts Report, the GIS and the beach certifications schemes which has been extended beyond the relatively easy private beach fronts to include the public beaches as well or the coral translocation, not just the successful movement of the coral due for destruction but through the capitalising on the public awareness and support aspects of the operation.
2. The TE argues that the project has done as much as can be done within the time available and with the resources at hand. It would undoubtedly have gone farther with more time and resources but at some point it would have reached a point where it could not go any further.
3. The TE argues that this is because it did not have a mandate to address the organisational structure of ASEZA in terms of the efficiency with which biodiversity is integrated into the planning process. This does not imply that ASEZA is inefficient, nor does it imply criticism that project did not have such a mandate but merely states the case from the perspective of fully integrating biodiversity into the coastal zone management planning process.
4. When the project’s results are held against the key components in the UNDP country programming in terms of mainstreaming the project was addressing a number of key priorities:

* Poverty alleviation: the project was working with artisanal fishing groups creating linkages between these communities and the University of Jordan Faculty of Marine Sciences to address issues of sustainability in fish stocks critical for these fishing groups’ livelihoods. Similarly, the project was working with the glass bottom boat users assisting them to establish an NGO to represent their interests in the planning process. In both cases the project took an approach which strengthened the voice and representation of the particular interests of these groups.

On completion of the economic valuation of the coral reef resources the project will very likely provide a more complete understanding of the economic and livelihood reliance on these resources. Arguably this reliance is highest amongst the less wealthy sections of society (e.g. fishermen, glass boat drivers, handicraft makers, etc.) and it is these groups who are most likely to be affected if these resources are lost. Therefore the project has an important element of safeguarding the livelihoods of these disadvantaged groups.

* Improved governance: in the ASEZ the ASEZA carries out the role of the Municipality, the latter being a democratically elected representative. The project’s approach was clearly influenced by the UNDP priorities of improved governance. While this was not always visible it was underscoring all of the project’s activities. The TE has argued that the project’s design should have given a greater emphasis on these aspects of conservation but it also recognises that this is not always possible during the period of design and will be further addressed in the recommendations of this report.
* Prevention and recovery from natural disasters: improved integrated coastal zone management can be expected to strengthen ASEZA’s preparedness for natural disasters and the efficiency to any responses to such events. Further, the project, through mainstreaming biodiversity into the planning process will have strengthened the resilience of the entire system. The State of the Coast Report, the GIS web-based database, as well as the capacity building carried out by the project, are all tools and skills which will be used to develop a high state of preparedness and also to increase the response in the event of a disaster.

### ICZM project and gender

1. Due to the nature of the project (e.g. mainstreaming biodiversity) and the level of entry (e.g. strategic coastal zone management) there were few good opportunities for any internal gender policy within the project outcomes. However the TE still examined the project to ensure that even without an explicit opportunity gender issues were implicit (e.g. by ensuring that gender equality was applied at any opportunities, such as employment, internships, etc., during the project) in the prosecution of the project.
2. Therefore, it should be noted that ASEZA has its own internal gender policies and the UNDP gender policies were applied to this project and were followed at all times, for instance, the introduction of the interns at the AMP ensured that a number of women graduates were included and selected as interns where they might not ordinarily have had the opportunity to do so.

### Sustainability

1. Sustainability measures the extent to which benefits are likely to continue, within or outside the project domain, from a particular project or program after GEF assistance/external assistance has come to an end. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially and socially sustainable. To this end the TE judges the likelihood of the project’s outcomes and benefits persisting beyond the end of the GEF funding.

#### Financial resources

1. Section 3.3.4 observed that arguably four of the most important components of managing the coastal biodiversity in the ASEZ have been to a large extent funded, if not driven by, donor-funded projects. These include the establishment of the AMP (1997), the establishment of the earlier GIS system (1999), the coastal and marine monitoring programme (2000), and the first integrated coastal zone management planning (2004). .
2. There are considerable economic pressures, regionally as well as nationally, and ASEZA is not isolated from these pressures. This project was expressly designed to ensure that those pressures did not over-ride the need to ensure ecosystem resilience. To what extent this was achievable given the TE’s concerns about the design of the project and the resources available in the GEF fund is debatable.
3. The TE has concerns that the principle sources of environmental finance, in particular resources which can be targeted specifically at biodiversity are essentially coming from fines or off-setting. The economic assessment which will be carried out by the project will go some way to address this but again the TE is concerned that this approach “creating a business case” for biodiversity conservation (see sections 3.1; 3.1.1) requires the support of a clear policy framework which currently is a weakness in ASEZA (see section 3.1.4) because, while there is basic policy statement and regulatory framework, this is not supported by a clear policy document on aspects of environmental management.
4. For instance the Environmental Fund exists and has been used at times for fines and off-setting payments (e.g. in the case of the coral translocation) but it has become the Environment and Emergency Fund and while there is stipulation in the Law as to what activities attract fines there are much broader guidelines on how this fund can be disbursed. Whether or not it is possible for funds raised from off-setting to be disbursed for activities relating to non-ecological emergencies without replenishing the fund is not clear but in theory at least this is possible.
5. These concerns extend to the AMP and its continued levels of financing if, as appears likely, the park’s position in the ASEZA hierarchy is reduced from a Department to a Division within the Environment Directorate. While the project has produced a good management plan for the AMP this is not associated with a financial plan and strategy (it should be noted that the project design did not include a financial plan for the AMP).
6. While there is obvious and understandable resistance to charging for access to the public beach this should not prevent the organisation from developing a financial plan for achieving the stated objectives of the management plan to identify current levels of financing, identify funding gaps and possible sources of future income (e.g. ASEZA subvention, payment for services, project financing and grants, sponsorship, etc.).

#### Socio-political sustainability

1. The project has built a large body of support with both state and non-state actors. There is a degree of pride in the outcomes of the project which suggests that it has effectively moved biodiversity conservation a considerable way up the agenda. This has largely been due to the “energy” of the project to get various messages across to broad sections of government, institutions and civil society. This “energy” has ensured that every opportunity has been capitalised to the maximum. For example the coral translocation, the refurbishing of the aquarium at the Aqaba Marine Science Station (MSS), building the impressive capacities of the AMP in education, awareness and importantly in utilising social media, etc., have all been innovative and carried out with such enthusiasm and motivation that it is hard to see the issues (of coral or biodiversity conservation) slipping down the agenda after the project closes.

#### Institutional framework and governance

1. ASEZA has considerable human resources and capacities already. The project has increased these resources in the key directorates in areas such as ICZM and tourism development and in areas such as the AMP by producing the management plan. These developments are very likely to be sustainable and therefore nothing will be lost after the GEF-funded project closes.
2. However, the efficacy[[58]](#footnote-58) of these project outcomes, with regard to biodiversity conservation, will be largely dictated by what happens within ASEZA. Currently there is a review of the institution and components such as the AMP may be downgraded in which case this might affect budget allocations, for instance, which will likely impact on the AMPs ability to carry out conservation activities.
3. If planning within ASEZA continues to be largely driven by investment then the impact of the changes brought in by the project will be reduced but they will still moderate the effects of development on biodiversity.
4. It is important to stress that this is not a criticism of ASEZA *per se*, but a reflection on the extent to which biodiversity (in particular coral) conservation will be factored into the future of the ASEZ. Eilat in Israel provides a stark example of development at the expense of the ecosystem. Jordan possess a very short coastline, just twenty-seven kilometres, and it is not clear if there are precise limits of acceptable change or carrying capacities for various habitats and uses which are integrated into ASEZA policy and this leaves these resources still vulnerable.
5. It is important to stress that the project has further integrated Jordan into regional bodies such as PERSGA, indeed in some instances Jordan is “leading the field” with the development of the web-based database, etc., and these regional and global institutional linkages provide a strong case for sustainability.

#### Environmental sustainability

1. The project has provided a number of tangible outputs which will reduce environmental risks which will improve ecosystem resilience (e.g. the web-based GIS system, the AMP’s management plan and increased conservation management capacities, raised conservation awareness, certification of the beaches, reduced environmental impact of hotels through the Green Key system, greater understanding of the fisheries, translocation of corals which would otherwise have been destroyed, etc.).
2. While the TE has been more cautious in the institutional impact of the project the increased public and political awareness, lively debate about environmental issues and increased public support for biodiversity conservation will likely affect the decision-making process in a positive way in the future. To some extent this will make the planning process consider the consequences of development on the ecosystem more carefully which suggests a degree of sustainability. While this might not be as effective as directly addressing the planning process through the institutional structure it is certainly a positive factor and a reasonable outcome for a mainstreaming project.

#### Overall likelihood of sustainability

1. Based upon the four measures of sustainability discussed the TE concludes that the overall likelihood of the project’s impacts being sustained following the end of the GEF-funded project is LIKELY. This positive rating is in a large part due to the human resources within ASEZA, the broad public and political support the project has garnered, the integration of the project outcomes into the regional coastal conservation efforts, the support that has been given by the NGO sector (e.g. JREDS and IUCN), and the continued support of the UNDP CO which has expressed a keen interest in remaining engaged in the ASEZ.

