

Impact Assessment and Final Evaluation PRP II Bangladesh

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Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Executive Summary | 3 |
| 1. Introduction | 7 |
| 1.1. Background and Context..... | 7 |
| 1.2. Purpose of the Final Evaluation..... | 8 |
| 1.3. Evaluation scope and objectives | 9 |
| 1.4. Methodology..... | 9 |
| 1.5. Key Evaluation Questions..... | 10 |
| 2. The Development Challenge | 12 |
| 3. UNDP response and challenges | 15 |
| 4. Contribution to results | 21 |
| 4.1. Findings against KEQs | 21 |
| 4.2. Findings regarding other evaluation criteria | 35 |
| 4.3. Lessons Learned..... | 40 |
| 5. Conclusions and recommendations | 42 |
| 5.1. Recommendations..... | 43 |
| Annex 1: Contribution Stories | 45 |
| Outcome Achieved: Increase in number and proportion of women in Bangladesh Police and the establishment of Victim Support Centres results in more sensitive services for 4,370 victims and vulnerable women and children | 45 |
| Outcome Achieved: Improved access to police and local problem solving for some communities through Community Policing Forums..... | 48 |
| Annex 2: Evaluation TORS | 51 |
| Annex 3: Persons interviewed | 59 |
| Annex 4: Question Guide | 61 |
| Annex 5: Key outcomes and evidence from Program Logic Workshop | 63 |
| Annex 6: Example Program Logic for Police Reform | 64 |
| Program logic for police reform - summary..... | 64 |

Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| AFP | Australian Federal Police |
| BP | Bangladesh Police |
| BPWN | Bangladesh Police Women's Network |
| CDMS | Criminal Data Management System |
| CID | Criminal Investigation Department |
| CPAS | Crime Pattern Analysis System |
| CPC | Crime Prevention Centre or Community Policing Cell |
| CPF | Community Policing Forum |
| CPO | Community Policing Officer |
| DFID | Department for International Development (UK) |
| DMP | Dhaka Metropolitan Police |
| DV | Domestic Violence |
| FTI | Forensic Training Institute |
| GoB | Government of Bangladesh |
| HRM | Human Resource Management |
| ICT | Information Communications Technology |
| IGP | Inspector General of Police |
| KEQ | Key Evaluation Question |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MOHA | Ministry of Home Affairs |
| MTR | Mid-Term Review |
| NGO | Non Government Organisation |
| NPD | National Project Director |
| OC | Officer in Charge |
| PRP II | Police Reform Programme Phase II |
| PSC | Project Steering Committee |
| PTC | Police Training College |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedures |
| TMSS | Thengamara Mohila Sabuj Shongho |
| TOC | Theory of Change |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| TOT | Training of Trainers |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| VSC | Victim Support Centre |

Executive Summary¹

Bangladesh is a densely populated fledgling democracy. Crime and corruption are problems affecting individual safety and economic growth. Women, in particular are affected by crime at alarming rates, for example 60% of ever-partnered women report lifetime physical or sexual violence². Unfortunately, multiple factors prevent women from reporting these crimes to the police or ever seeking or receiving justice.

The Police Reform Programme Phase II (PRP II, 2009-2015), funded by UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), built on the efforts of Phase I (2005-2009) and aimed to work in partnership with the Bangladesh Police (BP) to build their capacity to transition from a colonial style police force to a democratic style “service”. The PRP II delivered financial, technical and advisory support and facilitation to the BP and other key stakeholders under six outcome areas:

1. Strategic direction and organisational reform;
2. Human Resource Management and training;
3. Investigations, operations and prosecutions;
4. Crime prevention and community policing;
5. Promoting gender sensitive policing; and,
6. Information, communication and technology.

PRP II is due to finish in December 2015 and in accordance with UNDP policy, a final (terminal) evaluation was commissioned to explore specifically what worked well and what worked less well and why, in this context. The final evaluation was asked to also explore impact and assess the contribution of the PRP II to observable outcomes. The independent evaluation team³ undertook interviews with over 80 key informants, conducted workshops and site visits in Dhaka and five other districts over a period of two months in September and October 2015. Out of 20 outputs identified in the design, the PRP II fully achieved four, partially achieved 13 and had limited achievement of the remaining three outputs. The outputs fully achieved related to Human Resource Management Department structure, training improvements, and refurbishment of model (later renamed “PRP supported”) police stations (Thanas). Improvements in training have been echoed throughout the evaluation by the majority of key informants and the PRP supported Thanas contribute positively to increasing access to police for women in the community. The partial achievement of outputs relates in part to the ambitiousness of the outputs and while there was definite progress in terms of deliverables, the full output was not reached in the majority of cases. Two of the outputs reaching only limited levels of achievement related to strategic partnerships and sectoral collaboration. DFID tracks progress of this project with three indicators (% of finalised investigations under the Women and Children Repression Prevention

¹ The evaluation team would like to convey their deep thanks to the PRP II team, the Bangladesh Police and other stakeholders for their valuable time and effort in sharing their views and gathering information for this evaluation.

² *From Evidence to Policy: Addressing Gender Based Violence against Women and Girls in Bangladesh*, ICDDR,B and Population Council, Jan 2013

³ Team Leader Sophie Pinwill (Clear Horizon Consulting Pty Ltd) and Team Member Md. Nazmul Haque (National Consultant)

Act that were referred to the courts, comparing PRP-supported police stations with the national average; Extent to which and number of legislation, policy, strategy, and computerised database systems and tools considered or adopted for sustainable police reform; and Number of women and children access gender sensitive police services through the victim support centres) and the PRP II received relatively high scores in the annual DFID reviews, three “A”s and one “A+”. The Steering Committee seemed content with the progress of the programme. Of 59 documents (training and guidance), 12 have been formally approved but many of the others are reportedly in use anyway without formal approval. The sustainability of the training and guidance documents in the absence of formal approval is unknown.

In terms of outcomes, the PRP II had particularly ambitious key outcomes that were only partially achieved by the end of the programme, partly because the theory of change (TOC) was not clear and the assumptions not articulated or tested. Aside from simply the time it takes to realise reform, reasons for only partial success include limited human resources, continuous transfers of police and lack of legislative reform in key areas. The PRP II had some success in advocating for Community Police Officers (CPOs) to be exempt from mandatory 2 year rotations but largely the transfer system remained unchanged and posed a significant barrier to the achievement of police service delivery reforms. While some institutional outcomes were achieved, at the station level, leadership and management and corruption, too few police at the right levels of decision-making and inefficient management practices also contributed to the lack of observable outcomes in terms of service delivery.

In spite of these barriers, two outcome areas that have the potential to significantly impact on the lives of the community have emerged from the work of the programme. These include gender outcomes of an increase in the number and proportion of female police in the BP, and the establishment of Victim Support Centres (VSCs); and community engagement outcomes of well functioning community policing forums (CPFs) in some districts. The key reasons these have made such progress is that their success is a win-win situation for the BP and the stakeholders involved. The eight VSCs uniquely involve a partnership between BP and ten NGOs to help deliver services to victims and other vulnerable women and children and both sides of the partnership benefit from the arrangement. The CPFs in Bera, Bogra and Cox’s Bazar have also found a mutual benefit and the community members report significant improvements in their relationship with the police and in the police response to their issues.

Ideally these positive outcomes and better service delivery from BP would have been confirmed through public opinion surveys conducted in 2011 and again in 2014 and 2015. The 2015 survey actually showed that public opinion remained unchanged or decreased during this period. Unfortunately however, it seems that the systemic barriers are too great to observe behavioural changes at the station level or influence perceptions of police behaviour. Expected impacts of improvements in Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Training are thwarted by inadequacies and delays in the broader criminal justice system. Improvements in one area cannot be seen until improvements are also made to other partners in the justice sector.

The BP now has some very positive nascent reforms in these sustainable VSCs and CPFs, but there is a risk of negative and unintended impacts of both of these reforms on female police, victims of crime and community members if these structures are misused for political or publicity purposes or are allowed to become embedded without operational safeguards against discrimination and human rights abuses. Examples of potential abuses include female police being posted to VSCs by virtue of their sex, and missing promotional or other opportunities. There is also a possibility that victim support will be considered “women’s work” and therefore not as important as other police work. There is also a risk of confusing the police role in victim support

and shelters which other countries have addressed by giving the management of the support role to NGOs and enforcing good practice guidelines. Possible risks facing CPFs can include a blurring of the lines of responsibility for police work and the needs of the community being sidelined to promote the needs of local interest groups. Ongoing support to these areas to strengthen risk mitigation and embed good practice procedures is important.

