

**2015**

Elballa Hagona  
Consultant

# **EVALUATION REPORT OF SUDAN UNDAF(2013-2016)**

[

**Disclaimer**

The findings, analysis and recommendations made in this report reflect the views of the independent evaluation consultant and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations, the Government of Sudan or any other entity involved in the Sudan UNDAF.

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AARR	Average Annual Rate of Reduction
AHT	Anti-Human Trafficking State Law
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ALP	Alternative Learning Programmes
CBO	Community Based Organization
CBR	Children's Bill of Rights
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CC	Climate Change
CFS	Child Friendly Schools
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
COP-19	Conference of the Parties
CP	Country Programme
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
AUHLIP	African Union High Level Implementation Panel
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Control
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DaO	Delivering as One
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
EMTCT	Elimination of Mother to Child Transmission
ESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FCFP	Forest Carbon Facility Partnership
FCPU	Family and Child Protection Unit
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Gender Mainstreaming
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
GoS	Government of Sudan
GTG	United Nations Gender Theme Group
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
HCENR	Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
LGDPPEM	Local Governance Development and Public Expenditure Management
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMCI	Integrated Management Childhood Illnesses
I/NGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
MCH	Maternal and Child Health

MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MEFPD	Ministry of Environment, Forests and Physical Planning
MIC	Ministry of International Cooperation
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MNCH	Maternal and New Born Health
MoFNE	Ministry of Finance and National Economy
MoYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
NAMA	National Appropriate Mitigation Action Framework
NAP	National Action Plan
NCP	National Congress Party
NDDRCC	National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council
NDP	Five Year National Development Plan 2012-2016
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NIM	National Implementation Modality
NSDS	National Strategy for Development of Statistics
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OG	Outcome Group
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
OMT	Operations Management Team
OsOC	Out-of-School Children
PHC	Primary Health Care
PMT	Programme Management Team
RBM	Results-based Management
RC	Resident Coordinator
REDD	Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SAID	Sudan Aid Information Database
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SDDRC	Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
SOGV	Sexual Offences and Gender Violence Bill
SPE	Strategic Prioritization Exercise
SPLM-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
S3M	Simple Spatial Survey Method
TSI	Transitional Solutions Initiatives
TVETS	Technical and Vocational Education and Training Systems
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCBD	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group

UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and cultural Organization
UNFCC	United Nations Framework for Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNS	United Nations System
UN WOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
ToR	Terms of Reference
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WP	Work Plan

# CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .....	3
CONTENTS .....	6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	9
1. INTRODUCTION .....	11
1.1 Background .....	11
1.2 Objectives.....	12
1.3 Scope and Methodology .....	12
1.4 Limitations.....	13
2. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT.....	13
2.1 Political.....	13
2.2 Economic Developments .....	14
2.3 Poverty and Social Developments .....	15
3. UNDAF EVALUATION FINDINGS .....	16
3.1 General Observations on UNDAF Formulation and Implementation .....	16
3.2 UNDAF Coordination.....	17
3.3 Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability of UNDAF to National Development Priorities .....	18
3.3.1 Relevance .....	19
3.3.2 Effectiveness .....	19
3.3.3 Efficiency .....	20
3.3.4 Sustainability.....	20
4. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME RESULTS.....	21
4.1 Outcome 1.....	21
4.1.1 Overview .....	21
4.1.2 Relevance .....	22
4.1.3 Effectiveness .....	23
4.1.4 Efficiency .....	23
4.1.5 Sustainability.....	23
4.2 Outcome 2.....	24
4.2.1 Overview .....	24
4.2.2 Relevance .....	25
4.2.3 Effectiveness .....	25
4.2.4 Efficiency .....	26
4.2.5 Sustainability.....	26
4.3 Outcome 3.....	26
4.3.1 Overview .....	26
4.3.2 Relevance .....	27
4.3.3 Effectiveness .....	27
4.3.4 Efficiency .....	28
4.3.5 Sustainability.....	28
4.4 Outcome 4.....	29
4.4.1 Overview .....	29
4.4.2 Relevance .....	30
4.4.3 Effectiveness .....	30
4.4.4 Efficiency .....	31
4.4.5 Sustainability.....	31
4.5 Outcome 5.....	31
4.5.1 Overview .....	31
4.5.2 Relevance .....	32

4.5.3 Effectiveness .....	32
4.5.5 Sustainability .....	33
4.6 Outcome 6 .....	33
4.6.1 Overview .....	34
4.6.2 Relevance .....	35
4.6.3 Effectiveness .....	35
4.6.4 Efficiency .....	35
4.6.5 Sustainability .....	36
4.7 Outcome 7 .....	36
4.7.1 Overview .....	36
4.7.2 Relevance .....	37
4.7.3 Effectiveness .....	37
4.7.4 Efficiency .....	37
4.7.5 Sustainability .....	38
4.8 Outcome 8 .....	38
4.8.1 Overview .....	38
4.8.2 Relevance .....	39
4.8.3 Effectiveness .....	39
4.8.4 Efficiency .....	40
4.8.5 Sustainability .....	40
5. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	40
5.1 Conclusions .....	41
5.2 Lessons Learned .....	41
5.3 Recommendations .....	42
ANNEXES .....	44

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the RC, a.i. Mr. El-Mostafa Benlamlih, and the new RC, Ms. Marta Ruedas for their guidance. I would like to also thank those members of the UNCT who found time to meet and share their perspective with me.

I am especially thankful to Ms. Astrid Marschatz, Head, UN Resident Coordinator's Office, for her strong support to me throughout this assignment. Special thanks are due also to other members of the RC Office, Mohamed Mutasim and Bahaeldin Taha for their cooperation and support. I would like to thank Ms. Amani Atef from the RC Office for administering my contract.

I would like to also thank the PMT and its chair, Mr. Wael Al-Ashhab, who met with me at the start of this evaluation, provided guideline and met with me to discuss and comment on my preliminary findings.

My gratitude also extends to members of the Outcome Groups and the Monitoring and Evaluation Group for their availability and all other interviewees from the government of Sudan and the donor community in Khartoum. Special thanks are extended to Mr. Jorg Kuhnel, UNDP Team Leader, Oversight and Support Division, who was generous in his support.

I hope that my contribution will be useful to my UN colleagues and their partners in Sudan.

Most Sincerely,  
**EIBalla Hagona**  
**UNDAF Evaluation Consultant**



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation focuses on the Sudan United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2013-2016. The UNDAF was developed as a result of a comprehensive and inclusive consultative process involving the Government and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). This process, which started in September 2011, was aided with an internal mid-term review of achievements during the UNDAF of 2009-2012. A roadmap for the new UNDAF process was formulated, as was a calendar for consultations. A formal launch of the UNDAF preparation process occurred in January 2012, followed by a 3-day UNDAF programming principles training workshop. This process identified the four UNDAF pillars, viz., (i) Poverty Reduction, Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods; (ii) Basic Services; (iii) Governance and Rule of Law; and (iv) Social Cohesion, Peace Consolidation and Peace Dividends. Within these priority areas, crosscutting issues of protection, gender, environment and climate change, emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR), and HIV/AIDS were present. The UNDAF outcomes and areas of intervention under each of the four pillars were agreed upon at a strategic prioritization exercise (SPE) in March 2012. A validation workshop in June 2012 marked the final milestone before the UNDAF was signed later that month.

The UNDAF recognized the interface between humanitarian and development engagement and that in the complex environment of Sudan, where these stages often overlapped, neither could be fully realized without acknowledging the other. The UNDAF further argued that achieving a smooth transition to recovery and longer term development thus represented the cornerstone for the UNDAF, while continuing to support principles of responsible humanitarian planning. Encouraged by the prospects for peace in Darfur promised by the endorsement of the Darfur Development Strategy in April 2013 by the government and the international community, the Government of Sudan (GoS) advocated with and appealed to its international development partners in the donor community and the UN to support this positive development by shifting their attention from emergency towards recovery and long-term development cooperation. The government wanted that the current UNDAF to mark this shift from complete donor focus on humanitarian assistance to recovery and development. However, the positive trends did not last long and the situation in Darfur became highly volatile and the violent conflict broke out. In the face of this, donors maintained that, with the widespread demand for humanitarian assistance, the situation in Sudan was not ready and conditions were not conducive for full development cooperation. And consequently, the donors continued their focus and kept their funding priorities on humanitarian aid.

Sudan represented a complex environment where political, economic and multiple overlapping and localized conflicts continued to determine how successfully and equitably an integrated and development agenda could be implemented. There were specific implementation challenges and constraints linked to insecurity and difficult access in conflict areas of Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei, general low levels of institutional and staff capacities at federal and state levels, unfulfilled financial and non-financial commitments, bureaucratic and security restrictions on the mobility of development personnel, various kinds of data-related deficiencies, etc., that caused delays, did not facilitate the reduction of transaction costs as well as constrained both the efficiency and effectiveness of UN development interventions.

The effect of the absence of effective coordination and leadership from the UNCT deprived the UNDAF from maintaining both its life after signature and the continued buy-in from and partnership of the Government.

However and notwithstanding the above, the UN System provided a wide range of expertise to strengthen the capacities of federal and state level institutions as well as communities and individuals. The UN assistance has strengthened governance, justice and rule of law, has increased

access of the poor and other vulnerable groups, in particular in conflict areas, to quality basic services and sustainable livelihoods. The UN assistance was also instrumental in raising awareness, strengthening the effectiveness of institutions and communities to adapt to the risks of climate change and environmental degradation. However and although these UN intervention were relevant to and well aligned with the UNDAF Outcomes, the evaluation encountered great difficulty to find evidence that they were attributable to a common UN approach promoted by the UNDAF. Likewise, assessing the effectiveness of the current UNDAF as well as measuring the development results generated by participating agencies toward achieving the UNDAF Outcomes proved to be a complex task. The major reason for these noted difficulties was the lack of results focus in this UNDAF. And the lack of results focus was that there wasn't enough demand for information about UNDAF performance. There were a number of weaknesses in the UNDAF results matrix which rendered it a static and not a live tool used to collect results information. These were identified as:

- Outcomes were too broad;
- The above weakness caused the results chain to have poor internal logic;
- Poor use and monitoring of risks and assumptions.

The UNDAF M&E system was weak. The mandatory M&E plan was developed but was not kept up-to-date. The M&E Group in Sudan should be credited for supporting the OGs in fulfilling their role of collecting results information piecemeal from agencies and transforming it into usable results information about the UNDAF. The RC coordination office also played a role in this process. In addition to the above weaknesses in the UNDAF M&E system, many agencies have monitoring and evaluation frameworks parallel with the UNDAF M&E plan. As in many countries, some agency RBM systems do not focus on UNDAF results, but the focus is primarily on agency's programme to organizational priorities. It was for all of the above RBM and M&E-related issues that the UNCT was not able to generate a coherent and usable picture of UNDAF performance, and the evaluation concludes that the UNDAF monitoring was the weakest component.

After applying the 4-parameter evaluation criteria, the UNDAF was found to have partially achieved what it set out to do. Although genuinely measuring its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, given the limitations of the process as noted in the document, proved very difficult and challenging indeed. At the same time, it became apparent that much more could be done to strengthen all these elements in the next UNDAF (2017-2021). In addition, while all interviewees, from all parties, said they believe the UNDAF should be "strategic," there appeared to be a need for more coherence on what a "strategic UNDAF" would actually look like. The key lesson is that there is a need to rethink how to use the UNDAF in the next cycle before designing it.

The evaluation identified lessons learned from the current UNDAF experience and made recommendations for improving the implementation of the current as well as for informing and shaping the design of the next UNDAF. The UNCT has already started internal discussions on the next UNDAF (2017-2021) and the RCO initiated preliminary contacts with the object to involve the Government and a broader set of national stakeholders in the consultations from the start; a step in the right direction.

# **1. INTRODUCTION**

This Evaluation Report of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2013-2016 for Sudan was prepared at the request of the UN Country Team (UNCT). The exercise was organized during the penultimate year of the UNDAF so that its "lessons learned" and recommendations contribute both to improving the UNDAF's performance during the remainder of the cycle as well as inform and shape the country's next UNDAF. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation is available in Annex 1.

The evaluation was carried out by one consultant and was conducted in a consultative manner engaging a broad range of stakeholders from the UN System (UNS), Government of Sudan (GoS) and the donors.

The evaluation was conducted in strict compliance with the UN Development Group (UNDG) guidelines on the UNDAF, as well as the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidance on evaluations, in particular UNDAF evaluations.

The report was written to provide accountability and learning to the UN System as well as be responsive to the needs and priorities of the Sudan. It is envisioned that the main users of the UNDAF evaluation will be the UNCT and the UN partners including the GoS, development partners and civil society organizations (CSOs).

## **1.1 Background**

The Sudan UNDAF was signed by the UNCT and GoS in 2012 as the framework for development partnership between the United Nations (UN) and Sudan for the period 2013-2016. It outlines the UN contribution in support of the GoS in achieving its national priorities as articulated in the Five-Year National Development Plan (NDP) 2012-2016. The UNDAF also reflects the aspirations of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as the broader Millennium Declaration, and Sudan's initiatives in this regard.

The UNDAF design process started in January 2012. The UNDAF priorities were based on a Country Analysis (CA) carried out in February 2012. The formal launch of the process was followed by a 3-day UNDAF programming principles training workshop in February 2012. The two events, building on high-level discussions between the UNS and the Government on overall development directions, resulted in identifying the four priority areas "pillars" for the 2013-2016 UNDAF. A strategic prioritization exercise (SPE) was organized in March 2012 where the UNDAF outcomes and areas of intervention under each of the four pillars were agreed upon through substantive deliberations by a range of stakeholders, including the Government, regional institutions, donors, national and international non-governmental organizations, and key United Nations staff. Further agreement was reached thereafter on indicators and other elements of the UNDAF Results and Resources Framework (RRF). A validation workshop in June 2012 marked the final milestone before signature of the UNDAF later that month. In late 2014, the UNDAF Outcome Groups, in collaboration with the UNDAF M&E Group, developed inter-agency work plans for each of the outcomes to help operationalize the UNDAF results matrix. These work plans contain outputs linked to each of the UNDAF outcomes and output-level indicators, as well as identification of agency accountability for the output(s).

The UNDAF 2013-2016 is divided into four pillars: (i) Poverty Reduction, Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods; (ii) Basic Services; (iii) Governance and Rule of Law; and (iv) Social Cohesion,

Peace Consolidation and Peace Dividends. These areas are directly supportive of the primary objectives of the NDP 2012-2016 as well as the MDGs and Millennium Declaration. According to the preliminary distribution of planned resources in the UNDAF RRF, the Basic Services Pillar was allocated 60% of the UNDAF estimated budget, followed by Poverty, Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods (21%), Governance and Rule of Law receiving 10%, and Social Cohesion, Peace Consolidation and Peace Dividends (9%).

The UN resident agencies implementing development programmes in the Sudan and operating under the Resident Coordinator System are FAO, IFAD, UN-Habitat, UN Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNOPS, UNV, WFP, WHO. IOM as a non-UN Agency UNCT member is also represented in Sudan. Non-resident UN agencies active in Sudan include IAEA and ILO. The UNCT has a range of coordinating mechanisms to facilitate the implementation of the UNDAF under the eight outcomes in the four UNDAF pillars. The Programme Management Team (PMT) is the key coordinating body for the UN's development programming activities. It facilitates coordination around the UNDAF and is supported by mechanisms that include the Outcome Groups (OG) (one for each of the UNDAF outcomes), UN cross-cutting thematic groups (e.g. on HIV/AIDS and on gender) and the UNDAF Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Group, which provides technical support on M&E issues.

