IOM/UNDP
JOINT CONFLICT REDUCTION PROGRAMME
MID-TERM REVIEW

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Executive Summary

This report presents key findings and conclusions of a mid-term evaluation of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme phase II, jointly implemented by UNDP and IOM in West and South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei states of Sudan. The report also offers some recommendations for the remaining of the programme as well as for the design process for its potential next iteration.

The international consultant, working with a Sudanese consultant carried out a desk review, meetings with key stakeholders in Khartoum and conducted telephone interviews with those in the states. The review team could not travel to the field due to problems in obtaining travel permits and triangulation was in general limited as there are few other organisations working in these areas. The review took place in parallel to an evaluation by the European Union of programmes supported by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), under which JCRP is supported.

JCRP works to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the targeted areas through five different outputs, UNDP being responsible for the implementation of three and IOM for the remaining two. Although two separate agreements are in place with the EU for each organisation, the overall philosophy and approach are one of partnership and the outputs are designed to contribute to the overall objective in a coordinated manner. There is some merit in this partnership, which capitalises on each of the organisation’s added value and promotes coordination in approaching a sensitive area in a highly volatile environment.

Overall, the programme is highly relevant and well perceived across the states, with some differences amongst them mainly due to context specificities and partners’ diverse capacities. While the overall approach remains valid in pursuing the objectives, the programme’s conflict sensitivity suffers from the fact that it works mainly with and through government counterparts. This is necessary to guarantee access and support to the activities, but it also creates some concerns around neutrality. Efforts have been made to increase this neutrality in different ways, but these can be enhanced.

Lessons learned during the programme implementation should inform a prioritization of activities during the remaining months as well as the design of the next phase/iteration, for which a participatory process, under the umbrella of UNDP’s ongoing programme re-alignment process, is proposed. The consultant proposes that geographic and thematic extensions are considered, with suggestions around scaling up the peace dividend/hardware approach, a swift from conflict reduction to conflict transformation and prevention and exploring potential cross border cooperation.
Background Information on the project

The Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) works to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the former Protocol Areas of South Kordofan State, West Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei in Sudan.

The JCRP has been implemented in two phases: Phase I of the Programme was implemented over the period January 2012 – Feb 2014. Phase II of the JCRP is now being implemented, with the generous support of the European Union for 18 months over the period March, 2014 – August 2015. The programme is scheduled to come to an end in August 2015. However, UNDP is planning to submit a no-cost extension request to the EU until December 2015 and IOM has requested a cost-extension most likely to February 2016.

Phase II of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) builds on the work of the Conflict Reduction Programme (CRP), implemented in 2009 as a pilot programme aimed at prevention and resolution of local conflicts in South Kordofan and Phase I of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme, which expanded the work of the CRP into Blue Nile state and the Abyei Area. The JCRP was initially conceived in a post-conflict setting, in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Since 2011 however, there has been a re-emergence of larger-scale conflicts, with the Abyei Area, Blue Nile and Kordofan states becoming critical, not only for the security of Sudan, but also for South Sudan, owing to the inter-dependent livelihoods of communities across borders. Furthermore, local resource-based conflicts are increasingly becoming entangled with larger political and economic disputes, significantly impacting the security and development of affected communities. Building on the successes, lessons learned and ongoing analysis of the changing conflict dynamics, the overall objective of the current phase of JCRP is to strengthen Government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism (CPAP Outcome 7) in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur. The theory of change guiding the work of the programme is as follows;

- IF we build the capacity of state-level Government peace building institutions and of community-level peace builders THEN they will be better able to manage the peace processes they are strategically best placed to deliver

- IF we provide financial and technical support to local peace processes THEN we will have a direct impact on social cohesion at the community level

- IF we provide financial and technical support to actors communicating local voices to negotiators of a peace agreement THEN we will have a direct impact on plural voices being reflected in the negotiation of a peace agreement
• IF we deliver peace dividends focusing on services identified by communities after a peace agreement THEN we will help sustain local peace processes

• IF we support civil society organizations to deliver peace dividends focusing on developing capacities of local peace actors, fostering diversity and improving livelihoods to target communities or groups.

The specific objectives for Phase II of the Programme are:

1. Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.

Activities include the provision of tailored on-the-job capacity development support to state peacebuilding mechanisms, together with the provision of trainings to a broader range of peacebuilding actors including regional and local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Line Ministries, Native Administration, local level peace committees and peace ambassadors.

2. Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.

Activities include collaborating with state peacebuilding partners in the hosting of intra and inter-tribal dialogues, as well as the facilitation of peace processes between conflicting groups. Large events such as peace days and peace festivals are also organized to spread the message of peace and to promote the building of greater social cohesion.

3. Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;

In collaboration with the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum, activities include; the mapping of national peace actors, workshops on peace advocacy and the establishment of a Peace Innovation Hub and Peace Actors Network as well as the conducting of information campaigns to disseminate information about the outcomes of high level peace processes to people in local communities.

4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;

Based on priorities determined in collaboration with local communities themselves, peace dividends, such as schools or water-yards are provided to help sustain local peace processes.

5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.
Under this component, JCRP will support local civil society organizations to carry out innovative and creative peacebuilding interventions from a broader range of actors that foster stability, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in general, beyond addressing a specific conflict. The focus of the projects will be to build resilience of communities or groups (at risk of violent conflict as per criteria above) to violent conflict, through activities that:

- Build capacities for peace (training, capacity development etc.) in conflict analysis and monitoring, conflict resolution and reconciliation
- Promote diversity and social cohesion
- Enhance employment and livelihood opportunities
- Support improved natural resource management

Specific objectives 1-3 are being implemented by UNDP, with specific objectives 4-5 implemented by IOM. Though the programme is administered through two separate funding agreements, the achievement of the overall objective depends upon the inter-relationship between the specific objectives and programmatic coherence. Close collaboration is maintained between IOM and UNDP to ensure the integrity of the programme through steering committee, grants committee and bi-weekly coordination meetings.

1. Introduction

The purpose of the mid-term review is to provide stakeholders with an overall independent appraisal of JCRP programme performance and impact, and propose recommendations to inform programme adjustments in the current programme phase and how to strategically build on current efforts to strengthen programming on conflict management and peacebuilding given the political and security environment of Sudan.

The objectives of the Mid-Term Review are to evaluate programme relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, including from a conflict-sensitivity perspective how the programme is addressing peacebuilding at the local, State and national levels. Furthermore, it will also assess the programme’s key achievements, constraints, best practices and lessons learnt to date along with key recommendations for future programming. Lastly, considering that the Review is taking place at the later stage of the programme cycle, it will also look into the fundraising aspects in terms of needs and opportunities, and financing among different programme components.