Overall scores for the level of achievement of each evaluation criteria are as follows:

| Criteria | Score |
|----------------|----------------|
| Effectiveness | Medium |
| Partnerships | Medium to high |
| Impact | Medium to low |
| Sustainability | Medium to high |
| Relevance | Medium to high |
| Efficiency | High |

The PRP II scored well in terms of efficiency, generally being well managed, and some of the reforms, especially those approved by the BP and MOHA are likely to be sustainable. The programme’s focus in the second half on gender and human rights was relevant to the development problem and the level of ownership of the PRP II by the BP made much of the work relevant to this agency. The PRP II was able to leverage a great deal from the close relationship with the BP, although the closeness of this relationship also caused problems with the MOHA and in promoting reform through the draft Police Act 2013. The importance of relationships is one of the key lessons learned and the six key lessons of the Mid Term review in 2012 remain largely relevant.

Going forward, what is needed for any future engagement is a clear understanding of and agreement about the theory of change – clearly showing how intended activities are expected to lead to reform and clearly articulating the key assumptions and risks inherent in achieving expected outcomes. The TOC needs to express the intermediate steps; the M&E system needs to set out ways of routinely measuring progress towards these; and the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders needs to be clear and agreed.

Focusing on problem solving or thematic areas such as violence against women would help in some ways to address the multiple barriers (at different levels and in different institutions) but without the strong relationships built from being embedded in the BP, the level of influence is likely to be less, the level of cooperation needed between agencies higher, and the scale of the reform needed greater. This would require an even more careful understanding of the TOC and more attention to roles of various actors in the community and justice sector and a very high level of political will.

PRP II’s intervention has contributed to some valuable outcomes which, if supported with further expertise and guidance, have the potential to make a clear difference to the most vulnerable in the Bangladesh community.

Recommendations include:

Recommendation 1. Further support be provided to improve the success of Victim Support Centres and selected Community Policing Forums

Recommendation 2. Clarify the Theory of Change and design the M&E system on the TOC

Recommendation 3. Improve the role and function of Steering Committee

Recommendation 4. Mainstream risk analysis of Human Rights, Gender and Sustainability.

1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Context

Bangladesh is a developing nation and a fledgling democracy. Steady economic growth since the early 1990s has resulted in rapid gains in Human Development. Despite impressive achievements in a variety of fields, Bangladesh suffers from weak governance, poverty and limited government capacity to deliver basic services. For example, access to justice, respect for the rule of law and knowledge of human rights are generally acknowledged as inadequate.

Law and order, crime and corruption remain serious problems adversely affecting individual safety, national security and economic growth. There is broad acknowledgment that the justice sector needs to be strengthened. Overall, crime remains underreported and inadequately investigated by the police, the court system is slow and prisons are overcrowded.

Thus, an accountable, transparent and efficient police service in Bangladesh is essential for the safety and well-being of all citizens, national stability and longer-term growth and development, particularly the creation of a secure environment which is conducive to consumer and investor confidence.

Within this context the Police Reform Programme (PRP) Phase I was launched in 2005 under joint collaboration of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), European Commission, UNDP and the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). Phase I of the PRP concluded in September 2009 and established the foundation for police reform initiatives by supporting the introduction of Model Police Stations (Thanas), a Victim Support Centre (VSC) and a community policing philosophy across the country.

PRP Phase II commenced in October 2009 and is supported by the Government of Bangladesh, UNDP and DFID and will conclude on 31 December 2015. The PRP's development goal is a safer, more secure and stable Bangladesh, where the human rights of citizens, particularly the vulnerable and marginalized, are promoted and protected to accelerate progress on the Millennium Development Goals, economic growth and social justice. The programme's purpose is to improve safety, access to justice and human rights for all citizens, particularly disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. The targeted beneficiaries of Phase II are the Bangladesh people, and in particular the Bangladesh Police, who will benefit from increased capacity, job satisfaction, improved morale, image and social standing.

The PRP II is implemented by UNDP in partnership with BP over six years and three months with a budget of approximately USD29 million with support provided by the United Kingdom Department for International Development and UNDP and USD1.9M in kind contribution of the Government of Bangladesh. The National Programme Director (NPD) is an Additional IGP in the BP and has been a dedicated and professional leader of the programme. The programme reports to a Steering Committee (the Project Board stipulated in the project document and the TAPP) made up of the BP and other ministry representatives. Two NGOs are also members of the Steering Committee. The staff of the PRP are comprised of long term and short term National and International advisers and managers and some seconded BP members.

Through technical advice and facilitation, capacity building, and agreed provision of financial support for infrastructure and equipment, the PRP II worked to assist the BP to become a “service” rather than a “force”.

The Theory of Change underpinning the PRP II was implied rather than stated.

Phase II of PRP has had six outcome areas (or components) and the key intended outcomes are as follows:

Component 1: STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM

Key intended Outcome: Strategic direction and organizational reform supported by planning and budgeting, enhanced accountability and oversight, and a modernised legislative framework

Component 2: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING

Key intended Outcome: Human Resource Management systems and structures strengthened and training capacity enhanced to produce more competent and professional police

Component 3: INVESTIGATIONS, OPERATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

Key intended Outcome: Improved police operations, investigations, and prosecutions to enhance fair and equitable justice

Component 4: CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY POLICING

Key intended Outcome: Greater trust and interaction between the community and police, resulting in improved access to justice and human rights, in addition to a reduced fear of crime

Component 5: PROMOTING GENDER SENSITIVE POLICING

Key intended Outcome: Bangladesh Police promote the rights of women and children to be free of fear through improved representation at all levels and the provision of equitable and sensitive policing and victim support services.

Component 6: INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TECHNOLOGY

Key intended Outcome: Bangladesh Police makes progressive use of cost effective and sustainable information communication technology to provide better service to the community.

In accordance with UNDP policy, a final (terminal) evaluation on PRP Phase II was scheduled for the second half of 2015, and this document is the report of that evaluation. This terminal evaluation has been supplemented by a contribution analysis of PRP II key significant outcomes to better understand the impact and potential impact of the programme’s contribution to police reform. These key outcomes and PRP II’s contributions to these can be seen in detail at Annex 1.

1.2. Purpose of the Final Evaluation

The purpose of this final evaluation was primarily to learn about what worked well and what worked less well in this context and to independently assess the extent that the Police Reform Programme (Phase II) contributed to outcomes as defined in the PRP Project Document and

supporting documents. The evaluation report will be considered by UNDP, DFID (the major Donor), the Government of Bangladesh and the Bangladesh Police and may be used to identify key areas for possible post-2015 support to the Bangladesh Police.

1.3. Evaluation scope and objectives

As directed by the Terms of Reference (Annex 2), this final evaluation consisted of two components: the final evaluation that covers all of the programme and analyses achievements and what worked and what did not work; and the impact assessment that looked more in depth at certain identified key focus areas to assess their contribution to the outcomes.

The evaluation team was tasked with primary responsibility for the preparation of an objective and high-quality evaluation report. The evaluation included interviews with key national and international stakeholders including representatives from the: Ministry for Home Affairs; Bangladesh Police (BP); national justice experts; NGOs; Victim Support Centre personnel; and community beneficiaries. The team also interviewed donor partners (DFID), development partners and other UNDP projects operating in the criminal justice sector. The evaluation was conducted in Dhaka, Narsingdi, Bera, Bogra, Chittagong and Cox's Bazar over a period of two months (September and October 2015).

1.4. Methodology

The methodology of the evaluation was based around gathering answers to key evaluation questions (see below at 1.5) from various sources and triangulating a range of evidence to provide an evidence-based answer. The process began with a participatory workshop involving the PRP II team to understand the extent to which they considered that they had achieved the component objectives and evidence to confirm their perceptions. This exercise was designed to identify potential significant outcome areas and sources of evidence, and assist the evaluation team to develop a whole of program logic to understand how the programme contributed to the broader goals and higher level outcomes.

The evaluation process also involved independent validation of key outcomes and the contribution of the PRP II to the outcomes at an Outcomes Analysis Workshop held on the last day of the field work.

Data collection activities have included:

- Document review (PRP reports and M&E data, Open Source documents, Training Institute documents, NGO annual reports and research, correspondence, minutes of meetings, records and statistics)
- Field visits to five districts to observe police stations, community policing forums, village police and Victim Support Centres – Narsingdi, Bera, Bogra, Chittagong and Cox's Bazar
- Interviews with over 80 key informants including Bangladesh Police (various levels, locations), Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), NGOs, Court staff, Community members, other projects, Australian Federal Police (AFP), UNDP and DFID (more than 40 interviews in total– including one-on-one and small and large groups) – a list of persons interviewed is included in Annex 3 and question guides at Annex 4

- Most Significant Change (MSC) Stories – five MSC stories were collected from serving BP members on lien to the PRP. The purpose of collecting the stories was to gain illustrative data on changes and impacts (including unintended impacts) of interactions with PRP on the BP more broadly and on individual members. This data was used to corroborate information from other sources and then used as a tool for the Outcomes Analysis Workshop where police and community stakeholders provided opinions as to the most significant outcomes of the PRP.
- Two workshops – PRP program logic workshop (the outcomes of which are included in Annex 5) and Outcomes Analysis Workshop

Limitations

The evaluation team comprised a retired Additional Inspector General of Police (Addl IGP) in the BP and an external international consultant. The former senior police officer's contribution to the team was valuable in terms of a high level of knowledge of the BP and the environment and his ability to secure interviews with senior level stakeholders. This team composition and the heightened security environment however meant that most of the interviews included some police presence. This meant that the “best face” of the BP was on display, especially in the large group gatherings and smaller group meetings. The types of questions employed were designed to overcome some of the issues of bias and frank comments about police by some stakeholders indicated a willingness to be open despite the police presence.

