

Final Evaluation: UN Joint Program on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery in Somalia: Phase 1

REPORT PART 1

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This Part 1 of the Evaluation Report provides a retrospective evaluation of JPLG Phase 1. (From April 2008 to December 2012). Part 2 presents a forward looking perspective on the learning that is transferrable to the operation of JPLG Phase 2.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to acknowledge the assistance that has been given to us by Patrick Duong and the JPLG team in Nairobi, Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu. We are indebted to them and the community members, District and Central Government officials who took the time to share information and impressions with us.

We would like to give particular thanks to Fridah Karimi and Sahal Abdullahi for their efforts in ensuring that our mission in Somalia went smoothly and for the invaluable background information that they provided us with.

ACRONYMS

AIMS	Accounting Management Information System
BIMS	Billing Information Management System
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JPLG	Joint Programme on Local Government and Decentralised Service Delivery
LDF	Local Development Fund
LG	Local Government
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MTR	Mid-Term Review
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OES	Outcome Evaluation System
PEM	Public Expenditure Management
PMU	Programme Management Group
UN	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is a report on the End of Programme Evaluation of Phase 1 of the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery in Somalia, which ran from April 2008 until December 2012; when it transitioned into Phase 2. The evaluation was conducted between 18th January and 15th March 2014 by independent external consultants: Paul Donnelly and Joseph Bugembe.

There have been two extensive reviews of JPLG 1 already undertaken: the Mid-Term Review in August 2011 and the Final Outcome Evaluation in June 2013¹. This exercise, while clearly using them as significant reference points, does not seek to replicate or re-validate either. Rather, our key focus is on extracting the relevant learning that is available from a retrospective enquiry and drawing this learning into applicable lessons for JPLG Phase 2.

Thus this report will be presented in two distinct sections. The first of these will 'look back' and provide a summary of findings and conclusions using criteria adopted from the OECD/DAC Criteria for Development Assistance. This will form the foundation for the second section; which will be a detailed 'look forward' and provide a comprehensive set of recommendations in respect of the operation of JPLG 2.

The Programme

JPLG is a programme jointly delivered by five United Nations Agencies: ILO, UNCDF, UNDP, UN Habitat and UNICEF. The first Phase of the Programme was funded by DFID, SIDA, DANIDA, Italian Cooperation, USAID, Norway, UNDP, UNCDF and the EU. It was implemented in partnership with the then Transitional Federal Government and then the Federal Government of Somalia, the Government of Puntland and the Government of Somaliland.

JPLG was designed to respond to the priorities in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme 2008 – 2012 (RDP) and contribute to meeting the United Nations Transition Plan 2008 -2010 (UNTP) outcome 2: *Local governance contributes to peace and equitable priority service delivery in selected locations* as well as the United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy 2011 – 2015 (UNSAS).

Objectives

The Programme's Overall Objective is:

Local governance contributes to peace and equitable priority service delivery in selected locations.

¹ The final Outcome Evaluation concluded that JPLG had

- Built capacities in targeted LGs
- Demonstrated potentials of decentralised service delivery
- Worked towards harmonising local and central legal, administrative and financial systems
- Made communities more aware of the functions of local government
- Involved communities more closely in local governance forums

In the furtherance of this JPLG's two specific objectives are:

- *Communities have equitable access to basic services through local government*
- *Local governments are accountable and transparent.*

The Context

Somalia's long and continuing history of conflict has seen its people subjected to civil war in the 1980s, through state collapse, clan factionalism and war-lord dominance in the 1990s, to being a focus of globalised ideological conflict in the opening years of the 2000s.

It is against this backdrop that Phase One of the Joint Programme on Local Governance was established.

As is evident from the situational analyses presented in the JPLG Programme Document and Annual Reports; from its inception and throughout its duration, the Programme had to navigate a complex, dynamic and volatile social, political, conflict prone and insecure environment.

The communities with which it sought to engage were alienated from and distrustful of government at all levels: and government at all levels was fragile, substantially dysfunctional and distanced from the people whom it purported to serve.

In intervening in this milieu the JPLG took considerable professional risks in stepping outside the comfort zone of community driven development. They also took considerable personal risks; in respect of which a few paid a high price.

In undertaking this evaluation we have been at pains to take the contextual dimensions into account. While we identified aspects the Programme that could have been done better and aspects that should have been done but were not; it is important to state at the outset, our overall conclusion that JPLG has achieved a remarkable amount in the furtherance of good governance, at times against considerable odds.

This evaluation has both summative and formative elements.

From a summative perspective, it sought to identify the Programme's overall appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency of delivery, management, coordination and sustainability.

From a formative, programme improving perspective, it sought to identify the Programme's strengths and weaknesses, secure evidence to test its design and implementation against the given objectives and provide indications as to how these can be more fully achieved into in the context of the on-going Phase Two.

Given the constraints of time, the nature of the programme and the context in which it operated we chose to adopt a methodology based on Rapid Appraisal principles:

this being an appropriate means for securing answers to the significant questions associated with the key elements in this assignment.

However, the failure, for whatever reason, to follow some of the rudiments of programme planning processes undoubtedly undermined the Programme's ability to achieve its full potential: in some ways quite profoundly so.

In particular, the absence of a Log Frame that reflected a rigorous engagement with Theory of Change processes, the absence of a baseline study that focused on key indicator elements and the absence a robust M&E framework that demonstrated its achievements rooted in systematically secured evidence; represented serious omissions.

Relevance

The Programme was highly relevant to the UN and Somali Government governance priorities. A factor that contributed to JPLG being particularly relevant was the Programme Managers' preparedness to step out of the comfort zone of the nearly exclusive focus on the community driven development ethos that was characteristic of development intervention in Somalia at the time of its inception; toward the high risk engagement with state institutions and their relationships with citizens.

Effectiveness

While evidence of effectiveness was weak in some places, there were clearly substantial achievements in several key areas.

Notable among these was the support provided to participatory planning processes at District level, which, along with the processes and incentives offered by the Local Development Fund, served to promote the qualities of accountability, transparency and participation.

It would have been beneficial if JPLG had devoted more effort earlier to supporting the Decentralisation process and if the capacity building efforts had been more targeted and tailored to local needs.

Efficiency

The shortcomings of the Programme design, Log Frame and M&E system along with the, at times, imprecise or ambiguous relationship between specific activities and the outputs that they are intended to achieve, as well as the challenges of identifying unit costs of inputs (for example the daily participant unit costs of training provision); in combination serve as limitations on any attempt to evaluate the efficiency of the Programme.

However, it is evident that, in several aspects of the Programme's activities, there were readily accessible data that would have pointed to the efficiency of operations.

For example, throughout the documentation and as communicated in fieldwork interviews, there were considerable, measurable, data on the revenue increasing

benefits derived as a direct result of the introduction of BIMS and AIMS. On the presumption that the unit costs of installing and maintaining these systems is readily accessible; then a measure of the intervention's efficiency is also available.

To take another example, the increase in turnover and/or employee engagement of traders benefitting from the construction of a market or road construction can be measured and considered in the context of the construction and maintenance of the facility.

Management & Coordination

The management and coordination challenges in delivering JPLG were formidable; the management and leadership tasks were numerous and diverse, the inter-Agency model of working was novel to most of the personnel involved and to the UN in Somalia as a whole, the environment in which the Programme operated was as dynamic as it was volatile: overall it required the management of a cacophony of uncertainties and competing demands for early results, not all of them compatible one with the other.

The shortcomings in design, planning, Log Frame and M&E cannot be anything other than indicators of management weaknesses, the consequences of which percolated throughout the Programme's duration. However, the degree to which the Agencies were able to work together, the tenacity with which the Programme was delivered in the face of institutional and environmental challenges did serve to overcome some of the weaknesses and, there were substantial achievements in several key areas.

Sustainability

Consideration of whether the benefits of the Programme were likely to continue for a reasonable period of time after December 2012 is hampered to some degree by the fact that there was an unbroken continuum from Phase 1 to Phase 2.

The dominant opinion of the key informants at District and Central level who were interviewed in the course of the fieldwork for this evaluation was that if the Programme had ended in 2012 they would have continued with the systems and processes that were generated by PJLG.

Overall Conclusion

The overall conclusion is that the available evidence points to the Programme having made substantial progress toward meeting its objectives. Taking into account all the aspects of the Programme that have been covered in this evaluation: the abiding conclusion is that the lack of fundamental programme management building blocks as documented in this report and in other reviews of the Programme, has resulted in the truth of its achievements being in large measure concealed through lack of substantiating, systematic, measurable evidence. The Programme effectively undersold itself.

INTRODUCTION

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There have been two extensive reviews of JPLG 1 already undertaken: the Mid-Term Review in August 2011 and the Final Outcome Evaluation in June 2013². This exercise, while clearing using them as significant reference points, does not seek to replicate or re-validate either. Rather, our key focus is on extracting the relevant learning that is available from a retrospective enquiry and drawing this learning into applicable lessons for JPLG Phase 2.

We have purposely not disaggregated our findings and conclusions into separate accounts of Somaliland, Puntland and South Central, but rather we have provided an overarching synthesis of the Programme's performance as a whole³. Nor is it the case that we have explored each and every aspect of the Programme's activities and aspirations, which have already been well documented in earlier reviews: instead we have concentrated on those aspects of activity and performance that are of most relevance to the operation of JPLG 2.

Thus this report will be presented in two distinct sections. The first of these will 'look back' and provide a summary of findings and conclusions using criteria adopted from the OECD/DAC Criteria for Development Assistance. This will form the foundation for the more detailed second section; which will 'look forward' and provide a comprehensive set of recommendations in respect of the operation of JPLG 2.

THE PROGRAMME

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³ Mission reports from the evaluation team's visits to Somaliland, Puntland and South Central are presented as an annex to this report.

Federal Government (TFG) and then the Federal Government of Somalia, the Government of Puntland and the Government of Somaliland.

JPLG was designed to respond to the priorities in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme 2008 – 2012 (RDP) and contribute to meeting the United Nations Transition Plan 2008 -2010 (UNTP) outcome 2: *Local governance contributes to peace and equitable priority service delivery in selected locations* as well as the United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy 2011 – 2015 (UNSAS).

OBJECTIVES

The Programme's Overall Objective is:

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In the furtherance of this JPLG's two specific objectives are:

- *Communities have equitable access to basic services through local government*
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THE CONTEXT

Somalia's long and continuing history of conflict has seen its people subjected to civil war in the 1980s, through state collapse, clan factionalism and war-lord dominance in the 1990s, to being a focus of globalised ideological conflict in the opening years of the 2000s.

It is against this backdrop that Phase One of the Joint Programme on Local Governance was established.

As is evident from the situational analyses presented in the JPLG Programme Document and Annual Reports; from its inception and throughout its duration, the Programme had to navigate a complex, dynamic and volatile social, political, conflict prone and insecure environment.

The communities with which it sought to engage were alienated from and distrustful of government at all levels: and government at all levels was fragile, substantially dysfunctional and distanced from the people whom it purported to serve.

In intervening in this milieu the JPLG took considerable professional risks in stepping outside the comfort zone of community driven development. They also took considerable personal risks; in respect of which a few paid a high price.

THE CONCLUSION

In undertaking this evaluation we have been at pains to take the contextual dimensions into account.

While we identified aspects the Programme that could have been done better and aspects that should have been done but were not; it is important to state at the outset, our overall conclusion that JPLG has achieved a remarkable amount in the furtherance of good governance, at times against considerable odds.

REPORTING

This report will be presented in two distinct sections; one looking back on JPLG Phase 1 and one looking forward to the lessons for JPLG Phase 2.

This will report on the retrospective evaluation of the Programme and include:

- Approach
- Programme Design, Planning and Inception
- Relevance
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Management & Coordination
- Sustainability
- Overall Conclusion

Part 2 of the report, while containing a measure of continuing critique of aspects of the management of JPLG 1, will focus primarily on the contribution that the lessons from Phase 1 can make to the operation of JPLG Phase 2; and in the process provide recommendations for the way forward.