The scope of the Mid-Term review, as per the terms of reference, is to assess, in accordance with the OECD/DAC criteria, the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability of programme activities to date. A list of indicative questions was provided by the terms of reference. In addition, the following tasks were required from the terms of reference:

- Describe the programme’s key achievements.
• Identify and analyze key constraints impacting the achievement of objectives.
• Describe the ‘Best Practices’ that can be drawn from the programme.
• What have been the key ‘lessons learnt’?
• What are the over-all conclusions regarding the programme’s performance?
• Based on assessment of the above key questions, list the key recommendations regarding the potential continuation/scaling-up/replication of the programme and future programme planning.

Key limitations facing the Mid-Term Review include lack of access to the field and therefore reliance on interviews in Khartoum and on the phone and a tight timeframe and limited number of days for the exercise. Following an initial discussion with IOM and UNDP at the beginning of the assignment and considering the limitations above, it was agreed to focus the review on 1. General review of progress so far with recommendations for possible adaptations before the end of the programme and 2. Recommendations for the possible continuation of the programme.

Additionally, as the programme is in its final stretch (until the end of 2015 should both extensions be approved by the EU), recommendations for actions/adaptations within the life spam of the programme had to be realistic and actionable within the limited time left.

2. Methodology

The Mid-Term Review has been conducted by an international consultant, Isabel Candela, assisted by a Sudanese expert, Elsadeg Kara, during the months of May and June in Khartoum (Sudan), in accordance with a work plan submitted by the consultant and agreed upon by IOM and UNDP.

The review has been informed by the following:
• A desk review of relevant materials provided by IOM and UNDP and others available to the consultants including documents and reports on JCRP itself as well as reports on other relevant programmes and overall context;
• Meetings with IOM and UNDP project teams and management;
• Interviews: face-to-face interviews and three focus group discussions with relevant stakeholders in Khartoum (taking advantage of different events taking place in the capital during the time frame of the review) and phone interviews with stakeholders in the field. Interviews were semi-structured around six general questions and allowed for open discussions with the informants. Phone interviews followed the same structure, although

1 An exhaustive list of interviewees is included in Annex 1
conversations over the phone were more challenging and gave less opportunity for an open conversation;

- Observation of meetings of the JCRP in Khartoum during the period, including a meeting organized by the EU of partners funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP);
- Meetings with past/potential donors and experts and other international actors working in the area.

The review took place in parallel to an evaluation commissioned by the EU, only donor to the JCRP Phase II, on projects funded under the IcSP. As the EU evaluation assessed the JCRP within that framework, coordination with the evaluation team was sought through several meetings and exchange of information, joint interviews etc. to ensure complementarity and alignment as much as possible.

A planned visit to Blue Nile State for one day, in coordination with the EU IcSP evaluation team, did not take place as no permits were obtained for all mission members and flights were not available on that day due to a last minute declaration of national holiday.

Triangulation in general was a key challenge facing the review, as there are very few actors active in the area and triangulation in the field was not possible. As much as possible, triangulation was carried out through the interviews, as well as in conversations with other organisations working in the area and through phone interviews with residents in the area. There was also an effort to discuss with authorities, both at local and national level to gather their views on the programme.

These challenges had been anticipated by the IOM and UNDP teams and were discussed at the beginning of the assignment. They need to be taken into account in the design of the impact evaluation planned at the end of the programme.

The consultant followed international standards and recent practice in monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes, looking at both peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity aspects of the programme. More specifically and as requested by the terms of reference, OECD DAC evaluation criteria, in their interpretation for peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity evaluations, were used in the analysis of the different aspects of the programme.

3. Key findings in relation to the DAC Criteria

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2 Although a meeting with the EU Delegation was not possible during the time frame of the review, the consultant met with the Evaluation team as well as the EU Peacebuilding consultant in Khartoum.

3 President Bashir had declared a national holiday for the day his investment as President following the April elections. The national holiday was subsequently cancelled but flights could not be organized at such short-notice.

4 See Annex 2 for a list of relevant resources and sources.
The mid-term review terms of references required the consultant to assess the programme in relation to identified DAC criteria and guiding questions. The results of this assessment, overall for the programme and in relation to specific outputs when appropriate are summarized below:

### 3.1. Relevance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guiding questions:</th>
<th>Given the changing context in Sudan, to what extent are the programme objectives still valid, with reference to the Country Programme Document, the Country Programme Action Plan and the UNDP Strategic Plan? Based on current conflict analysis, are we doing the right things? How relevant is the intervention in light of local and national policies and priorities? Are the activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and intended impact?</th>
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The OECD DAC defines relevance in peacebuilding programming as the degree to which the objectives and the activities of the intervention address the driving factors of conflict, and helps link the objectives (implicit or explicit) of an intervention with the conflict analysis.

Overall, and despite changes and developments in the context in the past years, the programme continues to be highly relevant to the Sudanese context, and more specifically the targeted states. While the programme continues to address driving factors of conflict in line with its periodic conflict analyses and has shown its flexibility in adapting to changes in the context, its relevance in conflict sensitivity overall is affected by the fact that it works mainly through and with government counterparts, which are a party to the ongoing conflict in the area. We elaborate later in the review on this issue, but the overall perception of the programme by both insiders and outsiders is that it is biased towards one party to the ongoing conflict.

The programme sits well within the existing overall strategic plans. As a programme realignment exercise is currently ongoing within UNDP, it is expected that JCRP will undergo a transformation within that process, building into the next iteration of peacebuilding strategy for the organization. As far as IOM is concerned, the programme falls well within its strategy for Sudan.

A conflict analysis exercise was conducted in November 2014 by the EU, hosted and co-sponsored by UNDP, involving a wide range of international and Sudanese partners. The workshop aimed at developing a shared understanding within the EU and partners of the underlying causes of conflict, violence and insecurity in Sudan and to identify implications and priorities for international partners.

While the analysis underlined that until governance improves and resources are distributed in a more equitable way, a lasting reduction of violent conflict, poverty and humanitarian disasters was unlikely to be achieved, it also recommended strengthening of engagement at the local level, encouraging state governments to
provide services to their people as well as an increased emphasis on conflict prevention.

Although the first phase of JCPR was designed in the framework of a post-conflict situation following the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that sealed the end of the civil war between Sudan and South Sudan, the context very quickly reverted back to armed conflict in the targeted areas. The programme was adapted to reflect the new environment to a certain degree during Phase I implementation and more radically in the design of Phase II.

The programme did incorporate most of lessons learned from Phase I as indicated by the mid-term review and final reports from the project. Of key importance to its relevance, the programme team conducts regular (quarterly) conflict analyses of each of the states, which are used to inform decision making and overall management of activities, adaptation when necessary etc.