## **1.2 Objectives**

The overall purpose of the evaluation as defined in the ToR is twofold: (i) to generate evidence of UN cooperation towards national priorities and lessons learned; and (ii) to support greater accountability of the UNCT to UNDAF stakeholders. The specific objectives of the evaluation are:

1. To assess the extent to which UNDAF results have been achieved, with what level of efficiency and sustainability, and to analyze the extent to which these results have made a worthwhile contribution to national development priorities and achievement of the MDGs;
2. To identify the factors that have affected the UNCT's contribution, explaining why performance is as it is; and
3. To generate lessons and identify best practices and provide actionable recommendations for improving the UNCT's contribution as well as feed into the design of the next UNDAF cycle.

## **1.3 Scope and Methodology**

The UNDAF period to be covered by the evaluation is 2013 to mid-2015<sup>1</sup>. The contribution of UNCT to development results was assessed according to a standard set of evaluation criteria used across UNDAF evaluations: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The scope of the evaluation includes examining the five UN programming principles (human rights-based approach, gender equality, environmental sustainability, results-based management and capacity development), overall strategies and outcome/output specific strategies included in the UNDAF itself.

The methodology for the evaluation combined a process of desk review of the reports, surveys, mid-term progress, assessment and evaluation reports of UN agencies, as well as interviews, focus group discussions with the M&E Group, Outcome Groups, the UN Gender Theme Group, and three UN agency representatives and their programme staff. The data collection process began with a comprehensive desk review of several background documents and reports at the initial phase.

---

<sup>1</sup> ToR for the UNDAF evaluation

However, during the main phase, the evaluation drew on a variety of data collection methods, which included further desk review conducted over a period of two weeks focusing on:

- UNDAF planning documents, UNDAF progress reviews by UN agencies and national partners, strategy papers, national plans and policies, and related programmes and projects documents
- Reviewing the inputs from key stakeholders including government counterparts, donor community members, UNCT and implementing partners
- Questionnaires and interviews with UNDAF Outcome Groups, UNDAF Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Group and UN Task Forces. The framework for interview questions, issues for discussion with OGs and issues for discussion with M&E Group are attached as Annex 2.

The preliminary evaluation findings and results were presented to and discussed with the PMT.

## **1.4 Limitations**

The evaluation encountered some difficulties in its conduct related to a number of factors. Because of the high staff turn-over since the UNDAF was developed in 2012, many of those involved in the process had moved. Nevertheless, the consultant was able to establish contact with a few of the staff with institutional memory. Another limitation was that the mandatory annual reviews of the UNDAF had not been conducted, thus depriving this evaluation from useful learning and valuable information on the performance and results of UN work. The limited availability of data on UNDAF results as well as on resource mobilization efforts for the UNDAF derailed the evaluation process for a considerable length of time.

## **2. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT**

The development of the UNDAF 2013-2016 occurred during a turbulent period in the history of Sudan; its planning was only one year after the cessation of South Sudan in 2011. The NDP 2012-2016, the 3-Year Salvation Economic Programme 2011-2013, the I-PRSP, and the Quarter Century National Strategy 2007-2031, guided the formulation of the UNDAF as well as the definition of its priorities. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which ended the conflict between the North and the South and led to the independence of South Sudan did not end the war in either country. The secession of South Sudan strained Sudan with the drastic reduction in cross-border oil flow which resulted in a huge fiscal shock. Sudan responded to these developments with a vision for economic recovery in the short term, for economic diversification in the medium term and for more equitable opportunities to all Sudanese. In addition, longstanding disputes remain in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and areas bordering South Sudan (such as Abyei), which cause to drain resources away from development and essential services.

### **2.1 Political**

Following the presidential elections in 2015, the political scent in Sudan is dominated by the revival of the President's initiative for National Dialogue. A new date has been set to launch the full-scale National Dialogue between the ruling party, National Congress Party (NCP) and its armed and unarmed political opposition in October 2015. The National Dialogue will address issues of war, peace, national identity and the economic and political situation in the country as an inclusive process for all political parties and rebel groups. Also and despite the current stalemate in the negotiations, a new date has been announced for a new round of peace talks between the GoS and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) to settle their armed conflict in South

Kordofan and Blue Nile, under the mediation of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHLIP).

## 2.2 Economic Developments

Over a decade-long of economic sanctions on Sudan has inflicted a toll on the nation's economy and hampered its ability to service both domestic and external borrowing requirements as well as limited private sector growth and investment. Compounding this was the secession of South Sudan, which induced multiple economic shocks, including the most important and immediate which was the loss of the oil revenue which accounted for over half of government revenues and 95% of exports. However, since the shock of the secession of South Sudan and the loss of oil revenues, Sudan economic growth has gradually recovered, averaging 3.5 per cent in 2013-14 and projected at 3.1 per cent and 3.7 per cent in 2015 and 2016, respectively.<sup>2</sup> Inflation was 37.7% in 2014.<sup>3</sup>

The fiscal retrenchment put a heavy strain on spending on public social services. The share of social spending in the budget is low, at 3.6% in 2014, and is expected to drop to 2.8% in 2015.<sup>4</sup>

Recognizing the importance of agriculture and livestock and their contribution of approximately 35 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), they were assigned priority in the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and the Five-year Program for Economic Reforms approved by parliament in December 2014.

Sudan remains a highly indebted country. At the end of 2013, Sudan's external debt stood at \$45.1 billion in nominal terms, about 85% of which was in arrears. On the other hand, the protracted economic sanctions have had impact on the aid environment in Sudan, hindering direct financial disbursements to key Ministries within the Government of Sudan. Statistics on development assistance suggest a fluctuating and general downward trajectory on funding for Sudan. As the table shows, net official development assistance (ODA) declined from \$1,099 in 2011 to \$975 million in 2012. But, in 2013, net ODA picked up and increased by 19.3 per cent over the amount in 2012. The table further highlights that while the overall decrease in ODA for Africa between 2011 and 2012 was much lower than that for Sudan, the increase for Sudan in 2013 (19.3%) was more than double the increase in ODA for Africa (8.7%).

Figure1: Trend in Net ODA, 2011-2013 in US Millions<sup>5</sup>

<b>ODA Net Disbursement USD Millions</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Sudan</b>	1099	975	1,163
<b>Africa-wide</b>	51,728	51,343	55,793

According to UNOCHA statistics, funding for the humanitarian assistance in Sudan was also hit by the decline in ODA.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> African Economic Outlook, Sudan 2015, (Suwareh Darbo, Principal Country Economist and Officer-in- Charge, Sudan Field Office, AfDB Report), accessed through the internet.

<sup>3</sup> ibid

<sup>4</sup> ibid

<sup>5</sup> World Bank Secretariat Estimates.

<sup>6</sup> OCHA Sudan Website ([www.unocha.org/sudan/humanitarian-financing](http://www.unocha.org/sudan/humanitarian-financing))

## 2.3 Poverty and Social Developments

Sudan has deep and wide swaths of poverty and stark inequality between regions. Poverty estimates set the average rate of poverty incidence at 46.5% (2009 National Baseline Household Survey), indicating that some 15 million people are poor. Within this, however, the disparities are striking and poverty incidence numbers mask significant regional disparities. Notable discrepancies exist between settled and nomadic populations who constitute 9% of Sudan's population and 14% of its poor. Poverty in urban areas (especially Khartoum) is significantly lower than rural areas, which account for 60% of the country's population and 80% of its poor. Meanwhile, poverty incidence in North Darfur is approximately three times that of Khartoum and more than twice that of the River Nile State.

Gender-based disparities are also substantial with Sudan scoring very low in global measures of gender gaps and female empowerment. Severe gender gaps exist across a range of sectors, with rural areas faring worse than urban. In education, however, whereas the gender parity rate for primary school was 0.98 in 2014, the same index for secondary school was 1.07<sup>7</sup>.

Human development indicators remain low and Sudan ranks at 166 out of 187 countries in the 2014 UNDP Human Development Index. Prospects for Sudan meeting the MDGs by 2015 are also bleak as is its progress compared to the achievements of some of its neighbors as well as the Sub-Saharan average. However, according to health indicator data through 2010, Sudan made progress towards the MDGs. The under-5 mortality declined between 2000 and 2014 from 104 to 68 for every 1000 live births, with an Average Annual Rate of Reduction (AARR) of 2 per cent. The Average Annual Rate of Reduction (AARR) for maternal mortality ratio (MMR) was 3 per cent between 1990 and 2010 which led to a 60 per cent reduction in MMR. Between states, however significant disparities persist.<sup>8</sup> Other relevant indicators include: only 42.8 per cent of children were fully immunized in 2014; and nearly 28% of deliveries in Sudan took place in a health facility in 2014. As regarding water, in 2014 the percentage of household population using an improved source of drinking water was 78.3 per cent in urban areas compared to 63.5 per cent in rural areas.<sup>9</sup>

The primary school net attendance ratio increased from 72% in 2010 to 76% in 2014.<sup>10</sup> The 2012 Education Status Report notes the compounding negative impact of poverty, rural-urban disparities, and gender; poor girls living in rural areas are among the least likely to access educational opportunities. Indicators for nomadic and displaced populations are also poor.

The main determinants of poverty in Sudan include:<sup>11</sup>

- Sustained and multiple conflicts, which undermine opportunities for economic and social development, which in turn feeds longstanding grievances driving fresh conflict
- A dependence on oil which has resulted in the neglect of agriculture and livestock sectors as well as alternative sources of energy
- The unequal distribution of fiscal resources and access to natural resources, especially between the center and the periphery, and
- Governance failures as reflected in poor policy credibility and implementation as well as inadequate incentives for private sector investment and participation.

---

<sup>7</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), UNICEF Sudan. 2014, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 of fieldwork, Key Findings. Khartoum, Sudan: UNICEF and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)

<sup>8</sup> Government of Sudan - UNICEF 2014 Mid-Term Review Report

<sup>9</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), UNICEF Sudan. 2014, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 of fieldwork, Key Findings. Khartoum, Sudan: UNICEF and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)

<sup>10</sup> *ibid*

<sup>11</sup> Government of Sudan - UNICEF 2014 Mid-Term Review Report

### **3. UNDAF EVALUATION FINDINGS**

#### **3.1 General Observations on UNDAF Formulation and Implementation**

The UNDAF formulation process was deemed to be inclusive. The participatory discussions leading to the formulation of UNDAF outcomes were launched with representatives of Government agencies. Interviewees from the government recalled their active substantive participation and expressed satisfaction as they were able to participate on equal footing with their UN counterparts. There were, however, some noted challenges during the formulation process that affected its results:

- The two main interlocutors in the UNDAF, UN and government, did not ensure that staff with the appropriate level of responsibility and substantive knowledge were present throughout the various phases of the UNDAF formulation process. It was remarked that even from within the UN agencies the level of seniority of participants displayed considerable variability, which as noted by some of the interviewees influenced the formulation of the outcomes in line with the mandates of the larger agencies, which "imposed their will".
- It was emphasized by one interviewee from the government that the UN should support and persuade the government to ensure the participation of its most relevant officials in the UNDAF process. The interviewee added that the UNDAF formulation process should not be lengthy to ensure the continued participation of senior staff from government.

Following conclusion of UNDAF formulation in June 2012, the Darfur Development Strategy was endorsed in April 2013 by the government and the international community. This positive development created a feeling of hope and optimism about peace in Darfur and led the government of Sudan to call on its international development partners to shift their attention and focus from humanitarian to recovery and long-term development. However, the peaceful times did not last long as in late 2013 and early 2014, the situation in Darfur became highly volatile and the violent conflict broke out. In the face of this, donors maintained that, the situation in Sudan was not yet ready for such a shift. And in view of the renewed widespread demand for humanitarian assistance, donors continued with their old focus and support for humanitarian aid. The decision of donors to continue to prioritize humanitarian assistance dealt a big blow to the government's efforts trying to persuade the donors to shift their focus and funding toward recovery and development cooperation. It also sent a negative signal to the UNCT that only a small portion of, if any, donor funding would be available for the UNDAF (2013-2016). The force of these circumstances frustrated the UNCT's leadership role and support for the UNDAF and with continued declining advocacy for the UNDAF, the government's interest in and ownership for it waned until with the passage of time disappeared.

It was remarked by one of the interviewees from government who participated in the UNDAF formulation that the consultation on the UNDAF evaluation was the first time he heard about the UNDAF since the UNDAF was signed in 2012. It felt like that the UNDAF was for the UN only. This pointed to an unfulfilled need for increased attention by UN agencies to dedicated communication and advocacy around the UNDAF as well as for the UNDAF annual review.

In terms of content, a number of interviewees felt that eight outcomes were many. And by trying to include everything the UN could potentially contribute, the UNDAF was not being strategic and not focussed. The UNDAF also established a detailed RRF based on the eight outcomes, which contained relevant indicators, baselines, means of verification, targets, and assumptions and risks for



outcomes. Available and estimated resources have also been clearly identified for each result. However, there was no evidence that the RRF underwent a thorough revision during the two-and-half years to make it more RBM compliant.

The UN partnership with CBS made possible the disaggregation of national data by sex along gender and other categories. The UN agencies should capitalize on this and improve the disaggregation of indicators in the UNDAF.

## 3.2 UNDAF Coordination

Although the evaluation does not doubt nor question the commitment of the RC and UNCT to UNDAF coordination as well as their accountability for UNDAF results, the evaluation encountered evidence of lapse in the performance of these functions in respect of the Sudan UNDAF (2013-2016). Coordination around the UNDAF after its launch is essentially done around the preparation of the annual review, which was never conducted during the first two years as a result of UNCT decision. According to the UNDAF guidelines, "the annual review process is where the UNCT primarily engages with government and other partners to review overall progress towards results, and takes stock of lessons and best practices that feed into the annual planning processes and commitments for the coming year".<sup>12</sup> This is a once-a-year opportunity for all agencies and national partners to interact and review the collective contribution of the UN to national priorities based on the UNDAF. Organization of the annual UNDAF reviews would have realized the High Level Steering Committee stipulated in page 3 of the UNDAF document. Based on evidence gathered from individual interviews with UN staff, government and donors as well as from focused group discussions, it was evident that the UNDAF document did not continue as a living document for long after its signature in June 2012. This meant that there was no regular and effective coordination with the government.

As regarding the UNDAF coordination structures below the UNCT, in theory, they were relatively well-established, with eight OGs supporting the UNDAF outcomes. There was also the M&E Group which provides technical support on M&E issues. However, theme groups corresponding to crosscutting issues included in the UNDAF were not all established. For example, the GTG was established and became functional only recently; the Theme Group on HIV/AIDS was established at two levels (UN Theme Group at UNCT level and Joint Team on AIDS); and the UN Communications Working Group was only recently established. But, on the other hand, there were no theme groups yet for the remaining crosscutting issues, viz., protection, environment and climate change, emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR).

In practice, however, these coordination structures, in particular the OGs and the M&E Group, derived their functionality from the UNDAF and with the UNDAF losing life and vigour, the structures, particularly the OGs, declined in activity. The OGs did not succeed in attracting their full membership and did not operate effectively. Several of these OGs struggled to find their own rationale or to come up with a comprehensive working agenda. In the end, OGs' committed membership was significantly reduced to a maximum of 3-4, their functionality became occasional and the responsibility for workload fell on just a few of the dedicated members.

