Mid Term Evaluation

Support to the Electoral Cycle in Jordan 2012-2017

EVALUATION REPORT

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**ACRONYMS**

BRIDGE Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections

CD Country Director (UNDP)

CO Country Office (UNDP)

CSO Civil Society Organization

CTA Chief Technical Advisor (UNDP)

DIM Direct Implementation Modality (UNDP)

EAD Electoral Assistance Division (UN) of DPA

EDR Electoral Dispute Resolution

EMB Electoral Management Body

EU European Union

GPECS Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (UNDP)

IEC Independent Election Commission

IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IRI International Republican Institute

IT Information Technology

MEL Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

MOI Ministry of Interior

NAM Needs Assessment Mission (UN)

NDI National Democratic Institute

NSA Non-State Actor

NVEC National Voters Education Committee

PPLC Political Parties Liaison Council

PR Progress Report

QPR Quarterly Progress Report

RR Resident Representative (UNDP)

SC Steering Committee

SEPJ Strengthening Electoral Processes in Jordan

SPRING Support for Partnership, Reforms, and Inclusive Growth (EU)

TA Technical Assistance

TC Technical Committee

TOR Terms of Reference

VfM Value for Money

## 1. Executive Summary

The delivery of electoral support in Jordan has experienced a number of phases since the initial *Strengthening Electoral Processes in Jordan* (SEPJ) project commenced in 2012. Through documentation review and intensive discussion with project partners and advisors this mid-term evaluation has examined progress and impact across the key deliverables of the *Support to Electoral Cycle in Jordan* project. More particularly, an appreciation of the way in which the electoral landscape has evolved rather rapidly over the lifetime of the project and in particular over the last eighteen months, and the impact of those changes on project design and timeframe is central to this evaluation and the recommendations proposed to address the evolving context.

While an assessment of progress and impact towards projected outcomes and recommendations for strategic intervention or directional change are generally the primary features of a mid-term evaluation, this review has also been informed by shifting circumstances in Jordan that have necessitated reflection with regards to decision-making on future options including strategic positioning, donor harmonisation and coordination and the impact of an amended election timetable. The environment is fluid with regards to the election timetable and uncertain with regards to future funding modalities. In this context, as project deadlines loom and future options are weighed up, issues of continuity, cohesion and the stability of an evidence-based trajectory of positive influence and change must be addressed.

The SECJ project was conceived as a capacity and institutional development project to support the establishment of a new institution and has been widely praised for its achievements. Informed by a comprehensive capacity assessment and Capacity Development Plan completed between August and November 2013, the project has been careful and precise in its advisory functions. Support to the IEC has been mindful of the need for exactness, detail, the elaboration of processes, and policy clarity across all areas of work from operations to disability, media to gender, voter registration to voter education and procedures, to liaison with political parties. The project’s reporting is also orderly and thorough.

As an ‘electoral cycle’ project to foster strengths within the new institution to deliver on its electoral cycle responsibilities, the scope of input and the detail and care with which it has been delivered is exemplary, representing a quite different approach to the kind of rushed support an electoral ‘event’ process often necessitates. The project has not been a hands-on implementing partner but rather a guide and mentor in helping the Commission understand its own scope of responsibilities and develop its own skills and responses to policy needs though the electoral cycle. The transfer of skills and knowledge into policy at the highest level of the EMB remains a challenge, however.

But as an ‘electoral cycle’ project the scope is also very inward-looking to the EMB. Reliance on actual engagement or relationships with broader electoral stakeholders has been seen by the IEC as their responsibility to initiate and implement yet there is demonstrated reluctance in this area and the project has had limited opportunity to bring the IEC and external stakeholders together. Without a relationship with external stakeholders the project itself is unable to build those bridges that are currently very fragile or even absent.

This has an immediate impact on the EU Communications and Visibility Plan. There is a very clear and unambiguous recognition within the IEC of the EU as donor to the project and gratitude for its support. But while internal documentation, procedures, reports and limited events etc. acknowledge the EU as a donor, the restricted engagement with external stakeholders means visibility is accordingly weaker than hoped by both the EU and UNDP. Recommendations in this report for complementary, bridge-building work with external stakeholders will raise the profile of both the project and the EU, but additional strategies are also needed. A study of the project as an exercise in institution building, for example, would add to the fund of electoral approach knowledge and provide a model template for wider use. Greater donor harmonisation will also immediately raise the EU profile.

As the project moves into an election year, the capacity building focus will of necessity segue into an election preparation mindset. An Operations Support Team mobilised by the project in April 2015 laid the groundwork for the operations and logistics support required to help this transfer of focus. A Communication Advisor was deployed in May 2015 to advice on the design of a comprehensive communication plan for multiple elections over a multi-year approach. Much of the legal advice has been shaped, the voter registration processes established, and frameworks for and initial engagement on action on gender, disability and liaison with political parties have been proposed or put in place. Again, the somewhat slow process of giving voice to the advice and building bridges with external stakeholders will require renewed attention as the project moves into an election year.

As that event years loom, the IEC has identified needs in the areas of technical advice though dedicated TA, assistance in procurement including the provision of funds for equipment and the rollout of voter education and other strategies, and in logistical support.

With two institutions (UNDP and IFES) working within the EMB in long-term institution-building advisory capacities, it will be incumbent on the project to ensure a continued collaborative relationship with IFES that reinforces the myriad issues on which advice has been shaped and delivered until now and to identify, with the IEC, priorities within limited funding envelopes and shared responsibilities.

In brief, it is recommended that the project be extended to end 2017 to maintain cohesion and stability during the current electoral cycle while assessment and discussion on and preparations for a new project to succeed the current one are pursued and finalised.

### a) Overall performance assessment

In terms of performance against activities, the IEC is generally delighted with the very high quality of advice and support received.[[1]](#footnote-1) Relationships between the Project and the IEC Chair and staff appear to be warm and productive with the Chair expressing a desire for “continued expertise until the next election.” The delivery of the 2013 elections were lauded by observer groups, the government and other stakeholders as confirmed by the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM), the Carter Center and RASED, a Jordanian civil society coalition that observed the election.[[2]](#footnote-2) The EU found that the project had delivered “above expectations”.[[3]](#footnote-3) NDI’s representative[[4]](#footnote-4) expressed the view that without the support of the international staff, the IEC could not have made such significant achievements. An IRI survey found high levels of trust with the IEC.

Given the fulsome praise of the 2013 election delivery, it is cautionary to note the Capacity Development Plan of August 2013[[5]](#footnote-5) was mindful that the successes of the 2013 elections were reflective of an institution boosted substantially by external and seconded support and the delivery was not reflective of the core capacities of the IEC. The future comparisons of 2013 with 2016/17 need to be aware of the different circumstances. This should be noted in the risk plan.