### 3.2. Effectiveness

**Guiding Questions:** To what extent are the programme objectives being achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the programme objectives? Are programme risks being appropriately managed or contingency plans implemented where necessary?

The OECD DAC uses effectiveness to assess whether an intervention has met its intended objectives, and in peacebuilding, where the stated objectives may not directly be related to peace and conflict, how the immediate and secondary outcomes related to peacebuilding and conflict dynamics. Conflict sensitivity is implicitly part of the DAC’s definition of effectiveness, insofar as it suggests consideration of what the effort did to manage conflict-specific risks.

The programme is on its way to achieve objectives as originally designed, with some differences between the outputs, which are detailed below. Firstly, some overall remarks:

**Interconnection between outputs and contribution to overall objective:** despite the fact that linkages between the outputs in pursuing the overall objective have been strengthened through lessons learned during Phase I, there continues to be some disconnect, particularly when it comes to outputs 3 and 5. None of the interviewees had knowledge of the programme’s overall framework and objective beyond the output to which they were directly related, which shows an opportunity to increase link and aggregate results. However, all of them were able to refer to the programme’s overall objective, mentioning peace, stability, coexistence etc. Furthermore, the fact that IOM and UNDP have separate agreements and hence reports to the donor, the EU, make it difficult to have a clear overview to activities and their linkages from the reporting formats.
Delays and limitations in sequencing: Implementation started late for different reasons (including late signature of the agreement and disbursement of funds due to procedural issues). Delays have however been varied for different outputs, making sequenced implementation and linkages more difficult. In terms of sequencing, planning for output 4, delivery of peace dividends, had been planned to address first the backload from Phase I and continue working in line with progress in peace agreements during Phase II. The latter has not happened due to lack of funds. Activities under output 3 only started late in the process, and actual implementation of grants under output 5 have only started recently as the process for identification, selection etc took some time. These delays will make it difficult to monitor results and impact during the life of the programme.

One of the major claims of the programme, in achieving its overall objective of reducing conflict and promoting social cohesion, is that all major conflicts in the area have received attention from the programme. This claim is very difficult to substantiate and would require additional efforts in monitoring (see recommendations in section 5).

In terms of risk analysis and management, learning from Phase I, the programme has made efforts to develop a risk analysis and management system and use it to inform decision-making. The risk analysis is linked to conflict analysis and mitigating measures have been put in place when risks are identified, particularly from an operational perspective.

Looking more specifically at effectiveness within each of the outputs, below are some findings and conclusions:

Output 1: Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.

The programme has mixed results under this output, as follows:

Efforts have been made to develop the capacities of the state level peacebuilding mechanisms, the peace ambassadors and peace centres to address local level conflict. While trainings and capacity development initiatives have been undertaken, the programme has faced certain challenges.

Capacities and ability to operate between the state level peace building mechanisms are very varied: while in West Kordofan the mechanism has continue to produce results, the newly established mechanism in South Kordofan suffers from very low levels of capacity, very strong ties to the governor (who has changed the structure and posts on political basis) and limited credibility with the communities. One interviewee claimed that the mechanism in Blue Nile has had some serious problems regarding capacity and credibility and that himself, a member of the PC, has never participated in meetings/processes as it represents only one ethnic group in its current composition. UNDP’s assessment of the PC is however overall positive, with increased implementation of independent activities and fundraising efforts.
ongoing. There is no such a mechanism on Abyei. The programme has undertaken a capacity assessment of the mechanisms with a view to tailoring its support.

Peace Ambassadors (PA) have been selected and trained during the programme and some of them have been supported to undertake proposed activities. It is unclear whether the selection process and criteria have resulted in a balanced (tribal, political) group of Peace Ambassadors (see below recommendations in section 5). While all of the peace ambassadors interviewed by the review team were positive about the initial training received, they also agreed on the need to harmonise training, to better select trainers and curriculum and to provide advanced training for those having completed the first round. Some of them have taken the initiative to organize activities in promotion of social cohesion and peace (e.g. musical festival) but all requested more support to be able to carry out their role as PA. Although the PAs are already supporting a diverse range of activities such as dialogues, peace festivals and peace processes, there is potential in increasing and improving their role. The PA Forum organized in October 2014 and in general opportunities to network and learn from each other are very appreciated by the PA. They all feel their status in their communities has positively changed as a result of their participation in the programme and feel they can contribute to awareness raising and peace initiatives.

Peace Centres: there have been some efforts in supporting capacity development of the centres, particularly through a partnership with the Peace Reaseach Institute (PRI) of the University of Khartoum (UoK) under the programme. There is however perhaps a missed opportunity to further use some of them for trainings, mediation etc. Recent efforts to create a network of peace centres for learning, mentoring, support etc are welcome by the centres themselves as well as other interviewees who support an increased role for the centres overall. There is room to consider a stronger link with the work of the PA where possible, as the centres are perceived as academic and more neutral than the State level peacebuilding mechanisms.

Civil society and community level capacity: support to capacity development with CSOs has been undertaken mainly through activities under output 5. While there has definitely been an effort to train and support the six organisations selected to implement activities, continued by an “on the job training” approach while activities are ongoing, much more could be done in supporting civil society through the programme where possible. There is no evidence of direct work with or support to peace committees at the community level, with the exception of training of peace committee members in Abyei in May 2014. This represents an extremely important entry point for conflict prevention and mediation at the local level, preventing escalation and promoting sustainability of the processes and needs to be looked at for future work (particularly in Abyei in the absence of a government counterpart, but overall for the programme and learning from others’ experience: World Bank, Peace Collaborative Network, etc). Increased and sustained engagement at this level would be fundamental in increasing the neutrality and credibility of the programme.
Output 2: Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.

JCRP has had a direct impact on the reduction of conflict levels and flashpoints through the sustainability of 16/17 supported peace processes and three new processes (two in West Kordofan and one in South Kordofan) resulting in peace agreements (up to February 2015).

Although JCRP claims to have responded to all major conflict points occurring during the life of the programme, this needs to be strongly substantiated. The map included in the first year report by UNDP to the EU identifies conflict points in areas where there is no JCRP activity, although it is difficult to assess the causes, intensity levels and results of these conflicts/flashpoints.

Additionally, it is difficult to assess whether the supported processes were inclusive, the quality of the mediation and the factors that affect their sustainability (also linked to the peace dividends). UNDP’s assessment is that tribal representation is inclusive while that of women remains a challenge. Recommendations to strengthen monitoring of this output, also in relation to conflict prevention by identification of potential triggers, are made in section 5 of the report. Overall, there seems to be a direct correlation between the peace agreements and the decrease of violent incidents as reported locally. Those are most evident in relation to some of the activities undertaken as peace dividends, and particularly in the case of corridor demarcation.