Another limitation was the lack of focused engagement of the Programme Steering Committee which ideally would have been actively involved at the beginning, during and at the end of the in-country mission, but at least at the end for a Summit Workshop. This was not possible due to the relatively formal structure and infrequent meetings, which has broader implications for the use and effectiveness of the Steering Committee as an oversight mechanism. This is discussed further in section 5. Individual members of the committee were available and willing to meet with the evaluation team but the actual Steering Committee could not be convened for the evaluation.

There were a high number of public holidays during the in-country mission which meant that interviews during these times were difficult to secure. Despite this over 40 individual and small and large group interviews were conducted in Dhaka and five regional areas.

1.5. Key Evaluation Questions

1. Effectiveness (Priority area): to what extent did the Police Reform Programme attain its key outcomes? Sub-questions:
 - To what extent were the key outcomes achieved?
 - What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the key outcomes?
2. Has PRP successfully leveraged its partnerships with: 1) government agencies; 2) civil society, including victim support services; 3) relevant UNDP projects; 4) DFID Security and Justice Programme and 5) other development projects in the sector?
3. Impact: (Priority Area): What are the intended and unintended impacts of the programme for women and men? Sub-questions:
 - Is it reasonable to conclude that the programme made a difference?
 - Was there a difference in the types of outcomes for men and women?
 - Which key outcomes are the most likely to see impacts at the community level?

- What role did the PRP play in achieving the identified outcomes, and what role did others play?
 - What conditions are needed to make this type of programme succeed? (also consider partnerships)
4. Sustainability (Priority Area): To what extent will the benefits of the project continue after funding ceases? Sub-question:
- What were the major factors which influenced the likelihood of sustainability?
5. Relevance (lower priority area): To what extent was PRP's approach suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.
- How aligned was the PRP objectives with the target group, Bangladesh Government's and donor priorities and how well did the programme respond to changes over time?
6. Efficiency (lower priority area): How efficiently did the PRP deliver the programme?
- How efficient was the programme in terms of activities and outputs?
 - What lessons can be learned?

2. The Development Challenge

“In a study conducted by the US Department of Justice it was found that in almost 73% of cases of domestic violence the information came from the children of the house calling the police station for help. In the context of Bangladesh, the idea of calling police for help does not come into consideration..”⁴

The development challenge in Bangladesh is reflected in this quotation in several ways:

1. People generally do not call the police about crime due to fear and corruption⁵.
2. The ratio of police to community is so low (1:1052 overall⁶ but in some areas as low as around 1:10,000⁷) compared with countries such as Pakistan and India (1:625 and 1:695 respectively ⁸) that it would be impossible for police to meet public demands – if indeed the demand was there.
3. Women are reluctant to report their husbands for domestic violence because they are concerned about the economic and cultural impacts of divorce⁹.
4. There are other mechanisms such as the Village Police or local administration (Unions and Wards) which have a responsibility for community policing¹⁰ that may be preferable to involving the formal police in terms of proximity and local knowledge as well as follow up.

Domestic violence is a particular problem in terms of crime reporting with the Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers Association noting that as of March 2013, only 102 cases (supported by legal aid service providers) had been filed under the Domestic Violence (prevention and protection) Act 2010 and that there were 49 districts out of 64 where no cases had been filed at all.¹¹ In a country of 158 million where approximately 60% of ever-married women report lifetime physical or sexual violence¹² these low numbers of reports go some way to describe the vastness of the challenge faced by women in the justice system.

The challenge is multifaceted, starting with under-reporting by community due to fear, corruption and cultural barriers; lack of response to crime due to policing traditions (and antiquated laws¹³)

⁴ Rehnuma Binte Mamun and Md. Wahiduzzaman, *A Penal Policy and provisions in Bangladesh: Some Issues of Concern*, PSC Journal, Feb 2015, Page 1.

⁵ International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, Asia Report No. 182, 11 December 2009, Page 1.

⁶ Dr. AKM Iqbal Hossain, *Challenges in Police Reform of Bangladesh: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, PSC Journal, Feb 2015, Page 49.

⁷ Interview at Thana in Chittagong October 2015

⁸ Dr. AKM Iqbal Hossain, *Challenges in Police Reform of Bangladesh: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, PSC Journal, Feb 2015, Page 49.

⁹ Interview at Dhaka One Stop Crisis Centre, October 2015

¹⁰ Interview in Dhaka MOHA, October 2015

¹¹ Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers Association, *Ending Impunity, Monitoring Report for the implementation of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act 2010*. Page 32.

¹² *From Evidence to Policy: Addressing Gender Based Violence against Women and Girls in Bangladesh*, ICDDR,B and Population Council, Jan 2013

¹³ International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, Asia Report No. 182, 11 December 2009, Page 1.

that encourage the police to serve the powerful¹⁴; low police-community ratios; and, a dysfunctional court system which sees delays in court hearings of up to 15 years¹⁵.

Aside from the specific issues facing women in the justice system, the BP does not have a good reputation for impartial service delivery. Transparency International's 2014 Annual Report reveals Bangladesh to be ranked 145th from the top and 14th from the bottom in a list of 175 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This report also recognises the work of a journalist who "unearthed how more than 1,000 police constables secured jobs using fake addresses and identities¹⁶". This perception of corruption extends to the community with 75% of respondents to the PRP II Public Opinion Survey in 2015 stating that they think police in general are engaged in various types of corrupt practices. Importantly however, only 13% of the same respondents had actually paid a bribe to police. While this would indicate that the public perception in some ways is inconsistent with the reality, corruption remains a significant barrier to police service delivery.

However, the landscape has shifted for the BP in the last five years. PRP II made attempts to address recommendations made by various external reports. Of the 11 recommendations made in 2009 by the International Crisis Group in their report¹⁷, at least some progress has been made in relation to six.

1. Increasing the period between BP staff rotations: With advocacy and support from PRP II, there has been a directive circulated requesting that Community Police Officers (CPOs) be exempt from transfers for three years¹⁸ in order to allow them to build relationships with the community.
2. Increasing salaries: Another positive change for police has been an increase in salaries and ranks although the PRP does not claim any credit for this.
3. Increasing the number of women in the BP: There has been a significant increase in the number and ratio of female police¹⁹.
4. Modernise training methods: According to all key informants, the training for police has improved substantially in terms of methods, subjects and curriculum and professional development abroad.
5. Increase the number of PRP supported Thanas: A major accomplishment of the PRP has been to increase the number of PRP supported Thanas to 35. The BP also adopted the "blueprint" of the PRP supported stations to use as the design for building 101 new stations at a cost to GoB of USD\$84 million.
6. Work more closely with local community and police to ensure that CPFs have meaningful female representation and include human rights activists where possible: The support to Community Policing Women's Forums in Bera and Bogra districts are a significant achievement and the district CPF in Cox's Bazar includes at least one human rights lawyer.

¹⁴ ibid

¹⁵ Interview in Dhaka PRP, October 2015.

¹⁶ Transparency International Bangladesh Annual Report 2014, Page 21

¹⁷ International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 2009

¹⁸ Directive sighted Dhaka October 2015

¹⁹ From 1.87% in 2008 to 6.04% in 2014

Along with these achievements are the now sustainable Victim Support Centres, eight of which are now operating around the country providing comprehensive services from police and NGOs to victims of crime and vulnerable women and children.

In addition to supporting other donors such as GIZ, DFID directly supports two other justice sector activities; The Justice Sector Facility which aims to strengthen sector wide dialogue, planning and coordination for sectoral reform and to pilot improved case management and processing. The other is a Community Legal Services Project designed to increase poor people's access to community-level legal services. Other donors have and are supporting related programmes such as the One Stop Crisis Centre, which is a hospital-based multi-ministry programme to support female victims of violence (funded by Danida), but the PRP has been the first programme to have ever worked closely with the Bangladesh Police – so closely as to have its office embedded in police headquarters. This has had many advantages associated with proximity and senior level ownership of some PRP supported reforms but has also posed some risks and questions around the ability of the programme to be able to challenge the BP effectively or keep sight of the ultimate beneficiaries – the community²⁰.

²⁰ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, *Review of UK Development Assistance for Security and Justice*, Report 42, March 2015

3. UNDP response and challenges

This section outlines the response of the PRP II to the development challenges and includes a brief description of the outputs and focus areas of each component.

As noted in section 1, there was no Theory of Change or Program Logic developed for the PRP II which made it difficult to understand how the work of the Programme was expected to lead to outcomes. Without the program logic being clear, the other preconditions for change or reform, and importantly the responsibility for these, were also only implied rather than stated, and much less agreed between stakeholders. An example of a simple police reform program logic is attached at Annex 6. This shows, among other things, the types of preconditions that would need to be in place to achieve the type of reform desired, some of which PRP II has contributed towards.