Recommendations from the EUEOM have been tracked by the programme and ranked according to negative progress, no progress, limited or full progress. They were last updated in September 2015. A summary, prepared by the Project, is attached at Annex 1.

At a Directorate level, the IEC is also very satisfied with the inputs delivered although some modest dissatisfaction was noted with the level of expertise of some early advisors.

A detailed assessment of delivery and recommendations for future interventions and project design are elaborated in Section 8 of this report.

Challenges include seeking ways to encourage the Commission to formally embed advice within Commission practices, as there is an apparent hesitation to adopt recommendations as policy. There is also a lack of effective communication between the Project and the decision-making body of the Commission. This needs to be addressed if the longer-term impact of the project is to be achieved.

The management of expectations between plans and processes as advised by the Project and the capacity of the IEC to deliver on the practical implementation of those plans, especially where funds are expected for commodities and events, is another challenge. Further, there appears to be a logical gap between the operations and budget planning of the IEC currently not supported by an Advisor. Portfolio advisory inputs especially related to the development of plans, can lead to an expectation – or hope – that the UNDP and/or IFES will provide more in the way of commodities for the forthcoming elections (and by-elections) than either project is currently designed or able to do.

With a focus almost solely on the IEC, there has been very limited outreach or communication with other donors or stakeholders concerned with the electoral cycle. There is a positive opportunity at this half-way mark for the UN to undertake a mapping of donor support and interest and to engage more collaboratively with the broader community of electoral stakeholders and interested donors in a coordination role and, possibly, to attract additional funding.

One external stakeholder expressed concern that the sustainability of institutional strengthening to date may be affected by changes to the IEC law, which places the IEC within the civil service structure. A possible reduction in salary levels may, it is suggested, prompt staff to leave, putting at risk the investment in capacity development. This is an aspect to monitor.

As the project’s principal donor, the EU reports satisfaction with the competence of the CTA, engagement and the good relationships with stakeholders demonstrated by the project. [[6]](#footnote-6) However concern was expressed that activities relating to the judiciary and the electoral disputes mechanism have not been delivered to date; that the visibility of the project is low, that the EU has “no control” over implementation and that the UNDP-EU partnership suffers from poor communications. The project acknowledges that in the second half of the Project and particularly in the lead up to the next election, a stronger focus on electoral dispute mechanisms is a high priority. The issue of ‘control’ is perhaps reflective of personal perspectives - the Project has been tasked, after all, to deliver the inputs – and regular reporting, Technical Committee and other meetings ensure a continuous flow of information. Some more frequent informal dialogue and progress updates and sharing of thinking would assist the building of relationships.

The EU has initiated a review of its electoral support approach with an Identification Mission and has been open in stating that all options for the modality of electoral support after March 2017 when funding under the current Decision expire, are under consideration. The EU intends to have a new broader governance programme in place by March 2017 of which the IEC and support to civil society could be a part and for which UNDP is one possible vehicle through which funding could be channeled. The Identification Mission may recommend a more focused donor coordination mechanism; mapping of current donor investment in the electoral process and a more integrated and inclusive approach to electoral support in the future while retaining a focus on the IEC.

A concurrent fulltime electoral support programme with the IEC is being implemented by IFES. At the time of the evaluation the IEC, through the Deputy Secretary-General, had initiated a process of discussion with UNDP and IFES to provide clarity and cohesion on possible areas of duplication. This is an important conversation that will help shape inputs and relationships in the coming critical year.

Project phases and a more detailed explanation of the changing environment are found at Section 2 below.

### b) Impact of electoral framework amendments on project timeframes

Challenges are posed by the revised electoral timetable and enhanced IEC mandate:

**First**, a key challenge - quite beyond the scope of the project to influence - concerns the lifetime of the project currently due to conclude in March 2017, and the impact both of the extension of the IEC ‘s mandate to be responsible for municipal elections, and the revised electoral timetable that sees municipal elections deferred to the third quarter of 2017, ie *beyond* the life of the project. An issue for this evaluation therefore has been an examination of the options to ensure the electoral cycle programme reflects the revised and now actual electoral timetable.

**Second,** March 2016 also sees the conclusion of the current 4m euro EU/UNDP funding agreement, although a second parallel award of 730,000 euro will also run from January 2016 to March 2017. An extension of the larger EU award to March 2017 has been approved in principle and is awaiting signature. However the EU cannot provide any commitment at this time to funding to the project beyond March 2017 and is currently in the process of new project identification and in due course, formulation, with a view to a new project being established by March 2017. The collective impact has the potential to disrupt the anticipated flow of inputs, processes and project deadlines. It is of course hoped that the successful and effective collaboration to date between the EU and UNDP will continue to ensure a smooth and seamless flow of support to the IEC in these critical stages of the electoral cycle.

A UNEAD desk review of December 2014 recommended that UNDP Jordan broaden its current support to the IEC between December 2014 to March 2016 to cover municipal and governorate council elections in line with the IEC’s expanded mandate. The report noted that any electoral assistance beyond the current scope will require another desk review or needs assessment as necessary.

In August 2015, the mandate for UN electoral assistance to Jordan was extended to March 2017 following requests from the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the IEC for the continued provision of UN electoral assistance for the period 2016-2020.[[7]](#footnote-7) Since then the date of the municipal elections has shifted to later 2017. The Under Secretary General for Political Affairs (USG) indicated that a UN Needs Assessment Mission should be deployed by early 2016 to decide on whether there should be a longer-term extension and, if so, what scope of support should be provided.[[8]](#footnote-8) It is recommended that clarity be sought on this aspect of the mandate.

It is clear that the current electoral cycle will continue until at least the end of the third quarter of 2017 but that funding arrangements do not support this revised timetable. This has the potential to create a critical disconnect between assured funding and an election timetable that now falls outside this funding window.

This report recommends that these issues be addressed through an agreed eighteen-month transition process while future directions are cemented so that the significant and important achievements to date are not compromised and continuity is maintained through a critical period.