Output 3. Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;

Activities under this output only started late in 2014 and it is difficult to assess their effectiveness to date. The original design and objectives of the output might have been over ambitious as they assumed a higher-level dialogue with an opportunity for engagement would be in place, which is unfortunately not the case today. That said, some of the initiatives have been launched and have been very well received at the level of innovation, capacity development and networking.

Plans to hold a Peace Symposium in September to coincide with the Peace Day are underway and could represent an important opportunity to create awareness and attract attention to the need for peace and social cohesion in Sudan.

Recommendations on the continuation of activities under this output in the remaining of the programme life and beyond are covered in section 5.

Output 4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;

During Phase II, IOM first concentrated in addressing activities pending from Phase I, which had not been implemented because of lack of time/funds. There were delays in the commencement of the programme overall and then the rainy season
(June-September) prevented works to take place during that period, resulting in a concentration of activities in this output linked to peace agreements from Phase I. Reviewing evidence and reports shared by IOM, it is difficult to establish how many activities linked to peace agreements reached in Phase II have actually been implemented/concluded, particularly as IOM has now also utilized all funds allocated to this output and would require a cost extension from the EU to complete planned works.

Peace dividends are designed within the programme to provide incentives to the communities maximizing the impact and sustainability of local peace processes by linking these to targeted peace and recovery interventions carried out to address the prioritised root causes of conflict identified as part of the peace process. The programme recognizes the importance of linking the peace dividends to the actual agreements and ensuring the time lapse between the conclusion of the agreements and the start of the works is not too large. This has however not been possible in all cases due to the concentration on the backload of activities from Phase I and lack of funds to support interventions around agreements supported in Phase II.

Additionally, according to the interviews, it is not clear the communities understand the peace dividends as such and it seems they rather perceive them as isolated activities implemented by IOM through a sub-constructor. There is a need to make the communities aware of the peace dividend approach for it to be useful in supporting and maintaining the peace agreements.

As Phase II was being developed, it was expected for other donors (Norway and DFID) to join efforts by the EU and provide substantial funding to the programme. As the other donors pulled out from the process, resources had to be re-allocated within a much smaller total amount. Priority should have been given to the allocation of enough resources to address both the back load of activities from Phase I as well as new activities arising from needs during Phase II.

As expectations are created during the peace processes with communities in terms of peace dividends, should these not be implemented in a reasonable period of time, the peace dividend approach could be counterproductive and create conflict and/or animosity. It is important for the approach to be designed and implemented in the right sequence and with the appropriate linkages and resources to avoid this situation.

Otherwise, activities implemented by IOM as peace dividends seem to overall have the desired effect/impact in sustaining peace and stability. Of particular relevance, due to their high impact, are corridor demarcations, which should be expanded on and promoted where relevant. Limited follow up or monitoring has been undertaken on the works delivered so far (with the exception of one field visit by the UNDP M&E officer) so the actual impact of the works still needs to be established. Recommendations on ways to do so are included in section 5 of the report.
Output 5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.

The process to identify areas of intervention, train and select NGOs and conclude grants for the activities to be undertaken took some time. This is however justified, as it was important to ensure the process also served as a way to support capacity development and the right communities and activities were identified. As a result, six CSOs are currently implementing activities in 3 States. This excludes Abyei which was never included in the call for proposals as it was judged potentially conflict unsensitive in the absence of a joint administration. This decision was taken in consultation with key stakeholders. It is therefore difficult at this stage to measure the effectiveness of the activities themselves and efforts should be made to monitor them during the remaining period of the programme.

During the discussion with implementing CSOs, it became clear that the concept of resilience to conflict remains a complex one not well understood by all implementing CSOs. Efforts to continue on the job training and support during implementation should continue to emphasize the links between the activities and stability and resilience.

As per overall comments on effectiveness, activities under this output remain somehow isolated from the others, as they do not directly link to mediation/peace processes neither to capacity development under output 1. As the selection process was based on a local conflict analysis, assessment of conflict flash points and thematic priorities, the output does contribute to the overall objective. There might however be space for exploring further links between the outputs to increase sustainability.

The scale of this output is relatively small compared to the overall size of the programme and can therefore only have a limited contribution to the achievement of the overall objective. It can however offer important entry points and lessons learned for an increase in activities in support to civil society.

3.3. Efficiency:

**Guiding questions**: Are the objectives being economically achieved by the programme? What is the utilization ratio of the resources used to date? Are activities cost-efficient? Are objectives being achieved on time? Is the programme being implemented in the most efficient way compared to the alternatives?

The consultant only had access to general information on the budgets and overall expenditures under the programme. This section would therefore require further elaboration by the impact evaluation.

It is understood that the cost of doing work in the targeted areas is very high because of their remoteness, access limitations, costs related to security, very
limited number of implementing partners in the field etc. This is reflected in the overall budget and expenditure.

Delays in finalizing agreement and disbursement of funds, as well as those caused by the rainy season, have translated into implementation difficulties, disconnect between the phases and to some extend the outputs within the programme. In terms of implementation modality, the partnership between UNDP and IOM seems to bring efficiency and added value to the programme overall, allowing for different procedures and approaches to increase efficiency.

Sequencing and timing are key factors in this programme, as there needs to be a flow and link between the peace processes and the peace dividends. Failure to deliver promises could actually result in conflict or threaten gains obtained through the peace processes. It is therefore fundamental that the project aims at providing peace dividends in relation to all peace processes.

3.4. Impact:

Guiding questions: Is the development intervention contributing to the higher level development objectives? What is the impact of the programme in proportion to the overall situation of the target group? What real difference is the programme making to beneficiaries?

The overall objective of the current phase of JCRP is to strengthen government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur and the outputs are designed to all contribute to it.

The review could not assess details related to the impact of the activities as the programme is still ongoing (with some activities having started only a few months prior) and because of lack of time and resources. Additionally, a thorough review of the impact would have required access to the field and an extended time frame. Some recommendations to address this are made under section 5 of the report.

Within those limitations, a preliminary overview of the impact concludes the following pointers, which can perhaps also guide further monitoring and evaluation:

In terms of capacities, details on some of the progress are captured under each output for effectiveness. Capacities seem to be overall quite limited and would require continuation of support. The focus has been mainly on government bodies and peace ambassadors, with some opportunities to extend and increase this support to other actors (CSOs, peace centres, peace committees).
The programme reports an important direct impact in terms of reduction of levels of conflict, through the mediation and facilitation of peace agreements and the delivery of peace dividends. 70% of the interviewees refer to the overall conflict as the main challenge for JCRP’s impact to be increased. While resolution of conflict at the community level has a direct impact on the affected communities and their daily lives, the continuation and in some cases intensification of the conflict between the government and armed groups make those gains less significant.