In regards to the M&E Group, its performance was relatively better than the OGs. Although the Group maintained its membership and was holding occasional meetings, it had not been successful in generating results information and in reporting on UNDAF performance to the UNCT on regular basis. It should be pointed out that the M&E Group was part of a system that wasn't functioning. However, once this evaluation was launched, the Group responded positively. It succeeded in

---

<sup>12</sup> Standard Operational Format and Guidelines for Reporting Progress on the UNDAF, UNDG, January 2010

mobilizing its membership, which proved adequately trained and equipped as well as motivated. That mobilization generated sufficient interest among the agencies toward the UNDAF that did not exist before.

The major reason for lack of results-focus in this UNDAF was that there wasn't enough demand for information about UNDAF performance. Because if there was demand for UNDAF results from within the UNS or from outside (government), that demand would have caused UNDAF results to be tracked and reported to the UNCT. The UNDAF annual reviews have a clear results focus<sup>13</sup> and hence if annual UNDAF reviews were conducted that would have caused a regular flow of UNDAF results information to the UNCT and national stakeholders. There were a number of weaknesses in the UNDAF results matrix which rendered it a static and not a live tool used to collect results information. These were identified as:

- Outcomes were too broad;
- The above weakness caused both the results chain to have poor internal logic and indicators that did not help to measure whether results were being achieved and which led to changes in indicators by UN agencies without sufficient consultative process;
- Poor use and monitoring of risks and assumptions.

The UNDAF M&E system was weak. The mandatory M&E plan was developed but was not kept up-to-date. Annex C to the UNDAF document was an M&E calendar which forms part of the M&E plan and contained all monitoring, reviews, evaluations and surveys planned by the UN agencies for all purposes and not necessarily relevant to the UNDAF. The UNDAF M&E Plan should include the set of monitoring, evaluations, reviews and surveys that are only linked and relevant to the UNDAF, and should be adjusted annually in accordance with the findings and conclusions of the UNDAF annual reviews.<sup>14</sup> The M&E Group in Sudan should at least be credited for supporting the OGs in fulfilling their role of collecting results information piecemeal from agencies and transform it into usable results information about the UNDAF. The RC's office also played a role in this process. In addition to the above weaknesses in the UNDAF M&E system, many agencies have monitoring and evaluation frameworks parallel with the UNDAF M&E plan. As in many countries, some agency RBM systems do not focus on UNDAF results, but the focus is primarily on generating results on agency's programme to fulfil corporate and organizational priorities. Although agencies report annual on their programme results to their headquarters, they did not report on UNDAF results to the UNCT during the first two years of the UNDAF cycle.

It was for all of the above RBM and M&E-related issues, that the UNCT was not able to generate a coherent and usable picture of UNDAF performance, and the evaluation concludes that the UNDAF results monitoring and reporting was the weakest component.

As for the international development partners (donors), the interviews indicated that UNDAF (2013-2016) played no role whatsoever in their relations with the UNS.

### **3.3 Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability of UNDAF to National Development Priorities**

While the UNDAF recognized the interface between humanitarian and development engagement and underlined the importance of transitioning Sudan towards recovery and longer-term

---

<sup>13</sup> Results Based Management at Country Level: systemic issues that prevent good UNDAF results and the use of UNDAF results information. A paper presented to the working group on programming policies, by Alexander Mackenzie, Consultant

<sup>14</sup> UNDG, Guidelines for UNDAF annual Review, UNDG, 2007

development, it was not successful in translating that into concrete actions. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) existed as a parallel framework, whose funding and implementation were executed separately without any connection to the UNDAF. However, on the ground, and especially in the conflict areas, the activities supported by both frameworks existed side-by-side without any attempt to integrate or coordinate among them. Integrating them or ensuring their mutual reinforcement would have enhanced the objectives of stabilization and sustainability. At a different level, the persistence of humanitarian assistance as the main priority for donor funding diverted attention away from the UNDAF, causing the UNDAF to remain largely “on the shelf” in terms of implementation, with a limited sense of mutual accountability between the Government and the UNCT for UNDAF development results.

### **3.3.1 Relevance**

The evaluation followed the UNDG guidelines on the UNDAF as well as the UNEG guidance on evaluations in its analysis of the UNDAF Outcome Results. It relied primarily on the national planning documents, viz., the NDP (2012-2016), I-PRSP, the National Quarter Century 2007-2031 Strategy, and also used the 2012 CA as the benchmark for addressing the underlying causes of problems identified to determine progress made. The synchronization and harmonization of the UNDAF to the NDP and the I-PRSP firmly ensured its relevance to the national development priorities. The UNDAF objectives were relevant to the needs and priorities of Sudan and found to be well aligned with the development priorities in the NDP (2012-2016), as well as with the priorities of key sectoral plans and strategies in Sudan. Interviews with government and UN agency staff revealed a high level of satisfaction on UNDAF relevance with Sudan national priorities.

### **3.3.2 Effectiveness**

UNDAF’s effectiveness was measured by the extent to which the UNCT contributed to, or is likely to contribute to, the outcomes defined in the UNDAF. Assessing the effectiveness and impact of the current UNDAF has proven to be a complex task because of the poor functioning of the UNDAF M&E system. The UN in Sudan has had difficulty fully operationalizing its UNDAF M&E framework, both due to the complexity of the work to manage for UNDAF results as well as available resources to carry it out. Data on UNDAF results was limited and its quality was poor. In addition, the outcome indicators were subjected to changes without engagement of national stakeholders in the process. The evaluation did not find evidence that the process of changing outcome indicators involved all agencies participating in the outcome. As noted under Section 3.2 above, OGs were not fully operational to assess the output results reported by individual agencies, especially for shared outputs, for their relevance to the respective outcome. This casts doubt on indicators’ ability to capture the improvements brought about under the outcome statements as well as to whether the output level results reported by individual agencies to be considered toward outcome level results are indeed relevant.

The missed opportunities in the UNDAF effectiveness included the inability of the UNDAF (2013-2016) to ensure a coherent overall programming framework and its failure to serve as a guiding framework for the different programmes to be undertaken by the UN agencies in the country.

However, one could not simply discard the contributions and support made by the UNDAF to the government national priorities as defined in the NDP and various sectoral plans and strategies. The analysis provided in the next section provides a snapshot of the contribution of development results as reported by the UN agencies and OGs under the various outcomes. The rather modest performance of the UNDAF was caused by the interplay of many factors: some internal to the UNDAF and others were external. The internal could be summed up in the failure to fully

operationalizing the UNDAF to its fullest potential. On the other hand, the external range from the inability of the UNCT to ensure strong engagement, ownership and leadership from the government due to the annual review processes not being carried out, to the change in donor funding priorities.

The modest performance of the UNDAF coordination mechanisms cannot be over-emphasized. It played a major role in the limited effectiveness of the current UNDAF. The performance of coordination mechanisms, in particular, the OGs and M&E Group requires both attention and action. The roles of both the OGs and M&E Group requires significant further strengthening to enable the next UNDAF to be adequately evaluated according to the prescribed guidelines.

Moreover, the coordination mechanisms that normally would have provided monitoring oversight for the UNDAF (UNDAF Outcome Groups) have been described as particularly weak and also largely did not involve national partners at all. Moreover, agencies did not undertake a systematic review of their respective contributions to the UNDAF, which further limited monitoring and reporting on implementation.

### **3.3.3 Efficiency**

~~The analysis of the outcome~~ results for efficiency show that while both government and UN staff, alike, see the added-value of UN coordination through UNDAF, more work continues to be required to bring the UN to its expected level of efficiency in an UNDAF environment. As it was demonstrated in many countries, potentially, the UNDAF was a viable mechanism for reducing duplication, increasing value for money, and obtaining efficiency gains as a result of working more closely together between agencies and with government. However, the Sudan UNDAF (2013-2016) was not fully operationalized and hence missed the opportunity to test whether any of these benefits could be achieved. The future, however, promises better prospects for the efficiency of joint UN action in Sudan. The UNCT Operations Management Team (OMT) in Sudan has started to develop a common business operations strategy to be linked to the UNDAF that is expected to become operational in 2016. According to one interviewee, member of the OMT, the UNCT Operations Management Team in Sudan, stated that the OMT is committed to carry out some of the benefits that could accrue from greater harmonization.

### **3.3.4 Sustainability**

It could be argued that as the current UNDAF (2013-2016) will not be completed until the end of next year, it is premature to offer a final assessment of its sustainability. Moreover, in some areas, such as governance, social cohesion and peace consolidation, there may be results which have not yet been fully achieved and which will only be evident over a longer term. On the other hand, the sustainability of outcome-related UN interventions was addressed in the next section.

The UN made many contributions to building national capacities almost in all outcome areas as well as upstream institutional development, which could further contribute to as well as enhance the sustainability of interventions from donors and the government.

In conclusion, the weak national ownership of the UNDAF is the biggest threat to the sustainability of its results. The achievement as well as the sustainability of UNDAF results depend critically on the commitment and actions of stakeholders, as well as results to be achieved by government and partners outside the UNDAF. Unfortunately, the UNDAF did not establish viable links with these sources of other developmental results to assure the sustainability of its results.

The above analysis explained the factors that affected the UNDAF contribution and constrained the degree of success with which the UNDAF performed of some of its assumed roles, as a guiding programming framework for the UN, a fund raising document, a strategic framework for positioning of the UNS in the country. Had the annual UNDAF reviews been conducted for 2013 and 2014, the evaluation would have found sufficient and credible assessment of the UNDAF performance in these functional areas as well as on the UNDAF contribution towards national development priorities. The annual review process would have engaged the government and made possible a high level consultation with the government and other partners to interact and review the collective contribution of the UN to national priorities based on the UNDAF. However, in the absence of this global picture, the evaluation would present in the next section the UNDAF achievements at the outcome-level based on the results information reported by the UN agencies.

## **4. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME RESULTS**

Obviously, the assessment of the Outcomes was not less easy than that of the UNDAF due to the constraints discussed in section 3.2 above. The same constraints prevailed and limited the flow and reporting of UNDAF related results from the agencies. Also the fact that no annual UNDAF review was conducted in the first two years of the UNDAF cycle provide a disincentive for the M&E Group and the OGs and discouraged them from preparing the assessment reports by outcome area, describing the progress made towards the UNDAF outcome and key UN's contributions.<sup>15</sup>

The evaluation did not find evidence that agencies were generating sufficient data on their output level results toward UNDAF outcomes. This could only be interpreted to mean that was a general low or no demand for UNDAF results. And by extension, the lack of reporting prior to this evaluation is evidence of the absence of demand for UNDAF results by the UNCT. The results matrix when extended to the outcome WPs suffered even more problems, viz., the changing of outcome indicators as well as targets without the necessary consultative process with national partners, etc. These issues featured in the presentation by the evaluator to the PMT meeting on 8 September. They were acknowledged and the evaluator mentioned that the evaluation did not find evidence to suggest that the changes had any accountability implications, but rather justified on other reasons.

Therefore, the figures on the progress achieved towards the UNDAF outcomes, provided in the tables and as could be interpreted from the figures in section 4.9 below, should be taken with great caution. The methodology used to compute the percentage progress for each outcome was an average of the progress for each of the indicators under each outcome for which data (i.e. baseline, target and intermediate values) were reported.

### **4.1 Outcome 1**

"People in Sudan with special attention to youth, women and population in need, have improved opportunities for decent work and sustainable livelihoods and are better protected from external shocks, thereby reducing poverty".

#### **4.1.1 Overview**

The 18 UN agencies that signed the UNDAF Results and Resources Framework (RRF in June 2012) as participating agencies to this outcome decreased to only six (UNIDO, FAO, ILO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT and UNOPS) committed to the outcome WP which was developed in 2014; which could partially explain the low level of mobilized resources as compared to the initial plan. The estimated resource

---

<sup>15</sup> Standard Operational Format and Guidelines for Reporting Progress in the UNDAF, UNDG, January 2010.

requirement for the outcome in the RRF was US\$159.0 M or 17% of the total volume of required resources for the UNDAF. However, as of mid-2015, the actual resources mobilized by those agencies who provided information was only US\$36.9M or about 23% of the RRF figure for the outcome. The Outcome Group was constituted a year after the UNDAF was signed and its functionality was unsatisfactory with few poorly attended meetings that served only to share information, and not for substantive discussions for coordination, or proposing joint programmes or for planning resource mobilization for outcome-supported activities. The OG did not update the results matrix for the outcome nor used it as an M&E plan for joint monitoring and reporting with programme partners.

The UN agencies supported the outcome by six outputs identified in the outcome WP developed by the Outcome Group (OG) as follows: (i) Livelihoods recovery supported through sustainable solutions, community natural resources management and income generating with specific focus on vulnerable communities to overcome poverty and food insecurity; (ii) Technical and vocational education and training systems (TVETS) are developed and implemented; (iii) Agencies for investment and business development identified and promoted; (iv) Support to capacity development for pro-poor policy making provided; (v) National strategy for statistical development roll out supported to inform development planning and monitoring; and (vi) Reform initiatives for land tenure implemented, addressing key identified issues.

The results and progress achieved by the UN agencies included: support to the government's continued provision of direct cash transfers to one million extremely poor families through established safety nets in 2014 as well as the facilitation of access by 490,000 poor clients to microfinance from the Central Bank's Microfinance Unit. The support was in the form of technical assistance and complementary developmental downstream interventions for self-employment creation opportunities for women and vulnerable groups; creating employment and alternative livelihoods through new production techniques, product diversification, value chain and access to finance and markets in Khartoum, Eastern Sudan, South Kordofan and Darfur. The majority of UN interventions under this outcome were evaluated and they were expected to have positive contribution to and impact, albeit limited, on national priorities related to economic diversification, employment and livelihoods for youth and women in the areas where they were implemented. On the other hand, the development of policies and guidelines on technical and vocational training, micro and small enterprise development and the comprehensive capacity needs assessment for vocational training centres in 12 states would lead to the development of an enabling environment for the creation of employment opportunities and livelihoods initiatives in those states.

#### **4.1.2 Relevance**

The GoS gave priority in its NDP (2012-2015) and the I-PRSP to overall poverty reduction, reduced unemployment, especially among youth, revitalization of agricultural and industry; strengthening of the private sector, and combating environmental degradation, the impacts of climate change, and the risks of natural and manmade disasters.

The UNDAF outcome statement in the UNDAF RRF and as further detailed at the output level in the Outcome WP put emphasis on poverty reduction, generation of employment and livelihoods as well as support to the new drive for the revival of agriculture as a key factor in realizing food security and essential component to Sudan's economic diversification. The relevance of the outcome to the national priorities of the government is thus evident.