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| **Criteria** | **Rating** | **Justification** |
| Financial resources | MODERATELY LIKELY | The TE has reservations about the strategy to “build a business case” for coral conservation, the over-reliance on fines (and off-sets) as a source of income for biodiversity management, the effectiveness of the Environment and Emergency Fund and the current absence of a financial plan to support the AMP. |
| Socio-political | LIKELY | The project has built considerable social and political capital which will likely sustain the project in the future |
| Institutional framework and governance | MODERATELY LIKELY | The project has integrated Jordan into regional organisations such as PERSGA very effectively and has further built on the considerable human resources held by ASEZA. However, the current likely review of ASEZA may affect the AMP reducing its influence within the overall organisation and within its current institutional structure the mainstreaming of biodiversity is likely to remain subservient to investment opportunities when it comes to making planning decisions. |
| Environmental | LIKELY | The project has provided a number of tangible outputs which will reduce environmental risks which will improve ecosystem resilience. |
| Overall likelihood | LIKELY | ASEZA has considerable human resources, there is broad public and political support for coral conservation efforts, there is an effective and engaged NGO sector, academic institutions have been engaged in the process of marine biodiversity conservation and there is likely to be continued support from UNDP. |

## Impact

1. The impact of a project can be described as the extent to which the project intervention has brought about a change of circumstances related to achieving the objective. In particular the UNDP GEF evaluation guidelines require the TE to examine whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.
2. The ICZM project has had an impact upon coastal management as it relates to biodiversity conservation in the ASEZ. While this is not entirely the magnitude of impact which was envisaged in the Project Document this is still a considerable achievement.
3. The Project Document placed considerable store on the use of strategy of building a “business case” for coral conservation. The TE has suggested a number of weaknesses in relying too heavily in this approach in particular arguing that while an economic estimation of the value of biodiversity is a useful measure against which policy and planning decisions can be weighed against; it is a very long term strategy, it requires a very transparent and level planning process and also that planning decisions are often made on a much broader set of criteria which in many instances are inherently political and not necessarily based solely on economic tradeoffs.
4. Furthermore, the TE has argued that the project would have had a much greater impact if it had been given a mandate to address the institutional structure of the ASEZA from an ecosystem resilience and biodiversity conservation perspective but also notes that this would need a very high level political decision and considerably more resources, as well as time, than were actually available to this project.
5. Therefore the impact of the project is due more to the other aspects, discussed at length throughout this report, of the project and the skillful way in which they used to their fullest effect throughout the project. A measure of which might be seen in the clearly expressed intention of ASEZA and UNDP to remain engaged with mainstreaming biodiversity conservation into coastal zone management in the ASEZ.
6. Applying the three measures of impacts given in the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines and the ToR[[59]](#footnote-59) the TE concludes that:

**a) Verifiable improvements in ecological status:**

Over the time frame of a three-year project it is not possible to measure such change in this socio-ecosystem. While change is taking place and some of this is positive it would be spurious to try to directly attribute this to a project intervention. There are too many variables and it would require too many assumptions to make any statement on this. Section 3.3 provides a short explanation on the challenges of including biological indicators in a project SRF and GEF has produced a tool[[60]](#footnote-60) which is seldom used when GEF projects are designed to overcome this challenge to an extent although it lends itself more to the second measure of impact.

**b) Verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems:**

The project has made significant and verifiable reductions in the anthropogenic stresses affecting the entire socio-ecosystem. Firstly it has put in place a number of systems and tools that will provide information which provides a surveillance function capable of detecting incipient change within the system and there are more tangible indications such as the translocation of coral from an area where it would be destroyed to one of relative safety, the provision of permanent anchoring spots has dramatically reduced the damage to important corals, and the management capacity of the AMP has been significantly improved.

**c) Demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements:**

As would be expected from a three-year project the real impacts of many of the interventions are likely to be felt in the future and not necessarily within the lifetime of the project. The variety of tools and procedures already mentioned will have a long term impact on coral protection as will the increased capacities within ASEZA. The project has also raised awareness and understanding of conservation issues through the skillful use of communications which manifests in many ways from high-ranking decision-makers attending beach cleanup campaigns during the weekend to an active social media network discussing environmental issues and corals in particular.

The coral valuation will, once complete, provide an indication of the likely economic gains and losses due to anthropogenic effects on the ecosystem which can inform future decisions on development in the ASEZ. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the project has progress towards achieving these impacts and it is likely that in the future these improvements in the ecological system may be more accurately measured and attributed to the intervention of the project.

1. **Conclusions, recommendations and lessons**
2. The ICZM project has been successful in mainstreaming biodiversity into coastal zone management in the ASEZ. It has achieved this to the full extent of the modest material and financial resources at its disposal and within a short period of time.
3. The initial project’s design contained a number of weaknesses. The Project Document was at times confusing and at others impenetrable (in particular the SRF provided a weak planning tool with poor choice of indicators) although it did provide a sufficient approach for the project to manage. However, it should be noted that the PMU, UNDP CO and ASEZA’s own strong human capacities have played an important role in overcoming these challenges and ensuring this was a success. With lesser human resources the project would likely have been much less successful due to the design weaknesses.
4. While the project design provided a number of reasonable activities which would advance mainstreaming by integrating biodiversity into the coastal development planning process it also placed considerable emphasis on the economic valuation of biodiversity resources to create a “business case” for biodiversity conservation. It should be noted that this valuation was underway at the time of the TE but even without the results the TE argues that this can never be more than a useful measure by which planning decisions can be made.
5. The TE argues that for the purpose of fully mainstreaming biodiversity into coastal planning and management and building ecosystem resilience along Jordan’s twenty-seven kilometers of coastline it will be necessary to look more closely at the institutional structure of ASEZA and its written policy framework in order to achieve its stated policy objectives and its overall mandate and priorities. A “business case” can only ever be a component of the decision-making process and decisions about development which affect the coastal system will require a much broader set of issues (including culture, local livelihood security, local and national cultural identity, public access, risk reduction, resilience, etc.). There are risks in a dichotomous decision-making process based upon purely economic or financial criteria and a large assumption that markets behave reasonably and all businesses are smart.
6. The TE has not been able to determine the reasons behind the poor Project Document because of delays between design and approval and changes in most key personnel immediately prior to the project’s startup.
7. However, the project has been well-executed in an efficient manner with a number of notable successes such as the translocation of coral which was successfully carried out under very testing circumstances, the development of the web-based GIS, integration into regional programmes such as PERSGA, certification of beaches (including a public beach) and hotels for environmental standards, the development of the AMP management plan, integration of biodiversity (coral) monitoring into the State of the Coasts report, production of an eco-tourism strategy for the ASEZ, work with NGOs and CSOs, amongst many.
8. The TE has some concerns that the Environment Fund (which was intended to provide finance for biodiversity conservation from fines, compensation payments and biodiversity off-setting measures) has not been fully utilized. In fact the fund is now named the Environment and Emergency Fund and while there is a clear framework for payments into the fund the dispersal of the fund is less specific. Therefore there is a risk that finances stemming from biodiversity off-setting could be spent in other areas in response to emergencies. Furthermore, in the four years of the project despite a number of infringements being taken to court the fund has not received any fines due to the lengthy legal processes.
9. The ICZM project has played an important role during a critical time. The timing of the project means that it has spanned a period during which the ASEZ has been under considerable pressure due to the global economic slowdown beginning in 2009 and the regional security situation which has seen a steady worsening since early 2011 particularly amongst Jordan’s neighbors. Both of these have had a profound negative effect on the tourism sector and have undoubtedly impacted on ASEZA in terms of budgets and development. During this time the project has provided a focus for different groups both within ASEZA and externally to keep biodiversity on the agenda when otherwise it may have slipped.
10. The strong relationship between ASEZA, PMU and UNDP show a commitment to environmental management and biodiversity conservation in the ASEZ which has played an important role in the success of this project and shows a clear desire to remain engaged in the environment in its broadest terms in ASEZ.

4.1 Recommendations

### 4.1.1 Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits

1. The TE makes two recommendations given below:

**Recommendation 1 Financial Plan developed to support the AMP management plan:**

1. Financial Planning with the AMP: A simple financial planning exercise should be carried out with the AMP. This would entail:
2. Costing the various activities and developments required by the AMP Management Plan.
3. Determining the current expenditures on the management of the AMP including five years of historical data.
4. Identifying current sources of funding.
5. Identifying future sources of funding.
6. Identifying funding gaps.
7. Critically the financial plan should be arranged around the work programmes (e.g. administration, infrastructure, conservation, enforcement, education, etc.) in the management plan.
8. This exercise is essentially an intellectual exercise. It need not be expensive and could be run without external inputs as an in-house exercise thus maximising the capacity building and training aspect. There are a number of useful web-based resources[[61]](#footnote-61) where information on how to carry out the process and templates for spreadsheets can be obtained without any charge. The resulting financial plan can then be a “dynamic document” providing a useful tool for management planning.
9. A financial plan differs from a business plan. The financial plan is intended to provide the AMP management with greater control over their future and a means to implement the management plan to its fullest possible given the resources available. It is not about commercialising the AMP, indeed a financial plan differs from a business plan in the sense that it does not have to prove profitable. It is about being efficient and cost-effective and taking control of the financial future of the AMP even if it is not fully in control of the funding mechanism.
10. An issue repeatedly raised during the TE was an unwillingness of the AMP to charge for access to what one of the last remaining public beaches in the ASEZ. There is nothing wrong with this, arguably a public beach should be free to access for all. The AMP should not necessarily be profitable because it provides a valuable public service on many levels. However, it is very useful to know how much that services costs, how much is actually available and where the funds are coming from, where the gaps exist in the funding and what are the plausible scenarios for filling those gaps.

**Recommendation 1**

**Follow up action:** Develop a Financial Plan and Strategy for the AMP Management Plan.

**Instigator:** ASEZA / ICZM project PMU.

**Implementer:** AMP.

**External assistance:** There are no project funds available for this exercise. It would be possible to carry out the exercise as an internal “self-assessment” however it would greatly benefit from an external facilitator to guide the process. ASEZA should consider financing this to obtain the maximum benefit.

**Timing:** Within six months

**Recommendation 2: The AMP completes a Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) for the AMP.**

1. This is a fairly straightforward process which can be carried out as a self-assessment exercise with the direction of the PMU. One should have been completed during the PPG but was not so there is no baseline but it is important to complete one now to establish a baseline for the AMP.

**Recommendation 2**

**Follow up action:** Provide AMP with a METT template.

**Instigator:** ICZM project PMU.

**Implementer:** AMP.

**External assistance:** None, possibly some guidance from the PMU.

**Timing:** Before the project closes.

### 4.1.2 Proposals for future directions underlining the main objectives

During the evaluation the UNDP expressed a keen interest to maintain its assistance to the ASEZ and ASEZA. In particular the TE was requested by the UNDP CO to comment on the form or any future UNDP involvement in the ASEZ.