APPROACH

This evaluation has both summative and formative elements.

From a summative perspective, it sought to identify the programme's overall appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency of delivery, management, coordination and sustainability.

From a formative, programme improving perspective, it sought to identify the Programme's strengths and weaknesses, secure evidence to test its design and implementation against the given objectives and provide indications as to how these can be more fully achieved into in the context of the on-going Phase Two.

Methodology

Given the constraints of time, the nature of the programme and the context in which it operated we chose to adopt a methodology based on Rapid Appraisal principles:

this being an appropriate means for securing answers to the significant questions associated with the key elements in this assignment.

Rapid Appraisal falls on a continuum between very informal methods, such as casual conversations or short site visits, and highly formal methods, such as censuses, surveys, or experiments. It represents an effective compromise with more elaborate methods of enquiry and has proven benefit in enabling decision making at policy and programme levels. As well as facilitating institutional review it offers context and interpretation of the available data and can provide accessible understanding of complex environments, illustrating people's experiences, attitudes and aspirations.

In-built into the Rapid Appraisal approach is the flexibility to explore emerging issues and trends. It can assist in the identification of effective ways forward for improving the impact of the Programme's activities. The flexibility of the approach also allows for reviewing on a continuous basis the various interview and group discussion schedules; making adjustments as necessary in the light of emerging trends, discoveries and challenges.

Data Gathering

Essentially the data for this evaluation came from three sources:

1. **Conversation:** interviews across a spectrum of local and central government, community beneficiaries, contractors, training providers, Programme personnel and managers. Annex B provides a list of the 142 respondents.
2. **Observation:** we had opportunity to meet with community beneficiaries *in situ*: we met shopkeepers who had opened businesses along roads constructed under the auspices of JPLG, teachers and children in a school, stall holders in a market and had a demonstration of the operation of BIMS and AIMS by personnel who had undergone training in their use.
3. **Documentation:** given the distance in time this evaluation was from the end of Phase 1, we were more than usually reliant on the available documentation. In the course of the evaluation we reviewed in excess of 1,000 pages of Programme reports, hand books, evaluations and external articles and papers.

Evaluation Matrix

From data collection to analysis and through to reporting the evaluation's findings, considerable reliance was placed on an Evaluation Matrix as the main guiding research tool. This served four main purposes:

1. Provided a structured framework for the evaluation
2. Assisted in interview and document review design
3. Provided a basic quality assurance framework
4. Facilitated data analysis

This Matrix⁴ deconstructed each thematic area in terms of the specifics of data sources, methods of data collection and the key questions around which the interviews will be focused. It acted as an aid to documentary analysis as well as the structuring and tailoring of individual and group interview agendas.

Additionally, throughout the evaluation the Matrix served as an effective instrument for maintaining the coherence and cohesion of the secured data, particularly given the diversity of thematic areas and respondent sources. It also acted as an internal management tool: each day progress on addressing the areas of investigation was considered in the context of the degree to which the Matrix requirements were being fulfilled.

Data Analysis

We utilized Thematic Analysis to examine the themes and questions generated in the Matrix and addressed by the data sources; mapping the facts, perceptions and opinions across the full spectrum of the enquiry.

Thematic Analysis is one of the most widely used methods of analysis of qualitative data, it being a relatively straightforward method which encapsulates many of the basic processes of other methods of analysis. It is an appropriate method for the identification, analysis, and reporting of themes or patterns within qualitative data. Thematic Analysis is not tied to a particular theoretical perspective other than a general qualitative approach: there are clear advantages to adopting this approach as it can be used much more flexibly than other methods, is less time consuming and does not require complex computer based processing: and importantly, its results are accessible to non-specialist audiences.

Challenges

The challenges that emerged in the course of this evaluation were substantially identified in advance of commencing the fieldwork.

The weaknesses in the Log Frame design and M&E system were particularly challenging.

In conducting the fieldwork we were asking key informants to cast their minds back between two and six years in the present circumstances where JPLG has already been operating in Phase Two for more than a year: this understandably proved challenging for some and they invariably tended to comment on more recent events and issues.

As is the nature of governance institutions, particularly in post-conflict and fragile state situations, many of the key actors during Phase One had moved on by the time this evaluation was being done; but many had not and were fortunate to be able to meet with ex-mayors and ex-ministers in the course of the fieldwork.

⁴ The Matrix is annexed to this report.

As is the case in all evaluations, but particularly in post-conflict and fragile settings such as Somalia, negotiating uncertainties was a constant task requiring patience and the management of challenges, time and opportunity to the optimum benefit of the evaluation.

PROGRAMME DESIGN, PLANNING and INCEPTION

The Programme design, planning and Inception constitute the foundation on which any programme is built and therefore the first point of reference for any evaluation.

This section of the Report provides an analysis and critique of the design, planning and what the Programme Document terms *a transition period* running from December 2007 until April 2008 and which, for the purposes of this evaluation, we consider as the Inception Phase.

Programme Design

An important first step in effective programme design is the preliminary exploration of alternative interventions. While the JPLG's Purpose was to *contribute toward peace and equitable service delivery* there were potential pathways to achieving this objective other than through *local governance*. Although there is in fact considerable disagreement about whether and how decentralisation and local governance should be pursued in fragile or post-conflict environments⁵; the conventional wisdom is that *the design and development of local representative structures is a key element of peace-building efforts in conflict and post-conflict situations....supporting capacity building for decentralization, especially the delivery of basic services in an inclusive and participatory manner, is a critical element*.⁶

Derived from the above, the Programme is premised on two key assumptions:

1. Good governance and local development are critical factors for both peace building and poverty reduction, by means of local conflict management and improved service delivery.
2. Good local governance and local development are best promoted through the technical and financial resourcing of autonomous and accountable local government, and their linking to constituent communities.

There is no suggestion here that the chosen intervention design or the assumptions on which it was premised was in any way mistakenly or lightly arrived at, but it is to advocate for a process of demonstrably testing assumptions and alternatives as a means of arriving at a considered conclusion on how *peace and equitable service delivery* can best be achieved.

⁵ See GDSRC Research Note: Decentralisation and Assistance to Governments in Fragile States (1988)

⁶ UN, 2009, Report of Expert Group Meeting: Lessons Learned in Post-Conflict State Capacity Building, UN, New York (p10).

A key characteristic of JPLG at the design stage was the articulation of a systemic approach to intervention if not analysis. There are clear statements in the Project Document to the effect that the Programme would engage simultaneously with citizens and all levels of government in Somalia in pursuit of its Overall Objective.

High on the Programme's expressed aspirations was the pursuit of gender equality, especially in the fields of democratic representation and public sector employment.

The Programme Document gives no indication of those designing it having engaged with the construction of a Theory of Change. As will be discussed later in this report, and as was alluded to in the Mid-Term Review, the apparent failure to undertake this fundamental design task contributed to the Logical Framework and associated Monitoring and Evaluation challenges that were encountered in the course of the Programme's operation.

By way of definitional clarification; the engagement with Theory of Change is a critical thinking process that begins with the articulation of long-term goals and employs a backward mapping process, identifying, critically evaluating, eliminating and selecting options until there is an identified and consolidated framework for the purposes of achieving programme goals⁷.

Although it underlines the intention to develop management and oversight mechanisms that will have Somali stakeholder engagement in the Programme; the Programme Document does not provide any information on the degree, if any, that Somali counterparts were directly involved in the design process. However, it is understood that the design team did conduct extensive consultations with Somali stakeholders in the preparation of the Programme.

Programme Planning

While the situation analysis that is contained in the Programme Document provides an overview of the prevailing circumstances in each of the three jurisdictions in Somalia, it is lacking in the specific, detailed analytical qualities required for optimal programme planning.

What would have served the Programme's planning purposes better would have been the conduct of political economy⁸ studies in each of the three jurisdictions, and in fact as the Programme rolled out, in each of the Districts with which it engaged. Political economy studies help programme planners to identify:

- The interests and incentives facing different groups in society (and particularly political elites), and how these generate particular policy outcomes that may encourage or hinder development.

⁷ See Taplin D & Clark H, 2012 Theory of Change Basics, ActKnowledge, New York

⁸ See DFID, 2009, Political Economy Analysis How to Note, A Practice Paper, DFID, London

- The role that formal institutions (e.g. rule of law, elections) and informal social, political and cultural norms play in shaping human interaction and political and economic competition.
- The impact of values and ideas, including political ideologies, religion and cultural beliefs, on political behaviour and public policy.

Given the Programme's specific mandate to *contribute to peace* it is noteworthy that there is no indication of the Programme planners undertaking or commissioning any conflict assessment studies at either jurisdiction, region or district levels. *Conflict analysis can support orientation for future action. Conflicts are dynamic systems. Any intervention becomes part of the system and should focus on supporting the creative, positive energies, in the system or related to the system.*⁹

As indicated above, in the absence of an articulated Theory of Change, the Programme Planners appear to have operated on the basis that the promotion of effective local governance will have an inevitably positive impact on conflict mitigation. However, since this entails a division of power, authority, responsibilities and resources between the centre and local governments and between local governments and citizens, it has the potential to fuel rather than ameliorate conflict; unless, that is, it is pursued within the context of a comprehensive, systemic understanding of the environmental complexities.

Thus the importance of political economy and conflict analyses in planning programmes such as JPLG. Even though JPLG Agencies had an established presence in Somalia and knew the environment well, this collective knowledge and understanding should not have been a substitute for systematic analytical studies.

The preparation and testing of a Logical Framework is a key aspect of programme planning. It is an essential tool in programme management and programme monitoring and evaluation.

The Log Frame would need to be supported by a baseline study that provided specific and measurable beginning points for the Programme's intervention: and for the Programme managers and stakeholders to know what progress was being made toward achieving the Outputs and Overall Objective there would need to be a robust M&E regime in operation from the outset of the Programme, which incorporated identification of progress milestones at appropriate intervals throughout the duration of the Programme.

In order for the Log Frame to be an effective tool for management and M&E there must be a logical, causal sequence rolling back from the Overall Objective to the activities supporting its pursuit.

⁹ Swiss Development Corporation, 2005, Conflict Analysis Tools, SDC, Berne (p.1)

Rather than construct a Log Frame as identified above, the Programme planners instead opted for a Results and Resources Framework; a matrix that had several omissions and flaws, most of which were commented on in the Mid-Term Review; and most of which are attributable to the lack of a robust Theory of Change against which to judge the appropriateness or otherwise of the Programme's activities and their logical relationship to the achievement of the Outcomes.

Additionally, the Results and Resources Framework gave no indication of baseline, SMART indicators or milestones¹⁰.

It is worth noting that the design team did not continue to contribute to the Programme's operation.

Inception Phase

The inception phase in any programme provides an opportunity for testing assumptions and plans against on-the-ground realities, mobilising resources, undertaking baseline studies, setting in place a robust M&E regime; as well as developing networks and 'partnerships in change' with 'champions' at all levels.

Between December 2007 and April 2008 was identified in the Programme Document as a *transition period* during which UN organisations would phase out their existing projects relating to local governance, urban development and services, phase into the Joint Programme and prepare for the Programme's establishment. Included also during this period would be:

- Establishing Programme Coordination Unit
- Developing monitoring and evaluation tools
- Preparing Annual Work Plan for 2008
- Further developing the Local Development Fund Strategy
- Review and develop related manuals, technical documents and methodologies

In the event, during the December to April period there was neither a baseline study¹¹ undertaken or started nor any reported preparation of monitoring and evaluation tools: and if there was any testing of assumptions or plans there is no documentary record of such. The reported preparation of training and operational manuals etc. in advance of any systematic assessment of need is indicative of the apparent predominance of supply driven interventions by JPLG; an issue that will be discussed later in this report.

SOME FINDINGS FROM THE MID-TERM REVIEW
<i>Since the JPLG inception, designers and managers have struggled to return the (foundation) assumptions into a consistent statement of outcomes, outputs, activities</i>

¹⁰ The Results and Resources Framework was superseded by a Log Frame in late 2008 and this in turn was subject to further revision.