Results are overall mixed across states, depending on the existing capacities and entry points, issues related to access and security and overall opportunities. Abyei has received limited attention by the programme as it is a particularly challenging context and in the absence of a government counterpart. However, some efforts have been made to explore opportunities to increase the level of activities within the current environment.

3.5. **Sustainability**

**Guiding questions:** To what extent are positive effects of the programme being sustained or are likely to be sustained? What steps could be taken to increase the likelihood of project benefits being sustained beyond the life of the project?

Some references to sustainability already made above under each output. There are overall some question marks around sustainability, intrinsic to the general context and situation. As overall conflict between the government and the armed opposition continues and there are no immediate plans for the resurrection of the peace process, it is expected for the situation to remain fragile and volatile in the target areas. In other words, there is no clear indication that an end to the conflict is near. This said, the programme has focused in reducing conflict and its impact at the community level, between pastoralists and farmers, different tribes and groups, etc. Those efforts need to be maintained in order to sustain the direct impact on the communities achieved so far.

More specifically, it would be important to consolidate peace processes and agreements as much as possible to ensure their sustainability. Some recommendations are made in section 5.

Sustainability of the state level peacebuilding mechanisms needs to be further considered and strengthened, both in terms of increasing their capacity to mobilise resources and decreasing their dependency to the governors and local administrations.

An important investment has been made in the selection and training of PA, which could be an incredible asset in the continuation of the programme as well as for others. UNDP has started considering options to ensure their sustainability, there
needs to be a realistic expectation about how much they can achieve by themselves, linking them to other initiatives, selecting some champions for future activities etc.

As far as the Peace centres are concerned, they are existing institutions linked to universities, but with limited resources. The PC network, currently being established with the support of PRI, should help in maintaining the information sharing and capacity building aspects between the centres and overall contribute to their sustainability. Other ways to support their sustainability and capacity to support activities can be explored within the programme.

CSOs are perhaps the less sustainable aspect of the programme, as only a small number has been targeted and they do in principle require external support to operate. The supported extended to all CSOs meeting the minimum criteria (around 25) with training on conflict sensitivity and do no harm represents an important step in supporting peace building capacity in the area. Support to the CSOs in resource mobilization could help in providing them with other sources if income, as this is unlikely to come from the communities themselves or the government. Sustainability of the impact of their activities, and their actual contribution to stability and resilience need to be measured by the impact evaluation and in a longer time frame.

The sustainability of some of the activities undertaken under output 3 can be questioned, as some would require sustained assistance to continue. Networking between actors and low cost innovative tools can be explored in the remaining period of the programme to promote sustainability.

4. Lessons learned/promising practices

Key lessons learned during the programme are listed below. Some of them had already been identified during Phase I. They need to be taken into account for any continuation and they can also be useful for other projects to be designed/implemented by the organisations in the target area:

1. **Presence in the area**: All of the respondents agreed that the mere presence of a programme in support of social cohesion and peace building in the bordering States was per se an important asset. The fact that there is a very limited number of interventions in the area and that challenges of access and security make it very difficult to operationalize activities, makes it important to maintain a presence and activities supporting local actors.

2. **Hardware versus software**: The peace dividend activities and support to CSOs outputs provide the project with an important entry point to both government officials and communities. It allows for the software parts of the programme to take place, although with some difficulties, in a context where it would be very challenging to intervene otherwise. It is important to
find the right balance between the two types of activities and ensure their linkages.

3. **Double edge sword?** Working with and through government entities has both advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand it facilitates access and support to the activities by the government while on the other it taints the programme with a certain bias. This issue is address in other parts of the report more in detail but it is important to emphasise the need to collaborate with government partners to be able to implement activities. Building awareness of government actors (including HAC and security services) about the importance of the programme’s objectives has been key in creating the necessary environment for the activities to take place.

4. **Capitalizing on returns:** there have been important investments by IOM and UNDP, but also the donors and mainly the European Union, during both phases of the programme. These have paid off and resulted in the building of trust with communities and government institutions, the development of processes and approaches that work in the area and the establishment of knowledge and systems. These include amongst others the regular and systematic update of detailed conflict analyses for each of the states, which in turn inform decision making, the establishment of a robust monitoring and evaluation plan and efforts towards assessing peace capacities and supporting networking amongst peace actors, in the areas covered by the programme and beyond. It would be important to capitalise in these investments either through the continuation of the programme, whichever shape and form that might take, and/or for other interventions in the area.

5. **Recommendations**

Recommendations are put forward for both, the remaining of the programme (expected to be extended until the beginning of 2016) as well as for a potential new phase/iteration of the JCRP.

5.1. **Remaining of the project:**

With a few months left (six to eight months subject to approval by the EU) in the life of the programme in its current iteration, UNDP and IOM should concentrate on consolidating gains obtained so far, prioritizing activities as follows:

**Peace dividends:** no activities have been implemented as peace dividends in support to peace processes undertaken under Phase II of the programme. These should be prioritized as expectations have been created within the communities in regards to priorities identified during the process. As IOM has already used of all the funding allocated to output 4, additional funding (already requested to the EU) would be required to complete interventions in these communities.
Activities that can be completed during the remaining period and particularly those who either contribute to increasing the **sustainability** of interventions or actors or who represent entry points for planning and design of the next phase. Some activities contained in the workplan, which have not been undertaken so far and are unlikely to be completed within the life of the programme should probably be de-prioritised in coordination with the EU.

The remaining time can be very useful in the **consolidation of monitoring** as much as possible, with a focus on demonstrating and substantiating some of the key results of this phase. UNDP and IOM teams could explore ways to increase triangulation (through other projects active in the area as well as field visits when possible), to undertake additional remote monitoring (perhaps through the use of national consultants with access to the area and no links to the programme, through external national consultant services with the same purposes, etc). Some of the aspects where monitoring should pay special attention in the next few months include:

- It would be fundamental for the system to be able to show results around the quality and equity of peace processes, assessing their sustainability and identifying potential triggers which would jeopardise the agreements and translate into a return to conflict;
- Assessing levels of capacity and sustainability of the mechanisms supported by the programme, and particularly the state level peacebuilding mechanisms;
- Assess affiliation of direct beneficiaries of the programme (particularly community organisations and peace ambassadors) to inform strategies to increase diversification in future programmes;
- Assess the impact of activities undertaken under outputs 4 and 5. While the timeframe does not allow for a full impact assessment of these activities, some of them having been completed only very recently or still underway, the programme could assess impact of activities undertaken previously as an overall indication. The assessment should also look at ways in which these activities could be capitalised on and supported further as peacebuilding tools/initiatives (e.g. schools built as a peace dividend could be further supported to promote social coexistence and peace);
- Ensure a full impact evaluation is carried out at the end of the programme and possibly within a timeframe which allows its results to inform planning for the next phase.