1. The ICZM project has been successful in what it has achieved. However, ASEZA still does not have a planning system[[62]](#footnote-62) that measures all development and activities against its potential to reduce the ecosystems ability to continue to provide the goods and services necessary for life; which is the purpose of mainstreaming biodiversity into the coastal planning and management process.
2. The TE has at various points argued that in order to efficiently mainstream ecosystem (biodiversity) resilience into coastal zone planning in the ASEZ it will be necessary to look more closely (than this project had the mandate to) at the institutional structure of ASEZA and ensure that there is a more robust policy framework (which should be supported by the ecosystem valuation being carried out by the project and other tools provided by the project) because there is currently greater emphasis placed on investment and development within ASEZAs decision-making or planning process rather than development based upon the ecosystems capacity to continue to sustain life.
3. For instance, many informants expressed the view, often supported by expert opinion, that the coastline of the ASEZ cannot support any more hotel development. The project has provided an ecotourism strategy which describes the benefits of low volume and low impact tourism but the tourism section under the Economic Development and Investment Affairs Directorate has expressed a need to construct more hotels. While there appears to be a broad acceptance that it is vital to maintain the ecosystem there are still conflicting views on priorities which cannot be resolved within the existing policy framework.
4. UNDP has expressed a keen interest in remaining engaged with the environment and biodiversity in the ASEZ as an integral component of its CPAP which is of course a mutually agreed document between the Government of Jordan and the UNDP. Furthermore section 3.3.4 discussed the fact that much of what can be termed biodiversity conservation initiatives that have thus far taken place in the ASEZ are, if not donor driven, then a collaboration between ASEZA and donors, principally the UNDP.
5. However, any change (in mandate and institutional structure) in ASEZA must come from within the organisation and be broadly supported by local stakeholder participation, something that is not easily achieved within the confines of a conventional project, especially so when it needs to overcome sectoral (e.g. investment, tourism, energy, etc.) interests and mandates.
6. The project, with its limited resources and time has provided a number of really important tools to base decision-making on. The challenge now lies in getting the numerous sectoral interests to make decisions, using these tools and based on a collective action (for ecosystem resilience) rather than a “self-interest”[[63]](#footnote-63).
7. Therefore, these tools, as good as they are, on their own are not sufficient to create the necessary *paradigm shift* from investment-led planning to a planning process built on the basis of ecosystem resilience. The term *paradigm shift* is used in a non-scientific context here to describe a profound change in a fundamental model or perception of events that will fundamentally change the way decisions are made about issues, such as investment and development, which affect the ecosystem; the objective of mainstreaming.
8. In the TE’s experience this has been a challenge for a number of mainstreaming projects both regionally and in other regions. There is clear evidence that the project has tried to overcome this through engaging with a broad number of stakeholders, paying particular attention to *process* (e.g. ensuring that the project has not just produced outputs but also that the processes involved have been internalised and the capacity building has been maximised, UNDP has also used it’s “soft assistance” to great effect). Therefore the project has shown adaptive management by adapting a project designed to produce a number of discrete mainstreaming outputs into one which combined outputs with *process*. However, in common with a number of other mainstreaming projects it has lacked a tool or mechanism to fundamentally change the way all manner of stakeholders view the system (ecological, economic, social, and political; in its entirety) which they live in.
9. Therefore any future engagement with mainstreaming biodiversity, indeed with biodiversity conservation *per se*, in the ASEZ will need some mechanism to drive a *process*, to bring stakeholders together to address the collective challenge which is to ensure that ecosystem resilience, sustainability, is at the very heart of all decision-making.
10. While there are a number of tools that can be used to achieve this there is one, scenario planning, which has been tried with some degree of success already in the region and has recently been incorporated into a mainstreaming project in Egypt[[64]](#footnote-64) to “lead” what is otherwise a conventional mainstreaming project.
11. The benefits of scenario planning are that it allows a broad participation of interests, it provides a structured approach to deal with complexity and unpredictability and it allows participants to develop plausible future scenarios and ask “*what if?*” questions. In this way it is possible to rehearse the future in a way that participants can understand that their decisions, or lack of decisions, can have a profound effect on the future. While it does not predict the future it does provide a basis for avoiding the most catastrophic futures[[65]](#footnote-65) and to make coherent plans even in the face of uncertainty. Because it has a broad participation and because it is essentially a cognitive process it has the capacity to change the way in which participants view a system and the world they live in (see Annex 7 for a fuller explanation of scenario planning).

### 4.1.3 Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success

1. The TE has identified two issues that should be highlighted from the ICZM project. Paradoxically these two issues are “opposite sides of the same coin”:

**Worst practice:** The TE has stated repeatedly that the project’s design, while it provided a strategy which could equate more or less to mainstreaming, was confusing. However, it also appears to have fallen into the trap of trying to fix the “whole problem” without ensuring that it was fully resourced and had sufficient time.

Section 3.1.1 discussed how a single outcome (outcome 3.2), indeed just one output, contained so many activities that it would be physically impossible to have actually followed the narrative of the Project Document in the implementation and results of the project.

The TE postulates that this results from two issues; starting the process of project design with a given budget rather than designing the project and fitting a budget to it when the scope of the challenge is known, and; the pressure on project designers to meet the expectations of GEF operational programmes within a limited budget and timeframe.

A more realistic approach for a small project would be to focus on a single set of policy instruments such as those for providing information for biodiversity policies although this carries the risk that even though information is available, it is not acted on.

**Best practice:** It is clear that between the design and the implementation the project was “dealt a poor set of cards”. Ordinarily the TE would recommend that the inception phase should have stopped and used this part of the project cycle to adaptively manage it by substantially redesigning it.

However, a number of factors came into play. Firstly there was a protracted period between the design phase and the project start up, and secondly by the time the project did start those responsible for implementing it had not been part of the design phase, indeed several key positions were newly appointed. Thirdly when the project did start up the need to translocate the corals from the new port facility was urgent due to the international contract, it had to be done immediately or it would be destroyed.

A decision was made to proceed without revision to the strategy (although there were significant revisions to the budget across the components and outcomes). Ordinarily the TE would be highly critical of such a move but in this instance (and with hindsight) it appears to have been the correct decision under the circumstances. While the TE would not recommend every project faced with a similar dilemma to take such a course of action, in this instance it was possible because most of the key decision-makers already had experience of working together, they knew each other’s capabilities and they were supported by the institutional decision-making process.

This allowed the project (Implementing and Executing Agencies, PMU, etc.) to quickly analyse a situation, assess the risk and rapidly make a decision while always keeping an eye on the overall objective.

Had the project gone down the route of substantially redesigning the project (which admittedly would have been the TE’s preferred option after reading the Project Document prior to the field visit and validation) then it is likely that the project would have become “bogged down” and effectively disintegrated.

To extract a lesson from this it would be necessary to identify the selection of highly capable individuals for key positions, excellent communication within the project, the confidence to take decisions at different levels within the project based upon the understanding of the problem (and to recognise those decisions if they were wrong and correct them).

In this way the project, while it was “dealt a poor set of cards” at the beginning has “played those cards” very well.

**Annexes**

## Annex 1 Terms of reference

**INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANT PROCUREMENT NOTICE** 

**Country: Jordan**

**Description of the assignment:**

**International Consultant to Conduct a Terminal Evaluation**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Post Title:** | **International Consultant to Conduct a Terminal Evaluation** |
| **Starting Date:** | March, 2015 |
| **Duration:** | 20 working days during March 2015, **out of which 7 working days in Jordan.** |
| **Location:** | Jordan – Amman, and home based |
| **Project:** | Mainstreaming Marine Biodiversity Conservation into Coastal Zone Management |

**INTRODUCTION**

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized UNDP support GEF financed projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. These terms of reference (TOR) sets out the expectations for a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the Mainstreaming Marine Biodiversity Conservation into Coastal Zone Management (PIMS #4002)

The essentials of the project to be evaluated are as follows:

**Project Summary Table**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Project Title: | Mainstreaming marine biodiversity conservation into coastal zone management in the Aqaba Special Economic | | | | | |
| GEF Project ID: | | 4002 |  | *at endorsement (Million US$)* | | *at completion (Million US$)* |
| UNDP Project ID: | | 00078516  00061764 | GEF financing: | 950,000 US$ | | 950,000 US$ |
| Country: | | Jordan | IA/EA own: |  | |  |
| Region: | | RBAS | Government: |  | |  |
| Focal Area: | | Biodiversity | Other: | UNDP 50,000 | | 50,000 |
| FA Objectives, (OP/SP): | |  | Total co-financing: | 7,250,000 US$ | |  |
| Executing Agency: | | ASEZA | Total Project Cost: | 8,250,000 US$ | |  |
| Other Partners involved: | | JREDS, the Marine Park, glass boat and diving operators | ProDoc Signature (date project began): | | | 8 Nov 2011 |
| (Operational) Closing Date: | | Proposed:  June 2014 | Actual:  June 2015 |

**BACKGROUND & CONTEXT**

The coral reef ecosystems of the Gulf of Aqaba are the most significant feature of the marine environment in Jordan. These coral reefs are unique in that they are the northern-most tropical reef systems worldwide, have a high diversity of marine taxa, and provide habitat for endemic and rare marine species; thus presenting a readily-available enterprise for Jordan’s tourism industry. They also have the potential to be largely isolated from the effects of climate change as a result of their seclusion within the Gulf. The Jordanian coastline is, however, subject to considerable resource pressure, particularly as this coast supports Jordan’s only seaport facilities. The high level and conflicting nature of pressure on the natural resources of Jordan’s coast poses significant challenges to effective management and conservation of this unique environment.

The marine environment of the Gulf of Aqaba is of global significance in having some of the northern-most reef systems in the Western Indo-Pacific and is designated, along with the Red Sea, as a World Wildlife Fund (WWF) global 200 ecoregion on account of its marine biodiversity value. Home to both endemic and globally threatened species, the Jordanian reefs are an important reservoir or refugium for tropical reef species. In particular, the endangered Indo-Pacific humphead wrasse, *Cheilinus undulates* has been found in the vicinity of these reefs, as well as threatened species of marine turtles. Furthermore, owing to their isolated location, these reef habitats may be largely protected from the effects of global warming and, to date, have been unaffected by bleaching and other detrimental climatic effects. This ecosystem therefore provides a natural laboratory for the study of climate change impacts on coral communities.