### **4.1.3 Effectiveness**

Overall, the UN System had been moderately successful in its results toward the outcome. According to interviews with the participating agencies, this was largely due to the inadequacy of resources and the constraints in implementation. With regard to the employment in Sudan, the situation in 2014 has not improved as evidenced by the regression in unemployment rates for two of the three categories (youth, women) and for men it remained at the baseline level. However, access to microcredit services and alternative livelihood opportunities improved significantly. The UN System provided technical assistance and complementary developmental downstream interventions to the government's efforts for the provision of direct cash transfers to one million extremely poor families through established safety nets in 2014 as well as to the facilitation of access by 490,000 poor clients to microfinance from the Central Bank's Microfinance Unit. The purpose was the creation of self-employment opportunities for women and vulnerable groups, in particular youth. The development of a national employment framework was an important result which together with the roadmap towards a National Employment Strategy would help to raise the issue of employment to the top of GoS' policy agenda. The preparation of baseline studies on youth, labour demand and training institutes contributed to further institutional and capacity strengthening of the Ministry of Labour. Likewise, the collaborative effort of agencies in support of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in the implementation of the National Strategy for Development of Statistics (NSDS) was considered a strategic intervention that would, inter alia, strengthen the capacities for MDGs planning and monitoring as well as for the whole process of employment policy making. Furthermore, the UN cooperation assisted the formulation of 4 states and 14 sectoral strategic plans for the development of statistics. The Capacity Development for Aid Management and Coordination in the MoFNE would strengthen the development of Sudan Aid Information Database (SAID) as well as lead to harmonize SAID with Aid M&E.

On the basis of results information provided by the participating agencies in the outcome and using the methodology explained in the last paragraph under section 4.0 above, the estimated progress towards 2016 target for this outcome was 45 per cent. This is was based on agencies reporting on only 54 per cent of the indicators under the outcome.

### **4.1.4 Efficiency**

Difficulties of implementation in Sudan were a major efficiency constraint as they could cause delays and cost overruns. The general low levels of local technical and managerial competence also caused efficiency concerns. The independent evaluation of one of the major projects under this outcome (The Integrated Food security in Kassaka, Sudan) assessed the efficiency of the project as moderate and largely due to the complicated management structure of the project. The evaluation was of the opinion that project efficiency and delivery could have been better had there been an effective results-based management system in place from the outset.

Also, the low level of funding mobilized for the outcome by mid-2015 (less than 25 per cent of the required funding estimated in the RRF) has limited the scale of development results achieved as well as threatened the sustainability of achieved results.

### **4.1.5 Sustainability**

Based on the review of evaluation, mid-term and annual progress documents of UN supported programmes and projects under the outcome as well as interviews with the Outcome Group and agency representatives, the prospects for sustaining and up-scaling the achieved results are low given the declining donor support and the institutional capacity at the state and locality levels. The

independent evaluations noted the weak entrepreneurial capacity within all the groups targeted for business development and job creation. Youth, women and rural communities in various states have been trained in certain skills, and they have been provided with productive tools, equipment and infrastructure support. However, the necessary policy and institutional frameworks to provide technical and non-technical support to maintain as well as promote them is lacking. Most beneficiaries and national partners of employment and livelihoods related projects at the states level are heavily dependent on the external support provided through the UN supported interventions and they are not prepared to manage or expand these initiatives by themselves. Beneficiaries have not been linked to micro-finance and hence the financial sustainability of these initiatives is questionable.

## 4.2 Outcome 2

"Populations vulnerable to environmental risks and climate change become more resilient and relevant institutions are more effective in the sustainable management of natural resources".

### 4.2.1 Overview

At the design and signature of the UNDAF ten UN agencies signed in as participating agencies to this outcome. However, when the OG was formed and became functional in 2014 four agencies dropped and two new joined. The final eight agencies that committed to the Outcome Work Plan (WP) were UNEP, UNDP, WFP, UNIDO, FAO, UN-HABITAT, WHO and UNOPS. The estimated resource requirement for the outcome in the RRF was US\$43.90 or 4.7 % of the total volume of resources required for the UNDAF. However, as of mid-2015, the amount of actual resources mobilized by those agencies who provided information was US\$30.1M or about 69% of the RRF figure for the outcome. The functionality of the OG as a group was unsatisfactory, but the strong commitment of a few of its members and the national counterparts to the implemented programmes and projects helped the good resource mobilization efforts and achievements in development results.

The outcome was supported by four outputs identified in the WP as follows: (i) Federal and state level strategies and frameworks developed that improve natural resource management; (ii) Household resilience against natural shocks strengthened through improved natural resource management skills; (iii) Alternative/renewable/environmentally sound technology adopted on different levels; (iv) State, federal and community institutions with improved capacity to deliver sustainable management of natural resources.

The key achievements by the UN agencies supported programmes and projects under this outcome could be grouped under the following five major areas corresponding to the above listed outputs: (i) environment policy; (ii) environment mainstreaming; (iii) integrated water resources management; (iv) community environment management; and (v) livelihoods. Under these output/result groups, the UN achievements included: the development of the National Action Plan (NAP) on Climate Change (CC), and the government's preparation for the United Nations Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP)-19 meeting, which witnessed Sudan elected as head of the African group for 2014-2015. The UN supported programmes also achieved some success in the integration of CC and participatory environmental governance related issues in a number of new federal and state level government policies and strategies, such as NAP, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), and the Darfur Peace Process and its documentation. Also, the UN supported Sudan to draft its National Appropriate Mitigations Action Framework (NAMA).<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Sudan Integrated Environment Programme (SIEP) Project Completion Review Report 2014



The UN played a key role in ensuring the integration of climate change and environmental governance related issues into relevant Darfur peace processes and documentation. For example, following the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in 2011, UNEP chaired the Natural Resource Management group in the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission which resulted in natural resource management and pastoralist /livestock issues being recognized as key issues in the Darfur Development Strategy.

The implementation of projects designed under output 3 concerning alternative and renewable energy is yet to be initiated.

#### **4.2.2 Relevance**

Weather and climate-related natural hazards, including recurrent floods in 2013 and 2014, and desertification are having negative impact on the agricultural sector and people's livelihoods. The ongoing economic reform and the government's drive for economic diversification placed a central role for the agricultural and livestock sectors. These directions and their related development goals were given due priority in its NDP (2012-2015) and the I-PRSP as well as in the Five-Year Program for Economic Reforms approved by parliament in December 2014. Hence, outcome 2 and its related outputs supported by the UN agencies were a direct response to these national development priorities of the government.

#### **4.2.3 Effectiveness**

The UN System interventions had a substantial positive climate and environmental impact. They contributed to ensuring greater understanding of and attention to climate and environmental issues as well as the relationship between population dynamics and environmental degradation. The results in the environment policy area focused around climate change issues: the draft National Adaptation Plan completed and accepted by the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Physical Development (MEFPD); the revised Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)+ Preparedness Plan submitted to the FCFP in Lima and approved; UN technical support and training to Sudan delegation to the UNFCCC meetings in Bonn. Several climate change negotiation trainings were conducted prior to this meeting. The UN supported Integrated Environment Programme assisted the government's Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) in revising its institutional structure, as well as providing technical assistance in professionalising the service division. Study tour to Kenya and Tanzania organized for officials from Western Darfur who upon return organized for seminars to promote their learning on planning and policy for sustainable land management in drylands. With UN support, Sudan submitted its 5th National Biodiversity Report to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and was finalizing its national Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan. Sudan also initiated the preparation of its Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy (DRRS).

UN had raised awareness and understanding of IWRM and the approach was formally adopted by the Federal Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources and applied in Wadi El Ku in Darfur. At the downstream level, the UN also supported thousands of remote and marginalized people in diverse socio-economic and ecological conditions to benefit from adaptation to CC and increased climate resilience through improved natural resources management and agricultural practices and technologies. Another area of significant results was integrated water resources management (IWRM) where over 50 groundwater sites were monitored across Darfur and training and technical assistance were provided on groundwater monitoring and the development of a national water resource database. Under community environment management, documentation of best practices and lessons learned on sustainable forest management by communities and farmers was promoted.

Also resilience of communities and ecosystems for CC was enhanced by some projects in water and agriculture sector with impressive results of increased sorghum yield by 150% in areas in Gedarf, North Kordofan, South Darfur and River Nile.

However, it was assessed that not all processes initiated have led to actual changes in or adaptation of new policies and strategies. This is influenced by weak and under-resourced institutional set up of environmental institutions and the inadequate reinforcement capacity of environmental legislation.

The progress achieved against the selected outcome indicators as reported by individual agencies and the OG reached 78%. This was based on reporting by the participating agencies on 86% of the outcome indicators. Hence, at the current rate the UN is going to meet its targets against this UNDAF outcome by 2016.

#### **4.2.4 Efficiency**

Some of the programmes under this outcome suffered longer start-up times than anticipated. Also their original timeframes were overly ambitious not fully anticipating the operational constraints in the conflict region of Darfur, where a number of the projects were implemented. The design of some of these initiatives underestimated the scale up needed for the UN supported projects to forge strong and effective partnerships at state level. Delays in recruitment and implement caused failure of the drought mitigation infrastructure component of one project. On the other hand, most of the upstream work of the UN with the MEFPD and HCENR in Khartoum was saved from these challenges and these projects were implemented with high degree of efficiency.

#### **4.2.5 Sustainability**

The broader impact of the programmes and projects under the Outcome has been to raise awareness and build capacity around integrated approaches to environmental governance in Sudan. It was stated by the UN agencies as well as noted in a number of evaluations and reviews that the programmes and projects addressing upstream policy issues were nationally driven from the outset and prepared through a largely scientific and participatory process.<sup>17</sup>

### **4.3 Outcome 3**

"Government and stakeholders have evidence-based policies, strategic plans and mechanisms to ensure an enabling environment for improved basic services"

#### **4.3.1 Overview**

The County Analysis (CA) stated that many essential services have almost ground to a halt in parts of Sudan, while in others they are more well-developed, with significant disparities between regions and between rural and urban areas. Not only has chronic insecurity constrained efforts to restart provision of the basics of modern life in some areas – drinking water, sanitation, electricity, education and health care – but capacities to revive these services also continue to be far from sufficient<sup>18</sup>.

Yet quality services remain key priorities and require strong further improvement, given their centrality to national reconciliation and development; only then will achievement of the MDGs be

---

<sup>17</sup> UNEP Project Completion Review 2014, Sudan Integrated Environment Programme

<sup>18</sup> Sudan 2012 Country Analysis

within reach. Issues of equity and inclusion, participation and empowerment, services delivery suited to local needs and contexts (e.g., for nomadic communities) and protection of human security and human rights are particularly critical with regard to Sudan's essential services. "People in Sudan frequently lack the information and awareness needed to make informed choices and claim their rights"<sup>19</sup>.

The major bottlenecks in different basic services sectors, viz., Health - Nutrition ; Basic Education; WASH; and Housing, focused on inadequate enabling environment lacking effective legislation, policies and strategies. In addition, institutional set up, leadership and coordination in the sectors are weak as well as inadequate financial and human resource capacities.

The UNDAF assigned outcome 3 to address the above noted deficits in the social services sectors at the upstream level of policies and strategies. Nine agencies signed in the RFF as participating agencies to the outcome, and the same nine remained committed to contribute to the outcome WP that was formulated in 2014. The number of outcome indicators increased from three in the RRF to five in the WP. The outputs pursued by participating UN agencies toward Outcome 3 as outlined in the WP were: (i) Health system is strengthened and evidence-based policies and strategic plans for health and nutrition are revised/developed and operationalized (ii) Education line Ministry capacity enhanced and evidence-based policies and strategic plans for education are revised/developed and operationalized; (iii) By 2016, the WASH sector capacity is enhanced and appropriate technology options are available to support a substantial increase in WASH public investment and scaling up of WASH coverage for the poorest and under-served population in Sudan; (iv) HIV/AIDS multi-sector coordination enhanced and evidence-based policies and strategic plans for HIV/AIDS are revised/developed and operationalized; (v) Pilot integrated urban planning and land management for improved housing are developed. The updated figures on resources mobilized by the OG were not made available and hence it was not possible to draw any conclusions on the resource mobilization capacity and success of the OG.

It is clear from the above, that the UN's interventions focused on policy guidance, formulation of national and sectoral strategies and plans, institutional strengthening and capacity building, which were the same targets embedded in the outcome statement and correspond to the national priorities elaborated in the NDP (2012-2016) and the I-PRSP.

#### **4.3.2 Relevance**

The 2012 I-PRSP took the MDGs as the medium-term development targets for Sudan. Consequently, the UNDAF and the relevant UN agencies CPD, CPAPs and other programming instruments incorporated various MDG targets as part of their objectives for Sudan. Most of the MDG goals were relevant to outcome 3 and hence were incorporated in the UNDAF RRF as relevant targets under this outcome.

Based on what was mentioned in the overview, the statements of Outcome 3 and the five outputs outlined in the WP addressed the key issues and underlying causes identified in the various planning documents of the Government.

#### **4.3.3 Effectiveness**

In pursuit of the targets set in the outcome, the UN agencies jointly and individually played significant roles in contributing to improvements in the legislative environment and in access to services, focusing on the poor and underserved segments of the population. These improvements

---

<sup>19</sup> *ibid*

can be seen for example in strengthened legislative environment in a number of sectors. The following key policies and strategies were approved with technical assistance and facilitation from the UN agencies: (i) National Health Sector Strategic Plan (2013-2016); (ii) National Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS; (iii) National Elimination Mother to Child Transmission (EMTCT) Plan; (iv) Education Sector Policy and 18 Education Sector Strategic Plans drafted for 18 states; (v) National Youth Strategic Plan (2012-2016); (vi) National and State WASH Strategic Plans (2012-2016); and (vii) A Nutrition Investment Case and Policy Paper was elaborated. The Maternal and Child Health (MCH) acceleration plan (2013-2015) was also developed to improve service delivery at the community level. Significant progress was made on accelerating the approval of WASH National Policy. Sudan signed the local compact with partners in 2014 as part of their commitment to the International Health Partnership and Aid Effectiveness. The UN agencies also contributed to strengthening evidence-based policy and decision making environment in Sudan through supporting the CBS in the Simple Spatial Survey Method (S3M) and MICS surveys. In terms of human resource capacity building, UN agencies, in cooperation with other partners, trained 13,000 village midwives. Also, the UN supported the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MoYS) in the creation of multi-sectoral federal and state level Coordination and Technical Committees with key governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as youth representation. These committees have become a forum to discuss young people's priorities, advocate for their rights, share experiences and knowledge, and coordinate activities. In support of strengthening capacity around the Child Act, the UN, in cooperation with the Judiciary, organized four High Court Discussion Forums to address the concern expressed by the Committee for the Rights of the Child at the lack of consistency in Sudanese legislation and practice with regard to the definition of the child.<sup>20</sup> Also, Family and Child Protection Units (FCPU) were established in 18 states with UN agencies' support, for the provision of child-centered and gender sensitive justice and social welfare services. The UN also supported strengthening education sub-sector strategies on children with disabilities, nomadic children, girls, as well as a strategy on school construction to mainstream Child Friendly Schools (CFS).

The progress achieved against the indicators under this outcome as reported by individual agencies and the OG reached 90%, based on 84% of indicators reported on. This high rate of progress suggests that at the current rate the UN is going to achieve its targets against UNDAF outcome 3 by 2016.

#### **4.3.4 Efficiency**

The challenge to review the question of efficiency of the outcome, in line with the ToR, was that the evaluation was not provided with any documents or reports on the implementation of UN programmes and projects supported by UN agencies, in order to understand the link between uses of resources and the outputs or outcome produced. The other aspect relates to the development of systems to efficiently monitor and track progress.