¹¹ A baseline study was undertaken in 2010

*and inputs, i.e. into a consistent programme design.
However, the original RRF fails to clearly distinguish and logically arrange the programme's intended outputs.*

Conclusions

The failure, for whatever reason, to follow some of the rudiments of programme planning processes undoubtedly undermined the Programme's ability to achieve its full potential: in some ways quite profoundly so.

In particular, the absence of a Log Frame that reflected a rigorous engagement with Theory of Change processes, the absence of a baseline study that focused on key indicator elements and the absence a robust M&E framework that demonstrated its achievements rooted in systematically secured evidence; represented serious omissions.

RELEVANCE

When 'relevance' is defined as contributing to higher level objectives, there is little doubting the fact that the Programme in its conception and operation aligned with the priorities in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme 2008 – 2012 (RDP) and contributed to meeting the United Nations Transition Plan 2008 -2010 (UNTP) outcome 2: Local governance contributes to peace and equitable priority service delivery in selected locations as well as the United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy 2011 – 2015 (UNSAS). When 'relevance' is alternatively defined as referring to the extent to which the Programme's objectives were consistent with the distinctive interests of its beneficiaries, the initial relevance to institutional and community beneficiaries was less certain: this stemming from the fact that the programme planning process did not secure an early and systematic analysis of need. However, by the stage at which this evaluation took place, the unanimous opinion of key informants was that JPLG was highly relevant to their needs.

As was indicated earlier, a factor that contributed to JPLG being particularly relevant was the Programme Managers' preparedness to step out of the comfort zone of the nearly exclusive focus on the community driven development ethos that was characteristic of development intervention in Somalia at the time of its inception; toward the high risk engagement with state institutions and their relationships with citizens.

SOME COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD

JPLG didn't do every relevant thing, but everything that it did was relevant.

JPLG was relevant from the beginning and still is.

The Programme managers maintained close partnership with the MoI and moved with it through changing circumstances. They started in the right way and at the right time.

There was no doubt that the Programme was relevant to the needs of the people of Puntland.

Conclusions

The Programme was demonstrably highly relevant to both the higher level objectives and the needs of institutional and community beneficiary groups.

EFFECTIVENESS

This section of the report provides a critique of the degree to which the Programme met its objectives through the achievement of the associated outputs.

The fundamental question that is to be addressed in examining a programme's effectiveness is: how effective are the programme outputs at delivering the actual programme objectives?

In this context it should be noted that the absence of substantial performance metrics and the seeming absence of a visible commitment to manage Programme strategies and operations according to the collection, collation, and analysis of available empirical data; posed considerable challenges to the evaluation process. What performance indicators there were, lack specificity, and what they were intended to measure was left largely undefined. Additionally, the way in which the Programme generated groups of sub-outcomes, rather than formulating these as indicators, added another layer of ambiguity and imprecision to efforts at evaluating Programme effectiveness. Finally, throughout the reporting on the Programme, there was a consistent and pronounced tendency to confuse activities with achievements.

Although in danger of labouring the point here; it is still worth emphasising that the presentation of a training course is an activity, not, as stated throughout the Annual Reports, an achievement: participants' evidenced transfer of learning from a training event to practice is, however, an achievement. Likewise, the production of an operational manual is an activity, but the putting of it into effective and beneficial operation, as demonstrated in the evidence, is an achievement.

However, having noted all the above: through the cloud of activity that enveloped much of the Programme's interventions, there are perceptible and significant achievements that are well rooted in the testimonial, observable and documentary evidence; and which do clearly contribute to meeting the Programme objectives.

Accountability, Transparency and Participation

The promotion of the qualities of Accountability, Transparency and Participation was a core element in the design and operation of JPLG. When respondents for this evaluation, across a spectrum of stakeholder interests, were asked about the degree to which these qualities had been embedded in local governance practices; rather than refer to them in conceptual terms or in isolation one from the other, informants invariably reached for the planning process and a proxy description of these principles in action. It is easy to see why this might be the case, as accountability, transparency and participation are key elements in the participatory planning process.

Although the implementation of this process was a condition of eligibility for support from the Local Development Fund, the District authorities and the representatives of the relevant Interior, Planning and Finance ministries who were interviewed in the course of this evaluation all confirmed that the planning process was now mainstreamed into local governments' development planning, regardless of sources of funding. The ministries also alluded to the fact that other Districts, outside of the JPLG supported group, were also beginning to adopt this participatory approach to planning.

A key aspect of the planning process was the introduction of a transparent and accountable procurement process that sought value for money and fairness in awarding contracts for construction: and coupled with this was the engagement of community representatives in contract oversight. Again, while this originated with LDF requirements, Districts soon extended the process to all procurement tendering.

SOME COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD

Before JPLG we did have plans but they were in our head...we talked about them but never wrote them down and never acted on them.

The CMGs operate well and provide a useful and effective means of quality assurance.

International NGOs are a major problem: many show up with their own assessments and plans and just go ahead and implement without reference to the LG or the development plans.

From a Ministry perspective I was impressed by the local consultation and planning processes promoted by JPLG.

SOME FINDINGS FROM THE FINAL OUTCOME EVALUATION

LGs officers highlighted the ability to formulate AWPBs as one of the most important skills learnt. It was something they had never done before, particularly the incorporation of development projects. The planning directors of LGs also emphasised that during the formulation of AWPB, often all the LG departments and invited representatives from the villages together review the DDF, and it is from such consultations that the priority projects for that year are identified and integrated into the annual plans.

District PEM Cycle Overview




Figure 1 District Development Planning Process

Public Finance Management

The introduction, under the auspices of JPLG, of a Billing, Information and Management System (BIMS), an Automated Information Management System (AIMS) and GIS Property Databases represents a major contribution to local government finance management.

Several examples of the impact of the introduction of BIMS and AIMS are to be found in the relevant reports that record: *the Sheikh LG reported that since these systems went fully into effect in 2010, its collected revenue has increased by 15%*

annually.¹² Elsewhere it is noted that: *in Hargeisa the introduction of GIS and BIMS helped increase property taxes from US\$169,062 in 2008 to US\$795,000 in 2012.*¹³

While the commentary provided by key informants for this evaluation substantially echoed the above, there were, however, several points of concern expressed. All respondents were critical of the monopoly that the NGO which had been commissioned to develop the systems held over the software 'copyright' to the extent that they were the sole source of assistance when there were difficulties with the systems or they needed up-dating.

Another criticism was that, welcome as the BIMS and AIMS systems were as a beginning point, they lacked the sophistication necessary for more complex and comprehensive PFM functions. One municipality reported that they had stopped using BIMS because of shortcomings in its design, but more particularly because of the capacity limitations of its own staff in respect of ability to enter data accurately. This is contrasted with other Districts where staff readily demonstrated their competence in operating both systems; a fact they attributed to the informal guidance of their managers and the formal training provided through JPLG.

SOME COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD

BIMS and AIMS made a big difference and our revenue has increased by about 20%.

The finance system was greatly improved and could be improved more, but we should not go too high tech. as that might be difficult to absorb.

BIMS has many shortcomings: there is poor quality in the data entry on the part of our staff and problems with GPS...we have stopped using it here. AIMS we do use, but we rely on the outside agency for maintenance and problem solving.

Best practices and skills were introduced through training and new computer software programmes such as AIMS and BIMS. These were systems that were all easy to build on by future work.

Our property tax income went from about \$170,000 to nearly \$800,000 because of BIMS and AIMS.

It's so easy now. We get information immediately instead of working through piles of paper looking for things. It's easier to bill people and to chase up unpaid taxes.

SOME FINDINGS FROM THE FINAL OUTCOME EVALUATION

The financial department is where JPLG has accomplished fundamental contributions. BIMS has considerably increased revenue. The Sheik LG reported that since these systems were fully into effect in 2010, its collected revenue has increased by 15% annually. The installed AIMS financial system has streamlined financial management procedures, where it has become easy to follow up income and expenditure transactions on a daily basis.

¹² Source: Final Outcome Evaluation of Phase 1

¹³ Source: EU Final Narrative Report on JPLG Phase 1

Human Resources Management

The Final Outcome Evaluation report noted that: *human resources management in the Local Governments has been little impacted by JPLG*. While Local Government officials interviewed in the course of this evaluation asserted that they were implementing robust systems for open and on-merit recruitment and two pointed to the fact that they had employed female staff as proof of this; two points remained in the realms of ambiguity. Firstly, respondents were imprecise as to when the recruitment regime commenced, JPLG Phase 1 or Phase 2; and, secondly, their accounts were short on detail.

Part of the answer to the question as to why the Programme failed to make a major impact on Human Resources Management lies in the aspirations set in the Programme Document. This states that: *the Programme will review and improve local government policies and systems on human resources and staff development, ensuring common standards, equity in recruitment and staff development, and a specific policy on affirmative action*.¹⁴

Not only were these aspirations were clearly of a high order, there was no realistic targets set for their achievement, nor any indicators specified regarding how progress could be measured. Additionally, there was no recognition made of the complexities of the conservative, nepotistic, and possible job buying or renting milieu within which the Programme proposed promoting these HR good practices. Finally, if the Programme planners had reflected more on the implications of the proposed *specific policy on affirmative action* they might have given consideration to the possibility of unintended negative implications for those people whose interests they were seeking to promote.

There is no evidence provided in the documentation that there was any articulated institutional or community demand side prioritising of fair employment practices. While it is legitimate for a development programme to champion principles that are rejected, undervalued or resisted by counterparts, achievements in such circumstances can only come about by securing a detailed understanding of the complexities and intricacies of the institutional and societal environments, an identification of potentially effective entry points and an intervention strategy that is incremental and recognises that the beliefs and practices of generations cannot easily or quickly be turned around.

There was very little information on Human Resources Management forthcoming from the informants that were interviewed in the course of this evaluation; confirming to some degree the lack of priority this area has been given by the local and central government institutions.

When pushed on the subject the subject respondents would point to the fact that women were employed in the offices.

¹⁴ Source: JPLG Programme Document, p.17.

SOME FINDINGS FROM THE FINAL OUTCOME EVALUATION

In all previous OE reports it has been noted that the human resources management in the LGs has been little impacted by JPLG. At the baseline stage no staff job descriptions existed, staff grading was not done, and regulations on staff benefits were missing. In reality there were no proper functioning HR departments. While JPLG capacity building has been addressed to other LG management functions, HR has simply not benefited.

Mainstreaming Gender

The Programme documentation, particularly the annual work plans for 2010 and 2011 specify the importance of the JPLG promoting Gender Equality and Women Empowerment. However, what the documentation fails to do is to draw a link between Programme activities and the achievement of its broadly expressed aspirations in this area.

The Mid-Term Review referred to the fact that: *a baseline survey which had collected data on actual or perceived impediments to greater engagement of women in local governments and where and how those impediments are manifested would have proved the kind of information which could have usefully informed programme management and other stakeholders*¹⁵.

The absence of this baseline, or any precise indicators or milestones for success, leave this and any evaluation dependent solely on the Programme's self-reporting of its perceived achievements. There is also the recurring challenge that the lack of a well-developed Theory of Change means that linkages between objective and action are poorly defined, if defined at all.

The result of the above is that, while the Programme engaged in several gender related activities, courses and conferences for example, these took place outside a programmed or evaluated structure: therefore any evaluative statements would have little more status of being little more than assertions of opinion.

A perhaps telling insight was provided by the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Policy in Somaliland who offered the opinion that those concepts such as mainstreaming and cross-cutting in respect of gender issues have little real impact. What she advocated was that the Programme should have a more up-front commitment demonstrated by its seeking out and working alongside champions for change in gender rights and the framing of this as a free-standing objective, rather than one subsumed into wider agendas¹⁶.

As with HRM issues; the response from institutional informants ranged from the disinterested to the cynical: for example, it was pointed out that if very few women were elected to councils that was the product of democracy.