### c) Partnership and Design Issues

In addition to the assessment on progress to date and concerns regarding funding and continuity, this report also touches upon a number other partnership issues:

**First,** the relatively recent establishment of the UNDP Regional Hub in Jordan offers a positive opportunity for synergies to be leveraged in electoral cycle programming, the exploration for and negotiation of prospective funding (particularly to cover the period March – December 2017 when Swedish funds should be available for country-specific programming) and for more effective harmonisation and communication with donors and partners. At present both the Regional Hub and the Country Office project have entry points and specific engagement with the IEC and donors although the Hub approach is designed to be exclusively regional in terms of events. This can be confusing and protocol of engaging with national counterparts is not always followed. An example is the IEC Deputy Secretary-General’s appointment as head of the Arab Organisation of Electoral Management Bodies, an initiative of the Regional Hub. It is preferable that lines of communication and coordination are clear in order to avoid duplication of effort or lack of clarity in communications and that institutional capacity building at a country level is respected.

**Second,** donor expectations of project management are changing. There is a trajectory whereby donors expect detailed M&E, impact reporting and analysis including value for money measurements, and wish to enjoy a greater sense of participation in project oversight and are looking to management models that reflect this preference. Discussion with the EU Identification Mission consultant reinforced the donor’s preference for a stronger focus on M&E. [[9]](#footnote-9) Joint hub and CO approaches should include a more robust approach to monitoring and evaluation, to basic research with regards to baselines and measurable indicators of progress as well as to contextual analysis (addressed in final paragraph below) in order to position UNDP in a more competitive light with regards to accountability for funding and donor expectations for more professional project management standards.

The Logical Framework of the 2012-2017 ProDoc is a new component and demonstrates that significant attention has indeed been paid to the recommendations of 2013 and to the identification of an intervention logic, indicators and sources and means of verification across all the projects’ objectives, thus enhancing the M&E capacities of the project. However, as is noted in point six below, the project structure and budget does not provide many opportunities to actually measure the capacity being built. The Capacity Assessment Report and Development Plan are an immediately useful and immediate source of baseline data.

MEL is a specialised task and it is recognised that with a small team, comprehensive and consistent measurement of progress and impact is a not always the highest priority. However the project may benefit from a more evidence-based MEL and VfM framework. It is recommended that a specialist advisor be recruited short-term to refine the logframe to include measurable indictors of progress and substantive baselines that are more than a yes /no assessment.

**Third,** the preference of targeted EMB-specific support vis a vis support to more inclusive political process is a country-specific strategy decision but also needs to reflect a realistic assessment of available resources and priorities. Reflections of the EU in the preparation this report are evidence of these changing approaches but at this stage funding is not available to give life to these preferences.

**Fourth,** the *Support to the Electoral Cycle in Jordan* project is one of a two major technical assistance providers (with others interested) to the IEC. Overall engagement would be assisted by a more closely harmonised approach that maps the needs of the IEC to well targeted and consciously coordinated inputs by the respective service providers that includes regular joint partner meetings by all involved in working with the IEC. This process has begun in the IEC under the direction of the Deputy Secretary-General.

**Fifth,** despite being an ‘electoral cycle’ project, the project design provides only for capacity-building engagement with the IEC. The long-term commitment is welcomed and certainly reflects the generally agreed belief that continuity of engagement is critical. There is a logical disconnect however between the project design and the intent of the project as reflected in the project name. Elections are an inclusive political process with a multiplicity of stakeholders but the program design has provided for capacity-building intervention with only one entity, and does not provide for programmatic implementation at any level. The lack of embedded relationships with external stakeholders is a concern. NDI expressed the view that there is much room for the IEC to appreciate the role that ‘champions’ of an independent electoral entity can offer but at this point there is little room for engagement. The project should seek to engage closer with these bodies.

**Sixth,** a funding strategy that provides intellectual heft but limited or no capacity for programme-based implementation has the frustrating consequence of raising expectations without the certainty of application, or must devolve the more visible application – events, for example - of expert capacity building to other service providers. Future project design may benefit from balancing intellectual input with delivery opportunities that have the added benefit of positive visibility and continued testing, querying and refinement of approach as well as of measuring and testing the capacity actually being built.

**Finally,** the contextual political realties and clear necessity of Jordan remaining a stable and steady entity at the epicentre of a region in crisis cannot be underestimated. Over generations, Jordan has been host to millions of displaced persons, most recently as a result of civil war in Syria. It is a country that has demonstrated ability to deliver credible elections in a region beset by electoral strife. It is a country committed to strengthening its embryonic but so far well received and respected electoral processes. But lessons learned from other countries is that new institutions and processes are always fragile. Expectations of instant and sustained success are reflective of flawed thinking and blindness to the lessons of history. In such a critically important political context, the evaluation recommends therefore that the project invests in timely, on-going and in-depth political economy analysis to advise on areas of traction; continually monitor the political context and landscape; inform on emerging risk and advise on emerging issues and opportunities.

## 2. Political and Project Context

#### Political Context

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, located in an unstable region, and host to generations of refugees from Palestine since 19348 and more recently Iraq and Syria, is a small, low-to middle-income country with a population of 6.1 million. It faces significant economic, environmental, political and security challenges to maintaining its stability.

A political reform agenda has sought to identify measures to promote and establish democratic institutions and civic participation. A key priority, and a continual challenge, throughout this period has been the attempts by Jordanian authorities and stakeholders to build an effective framework for the holding of inclusive, credible and transparent elections.

Since the resumption of elections in 1989, elections were conducted by the Ministry of the Interior. Until the 2013 elections, conducted under the auspices of the new Independent Electoral Commission and with the support of the international community, elections were marked by a series of controversial electoral policies related *inter alia* to the electoral system in place, the delineation of electoral boundaries, the assignment of seats to electoral districts, the role of governmental institutions in the management of elections, the process of voter registration, and the role of corrupt practices such as vote-buying in electoral campaigning. One consequence of these controversial electoral policies has been that political parties have tended to achieve limited success in winning elected office, leading to the boycott of elections by the Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and widely regarded as the most popular political party in Jordan. Another consequence was the push for an independent electoral management body.

A constitutional amendment was approved in 2011 followed by the adoption of a Law on the Independent Election Commission in March 2012 that was ratified by King Abdullah II in April 2012. The IEC Law stated that the main duties of the IEC will include supervising the parliamentary election process and monitoring it in all its phases; setting election dates; drawing up schedules, plans, and programs necessary for the implementation of elections; and taking the necessary measures to manage candidate nominations and voter registration in line with the provisions of the Elections Law.

An initial project of support was developed by UNDP Jordan. The *Strengthening Electoral Processes in Jordan* project (SEPJ) , funded by a $500,000 contribution from the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation via the UNDP BDP-managed Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS focused on the provision of technical assistance to the establishment of the Independent Election Commission.