#### **4.3.5 Sustainability**

The results achieved and emerging strategies from the sectors of basic services pointed to an increasing prominence of community level engagement across areas of intervention. This is particularly true in the case of the government's bold step towards a national programme for WASH with the development of the WASH Strategic Plan (2012-2016) at national level and states, with technical support from the UN. The strategic plan outlined the key results to be achieved and the main strategies, activities and budget required to the results. An important provision was the stipulation sharing between government (50%), communities (30%) and donors (20%) of the cost of delivering WASH services. In the case of health, the sustainable utilization of the policies and plans

---

<sup>20</sup> Government of Sudan - UNICEF 2014 Mid-Term Review Report

developed with UN support would depend on easing the limitations in terms of infrastructure at state and locality levels, budget, human resources, logistics, etc.

## 4.4 Outcome 4

"People in Sudan, with special emphasis on populations in need, have access to equitable and sustainable quality basic services"

### 4.4.1 Overview

Human development indicators remain low and Sudan ranks at 166 out of 187 countries in the 2014 UNDP Human Development Index. Prospects for Sudan meeting MDGs by 2015 are bleak.

Showing how far the country needs to progress to achieve the MDGs, a total of 68% percent of Sudan's population had access to improved drinking water in 2014<sup>21</sup>, with a target of 82 percent for 2015; 33 percent had access to improved sanitation in 2014<sup>22</sup>, with a target of 67 percent in 2015. The prevalence of child malnutrition is high, at more than twice the 2015 target of 15 percent. The proportion of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption stood at 28 percent, again twice the 2015 target. Maternal mortality is still alarmingly high, even as under-5 mortality has declined. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) prioritized education as a key factor in addressing the root causes of poverty and tribal conflict. The primary school net attendance ratio in 2014 was 76% (up from 72% in 2010),<sup>23</sup> with regional disparities ranging from 96% in Northern State to 54% in Central Darfur.

Outcome 4 was designed to address the above noted deficits in basic social services and contribute to the corresponding national priorities elaborated in the NDP for 2013-2016 and the I-PRSP. In addition to the five indicators selected for the Outcomes in the UNDAF RRF, seven were added, bringing the number of indicators in the Outcome WP to twelve. The number of participating agencies to Outcome 4 dropped from twelve signed in the UNDAF RRF to 8 in the WP. The updated figures on resources mobilized by the OG were not made available, and hence it was not possible to draw any conclusions on the resource mobilization capacity and success of the OG.

However, fifteen outputs grouped under the following five sectoral areas were defined in the outcome WP. These were: (i) Access to Health-Nutrition Services (7 outputs: Health facilities established/rehabilitated/upgraded and capacity strengthened; By 2016, Women and children have access to PHC services that include IMCI services, malaria control and diseases prevention quality information services; By 2016, Women in underserved and needy areas have improved access to maternal and new born health {MNCH}; Increased availability of high quality information services for Family Planning & HIV prevention specially for adolescents, underserved population and people in special needs; By 2015, the most disadvantaged children, especially boys and girls living in poverty, benefit from improved coverage of preventive nutrition services; Strengthened national capacity for surveillance and timely responses to communicable diseases; Increased demand for Family Planning, HIV/AIDS, MNCH information and services utilization); (ii) Improved Access to Basic Education (3 outputs: Out of school children {6-13 years} reduced by 50% by 2016: Curriculum for nomadic Education and ALP updated and revised, by 2016; Environment Friendly school construction designed and standardized, approved and used); (iii) Improved Access to WASH Services (one output: By 2016, Families living in rural and peri-urban communities with high rates of malnutrition,

---

<sup>21</sup> CBS and UNICEF, MICS 2014.

<sup>22</sup> CBS and UNICEF, MICS 2014.

<sup>23</sup> Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), UNICEF Sudan. 2014, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 of fieldwork, Key Findings. Khartoum, Sudan: UNICEF and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)

AWD/Cholera and other water-related diseases have improved access to cost effective, gender sensitive and environment friendly WASH services and practice proper hygiene behaviour); (iv) Improved Access to Housing and Administrative Services (one output: Access to pro-poor housing and administrative services is increased) and (v) Improved Access to Humanitarian Responses (3 outputs: By 2016, Families of IDPs, returnees and host communities affected by emergencies and or natural and man-made disasters have increased access to sustainable gender sensitive and environment friendly WASH services and practice proper water, sanitation and hygiene behavior; Government and key humanitarian partners respond in timely manner to health emergencies; By 2015, timely required nutrition treatment and prevention interventions reach women, girls and boys living in emergency situations, and the coverage of good quality treatment for severe acute malnutrition is increased). It is noteworthy the integration of the humanitarian response into the WP for the UNDAF Outcome 4.

This outcome was implemented by a large number of agencies and through the medium of a very broad WP which included 15 outputs grouped under 5 sectoral components. The synchronization of UN assistance into a cohesive and coordinated approach was constrained.

#### **4.4.2 Relevance**

Based on what was mentioned in the overview, the outcome statement and the wide range of outputs (a total of 15) outlined in the WP, it is clear that the outcome addressed the key issues and underlying causes relating to basic services identified in the NDP, I-PRSP and CA. The common rationale of issues addressed throughout the outcome was governed by the challenge to ensure the progress of service-related MDGs and to restore the national development goals in the social sectors. According to this rationale, the sectors of health - nutrition services; basic education; WASH; Housing; and humanitarian responses were selected as priorities.

#### **4.4.3 Effectiveness**

Improved access to equitable and sustainable quality basic services in Sudan has seen some progress, as reported by the participating UN agencies in Outcome 4.

In the health sector, only modest progress was made towards the MDGs. The under-5 mortality declined between 2000 and 2014 from 104 to 68 for every 1000 live births<sup>24</sup>.

In the WASH sector, the trend in improved water and sanitation indicates that Sudan will miss the MDG targets for the sector and will require substantial efforts and significant annual investments to achieve targets. In nutrition, Sudan has one of the highest levels of malnutrition in the world in terms of global acute malnutrition at the under-5 level. In education, primary school net attendance has increased from 72% in 2010 to 76% in 2014.<sup>25</sup>

The thematic distribution of activities between agencies shows a clear separation of responsibilities and follows clearly the specific mandates of the different agencies.

Assessing the progress achieved against the selected outcome indicators is challenging. The progress achieved against the indicators under this outcome as reported by individual agencies and the OG reached 36 per cent. This was based on reporting against 71% of the outcome indicators. Similar to what happened in other OGs, there had been no systematic monitoring and reporting of UNDAF results by the participating agencies in Outcome 4. Also as noted above, the formulation of outcome

---

<sup>24</sup> CBS and UNICEF, "Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 – Key Findings", April 2015.

<sup>25</sup> CBS and UNICEF, "Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 – Facts and Figures", September 2015.

was so broad and consisted of so many components that it made monitoring and reporting on results a complex task. It has also proven extremely difficult to extract results attributable to a common UN approach. But, with this rate of progress at this point, the UN is not likely to meet its targets against this UNDAF outcome.

#### 4.4.4 Efficiency

The UN participating agencies reported that field-level coordination was more harmonized and contributed to enhanced efficiency of programmes implementation. Also at the field-level, agencies made increased use of national NGOs which contributed to effective delivery of services on the ground. It is, however, noted that the limited number of international NGOs as well as the limited capacity of many of the national NGOs constituted a bottleneck for service delivery and capacity building.

#### 4.4.5 Sustainability

The results achieved and emerging strategies from the sectors of basic services pointed to an increasing prominence of community-level engagement across areas of intervention. On the other hand, the government's full commitment in terms of implementing and financing the developed strategies and plans has been hindered by budgetary pressures and political delays. The UN has provided support to develop an investment case for nutrition that has been used to leverage large partnerships of UN agencies (WFP, FAO and UNICEF) and DFID in fighting the high prevalence of wasting and stunting in Sudan. The UN has participated actively in collaboration with the World Bank to establish a national aid coordination framework led by the Ministry of Finance. Advocacy will be made in order to mobilize investment of government and donor and partners to fill the gap of funding for the remaining balance for this investment.

### 4.5 Outcome 5

"Governance institutions at all levels are strengthened to effectively plan, deliver and monitor their mandates, particularly **public services, in an equitable and accountable manner**"

#### 4.5.1 Overview

The CA stated that "Despite the efforts of Government and achievements in recent years, Sudan's governance context continues to be highly challenging. Governance remains characterized by a need for strengthened transparency and an acute shortage of qualified human and financial resources that can further propel social, democratic and economic reforms"<sup>26</sup>. The CA identified key governance-related challenges to include: increasing the Government's capacity to exert legitimate authority, rule by the law, ensure security, and protect the rights of all people; and strengthening the Government's capacity to perform its other core functions and to deliver services efficiently. Other problems comprised decentralization and local governance; corruption; and data limitations.

The process of decentralization, introduced in 1992, has exposed severe institutional weaknesses, human and physical capacity deficits. "Key constraints include, the weak technical and institutional capacities at all levels; limited funding at state and local levels to meet constitutionally assigned responsibilities; and the lack of real autonomy and participation of the population in local government. Critically, no mandated revenue-sharing allocation mechanism between the three

---

<sup>26</sup> Sudan Country Analysis, 2012, page 32

levels of Government is in place, and the federal Government decides annually how much goes to the states; in turn, the states then decide shares of localities."<sup>27</sup>

Outcome 5 was designed to address the above mentioned broad governance problems. Five indicators had been selected for this Outcome in the UNDAF RRF. However, the 5 indicators for the outcome in the RRF were dropped and replaced by 3 new ones in the WPs. The number of participating agencies to the outcome dropped from nine in the UNDAF RRF to four in the WP. The updated figures on resources mobilized by the OG were not made available, and hence it was not possible to draw any conclusions on the resource mobilization capacity and success of the OG. The OG was constituted a year after the UNDAF was signed and its functionality was unsatisfactory. There had been neither systematic monitoring nor reporting of UNDAF results by the agencies during 2013-2014. The Outcome WP incorporating agencies' supported outputs and their indicators were only developed in 2014-2015. Clearly, the lack of monitoring for UNDAF results by agencies implies that staff are not sufficiently aware of how what they are doing on a daily basis contributes to UNDAF results; which further points to the blurriness between agency programmes and projects and the UNDAF outcome.

The outputs pursued by UN agencies toward Outcome 5 as outlined in the WP were: (i) Intergovernmental, government institutions have adequate systems, frameworks and capacities to support decentralization (planning, budgeting, public expenditure management) for effective services delivery; (ii) Public and social accountability mechanisms established to increase transparency and effectiveness of public resources use, service delivery and oversight functions for recovery and development; and (iii) Constitutional review processes and oversight mechanisms and systems to broaden participation of citizens in political processes including legislative institutions, media and CSOs.

It is clear from the above that the UN assisted outputs addressed the targets expressed in the outcome statement

#### **4.5.2 Relevance**

The proposed areas of intervention and the programmatic initiatives supported by the UN participating agencies toward Outcome 5 are linked to the outcome statement and relevant to the governance challenges identified in the government's NDP, I-PRSP and the CA. By and large, the projects and programmes, as observed in the various evaluation and review reports, were aligned to the government sectoral priorities. For example, the independent evaluation of the Local Governance Development and Public Expenditure Management (LGDPEM) noted that the project was highly relevant for accelerating progress towards MDGs. The project was implemented in Eastern Sudan which had some of the worst social indicators in Sudan. The evaluation concluded that since the provision of basic services was a local government function, the project therefore contributed to accelerating progress towards the MDGs, which are among the core of Government national priorities.

#### **4.5.3 Effectiveness**

Based on the above, while the general trend regarding the outcome is showing positive change, the outcome is not expected to be fully met by the end of the UNDAF period.

The work plan (WP) for the outcome was only developed recently. Although it relates well to the areas of interventions identified in the UNDAF RRF, the scope and scale of UN supported outputs

---

<sup>27</sup> *ibid*



linked to Outcome 5 in the WP have shrunk from that stipulated in the UNDAF. The public expenditure management instruments developed at state level, together with strengthened planning capacity, contributed to improved delivery of public services in North Darfur and Eastern Sudan. Also government efforts to improve community participation in local development planning and public hearing processes received capacity building support from the UN agencies both for government institutions and civil society organizations. This resulted in rapid impact of civil society participation in drafting state and locality plans and the drafting and analysis of public budgets.<sup>28</sup> It was noted that one of the greatest strengths of the UN is its participatory and inclusive approach to development. UN agencies facilitated a participatory inclusive approach to planning and decision-making. However, despite these reported improvements, the level of capacities in state and local level governments for planning, budgeting and monitoring of public services remains overall low in Sudan.<sup>29</sup> Three factors are responsible for the insufficient capacities: weak political will to establish a comprehensive framework for decentralization and review fiscal transfers and the national revenue management system; decreasing flow of resources to the state level due to the deterioration in the economic situation in the country since 2013; and only limited resources committed by international partners to the development of local government structures.

The results information for UNDAF was not being generated systematically and the generation and reporting of outcome results by individual agencies and the OG started only recently. According to data collected by agencies against outcome indicators and the outcome WP output indicators, the estimated progress towards UNDAF targets was only 21%; and this was calculated on the basis of reporting on 83% of indicators under this outcome. Hence, clearly and at this rate of progress, the UN is not likely to meet its targets against this outcome by 2016.

#### **4.5.4 Efficiency**

The challenges in resource mobilization experienced by all agencies caused delayed commencements as well as restricted both the magnitude and scale of supported activities. This had implications on the sustainability of achieved results. While National Implementation Modality (NIM) was probably not feasible due to the limited capacities at state level, the use of the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) in some of the interventions within this outcome was considered not consistent with the principles of national ownership and capacity building.

#### **4.5.5 Sustainability**

The UN agencies explained that they addressed sustainability of the results under Outcomes 5 through integrating in the design of programmes and projects direct engagement of the communities in the preparatory phase and strong partnerships during the implementation, thus cultivating a sense of ownership among the stakeholders. However, there are some concerns regarding financial sustainability, since many of the achieved results require future support and follow-up activities. UN agencies have limited core resources to cover these needs and rely heavily on government and external funding which have been in short supply during the period of this UNDAF.

### **4.6 Outcome 6**

"People in Sudan are protected under an enabling environment that guarantees rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms".

---

<sup>28</sup> Local Governance Development and Public Expenditure Management Evaluation Report 2013

<sup>29</sup> UNDP 2014 ROAR

#### 4.6.1 Overview

The CA argued that a functioning system of governance cannot exist without a judicial system able to enforce law and resolve disputes equitably and consistently. Some advances have been made in promoting accountable, accessible justice sector institutions, through capacity development and advisory support to critical rule of law institutions. Nevertheless, much more remains to be done.

Overall, awareness of the right to justice remained very low, necessitating further support to adoption of public policies addressing access to justice for the poor and marginalized. The 2012 CA reported that only 43 percent of people were aware how to access Government justice systems, with only 16 percent indicating high confidence in fair treatment if they are arrested or file a complaint with local law and order institutions<sup>30</sup>.

It was also noted that Sudan included related human rights provisions in its constitutional and legal framework, including creation of the Advisory Council on Human Rights and the proposed Human Rights Commission. Nevertheless, the CA found that in 2012 the human rights situation in Sudan was highly challenged.<sup>31</sup>

The situation with gender equality, women's rights, and related issues of combating Gender Based Violence (GBV) and tackling Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), has seen both progress and regression in Sudan.