PRP II's contributions to addressing the problems of the justice sector are as follows:

Component 1: STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM

Planned outputs for this Component include:

- 1.1 Organisational and structural change to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the Bangladesh Police and meet contemporary policing requirements based on human rights standards and the principle of rule of law
- 1.2 Planning, policy and research capabilities of the Bangladesh Police and MOHA strengthened to support strategic reform based on planning, budgeting and performance measurement
- 1.3 Oversight and accountability mechanisms strengthened
- 1.4 Improved strategic partnerships and communication between Bangladesh Police and civil society, public and other government agencies to support police reform

To address the issues of the antiquated law, Component 1 focused on supporting the process for the Draft Police Act 2013 (to replace the Police Act of 1861). The draft law has not proceeded further from MOHA however and is unlikely to do so in the short to medium term²¹. This piece of legislation is critical to any sustainable reform in the BP as the current law is considered to be a major obstacle to BPs "transformation from a police force to a police service"²²

This component also supported the development of the previous and current Bangladesh Police Strategic Plan (2012-2014) which has been extended until the end of 2015. The programme deliberately played a minor role in supporting the development of the content of the current Plan however, aiming to increase the ownership of the Plan by the BP. The PRP provides a high level of support for activities involved in five of the 10 priority areas; Crime Management, Community Policing, Training, ICT and Service Delivery Management.

Human rights training and awareness has also been a key output of this component with 3,524 Public Order Management Commanders trained²³ as well as a cadre of 57 trained Human Rights Trainers from within the ranks of the BP. Human rights pocket guides, posters and a training manual were developed with support of the PRP and many distributed to police units (while not

²¹ Interview with MOHA, October 2015

²² PRP, *From a Force to a Service; Police Reform in Bangladesh*, 2015

²³ PRP Project Closure Report, forthcoming.

formally BP approved). The Human Rights Training Handbook is used by the Police Academy and in-service colleges but has not been formally adopted as curriculum.

The Bangladesh Citizens Charter has been approved by MOHA and has been distributed to police units.

A relatively modest amount of USD\$1,740,786 was spent (to August 2015) delivering activities under this component.

Component 2: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING

Planned outputs for this Component include:

- 2.1 Professional and dedicated Human Resource Department established
- 2.2 HRM policies, structures, systems and procedures updated to promote transparent and merit based recruitment
- 2.3 Comprehensive improvement in capacity to deliver competency based training

Reducing enablers of corrupt practices in recruitment and promotions was one of the aims of providing support to the new HRM system in Component 2; the Personnel Information Management System (PIMS). However, the results of this new system are yet to be realised as it is still being rolled out. In addition, structural reforms that include the establishment of a dedicated Human Resource department within BP and welfare help desks for police have the potential to assist with improving the working conditions for BP members.

Based on Training Needs Analyses (TNA), modernising the training content, methods and curriculum was a key focus of the whole PRP II, but specifically in Component 2. Across the PRP II more than 50,000 people (12% women), including community members (31%), were trained on a range of subjects.

In addition to training organised, delivered, or jointly delivered at the Police Staff College in Dhaka and other venues (236 courses), the PRP supported the re-establishment of functioning in-service training centres along with standard operating procedures (SOPs)²⁴. PRP II also supported the Detective Training School and the establishment of the Forensic Training Institute, which now operates sustainably with no external support.

Of the nine training manuals and handbooks developed under this component, none have been formally approved but six have been used for training at national police training institutes.

The total expenditure under this component (to August 2015) was USD\$2,825,660

Component 3: INVESTIGATIONS, OPERATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

Planned outputs for this Component include:

- 3.1 Investigation and prosecution processes begin to shift from confession to hard evidence based procedures
- 3.2 Investigation capacity for both general and specialised crime improved in particular for crimes against women and children, human trafficking, sexual abuse / assault, serious and emerging crime, counter terrorism, financial and cyber crime

²⁴ PRP II reports

- 3.3 Improvement in criminal intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination
- 3.4 More effective working level collaboration between police and the judicial system

Improved technical capability and professional investigations under Component 3 were designed to lift the BP out of inefficient and outdated systems that contribute to rights violations of suspects and accused, and hinder detection and investigation of crime.

Training in investigations and crime scene management was delivered to more than 4,000 investigators and investigation equipment was purchased and delivered to all stations where trained investigators were stationed. This investigation expertise is designed to reduce the reliance on confessions and verbal testimony by introducing physical evidence gathered from crime scenes.

Support to CID under this component led to more effective cooperation and a better outcome for the investigation as demonstrated in two high profile examples: one in which a paedophile network was disrupted and the other the murder of a diplomat. In the first case, the BP was able to cooperate with international police agencies and contribute valuable forensic information to the case²⁵. In the latter case, improved ballistics capability contributed to the arrest of the offenders²⁶.

PRP provided technical support throughout the procurement process of a fingerprint database (AFIS) and financed the procurement of a ballistics database (ABIS) during Phase I. PRP supported the BP to promote greater use of these two databases during Phase II through a fingerprint collection initiative and by extending support and providing refresher training for ABIS. Achievements of this component also include the approved SOPs on crime scene management and the approved guidelines on arrest and detention. A *crime scene management course - guidelines for supervisors* was also formally approved and has been embedded in the Forensic Training Institute. This component supported a comparatively large number of training manuals on a range of topics but half (n=9) have not been approved or embedded.

The total expenditure under this component (to August 2015) was USD \$3,434,211

Component 4: CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY POLICING

Planned outputs for this component include:

- 4.1 Community Policing philosophy is integrated into policing operations at all levels nationwide
- 4.2 Effective community policing forums
- 4.3 Improved access to justice through refurbishment and ongoing support to women friendly model Thana

Component 4 relates directly to the issue of weak community engagement and distrust of the police, and the work undertaken in this component has aimed to build structures (both physical buildings and organisational structures), establish guidance and mechanisms to support increased positive community engagement between the BP and the most vulnerable people in the community. This is important as the delivery of police services depends on demand for police services as well as supply.

²⁵ Interviews with partner police, September 2015

²⁶ Interviews with BP, September 2015

PRP has supported the construction of six whole new police station (Thana) buildings and 29 service delivery centres have been refurbished in order to increase the access and use of the Thana by female police and community members (including women) and to assist police to “improve.. their public image”²⁷. In addition to the physical improvements, this component delivered training for police posted at these “model” Thanas in various subjects such as investigation, community policing and gender sensitive policing.

Mobility assistance was provided by PRP in the form of vehicles, motorbikes and bicycles to enable police to more easily travel to communities.

The Bera and Bogra examples demonstrate different models of women’s community policing forums (CPFs) supported by PRP II; one through the support of an NGO and the other through direct support to local women in the community and the relevant CPOs. Including these women’s CPFs, PRP has provided financial and technical support to 3,024 CPFs around Bangladesh²⁸.

Underpinning the approach of community policing PRP supported the development of a Community Policing Strategy that is awaiting final review from the MOHA. This document is among six developed under this component, none of which have been formally approved but are “in use” by either the PRP or police units²⁹.

Unsurprisingly, given the inclusion of infrastructure, this component was by far the biggest investment of the PRP II at USD\$7,518,761.

Component 5: PROMOTING GENDER SENSITIVE POLICING

Planned outputs for this Component include:

- 5.1 The participation of women in Bangladesh Police is increased at all ranks and progressively more women are represented in positions of authority
- 5.2 Gender awareness increased
- 5.3 Improved victim support services

Component 5 had a dual focus of trying to address inequalities for women through; increasing the number and representation of women in the BP (and improving their experiences in the workplace) as well as improving the availability of victim-sensitive services to women and child victims of crime by the establishment of Victim Support Centres (VSCs). The intended impact of increasing female police is interlinked with victim support – if female police are visible in the stations (or VSCs) then more women will feel comfortable reporting crime, and receive a more sensitive response.

The PRP has supported the establishment of the Bangladesh Police Women’s Network (BPWN) in 2009 and all female police in the BP are automatically members of this organisation. PRP II supported the BPWN to host and attend international and national conferences and has assisted the network to become a sustainable entity. In addition to its lobbying role the BPWN operates a 24 hour helpline for members to call for assistance or advice on issues they are facing as female police officers. The BPWN has campaigned and lobbied the BP Policy Group for increases in the number and ratio of female police in the BP at all levels.

²⁷ ibid

²⁸ ibid

²⁹ PRP documentation

The number and percentage of female police has risen dramatically in the years since 2008. The increase from 1.8 % in 2008 to 6.04% in 2015 is an increase of 223% which contrasts with only a 52% increase in women in the civil service more broadly over a similar time period. While the contribution of PRP or the BPWN to this rise is difficult to establish, this large variation in percentage increases would indicate that the BP, BPWN and PRP may have played a role.