As the Jordanian coastline is limited to 27 km in length, the area is strategically important and the vast majority of all consumer goods and foodstuffs for the country are shipped through the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). There is also a small artisanal fishery in the Gulf of Aqaba. Furthermore, the current population for Aqaba City is projected to increase by more than 50% from approximately 100,000 to over 160,000 people by 2020, creating significant additional resource pressure. An initiative aimed at moving and expanding Jordan’s port facilities has recently become a higher priority, which has added urgency to this project for mainstreaming marine biodiversity conservation in the coastal management systems for the ASEZ. The development of port facilities is proposed for areas of high conservation value near the southern Jordanian border. Jordan’s coastline has become the focus of a burgeoning tourism industry. Several extensive tourist resort developments are already underway and others are proposed in the near future, adding to pressure on environmental resources.

**PROJECT GOAL, OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES and OUTPUTS:**

The goal of this project is to mainstream biodiversity conservation in order to promote more effective and integrated management of the coastal zone in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone. The strategy to achieve this goal has four primary components: development and improvement of knowledge-management systems for coastal and marine biodiversity, promotion of biodiversity friendly investment and development, improving institutional capacity for integrated coastal zone management and biodiversity conservation and coral reef protection.

Effective stewardship is premised on having a good understanding of the nature and interactions between the living (human and non-human) and non-living components of the environment. The use of this information must be managed effectively for good stewardship. Where this information indicates that anthropogenic activities negatively impinge on environmental sustainability, appropriate guidance should be provided. The roles and responsibilities of environmental managers must therefore be transparent and grounded in the principles of long term environmental sustainability.

The project includes four components that are designed to lift the barriers identified earlier and currently preventing the required balance between biodiversity conservation and development decisions. These outcomes are the following:

***Project Component 1: Knowledge management systems for planning and investment.*** This component involves the development of a marine and coastal biodiversity database with GIS support (covering ecosystems, species, physical factors and human uses) that will permit the development of a marine spatial plan to complement the existing Land Use Plan, and provide long-term support for biodiversity-based ICZM. This component will also review national progress in ICZM, update the 2004 PERSGA national report on ICZM, produce a ‘State of the Coast’ report that covers biodiversity conservation issues, and integrate the National Coral Reef Action Plan into other ICZM planning initiatives. The methodology and indicators developed by IOC-UNESCO to assess management effectiveness and the impact of ICZM, and promoted by PERSGA, will be introduced. This component has two outcomes.

***Project Component 2: Promotion of biodiversity friendly investment and development*.** This includes an economic evaluation of Jordan’s marine biodiversity using information gathered in the previously named component, building on previous relevant studies, and demonstrating how this value can be fully realized on a sustainable basis. This component will be undertaken in collaboration with the private sector, particularly the tourism industry, and will identify mechanisms for introducing incentive measures (such as eco-certification), offsets and other schemes by which relevant industries, particularly tourism, might finance management actions aimed at maintaining healthy coral reefs. This component has three outcomes.

***Project Component 3: Institutional capacity for ICZM and biodiversity conservation.*** This component involves the development of a comprehensive ICZM process that places marine biodiversity conservation on an equal footing with economic development in recognition of the ecosystem services provided by the *former* on which the latter depends. The project’s activities will include preparation, approval and implementation of a marine spatial plan and a capacity-needs assessment for implementation of the ICZM regulatory framework. This will require a full consultation process with all sectors and stakeholders, building on the experiences garnered during the PPG.

***Project Component 4: Coral reef protection.***Relocation of the main cargo port to an undeveloped site near the international border with Saudi Arabia will result in the destruction of approximately 4 ha of high quality *coral* reefs. In recognition of the importance of coral habitat, the regulatory authority, ASEZA, has a policy of requiring project proponents provide significant financial compensation for any planned or accidental destruction of coral reefs. An opportunity has thus been provided to preserve some portions of coral reef that are currently slated for complete destruction.

**SCOPE OF WORK**

Within the context outlined above, UNDP seeks the recruitment of an international consultant to support the achievement of the following project terminal evaluation objectives:

Conduct a terminal evaluation of project in line with internal procedures of UNDP and GEF guidelines. The scope of Objective One should cover the following:

The scope of the evaluation will cover all activities undertaken in the framework of the project. The evaluators will compare planned outputs of the project to actual outputs and assess the actual results to determine their contribution to the attainment of the project objectives. It will also attempt to evaluate the efficiency of project management, including the delivery of outputs and activities in terms of quality, quantity, timeliness and cost efficiency as well as features related to the process involved in achieving those outputs and the impacts of the project. The evaluation will also address the underlying causes and issues contribution to targets not adequately achieved.

The key product expected from the terminal evaluation is a comprehensive analytical report in English that should, at least, follow requirements as indicated in Annex E.

The terminal evaluation report will be a stand-alone document that substantiates its recommendations and conclusions. The report will have to provide convincing evidence to support its findings/ratings.

The report together with its annexes shall be presented in electronic form in MS Word format.

The consultant is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring engagement with the project team, project partners and key stakeholders.

The consultant is expected to use interviews as a means of collecting data on the performance and success of the project. Questionnaires prepared by the consultant can be distributed to national project partners, facilitated by participating implementing agencies

**METHODOLOGY**

An overall approach and method[[66]](#footnote-66) for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported and GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact,** as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects. A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR (Annex C). The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

The evaluation must provide evidence‐based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, in particular the Ministry of Environment and other stakeholder agencies, GEF OFPs, UNDP Country Offices, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to Aqaba. Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum: *Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority* (*ASEZA*), The Royal Marine Conservation Society of Jordan (JERDS), glass boats and diving operators.

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – including Annual APR/PIR, project budget revisions, mid-term review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in Annex B of this Terms of Reference.

**Evaluation criteria and ratings**

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework (see [Annex A](#_TOR_Annex_A:)), which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.** Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales are included in Annex D.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Ratings:** | | | |
| **1. Monitoring and Evaluation** | ***rating*** | **2. IA& EA Execution** | ***rating*** |
| M&E design at entry |  | Quality of UNDP Implementation |  |
| M&E Plan Implementation |  | Quality of Execution - Executing Agency |  |
| Overall quality of M&E |  | Overall quality of Implementation / Execution |  |
| **3. Assessment of Outcomes** | **rating** | **4. Sustainability** | **rating** |
| Relevance |  | Financial resources: |  |
| Effectiveness |  | Socio-political: |  |
| Efficiency |  | Institutional framework and governance: |  |
| Overall Project Outcome Rating |  | Environmental : |  |
|  |  | Overall likelihood of sustainability: |  |

**Project finance / co-finance**

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Co-financing  (type/source) | UNDP own financing (mill. US$) | | Government  (mill. US$) | | Partner Agency  (mill. US$) | | Total  (mill. US$) | |
| Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Actual | Actual |
| Grants |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Loans/Concessions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| * In-kind support |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| * Other |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Totals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Mainstreaming**

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

**Impact**

The evaluators will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.[[67]](#footnote-67)

**Conclusions, recommendations and lessons**

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions**, **recommendations** and **lessons**.

**Implementation arrangements**

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP Jordan CO. UNDP Jordan will issue and manage the contract. The Project Team and Country Offices involved will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, coordinate with the Government etc.

*Although the Consultant should feel free to discuss with the authorities concerned, all matters relevant to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitment or statement on behalf of UNDP or GEF or the project management.*

**Evaluator ethics**

Evaluation consultant will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct (Annex E) upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the [UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'](http://www.unevaluation.org/ethicalguidelines)

**Evaluation timeframe**

The total duration of the evaluation will be *20* days over a time period of *4* weeks in which **7 working days in Jordan.**

**DELIVERABLES**

The evaluation team is expected to deliver the following:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Deliverable | Content | Timing | Responsibilities |
| **Inception Report** | Evaluator provides clarifications on timing and method | week before the mission | Evaluator submits to UNDP CO |
| **Presentation** | Initial Findings | End of evaluation mission | To project management, UNDP CO |
| **Draft Final Report** | Full report, (per annexed template) with annexes | Within 3 weeks of the evaluation mission | Sent to CO, reviewed by RTA, PCU, GEF OFPs |
| **Final Report\*** | Revised report | Within 1 week of receiving UNDP comments on draft | Sent to CO for uploading to UNDP ERC. |

\*When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report.

**REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS**

**A) Education:**

* Advanced university degree in Natural Resources or management or planning/strategic planning or development or project management/evaluation or environmental science and management or environmental law and policy or any other relevant major.

**B) Professional Experiences & Skills:**

* Preferably 10 years of professional experience in fields relevant to biodiversity, environment or relevant fields
* Preferably experience of marine Biodiversity.
* Minimum 5 years’ experience in conducting evaluation of similar UNDP projects and/or GEF projects
* Sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring and evaluation).
* Fluency in written and spoken English
* Full computer literacy

**C) Competencies**

* Strong interpersonal skills, communication and diplomatic skills, ability to work in a team
* Ability to plan and organize his/her work, efficient in meeting commitments, observing deadlines and achieving results
* Openness to change and ability to receive/integrate feedback
* Ability to work under pressure and stressful situations
* Strong analytical, reporting and writing abilities
* Keeps abreast of available technology, understands its applicability and limitations, willingness to learn new technology

**Payment modalities and specifications**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| % | Milestone |
| *20%* | Following submission and approval of the inception report |
| *40%* | Following submission and approval of the 1ST draft terminal evaluation report |
| *40%* | Following submission and approval (UNDP-CO and UNDP RTA) of the final terminal evaluation report |