Parliamentary elections took place on 23 January 2013, just 8 months after the formal establishment of the IEC. Substantial efforts were made to ensure that the IEC was operationally ready to implement elections in time, including drawing on significant levels of support from staff seconded from other public institutions (such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Education) as well as support from national and international actors (including the UNDP and European Union) who played both an advisory role and also offered technical assistance through procurement of equipment, etc.

The 2013 parliamentary elections took place under new election legislation that provided for the role of the IEC and also made other significant reforms to the broader electoral framework, including: the electoral system (the introduction of seats to be won through a national closed list proportional representation contest); the women’s quota (increasing the number of reserved seats); changes to the voter registration framework (including the use of voter cards and assignment of voters to specific polling stations); and the introduction of standardised ballot papers. Despite these reform measures, the elections were subject to a boycott by the Islamic Action Front.

The 2013 elections were generally assessed positively, with national and international observer groups (including the EU Election Observation Mission) commending the IEC for the management of the elections, especially its implementation of election operations, the adoption of a complex series of procedures, and its attempts to ensure effective outreach with stakeholders and voters. However, observers also noted a series of areas where the legal and political framework for elections could be improved., particularly in the area of the participation of women.

Municipal elections of 23 August 2013 were managed by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, although the IEC was tasked with a supervisory role.

The success of the initial project were leveraged with funding from the European Union to support the new Independent Election Commission in terms of both institutional capacity building and equipment under the *Strengthening Electoral Processes in Jordan* project.

#### Project Objective

The project, primarily funded by the European Union, consists of technical and material assistance designed to build upon the initial work of the *Strengthening Electoral Process in Jordan* project and enhance and further consolidate the institutional and professional capacities of the newly established Independent Election Commission (IEC). The objective is to assist the IEC to deliver its mandated functions of conducting fair, credible and transparent elections and further consolidate itself as a permanent, professional, credible and independent institution of governance, with the benefits of its work enjoyed equally by men and women. The project will also support the IEC and the Jordanian judiciary on comprehensive electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.

In August 2014, significant constitutional and legal reforms, outlined in Section x below extended the mandate of the IEC “*to conduct parliamentary and municipal elections and any general elections according to the provisions of the law”*. The amendment was widely regarded as a demonstration of confidence in the role of the IEC and its successful performance in the conduct of the 2013 parliamentary elections and a subsequent number of by-elections.

In the light of these amendments the Project was revised in 2015, with a new and broader focus on the electoral cycle.

## 3. Evaluation Focus

The focus of the evaluation extended beyond an immediate and more traditional assessment of progress and impact to include the emerging contextual issues and consequent considerations for the project in areas including strategic positioning, donor harmonisation and coordination and the impact of an amended election timetable. The focus has been threefold:

1. An assessment of progress of the key intervention areas against impact and effectiveness, achievements and challenges, to determine if they are on track to achieve the project’s objectives;
2. A review and discussion of the overall direction of the project in the context of an amended electoral timetable and in the light of the possible outcomes of the EU evaluation mission, and
3. Provision of advice and recommendations on some strategic re-positioning and funding /support options given the revised electoral timetable.

As the December 2013 External Evaluation[[10]](#footnote-10) assessed the project to that date, this report does not revisit or reassess that period other than to cross-reference recommendations from that time.

## 4. Methodology

The evaluator has conducted a review of many documents (as listed in Annex 2) and met with a range of stakeholders from within the UNDP management team; the EU, the IEC, the UNDP regional hub and with the EU’s formulation mission.A list of interviewees is found at Annex 3.

The report looks at how the findings and recommendations from EU Evaluation of June 2013 and UNDP evaluation of December 2013 have been incorporated into revised ProDoc and on the impact of the new law and amended electoral timetable has impact on overall project design and approach.

## 5. Phases of the Project

The initial SEPJ project, funded by the Spain under the GPECS Programme and implemented by UNDP was focused primarily on providing technical assistance to building the capacity of the newly established Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).

Funding processes and agreements subsequent to the initial GPECS programme are somewhat confusing.

During this period the second, longer-term project, *Support to the Electoral Cycle in Jordan* was developed, in partnership between the EU and UN, leveraging the EU’s SPRING envelope dedicated to the political reforms of Jordan. This 2012-2015 (four year) initiative supported with Euro 4m from the EU was designed to consciously move from an electoral event to an electoral cycle focus, segue from the SEPJ Project, and build on and expand the preparatory work of the SEPJ project. The central objective was to build the capacity of the IEC to deliver elections in Jordan fully in line with Jordan’s international electoral commitments and the relevant national legislation.

An immediate focus became provision of advice and support for the January 2013 parliamentary elections.

Assessments conducted by the EU in May 2013 and by UNDP in December of 2013 that reviewed the GPECs programme and the early phases of the current project overwhelmingly praised the achievements of the first phases of the project noting the positive impact on wider democratic objectives and the benefits accruing from the SEPJ provision of legal advice, operational assistance and incremental institutional development. This evaluation has not revisited the achievements of the 2013 elections in detail as they have been previously addressed in these earlier evaluations. As anticipated however, the assessments included a number of ‘lessons learned’. Recommendations flowing from the assessments and how they have been embedded in subsequent project design and implementation are examined in Section 10 of this report.

The initial second phase of the electoral cycle project design foreshadowed a close- down in March 2016.

In 2014 and 2015 the electoral landscape and, consequently, the viability of the project design and duration, was impacted by a constitutional amendment and proposed amendments to the electoral law.

A constitutional amendment of 2014 extended the mandate of the IEC *“to conduct parliamentary and municipal elections and any general elections according to the provision of the law”*. This amendment was widely regarded as a demonstration of confidence in the role of the IEC and its successful performance in the conduct of the 2013 parliamentary elections and a number of subsequent by-elections.

The Jordanian government also foreshadowed a series of draft laws relating to elections to be proposed to Parliament ahead of the next parliamentary and municipal elections which would significantly affect the role and responsibilities of the IEC. It is noted that municipal elections had previously been the responsibility of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. These new laws are:

* A new draft Elections Law, which amends the framework for parliamentary elections, including proposals for changes to the electoral system (published September 2015)
* A new Political Parties Law, which amends the regulatory framework for political parties (came into force September 2015)
* New amendments to the IEC Law, to provide a legal basis for the IEC’s extended constitutional mandate to administer parliamentary, municipal and other elections (came into force October 2015)
* A new Municipalities Law, to amend the framework by which municipal and local authorities are elected, under elections managed by the IEC (came into force September 2015)
* A draft Decentralisation Law, to establish Governorate Councils that will be partially directly-elected, under elections managed by the IEC (adopted by Parliament in August 2015 but re-submitted for consideration).