PRP has supported the establishment of eight VSCs around Bangladesh and one Women's Support and Investigation Division (WSID) attached to the VSC in Dhaka. The WSID is tasked with investigating cases presenting at the VSC. The VSCs operate with a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with 10 NGOs to provide medical, legal, psycho-social and other services to victims – the first ever arrangement of this kind between police and civil society. The VSCs have served around 4,000 victims since the first one opened in 2009 and the WSID have investigated 1,352 cases³⁰. Victim Support Centre Guidelines have been formally approved and are in use in the VSC but the other six documents (training and strategy) under this component have not been approved despite being in use by the programme.

The total expenditure for this component (until August 2015) was USD\$2,074,791.

Component 6: INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TECHNOLOGY

Planned outputs for this Component include:

- 6.1 ICT Master Plan informs a cost effective and structured approach to the acquisition, installation and application of ICT
- 6.2 Crime response and prevention improved through better use of information and intelligence
- 6.3 Community safety enhanced through appropriate application of ICT infrastructure and training

Component 6 aimed to address problems relating to inefficiencies and the technology needs of modern policing, including assisting with infrastructure to connect all Districts to a central Criminal Data Management System (CDMS). In Dhaka Metropolitan Police a Suspect Identification and Verification System was developed and implemented

PRP assisted with a number of pieces of equipment such as passport readers, portable devices for travel documents, cybercrime equipment, two crime and suspect analysis systems and a records management system in addition to training in the use of these.

Of the six documents (training and guidelines) developed under this component, all have been formally approved and excepting the Basic ICT Training manuals, all are in use. This contrasts with the other components which the majority of materials developed have yet to be formally approved.

Also supported by PRP was strategic planning and structural advice for ICT which resulted in a permanent business roles approved by MOHA and the Ministry of Finance. An ICT Master Plan was developed and submitted to the relevant BP managers.

An ICT Service Desk and Application Support Unit were established with support from PRP II.

³⁰ Interview with PRP, Dhaka September 2015.

There has been a high level of input and activity resulting in some sustainable structural outputs but any outcomes or impacts of these were not reported in programme documents nor offered by key informants.

Total expenditure for this component (up until August 2015) was comparatively high at USD\$4,708,940

Overall, programme management expenses up until August 2015 totalled USD\$5,045,583 which was around 18% of the total expenditure.

The total budget for the PRP Phase II was approximately USD\$29 million and GoB in-kind contribution was USD 1.9 million.

4. Contribution to results

This section analyses the findings of the evaluation against the key evaluation questions. The Effectiveness question is the highest priority and therefore warrants greater attention and detail under each component heading describes the level of achievement of the key outcomes, the level of achievement of targets set in the PRP II's M&E system and the extent of achievement of planned outputs. The factors affecting achievement or non-achievement are discussed in the narrative.

4.1. Findings against KEQs

1. Effectiveness: To what extent did the Police Reform Program attain its key outcomes?

Score: Medium

- a. To what extent were the key outcomes achieved?
- b. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the key outcomes?

While the PRP II achieved or partially achieved a number of outputs and reached some of the targets set out in the Programme's M&E system (around a third), it only partially achieved the Key Outcomes from each Outcome Area (Component). The Programme scored relatively well each year in the DFID annual Reviews (scoring three "A"s and one "A+") and received generally favourable reviews throughout its lifetime. The main exception was the recent Independent Commission for Aid Impact report (March 2015), which questioned the programme's strategy and outcomes within the broader context of police reform internationally. The programme's progress was described in the reports to the programme's Steering Committee. Of the six "top expected results for 2013" outlined in the Programme Steering Committee Minutes³¹, for every single one, progress/results are described as "fully achieved". This would naturally lead relevant stakeholders to feel confident about the progress of the programme. However it would seem that there was a disconnect between the annual goals and expected top results and the overall project goals and the Steering Committee was content with reports against the lower level annual goals rather than the overall project goals.

Findings of "fully achieved" seemed to be based on the descriptor of "improved" or "increased" in which any level of improvement would be viewed as achievement. The realisation of actual reform or outcomes requires an understanding of how much increase or improvement there needs to be. The PRP II targets did not appear to be based on a clear understanding of how much change would be needed to achieve key outcomes and the indicators and targets vary in quality and relevance.

Overall, the major factor in the achievement of some outputs and targets was considered to be the good relationship with the BP which provided a high degree of ownership of some of the PRP supported reforms³². Other reasons include the ability of the PRP II to harness drivers and champions of change already underway, for example with regard to increasing numbers of

³¹ 7th PSC minutes

³² Interviews September/October 2015

women in the BP, and use this momentum to support the development of good practice tools and guidance³³. Finally, the PRP was heavily engaged in the achievement of *deliverables* such as procurement, building, training and capacity development, and development of guidelines/tools/strategies/manuals/systems; activities in which the programme seemed to excel, but for which it was then the responsibility of the BP to a) formally endorse/adopt, b) use to *change their performance* (ie, realise outcomes) and c) provide the supervision and leadership to ensure compliance. Only 12 of the 59 documents developed by PRP have been formally approved (20%). The other documents are reportedly variously in use anyway (without approval), or are not part of the BP training or guidance.

In terms of changing behaviour, the transition from inputs and outputs to outcomes is where the effects of overly ambitious expectations are most visible. The results of the Public Opinion Survey in 2015 revealed that public perceptions of police performance and community engagement, particularly police at the PRP supported Thanas, is in fact worse than previous years. Overall satisfaction with police investigation and services has reduced from 65% in 2014, to 47% in 2015, although “overall satisfaction” with local Thana police increased from 75% to 84% since 2011.

Public opinion surveys are problematic, however, as they do not accurately reflect the performance of police with any certainty. Perceptions of police behaviour are affected by the media, public events such as elections, and PR campaigns among other things (the disparity between perceptions of corruption and actual bribe paying being a case in point, although the perceptions are still concerning). Most people do not have a great deal of interaction with police other than to see them doing traffic duty or learn about them in the press (usually in a negative way). A more accurate description of police performance would perhaps be a gained from those accused of crime or those victimised by crime who come into direct contact with law enforcement, but even then, treatment of victims and suspects is only one aspect of police performance. Other important aspects are professionalism, skill, compliance with applicable rules and procedures, and good practice. The losers in a court case are unlikely to speak favourably of their treatment by the justice system regardless of how professional and lawful it was.

The justice system is a very complex system in which to measure improvements. Interdependencies between the law, police, courts, prisons and the community, means that even if there are improvements in one area, unless there are also improvements in others, any effects will be hard to see for example, effects of improvements in investigations can be compromised by delays in trials. Community attitudes to gender based violence compromises the effects of improvements in treatment of victims of crime because attitudes prevent victims from reporting. Improvements in detection and prosecution of crime will lead to more overcrowding in prison unless prison conditions are also improved...etc. Indicators of success are notoriously difficult – does an increase in reported crime reflect positive or negative trends? Are increased convictions a sign of stronger investigations or a weakness in the courts? Some of these issues go partway to explaining why seeing results or outcomes in police development continues to be a challenge.

While evaluation informants generally agreed that police performance had improved, all noted that this was not consistently achieved. Some suggested that Bangladesh police know how to do their jobs well (during UN missions for example), just not in Bangladesh because the BP has the mindset of being the “master” not the “servant”³⁴. Other informants suggested that the BP

³³ Comments from the Outcomes Analysis Workshop, October 2015

³⁴ Interview with BP representative, September 2015

systems, protocols and procedures all work against the improvement of police performance and until these institutional aspects change, any type of reform encouraged through training and capacity building is unlikely to make a difference³⁵.

The explanation for the only partial achievement of the Key Outcomes was that they were too ambitious for the timeframe and budget. USD\$29 million over 5 years as per initial project document is not a great deal, especially when considering the scale of the task at hand (and the budget of the BP). Other hindering factors recognised by the DFID 2012 Annual Review and the 2012 Mid-Term Review remain as major obstacles to change:

1. Limited human resources (ratio of 1:1052) and the majority at non-decision-making levels - two thirds of BP establishment are constables.
2. Continuous transfer and rotation of police – meaning that they can never build or use relevant specialist skills or relationships with communities.
3. Lack of legislative reform in key areas – resulting in ongoing barriers to police developing a service-orientation and escaping political interference.

These structural issues are areas that the PRP II has limited ability to influence in the timeframe and within the existing political environment.

Major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of key outcomes under each component are as follows:

Component 1 - Strategic direction and organisational reform

Key intended outcome: Strategic direction and organisational reform supported by planning and budgeting, enhanced accountability and oversight and a modernised legislative framework.

To what extent were the Key Outcomes achieved? This component was challenging and despite continued advocacy from PRP and the Bangladesh Police, the Draft Police Act 2013 has not progressed from MoHA to other Ministries for wider consultation. Human Rights training was well received and a cadre of 57 human rights trainers has been established but their ongoing delivery of training is in doubt. Comments made by some BP key informants were that there have been improvements in the way police handle detainees in custody, however it was noted that this was not widespread. The development of the 2012-2014 Strategic Plan was a process owned by the BP and the Plan is in use. Two of the ten documents developed by PRP II under this component have been formally approved.