¹⁵ Mid-Term Review p.20

¹⁶ Given that there are similar challenges to gender equality to be found in Afghanistan, some useful insights can be found in: Larson A, 2008, A Mandate to Mainstream: Promoting Gender Equality in Afghanistan, Kabul, AREU

The Mid-Term Review commented that: *it is a concern that the OE reporting does not provide much in the way of informed discussion about progress in gender equality and women empowerment outcomes.*¹⁷

The Final Outcome Evaluation does, in fact, provide a fairly detailed account of the Programme's activities in support of Women's Empowerment: and while it offers comments and insights of a positive nature, it still fails to provide more substantial evidence on outcomes. There are comments such as: *respondents attributed achievements in women's empowerment to various initiatives by JPLG*; without providing any clarity as to what the achievements or the activities were or how these related to the Programme's objectives.

Civic Education

The available evidence points to activities in Civic Education being initiated and delivered by the Programme. There is no evidence of any articulated clarity of purpose, baseline measure or impact evaluation of the wide range of Civic Education activities and events. Neither is there any indication of the degree of institutional or community demand, or of Local Government buy-in or intention to assume ownership of a Civic Education mandate.

Local Development Fund

The development and implementation of the Local Development Fund is one of the well-evidenced and widely acclaimed successes of the Programme; and serves as a good example of how a well-targeted and skilfully managed supply side initiative can become integrated into the local governance ethos.

It is clear from the documentary and key informant contributions that the LDF was a trigger incentive for communities and Local Governments to engage in the participatory planning processes promoted by JPLG.

As was mentioned earlier in this report, the participatory, transparency and accountability elements of LDF requirements, as well as the robust procurement processes it introduced are well-embedded in the JPLG Districts standard operations and, according to central government officials interviewed in the course of this evaluation, have had an influence on other Districts.

In the course of the fieldwork for this evaluation a number of informants, including some JPLG personnel, pressed for the Programme to give consideration to increasing the amount of money available for the Fund: but there was also an acknowledgement that the main purpose of the Fund was to promote and facilitate good governance practices.

¹⁷ Mid-Term Review p21.

SOME COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD

The LDC, not only provided basic investments, it was an incentive to us to engage in good governance processes.

The LDF funding mechanism is vital in inspiring Central Government and Local Governments alike.

LDF funding improved services and promoted good governance.

While it is useful, there should be much more money provided by LDF.

LDF funds are too small a percentage of the JPLG budget.

We are always careful to ensure that we are able to maintain whatever LDF funds.

The procurement procedures that we used for LDF are now used in many more of our Districts for all procurement activities.

Many of the facilities were not used because of the defect procedure by which they came to be constructed – none of the 13 facilities were in the MoH work plans; none met the standard building design, that is in terms of space required and other provisions; none of the constructed facilities made provision for downstream requirements, such as the need for personnel to man them or for drug supplies to be distributed through them.

SOME COMMENTS FROM THE FINAL OUTCOME EVALUATION

The JPLG is improving basic services in both urban and rural Districts through projects that are essentially about building physical facilities. Where the project is not affected by poor quality appraisal and technical limitations, or lack of operational funding, the positive impact is clear....operations financing remains a critical constraint.

Decentralisation

The promotion of Decentralisation in the three Zones of Somalia was considered from the outset to be a key element in the Programme meeting its objectives. The Programme Document expresses the intention to engage with government institutions at Federal, Jurisdictional, Regional and Local levels in pursuit of this.

While the Programme commissioned a number of discussion papers and provided consultancy support to government deliberations on Decentralisation; as Annual Reports consistently recorded, measurable progress in this area was halting at best.

It seems that lack of progress in this area, particularly in the early years of the Programme, prompted a weighting of effort toward Local level governance, a less intensive engagement with the Central government and a complete lack of engagement with Regional level institutions.

In the course of the fieldwork for this evaluation several Ministry officials reflected on the capacity gap that had opened between the central and local administrations and the tensions generated in the centre as Local governments were observed to be

moving ahead of them in capacity and resource terms. It should be added that by the time of this evaluation they saw the balance having been somewhat redressed.

On the related issue of inter-ministerial coordination, although for much of the Phase 1's duration this rested with the Ministries of Interior, who in each Zone found it a struggle to exert sufficient influence over peer Ministers. However, prompted by JPLG in each Zone, the emergence of the Vice Presidents as 'Champions' in 2012, has brought a new impetus to the Decentralisation process.

While the challenges to promoting Decentralisation are formidable, it is clear that the Programme could have invested more in supporting this earlier. However, as one respondent expressed it: *it's during the Phase 2 that Decentralisation's 'time has come'. Before now neither people nor institutions were ready for it.*

SOME FINDINGS FROM THE FINAL OUTCOME EVALUATION

No specific policies on defining decentralisation had been formulated by the end of Phase 1: no precise legislation enabling decentralisation had been passed. It has been an anomaly in JPLG that a policy options paper on decentralisation was written before functional analyses were conducted.

Capacity Building

In JPLG capacity building was the primary means by which it intended to achieve Programme objectives and in this context a formidable element of the Programme Budget is devoted to it, from both the core budget and the 10% of LDF funds available to Districts for capacity building purposes.

Throughout, the JPLG documentation makes frequent reference to the roles of: *learning by doing, on-the-job training, mentoring and training.*

According to the Capacity Development Study conducted toward the end of 2012, from 2009 until that date JPLG had developed more than twenty short courses and delivered these to over 6,000 participants. The same study also draws attention to the fact that any training needs analysis undertaken by the Programme lacked depth and specificity; that there was little coherence across the spectrum of provision and that the mode of delivery was, in the main, didactic and tended toward the theoretical.

From the data that was secured in the course of this evaluation there is no evidence of any process of pre-test, post-test or follow-up evaluation of impact of training; even the so-called 'happy sheets' were seldom in evidence¹⁸.

¹⁸ See Kirkpatrick, D. L. and Kirkpatrick J.D. (2006). Evaluating Training Programs (3rd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler

Given the imprecisions and ambiguities in the identification of intended Programme results, there is little indication of the training regime being a clearly thought through strategy for capacity development; but rather, the available evidence points to a supply side investment that proceeded without benefit of a clearly articulated, traceable relationship to Programme objectives.

Key respondents for this evaluation expressed the almost unanimous opinion that, with notable exceptions, such as the practical training on BIMS and AIMS, the training provided by JPLG lacked practical focus and was insufficiently context specific to local conditions.

There was an impression that much of the training material was pre-prepared and generic rather than focused on the assessed needs of Local governance in Somalia. Some of those who had benefited from JPLG sponsored study visits to other countries expressed regret at their being no longer available.

While some respondents pointed to the benefits of on-the-job training on BIMS and AIMS, there was little documentary or informant evidence of other examples of this model of training.

As has already been mentioned throughout the Programme documents there is heavy emphasis placed on the engagement of *learning by doing* and *mentoring*. These are both sophisticated models of professional development requiring planning, systematic implementation and fairly elaborate evaluation¹⁹.

There was no documentary evidence found in the course of this evaluation that pointed to the reflective learning processes inherent to the learning by doing model being engaged with or of any systematic programme of mentoring being planned or implemented.

What seems to have been the case is that the Programme documentation used these otherwise precise terms to describe two distinctively different processes: firstly, personnel learning to improve performance through experience at operating processes and systems and, secondly, the provision of informal advice and guidance. Both these activities are legitimate and, in the circumstances, probably more suited to promoting capacity development than more elaborate alternatives.

SOME COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD

Many of the courses were 'imported'. What we feel was needed was for training to be more relevant, tailor made, integrated into our work over time and preferably with some sort of qualification.

JPLG1 needed deeper, longer and more regular trainings.

JPLG should allocate adequate time for all training activities (study tours, workshops,

¹⁹ See Gibbs, G. 1988. *Learning by Doing: A guide*, Birmingham, , UK: SCED and Murrell A. J. 2007, *Five Steps to Mentoring*, DC, Kaitz Foundation

*etc) instead of rushing through them.
We should have been more tailored to their needs, more practically oriented, deeper and longer....there is a continuing need for training new councillors.
It's your programme in our country, so it's your training.*

Conclusions

As has been stated elsewhere in this report, the design and Log Frame weaknesses have undermined the ability to make definitive statements about the Programme's effectiveness. However, there are clearly substantial achievements in several key areas as identified above. It would have been beneficial if JPLG had devoted more effort earlier to supporting the Decentralisation process and if the capacity building efforts had been more targeted and tailored to local needs.

EFFICIENCY

Efficiency is the measure of productivity arrived at by converting the costs of inputs to their corresponding outputs: the higher the level of output that is derived from a given level of input, the more efficient the endeavour is.

The shortcomings of the Programme design, Log Frame and M&E system along with the, at times, imprecise or ambiguous relationship between specific activities and the outputs that they are intended to achieve, as well as the challenges of identifying unit costs of inputs (for example the daily participant unit costs of training provision); in combination serve as limitations on any attempt to evaluate the efficiency of the Programme.

In addition any evaluation of efficiency would need to consider the overhead, logistic and life-support costs which are inherent to working in Somalia and which would need to be either taken into account or discounted in arriving at unit cost estimates.

However, it is evident that, in several aspects of the Programme's activities, there were readily accessible data that would have pointed to the efficiency of operations.

For example, throughout the documentation and as communicated in fieldwork interviews, there is considerable, measurable, data on the revenue increasing benefits derived as a direct result of the introduction of BIMS and AIMS. On the presumption that the unit costs of installing and maintaining these systems is readily accessible; then a measure of the intervention's efficiency is also available.

To take another example, the increase in turnover and/or employee engagement of traders benefitting from the construction of a market or road construction can be measured and considered in the context of the construction and maintenance of the facility.

Conclusion

While the Final Outcome Evaluation did not directly address the key efficiency questions and the Mid-Term Review concluded that *JPLG outputs appear to be delivered in a reasonably efficient manner*: given the critique offered here, it is not possible, at this juncture, to provide an authoritative evaluation of the Programme's overall efficiency. However, there are aspects of Programme activities that were amenable to an efficiency evaluation, but these were not availed of by the Programme managers.

MANAGEMENT & COORDINATION

This section of the report focuses on issues of management and coordination as they related directly to the operation of the Programme during Phase 1. Consideration of the wider management dimensions, including inter-Agency coordination, budgets, M&E framework, personnel and Programme development will be discussed in Part 2 of this report.

At the outset it needs to be stated that the management and coordination challenges in delivering JPLG were formidable; the management and leadership tasks were numerous and diverse, the inter-Agency model of working was novel to most of the personnel involved, the environment in which the Programme operated was as dynamic as it was volatile: overall it required the management of a cacophony of uncertainties and competing demands for early results, not all of them compatible one with the other.

Against this background it is understandable that short-cuts might have been taken in order to get the Programme up and running and producing observable, if not easily measurable, results. However, the important lesson from this is the distinction between *getting things right* and *getting things right now*. While the latter of these is defensible in the short-term, programme management guided by the former is essential if a programme is to achieve its objectives.

As has already been discussed in this report, the shortcomings in the Programme's design, planning and early operation set in motion a substantial, but evidently not total, undermining of JPLG's ability to reach its full, effective and efficient potential. While there were stocktaking opportunities along the way, the Programme's remedial responses were generally insufficiently radical or far reaching enough to fully retrieve lost ground or opportunities. There was a 'tilt on the tiller' instead of a remedial root and branch overhaul of JPLG's operation.

The JPLG documentation placed considerable emphasis on partnership and Somali ownership of the Programme's processes, activities and results. In this context it is clear from minutes of meetings and from the contributions of key informants in this evaluation that the Steering Committee format is a useful forum for discussion, planning, review and decision making.

However, the language throughout the Programme Annual Reports and other documentation portrays interventions that are substantially, if not exclusively, supply side originated and driven. As has been mentioned earlier in this report, it is perfectly acceptable for a programme team to observe needs that are not being addressed and to lobby for responses to them by counterparts: it is perfectly acceptable for a programme team to provide technical expertise, leadership even, when counterparts agree priorities for intervention.