Outcome 6 was designed to address the above mentioned governance issues of rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Three indicators had been selected for this outcome in the UNDAF RRF. However, while the number remained at three, but the indicators were changed in the WP. The number of participating agencies to the Outcome dropped from seven in the UNDAF RRF to three in the WP. The updated figures on resources mobilized by the OG were not made available, and hence it was not possible to draw any conclusions on the resource mobilization capacity and success of the OG.

Three outputs related to Outcome 6 were defined in the WP. These were: (i) Justice institutions, including customary and traditional justice and security systems at state/local levels are strengthened to provide effective, equitable and timely justice/protection services in line with international standards; (ii) Availability of legal aid facilities to needy populations to strengthen protection of basic rights and equal access to justice for all; and (iii) Regulatory framework and mechanisms for addressing Violence Against Women (VAW) established, judiciary and traditional leadership.

The three outputs in the outcome WP are well aligned with the above noted priority issues of rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. These interventions strengthened the capacities of individuals and institutions so that they could participate in decision-making processes. While these results were not exclusively attributable to the UN, the influence of its cooperation was acknowledged by independent evaluators and assessed as significant to present an important basis for future interventions.

---

<sup>31</sup> UN Country Team in Sudan, "Sudan Country Analysis", 2012, page 35

#### 4.6.2 Relevance

The proposed areas of intervention and the programmatic initiatives supported by the UN agencies toward Outcome 6 appear to be relevant and well aligned to address the governance challenges of rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms articulated in the NDP (2012-2016), identified in the CA and embodied in the outcome statement.

#### 4.6.3 Effectiveness

Outcome 6 has had achievements in some areas and close to none in others. Available data against indicators under this outcome generated by UNDP, the only reporting agency under this outcome, showed regression in some areas and slight progress in others. Confidence in rule of law institutions in Sudan has not increased in 2013-2014. Although mostly outside the UNDAF period, perception data showed a regression from its 2010 baseline of 46% to 39.1% in 2013. Results of interventions in the field of legal aid and access to justice included improvement of the mechanism for protection, mitigation and response to violations against human rights, in particular human rights violations affecting the most vulnerable. However, the utilization of the access to justice results is constrained by the high costs, complicated procedures for the illiterate and the long distance to locations of some offices. Other human rights (HR) and fundamental freedoms-related results include: establishment of the National Committee for Anti-Human Trafficking, and approval of the statute and structure of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Also, a detailed 10- Year National Action Plan for the Protection of Human Rights was endorsed by the government and a committee of legal experts was set up by the Ministry of Justice to study the necessary reforms for relevant laws.<sup>32</sup> At the policy level, the UN supported state governments in formulating the Sexual Offences and Gender Violence Bill (SOGV), the Children's Bill of Rights (CBR) and the Anti-Human Trafficking State Law (AHT). The SOGV bill proposes the creation of special courts. Presently the CBR has had an impressive impact advocating against the practice of child abuse in the states of Eastern Sudan.

However, it must be said that rule of law and access to justice constitute a minimal component within the NDP 2012-2016.<sup>33</sup> There are contextual and political challenges in pursuing judicial reforms.

The results information was not being generated systematically and the generation and reporting of outcome results by individual agencies and the OG started only recently. According to data collected by agencies against outcome indicators and the outcome WP output indicators, the estimated progress towards UNDAF targets was only 43%; and this was calculated on the basis of reporting on 100% of indicators. Considering this low rate of progress as well as other constraining factors related insufficient availability of resources for participating UN agencies and limited absorptive capacity of national counterparts for the types of activities supported under this outcome, the UN will struggle to meet its targets by 2016.

#### 4.6.4 Efficiency

The efficiency of UN assisted intervention appear to have suffered from a number of factors that existed in the operating environment. The interventions were implemented at the national and state levels.

Collaboration with the counterparts at state level proved challenging at first, due to the centralized nature of the GoS and the perceived need for confidentiality.<sup>34</sup> This, coupled with a very high

---

<sup>32</sup> Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of Human Rights in Sudan 2013

<sup>33</sup> 2nd Five Year - Year Plan 2012-2016 (the Governance and Management Sector section of chapter two)

turnover of national counterparts at the state level caused a number of project deliverables to be delayed.

UN partners (CBOs and I/NGOs) faced considerable difficulties in implementing activities within IDPs and refugee camps. For instance, paralegal groups faced many restrictions while working, even where no other support was available to assist in handling disputes and resolving conflicts within communities.

The uncertainty over donor funding forced the UN agencies in this outcome to adopt a project-by-project approach, making it impossible to exploit the synergies that exist between projects, and resulting in additional costs and sub-optimal impact.

#### **4.6.5 Sustainability**

The access to justice and rule of law projects were delivered through partnerships with Sudan Judiciary, the Police, the Prison, Legal Administration of the Ministry of Justice, and civil society, which would enhance both the national ownership and sustainability.

However, as for the capacity-building of rule of law institutions, officials at the central level were satisfied with the support that their institutions had received, and felt there was ongoing improvements being made. But, on the other hand, officials at the state level felt that the resources allocated are insufficient for them to operate efficiently and effectively as well as sustain the gains from UN cooperation.

### **4.7 Outcome 7**

"Government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism are strengthened"

#### **4.7.1 Overview**

The GoS prioritized peace and social cohesion, peace consolidation, addressing root causes of conflict through national dialogue, supporting diversity and pluralism by overcoming tribal interests, equal citizenship and civic education, and strengthening civil society in conflict resolution, in the NDP 2012-2016. It further prioritized in the NDP 2012-2016, youth participation, cultural security to protect the national heritage, and building cultural bridges regionally and globally.<sup>35</sup>

Outcome 7 was designed to contribute to the achievement of the above national priorities through addressing components of social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism.

A total of three indicators had been selected for this outcome in the UNDAF RRF. The same indicators were retained without change in the outcome WP. The number of UN contributing agencies to Outcome 7 increased from ten that signed in the UNDAF RRF to 13 in the WP. The updated figures on resources mobilized by the OG were not made available and hence it was not possible to draw any conclusions on the resource mobilization capacity and success of the OG.

The outputs pursued by UN agencies toward Outcome 7 as outlined in the WP were: (i) Government and community-led peace-building initiatives supported to promote stability, inter-communal reconciliation and peace coexistence; and (ii) Community infrastructure and productive assets that

---

<sup>34</sup> Strategic Partnership, Phase II, Final Report, Governance and Rule of Law, UNDP

<sup>35</sup> Sudan UNDAF 2013-2016

sustain social stability, community security and resilience to crisis delivered. The UN interventions were intended to promote direct action that reduces and prevents the likelihood of violent conflict at the community level, as well as indirect action that would create an enabling environment for peace consolidation. The focus would also be on strengthening the infrastructure for peace, aiming at strengthening national processes, policies and institutions.

The outcome witnessed a number of joint programmes and partnerships between the UN agencies, UNAMID and donors.

#### **4.7.2 Relevance**

Sudan continued to be impacted by conflicts across Darfur, Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and tribal conflicts. Thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continue to reside in camps in Darfur. The GoS assigned high priority to ending these conflicts as well as simultaneously address the suffering of affected communities, and for this purpose sought support of international community. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) and the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) as well as donor support were applied toward this effort. From its part, the UN dedicated Outcome 7 in the current UNDAF (2013-2016) as its response to support the government and civil society in their efforts to promote social cohesion and peace consolidation in these conflict regions. The outcome statement and results pursued by the participating UN agencies revolved around the capacity of government, civil society and communities, and hence their relevance and alignment with government priorities to address the root causes of conflict articulated in the government's NDP (2012-2016) is evident.

#### **4.7.3 Effectiveness**

The progress toward peace and social cohesion was attributed to the upholding of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The contribution of UN interventions was also assessed to have proven effective in consolidating peace, social cohesion, and reconciliation. Records<sup>36</sup> showed decreased numbers of incidents in North and West Darfur in 2014. The UN also provided technical support to National institutions in developing joint DDR policies and strategies. Regular capacity development support was also provided to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SDDRC). The UN supported the development of a Darfur DDR and CSAC strategy which were endorsed as part of the National DDR Strategy. The UN also assisted the SDDRC in organizing over 30 consultative meetings with national and international around the full-fledged Darfur DDR programme.

According to data collected by agencies against the outcome and output indicators, the estimated progress towards UNDAF target for Outcome 7 was 51%. This was calculated on the basis of reporting on 57% of indicators. The OG was not fully functional and did not play any role in the development of the joint programmes that were designed and implemented by the UN agencies. The generation and reporting of results information for the UNDAF only began in late 2014. The overall development trend regarding this outcome is positive and the UN could meet its targets against this outcome by 2016.

#### **4.7.4 Efficiency**

The efficiency of the programmes implemented under this outcome suffered from a number of factors. The Transitional Solutions Initiatives (TSI) suffered from disagreements between the GoS and international partners caused by misconception that the TSI was promoting local integration of refugees, which resulted in its suspension. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme's efficiency was affected by inflation which reduced the material support

---

<sup>36</sup> End of Project Report 2010-2014 DDR Preparatory Support Project

delivered to the beneficiaries, but a special measure was applied which mitigated the negative impact and enabled delivering reintegration support – in a more reasonable quality and quantity – to ex-combatants. Delays in receiving travel authorizations from the HAC also caused delays in implementation. Also, the changes in senior management of the two national coordination bodies triggered delays and uncertainty in policy-making decisions.

#### **4.7.5 Sustainability**

Judging by the magnitude of resources, the UN System must have made a positive contribution to all peace processes in Darfur, Blue Nile and S. Kordofan, DDR programme, conflict prevention at community level through dialogue in many areas as well as to improved basic services and sustainable livelihoods at community level in the targeted areas of conflict. However, it should be pointed out that this massive effort was not all conceived, designed and implemented as part of the UNDAF. Furthermore, despite all these efforts, neither the stabilization and reintegration targets could be fully met nor could the results achieved on the ground last long due to the strong conflict dynamics, especially in Darfur.

### **4.8 Outcome 8**

"Peace Dividends are delivered for sustainable return, reintegration and recovery"

#### **4.8.1 Overview**

The population of IDPs and refugees in Sudan is estimated to be between 5 and 10 percent of the total population.<sup>37</sup> In addition to substantial populations of IDPs in Darfur and East Sudan, IDP camps also are found in Khartoum and its surroundings.

The UNDAF stated that the UNS will support an enabling cultural environment for community reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. Enhanced resources to support community cohesion in returnee and host/receiving communities will be advocated, while capacity development at state and local levels on human settlement planning will be complemented by support to affordable and environment-friendly construction technology.

Outcome 8 was designed to support evidence-based return, reintegration and recovery through delivering peace dividends to enhance these processes.

The three outcome indicators originally selected in the UNDAF RRF were retained without change in the outcome WP. The number of UN participating agencies in Outcome 8 increased from seven signed in the UNDAF RRF to nine in the WP. The updated figures on resources mobilized by the OG that were made available were incomplete and hence it was not possible to draw any conclusions on the resource mobilization capacity and success of the OG.

The outputs related to Outcome 8 were: (i) IDPs, refugees and their host communities have access to improved basic services and sustainable livelihoods; and (ii) Sustainable targeted socio-economic reintegration assistance to ex-combatants and selected community members, and social cohesion is accelerated.

The outcome attracted joint programming and partnerships between the UN agencies, UNAMID, donors and national stakeholders.

---

<sup>37</sup> IPRSP, op.cit.

#### **4.8.2 Relevance**

Outcome 8 is very much interlinked with Outcome 7. Whereas Outcome 7 focused on supporting the capacity of government and civil society in their peace-building initiatives, concentrated on supporting the peaceful return of ex-combatants, IDPs and refugees to their old or new communities and delivering a peace dividend to them and to their host communities. So as was said under Outcome 7, the statement of Outcome 8 and the programmes and projects designed by participating agencies were in direct response and support of the government priorities to address the root causes of conflict articulated in the government's NDP (2012-2016), DDPD and DDS.

The proposed areas of intervention are relevant to the key priorities for peace and social cohesion and the need to address the root causes of conflict. The SDDRC – was decreed by the GoS - to oversee the DDR and CSAC programme implementation. The SDDRC reports to the National DDR Coordination Council, with results reported directly to the Presidency. For these very reasons, the programme holds a distinctive position; national and international stakeholders participate in a partnership that saturates not only the federal level but also that of the state and community.

#### **4.8.3 Effectiveness**

These joint initiatives by participating UN agencies implemented activities and produced tangible results in the various areas of conflict in Sudan, viz., Eastern Sudan, Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. The results included: (i) individual economic reintegration ex-combatants in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur, where the UN played a vital role, especially in light of the ongoing conflict within Blue Nile state and South Kordofan state. Former fighters and – more recently – local community members through pilot projects, have been able to create viable livelihoods; decreasing their likelihood of rejoining or entering into conflict. The cumulative number ex-fighters who received reintegration support was 26,112 or approximately 72% of the 36,251 demobilized fighters (ii) social reintegration, stabilization resilience and CSAC initiatives in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur; wherein by providing CSAC projects which incorporate an infrastructure (hard component - both basic services and economic activities) and social (soft component), stabilization and community resiliency between former fighters and communities continued to be addressed. While the infrastructure (hard) component supports issues relating to: community security and resiliency, stability, livelihoods for unemployed youth, supporting communities to build community level committees to address the issues of social reintegration, small arms control, conflict prevention and resolution; social reintegration focuses on gender and addressing issues such as: violence against women, HIV/AIDS and reproductive health through innovative gender-sensitive tools and methodologies (iii) former fighters received reintegration support and host communities were provided with critical social, and economic infrastructure; and (iv) local integration of refugees and peace dividends delivered for sustainable return, reintegration and recovery. Capacities of SDDRC, regional/state level partners and NGOs to continue SDDRP implementation and monitoring. Programmes positively contributed to basic services, livelihoods and promotion of self-reliance livelihoods.

The UNDAF results information was not being generated systematically and the generation and reporting of outcome results by individual agencies and the OG started only recently.. According to data collected by agencies against outcome indicators and the Outcome WP output indicators, the estimated progress towards UNDAF targets was only 34%; and this was calculated on the basis of reporting on 56% of indicators. The low rate of progress was affected by both the limited availability of resources and the continuous revival of conflict and the concomitant operational constraints in those regions. Hence, achievement of UN targets against this outcome by 2016 is unlikely.


#### 4.8.4 Efficiency

Because Outcomes 7 and 8 overlap and often operate simultaneously in a mutually supportive and reinforcing fashion, their encountered the same efficiency challenges. For example, the Transitional Solutions Initiatives (TSI) supported both peace building and delivered dividends in the East. The programme suffered from disagreements between the GoS and international partners which resulted in its suspension. Likewise, the DDR programme's efficiency was affected by inflation which reduced the material support delivered to the beneficiaries. Constraints resulting from government regulations relating to travel authorizations restricted mobility caused delays in implementation.

#### 4.8.5 Sustainability

Partnerships with national stakeholders in the implementation of the DDR Programme were valued by donors. There has been a consistent and highly functioning partnership with NGOs, UN agencies and government partners in order to plan and implement high level programming. Additionally, MoUs with various state-level line ministries continue to be signed with UNDP for several CSAC projects in order to support the sustainability of interventions.