Overall some strategic direction was supported but there have been limited observable outcomes with regard to enhanced accountability and oversight or any changes in the legislative framework.

| Key Outcome | Comments | Extent of achievement |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|
| Strategic direction and organisational reform supported by planning and budgeting, enhanced accountability and oversight and a modernised legislative framework. | The delays in considering legislation significantly impacted on the achievement of this outcome | Limited ³⁶ achievement |
| M&E Indicators ³⁷ | Target | Extent of achievement |

³⁵ Interview with partner police, September 2015

³⁶ The assessment scale is a three point scale: Limited (less than half the expected achievement), Partial (not fully achieved), Achieved.

| Progress towards a modernised legislative framework for the Bangladesh Police | Fully achieved would be 18 points | 7 points (limited achievement) |
|--|--|---|
| % of public that know how to make a complaint against the police in the case of wrong doing | Target in 2014 was 45% | 30% in 2015 (was 25% in 2011) (limited achievement) |
| Planned outputs | Comments | Extent of achievement |
| 1.1 Organisational and structural change to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the Bangladesh Police and meet contemporary policing requirements based on human rights standards and the principle of rule of law | Some structural changes, not yet reaching contemporary policing requirements | Partial achievement |
| 1.2 Planning, policy and research capabilities of the Bangladesh Police and MOHA strengthened to support strategic reform based on planning, budgeting and performance measurement | Strategic plan 2012-2014 developed but no future plan | Partial achievement |
| 1.3 Oversight and accountability mechanisms strengthened | Citizens Charter approved | Limited achievement |
| 1.4 Improved strategic partnerships and communication between Bangladesh Police and civil society, public and other government agencies to support police reform | Some partnerships with NGOs developed under component 5 | Limited achievement |

What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?

The adoption of the draft Police Act 2013 is not on the horizon, mainly because vested interests are preventing this from occurring. It is, however, a crucial piece of legislation needed as a precursor to police reform, so this is a significant barrier. What the PRP could have done to ensure the approval of this new law is not clear, except one stakeholder suggested it was a timing issue. Had a reform oriented government been in place, the law may have been passed. This is not the case, however, in the current political climate.

While human rights training has been well received, common feedback from informants was that it was too short to change police behaviour. The course has not been approved formally but is reportedly being used in the national training institutes. One human rights trainer reported that she would not be able to continue to deliver the course after PRP has finished so it would appear that the some gains made are not sustainable.

The evaluation team was not able to get an understanding of why there was no plan to extend the strategic plan or develop a new one post 2015.

Component 2 – Human Resource Management and Training

Key intended outcome: Human Resource Management systems and structures strengthened and training capacity enhanced to produce more competent and professional police

³⁷ All of these indicators are from the PRP's own M&E system and the quality and relevance is variable. These results should be viewed within the context of the evaluation findings overall.

To what extent were the Key Outcomes achieved: Almost all informants reported an improvement in training being delivered to police since PRP began, including the content and methods of training. Some informants have gone as far as to report great success in delivering training to other BP members and assert improved performance due to the new skills³⁸. The PRP II training reached around 37,600 BP officers (amounting to about 20% of staff that included workshops and overseas training). In addition to police, the training of village police was also delivered under this component and both village police and CPOs report that this has been instrumental in improving the preservation of crime scenes and improved the communication between the BP and the Village Police. Improved cooperation between Village Police and station police is a promising achievement due to the low ratios of police to community, and the role the village police play in local dispute resolution.

Also considered a highlight of this component was the inroads made to the BP's HRM system through support to the development of a Personnel Information Management System (PIMS). Informants reported that when operational, the PIMS can be used by decision-makers to approve promotions and training opportunities as well as record postings and keep track of BP personnel; thereby avoiding situations that enable corruption.

Overall evidence showed that training capacity has been enhanced, but this is yet to have a measurable widespread impact on BP service delivery. New HRM systems have the potential to assist with improved decision making and reduced corruption but there is no evidence of this yet.

| Key Outcome | Comments | Extent of achievement |
|--|---|--------------------------|
| Human Resource Management systems and structures strengthened and training capacity enhanced to produce more competent and professional police | Structures improved and training strengthened but further reforms needed to achieve competent and professional police | Partial Achievement |
| M&E Indicators | Target | Extent of achievement |
| Progress towards a centralised Human Resource unit in the BP with adequate functions | 5 points | 5 points (achieved) |
| # of people / professionals who annually benefitted from reform related (PRP) training and capacity building interventions | 4,000 (2014) | 11,574 (2014) (achieved) |
| Planned outputs | Comments | Extent of achievement |
| 2.1 Professional and Dedicated Human Resource Department established | Department established | Achieved |
| 2.2 HRM policies, structures, systems and procedures updated to promote transparent and merit based recruitment | Development of PIMS but yet to be rolled out | Partial achievement |
| 2.3 Comprehensive improvement in capacity to deliver competency based training | Improvements noted | Achieved |

What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?
Improved training capacity is undeniably a positive outcome. However training is not a stand-

³⁸ Interviews with BP trainees, October 2015

alone solution, or even in combination with other support³⁹, and there were some factors which may have impacted on widespread performance change:

- Most senior level (Superintendents - SPs) received limited training because they were simply not available. SPs have a very demanding role in the structure of the BP and are generally not able to delegate or take time out for training.
- Most junior BP members (Constables) were not targeted for training because in the structure of the BP, they have very limited ability to make any decisions and rely on instructions from ASPs and SIs. However, constables make up over two thirds of the BP so without them, sufficient coverage (dosage) to reach a tipping point is hard to achieve.
- The training courses were considered by informants to be too short and it is only recently that some PRP training has been included in training institutes – it is too soon to see any effect. Other curriculum remains traditional with a heavy focus on non-democratic policing.
- The training program in some ways was responsive rather than strategic – responding to TNA but without a strategic goal that would see training sitting among a range of steps towards institutional change.
- Antiquated laws, rules and procedures that are inconsistent with new skills and reforms remain in place as barriers to the implementation of new behaviour.
- Staff rotation policies that take trainees out of roles that they were trained for on a regular basis are a major barrier to trainees practicing new skills.

The PIMS seems to offer great promise to assist the BP manage its establishment, recruitment, promotions, training and postings. There are concerns however. While the PIMS is connected in more than 100 police units, we have yet to see evidence of how useful it will be when fully implemented or whether there will be unforeseen barriers. The second concern is the protection of privacy of individual BP members' information and whether there are sufficient safeguards in place to protect personal information. Moving from a standalone to a web-based platform brings inherent risks that need to be carefully mitigated well before the systems go 'live'. Finally, the link between this database and improved police service delivery for the community is a long one with many other reforms, including to leadership, needing to be in place. Installing an HRM database without sufficient attention to the overarching strategy regarding HRM reform is possibly a diversion.

Component 3 – Investigations, operations and prosecution

Key intended outcome: Improved police operations, investigations, and prosecutions to enhance fair and equitable justice

To what extent were the Key Outcomes achieved: There has been substantial work done in this component and the role and profile of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) has elevated due, in part, to the attention of PRP II. The results of this work include an 89% increase in physical exhibits being collected by police and sent to the forensic laboratory⁴⁰, the development of a fingerprint database (AFIS), a ballistics database (ABIS) and improvements in the training and sustainability of the Forensic Training Institute.

³⁹ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, *Review of UK Development Assistance for Security and Justice*, Report 42, March 2015

⁴⁰ PRP annual data

Overall, some police operations have improved and there is evidence that some high profile and other serious criminal investigations have benefitted from improved skills and equipment. However, due to the scale of barriers to improvements in prosecutions such as trial delays and the outdated Evidence Act, as well as structural problems with the BP regarding the low proportion of investigators, there is limited evidence of broader changes to the fairness or equity of justice.

| Key Outcome | Comments | Extent of achievement |
|---|--|---|
| Improved police operations, investigations, and prosecutions to enhance fair and equitable justice | Some evidence of improved investigations and CID capacity but not widespread | Partial Achievement |
| M&E Indicators | Target | Extent of achievement |
| % of people who reported a crime to the police in the last two years that are satisfied with police investigation and services received | 55% in 2014 | 65% in 2014, 47% in 2015 Baseline was 50% in 2011 (limited achievement) |
| % of police officers that are “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with the quality of crime scene management | 66% in 2014 | 81.2% in 2013 (investigators only) (achieved) |
| % of all crime scenes visited per year by an investigator where a crime scene kit was used to collect evidence | 15% in 2014 (model thana) 10% in 2014 (non-model thana) | 4.25% (model thana) 10.41% (non-model thana) (partial achievement) |
| Planned outputs | Comments | Extent of achievement |
| 3.1 Investigation and prosecution processes begin to shift from confession to hard evidence based procedures | Indications are that this is beginning to occur in some areas | Partial achievement |
| 3.2 Investigation capacity for both general and specialised crime improved in particular for crimes against women and children, THB, sexual abuse / assault, serious and emerging crime, counter terrorism, financial and cyber crime | CID capacity improved but not yet BP generally | Partial achievement |
| 3.3 Improvement in criminal intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination | Work on this was suspended | Partial achievement |
| 3.4 More effective working level collaboration between police and the judicial system | Training conducted for court officers but police prosecutors role changed | Limited achievement |

What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?