While there are undoubtedly elements of the above to be found throughout the duration of the Programme, there are equally indications of the Programme *doing to* and *doing for* counterpart institutions and communities, rather than *doing with*.

There were intentions stated in the Programme Document that were either totally unrealistic in their ambitions or that committed JPLG to activities of which there is no evidence of having taken place.

Very early in the Programme, perhaps even before it started operation, it was obvious that for funding, human resource and security reasons the target of engaging with ninety eight Districts would never be achieved by JPLG Phase 1; yet it continued to appear in Annual Reports as if it would be.

The Programme Document also committed to working with Regional Administrations and Councils: *the JP will strengthen their coordination functions with respect to data collection, needs, priorities and plans for districts in that region, linkages between the central and district tiers of government and monitoring and oversight of districts*: there was no documented contact with Regional level institutions.

The Programme Document states: *relevant authorities have developed context-specific communication strategies on social issues, including AIDS. This will entail capacity building of regional and district councils in identifying key social messages and successful communication channels to regularly disseminate information and raise awareness, for example on hygiene*. There is no indication that the Programme provided any input on public information in respect of social issues.

It is understandable that, in the light of changing circumstances or with the emerging understanding of the unfeasibility of a particular intention that a decision to be taken not to engage with previously planned activities. However, in the case of JPLG, while some aspirations were lowered and some abandoned, we have found no documentary trace of how, why or when decisions in respect of these were arrived at: pointing to them being allowed to fade away rather than being actively decided on.

The Programme's commitment to conflict resolution and peace building would have needed to have gone beyond a *do no harm* policy if it was to fully engage with these aspects of its Overall Objective to: *contribute to peace and equitable priority service delivery in selected locations*. In fact, the key eligibility for any district's inclusion of

working only with districts where there is no active conflict potential associated with JPLG intervention could be interpreted as an exercise in conflict avoidance.

There are however, a few identifiable instances which indicate that further thought should have been given to the conflict potential of JPLG activities. In the Programme Document reference is made to: *some competition between districts might in fact produce positive developments*: and in the minutes of the Programme Management Group there is reference to a prize and a plaque for the best performing Mayor. The conditions of this competitive process are not stated, so it is not certain if the criteria are to do with the Mayor who has reached the highest level of some specified scale, or the one who has travelled furthest. In any event the idea of prizes and competitions runs contrary to the principle of promoting inter-District cooperation and collaboration as a means of conflict reduction.

On a positive note, there is strong evidence to the effect that in delivering the Programme the partner UN Agencies have worked well together in a collaborative mode, harnessing the strengths of each toward shared goals.

The table below provides an example of this in operation.

EXAMPLE OF JOINT PROGRAMME IN ACTION: DEVELOPMENT PLANNING	
Planning Tasks	UN Agencies Working Jointly
Community Consultation	UNICEF with Communities and Districts
Prioritising	UNDP with relevant UN Agencies and line Ministries to help coordinate/link with central/regional sector priorities
Validating	UNDP with Districts
Testing Feasibility	ILO with MoPW and other relevant sector ministries
Costing	ILO with engineers
Drafting Plan	UNDP in support of District Administration
Council Approval	With UNDP support
Procurement	ILO with Districts and contractors
Execution	ILO with Districts, MoPW Districts and contractors
Payments (Fiscal Transfers)	UNCDF with MoF, Accountant General and Districts. UN Habitat is also engaged with the support they provide to Districts for Municipal Finance (AIMS being a pre-requisite for LDF)
Community Oversight	UNICEF with Community and District Councils

Figure 2 JPLG Joint Working

Conclusions

The shortcomings in design, planning, Log Frame and M&E cannot be anything other than indicators of management weaknesses, the consequences of which percolated throughout the Programme's duration.

However, the degree to which the Agencies were able to work together, the tenacity with which the Programme was delivered in the face of institutional and environmental challenges did serve to overcome some of the weaknesses and, as outlined in the section of this report on Effectiveness, there were substantial achievements in several key areas.

SUSTAINABILITY

Consideration of whether the benefits of the Programme were likely to continue for a reasonable period of time after December 2012 is hampered to some degree by the fact that there was an unbroken continuum from Phase 1 to Phase 2.

The dominant opinion of the key informants at District and Central level who were interviewed in the course of the fieldwork for this evaluation was that if the Programme had ended in 2012 they would have continued with the systems and processes that were generated by PJLG.

SOME COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD

We now have the tools, so we could get on with the job.

The money would have gone but the ideas, practices and principles would have remained.

If JPLG had not happened, the district would have 'just lived from day to day'. If it had ended in 2012 everything would have carried on but the \$\$\$ would have gone, but for us this was always a small % of the LG expenditure.

If JPLG had not arrived there would have been no noticeable progress: if it had left in 2012, the likelihood is that the progress would have steadily unravelled.

We would have been able to continue because JPLG1 had demonstrated the right way of conducting business.

Apart from expressing the aspiration that Somali authorities would be in a position to assume the cost of the national consultants by the Programme's end, there is no indication of any exit or transfer strategy in the Programme Document or anywhere else in the documentation that has been reviewed in the course of this evaluation.

In the course of, for some Districts, nearly five years of JPLG support, it would be reasonable to expect that in at least some aspects of governance at least some Districts would have sufficient capacity to proceed unaided. There is no indication that there was any significant tapering off of JPLG technical assistance intervention in any District.

An aspect of the Programme's tapering off would be the planned exit of the national consultants from the Districts and Ministries where they were placed. In the course of our interviews with consultants and District and Government key informants it was obvious that a significant percentage of consultants' time was devoted to capacity substitution as opposed to capacity transfer activities: in fact in two settings it was clear that the consultants were fully engaged in capacity substitution with no evident plans for any change in the situation.

Conclusion

The balance of the evidence that was available to this evaluation points to the Programme's core key achievements in respect of Local governance were well embedded in the community and institutional ethos of those Districts and Ministries with which it engaged and would have been sustained had JPLG terminated in December 2012.

OVERALL CONCLUSION

The overall conclusion is that the available evidence points to the Programme having made substantial progress toward meeting its objectives. However, in the absence of clearer, measurable indicators against which to measure success any statement about objectives being fully achieved needs to be expressed tentatively.

Taking into account all the aspects of the Programme that have been covered in this evaluation: the abiding conclusion is that the lack of fundamental programme management building blocks as documented in this report, and in other reviews of the Programme, has resulted in the truth of its achievements being in large measure concealed through lack of substantiating systematic, measurable evidence. The Programme effectively undersold itself.

ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Position Lead Consultant (Evaluating Decentralization and /or Governance Programmes)

Place of Performance Nairobi / Somalia

Contract Duration 6 – 7 Weeks including 5/6 weeks in Nairobi/Somalia

Salary TBA

Starting Date ASAP

Closing Date The Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG) for Somalia is a five year joint UN program comprising of ILO, UNCDF, UNDP, UN-HABITAT and UNICEF which commenced in April 2008 and ended on 31 December 2012. It was designed to respond to the priorities in the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme 2008 – 2012 (RDP) and contribute to meeting the United Nations Transition Plan 2008 -2010 (UNTP) outcome 2: Local governance contributes to peace and equitable priority service delivery in selected locations as well as the United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy 2011 – 2015 (UNSAS).

The JPLG was implemented in partnership with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and then the Federal Government of Somalia, the Government of Puntland and the Government of Somaliland. The JPLG two specific objectives are²⁰:

- Communities have equitable access to basic services through local government
- Local governments are accountable and transparent.

The JPLG works to ensure transparent, accountable and efficient local service delivery by working at the following different enabling levels²¹:

- Improving the legislative and regulatory framework for decentralized service delivery in all three zones of Somalia;
- Improving the capacity of existing and upcoming district councils;
- Providing funding for service delivery through districts councils; and
- Developing the capacity of communities to generate the demand side governance at the local level.

With the first phase of the programme ending in December 2012, and as recommended by the Mid-Term Review (MTR), a second phase of the programme (JPLG II: 2013-2017) was designed in 2012 following intensive consultations with stakeholders. The new five year programme was adopted in December 2012 with strong support from Governments (central and local), donors, and the five participating UN Agencies. As this second phase is now being implemented (2013 Annual budget is USD 25M), JPLG nonetheless wishes to conduct an evaluation of its first phase to inform JPLG II of possible areas for improvements.

20 Joint Programme Document. UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery, UNDP Somalia April 2008.

21 See JPLG programme logframe for details. Note that a JPLG logframe prepared in 2008/9 was revised from the original results and resources framework presented in the JPLG project document. This enabled the establishment of the overall M&E framework and the monitoring and information system for JPLG.

Purpose / Objective of the final review:

The JPLG final evaluation will primarily look at the results and impacts of the joint programme (2008 -2012) and more specifically the relevance, effectiveness and value-adding of the JPLG, as a joint programme that aimed at enhancing local governance and improve delivery of basic services in Somalia. In addition, the efficiency of management, implementation and sustainability of results will be addressed.

The JPLG is a joint programming tool²² for alignment of UN priorities to governments as well as to multiple development partner strategies and to coordinate programme implementation and financial management of the five participating UN agencies. In addition this joint programme has been agreed to by partners to ensure the complementarity of inputs of technical agencies and to develop a singular interlocutor for all partners. The evaluation would then identify whether or not the JPLG has achieved its intended results, as well as recommend ways in which the JPLG could enhance coherence, alignment and harmonization based on joint programming best practices and the Bussan Agreement and the New Deal. The results of the evaluation will be used to improve the implementation and management of JPLG II (2013 -2017) which started in January 2013.

The Final evaluation will be conducted using, amongst other documents, the external OES and MTR reports as secondary data and based on a simple system that will need to be designed to verify findings and/or collect additional primary data as required.

Programme evaluations:

Apart from the internal M&E system of JPLG, a baseline survey (local governance) was conducted in 2010 against which annual Outcome Evaluations (OES) are made (a final OES report is expected by end of June 2013). In addition a Mid-Term Evaluation (MTR) was conducted in 2011 and recommended the formulation of a second phase of the joint programme. The MTR assessed the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of management and implementation, as well as the sustainability of the Joint Programme's results.

Scope of the final evaluation

1. Assess if JPLG's objectives and planned results, approach, organization and scope were valid and relevant, taking into account the evolving local governance environment in Somalia.
2. Assess the outcome results and impacts (positive or negative) achieved after the first five years (2008-2012) against the JPLG project document as well as the annual work-plans, the quality and sustainability of institutional results, and recommend adjustments or changes to improve relevance, sustainability and effective service delivery (under JPLG II, 2013-2017).

²² The JPLG is set up as a country run joint programme operated through the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF) in New York. As such the JPLG primarily uses the pass through mechanism as the financing tool for donors to finance the joint programme. There is accountability and reporting line to the MPTF. Refer to <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/JS000>

- Note that institutional results also encompass presence of the fundamentals of good governance such as participation, accountability and transparency in ensuring service delivery.
3. Assess and make recommendations on the replicability (i.e: institutionalization and / or expansion) of JPLG interventions and the extent to which this has enhanced the effectiveness and value for money of the Joint Programme.
 4. Assess and make recommendations on the extent to which JPLG interventions have contributed to peace and stability at the local level and particularly in the target districts in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia.
 5. Assess and make recommendations on the efficiency and effectiveness – value for money - of implementation by the participating UN agencies as well the JPLG management arrangements.
 6. Assess and make recommendations on the JPLG monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework and mechanism (incl. the OES system), its results and the general reporting system.
 7. Assess and make recommendations on the added value of the joint programme in terms of expected benefits of UN joint programmes such as aid effectiveness, coordination and harmonization between governments, donors and participating agencies, alignment with donor and government strategies and priorities; donor use of the UNDP/MPTF pass-through funding mechanism.