It is envisaged that the draft legislation will be considered by the Jordanian Parliament in late 2015 and early 2016, parliamentary elections in late 2016/early 2017 and with municipal elections then being held in late summer 2017. In case the Decentralisation Law is adopted, Governorate Council elections are expected at the same time as municipal elections, or shortly thereafter.

A project design review in 2015 that acknowledged the impact of the new laws and that reshaped the objectives in a clearer way while retaining the original design vision, recommended an extension of the project to March 2017 to ensure project coverage of the scheduled municipal elections of 2016 and the parliamentary elections slated to be held between October 2016 and the end of January 2017.

To enable the project to continue to from January 2016 (the original close down date) to March 2017 the EU agreed to provide funding of Euro 0.737m under a new and separate grant (necessary as the first grant was not able to be extended under the EU funding arrangement ) but with essentially the same TORs as the original funding agreement. A notable difference in the project title however is the inclusion of the judiciary in the Programme name: *Enhanced Support to the Independent Electoral Commission and the Judiciary in Jordan (2016-2017).* Effectively, therefore, there are two grants running parallel to each other. It is noted that Annex 1 of this parallel agreement does not obligate the support to extend to the municipal elections but rather “allows for extensive preparatory work that will be undertaken in respect of municipal elections (and possible Governorate Council elections) by mid 2017.”[[11]](#footnote-11)

At the same time a request to extend the current (Euro4m) project to March 2017 has been approved in principle and is awaiting formal confirmation by the Steering Committee and signature.

Critically, in the intervening period, the date for municipal elections was deferred to mid to late 2017 thus extending the natural life of the current electoral cycle to the end of 2017, beyond the initially projected end date of March 2017.

## 6. Project Objectives

The five goals of the *Support for the Electoral Cycle in Jordan* project as articulated in the 2012-2015 ProDoc were:

1. Developing IEC’s necessary regulations and strategic and operational plan in place to function in a professional manner;
2. Developing the IEC internal and external communication strategies;
3. Setting up a joint committee with civil society on voter education;
4. Setting up a Liaison Council with political stakeholders; and
5. Drafting gender strategies for the IEC and the PPLC.

These objectives were to be achieved via the following activities:

1. Consolidation of institutional framework for electoral reform by building the institution of the IEC;
2. Strengthening trusted liaison mechanisms between the IEC and its external stakeholders;
3. Increased capacity of the IEC to manage the electoral register;
4. Increased capacity of the IEC to implement the 2012 parliamentary elections
5. Establishment of a workable and credible electoral dispute resolution system, and
6. Enhancement of participation of political parties in political processes.

These activities were reviewed in December 2013 in a process that focused on the strengthening of the institutional and operating capacity of the IEC and the development of external stakeholder relations. They were found to have been achieved and generally effective in supporting the IEC to deliver improved elections in held at the beginning of that year in January 2013 although gaps were identified in the area of stakeholder relationship building.[[12]](#footnote-12) As the December 2013 External Evaluation assessed the project to that date, this report does not revisit or reassess that period except to examine whether recommendations were adopted.

In 2015, following the constitutional amendment to task the IEC with responsibility for municipal and other elections, and pursuant also to legal amendments that would affect the role and responsibility of the IEC, the project outputs were slightly revised to cover:

* 1. Support to IEC development as a professional and independent institution
	2. Enhanced IEC external relations with stakeholders
	3. EC development of a Voter Registration Data Base
	4. Enhanced IEC capacities for the implementation of election operations
	5. Strengthened electoral dispute resolution mechanisms
	6. Enhanced IEC engagement with political parties
	7. Provision of specialised advice on electoral issues and project management.

The revision lessened the intense capacity building approach to include a focus on outputs such as the voters register and strengthened electoral dispute mechanisms.

This evaluation is based on the above, slightly revised suite of outputs.

## 7. Management Structure and Governance

## The project is managed by a dual level structure. A high level Steering Committee comprising the IEC President of the Board of Commissioners; the Ambassador of the EU; the UNDP Country Director and the IEC Secretary-General is intended to meet on a quarterly basis but in fact the meetings are somewhat more infrequent with only two held in the last 18 months: once in September 2014 and again in April 2015. The challenge of uptake of policy recommendations might be enhanced by a more energetic leadership role and greater engagement at this level. More consistent project management is carried out by the Technical Committee made up of representation from the IEC through the Chair, the EU, the UNDP Country Office and the Project CTA. The Technical Committee meets on a quarterly basis and receives regular activity reports. Quarterly reports are produced by the project for the Technical Committee by the CTA.

## 8. Summary of recommendations noted in December 2013 Evaluation

The December 2013 evaluation of the project assessed the interventions of the GPECS programme of which the current programme is an integrated successor, and of the first phases of the *Support to the Electoral Cycle in Jordan* project. The assessment determined that the objective of strengthening the electoral process in Jordan through the provision of technical support to the IEC had been achieved in a constrained time period, while noting some challenges in the measurability of particular activities. Partial delivery was noted in the establishment of a National Voter Education Committee (not yet established); informal and ad hoc technical support to political party liaison processes but noting that a formal council had not been established, and challenges in the area of gender including both within the IEC’s structure and operations (the initial gender strategy developed by the project had not been adopted by the IEC) and the lack of progress in the IEC’s advocacy of gender strategies within political parties.

The December 2013 evaluation commented on the need for greater capacity to measure impact of project activities and a set of quantifiable and measurable base line indicators. This has been partially addressed through the revised logical framework although progress indicators are not embedded and baselines remain limited.

The recommendation for policy decisions by the IEC on stakeholder relations remains a challenge with limited policy uptake at the decision-making level of the IEC.

The Project has prepared detailed advice and recommendations both on gender and disability, which await confirmation from the IEC. Gender mainstreaming indictors have been included in the new logical framework although baselines remain weak.

## 9. Assessment of achievements and challenges of project delivery to November 2015

### a) The Capacity Development Approach

The UN defines capacity development as ...*the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain capabilities to set and achieve their own development objectives over time.* Since its inception the project has focused on the capacity development of the IEC with scope broadening slightly since the revision of the ProDoc in 2015.

A very significant achievement and input of the project was the commissioning, in August 2013, (somewhat late, it is admitted) of an impressively comprehensive capacity assessment of the IEC[[13]](#footnote-13) and the later formulation of the Capacity Development Plan. It is rare in electoral support projects generally to have the opportunity to help build an institution, effectively from scratch, and to have such thorough tools to inform strategy and process.