## Annex 2 Agenda and persons interviewed

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Day** | | **Activity** | **Time** | **Status** | Responsibility & location/Notes |
| Wed. | **25** | Arrival to Amman, travel Amman - Aqaba | 22:00 | Confirmed | Nedal to provide airport pick up and drive from Amman to Aqaba (4 hrs drive, arrival 2am, March 26th) |
| Thu. | **26** | Meeting with Project Staff   * Briefing on project status & key issues * Discussion | 10:00 - 13:00 | Confirmed | Project staff/Project office |
| Lunch | 13:00-14:00 | Confirmed |  |
| Field visit to the Aqaba coast (27km) and some facilities (development projects, Marine Sciences station/Aquarium, Aqaba Marine Park, new port location, etc.) | 14:00-17:00 | Confirmed | Aqaba Coast |
| Fri.\* | **27** | * Meeting with the Marine Park Management * Boat tour along the marine park and the coral translocation sites | 9:00-10:30  10:30-11:30 | Confirmed | Aqaba Marine Park (AMP)   * Mr. Abdullah Abu Awali, Director * Mr. Hamza Muheisen, Head of Outreach Division |
| Sat. |  | Meeting with Project Staff | 9:00-11:00 | Confirmed | Project Office  ADA’s office |
| Meeting with Dr. Marouf Khalaf, the national consultant working on the fish stock assessment in Aqaba | 12:00-13:30 |
| Meeting with Aqaba Diving Association (ADA) | 18:00-19:00 |
| Sun. | **29** | **Meetings at ASEZA** | 9:00-10:00 | Confirmed | * All meetings on Sunday will take place at ASEZA’s premises (where our project’s office is located) * GIS team at ASEZA are engaged in the development of the marine/coastal database * Directorate of Env /Monitoring section is in engaged in a number of activities with the project including the monitoring and the database. |
| Meeting with Director of GIS and his team |
| Meeting with Directorate of Environment/ Head of Monitoring Section | 10:00-11:00 |
| Meeting with Directorate of Tourism | 11:30-12:30 |
| Meeting with Director of Planning & Architecture | 14:00-15:00 |
| Wrap up of the day with PM | 19:00-20:30 |
| Mon. | **30** | Joint meeting with PM and the AMP director to discuss findings of the above meetings and clarify any relevant issues. | 10:00-11:00 | Confirmed | Location: Project’s office  The AMP director is the project focal point from ASEZA side and he is totally engaged in all relevant activities. |
| Meeting with Dean of Faculty of Marine Sciences /University of Jordan (some of his colleagues might join) | 12:00-13:30 | Confirmed | Location: Faculty of Marine Sciences (the faculty’s team were engaged in the preparation of the State of coast Report and in other activities as well) |
| Meeting with H.E Dr. Mohannad Hararah, Commissioner for Environment | 14:00-14:45 | Confirmed | He is travelling nowadays and awaiting to arrange with him personally. The time was proposed by his office. |
| Meeting with a representative from Royal Jordanian Navy | 18:30-19:30 | Confirmed | Location TBD later |
| Tue. | **31** | Travel Aqaba to Amman | 06.00 – 10.00 |  |  |
| Meeting with the Royal Marine Conservation Society (JREDS) | 10:00-12:00 | Confirmed | JREDS was engaged in the development of the publicity Strategy |
| Meeting with UNDP Environment and Energy, Resident Representative | 13.00 – 17.00 |  |  |
|  | | | |
| Wed. | **1 April** | Departure to Amman | 4:00 | TBC |  |

## Annex 3 Evaluation ratings explained

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, I&E Execution*** | ***Sustainability ratings:*** | ***Relevance ratings*** |
| 6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings  5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings  4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS)  3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings  2. Unsatisfactory (U): major problems  1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems | 4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability | 2. Relevant (R) |
| 3. Moderately Likely (ML):moderate risks | 1.. Not relevant (NR) |
| 2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks  1. Unlikely (U): severe risks | ***Impact Ratings:***  3. Significant (S)  2. Minimal (M)  1. Negligible (N) |
| *Additional ratings where relevant:*  Not Applicable (N/A)  Unable to Assess (U/A | | |

## Annex 4 List of documents reviewed

ASEZA website: <http://www.aqabazone.com/en/> , various

Project initiation form (PIF)

Project Document

Inception Workshop Report

Annual plans

Project Identification Reports (PIR): 2013 and 2014

Baseline GEF focal point tracking

Minutes of the meetings of the board meeting

Quarterly progress reports

Audit report 2013

Training material / Proceedings / minutes for the workshops or conferences which would have been organised as a part of outreach / awareness creation / training activities for this project

Knowledge products

UNDP Country Programme and Action Plan for Jordan

Jordan ICZM Country Report 2014: Towards Sustainable Coastal Zone Development

Aqaba Ecotourism Development Plan, 2014

## Annex 5 Evaluation questions matrix

| **Evaluative Criteria Questions** | | **Indicators** | **Sources** | **Methodology** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels? | | | | |
|  | * How and why have project outcomes and strategies contributed to the achievement of the expected results? Have the project outcomes contributed to national development priorities and plans? | * Synergies with national policy framework * Contribution to national reporting on MEAs | * National policies, international Conventions and Agreements | * Review |
|  | * Are the project’s objectives and components clear, practicable, and feasible within the project’s timeframe? | * Conformity of activities implemented with project document | * Project Document and reports | * Review, consultations with PMU and project partners |
|  | * Were the capacities of executing institutions and counterparts properly considered when the project was designed? | * The performance of executing institutions and counterparts in implementing similar projects. | * History and records | * HACT/capacity assessment/proposing capacity assessment activities |
|  | * Were counterpart resources (funding, staff, and facilities), enabling legislation, and adequate project management arrangements in place at project entry? | * Legislations applied, the concerned entities at IP were operating and functioning | * ASEZA’s legal framework, organogram (institutional structure) and budget. | Reviewing |
|  | * What are the underlying factors beyond the project’s immediate control and to what extent they have influenced outcomes and results? How appropriate and effective were the project’s management strategies for these factors. | * Institutional and personnel changes | * Cabinets’ decisions | * Review |
|  | | | | |
|  | * To what extent have the project objectives and outcomes, as set out in the Project Document, project’s Logical Framework and other related documents, have been achieved? | * Conservation of coral reef communities in certain locations * The capacities of the concerned entities developed and contributed to the conservation efforts * Marine biodiversity integrated into planning process | * PR/PIR * Field survey and monitoring activities * Quality of the performance of concerned staff * State of coast Report | Review |
|  | * Review planned strategies and plans for achieving the overall objective of the project within the timeframe. | * Alignment of project outcomes and outputs with the existing policy framework. | * The relevant policy document. | * Feedback and tracing from IP’s side |
|  | * Were the assumptions made by the project right and what new assumptions that should be made could be identified? | * The model of ASEZA and the nature of the special economic zone. * Assumption on how ASEZA would respond to external events (e.g. comparing current ASEZA activities with stated policy objectives). | * ASEZA policies | * Review |
|  | * Were the project budget and duration planned in a cost-effective way? | * Comparison of budgeted (Project Document) activities and annual work plans developed by PMU. * Some proposed activities were “financially underestimated”, we had to negotiate and conduct some activities jointly with other agencies so as to share cost | * Project records | * Review * Interviews with PMU |
|  | * How and to what extent have implementing agencies contributed and national counterparts (public, private) assisted the project? | * The time, efforts, intellectual, and material offered by the different concerned entities through coordination committees and task forces. | * Minutes of meetings and records, resolutions and internal memos. | * Review |
| Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards? | | | | |
|  | * How useful was the logical framework as a management tool during implementation and any changes made to it? | * Adaptive managing | * Progress reports and PIR | * Review |
|  | * Were the risks identified in the project document and PIRs the most important and the risk ratings applied appropriately? | * Implementation of project activities, outputs and outcomes | * PIRs, interviews | * Review and analysis |
|  | * How and to what extent have project implementation process, coordination with participating stakeholders and important aspects affected the timely project start-up, implementation and closure? | * Budget execution * Execution of annual workplan | * Progress reports * Annual workplan | * Review |
|  | * Do the outcomes developed during the project formulation still represent the best project strategy for achieving the project objectives? | * Annual plans and resources allocation | * Project document * ICZM previous report * Annual Plans document | * Review |
|  | * How have local stakeholders participated in project management and decision-making? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the approach adopted by the project? What could be improved? | * Type of stakeholders participated in the project’s events | * Project reports | * Review |
|  | * Does the project consult and make use of skills, experience, and knowledge of the appropriate government entities, NGOs, community groups, private sector, local governments, and academic institutions in the implementation and evaluation of project activities? | * Number of assignments and services provided and assigned to some of these entities. * Number of meetings and consultations with selected entities | * Contracts/agreements/MOU/ Reports | * Assessment of their capacity and close follow up in implementation to ensure proper and quality outputs |
| Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results? | | | | |
|  | * Was project sustainability strategy developed during the project design? | * Structure/outline of the project document * The quality of logframe | * Project document and framework | * Review |
|  | * How relevant was the project sustainability strategy? | * Institutional ownership of Outcomes and outputs * Type of participation in project’s activities * Investment by IP in project outcomes | * Project Report * Events records and minutes | * Review |
|  | * Are there any financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? What is the likelihood of financial and economic resources not being available once the GEF assistance ends (resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and private sectors, income generating activities, and trends that may indicate that it is likely that in future there will be adequate financial resources for sustaining project’s outcomes)? | * ASEZA plans and budgets | * Reports | * Review |
|  | * Are there any social or political risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? What is the risk that the level of stakeholder ownership will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes/benefits be sustained? Do the various key stakeholders see that it is in their interest that the project benefits continue to flow? Is there a sufficient public/ stakeholder awareness in support of the long term objectives of the project? | * ASEZA plans, stakeholder opinions | * Interviews | * Review |
| **Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?** | | | | |
|  | * How has the project contributed to the reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status? | * Growth rate of coral reef * Quality of seawater * Threats and barriers identified in the project document | * State of coast and Monitoring findings | * Review |
|  | * Are the project outcomes contributing to national development priorities and plans? | * Synergies with national policy framework * Contribution to national reporting on MEAs | * National reports | * Review |

## Annex 6 Evaluation Consultant’s Agreement Form



## Annex 7 Scenario planning

The ICZM project has provided a number of useful tools which in themselves are necessary for mainstreaming by providing information. For instance the ecosystem valuation will provide information for reforming the accounting system and making costs and benefits of different development explicit. These can further assist mainstreaming by setting incentives and then regulating use.

However, these are very long term goals and assume that there is a clear rationale and “level playing field” behind any investment decisions which may not always be the case with different interests vying[[68]](#footnote-68) for a specific and narrow sector-based interest which might have a profound (positive or negative) effect on the future of the ASEZ.

Furthermore, individuals at all levels will often hold very strong views on the direction development must go in. These views of the future are neither *right* nor *wrong*, but are based upon a set of values and an understanding of how different *drivers* are shaping the system in its entirety. However, systems such as the ASEZ are highly complex and the drivers, socio-political, environmental and economic, are interacting with each other in a manner which makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible to predict the future with any certainty.