### Summary Figure



Note: The estimated progress towards 2016 targets is an average of the progress for each of the indicators under each outcome for which data (i.e. baseline, target and intermediate values) have been reported. These estimations are meant for illustrative purposes only and not as solid evidence on UN performance. These data should also be treated with caution due to the amount of missing values.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the report shows and based on the data presented on estimated outcome progress, at the current rate the UN is likely to achieve its targets against three of the eight outcomes (2, 3 and 7), marginally poised to achieve its targets against two outcomes (1 and 6) and is less likely to achieve its targets against the remaining three outcomes (4, 5 and 8). However, more than a year is still available for the RC and the UNCT to steer things around, strengthen the functioning of UNDAF coordination structures and the resource mobilization efforts to enhance the progress and achievement in the less performing outcome areas. For the successful renewal of efforts and energy in the remainder of UNDAF period, it is essential to regain the support of government and its ownership of the UNDAF.



## 5.1 Conclusions

As the report shows, the current UNDAF (2013-2016) did not succeed as a platform through which the UN could present as a coherent, unified entity for advocacy and outreach and for engagement with the GoS. Likewise, the UNDAF did not serve as a vehicle for the UN to leverage its comparative advantage as a convener between the GoS and donors in the mobilization of resources. One donor stated that he was visited by several UNCT members in the past two years, but did not recall a single time that UNDAF was mentioned or their cooperation and partnership was sought for its support. However, acting outside the framework of the UNDAF, the UN System provided a wide range of expertise to strengthen the capacities of federal and state level institutions as well as communities and individuals. The UN assistance has strengthened governance, justice and rule of law, has increased access of the poor and other vulnerable groups, in particular in conflict areas, to quality basic services and sustainable livelihoods. The UN assistance was also instrumental in raising awareness, strengthening the effectiveness of institutions and communities to adapt to the risks of climate change and environmental degradation. However, as noted above, assessing the effectiveness and impact of the current UNDAF has proven to be a complex task.

Although the UNCT/GoS partnership around individual agency-specific programmes functioned well, the commitment and ownership of the UNDAF could be improved. It is anticipated that with the reinstituting of the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) and based on past experiences, the UNCT/GoS partnership and coordination at the highest level promises to improve. The UN internal coordination and coherence mechanisms as performed during the current UNDAF would require further strengthening, if the UN were to embrace Delivering as One (DaO) in future.

## 5.2 Lessons Learned

The experience of Sudan current UNDAF (2013-2016) has brought about a number of important lessons. These are summarized in the following:

1. Strong leadership and commitment of the UNCT and government are critical to the full operationalization and success of the UNDAF. The inclusive and participatory preparation process for the UNDAF was successfully concluded with the signature of the UNDAF document by both the GoS and the UNCT. However, and shortly after the launch of UNDAF implementation, and for reasons explained above the commitment of both the UNCT and government toward the UNDAF declined and the UNDAF ended being placed on the "shelve".
2. Effective coordination requires commitment, investment of time and funding. Cost sharing for the development of joint programme initiatives can be high. However, most UN interviewees agreed that the higher costs for coordination would be outweighed by the benefits to be generated the UNDAF in terms of coordinated UN response and integrated action.
3. There is a need to ensure full and clear understanding of the role and responsibilities of UNDAF coordination mechanisms, in particular the UNCT, OGs and the M&E Group.
4. There is a need to ensure the close engagement of national stakeholders at all times throughout the UNDAF process.
5. There is a need to ensure full understanding of results-based management. UN staff having practiced and succeeded in institutionalizing results-based planning, they should learn and adapt from their UNDAF planning experience to practice and institutionalize results-based reporting.
6. The M&E system for the UNDAF did not function properly to generate UNDAF results information on a regular basis and report it in a coherent and usable format to the RC and UNCT to facilitate for them to manage for the achievement of UNDAF outcomes. The failure to conduct the mandatory annual reviews of UNDAF, due to UNCT decision, deprived the UNDAF from possible revival and redemption of its credibility with government.

7. The approach to resource mobilization in the current UNDAF characterized by individual agencies raising of funds for specific interventions contributed to limiting the potential for partnerships and joint programming under the current UNDAF.
8. The limited action of the UN Communication Group has weakened communication and messaging about the UN in general, and UNDAF in particular.

## 5.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, the following recommendations - are made for the UN Country team to consider in respect of the current and future UNDAFs:

1. The UNCT should continue to prioritize strengthening collaboration and communication around the UNDAF with the GoS in a two key issues. These were:
  - The activation of the High Level Steering Committee stipulated in page 3 of the current UNDAF document. This Steering Committee should be invited to meet by the end of 2015 to review the progress of UNDAF implementation and results. In light of the good progress in several of the UNDAF outcomes as shown above, this review should recommit the two sides to support and fully operationalize the current UNDAF during its remaining period.
  - A commitment from the UNCT to share information on funding and UNDAF results with the government's institution responsible for coordination with the UNS.
2. The UNCT should carry out a complete overhaul of the monitoring and evaluation system of the UN in Sudan to harmonize the functioning of its many parts as well as ensure the necessary incentives for the staff in the M&E Group in the various agencies to track and report on UNDAF results.
3. The UNCT should demonstrate its leadership in results-based management and in promoting and supporting a culture of results through:
  - creating demand for results;
  - ensuring the conduct of the annual UNDAF reviews
  - supporting organizational systems, procedures and incentives; and
  - supporting a move towards one annual UN progress report
4. Although Sudan signed the international treaties, conventions and instruments relating to the UN programming principles, the use and application of these principles in the programming of UN cooperation leaves much to be desired. It is therefore recommended that in order to push for further use and application of these principles, it is necessary to forge a clear understanding within the UNS in the country and then hold a high level discussion with government to arrive at a common agreement and a harmonized approach on the degree to which the programming principles can be used and applied in the various programmes.
5. The UNCT should undertake special efforts, including appropriate capacity development of the staff, in order to ensure the integration of the programming principles, viz., human rights-based approach (HRBA), gender equality, environmental sustainability, results-based management and capacity development in the next UNDAF.
6. The UNDAF mechanisms below the UNCT, such as Outcome Groups, Cross-cutting Theme Groups, etc. should be equipped with the appropriate staff calibre and incentives as well as sufficiently empowered to carry out their role and responsibilities. It is recommended that these UNDAF mechanisms include in their membership national stakeholders from government and CSOs.
7. The next UNDAF should also focus on joint programming and seek to provide incentives for that.
8. As a special measure to address the gender situation, it is recommended to incorporate a comprehensive gender mainstreaming perspective in the design of the next UNDAF. The most effective vehicle for GM would be joint programmes and projects as well as strong support from the UNCT.

9. A special resource mobilization strategy should developed and pursued by the UNCT as an integral component of the next UNDAF.

# ANNEXES

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### Sudan UNDAF Evaluation

Terms of Reference (*draft 10 May 2015*)

---

#### I. Background

The Sudan United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) was signed by the UN Country Team (UNCT) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in 2012 as the framework for development partnership between the United Nations (UN) and Sudan for the period 2013-2016. It outlines the UN contribution in support of the GoS in achieving its national priorities as articulated in the Five-Year National Development Plan 2012-2016.

The UNCT has a range of coordinating mechanisms to facilitate the implementation of the UNDAF under the eight outcomes in the four UNDAF pillars: Poverty Reduction, Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Livelihoods; Basic Services; Governance and Rule of Law; Social Cohesion, Peace Consolidation and Peace Dividends. The Programme Management Team (PMT) is the key coordinating body for the UN's development programming activities. It facilitates coordination around the UNDAF and is supported by mechanisms that include the Outcome Groups (one for each of the UNDAF outcomes), UN cross-cutting thematic groups (e.g. on HIV/AIDS and on gender) and the UNDAF Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Group, which provides technical support on M&E issues.

Currently, the UNCT, in close partnership with the government, is in the process of preparing for the mid-term evaluation of the UNDAF. This evaluation is a key step in the UNDAF process aimed at improving accountability and strengthening programming and inter-agency coordination. Emphasis will be placed on looking forward, as the evaluation is being conducted in the penultimate year of the UNDAF cycle so it informs the planning stage of the next UNDAF.

The evaluation seeks to answer the following questions: "Are we doing the right thing? Are we doing it the right way? Are there better ways of achieving results?" For this, the UNDAF evaluation will assess the UNDAF with regards to the following criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

The UNDAF evaluation will be an independent evaluation for which (an) external evaluation consultant(s) will be recruited. The government and other partners in the country will be major actors in the evaluation, contributing both information and validation of UNDAF evaluation results. The main users of the UNDAF evaluation will be the UNCT, government counterparts and other development partners.

#### II. UNDAF evaluation context

The UNDAF evaluation is an essential part of the results-based management of the UNDAF, and it is meant to contribute not only to the current UNDAF but also to the next UNDAF. The UNDAF will be evaluated against the strategic intent laid out in the UNDAF document and specifically its contribution to the national development results included in the UNDAF results matrix and the UNDAF outcome work plans.

As decided by the UNCT, the current Sudan UNDAF did not undergo any annual reviews, and the once-in-a-cycle UNDAF progress report is not to be elaborated either, underscoring the importance of this evaluation. In late 2014 the UNDAF Outcome Groups, in collaboration with the UNDAF M&E Group, developed inter-agency work plans for each of the outcomes to help operationalize the UNDAF results matrix. In early 2015 the M&E Group coordinated an exercise to collect baseline, target and monitoring data for each of the indicators in the work plans. These data are to help determine the achievements of the UNCT with regards to the results in the work plans.

### **III. UNDAF evaluation purpose, objectives and scope**

The overall purpose of the evaluation is threefold:

- 1) To generate evidence and lessons learnt based on an assessment of what works in the context of the UNDAF, what does not work, and why. It is expected that the evaluation will provide important information for strengthening programming and results, specifically informing the planning and decision-making for the next UNDAF and for improving UN coordination in Sudan.
- 2) To support greater accountability of the UNCT to UNDAF stakeholders. By objectively verifying results achieved within the framework of the UNDAF and assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategies and interventions used, the evaluation will enable the UNCT to show national counterparts, donors and other stakeholders what it is delivering against its commitments.

The objectives of the evaluation are:

- 1) To assess the extent to which UNDAF results (outputs and outcomes) have been achieved, and with what level of efficiency and sustainability, and to analyze the extent to which results achieved by the UNCT in the framework of the UNDAF have made a worthwhile contribution to national development priorities and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
- 2) To identify the factors that have affected the UNCT's contribution, explaining why performance is as it is.
- 3) Based on the lessons learnt identified through the evaluation, to provide actionable recommendations for improving the UNCT's contribution, especially for incorporation into the new UNDAF.

The time period covered by the evaluation is 2013 to mid-2015. The scope covered by the evaluation includes examining the five UN programming principles: human rights-based approach; gender equality; environmental sustainability; results-based management; and capacity development. (see IV. below)

### **IV. UNDAF evaluation methodology**

The UNDAF evaluation will follow the UN Development Group (UNDG) guidelines on the UNDAF<sup>38</sup>, as well as UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidance on evaluations, in particular UNDAF evaluations<sup>39</sup>.

#### **Evaluation criteria:**

The contribution of the UNCT to development results will be assessed according to a standard set of evaluation criteria used across UNDAF evaluations:

---

<sup>38</sup> [https://undg.org/main/undg\\_document/undaf-guidance-and-support-package/](https://undg.org/main/undg_document/undaf-guidance-and-support-package/)

<sup>39</sup> <http://uneval.org/document/guidance-documents>

- 1) **Relevance:** The extent to which the objectives of UNDAF are consistent with Sudan's needs, national priorities, Sudan's international and regional commitments, the MDGs and sustainable development, and the needs of women, men, girls and boys in the country.
- 2) **Effectiveness:** The extent to which the UNCT contributed to, or is likely to contribute to, the outcomes defined in the UNDAF. The evaluation should also note how the unintended results, if any, have affected national development positively or negatively and to what extent have they been foreseen and managed.
- 3) **Efficiency:** The extent to which outcomes are achieved with the appropriate amount of resources and maintenance of minimum transaction cost (funds, expertise, time, administrative costs, etc.).
- 4) **Sustainability:** The extent to which the benefits from a development interventions have continued, or are likely to continue, after the UNDAF has been completed.

While assessing performance using the above criteria, the evaluator(s) will identify the various (enabling) factors that can explain the performance, including UN coordination and the five UN programming principles (listed above).

The evaluation will use a variety of data collection methods, including desk review of relevant documents, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, surveys and questionnaires, focus group discussions. Qualitative and quantitative tools will be used to analyze the data. The evaluation will use a variety of validation methods, including triangulation, to ensure that the data and information used and conclusions made carry the necessary depth.

## **V. Structure of the UNDAF evaluation report**

The report will not exceed 75 pages (excluding annexes), and should include the following sections:

- Table of content
- List of acronyms
- Executive Summary (max 2 pages)
- 1. Introduction (background, objectives, scope and methodology, limitations)
- 2. National development context
- 3. Evaluation findings (corresponding to the UNDAF outcomes with each analyzed by the evaluation criteria and identifying enabling factors)
- 4. Lessons learned and recommendations for the current UNDAF and for the next UNDAF
- Annexes might include the following:
  - Stories worth telling
  - List of documents used and persons met
  - Details on the methodology

## **VI. Coordination, timeline and work plan**

The consultancy will be for six weeks. The consultant(s) will report to the Evaluation Management Group (EMG) to be formed. The PMT will oversee the overall evaluation process, while the UNDAF M&E Group will provide guidance on the methodology and will perform a quality assurance role. The UNCT and the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) will provide overall guidance and approve the final product.