Through a process of self assessment questionnaires, focus group discussions, interviews and document review, the assessment examined capacity at an institutional, organisational and individual level and identified gaps to be covered in order for the IEC to meet is obligations in a professional and informed way. It made recommendations for project focus across a range of responsibility areas including institutional capacity particularly focused on the legal framework; stakeholders; strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation; organisational structure and key functions; job descriptions; organisational culture; human resources policies and procedures; electoral training; service delivery and internal procedures; budget, support services and electoral procurement; knowledge, accountability and individual capacities.

That report informed the Capacity Development Plan finalised in November 2013 for the years 2013-2016 although effectively, with the Plan not finalised until late 2013, it was applicable for only half the life of the programme as then envisaged. It would have been more helpful to conduct this process earlier. The Plan projected that baselines and indictors would be defined to follow up the progress of implementation and to facilitate the process of monitoring and evaluation.

Interestingly, despite the praise for the conduct of the 2013 elections, the Capacity Development Plan cautions that at that time, the IEC was supported by many individuals seconded from outside the organisation and that the successes of 2013 should not be assumed to have been institutionally forged. The Plan rings warning bells therefore about possibly unrealistic capacity future comparisons with 2013 with respect to IEC exercises. This should be noted in the risk plan.

As noted elsewhere it is recommended that more attention be paid to this area. With follow-up of the Capacity Development Plan not institutionalised, it is suggested that the end of project evaluation be, in effect, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the capacity development approach, using the capacity assessment as the baseline and framework for such an exercise. A mid term lessons learned workshop with the IEC, the Project and IFES to revisit the Plan and assess progress would be a helpful end-of-year of start-of the –new –year exercise.

The Quarterly reports and regular provision of policy papers, legal analysis and planning processes provide a comprehensive tracking of the Project’s inputs. This Section does not revisit the input and activity reporting which is readily available elsewhere, but seeks to assess the client’s perspectives on the quality and impact of the advisory functions.

### b) Component Assessment

The Capacity Assessment and Development reports challenge the programme to ask the question: what does success look like?

In interviews with the Secretary-General, Deputy SG and Heads of Directorates, significant confidence was expressed that progressive successes could be identified, and EU and UNDP support to help Jordan carry out electoral reforms and build the compliance of the IEC in conformity with international standards and consistent with national legislation, warmly acknowledged.

That citizen trust on the electoral process had been regained, and the trust of political parties increased, was noted as two of the most important impacts of the Project and reflected the very purpose of the process.

####  i) Support to IEC development as a professional and independent institution

The DSG noted that institution-building could really only start in earnest after the 2013 elections as so much focus prior to then was on the event itself, and that the approach was highly participatory. An early Action Plan helped map the interventions for development and became, in effect, their road map.

The SG noted that priorities for development were the legislative framework and legal reform across the parliamentary, municipal and governorate elections and the development and professionalistation of the IEC as an institution. The transfer of skills and experience through training; the identification of strategic principles; the development of executive and internal instructions and the building of capacity to deliver a successful 2013 elections were four highlights as identified by the SG. He commended the project for the delivery of inputs across all relevant areas including voter registration, candidate nomination, planning and campaigning, communications and voter registration and for the policy papers prepared by the CTA, an expert in electoral law, which have been sound and well targeted, assisting the IEC to develop an vision for compliance and delivery.

The DSG commended the Procedures Advisor as one of the most important of the experts who delivers consistency and excellence in methodological approaches, tools and structure of inputs and who has greatly assisted in the IEC’s own self-assessment.

The SG noted that the Strategic Plan (a process led by IFES) has delivered the vision and mission for the IEC however the substance is yet to be elaborated. Future plans include embedding a gender strategy and a closer engagement with political parties and with CSOs. This vision supports the Project’s strategy also for a more vibrant relationship with external stakeholders.

####  ii) Enhanced IEC external relations with stakeholders

Work in the area of communication, media and public outreach in 2014 led to the development of a Public Awareness Framework for 2015-2016, which was adopted by the IEC in January 2015. To assist in its implementation, a Communications Advisor was deployed in May to prepare a comprehensive communications and public outreach plan. While initial deployment of the Adviser was only temporary, the IEC was able to agree on a structure for a multi-election, multi-year approach to its external relations. At the request of the IEC, that Adviser recently arrived for a longer-term assignment that should continue through to the elections, noting that his time is shared with work being undertaken by the Regional Hub. He has worked with the Communications Department to prepare a comprehensive public outreach plan. Another challenge is again the issue of communications planning being disconnected from central budgeting, leaving open the risk that plans cannot be actualized unless supported by donor funding that is not, it would appear, currently available.

At the time of writing, the IEC was yet to clarify with the Ministry of Political Affairs the respective role of each entity in communicating information about the new electoral legal framework, with the IEC seemingly reluctant to take the initiative. While it is intended that CSOs are brought on board as partners in voter education and a voter education committee planned, this will not be activated until the IEC is clear about its role.

In the meantime the advisory focus has been on voter education planning, institutional communications strategies and the development of a public awareness framework - which has been completed. More recently, work in communications has moved from a more theoretical basis to project planning and finessing the structures of the communications directorate. This has been a positive process with a Plan approved by the Commission to start in February 2016 that covers the establishment of a coordination mechanism with the Ministry of Political Affairs; the development of a voter education plan for the parliamentary elections, and work in branding, the website, the development of a and other initiatives. While no workshops have been conducted with media, a Spokesperson for the IEC was appointed in early November signaling a greater commitment to engagement. An atlas of electoral maps is also projected.

The Secretary General reported that the Commission is in the final stages of preparing to launch of the CSO /IEC voter education committee. However, a series of regional meetings that were scheduled for Autumn 2015 were suspended after just one event following the publication of the new law.

####  iii) IEC development of a Voter Registration Data Base

Mahmoud Alzaben, Head of the IT Directorate, expressed gratitude for the project’s interventions and continuous cooperation, provision of infrastructure and expertise capacity, and for the long relationship with the project’s IT Advisor in the establishment of the IEC’s voter registration database. He described the inputs as cost effective and time efficient with positive skills transfer. Despite the lack of continuity of the Advisor in the IEC (his time is shared with the Regional Hub) the IEC says this is not a problem. The Secretary-General expressed hope that in due course all eligible voters will be included in a clean register managed by the IEC.

The IEC voter registration database is not created from scratch but is a parallel, enhanced version of the data supplied by the CSPD (Civil Status and Passport Department – the civil registry) into which additional fields of data pertinent to the electoral process are added such as linking a voter with a polling station. By law, the IEC is required to update the data of newly eligible voters every six months, but the IEC has extended this role to develop an updated comprehensive registry of all eligible voters. The project has been instrumental on advising the IEC on this approach. Surveys have found that confidence in the IEC’s database has increased over previous methods and has reduced the risk of multiple voting. The voter’s register is purely internal at present but it is planned to be rolled out with the next parliamentary elections . There is no capacity within the IEC (nor need) to conduct a independent voter registration process per se. The IEC has been conducting tests internally with the CSPD to identify gaps, discrepancies and weaknesses and has also initiated a survey to cross check information.