Work-plan and expected deliverables:

The evaluation should be carried out over an estimated period of six/seven weeks, including five/six weeks in Nairobi/Somalia and a few days (desk work) to prepare the mission and finalize the end report. Proposed tentative schedule:

- Week I (prior to arrival in Nairobi): Collect existing data/reports, preliminary interviews, desk analysis and preparation;
- Week II (one week after arrival in Nairobi): An 'Inception Report' is provided which includes a response to the TOR, and a detailed work plan detailing the approach, methodology for data collection and analysis, the outline of the final report, an indicative list of stakeholders to interview and key questions to be asked. Initial interviews will be conducted during this first week in Nairobi.
- Week III, IV (and possibly V): Conduct field work (approx. 14-21 days) in Somalia (Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland – and to selected target districts within these regions), interviews, consultations, workshops and preparation of first draft of the report (3 weeks following the approval of the inception report).
- Week V: 'Draft Report' finalized and a presentation delivered to key JPLG partners and stakeholders.
- Week VI: Production and presentation of the 'revised Draft Report', incorporating comments by the partners and government. Departure from Nairobi.
- Comments on the final report shall be provided within two weeks from JPLG and its stakeholders. The 'JPLG Final Evaluation Report' (approx. 20 pages, plus annexes and a 2-page executive summary) shall be finalized within two weeks after receipt of comments.

List of recommended individuals and institutions to be consulted:

- Vice-Presidents, Ministers and/or DGs in charge of Planning, Interior, Finance, Women affairs, Public Works, Health and Education; Water
- Sector Agencies – PASWEAN, Road Agencies (PL & SL)
- Mayors, Councilors and Community representatives from target districts (incl. former Mayors and Councilors),
- Local Government Departmental Staff – Finance, Administration, Social Affairs, Public Works
- JPLG outcome evaluation team (OES)
- UN Resident Coordinator
- UN participating agencies and the JPLG team (incl. PMG, PMU, TWG, local teams)
- Donors and other partners (incl. the World Bank)
- Key complementary programmes – external and within the Partner Agencies e.g. CDRD, SIDP, Inter-Peace, etc.
- Implementing partners, i.e. selected service provider institutions i.e. CSI (SL), PIDAM & KAALO
- Private sector stakeholders – i.e. those engaged in public service delivery (PPP partners)
- The UNDP MPTFO and its focal point in UNDP Somalia

Main Responsibilities of the consultants:

The evaluation will be undertaken by a team of two consultants:

- 1. Team Leader (expert on evaluating decentralization and/or governance programmes in fragile states/conflict settings).**
- 2. Junior Expert Consultant (for evaluating JPLG Management arrangements, Aid effectiveness and the JPLG M&E system)**

GENERAL FUNCTIONS

Team Leader (expert on evaluating decentralization and/or governance programmes in fragile states/conflict settings)

- The Team leader will provide overall leadership on the evaluation exercise (including oversight for work planning and division of labor) and coordinate and be responsible for delivering the inception report, draft, final report and presentations in line with the scope of the evaluation mentioned under section 3. More specifically, the Team leader will:
- Review the JPLG from an objective overall perspective.
- Review and use, amongst other documents, the external OES and MTR reports as secondary data and develop a simple system to verify findings and/or collect additional primary data if required.
- Review and assess (using the reports and system mentioned above) the achievements reached after the first phase of JPLG (2008-2012) against the JPLG project document as well as the annual JPLG work plans, the quality and sustainability of institutional results and improvement in equitable access to basic services.
- Assess the extent and effectiveness of capacity development initiatives supported by the Joint programme.
- Assess the extent to which JPLG contributed to peace and stability at the local level, particularly in Somaliland and Puntland.

- Assess the JPLG efforts to address and integrate gender into the programme and make recommendations for adjustments.

Expected starting dates and Duration of work:

As anticipated, the Final Evaluation shall be carried out by a team of two consultants and conducted (preferably from end October 2013) over an estimated period of six/seven weeks, including five/six weeks in Nairobi/Somalia and a few additional days (desk work) to prepare the mission and finalize the end report. It is likely that the consultants will need to participate in the UN security training (SSAFE) which will be factored in the timelines provided.

Scope of proposal and schedule of payments

This will be a fixed output-based price contract based on the accepted proposal.

The proposal should include among others consultants' costs (professional fees), travel costs, living allowances and insurance costs.

Payment for satisfactory services rendered and submission of invoice will be effected as below:-

Milestone	Percentage	Target date (Week)
Signature of agreement by both parties	5%	Week I
Acceptance of the inception report which should include a response to the TOR, and a detailed work plan detailing the approach, methodology for data collection and analysis, the outline of the final report, an indicative list of stakeholders to interview and key questions to be asked.	40%	Week II
Presentation and acceptance of the draft report incorporating comments by the partners and government.	25%	Week VI / VII
Acceptance and endorsement of the final report by JPLG partners.	30%	Week XI / XII

ESSENTIAL EXPERIENCE

- The Team Leader should have a Post-graduate degree in international relations, political science, international development, social geography or a subject related to local governance and decentralized service delivery.
- Fifteen years' experience in decentralisation and/or governance programmes, including in fragile states/conflict settings.
- Previous experience in conducting programme evaluations and willingness to travel to Somalia.
- The Team Leader is directly responsible for the overall implementation, management and delivery of expected deliverables of the Final evaluation.

LANGUAGES

- Excellent analytical skills and drafting in English.

ANNEX B: KEY RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED

Key Informants in Nairobi

Patrick Duong: Senior Joint Programme Manager

Khalif Farah: Programme Specialist, PMU

Fridah Karimi: Programme Administrator, PMU

Bobirjan Turdiyev: M&E Specialist, PMU

Angela Kabiru-Kang'ethe: Project Manager, ILO

Anka Kitunzi: Chief Technical Adviser, UNCDF

Phillip Cooper: Project Manager, UNDP

Modupe Adebajo: Project Manager, UNHABITAT

Diana Vakarelska: Project Manager, UNICEF

Paul Crook: Chief Technical Adviser, ILO

Dragan Tatic: Human Settlements Officer, UN Habitat

Bushra Hassan, UNDP

Ahmad Alhammal, UNDP

John Fox OES Team Leader IDC, Nairobi

Key Informants: Local JPLG Teams – Regional, Ministry and District

Mohamed Hassan JPLG Programme Officer ILO, Somaliland

Adnan Ahmed JPLG Programme Officer UNCDF, Somaliland

Sahal Hassan JPLG Programme Officer UNDP, Somaliland

Ayanle Mohamed Omer JPLG Community Development Officer UNICEF, Somaliland

Hamdi Mohamed JPLG M&E Officer PMU, Somaliland

Mohamed Said JPLG Programme Officer ILO, Puntland

Ahmed Noah JPLG Programme Officer UNCDF, Puntland

Abdurazak Hassan JPLG Programme Officer UNDP, Puntland

Salah Haji Abdirahman, JPLG Programme Specialist UNDP, Puntland

Mohamoud Osman JPLG Programme Officer UNHABITAT, Puntland

Abdiwelli Osman JPLG Programme Officer UNICEF, Puntland

Aligab Abdi Abdirahman JPLG Programme Officer UNDP, South Central

Abdirahman Abdi Hassan Ministry JPLG Consultant Ministry of Interior and LG, Somaliland

Abditahman Elmi Wairah Ministry JPLG Consultant Ministry of Health, Somaliland

Abdiqadir Essa Hussein Ministry JPLG Consultant Ministry of Education and Health

Abdukadir Nur Ministry JPLG Consultant/Local Governments Ministry of Interior, Local Governments and Rural Development, Puntland

Mohamed Yusuf Ministry JPLG Consultant/Planning Ministry of Interior, Local Governments and Rural Development, Puntland

Abshir Mohamed Abshir

Ministry JPLG Consultant/Fiscal Decentralization Ministry of Finance, Puntland

Mohamed Shire Jama Ministry JPLG Consultant/Fiscal Transfer Ministry of Finance, Puntland

District JPLG Consultant Berbera District, Somaliland

Shukri Mohamud District JPLG Consultant Bosaso District, Puntland

Rashid Ali Arraleh District JPLG Consultant Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland

District JPLG Consultant Sheikh District, Somaliland

Yussuf Hussein Dahir Vice President JPLG Consultant Puntland

Abshir Mohamed Abshir Ministry JPLG Consultant, MoI Puntland

Mohamed Yusuf Muse Ministry JPLG Consultant, MoF Puntland

Mohamed Shire Jama Ministry JPLG Consultant, MoF Puntland

Hussein Samantar Ministry JPLG Consultant, MoH Puntland

Eng. Siaid Abdullah District JPLG Consultant Bosaso District, Puntland

Awil Mohamud Ali District JPLG Consultant Gardo District, Puntland

Key Informants Central Government Personnel

Eng. Hussein Mohamoud Jiciir Local Government Expert/Formal Mayor of Hargiesa Vice President's Office/Local Governance and Decentralization, Somaliland

Abdalla Mohamed Ali Local Government Officer/Formal Mayor of Berbera Vice President's Office/Local Governance and Decentralization, Somaliland

Ahmed Abdirahman Egeh Local Government Expert Vice President's Office/Local Governance and Decentralization, Somaliland

Siyid Hussein Mursel Vice President Secretariat Office Vice President's Office/Local Governance and Decentralization, Puntland

ShukriHarir Ismail Deputy Minister Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Somaliland

Nimo Hussein Qawdhan Vice Minister Minister of Health, Somaliland

Awale Mohamed Muse Director of Planning and Statistics Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Somaliland

Khadar Mohmoud Ahmed Director of Health Services Ministry of Health, Somaliland

Mohamed Abdi Bade Accountant General Ministry of Finance, Somaliland

Khadar Mohamed Abdi Head of Internal Audit Ministry of Finance, Somaliland

Mohamed Ali Mohamed Director of District and Regional Development Ministry of the Interior, Somaliland

Abdirahman Abdisalam Sh Ali Director of Sustainable and Regulatory Framework Ministry of Water Resources, Somaliland

Eng. Said Dualeh Molid Director of Planning and Coordination/JPLG Focal Point Person Ministry of Water Resources, Somaliland

Mukhtar Mohamed Ali Director General Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Transport, Somaliland

Eng. Rashid M Mohamed Ali Director of Planning Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Transport, Somaliland

Abdi Abdillah Hassan, Director of Social Services, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Somaliland

Abdigashis Mohamed Hersi, Minister of Public Works, Puntland

Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim, DG, Ministry of Education, Somaliland

Abdulahi Said Yusuf Director General Ministry of Interior, Local Governments and Rural Development, Puntland

Mohamed Ali Wov Director of Planning Ministry of Interior, Local Governments and Rural Development, Puntland

Jouse Hassan Hussein Director of Local Governments Ministry of Interior, Local Governments and Rural Development, Puntland

Ahmed Jama Hassan General Secretary Ministry of Finance, Puntland

Mohamed Ali Wor Director Planning Ministry of the Interior, Puntland

Fatima Said Ali Ministry of Planning, Puntland

C/Wal Ismahil Yuusuf

Abdirizak Farah Mohamed

Ali Abtidon Halawe Director General Ministry of the Interior, South Central

Mohammed Ali

Head of Planning Department Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Puntland

Farah KulmiyaElmi Director General Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Puntland

Key Informants: Local Government Personnel

Baasha Abdullali Ibrahim Vice Mayor Berbera District, Somaliland

Suhayb Mohamed Ali Executive Secretary Berbera District, Somaliland

Mohamed Ali Aabi Director of Administration and Finance Berbera District, Somaliland

Abdinasir Omer Jama Director of Planning and Development Berbera District, Somaliland

Abdikadir Jama Mohamed Head of Planning and Development Section Berbera District, Somaliland

Mustafa Basha Allahi Director of Protocol of Office of the Mayor Berbera District, Somaliland