Therefore it is useful to have a means to identify these plausible future scenarios and to understand how to avoid the unpleasant and to achieve the favorable futures. The difficulty with a conventional approach is the lack of any mechanism that will convince organizations, agencies, institutions and individuals that it may be necessary to change the way that they behave, the way they perceive and think about an issue, in order to avoid the undesirable futures.

Scenario planning[[69]](#footnote-69) is an approach which can be applied to complex situations and also as a means to affect the cognitive processes of participants, in other words it can change the way people think about a problem.

Scenario planning is a planning methodology that has its origins in post WWII military thinking where strategic military planners used scenarios to examine the threats posed to the Western Alliance by the Warsaw Pact countries. It was later applied to business planning by Pierre Wack at the multinational corporation, Shell Oil, to examine the threats and opportunities faced by Shell in the energy sector during the early 1970’s. The use of scenarios greatly assisted Shell in its business operations during the 1973 “oil crisis” resulting in Shell considerably improving its own position in the oil industry during a period of great uncertainty.

Scenarios were also used as a tool for conflict resolution during South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to a new democratic disposition in the early 1990’s. In this instance the use of scenarios firstly assisted in convincing senior policy makers in the (old) South African government of the inevitability of change and secondly assisted the range of political stakeholders in visioning the future of a democratic South Africa and the possible consequences of not accepting a peaceful and democratic transition to the “new” South Africa.

In the environmental sector the use of scenario planning is a relatively recent development. Scenario planning was used in the Millennium Assessment report to evaluate global environmental threats and highlight the need for alternative actions to prevent catastrophic environmental and ecological events.

The core of scenario planning is the identification of those elements that are shaping events or systems. These elements known as “drivers” interact with each other often at different physical and temporal scales. Most conventional planning systems are based on the assumption that drivers are constant (or predictable) and yet because of their interaction drivers are invariably in a state of change and this is often unpredictable. Sometimes this change is quick and at other times the change may be slower. Scenario planning is based on understanding what constitutes the current system drivers and the cause and effect relationship between the drivers. This understanding also helps to understand the scale (both physical and temporal) and impact that various drivers have on a system. Once the drivers are identified and their relationship understood, scenario planning provides a methodology for examining how the drivers might possibly interact in the future. Since driver interactions in socio-political, economic and environmental systems are complex the scenario planning process attempts to analyse possible and plausible future driver relationships rather than creating predicted futures.

While scenario planning may be used in different ways as outlined above there are certain consistent elements regarding the use of scenario planning:

* There is no one single scenario planning methodology and approaches will vary depending on the issues to be address and the scale of the scenario plan.
* Scenario planning is a systematic way of looking into and “rehearsing the future” without attempting to be predictive.
* Scenario planning helps us understand the “drivers” that are shaping the present and how they may influence the future.
* Scenario planning helps us understand that the future is not pre-determined. We can influence the future by understanding and managing those current drivers over which we might have control. The example of carbon emissions and their effect on climate change is a case in point.
* Scenario planning helps us prepare for the uncertainties, shocks and surprises that will inevitably arise in any socio-ecological system.
* It is important however to realise that scenario planning has its limitations and as such scenario planning is not about predicting the future nor is it necessarily a replacement for conventional forms of planning.

Scenario planning can be used by policy makers, planners, managers and even communities to:

* Assist in testing existing plans and strategies in different futures, for instance in “climate proofing” the existing ASEZ development plans, ensuring that future planned investments in tourism or industrial development do not destroy the resource base in a drive to create employment, etc.
* Identifying the key drivers for long term monitoring in an adaptive management system.
* Guide short term management responses where “rapid response scenario planning” is used.
* Visually demonstrate the importance of drivers that might hitherto have been considered irrelevant.
* Assist stakeholders in communicating their aspirations in large scale planning processes.
* To build understanding and consensus on key issues between stakeholders in order to work towards a common vision.

Lastly scenario planning is a useful tool to engage with “*wicked problems*”. Given the complexity and multiplicity of different interests and agendas affecting biodiversity conservation and development in the ASEZ, ASEZA is facing what might be termed a “*wicked problem*”. “The criteria for judging the validity of a “solution” to a wicked problem are strongly stakeholder dependent”. However, the judgments of different stakeholders …“are likely to differ widely to accord with their group or personal interests, their special value-sets, and their ideological predilections.” Different stakeholders see different solutions as simply better or worse”[[70]](#footnote-70). For instance the different Directorates might be seen to have differing agendas and therefore a solution to one problem may be seen as a poor compromise rather than a rationale decision on the basis of an agreed future.

In this sense scenario planning can be a powerful tool for building consensus within a group with widely differing backgrounds and agendas and can provide a mechanism to hold the different components (ecosystem, economy and society) components the ASEZ together and navigate through a process in which the outcomes are not easily pre-determined and ecosystem resilience within the various interest groups.

## Annex 8 Co-financing

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Co-financing (Type/**  **Source)** | **IA own  Financing (mill US$)** | | **Multi-lateral Agencies (Non-GEF)**  **(mill US$)** | | **Bi-laterals**  **Donors (mill US$)** | | **Central Government (mill US$)** | | **Local Government (mill US$)** | | **Private Sector (mill US$)** | | **NGOs (mill US$)** | | **Other Sources\***  **(mill US$)** | | **Total Financing (mill US$)** | | **Total at TE**  **Disbursement (mill US$)** | |
|  | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** | **Proposed** | **Actual** |
| Grant |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 | 0.375 |  |  | 0 | **0.03** |  |  |  |  |  | 0.378 |
| Credits |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Loans |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Equity |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| In-kind |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **7,25** | **6.9** |  |  | **~~0~~** |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6.9 |
| Non-grant Instruments**\*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other Types**\*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **TOTAL** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 7.275 |  |  |  | **0.03** |  |  |  |  |  | 7.305 |

## Annex 9 Gulf of Aqaba

(Source Project Document)