The IEC has future plans for online voter registration updates and envisages the production of a government–issued smart card which will impact on the procurement needs for card readers and on the investment being made currently in voter registration processes.

The IT Director has requested support for improved connectivity between polling stations and the IEC HQ which manages dual systems at the head office and a back- up system offsite, but this is beyond the financial capacity of the project to provide. Further, IEC currently uses unlicenced software, against the advice of the project, particularly on security grounds. Both items should be embedded into the institutional budget. Additionally IT wants, in future, to conduct voter ID through photo matching online. A future need is to support GIS mapping for municipal elections as well as run another call centre, with the suggestion being that the operationalisation of these tasks are dependent upon donor input. Core tasks for al these options need, however, to be budgeted centrally – which is not happening at present.

Advice and support is also provided for the IEC website (current and new). The updated website however has experienced frustrating delays due to internal wrangling over the design style, control of content and maintenance and the embedded reluctance of public outreach. Potential audiences of the new website – voters, civil society etc. – have not been consulted on the design. The new website, once up and running, is intended to be interactive and responsive.

Attention to internal communications protocols and structure for information-sharing within IEC would greatly assist the level of learning and knowledge-sharing and benefits of the project.

####  iv) Enhanced IEC capacities for the implementation of election operations

‘Operations’ within the IEC covers a multitude of aspects from operational planning, field operations, budget planning, procurement planning and so on. At the moment in the IEC, all the personnel in the Operations department have been secondees from the Ministry of the Interior or related Ministries and there is currently no direct engagement between the Project and this Directorate. This is a challenge.

An Operations Assessment Mission in April 2015 set the framework for inputs to be delivered in the coming year. It is important that TORs for and the recruitment of an operations / logistics advisor be progressed but that clear lines of responsibility first be established with IFES, who also plan to recruit Operations and Logistics Advisors.

####  v) Strengthened electoral dispute resolution mechanisms

It is acknowledged that progress in electoral dispute resolutions (EDR) has been delayed and that the second half of the programme will require a focus on work with the judiciary and on electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. The SG explained this delay in terms of the current lack of clarity on electoral legislation. That said, there were very few disputes to actually be resolved in 2013 hence the decision to reduce the budget for this activity. Those issues that did emerge were not actually resolved through the court system, and others that were resolved through negotiation, such as problems over results. The most significant controversy however was that the IEC identified 4 candidates as responsible for campaign violations but as they were elected, the cases were not prosecuted. Based on 2013, it is advised that the key factor would be working with prosecutors, but that will be difficult. Judges could be interested in a lessons learned process. The Project intends to conduct a symposium on the new law.

It is noted that within the IEC the process for receiving and imitating complaints appears weak and needs attention.

####  vi) Enhanced IEC engagement with political parties

While guidance has been provided on the establishment of liaison platforms and processes with political parties, only two such Political Party Liaison Committee (PPLC) consultative events have taken place (one being its launch in March, the other in July to discuss voter registration) out of seven planned, albeit well attended by 33 to 35 parties present. While the SG notes that the IEC needs to reinforce its level of participation and understanding with political parties, reinforcing this commitment, the Chair has expressed the view that consultations may not proceed until clarity is received on the new electoral laws. The IEC Chairman nonetheless recently offered its patronage to two civil society events – one by the Al Quds Centre, one by the Rasheed Network, both of which are coincidentally funded by the EU - for events to discuss campaign financing, a topic that was the focus of an event by the project in February 2015, . While IEC patronage of external events is an encouraging process, the IEC was not significantly involved in the substantive discussions, and it will be important, moving forward, for the IEC to lead on such interventions with the support of the project.

####  vii) Provision of specialised advice on electoral issues and project management

The CTA has dedicated much of his time to the drafting of legal advice on the new electoral laws and on gender, disability and other key areas of engagement, with this key grounding work supported by the Procedures Advisor. The Project leads on analysis of the electoral law and the design of procedures, executive instructions and the like, ultimately helping to guide and shape IEC appropriate and best-practice processes.

Interestingly the DSG has tracked the number of hours (65) and number of sessions (10) spent on working through electoral legal amendment reviews.

Within this activity, the Project has also been providing regular analyses of electoral developments, including presentations for the international community or a gender analysis of the new draft election law, but which have been shared only with a limited audience. This work is likely to be of wider interest and steps could be taken to position the project as a key source of information on electoral issues.

####  viii) Gender

As noted in the early part of this report, gender issues are concerning – particularly the participation of women in political processes and as elected representatives Gender is a focus of the project , embedded through Activity 1.2 where “women and other marginalised groups are integrated into election management“ which has been included to reinforce the need to address gender mainstreaming institutionally, programmatically and in relation to legal reforms. The DSG noted the tendency to ‘digress’ to other issues and that gender is not a high priority culturally, although the IEC is fortunate in having high profile female participation at the Board level. It is noted that a number of gender policy papers have been prepared for the IEC by the Project but again, uptake is poor. The IEC looks forward to a more substantive approach in the second half half of the Project. It is recommended that a mid-term gender assessment be undertaken to review strategic approaches and the adoption of gender mainstreaming in the project and in the IEC.

#### ix) Supplementary Feedback from the IEC

The project started with a new institution with very few dedicated staff, needing to build procedures on all aspects from identification of personnel needs, the preparation of job descriptions and TORs to the recruitment of staff , to running an election that was widely applauded.

The contribution of the three CTAs was recognised for their insight on electoral best practices and for the critical contribution to the success of the 2013 election, for the follow-up to those elections and to starting preparations for the next elections.

The IEC recognises that there has been a challenge in being open to political parties due to uncertainty about the status of the electoral laws, which led to a need be but cautious about impartiality, but that moving forward, a greater degree of openness and engagement will be valuable and necessary.

Overall, the senior members of the Commission have confirmed the critical importance of the Project. It was wisely noted that one experience does not confirm or guarantee long term sustainability and there is need for continued support through to 2021 especially given the expanded mandate of the Commission. It is also acknowledged that there remain gaps between:

* theory and practice,
* operations and budgeting,
* planning and the identification of electoral needs ,
* internal and external communications with stakeholders, and
* between the Project and donors and senior decision-making levels of the Commission.