The increases in evidence being collected is not being seen at the court level yet (although this may be a timing issue), and the evidence itself is not generally being collected using the investigation kits provided to all stations. Some items in the kits are useful such as the crime scene tape, cameras and gloves, but the majority of equipment is not being used systematically⁴¹. Reasons given by informants include that the kits are not being kept where the investigators need them, trained investigators have been transferred, or due to a concern about the cost of replacement materials. Another two significant barriers are the limited number of

⁴¹ Interviews and observations September and October 2015

police whose role it is to investigate crime (only around 15,000⁴² out of 155,000), and the significant delays in the court process. Impacts of improvements in these technical areas are likely to be thwarted by the other systemic problems.

Component 4 – Community Policing

Key Intended outcome: Greater trust and interaction between the community and police, resulting in improved access to justice and human rights, in addition to a reduced fear of crime

To what extent were the Key Outcomes achieved: The replication of the original ‘model’ Thana design by BP for 101 new Thanas (a commitment of USD 85 million) is a very positive outcome and an indication of substantial leverage. The resulting improved facilities for service delivery and women’s change and rest rooms will mean that women who visit and work at the stations will have access to these. The placement of female officers is ensured in the PRP supported Thanas and the evaluation team’s observations confirmed the presence of between four and seven female police in PRP supported Thanas. In one of the PRP supported Thanas, the Community Policing Officer had been stationed there for four years⁴³ which was at least two years longer than in all of the other stations visited. This was a positive indication for building police – community relationships and the high number of calls reportedly from CPF members to that station daily seemed to support claims of this enhanced relationship.

The PRP supported Thanas generally did not fare well in the various public opinion surveys however with those Thanas scoring less satisfaction in some areas (43% dissatisfied in PRP supported Thanas versus 35% in control Thanas and dissatisfied with local Thana police performance at 13% for PRP supported Thanas versus 8% at control Thanas⁴⁴) and perceptions of corrupt behaviour (23% PRP supported Thanas versus 12% at control Thanas⁴⁵). Personal experience of crime while marginally higher in PRP supported Thanas was much less overall than in 2014 (13% in 2015 versus 48% in 2014) which is a positive sign among other less positive results.

The BP has established over 52,000 community policing forums which have the potential to increase community engagement. This component is one of two with the most potential to impact positively on the community (and the most marginalised) and the situation in the areas with effective CPFs is very promising. The evaluation team found that in the areas where the CPFs worked well the results were a win-win situation, with both sides benefitting from the engagement. In Bera and Bogra for example, women’s CPFs reported decreased fear of police and crime and improved self-confidence and status in the community. The women’s forums were handling, with support from police, important issues such as child marriage, drugs, domestic violence and school drop outs with some good results⁴⁶. Women reported in one village that when the police used to come to the village people ran away in fear, but now they work together and the police respond more quickly to requests for assistance⁴⁷. This sentiment is corroborated in the PRP’s rapid assessment on the Impact of Community Policing Forum and Police Support in 2014 where 72% of respondents said that CPFs impacted on developing more trust with the community “to a great extent”⁴⁸.

⁴² Interview with PRP, October 2015

⁴³ Chittagong Model Thana

⁴⁴ Public Opinion Survey on Personal Security and Police Performance, 2015

⁴⁵ *ibid*

⁴⁶ Meetings with CPFs in Bera and Bogra, October 2015

⁴⁷ *Ibid*

⁴⁸ Rapid Assessment on Impact of Community Policing Forum and Police Support, February 2014

It was also clear that the CPFs in some areas and their work with schools had a potential for community members to claim their rights from police through direct interaction. The evaluation team witnessed a student asking the police for advice as to what they should do during the 2-3 hour wait for police when police attendance was requested for a problem⁴⁹.

Overall, progress in this component is the most promising in terms of the impact on vulnerable people's lives but it is harder to see any impact through the public perception surveys. Only 9% of respondents had heard of CPFs and only 6% report having CPFs in their locality⁵⁰. The very positive observations of the evaluation team would indicate that this key outcome has been achieved in some localities where the CPFs are functioning well, for example the women's groups in Bera and Bogra and some of the CPFs in Cox's Bazar, but not more broadly.

| Key Outcome | Comments | Extent of achievement |
|--|---|--|
| Greater trust and interaction between the community and police, resulting in improved access to justice and human rights, in addition to a reduced fear of crime | In selected districts this has been achieved but not widespread | Partial Achievement |
| M&E Indicators | Target | Extent of achievement |
| % of 35 targets in the National Community Policing Strategy that are achieved | 66% in 2014 | 45.7% in 2014 (partial achievement) |
| % of members of the community policing forum that are women | 25% in 2013 | 14.9% in 2013 ⁵¹ (limited achievement) |
| Difference in % of people that are "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with police station services in model thanas compared to non-model thanas | +80% in 2014 | +1% in 2014 (limited achievement) |
| Planned outputs | Comments | Extent of achievement |
| 4.1 Community Policing philosophy is integrated into policing operations at all levels nationwide | CPFes established all around Bangladesh although extent to which it is integrated unclear | Partial achievement |
| 4.2 Effective community policing forums | Some CPFes are effective, some less so | Partial achievement |
| 4.3 Improved access to justice through refurbishment and ongoing support to women friendly model Thana | Refurbishment and replication of model by BP but behaviour change not observable | Achieved |

What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?

The lack of impact (or even negative impact) of the PRP supported Thanas on public opinions of police behaviour has been a disappointment. Possible reasons for the lack of observable behaviour change in PRP supported Thanas (other than the possibility that there is in fact no change in behaviour or negative change), include rotation of staff and sheer lack of numbers – the police to person ratio is so low that people are rarely going to see a police officer, let alone see a change in their performance over time. It is also not unreasonable to imagine that the expectations of the community of the police may well have increased with the improvements in the physical environment resulting in a worse than "no change" rating or at best no perceivable

⁴⁹ School visit facilitated by CPF Cox's Bazar, October 2015

⁵⁰ Public Opinion Survey on Personal Security and Police Performance, 2015

⁵¹ 2015 data not available

change. Better equipment and environs could also contribute to the community feeling that the PRP supported Thana police must be corrupt compared to the control Thanas that are unchanged and while generally clean, are quite run down.

When accounting for all of these factors it may appear to be a time lag before changes can be seen if support continues to train police and build more service delivery centres – that eventually a critical mass of police will have been trained and there will be enough of them to make a difference. However, without other reforms to legislation, out of date procedures, and most critically, a change in leadership and management culture at the station level which reinforces traditional ways of working, it is unlikely that widespread changes will be seen. In addition to the work that has been done, the police culture needs to change at a leadership level in addition to increases in accountability and the demand for professional, accountable police services.

Component 5 – Promoting Gender Sensitive Policing

Key intended outcome: Bangladesh police promote the rights of women and children to be free of fear through improved representation at all levels and the provision of equitable and sensitive policing and victim support services

To what extent were the Key Outcomes achieved: As noted in earlier sections, there has been an increase in female police since 2008 in larger proportions than the broader civil service although the link to the PRP II is not concrete. The successful Bangladesh Police Women’s Network (BPWN) could be a factor in encouraging women to join the police through campaigning, and its role in lobbying the BP policy group. Another factor could be the PRP supported Thanas and the VSCs providing a more female-friendly work environment and locations that need police women to staff them. Regardless of the factors, there is evidence of a significant increase in female police and they report feeling more confident at different levels in the BP. This is a positive sign for women coming to the station or VSC to report crime. The VSC and the role of the Women’s Special Investigation Division (WSID) in investigating crimes against women are outcomes of PRP most often cited by informants and this and the promotion of gender is considered to be a major success of PRP II. The significance of the establishment of the VSC in partnership with NGOs is unprecedented and the joint service has the potential to be a regional role model. NGOs currently provide free services to victims residing in the VSC in terms of legal support, counselling and psycho-social assistance, medical support and post-VSC longer term accommodation. Some important issues need to be addressed however, for this service to become a model of good practice.