The remaining months provide an important opportunity to launch a **planning process for the next stage**. As this process takes place within a broader initiative for programme re-alignment within UNDP, it would be important that it is designed as part of it rather than independently for JCRP. UNDP’s programme re-alignment, part of efforts by the organisation to rationalize and mainstream interventions globally, aims at integrating and aligning strategies in the areas of peacebuilding/social
cohesion, livelihoods and governance. There are programmes ongoing in all of these areas across the country with different approaches and geographical focus. The process provides an opportunity to identify and confirm aspects and elements from JCRP which can contribute to the overall strategy and be replicated in other areas. It is recommended for the planning process to take into account the following elements:

- Consultations need to be undertaken early on in the process: both at the state/community level as well as in Khartoum. Ongoing activities can provide entry points for consultations in the field, and with other Sudanese and international actors active in the areas. A dedicated consultation with donors and international agencies in Khartoum needs to be launched in parallel to make sure the strategy falls within a broader international approach and attracts as much buy-in as possible. This would be important for coordination purposes as well as for future support;
- As far as the JCRP is concerned, the process should identify which elements of JCRP that can be carried over and adapted within the new framework.
- The planning process should be undertaken jointly by all three sectors teams (peacebuilding, livelihoods and governance) to ensure alignment at the level of strategy, rather than project/activities, from early on.

5.2. Considerations for next phase/iteration

Without prejudice to the process suggested above and its potential outputs, some recommendations are made below for consideration for the next phase/iteration of the JCRP, whichever form and shape this might take:

**Scale up and extend the peace dividend/hardware approach:** this could be done through the alignment with other sectors particularly around support to livelihoods, as well as through links with other agencies/actors, with a special focus on education and projects targeting the youth (e.g. UNICEF for schools/education). Most interviewees during the review stressed this point and referred to the lack of basic infrastructure, the importance of natural resources management and water projects.

Seriously explore all possible options to increase neutrality and conflict sensitivity and balance off the focus on support to the government and government linked bodies and individuals, including:

- While preparing and presenting arguments (backed by results) on the benefits of engaging with state level mechanisms, explore ways in which they can play a more neutral role (non-governmental funding, increased independence to the governor and local authorities, etc);
• Improve and increase measures to ensure a neutral approach to the selection of beneficiaries and partners: from communities to implementing CSOs and peace ambassadors;
• Explore further engagement with the peace centres as a more neutral/academic body;
• Explore increased engagement with/through peace committees at the community level where possible (instead of mediation by the state level Peacebuilding mechanisms). Some peace committees already exist and can become important partners in the pursuit of peacebuilding objectives;
• Identify key partners/counterparts at the federal level that provide a more balanced approach and dilute the power over decision making by anyone specific actor on the government side.

Consider the **expansion of levels of intervention and geographical areas**: explore the possible use of JCRP elements and lessons learned to be applied at different levels or phases of conflict, including conflict prevention, management and transformation. In parallel, explore the extension of the approach to other regions with different contexts in relation to conflict (Darfur and the East in particular), while taking into account ongoing projects and lessons learned (e.g. DCPSF) in those areas.

In terms of **linkages to higher-level dialogue/peace process**, develop a more realistic approach that concentrates on the development and coordination of messages and experiences at the local level. While building capacities at the local level, explore possible (separate) strategies to support the establishment of space at the higher-level dialogue/peace processes for local participation through different entry points.

As there is currently no ongoing dialogue and it is not clear yet what shape it might take in future and which actors will be involved, planning needs to be flexible and opportunistic around this area. Some possible considerations:

• Continue supporting innovative/technology vehicles for the development and coordination of messages;
• Continue supporting capacities at the local level to inform and possibly influence higher level discussions if and when these take place (local consultations could be part of a future national dialogue, providing space for some participation)
• Strongly coordinate with donors and other actors involved in the higher-level dialogue (AUHIP, UN Special Envoy, embassies) support to the creation of space for participation and consultation.
• Explore ways of increasing awareness and preparation at the local level, through media and others.

**Abyei** has received very limited attention from international and national efforts in the past years due to the very challenging and volatile situation, lack of government
counterparts, lack of access etc. The situation also represents an opportunity in terms of defining a different way of operating in support to social cohesion and peace dividends. The planning process should continue to explore ways in which a targeted strategy could be designed for Abyei, exploring coordination/collaboration with the mission and UNDP/IOM South Sudan country programmes on the other side of the border, assessing other local actors which activities could be implemented, etc.

In line with the above recommendation regarding Abyei specifically, it is proposed that cross-border cooperation (South Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia) is explored and taken into account for the programme design. This would require coordination with actors working on the other side of the borders, but considering the nomadic and other movements it is an aspect that cannot be ignored.

6. Conclusions

Working in a highly complex and volatile environment, facing important challenges in access, security, limited capacity etc, the JCRP has managed to learn and adapt since its inception and continues to deliver tangible results in the targeted areas. Reduction of the conflict levels at the community level, particularly between farmers and pastoralist and tribal/ethnic groups, has continued to consolidate through the second phase of the programme. Additionally, increased awareness around peaceful coexistence and capacity development of key actors have contributed to the development of an environment more conducive to reconciliation and social cohesion.

However, the programme still faces some important challenges, some of which can still be addressed in the remaining of its life spam (should the extensions be approved by the EU). Some of the priorities during this period include consolidation of gains produced by the programme interventions, strengthening of the monitoring system to substantiate results and investment in aspects related to sustainability of the results and institutions supported.

Other challenges can become lessons learned to inform the planning process and decision making for the next iteration of the programme. These challenges refer to the need for a balanced approach in supporting peacebuilding and social cohesion, concentrating work at the community level as much as possible, stronger links and sequencing of project activities to underpin the peace dividend approach and a more realistic approach in linking with higher-level peace processes.

The partnership between IOM and UNDP has also progressed during the programme implementation and important results have been achieved thanks to the combination and integration of expertise and activities. This needs to be acknowledged and built on as much as possible.