Ali Duialle	Head of Office of the Executive Secretary	Berbera District, Somaliland
Suhayb Mayled	District Officer	Berbera District, Somaliland
Hassan Abdalle Hassan	Mayor -	Bosaso District, Puntland
Said Abdirahman	Vice Mayor	Bosaso District, Puntland
Usalaan Ahmed,	Executive Secretary	Bosaso District, Puntland
Sahro Mahd,	Director of Finance	Bosaso District, Puntland
Yusuf Adan Gas	Director of Planning	Bosaso District, Puntland
Bashil Xaashi,	Director of Social Affairs	Bosaso District, Puntland
Fowsiyo Mohmed	Councillor	Bosaso District, Puntland
C. Nur Kalayr	Councillor	Bosaso District, Puntland
Bashir Said	Councillor	Bosaso District, Puntland
Ahmed Dacar,	Procurement Officer	Bosaso District, Puntland
Nakim Yasin Cabdi,	Accounting Officer	Bosaso District, Puntland
Jinow Abas Nuuz,	Town Officer	Bosaso District, Puntland
Maxamud Jaxed Jhie –	Executive Secretary	Gardo District, Puntland
MaxIned Yusuf Ssews	Director General	Gardo District, Puntland
Hassan Abdi	Director of Public Works	Gardo District, Puntland
Mohamed Elim Muse	District Engineer	Gardo District, Puntland
Eng. Abdilkadir Abdidahir Farah	Technical Adviser/ MoPW&T	Gardo District, Puntland
Waeyes Aidarus Sure	District Procurement Officer	Gardo District, Puntland
Xirsi Ismaeel Axmal	District Council Officer	Gardo District, Puntland
Mohed Abdi Alir Mohed	Director of Finance	Gardo District, Puntland
Abdirizak Farah Hassan	City Councillor	Hargeisa Municipality, Somaliland
Abdulqdir Omer	Director of Planning & Development	Hargeisa Municipality, Somaliland

Maxamoud Ahmed Mireh	Finance Department	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Mohamed Reshid Abdulahi	Administration and Finance Department	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Alrahman Allahi	Administration and Finance Department	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Ayaanle Ahmed Matika	Administration and Finance Department	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Abdi Ali Aadey	Accounts Department	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Molied Amiin Jama Ali	Department of Planning/Statistics	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Molied Alnour H. Aadam	Department of Planning/Statistics	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Mohamed Ahmed Ghalib	Department of Planning/Statistics	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Hamse Mohaed Abdillahi	Staff Planning Department	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Rabile Omar Abdi	Revenue/ Assistant Cashier	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Saeed Adau Husein -		Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Yasin Suleiman Muumin	-	Hargesia Municipality, Somaliland
Abdi Artin H. Abokar	Deputy Mayor	Sheikh District, Somaliland
Ali Ahmed H. Abdillahi	Executive Secretary	Sheikh District, Somaliland
Bahra Abubakar Ismail	Director of Administration and Finance	Sheikh District, Somaliland
Mohmed Mohmoud Yousuf	Director of Planning and Development	Sheikh District, Somaliland
Mohomoud Omer Mohid		Sheikh District, Somaliland
Mohadium Ismeal Abd	District Planning Officer	Sheikh District, Somaliland
Ahmed Salad	Former Mayor/Commissioner	Odado District, South Central
Key Informants: JPLG Service Providers/LDF Private Contractors		
Mohamed Mumin Yusuf	Rector Pidam University	Bosaso District, Puntland

C/nuur Farah Yusuf Vice Rector, Pidam University Bosaso District, Puntland

Saiid Cali Maxamuud, Badowle Construction Company Bosaso District, Puntland

Gaar Yasin Ahmed, El Gaar Construction Company Bosaso District, Puntland

Farah Adeec Jubba Group Construction Company Bosaso District, Puntland

Key Informants: JPLG1/LDF Community Beneficiaries

Salaalo Maxamed Maxamuud, Gribble A Village Resident Bosaso District, Puntland

Buuxo Maxamuud Omar Gribble B Village Resident Bosaso District, Puntland

Ruguyo Maxamed Axmed 1 Luulyo Village Resident Bosaso District, Puntland

Khadiizo Maxamed Axmed Dayaxa Village Resident Bosaso District, Puntland

Sahra Faarax Gurlaale, Jubba Airport Village Resident Bosaso District, Puntland

Several Women Women Market vendors (On spot check on Local Market LDF Beneficiaries) Gardo Municipality, Puntland

5 Men and Women School Management Committee (On spot check on a constructed school) Gardo Municipality, Puntland

Roda Abdi Ali Woman (Police Post LDF Beneficiary) Hargeisa Municipality, Somaliland

Several Youth Youth Guards for unused Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Clinic LDF Project Hargeisa Municipality, Somaliland

Several Women Women Market vendors (On spot check on Local Market LDF Beneficiaries) Berbera Municipality, Somaliland

ANNEX C: PROGRAMME RELATED DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

- PMU (2013) Somalia UN-JPLG Final Narrative Report 2008-2012, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2013) Somalia UN-JPLG Final Outcome Evaluation Report, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2013) Somalia 2012 UN-JPLG Annual Report, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2012) Somalia UN-JPLG 2011 Annual Report, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2011) Somalia UN-JPLG 2010 Annual Report, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2010) Somalia UN-JPLG 2009 Annual Report, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2009) Somalia UN-JPLG 2008 Annual Report, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2008) Somalia UN-JPLG Programme Document, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2012) Study on Somaila UN-JPLG Capacity Development Approaches, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- PMU (2012) Puntland Fiduciary Risk Assessment, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNCDF, Nairobi.
- PMU (2012) Somaliland Fiduciary Risk Assessment, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNCDF, Nairobi.
- PMU (2012) South Central Fiduciary Risk Assessment, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNCDF, Nairobi.
- PMU (2011) Somalia UN-JPLG Mid Term Review Report, Programme Management Unit, Somalia UNDP, Nairobi.
- UN (2010) United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy, 2011-2015, , Somalia UN, Nairobi.
- UN (2008) Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme: Deepening Peace and Reducing Poverty, Somalia UN, Nairobi.
- UN (2007) United Nations Transition Plan for Somalia, 2008-2009 Somalia UN, Nairobi.
- PMU (2010) Puntland UN JPLG Baseline Survey, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Nairobi.
- PMU (2010) Somaliland UN JPLG Baseline Survey, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Nairobi.
- PMU (2010) South Central UN JPLG Baseline Survey, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Nairobi.
- PMU (2009-2012) Minutes of Puntland UN JPLG Steering Committee Meetings, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Nairobi.
- PMU (2009-2012) Minutes of Somaliland UN JPLG Steering Committee Meetings, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Nairobi.
- PMU (2009-2012) Minutes of South Central UN JPLG Steering Committee Meetings, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Nairobi.
- PMU (2009-2012) Notes of UN JPLG Technical Working Group Meetings, Somalia Programme Management Unit, Nairobi.

Other documents consulted in the course of this evaluation are identified in foot notes in the text of the report.

ANNEX D: SUMMARY FIELD REPORTS

Briefing Note on Somaliland Mission

This short briefing note provides a description of the Evaluation Team's activities and preliminary findings during their mission to Somaliland from 26th Jan - 9th Feb 2014.

During the mission interviews were conducted with one Deputy Minister and senior officials at central government level, senior and mid-ranking officials in the municipalities of Hargeisa, Bebera and Sheik, where we also met with the Deputy Mayor. We also had interviews with the consultants embedded in the ministries and in the three municipalities, the JPLG team and the ex-mayors of Hargiesa and Berbara who provided to have an encyclopaedic knowledge of JPLG 1. Because of logistical constraints our contact with community beneficiaries was limited to an informal conversation with stall holders in a JPLG funded market in Berbara.

We had aspirations to meet with, among others: the Vice President, the Director General of the MoI, Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Executive Secretary in Hargeisa Municipality and the Association of Local Government. In all cases the primary reason was failure to meet that key individuals were out of town or caught up in other pressing business. Nonetheless, those key informants with whom we were able to meet provided useful information, opinion and insights.

On February 8th we conducted a validation meeting with representatives from the JPLG team, embedded consultants, Hargeisa Municipality, including a member of the Council and the ex-Mayor of Hargeisa.

Appended to this note is a list of the individuals with whom we met in the course of the mission.

In addition to conducting, recording and beginning the content analysis of the interviews in Somaliland we also made progress with the review of the voluminous documentary material relating to the Programme. Given the time lapse since the ending of Phase 1 and its immediate merging into Phase 2, this material is more than usually relevant to our evaluation.

Summary of Findings

The following notes relate to findings in relation to the 'on the ground' operation of the Programme. There is no substantial critique here of its management structures, although these were touched on in interviews with the JPLG team and some key informants in respect of Programme 'branding'.

Relevance

All informants were firmly of the opinion that the Programme's intervention was highly relevant to the local governance needs of Somaliland; at the outset and throughout its duration. As one informant put it, *"everything the JPLG did was relevant but it didn't cover every relevant thing"*. In our review of the Programme Document it was evident that in its initial planning and design care was taken to

ensure that the objectives were consistent with UN and Somali Government strategies.

The participants in the validation meeting confirmed the relevance of the Programme in the Somaliland context.

Key Governance Achievements

Key informants tended to respond to questions about transparency, accountability and participation in the context of these qualities being inseparable, almost indistinguishable, elements of a single advance in local governance. What they all pointed to was the part that community participation in planning played as a trigger to the local government institutions being prompted into engaging in more transparent and accountable practices.

The informants in each district administration provided full accounts of the planning participatory processes. There were some slight variations in how community consultation took place. In Sheik, for example, the local government staff went to the villages to seek community priorities, while in Hareisa and Berbara local NGOs and students were engaged to undertake this activity. Each had various levels of validation of draft plans; and in respect of communicating the outcome of the planning process, Sheik and Hargeisa relied on the councillors to communicate these to their constituents while Berbara, in addition to this, also used local media.

The transparency and accountability elements were seen as arising from the original participatory planning, with citizens being engaged in project oversight, lobbying for their communities and arguing for their priorities to be included in final plans. This was facilitated by the system improvements promoted by JPLG.

The validation meeting concurred with the key informant findings in respect of transparency, accountability and participation.

Systems Improvement

The key systems improvements identified by key informants were in the areas of:

- Public Finance Management
- Procurement
- Planning

In respect of public finance management the informants at central and local level expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the implementation of the BIMS and AIMS software. Local officials pointed to the accuracy as well as the time and energy saving that these systems represented. The substantial increase in revenue coming to the local governments was described as being attributed to BIMS and AIMS.

In the validation meeting it was pointed out that, while these represent a major contribution to PFM, there was resistance from the central authorities who required that the old double-entry manual accounting system be maintained in parallel to

BIMS and TAMS. Also, a validation meeting participant pointed out that the systems were not without their technical shortcomings and continuing 'control' over them on the part of the NGO that adapted the Access platform for local government use inhibited the development of in-house expertise.

The introduction of the procurement system, initially for LDF funded projects but later expanded by the three local governments to include all procurement was described by key informants as being a major contribution to local government effectiveness and efficiency, as well as enhancing transparency, accountability and providing a fair means for local providers to bid for contracts.

The validation group concurred with this view.

Mention has already been made of the participation aspect of planning, but the inculcation of the planning ethos as promoted by JPLG was considered by key informants to be a major contribution to local governance. Several pointed out that previous efforts at planning were no more than 'wish lists' but such things as the introduction of the five-year planning framework and the annual planning round with an emphasis on costing and prioritising represented an important contribution from the Programme.

Some planning department personnel raised a concern about International NGOs who arrived in and proceeded with interventions without reference to Local Government, plans or priorities. One cited an instance where an INGO was constructing a road that was not a local priority and when challenged on this informed the local authority that the Ministry of Public Works had given their permission.

The validation group concurred with the view that the planning system improvements were a major contribution to good governance.

Investments

Respondents clearly saw the LDF as much a means to developing capacity with the local governments as a medium for development funding. In fact, as local revenues increased over time it became less significant in terms of overall development resources. There was some criticism from CG and LG informants to the effect that the formula for determining LDF allocations was inappropriate: it did not take account of the demographics or needs or particular circumstances of individual districts. However, there was general agreement that the role the LDF played in promoting the implementation of good practice systems was a key element in the Programme's success. As the ex-Mayors of Hargesia and Berbara pointed out, the substantial increase in revenues from the implementation of the software systems meant that the LDF money was progressively a smaller element of the development budget.