This is hardly surprising given the very new and early stages of the Commission’s life.

The Commission would welcome additional donor support but has expressed a clear preference that the Project be the focal point, and that the IEC take greater responsibility for leadership on internal coordination.

## 10. M&E Aspects

The evaluation found a weakness in the absence of measurable baselines and reliable data and recommends that at this mid way point it would be helpful to recruit a short term expert to refine the logframe and provide measurable, locally available indicators of progress and meaningful baselines. The Results and Resources Framework set out in the original Project Document has very simplistic yes/no baselines measures for performance [[14]](#footnote-14) that are absent of progress milestones or impact measures, limited to “evidence-free” yes/no baselines and target measures. This level of analysis is not acceptable to donors generally and needs attention. Any future project must embed a robust M&E and Learning framework; be subject to continuous evaluation against established milestones and progress indicators and that tools for the measurement of attitudes, behaviours and performance delivery be carried out as part of the project implementation strategy to ensure future measurability of progress, impact and results.[[15]](#footnote-15) It is recommended that future project management tools also be mindful of donor criteria of evaluation for effectiveness and value for money and that in collaboration with donors, such indicators be agreed in the early stages of the project. The DFID VfM framework of the 4 e’s - economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity - is a useful stating point.

## 11. Summary of Recommendations

This report has recommended that:

1. as a minimum, steps be taken to ensure that the project period be extended to end 2017 to maintain cohesion and stability during the current electoral cycle while assessment and discussion on and preparations for a new project to succeed the current one are pursued and finalised;
2. a window of complementary programme support to IEC electoral stakeholders (civil society, media, political parties, observers) be included as much as possible into re-programming of the current project, and be a key component in future programme models as a means of bridge-building between the EMB and other relevant parties as part of an approach to inclusive political processes;
3. the mandate of the UN to support electoral processes through to the end of 2017 be confrmed;
4. A decision of the Project’s engagement of an Operational Adviser be taken (given IFES’s intention to also deploy a similar position) as a matter of priority;
5. electoral timeline challenges be addressed through an agreed transition process while future directions are cemented so that the significant and important achievements to date are not compromised and continuity is maintained through a critical period;
6. a robust MEL framework be developed and that a specialist advisor be recruited short term to re-frame the logframe in terms of measurable indictors of progress and substantive baselines that are more than a yes /no assessment.;
7. the project invest in on-going political economy analysis to advise on areas of traction; continually monitor the political context and landscape; inform on emerging risk and advise on emerging issues and opportunities;
8. UNDP initiate and take the lead on a donor mapping exercise and on election coordination meetings that engage both other possible donors and broader electoral stakeholders;
9. with follow-up of the Capacity Development Plan not institutionalised, it is suggested that a mid term (or as the focus of an end of project evaluation) capacity assessment monitoring follow-up be conducted to assess progress and change across the facets of intervention using the capacity assessment study as the baseline and framework for the evaluation. A mid term lessons learned workshop with the IEC, the Project and IFES to revisit the Plan and assess progress would be a helpful end-of-year or start-of the-new-year exercise.
10. a mid-term gender assessment be undertaken to review strategic approaches and the adoption of gender mainstreaming in the project and in the IEC.

ENDS

**Annex 1: List of persons consulted**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **UNDP Jordan** | Mrs Zena Ali Ahmad | Country Director, UNDP |
| **UNDP Project** | Richard Chambers | Chief Technical Adviser |
|  | Saed Madi | Assistant Project Officer |
|  | Majida Al-Assaf | Programme Manager |
|  | Mais Al Attiyat | **Project Officer** |
|  | Maxim | Media Communications Outreach Advispr |
|  | Everard | IT Adviser |
|  | Katie Green | Procedures Adviser |
| **UNDP Reg. Hub** | Luis Martinez-Betanzos | Regional Electoral Adviser |
| **EAD** | Ricardo Alejando Philion | Political/Electoral Affairs Officer |
| **UNDP NY** | Niall McCann | UNDP Elections Advisor |
| **EU** | Florence Burban | EU Consultant, Identification Mission |
|  | Gonzalo Jorro Martinez, | Programme Manager, Governance, Peace and Stability |
| **IEC** | HE Mr Royadh Al-Shak’a | Chairman |
|  | HE Dr Ali Al-Drabkeh | Secretary-General |
|  | Ms Badrieh Belbeisi | Deputy Secretary-General |
|  | Mahmoud Al Zabin, | Director, IT |
|  | Sharaf Uddin Abu ruromman, | Director of Media, Communications and Awareness Directorate |
| **IFES** | Anna W | Country Director |
|  | Sarah | Deputy Country Director |
| **NDI** | Bushra Abu Shahout | Programme Manager, Governance and Women’s Participation |
|  |  |  |

**Annex 2: List of documents reviewed**

Project Document 2012-2015

EU Evaluation May 2013

Final External Evaluation, Strengthening Electoral Processes in Jordan, December 2013

Desk Review EAD December 2014

Revised Project Document 2012-2017

EU Project Document 2 September 2015

Project Steering Committee Minutes 2014/15

Project Quarterly Reports 2015

Capacity Assessment of the IEC, August 2013

Capacity Development Plan IEC 2013-2016, November 2013

2015 Draft Electoral Law – Richard Chambers

Annex 3: Tracked EUEOM 2013 recommnedations

1. See Section 8 below for detailed commentary on output delivery. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See Final External Evaluation December 2013 pp 9,10 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. EU Monitoring Report 3 June 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Interview with Bushra Abu Shahout, Manager for Good Governance and Women’s Participation, NDI [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. IEC Capacity development Plan August 2013, pp 2,3 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Interview with Gonzalo Jorro Martinez, EU Programme Manager [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Project Quarterly Report for 3rd Quarter, p 12 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The desirability for clarity and a possible NAM or further desk review was noted in a conversation between the writer and Ricardo Alejando Philion of EAD, as part of this evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Interview with Florence Burban, EU Identification Mission Consultant. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Final External Evaluation *Strengthening Electoral Processes in Jordan,* Stephen Beale, December 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Annex 1 *Enhanced Support to the Independent Electoral Commission and the Judiciary in Jordan* p 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Refer to Final External Evaluation *Strengthening Electoral Processes in Jordan,* Stephen Beale, December 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Capacity Assessment of the Independent Electoral Commission,* August 2013, Francisco Cobos Flores and Muna Hakooz [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See ProDoc 2012-2107 RRF pp 17-20 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. It is noted that an attitude survey is in the process of being conducted and this will provide an updated reflection of perceptions of the IEC to the earlier IRI survey. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)