While reviewing progress towards achieving the programme's objectives, this review has also focused on identifying key lessons learned and providing some
recommendations for a planning process to design the next iteration of the JCRP, in the framework of the ongoing programme re-alignment process recently launched by UNDP. The review needs to be read in conjunction with the ongoing evaluation of IcSP supported programmes commissioned by the EU.
ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Face to face interviews
Goma Judal Kreeem (Male, SPPCC – SKS)
El Tayeb Badawi (Male, ASHAB organization, funded by IOM)
Tahani Abdel Rahman (Female, Peace Ambassador, WKS)
Al Taher Mohammed (Male, Peace Ambassador, Abyei Area)
Dr Abdel Magid Mohamed Ahmed (Male, Peace Ambassador, BNS)
Al-Gedi Saeed Faragalla (male) SKS\WKS
Fairouz Farah (female) SKS UNDP/JCRP
Dr. Nagla Mohammed S Darfur State Peace Research Institute Nyala
Hassan Hamza BNS BN University
Ali Mo’men Musa SKS Lawyer, ex-governor advisor

Focus Group Discussions:
1. Dialogue meeting participants:
   Mohamed Rahal (native administration)
   Al Fatih Al Mak (Head of Peace Council, BNS)
   Mohammed Alderk (RPCM, WKS)
   Ismael Hagana (Global Aid Hand)
   Sefat Abdallah (Female, Peace Ambassador, SKS)
   Manahil Ibrahim (Female, Peace Ambassador, BNS)
   Abdel Rahman Daldom (Male, Native Administration, WKS)
   Suliman Mohamed Suliman (East Darfur activist)

2. Peace centres’ network discussion:
   Dr Mohamed haroun (University of Khartoum)
   Dr. Yassir Satti (University of Fasher)
   Dr. Emadeldine Mohamed Salih (University of Zalinge)
   Dr.Abdelmagid Ahmed Mohamed (Alslam university)
   Dr. Mohamed Abdelgader Mohamed (university of Dalanj)
   Dr. Abdelaziz Mohamed Adam (Blue Nile University)

3. Focus Group Discussion CSOs grantees under output 5
   Afaf Mohammed IPDO\KRT
   Talaat Abass FPDO\KRT
   Adam Mukhtar SUDIA\KRT
   Mohammed Adam GAH\KRT

Phone interviews

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<th>Name</th>
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<td>Abdelrahman Hussan</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Ahmed Mohamed Al-Awad</td>
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<td>Ali Guma Mohammed</td>
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<td>Jaafar Saaeed</td>
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<td>Abdelrahim Hamid</td>
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<td>Rasha Ahmed</td>
<td>Collaborative network, SKS</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Elsadig Adam</td>
<td>Deputy Director, National Office for IDPs Affairs, HAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Suzan Omar</td>
<td>Director, Foreign</td>
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Meetings in Khartoum
UNDP JCRP team and Country Director
IOM JCRP team
Ingrid Skjoolas- Norwegian Embassy
Iris Wielders- Conflict Adviser- DFID
Jonas Horner- EU Peacebuilding Consultant
Fernanda Faria- EU consultant- evaluation of IsCP
Tom Gillhespy- Peace Centre (supporting Peace Collaborative Network in South Kordofan)
Prof. Munsoul (PRI)
Other organisations (CARE, World Bank, Search for Common Ground)
implementing programmes in the target areas and supported by the EU/IcSP were met in the margins of a EU IsCP coordination meeting on 4th June.
Annex 2- Bibliography, resources and documents reviewed


EU- Conflict Analysis report- Workshop November 2014

EU- Evaluation of IFS programmes in Sudan September 2013

JCRP Phase I Mid-term evaluation, March 2013

IOM and UNDP programme documents and reports to the EU, monitoring reports (UNDP and PRI)
A. Project Title: Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP)

B. Program Background:

The Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) works to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the former Protocol Areas of South Kordofan State, West Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei in Sudan.

The JCRP has been implemented in two phases: Phase I of the Programme was implemented over the period January 2012 – Feb 2014. Phase II of the JCRP is now being implemented, with the generous support of the European Union for 18 months over the period March, 2014 – August 2015.

Phase II of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) builds on the work of the Conflict Reduction Programme (CRP), implemented in 2009 as a pilot programme aimed at prevention and resolution of local conflicts in South Kordofan and Phase I of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme, which expanded the work of the CRP into Blue Nile state and the Abyei Area. The JCRP was initially conceived in a post-conflict setting, in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Since 2011 however, there has been a re-emergence of larger-scale conflicts, with the Abyei Area, Blue Nile and Kordofan states becoming critical, not only for the security of Sudan, but also for South Sudan, owing to the inter-dependent livelihoods of communities across borders. Furthermore, local resource-based conflicts are increasingly becoming entangled with larger political and economic disputes, significantly impacting the security and development of affected communities.

Building on the successes, lessons learned and ongoing analysis of the changing conflict dynamics, the overall objective of the current phase of JCRP is to strengthen Government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism (CPAP Outcome 7) in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur. The theory of change guiding the work of the programme is as follows;
• IF we build the capacity of state-level Government peace building institutions and of community-level peace builders THEN they will be better able to manage the peace processes they are strategically best placed to deliver

• IF we provide financial and technical support to local peace processes THEN we will have a direct impact on social cohesion at the community level

• IF we provide financial and technical support to actors communicating local voices to negotiators of a peace agreement THEN we will have a direct impact on plural voices being reflected in the negotiation of a peace agreement

• IF we deliver peace dividends focusing on services identified by communities after a peace agreement THEN we will help sustain local peace processes

• IF we support civil society organizations to deliver peace dividends focusing on developing capacities of local peace actors, fostering diversity and improving livelihoods to target communities or groups.

The specific objectives for Phase II of the Programme are;

1. **Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.**

   Activities include the provision of tailored on-the-job capacity development support to state peacebuilding mechanisms, together with the provision of trainings to a broader range of peacebuilding actors including regional and local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Line Ministries, Native Administration, local level peace committees and peace ambassadors.

2. **Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.**

   Activities include collaborating with state peacebuilding partners in the hosting of intra and inter-tribal dialogues, as well as the facilitation of peace processes between conflicting groups. Large events such as peace days and peace festivals are also organized to spread the message of peace and to promote the building of greater social cohesion.

3. **Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;**

   In collaboration with the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum, activities include; the mapping of national peace actors, workshops on peace advocacy and the establishment of a Peace Innovation Hub and Peace Actors Network as well as the conducting of information campaigns to disseminate information about the outcomes of high level peace processes to people in local communities.
4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;

Based on priorities determined in collaboration with local communities themselves, peace dividends, such as schools or water-yards are provided to help sustain local peace processes.

5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.

Under this component, JCRP will support local civil society organizations to carry out innovative and creative peacebuilding interventions from a broader range of actors that foster stability, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in general, beyond addressing a specific conflict.