Phase I - Preparation	Responsible parties	Timeframe
-----------------------	---------------------	-----------

	Lead party	Others	Begin	End
1. EMG meets with government counterparts to agree on evaluation process	EMG	RCO		
2. PMT approves ToR drafted by RCO	RCO	M&E Group		
3. Selection of evaluation consultant(s)	EMG			
4. Contracting of evaluation consultant(s)	RCO			
5. Compilation of material for desk review	EMG	PMT		
<b>Phase II - Study</b>				
	<b>Responsible parties</b>		<b>Timeframe</b>	
	Lead party	Others	Begin	End
1. Development of detailed work plan outlining specific dates for key deliverables	Consultant(s)	EMG		
2. Inception report detailing overall scope, approach, design, timeframe, methodology	Consultant(s)	EMG, M&E Group		
3. Data collection as agreed in inception report	Consultant(s)	EMG		
4. Draft report	Consultant(s)	EMG		
5. PMT feedback on draft report	EMG	PMT, M&E Group		
6. Final draft report incorporating PMT feedback	Consultant(s)	EMG		
<b>Phase III – Follow-up</b>				
	<b>Responsible Parties</b>		<b>Timeframe</b>	
	Lead party	Others	Begin	End
1. Release of evaluation report (ideas: workshop with relevant stakeholders to disseminate and discuss the findings, publishing on UNCT website)	RCO	UNCG		
2. Extraction and sharing of lessons learned	EMG	UNCT		
3. Elaboration of management response to evaluation	RCO	UNCT		

## VII. Milestones and deliverables of consultancy

- 1) Detailed work plan, within two days of contract signature, to be approved within two days by EMG
- 2) Inception report, within two days of work plan approval, to be approved by EMG
- 3) Draft report, within 28 days of contract signature, for PMT comments within one week
- 4) Final report incorporating comments received on draft report, within one week of receiving comments

Activity/deliverable	W1	W2	W3	W4	W5	W6
Detailed work plan						
Inception report						
Data collection						
Draft report due						
PMT comments on draft report						
Final report						

## Annex A. Roles and responsibilities

Who	Roles and responsibilities
UNCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide strategic guidance to the process</li> <li>• Review, comment on and approve final report</li> <li>• Ensure any necessary UNCT decisions are made on time</li> <li>• Facilitate provision of necessary information and documents</li> <li>• Hold substantive discussions to inform draft management response to evaluation, and approve final draft of management response</li> </ul>
RC Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Draft ToR</li> <li>• Manage recruitment of consultant(s)</li> <li>• Day-to-day management of consultant's (s') contract</li> <li>• Facilitate communication between the consultant(s) and RC/UNCT</li> <li>• Facilitate review of work plan, inception report, draft report and final report</li> <li>• Ensure dissemination of evaluation report</li> <li>• Draft management response based on UNCT inputs</li> </ul>
Evaluation Management Group (EMG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oversee overall evaluation process</li> <li>• Select evaluation consultant(s)</li> <li>• Compile material for desk review</li> <li>• Review, comment and approve evaluation work plan</li> <li>• Review, comment and approve inception report</li> <li>• Facilitate access of consultant(s) to information sources (documents and interviewees) to support data collection</li> </ul>
PMT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finalize evaluation ToR</li> <li>• Review and comment on draft report</li> <li>• Review final report before submission to UNCT</li> </ul>
M&E Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review and comment on evaluation work plan</li> <li>• Review and comment on inception report</li> <li>• Provide complete monitoring data from work plans to the consultants</li> <li>• Review and help finalize data gathering tools (e.g. questionnaires)</li> <li>• Review and comment on draft report to ensure adherence to UNDG and UNEG guidelines</li> <li>• Provide technical support on methodology if necessary</li> </ul>
Consultant(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct the evaluation process in a timely manner</li> <li>• Draft evaluation work plan and incorporate comments from EMG</li> <li>• Produce inception report and incorporate comments from EMG and M&amp;E Group</li> <li>• Conduct desk review and gather additional necessary information through semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, surveys and questionnaires, focus group discussions, etc.</li> <li>• Develop draft report and incorporate comments from M&amp;E Group and PMT</li> <li>• Produce final evaluation report incorporating comments received</li> </ul>



## Annex B. Proposed evaluation questions

The questions below serve as a starting point. The final evaluation questions will be formulated by the consultant(s) in consultation with the M&E Group and the EMG, and presented in the inception report.

### 1) Relevance:

- How well have the UNDAF outcomes addressed key development issues in Sudan, their underlying causes and challenges, and which are the gaps that should (have) receive(d) more attention?
- To what extent have the agency-specific country programmes been results-oriented, relevant and mutually reinforcing to UNDAF outcomes, values and principles?
- How well does the UNDAF generate a coherent UNCT response to the National Development Plan?
- To what extent has the UNDAF been relevant in terms of internationally agreed goals and commitments, norms and standards?
- To what extent was the UNDAF results matrix flexible and relevant to respond to new issues and their causes as well as challenges that arose during the UNDAF cycle?

### 2) Effectiveness:

- What progress has been made towards the realization of UNDAF results?
- What factors contributed to the realization or non-realisation of UNDAF results?
- To what extent can progress towards UNDAF results be attributed to the work of the UN in Sudan?
- How have unintended results under UNDAF outcomes, if any, affected national development positively or negatively and to what extent have they been foreseen and managed?
- To what extent does the UNDAF promote effective partnerships and strategic alliances of the UN with key stakeholders around the main national development goals and UNDAF outcomes areas (e.g. within Government, with national partners, International Financial Institutions and other external support agencies)?
- How has the UNDAF been used by UN AFPs and government institutions for coordination in planning their activities and setting goals?
- How have the UNDAF and the work of Outcome Groups enhanced joint programming by agencies and/or resulted in specific joint programmes?
- To what extent have UN AFPs successfully facilitated the mainstreaming of provisions to advance gender equality and human rights during UNDAF implementation?

4.

### Efficiency:

- To what extent and in what ways has the UNDAF contributed to a reduction of transaction cost for the government and for each of the UN agencies?
- In what ways could transaction costs be further reduced?
- Were results achieved in a cost efficient manner and at reasonably low or lowest possible cost?

### 5. Sustainability:

- To what degree did the implementation of the UNDAF contribute to creating durable change and progress towards national development goals and UNDAF results?
- To which extent will the benefits created by the implementation of the UNDAF continue, or are likely to continue, after it has been completed?

E

- What are the enabling as well as constraining factors that have influenced the sustainability of the policies and programmes (at national level and at sub-national level)?
- To what extent have the partnerships with ministries, agencies, and other representatives of the partner government allowed the UN to make use of its comparative strengths, while, at the same time, safeguarding and promoting national ownership?
- To what extent has the capacity of the government to sustain programmes and related results been developed in the course of the UNDAF implementation?

## **Annex 2: Framework of Interview questions**

### **Framework for Interview Questions**

The following questions are drawing from the questions specified in the Evaluation TORS, and the list is by no means exhaustive. Respondents include the UNCT, UNDAF Outcome Group (OG) Co-Chairs and Focal Points, M & E Group and representatives from donors, IFI, LNGO, INGO and CSO partners. The questions will be tailored to respondent type.

1. Were you involved in the current Sudan UNDAF design phase? If not, for how long have you been with the UN in Sudan?
2. How does your agency planning cycle align with the timing of the formulation and implementation of the UNDAF cycle align with your planning cycle (CPD and CPAP for ex comm, agencies; Strategic Plan, etc. for other agencies)?
3. Did UN Agencies use the current UNDAF as a ready reference in designing their CPAPs?
4. Do Government partners apply or refer to UNDAF in their national, sectoral, sub-national planning frameworks?
5. How well do you see the UNDAF aligning with GoS strategies and plans?
6. How well would you say that the UNDAF has served as a platform for UN positioning? Are there any UN agencies/programmes/sectors where this works better than others? If so, how could this be adjusted in the UNDAF?
7. How well do you think the UNDAF has encouraged/contributed to greater policy and programming consistency? An improved "common voice" for the UN through the UNCG efforts? Are there any sectors/programmes in which this has worked better than others? If so, how could this be adjusted in the UNDAF?
8. The United Nations System offers several broad comparative advantages to support the UNDAF and is perceived overall as collaborative, knowledgeable, responsive and valued partner. In addition, the UN is well-positioned to harness its leadership, advocacy and global access to expertise and best practices. How well does the UNDAF serve as a tool to both enhance and promote these comparative advantages? What might be improved?
9. Has UNDAF enhanced joint programming by UN Agencies and/or resulted in specific joint programmes?
10. Has UNDAF promoted more coherence and synergies amongst UN Agencies?
11. What would you say are the key programmes from other donors/government in Sudan which are relevant to you OG? What are your linkages with these programmes? Are those reflected in the UNDAF?
12. What - if any - are the other national level coordination mechanisms for your area of activities?
13. How well do you feel that the UNDAF projects a unified, coherent UN - at the policy level? At the operational level?

14. Has UNDAF contributed to lowering transaction costs for Government and for UN Agencies?
15. To what extent has UNDAF process facilitated harmonization of UN Agencies procedures in order to reduce transaction costs and enhance results? How could transaction costs be further reduced?
16. What have been the particular challenges with regards to stakeholder expectations?
17. How would you describe the functionality of your OG in terms of coordination and effectiveness? What percentage of UN members usually attend OG meetings? Are the attendees the actual members or are they delegates?
18. What have been OG major achievements, best practices?
19. Are there any non-resident Agencies in your OG? If yes, how has their expertise/data been integrated?
20. To date, to what extent has the OG improved coordination between UN partners? What could be improved?
21. To what extent do you expect your OG targets to be met by the completion of this UNDAF? If they will not be met, why not? How could that be improved?
22. For your OG UN staff members, is their work on the OG noted on their staff appraisals (an incentive)?
23. Do you have any private sector partners (PSP)? If yes, who are the key PSPs and how do they support OG activities? If no, what are your strategies to engage PSPs?
24. Do you feel that UNDAF has succeeded in attracting expanded cost sharing and/or financing from GoS?
25. Has UNDAF promoted stronger national leadership, ownership and accountability?
26. Has UNDAF stimulated effective partnerships and alliances around the main national development goals and UNDAF Outcome Areas (e.g., within GoS, with national partners, IFIs, donors, etc)?
27. Who are your OG primary NGO/CSO implementing partners?
28. To what extent have UN Agencies involved their Government counterparts in the annual tracking of implementation of their work plans?
29. Have UN Agencies encountered difficulty with regular collection of UNDAF performance information and the use of that information in decision making?
30. Has UNDAF process enabled UNCT to operationalize and build partnerships and alliances around the UNSC Resolution 1325?
31. Do you feel that the UNDAF process has generated sufficient UNCT cooperation as well as engagement and buy-in from country stakeholders that facilitated for the three normative

programming principles (Human rights & HRBA, gender equality and environmental sustainability) to be mainstreamed in the UNDAF chain of results and has any become priorities in themselves?

32. Why have the UNDAF annual reviews been abandoned?

33. What would be your recommendations for the next UNDAF cycle, e.g., on relevance of current themes; other themes; coordination; South-South cooperation; resource mobilization and other kinds of support; private sector partnerships/PPPs, others?

34. Did UN coordination arrangements under UNDAF reduce transaction costs and increased the efficiency of UNDAF implementation?

35. Did the UNDAF adequately invest in, and focus on, national capacity development? To what extent and in what ways did UNDAF contribute to capacity development of Government, NGOs and CSOs?

36. To what extent and in what ways did UNDAF promote NEX programmes and/or use of national expertise, goods and services?

### **Issues for Discussion with Outcome Groups**

1. Are indicators for your theme (Governance, Poverty, environment, etc) being collected periodically in Sudan and by whom?
2. Did your Group develop a Results Action Plan for your Outcome? How does it relate to the Areas of Intervention identified in Annex B of the UNDAF document?
3. How is progress achieved by individual UN Agencies against outputs and towards the related UNDAF Outcome being measured /or assessed?
4. Has the OG established networks of public, private and civil society actors, including the media and academia, that are deemed by the CCA necessary to help develop and clarify norms, embark on integrated activities, and monitor performance? **For Governance OG**
5. How are results information from individual agencies aggregated?
6. What is the overall trend regarding the Outcomes managed by your Group? Is it positive?
7. Do you have data on the status of baseline indicators as at end 2014 and 30 June 2015?
8. Can we make any attribution of UN System support to any of the indicators under any of the Outcomes?
9. Has the perception of corruption been influenced directly by the UNDAF, as the framework did not target this malpractice? **For Governance OG**
10. Who does your Group report to and report what? Are results reported?
11. Who are your national partners and did they perform the roles assigned for them in the UNDAF Results and Resources Framework?
12. How many meetings have your Group held to-date? And who participated in them from the national stakeholders? Were the meetings generally to share information or to solve problems and discuss results?

### **Issues for Discussion with M and E Working Group**

1. Did you have a One M & E Plan that was designed at the same time with and based on the UNDAF Results Matrix?
2. Did that Plan provide the operational details of the inter-agency mechanism and processes for monitoring UNDAF performance and reporting?
3. Did the Plan enjoy joint ownership by UN, GoS and Donors?

4. How are indicators decided upon? Do all retained indicators lend themselves to aggregation at all levels and are they sufficiently dis-aggregated
5. Are thematic indicators (e.g., for Governance, Poverty, environment, etc) being collected periodically in Sudan and by whom?
6. How is progress achieved by individual UN Agencies against outputs and towards the related UNDAF Outcome being measured /or assessed?
7. Do you have a mechanism / tool to aggregate results information from contributing agencies?
8. Do you have data on the status of all baseline indicators as at end 2014 and 30 June 2015?
9. Are agencies accountable for sharing results information with the RCO?
10. Are results information from agencies rolling-up in a coherent and usable way to the UNCT for consideration of UNDAF as a whole?
11. Does RC report to GoS on progress made against results agreed in the UNDAF?
12. Are Outcome Groups effective in the use of Results Matrix and M & E Plan to monitor and report on regular basis to UNCT about progress towards achieving outcome results?
13. To Whom does the M & E Group report?
14. Who are your national partners and did they perform the roles assigned for them in the M & E Plan?
15. How many meetings have your Group held to-date? And who participated in them from the national stakeholders? Were the meetings generally to share information or to solve problems, discuss and report results?
16. The question of attribution?

### Annex 3: Bibliography

1. UNEG "Standards for Evaluation in the UN system"
2. Various Documents accessed from the undg Website
4. Results Based Management at Country Level, A paper presented to the Working Group on programming policies, 2008,
5. Country Analysis 2012, Sudan
6. UNDAF 2013-2016
7. Result-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) of UNDP Sudan for 2013 and 2014
8. Government of Sudan - UNICEF 2014 Mid-Term Review Final Report
9. Sudan Country Report On Out-Of-School Children, October 2014
10. Sudan Multiple Indicator Survey, (MICS) 2014, Key Findings April 2015, Central Bureau of Statistics
11. Government - UNICEF Revised Results Matrix 2015-2016 in Sudan
12. National Report on the Evaluation of EFA during the period 2000-2015: Sudan Vision After 2015, Khartoum, June 2014, Ministry of Education (in Arabic)
13. UNFPA Sudan CP Review for 2013 and 2014
14. UNEP Project Completion Review 2014 Sudan Integrated Environment Programme
15. Sudan Integrated Environment Project, Quarterly Progress Report, January to June 2014
16. UNDP/UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), Joint Programme, Phase I (2012-2014) Final Report
17. End of Project Report 2012-2014, DDR Preparatory Support Project
18. Sudan DDR Programme, End Annual Report from January 2009 to December 2019
19. Evaluation Report, Rule of Law Project in Darfur, 2013
20. Final Evaluation of UNDP Project, Local Governance Development and Public Expenditure Management (LGDPEM) in Eastern Sudan
21. Strategic Partnership Phase II, 2009-2013, Final Report: Governance and Rule of Law, UNDP Sudan
22. Community Livelihood and Rural Industry Support Programme - Phase III (CLARIS III), Terminal Report (February 2014- January 2015)
23. Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion (EDIP) - Sept. 2014-April 2015 Report
24. Recovery of Coastal Livelihoods in the Red Sea State of Sudan: The Modernization of Artisanal Fisheries and Creation of New Market Opportunities, Terminal Evaluation (UNIDO Evaluation Group)
25. Mid-term Evaluation of the Integrated Food Security Project in Kassala, Sudan (IFSP - Kassala), Evaluation Report (FAO Office of Evaluation), November 2014
26. Extracts from the World Bank Report "Community-based Development in Northern Sudan 'Lessons Learned'"
27. Connecting Farmers to Markets (F2M) in Sudan, Evaluation report of the 2012-2013 Farming Season (WFP)
28. Global Aids Response Progress Reporting: Sudan National Aids and STI Control Program, Federal Ministry of Health, June 2015
29. African Economic Outlook, Sudan 2015, (Suwareh Darbo, Principal Country Economist and Officer-in- Charge, Sudan Field Office, AfDB Report), accessed through the internet
30. 5-year National Development Plan (2012-2016)
31. Nation Quarter Century 2007 - 2031 Strategy
32. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
33. Sudan Views: Contribution to the Post-2015 Global Development Agenda (Report of Nation Consultation in Sudan, Khartoum, May 2013)