## Annex 11 Project outputs

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Project comment | Source of verification | TE comment |
| **Component 1:**  **Knowledge management systems for planning and investment** |  |  |  |  |
| ***Outcome 1:***  ***Spatial planning and sharing of benefits from marine resources informed by sound knowledge*** | Adequate, geospatially referenced information is publicly available |  | External access |  |
| ***Output 1.1:***  *A coastal and marine database, with associated GIS, established and information available to all stakeholders*. | A GIS-based marine biodiversity database will be established  The database will be regularly updated with relevant marine biodiversity information  The database will be made publicly available via a web-based portal | * The GIS-based marine biodiversity database was established and installed at the local server of ASEZA. * The database was established in full coordination with GIS Directorate and the env. Directorate, so as to ensure the regular updating with relevant information * The first phase of the operation will be only made for the concerned staff and institutions database, and a later stage once the system is well functioning, it will be made publicly available via a web-based portal (the design of the system was already made to function via web) | * + - 1. Examination of the database is required       2. Update tracking and reporting of the database will occur regularly       3. Unrestricted access to the database is apparent | Satisfactory, the delay in unrestricted access is only due to technical issues and not going to be restricted. |
| ***Outcome 2:***  ***Trends in status of marine biodiversity documented and causes of changes identified*** | Baseline and monitoring information is available | The State of Coast Report prepared by the project was a cornerstone for baseline and monitoring.  The report was the first comprehensive document describes the status if the marine and coastal environment in Aqaba. | Notification of information updates is provided | Satisfactory, the project was adaptive in the State of Coast Report which is a publicly available document. |
| ***Output 2.1:***  *Monitoring of marine biodiversity strengthened and expanded* | Monitoring work plans and timetables regularly provided/updated  Monitoring activities occur regularly and are logged when complete  Monitoring information incorporated into the database | * Monitoring activities were in place upon the inception of the project, however the project has contributed to further strengthen the capacities in this regard. * The project has managed to include the monitoring of the translocated corals into the national monitoring program. | * + - 1. Work plans/timetables independently verified       2. Activity recording independently verified       3. Automatic notification of updates permits verification | Satisfactory, the expectations of the Project Document were extremely high. |
| **Component 2: Biodiversity friendly investment and development** |  |  |  |  |
| **Outcome 2.1:**  **Marine biodiversity and ecosystem services accounted for within the ASEZ decision-making** | Investment decisions make reference to marine biodiversity and ecosystem services | The reports and studies prepared by the project have been referred to by decision makers in different events related to investments in Aqaba. | Independent audits of investment decisions conducted | Satisfactory, the expectations of the Project Document were extremely high and somewhat vague as to how this would work. Currently the EIA process would need to consider any pertinent reports and/or studies but this is within the EIA legislation and not nested within a clear set of policy guidelines. |
| **Output 2.1.1:**  Ecosystem services identified, their economic value and carrying capacity estimated, and a ‘business case’ for marine biodiversity conservation prepared | Robust valuations of ecosystem services are made  Carrying capacity/external pressure assessments of habitats are provided  Financing and incentive options implemented in ASEZA systems  Reference to ecosystems services and benefits of biodiversity conservation provided by developers in applications |  | Valuation and carrying capacity studies provided  Evidence of developers incorporating environmental principles into plans is provided | Not available at TE but IUCN has been contracted to carry out this study and the same institution did a credible job on the Red Sea Coast in Egypt. |
| **Output 2.1.2:**  Guidelines for environmentally sound investments | Guidelines for environmentally sound investments provided to all developers.  Reference to environmentally sound investments provided by developers in applications | * The Guidelines were prepared parallel to the preparation of the ecotourism as both complement each other in the concept.. | Guidance documents available for independent review  Evidence of developers incorporating eco-labeling/certification programs in their investments is provided | Satisfactory |
| **Output 2.1.3:**  Marine biodiversity and ecosystem services in ecologically sensitive areas identified managed effectively | Membership in an independent expert panel is assessed  Risk-based approaches to marine biodiversity conservation in sensitive areas are incorporated into decision making | * The project has contributed in identifying sensitives and fragile areas along the coastline. * The management of these areas has shifted towards a more integrated approach which resulted from the capacities enhanced to the people engaged in managing these areas. | 1. The qualifications and relevance of the expert panel membership is reviewed by an independent body 2. Evidence of developers receiving and using risk-based advice when considering development in sensitive areas | Satisfactory, the PPG was vague in how this should be achieved leaving the project with a very high expectation which was more within its resources and means to achieve within the timeframe. |
| **Outcome 2.2:**  **Tourism sector contributes to marine biodiversity conservation.** | Tourists provided with facilities and activities which actively promote marine biodiversity conservation. | * The facilities at AMP and the aquarium have been both utilized to promote marine biodiversity conservation. * The project contributed to the expansion of the existing aquarium and preparing a number f educational material for the visitor as well as the renovation of the educational room at AMP (SEA HALL). | Independent auditing of tourism activities | Satisfactory, the TE was initially skeptical about this approach but following a visit to the facility was highly impressed with the way in which this had been done and the interest it was stimulating. In particular it was providing an ecological/conservation awareness to parts of Jordanian society who might not ordinarily have access to these opportunities. The TE questions the PPG’s reliance on “independent audits” without making adequate provision for such undertakings. |
| **Output 2.2.1:**  Mechanisms to promote marine-biodiversity friendly tourism identified and implemented | Capacity needs assessment completed  Environmentally-friendly tourism initiatives are developed and promoted by facilities operators  Financial and incentive measures included in the ASEZA development framework  Environmentally friendly tourism strategy prepared and adopted by ASEZA  ‘Natural Information and Interpretation Centre’ present in Aqaba city | * The Capacity needs assessment was completed at an early stage of the project implementation. All capacity development activities were made based on that assessment. * The ecotourism plan was formulated in collaboration with Tourism directorate and a wide range of options were included. ASEZA is considering implementing pilot activities in the near future. | 1. Capacity needs assessment report audited 2. Independent auditing of the implementation of a coordinated ‘green’ tourism strategy 3. ASEZA development framework updated. 4. Presence of an expanded and revised visitor information centre | Satisfactory, the project has achieved good results with the means available to it. The TE feels that the complexity of each of these outputs (this one in particular and output 3.2.1) should have been challenged during the PPG on the understanding that this was always going to be a GEF Small Project and the bulk of the co-financing was associated with Component 4 coral translocation. |
| **Output 2.2.2:**  Identify and implement eco-labeling/certification schemes to promote marine-biodiversity friendly tourism | 1. Aqaba Ecotourism Criteria developed 2. Guidelines for eco-labeling systems prepared 3. Eco-labeling incentives are adopted by facilities operators and developers | * The project has complemented activities initiated in Aqaba by a local NGO in the field of eco-certification. * A significant contribution made by the project is the adoption of a local public beach and work jointly with different institutions to obtain blue flag for a public beach within the marine park. * This has included the monitoring –done by the project- of the seawater quality for 22 months to meet the requirements. | 1. Aqaba Ecotourism Criteria audited by an independent agency 2. Guidelines available for independent audit 3. Internationally-recognized eco-labeling certifications and activities are provided by facilities operators | Satisfactory, the project has clearly picked up on some of the underlying social issues related to public beaches and the expropriation of what is essentially a *public good* by the private sector |
| **Outcome 2.3:**  Public understanding pressures political commitment for strengthened marine biodiversity conservation | Increased public participation and interest in EIA scoping and review sessions for coastal developments | * The project had conducted several specific events on EIA for local community and NGOs. | Independent audits of participatory processes reveal increased public/stakeholder participation | Satisfactory, see above, the project has been able to capture this undercurrent of public interest to good effect and has arguably gone as far as it could within its mandate. |
| **Output 2.3.1**  Media campaign on marine biodiversity undertaken | 1. Publicity strategy prepared and implemented 2. Variety of media used, including public meetings, newspaper advertisements, marketing brochures and one-on-one consultations with local stakeholder groups | * The strategy was prepared in consultation with a local environmental NGO and a wide range of specialists and groups * The strategy document was the first to address communications, awareness and education related to marine and coastal ecosystem. * The strategy document included an evaluation of all previous awareness and communication activities and analysed the gaps in these activities, strengths and weaknesses. * Upon completion, the strategy was launched on August 2014, in a national ceremony in Aqaba. * A number of pilot activities have been selected from the strategy and already implemented. * The project and since the inception has produced several promotional and educational material; brochures and posters, ..etc. * All media related meetings and activities used to be organized  with a full coordination with communication section at AMP. * Three websites were dedicating a space to host the relevant media and communication material (UNDP, ASEZA  and the AMP). * The project also published a joint newsletter to cover its activities with ASEZA. * Media community has assisted the project through articles in promoting the objectives of the project, * A good documentation of their activities via national TV, local Radio, newspapers and websites were made. * Most of the project relevant communication activities were also used to be covered by ASEZA. * The strategy was prepared in consultation with a local environmental NGO and a wide range of specialists and groups * The strategy document was the first to address communications, awareness and education related to marine and coastal ecosystem. * The strategy document included an evaluation of all previous awareness and communication activities and analysed the gaps in these activities, strengths and weaknesses. * Upon completion, the strategy was launched on August 2014, in a national ceremony in Aqaba. * A number of pilot activities have been selected from the strategy and already implemented. * The project and since the inception has produced several promotional and educational material; brochures and posters, ..etc. * All media related meetings and activities used to be organized  with a full coordination with communication section at AMP. * Three websites were dedicating a space to host the relevant media and communication material (UNDP, ASEZA  and the AMP). * The project also published a joint newsletter to cover its activities with ASEZA. * Media community has assisted the project through articles in promoting the objectives of the project, * A good documentation of their activities via national TV, local Radio, newspapers and websites were made. * Most of the project relevant communication activities were also used to be covered by ASEZA. | Publicity programme provided for comment.  Records of media used provided | Satisfactory, the project has been extremely active in this field and there is good evidence to show that this experience and capacity has been captured institutionally for instance in the work that the AMP is doing. |
| **Component 3: Institutional capacity for Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and mainstreaming of marine biodiversity conservation** | Environment revenue/total revenue | 1% in 2008 | * End of project assessment using the same methodology as USAID assessment * Survey of glass boat usage * Survey of diving operations * Survey of Marine Park usage (camping ground, beach access) * Survey of marine-based resort activities undertaken by guests | Figures pending the outcome of the Coral Economic Valuation |
| **Outcome 3.1:**  **Negative impacts on biodiversity from coastal development minimized** | There is minimal to no degradation of coastal marine habitats associated with new coastal developments |  | Baseline and monitoring information |  |
| **Output 3.1.1:**  Marine spatial plan for the ASEZ, identifying user rights allocations and regulations, developed and approved with full public consultation and participation | 1. Development of a Marine Spatial Plan is advertised 2. Full public participation (with representatives of all significant stakeholder groups) in the development of the plan occurs 3. A Marine Spatial Plan is prepared and implemented | * The Marine Spatial Plan was prepared in full public consultation and participation. * The plan took into consideration and carefully the different current and potential uses of the marine area. * The development process of the plan was utilized also to develop the capacity of a selected group of concerned staff at a number of institutions on the spatial planning and implementation of the plan itself. * The plan contains a section on the best scenario and approach for implementation as well as a plan for capacity development relevant to effective. implementation. | 1. Surveys of public awareness during the participatory period 2. Marine Spatial Plan prepared 3. New, relevant Bylaws or Laws are passed relating to the regulation of coastal resource allocation according to the Marine Spatial Plan | Satisfactory, the project has done what it can and to a high quality. This output in itself was a large project and would have required considerably more external technical assistance on issues such as common property systems which was not addressed in the PPG. The project has been working closely with the fishing communities to this end but this aspect was dismissed by the PPG although in the eyes of the TE it is extremely important. |
| **Outcome 3.2**  **Benefits of marine biodiversity equitably shared** | Equitable public and private use of the coastline and coastal and marine resources is provided |  | Visitor number records from the Marine Park and coastal resorts |  |
| **Output 3.2.1**  Existing CZM plans updated and formal ICZM process established to oversee implementation of ICZM activities and ensure marine biodiversity needs are addressed | The Aqaba Master Plan, and Land Use Plan are updated  Plans governing use and protection of the Aqaba Marine Park are updated  A formal ICZM process is established and implemented  Relevant regulations for implementing the ICZM strategy are adopted | The implementation of the different components and activities of the project which were comprehensive and covered all key aspects and disciplines of ICZM has marked the beginning of a formal ICZM process in Aqaba. | Updated plans provided  Relevant laws/bylaws/regulations passed  An ICZM strategy is publicly adopted by ASEZA | Satisfactory, the TE has to admit to being perplexed at what was expected of this project and agrees with the PMU that this process has been started and the AMP Management Plan has been updated but lacks a Financial Plan |
| **Outcome 3.3**  **Capacity to ensure implementation of effective ICZM strengthened (measured by changes in results of UNDP’s capacity development scorecard)** | Improved results on the UNDP capacity development scorecard |  | UNDP |  |
| **Output 3.3.1**  Capacity needs for implementation of ICZM identified, and training and infrastructure development undertaken | Capacity needs assessment is completed by project team  Appropriate training strategies are developed and implemented  Appropriate infrastructure development is implemented |  | 1. Audit of the assessment 2. ASEZA Environment Directorate prepares and implements new training strategies for staff 3. Identified ASEZA units undertake training and other professional development relevant to ICZM 4. Key Aqaba Marine Park personnel undertake training on marine spatial planning andmanagement 5. Key of the PHOSCC undertake training in marine biodiversity conservation | See output 2.2.1 |
| **Component 4: Coral Reef Protection** | Coral reefs slated for destruction are protected through a programme of transplantation to a suitable site |  | Records kept by transplant team |  |
| **Outcome 4.1**  **Southern reef translocated using globally recognized best practices, and all other natural reefs under long-term protection** | 1. Greater than 75% of all accessible corals affected by the southern port expansion are transplanted from the site 2. Survival of transplanted corals greater than 75% by project end-point. |  | Independent monitoring of the transplantation results is conducted |  |
| **Output 4.1.1**  Corals translocated, and long-term monitoring programme in place | * + - 1. Expert peer review group formed       2. Coral transplantation operational work plan OWP provided       3. Public awareness plan implemented       4. Staged implementation progress reports       5. Experimental design of the monitoring program provided for review       6. Coral health checks and assessment of associated reef fauna and flora undertaken on a regular basis       7. Results of monitoring submitted for consideration on a regular basis. | * The coral translocation was made during year 1 of the project. * The translocation was made with an assistance from an international expertise to ensure best practices and worldwide standards. * The translocation was accomplished according to a well-developed plan that considered both; the technical aspects and the relevant logistics * The translocation has been intensively monitored several times during the first years. * Findings of monitoring confirmed a very good result of growth. * Regular Monitoring has been set and is now in place. * Concerned staff at AMP have benefited from the exercise through engaging them in training on translocation and monitoring. | 1. Coral OWP reviewed by expert peer group 2. Public awareness plan reviewed 3. Progress reports assessed by expert peer review group, Project Board 4. Assessment of biological indicators such as % coral cover, abundance of corals and associated taxa (reef fish, invertebrates) 5. Growth rates of transplanted corals equal to or greater than baseline growth rate | Satisfactory, the project provided a good effort under difficult conditions. |
| **Output 4.1.2**  Management of visitors to, and tourism developments around, Aqaba Marine Park improved | Aqaba Marine Park Management Plan Revised  Visitor management plans are prepared and implemented  Marine Park staff upskilled  Public awareness materials available and campaigns underway  Visitor numbers and activities in the Marine Park recorded.  Sustainable Tourism Liaison group formed | * Aqaba Marine Park Management Plan has been revised and updated. The previous plan was 12 years old, therefore the updated one has assisted the AMP to clearly set its strategic and operational plans in a consistent and effective manner. | 1. Inquiries at Visitor’s information kiosks and at Aqaba Marine Park increased by 50% 2. Public awareness campaign 3. 50% reduction in beach litter present in the Aqaba Marine Park; 4. Additional damage to coral reef areas in Aqaba Maine Park is reduced by 50% year-on-year. | Satisfactory, repetition between the outputs however, the AMP Management Plan has been produced, while it still requires a Financing Plan it provides for all of these “indicators”. |