The focus of the projects will be to build resilience of communities or groups (at risk of violent conflict as per criteria above) to violent conflict, through activities that;

- Build capacities for peace (training, capacity development etc.) in conflict analysis and monitoring, conflict resolution and reconciliation
- Promote diversity and social cohesion
- Enhance employment and livelihood opportunities
- Support improved natural resource management

Specific objectives 1-3 are being implemented by UNDP, with specific objectives 4-5 implemented by IOM. Though the programme is administered through two separate funding agreements, the achievement of the overall objective depends upon the inter-relationship between the specific objectives and programmatic coherence. Close collaboration is maintained between IOM and UNDP to ensure the integrity of the programme through steering committee, grants committee and bi-weekly coordination meetings.

**Mid-term Review Stakeholders:**

Key stakeholders of the Review will include: programme beneficiaries, the management and staff of IOM and UNDP, EU Delegation, Peace-building Mechanisms in the respective target states, and CSO partners. Additional relevant bodies, such as other Implementing Partners under EU’s IcSP and Sudan’s federal-level governmental counterparts, can be considered.

**C. Purpose and Objectives of the Mid-term Review:**

The purpose of this mid-term review is to provide stakeholders with an overall independent appraisal of JCRP programme performance and impact, and propose recommendations to inform programme adjustments in the current programme phase and how to strategically build on current efforts to strengthen programming on conflict management and peacebuilding given the political and security environment of Sudan. The objectives of this Mid-Term Review are to evaluate programme relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, including from a conflict-sensitivity perspective how the programme is addressing
peacebuilding at the local, State and national levels. Furthermore, it will also assess the programme’s key achievements, constraints, best practices and lessons learnt to date along with key recommendations for future programming. Lastly, considering that the Review is taking place at the later stage of the programme cycle, it will also look into the fund-raising aspects in terms of needs and opportunities, and financing among different programme components.

D. Mid-term Review Scope and Key Evaluation Questions:

The Mid-term Review consultant/s will be required to:

i) Assess, in accordance with the OECD/DAC criteria, the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability of programme activities to date. Below is a list of related questions, to be fine-tuned following the desk review.

| Relevance | Given the changing context in Sudan, to what extent are the programme objectives still valid, with reference to the Country Programme Document, the Country Programme Action Plan and the UNDP Strategic Plan? Based on current conflict analysis, are we doing the right things? How relevant is the intervention in light of local and national policies and priorities? Are the activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and intended impact? |
| Effectiveness | To what extent are the programme objectives being achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the programme objectives? Are programme risks being appropriately managed or contingency plans implemented where necessary? |
| Efficiency | Are the objectives being economically achieved by the programme? What is the utilization ratio of the resources used to date? Are activities cost-efficient? Are objectives being achieved on time? Is the programme being implemented in the most efficient way compared to the alternatives? |
| Impact | Is the development intervention contributing to the higher level development objectives? What is the impact of the programme in proportion to the overall situation of the target group? What real difference is the programme making to beneficiaries? |
| Sustainability | To what extent are positive effects of the programme being sustained or are likely to be sustained? What steps could be taken to increase the likelihood of project benefits being sustained beyond the life of the project? |

ii) Describe the programme’s key achievements.
iii) Identify and analyze key constraints impacting the achievement of objectives.
iv) Describe the ‘Best Practices’ that can be drawn from the programme.
v) What have been the key ‘lessons learnt’?
vi) What are the over-all conclusions regarding the programme’s performance?
vii) Based on assessment of the above key questions, list the key recommendations regarding the potential continuation/scaling-up/replication of the programme and future programme planning.

E. Mid-Term Review Approach and Methodology
It is expected the Review team would undertake a desk review of relevant project documents including the Programme Document, Logframe, M&E Framework, Reports, Reviews and ongoing monitoring data. They would then prepare a brief Inception Report summarizing the preliminary findings of the desk review, confirm the evaluation questions, the evaluation methodology, any limitations to the evaluation and the time-table for completion of tasks. On completion of the review activities, the consultant/s will provide a Draft Mid-Term Review Report, which will be reviewed by IOM and UNDP JCRP focal persons, who will provide initial feedback and request any outstanding issues be addressed, upon which the consultants will then submit the Final Evaluation Report.

F. Expected Outputs and Deliverables:
   i) Inception Report
   ii) Draft Mid-term Review Report
   iii) Final Mid-term Review Report: The report should include;
       - Title Page
       - Index and List of Abbreviations
       - Executive Summary
       - Background Information on the project
       - Introduction outlining purpose, objectives & scope of review, including any limitations on the review
       - Methodology
       - Review questions and findings in relation to the DAC Criteria and key Review Questions
       - JCRP Best Practices
       - Lessons Learnt
       - Conclusions (Summary of Review findings)
       - Recommendations
       - Annexes

G. Work Schedule and Time-table for Deliverables:

The consultant/s will be recruited for 15 days over a two month period with the following tentative schedule of work:

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<td>Desk Review of key project documents</td>
<td>April 15-31</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inception Report</td>
<td>May 31</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travel to field if security allows / Review activities</td>
<td>May 1-15</td>
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<td>Draft Mid-term Review Report</td>
<td>May 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Mid-term Review Report</td>
<td>June 15</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
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Tentative meetings / interviews:
- Government partners: RPCM, SPPCC and the Peace Council
- Native Administration leaders
- Federal-level Government counterparts: Ministry of Finance and National Economy
- UNDP teams: CPRU and Governance projects in South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei
- NGO small grant recipients
• Programme Beneficiaries
• Other international organizations working on peacebuilding: AECOM, UNICEF, UNHCR

J. Institutional Arrangements:

Under the overall direction and supervision of both the Programme Manager, UNDP and Programme Coordinator IOM, the consultant/s are expected to liaise with the JCRP team, both within IOM as well as UNDP, as well as other colleagues if and when necessary.

Duty Station:

Home based & Khartoum (with travel to Blue Nile State, South and West Kordofan States and the Abyei Area, if/as security permits).

K. Qualifications of the Successful Mid-term Review Consultant/s:

• A master’s degree in conflict management, international development, programme evaluation or a related field;
• At least seven years of experience in programme evaluation, including three years in an international development setting and in post-conflict contexts;
• Skilled in designing and implementing programme reviews and evaluations using a broad range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies and in accordance with DAC evaluation principles and standards;
• Solid understanding of the conflict dynamics and socio-economic development trends in Sudan;
• Skilled in facilitating key informant interviews, focus groups, workshops, and grassroots community consultations in a participatory and inclusive manner;
• Experienced in conducting and applying political and conflict analysis in post-conflict environments and;
• Highly developed communication and report writing skills.
# Annex 4- List of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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