There were accounts given of some difficulties in the early days of the Programme relating to the lack of coordination with the line Ministries.

Officials in the three districts visited emphasised that they distinguish between capital and operational funding and ensure that there are operational funds budgeted for each capital development.

The validation meeting participants concurred with the view that the LDF, while providing limited infrastructure development, was a major element in promoting improved LG systems.

Training

The provision of training played a major role in the delivery of the programme throughout Phase 1. Opinions offered by stakeholders differed: all agreed that there was a lot of it; some thought too much, others not enough. There was a general consensus that training inputs should be tailored to the identified local needs, that the preparation should involve contributions from LG and CG personnel and where possible training should be provided in the local language. Some were also of the opinion that training should be longer and perhaps assessed and certified on successful completion.

The validation meeting participants did not dwell on training at any length, but the general opinion was that the more practical the training, for example on BIMS and AIMS, the more embedded it would be in the longer-term. The idea of longer, assessed and certified training was also seen to have merit.

Gender Issues

At the CG level the informants from the Min. of Labour and Social Affairs had positive views on the role played by the Programme in promoting civil education, especially in encouraging women to participate more fully in local government. They expressed scepticism about concepts such as cross-cutting and were of the opinion that gender issues should be given prominence 'in their own right'. At LG level there was a hint of equality issues not being taken seriously: passing references were made to the democratic process deciding who gets elected. There were passing references made to the fact the women participated in the planning processes, were on the CMGs and that there were women employed in the LG.

Unfortunately, the validation meeting came to an end before we were able to have this issue discussed. We hopeful this not a reflection on our commitment to deal appropriately with this subject, but rather an indication of the lengthy discussions on other themes that left us 'out of time'.

What if IDLG had not happened? What if it had closed in 2012?

These two questions were asked of each of the key informants. The universal response was that there would have been little or no progress if the Programme had not happened. As one respondent put it "we would have just continued putting in our days". In response to the question about the programme closing in 2012, the response was always to the effect that the systems and processes would continue,

but the LDF money would have gone. One respondent summed the situation up thus, “they would have left us with the tools”.

While the validation meeting participants were generally reluctant to be drawn on the first question; “who knows” was the shared sentiment: they also supported the notion that had the Programme ended in 2012 the capacity that had been generated would have substantially remained.

Conclusion

The above note represents the interview data that we secured in relation to the Programme’s activities and achievements.

We were also provided with some facts and opinions in respect of aspects of Programme management that were incomplete and not subjected to validation at this stage. In addition, we have not at this stage completed our review of the extensive documentation that will inform our further enquiries and findings.

Briefing Note on Mogadishu Mission

This short briefing note provides a description of the Evaluation Team’s activities and preliminary findings during their mission to South Central from 25th - 27th February 2014.

During the mission interviews were conducted with senior central government officials and district mid-ranking officials. Interviews were also conducted with JPLG consultants.

We had aspirations to meet with among others the Federal State officers as well as the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) officers. In all cases, the key individuals were variously affected by problems such as being out of town, Mayor’s regime change or insecurity acting as a barrier to travel to the interview places.

On February 26th we conducted a general JPLG1 meeting with representatives from the JPLG team, Mogadishu City and Odado district. Appended to this note is a list of the individuals with whom we met in the course of the mission. The general meeting was followed with a more specific meeting with representatives of Odado district.

In addition to conducting the meetings progress was made with respect to the review of JPLG1 documents.

Summary of Findings

The following notes relate to findings in relation to the findings from South Central.

Relevance

All informants confirmed that the Programme's interventions were aligned to the local governments and communities needs of South Central and its goals and objectives were consistent with UN and Somali Government strategies.

Achievements

South Central mostly benefited from programme related mobilization where the information on the strategies of the programmes and its interventions were disseminated. In Mogadishu, much of the work stopped at this level due to insecurity and late entrant districts such as Adado enjoyed more programme benefits in the area of fostering LG transparency, accountability and participation all of which were triggered by the local government institutions due of community participation in development planning that paved the way for the transparency and accountability elements to oversee the implementation of the DDF (collective oversight in project procurement and implementation).

Systems Improvement

The key systems improvements identified by key informants were in the areas of Public Finance Management, Procurement and Planning.

Investments

For Adado district, the LDF was seen much as the means towards developing institutional capacity through LDF allocations and procurement and implementation good practices with prospects that such a system would be mainstreamed in the districts PFM.

Training

The provision of training delivered with the aegis of the programme was seen as satisfactory but inadequate in terms of the time allocated to training workshops.

Impact

Without JPLG1 there would have been stagnation in Odado district because support from the Diaspora was little. On had it stopped in 2012 again it was pointed out that because Odado came on board late it would have been a still birth.

Conclusion

The interview data secured in relation to the Programme's activities and achievements in South Central reveals some uneven support to Mogadishu, BRA and Odado districts. Chronic insecurity in the former appears to be the key factor explaining the weak progress, performance and impact of the programme over the years.

Briefing Note on Puntland Mission

This short briefing note provides a description of the Evaluation Team's activities and preliminary findings during an evaluation mission to Puntland from 9th – 23rd Feb

2014. On 22nd February 2014 we conducted a validation meeting with representatives from the, Central government, Garowe Municipality, JPLG team and embedded consultants.

During this evaluation, mission interviews were conducted with representatives of the Vice President's Office, senior officials at central government level, senior, mid-ranking officials in the municipalities of Garowe, Gardo and Bosaso. We also had interviews with the JPLG local team and JPLG consultants embedded in the ministries and in the districts. JPLG/LDF infrastructure projects were visited along with interviews with selected private sector contractors involved in their construction. Community beneficiaries of the selected LDF/JPLG projects (two markets, a primary school, shopkeepers on newly constructed road, a water project and a community centre) were met and interviewed.

Findings

The following briefing note presents findings in relation to the 'on the ground' operation of the Programme in Puntland between 2008 and 2012. There is no substantive comment on matters to do with programme management (implementation structures) because these did not figure prominently in the course of the key informant interviews.

Relevance

The majority of the informants held the view that the Programme's intervention was relevant to the needs of the programme communities and districts. This was clear and evident with all the communities and districts that benefited from LDF projects such as markets, primary schools, water projects and community centres. The participants in the validation meeting confirmed the relevance of the Programme in the Somaliland context.

Achievements

Responses to questions about transparency, accountability and participation were deemed to be inseparable from the overall programme strategy that was adopted. The introduction of community participation in the planning process of the DDFs, whereby the transparent engagement of the stakeholders paved the way for future accountable practices. The informants in each municipality provided a full account of the participatory planning process where LG staff went to the villages to seek community priorities.

Community consultations involved validation of previous works and relied on the district councillors to communicate progress to their constituents while communities used the opportunity to raise questions about the previous performance of the district.

The validation meeting concurred with the findings that these nascent transparency and accountability elements were seen as vital for citizens' engagement through consultation, oversight, lobbying and advocacy for new interventions.

Systems Improvement

The key systems improvements identified by key informants were in the areas of:

- Public Finance Management
- Procurement
- Planning

In respect of public finance management (PFM) the informants at central and local level, with the notable exception of Garowe Municipality, expressed satisfaction with the introduction of AIMS software. However, as pointed out in the validation meeting, the introduction of BIMS software was slower than AIMS (it hadn't picked up adequately in Puntland to the extent it had in Somaliland). Local officials pointed to the efficiency gains that came with automated accounting and billing as opposed to the manual system previously used. In all, there was increase in revenue accruing to the local governments that had benefited from AIMS related support. The contribution of AIMS and BIMS to the central and local government PFM was more of a goal than an achievement. While there was no resistance to the automated system of accounting system efforts to make LGs make a transition from the manual systems were few and far between. Also, a validation meeting observation was that the monopolistic outsourcing of all troubleshooting of software glitches to Terre Solidaire was a problem in terms of cost and limited sustainability.

The introduction of the LDF procurement system was popular to the extent that the districts were working towards adopting it in all the procurement work to be done in future. It was seen as effective because it was open and transparent, vital ingredients for promoting participation and accountability in contract management.

As pointed out above, participatory planning was promoted in contribution to improved local governance by widening transparency and accountability (T&A) mechanisms. The DDF system was well inculcated in the minds of the participants to the extent that they knew how to proceed in future but with knock on effects of the nature that their participation made them inquisitive district participants, hence playing a T&A role.

Investments

Community and district respondents saw LDF as having direct and indirect benefits to them, namely rendering social infrastructure provisions as well as developing capacity with which such provisions are put in place and managed. As local revenues increase over time, it is likely that local governments will apportion significant LG development resources to use the LDF modality. There were accounts given of some novelty with which the LDF benefits were made to flow to the intended

beneficiary, something new and worth adopting by LGs and communities. However, the discussions were more about the physical and visible investments without much distinction made between development and recurrent expenditure associated with the capital and operational costs of the projects respectively. This still needed further clarification, dialogue and consensus.

Training

There was a general consensus that training was unsatisfactory in terms of being necessary, tailored, needs based, participatory and customised through the use of the local language or translation of training materials. However, few comments were made and the programme documents provided no proof to the effect that the training was associated with certain learning, adoption and returns. Indeed, the validation meeting participants dwelt more on matters of a practical nature with respect to the training inputs (e.g. need for longer trainings and more study tours) than those of a strategic nature (e.g. the training outcomes achieved by the programme).

Impact

The communities and local governments would have made little or no progress without the programme support. There was a sense of confidence that the local governments would have been able to forge on had the programme closed in 2012. The informants and the validation meeting confirmed that the second phase enabled the lessons to sink even further.

Conclusion

The interviews were positive about programme achievements and programme management because questions and challenges were less often pointed out to the effect that there were major hitches to programme implementations attributed to programme management.

ANNEX E: EVALUATION MATRIX

JPLG EVALUATION MATRIX			
QUESTIONS	THEMES	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION
1. How relevant was the programme?	Targeting at identified needs and citizens' priorities. Consistency with National policies, strategies and priorities. Consistency with UN strategies and priorities.	Legislation Policy, consultative, research and JPLG documentation, including the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme 2008-2012, the UN Transition Plan 2008 - 2010 and the UN Somali Assistance Strategy 2011 – 2015. Facts, opinions and suggestions derived from key informants.	Documentary review Semi-structured interviews and focus group meetings with key informants: ministry & local officials, elected representatives, other programme providers, citizens and citizen groups.
2. How effective and efficient was the programme?	Degree to which outcomes and results were achieved. Impact on citizens and institutions of governance. Degree to which the Programme reflected the principles of good governance, especially participation, accountability, and transparency in ensuring service delivery. Degree to which the Programme represented value for money. The effectiveness of the funding mechanism. Management of fiduciary risks.	Consultative, research and JPLG documentation. Reports on best practice form elsewhere. JPLG financial audit and review documents, annual reports and reviews. Facts, opinions and suggestions derived from key informants.	Documentary review Semi-structured interviews and focus group meetings with key informants: ministry & local officials, elected representatives, other programme providers, citizens and citizen groups.
3. How replicable and sustainable were the programme's outcomes and results?	Level to which civic space at district level has been developed and inculcated into the institutional and civic ethos. Degree to which the Programme's outcomes and results are manifest in behaviours and institutional arrangements. Learning that has been gained from	JPLG documentation. Facts, opinions and suggestions derived from key informants.	Documentary review Semi-structured interviews and focus group meetings with key informants: ministry & local officials, elected representatives, other programme providers, citizens and citizen groups.

	JPLG has been promoted. Demand from other areas for JPLG intervention.		
QUESTIONS	THEMES	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION
4. How well managed was the JPLG?	Effective use of resources. Alignment with UN, donor and government strategies. Degree to which JPLG added value for the participating UN partners and promoted aid effectiveness. Quality of Programme's M&E systems and the use that was made of M&E reports and findings.	JPLG project documentation, documentation from UN partners, annual reports and reviews. Facts, opinions and suggestions derived from key informants.	Documentary review Semi-structured interviews and with key informants: JPLG personnel and UN partner personnel.