## Annex 11 Report comments audit trail

**To the comments received on 29th June 2015 from the Terminal Evaluation of Mainstreaming Marine Biodiversity Conservation into Coastal Zone Management** **(UNDP Project ID-*PIMS 4002)***

*The following comments were provided in track changes to the draft Terminal Evaluation report; they are referenced by institution (“Author” column) and track change comment number (“#” column):*

## This annex is provided in a separate file

## Annex 12 Objective 2 Tracking Tool

## This annex is provided in a separate file

1. Henceforth referred to as the ICZM project [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Using a six-point rating scale: 6: Highly Satisfactory, 5: Satisfactory, 4: Marginally Satisfactory, 3: Marginally Unsatisfactory, 2: Unsatisfactory and 1: Highly Unsatisfactory, see Annex 3 for ratings explanations (including Sustainability, Relevance and Impact). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For a full account of the project’s results see Table 7 of the main report [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. To avoid confusion the SRF was poorly designed and appears to have confused components with outcome or at least only provided indicators for components. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. There is a legal framework for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) but this does not necessarily provide the strategic viewpoint to the planning process necessary to set long term sustainability and resilience objectives. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The TE notes that the verifiable improvements in ecological status is extremely difficult and even when detectable across these short (project) timeframes, attributing any change to a project intervention could be highly spurious. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The quality of being convenient and practical despite possibly being improper. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The TE could not determine any reason behind this delay in signing the Project Document. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The corals were translocated during the project to the Marine Park. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Project Document, p. 44, section 2.3, para. 202 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Project Document, p. 55, para. 267 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The TE notes that if an indicator was not applicable (N/A) at the start of the project then it can hardly be relevant at the end. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Terminology from the Project Document [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Project Document, p. 50, para. 243 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. This outcome is actually listed as “outcome 2.1” in the SRF as there appears to be little attention to any systematic approach in the document. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Project Document, p. 43, para. 194 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The relevance of this is not clear because the policies and procedures are already included in the UNDP Country Programme and Actions Plan (CPAP) and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. A review of the outcomes, outputs and activities leads the TE to suspect that this was initially intended as a full-sized (FSP) project and not a small project although there is no evidence in the to support this because the PIF and other documents are not available. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. CEO Endorsement Document, p. 35 – 36, Annex B, Response to project reviews, 04/26/2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. As will become clear later in this report the situation during the inception phase was further pressurized because of the urgency in translocating the coral from the port facility which was scheduled for the second year but brought forwards due to the construction contract (i.e. it was beyond the control of the project). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Neither was there an allocation from the GEF grant for this component. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Project Document, p. 48, para. 231 - 233 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. GEF projects recognise this long-term effect and that the full impact of an outcome may not be seen until sometime after a project has finished but any “business case” inclusive of ecosystem goods and services would need to be firmly embedded in the planning process and it is this time to integrate these services into that process which was lacking in the project’s design. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. The term *political* is used here to indicate that decisions are not based upon a simple economic or financial equation but on numerous variables such as defence, public interest, cultural norms, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Project Document, p. 49, para. 238 and Annex 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. UNDP PIMS 1878, GEF ID 1028 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley / Red Sea Flyway, Project Document, p. 38 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. This project should not be singled out for any specific criticism relating to the time available because there are still mainstreaming projects being designed and approved with 3 to 5 year time frames (e.g. the Mainstreaming the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity into the tourism development and operations in threatened ecosystems in Egypt which has a four-year timeframe). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Project Document, p. 36, para. 153 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Project Document, p. 55, para. 265 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Project Document, Annex 4, p. vi [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. http://www.aqabazone.com/en/about-aseza/organization-structure2/directorates/environment-policies/ [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. To be fair to the PMU it has encouraged a much broader cross-section of participation in the project’s implementation through a number of channels and a policy of openness since the project began. An aspect of the project’s implementation has been its widespread encouragement of debate. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Project Document, p. 58, para. 293 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The Contract for this study has just been finalized with the IUCN Regional Office at the time of the TE. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. During the implementation the project has, to its credit, paid greater attention to the artisanal fisheries in particular through the Faculty of Marine Sciences at the University of Jordan which is working closely with fishermen. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The Environment Fund is the fund into which all penalties, fines and mitigation payments are collected. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Project Document, p. 75, para. 295 - 305 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The Project Document (p. 75, para. 301 – 303) provided a brief paragraph describing the PSC and the PB but nothing which might be recognised as ToR for these two structures. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. An English *idiom* meaning to think and react quickly particularly in situations where circumstances are changing rapidly [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Inception Report, p. 15, section 1.8.9 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Audit Report of Mainstreaming Marine Biodiversity, Project ID 00078516. For the year ended 31 December 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. The TE has praised the national capacities on a number of occasions but it is important to point out that in specific areas (e.g. coral translocation) there is only a small pool of technical experts globally. While coral translocations had been done using national technicians these had had poor success rates and never been on a scale of magnitude that the project was attempting. It was at the project’s insistence that international technical expertise was brought into to build capacity and training. Thus the TE proposes that the project design overlooked this aspect and under-budgeted. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. A TT was completed during the PPG and repeated at the time of the TE [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. These are reported below in Table 4 replacing the SC meetings [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. One audit costs approximately US$3,000 - 5,000 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See Annex 3 for a description of the ratings [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. A representative from ASEZA was always present on the evaluation and selection panel [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. This has necessitated using some of the component/outcome indicators to validate the objective. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. This would be the approach followed by a Theory of Change exercise. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Ten Brink, P, 2011: The Economics of Ecosystem and Biodiversity in National and International Policy Making, Earthscan, London & Washington DC. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. The SRF provided this statement as an assumption: “*Underlying this indicator is the assumption that increasing environment revenue will be correlated with additional new ventures, a higher valuation of natural assets, and that these will be translated into financial and economic benefits accruing to ASEZA. However, this indicator and its components will be closely monitored to avoid a situation where offsets are favoured as opposed to avoidance and mitigation”.* However this was associated with outcome component 3 (essentially the capacity of ASEZA and valuing ecosystems goods and services) and not component 4 which was addressing the issue of coral translocation. This leads the TE to postulate that it may have been an error in the SRF and illustrates just how difficult a task it is to understand the Project Document. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/jo/jo-nbsap-v2-en.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. All terminology for rated sections is taken from the *Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects* handbook. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Note: The term is also used as an aggregate measure of (or judgment about) the merit or worth of an activity, i.e. the extent to which an intervention has attained, or is expected to attain, its major relevant objectives efficiently in a sustainable fashion and with a positive institutional development impact. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Project Document, p. 41, para. 182 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The capacity for producing a desired result or effect. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. See Annex 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. *Margoluis, R. and N. Salafsky. 2001.* Is our project succeeding? A guide to Threat Reduction Assessment for conservation. Washington, DC.: Biodiversity Support Program.

    *Salafsky, N. and R. Margoluis. 1999.* Threat reduction assessment: a practical and cost effective approach to evaluating conservation and development projects. Conservation Biology 13:830 - 841.

    Available on the Biodiversity Support Program website: [www.BSPonline.org](http://www.BSPonline.org). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. If a web-based template cannot be found the TE can provide a template which can be adapted. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. There is a legal framework for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) but this does not necessarily provide the strategic viewpoint to the planning process necessary to set long term sustainability and resilience objectives. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. The term “self-interest” is used here to denote a sectoral, institutional or agency interest and not an individual interest. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Mainstreaming the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity into tourism development and operations in threatened ecosystems in Egypt, GEF 5073, PIMS 4590 [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. In this sense it has an important role to play in disaster risk reduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. For additional information on methods, see the [Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results](http://www.undp.org/evaluation/handbook), Chapter 7, pg. 163 [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. A useful tool for gauging progress to impact is the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) method developed by the GEF Evaluation Office:  [ROTI Handbook 2009](http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/M2_ROtI%20Handbook.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Competing or contending [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Scenario planning has already been successfully used in the UNDP-GEF MPCP in South Sinai to assist in the development of a CBNRM system. Regionally it has also been used for protected areas policy development and management planning in the UNDP–GEF BCPAM project in Syria [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. From Murphree, M, Hazard Knowledge Product No. 32 Scenario Planning, African Centre for Disaster Studies, South Africa).

    [↑](#footnote-ref-70)