Overall, this component objective has been achieved to some extent with some caveats about good practices around gender equity. There is a conceptual problem with the outcome description – promoting the rights of women to be free of fear is different to promoting the rights of women, or indeed the rights of women to be treated equally before the law, or the rights of women to be free of violence. This ambiguity about rights is perhaps causing confusion for those working with this component and its clarification could see better progress towards gender equity.

| Key Outcome | Comments | Extent of achievement |
|---|--|-----------------------|
| Bangladesh police promote the rights of women and children to be free of fear through improved representation at all levels and the provision of equitable and sensitive policing and | Improved representation at all levels and improvements in sensitive policing but limited use of VSCs and gender and rights concepts and protections need further review and refinement | Partial Achievement |

| victim support services | | |
|--|---|-------------------------------------|
| M&E Indicators | Target | Extent of achievement |
| % of women in the BP | 5% in 2014 | 5.26% in 2014 (achieved) |
| % of Bangladeshi that agree with the statement that “women are treated equally by the police” | 35% in 2014 | 27% in 2014 (partial achievement) |
| Number of victims the VSCs provide services per year | 7,000 (cumulative) 2014 | 4,026 to 2015 (partial achievement) |
| Planned outputs | Comments | Extent of achievement |
| 5.1 The participation of women in Bangladesh Police is increased at all ranks and progressively more women are represented in positions of authority | Increase of 255% and increases in all ranks | Achieved |
| 5.2 Gender awareness increased | Evidence of this can be seen with BP who have the most association with the PRP II but more gender expertise and knowledge of international good practice is needed | Partial achievement |
| 5.3 Improved victim support services | Improved but more victim support advisory expertise and restructure of VSCs needed to ensure victims rights upheld | Partial achievement |

What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?

While it has enormous potential, the VSC needs some adjustments for it to be consistent with international good practice (and women’s rights). The role and purpose of the VSC and its partners needs to be clarified and appropriate (non-police) expertise employed to manage the shelter part of the Centre and look after victims’ welfare. Currently the VSC serves as a marketing/PR/awareness raising vehicle (to raise awareness of the service to potential victims) as well as a victim reception and support centre and this is problematic both for the police and victims. The necessary expertise needed to provide appropriate victim support and protection is not possible to gain in a few days training program. Expecting police to play this role is doing them a disservice and is also potentially damaging to victims of crime who are often mentally ill and / or traumatised. NGOs play a critical support role in the VSCs but they are not currently doing the full time shelter management role. During the Outcomes workshop, the feedback from some stakeholders was that NGOs only contributed around 5% to the VSCs⁵². Feedback from the NGOs themselves included wanting an increase in the availability of non-police delivered services in the VSC⁵³. NGOs are underused in the VSCs.

While the awareness raising aspect of the work is of course very important, the rights of victims to privacy and dignity are being violated by the use of their stories and photos in marketing material and through the practice of “showing” the victims to various visitors to the VSC. The victim numbers are relatively low, most being referred by the police stationed nearby. Police outside the immediate vicinity report not using the VSC because it is too far away⁵⁴. Police bringing victims in to the VSC (without the victim’s explicit consent) could be argued by victim

⁵² Outcomes Analysis Workshop, Dhaka, October 2015

⁵³ Interview with NGOs VSC Chittagong, October 2015

⁵⁴ Interviews with police in districts, October 2015

advocates as victim detention. An absence of clear rules and procedures regarding victims rights to decline services, not cooperate with police and leave the shelter at any time, as well as the right not to be photographed or identified makes these services inconsistent with international good practice. One VSC reported that a child's mother accused the police of kidnapping and holding the victim against her will which, while relatively rare, is possible when victim-centred rules and procedures are not clear.

One report suggests that police women in uniform may be intimidating for victims, leading to low rates of use of the VSCs and that the model in western countries is to integrate police into other services like hospitals to make them more accessible⁵⁵. There is a service in Bangladesh using this model, the One Stop Crisis Centre (OCC), although it is exclusively for victims of violence. The numbers at the OCC were also quite low when considering the population (5-7 victims per day), reducing the likelihood that fear of police specifically prevents victims from seeking official help when victimised. However, other barriers clearly exist when the percentage of violence against women is as high as 60% of ever-partnered women.

Another issue of women's rights that was difficult to explore for the evaluation team was the right of police women not to work in the VSC or on women's desks in the stations. While all policewomen interviewed said they liked working at the VSC⁵⁶, there is a risk that women may not be offered other posts or promotions because of the need to fill VSC vacancies. There is a related risk of VSCs making victim support "women's work", and therefore less important than general policing. An awareness of these issues and risks is important, and a deliberate and balanced approach that mitigates risks to real gender equality is needed, as opposed to the optimistic but somewhat simplistic solution that the VSCs currently appear to be offering. It would be a shame if the BP were accused of using the VSCs as a public relations exercise to deflect public criticism but if the operational issues are not resolved this is indeed a risk.

Component 6 – Information, Communication and Technology

Key intended outcome: Bangladesh police makes progressive use of cost effective and sustainable information communication technology to provide better service to the community

To what extent were the Key Outcomes achieved? The ICT component was consistent with the BP's own priorities of modernisation and several important structures and plans were established and in some cases, embedded in the BP, without perhaps being finalised for long enough to see any impact. Of the 10 ICT targets listed in the BP strategic Plan 2012-2014, two were implemented, seven partially achieved and one not implemented. This state of affairs in ICT is indicative of a broader issue with ICT development; any sustainable reforms or improvements take many years, involve substantial investments of time and resources and often involve many "false starts" (trying things that turn out not to work, or that may work but not in the specific context). Rotation of staff (five heads of telecom in five years) and pilots that did not continue due to changes in staff reveal systemic barriers to sustainable change.

Issues such as expensive software licences and the discontinuation of lines of specialist equipment affected the use and sustainability of some deliverables⁵⁷.

⁵⁵ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, *Review of UK Development Assistance for Security and Justice*, Report 42, March 2015

⁵⁶ Unfortunately the evaluation team was not able to individually interview VSC staff in a private setting which may have elicited different answers

⁵⁷ Interviews with PRP, September 2015

Overall, the delivery of activities was generally high, but the outcomes of improved efficiency and widespread use of automated information are not yet visible beyond perhaps the CDMS which appeared to be in use in most stations visited. In Dhaka Metropolitan Police a Suspect Identification and Verification System was developed and implemented but there are no reports of outcomes of this new system. The scene has been set in some ways for progress in this area, although the certainty of link between improved ICT and better service provision to the community has not been tested.

| Key Outcome | Comments | Extent of achievement |
|---|--|--|
| Bangladesh police makes progressive use of cost effective and sustainable information communication technology to provide better service to the community | Some improvements in ICT use but limited evidence of better services to the community. This is due in part to the length of time ICT supported change takes and the importance of starting with governance systems | Partial Achievement |
| M&E Indicators | Target | Extent of achievement |
| Progress towards implementing an information management strategy for BP | 4 points in 2014 | 3 points in 2015 (partial achievement) |
| % of police officers that believe there is adequate ICT equipment in the workplace | 50% in 2014 | 13% in 2013 ⁵⁸ (29% in 2008) (limited achievement) |
| Planned outputs | Comments | Extent of achievement |
| 6.1 ICT Master Plan informs a cost effective and structured approach to the acquisition, installation and application of ICT | The master plan was developed and governance structures in place but some initiatives suspended | Partial achievement |
| 6.2 Crime response and prevention improved through better use of information and intelligence | Some achievements in border management and CDMS although use of information and intelligence is not clear | Partial achievement |
| 6.3 Community safety enhanced through appropriate application of ICT infrastructure and training | Some training delivered and infrastructure provided, the link to community safety is not clear | Partial achievement |

What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?

Issues with the use of new skills in the workplace apply to this component as to others. The rotation of BP members, despite PRP II having made significant investments to training is highlighted in the case of four members recently returning from six weeks specialised training in computer forensics in Canada (costing about USD 20,000 each) but only one of these trainees is doing work in IT now⁵⁹. Observations at stations also revealed that police trained in ICT were not given access to the station computer and the officer's new skills had therefore been forgotten⁶⁰.

⁵⁸ Investigators only. 80% (2014) of OCs in PRP supported Thanas believed that there was adequate ICT equipment (computer, printers etc.) available at the Thana as compared to 43.3% of OCs from other Thanas (Phone Poll of PRP supported and selected other Thanas). 2015: 89% of the respondents mentioned that ICT equipment and specialised program that they use is relevant to their jobs; 65.27% of respondents indicated that they have found ICT helpful in decision making.

⁵⁹ Interviews with PRP, September 2015

⁶⁰ Interviews at Nargsingdi, September 2015

2. Has PRP successfully leveraged its Partnerships with 1. Government Agencies. 2. Civil Society. 3. Relevant UNDP projects. 4. DFID Security and Justice Programmes. 5. Other Development projects in the sector.

Score: Medium to High overall

1. Government agencies: The PRP II leveraged a great deal of resources from its relationship with the BP. Financially the PRP's support arguably helped to leverage the significant investment by BP to construct 101 new Thanas (USD 84 million). Around USD 138,000 was saved by using BP venues for training and the office accommodation costs saved by the co-location arrangement were also substantial. The District Superintendent (SP) in Narsingdi used PRP ideas to successfully lobby the Narsingdi district administration for funds to construct a women's help desk at a non-PRP supported station. In terms of leveraging influence with government agencies, the Steering Committee could have been both more active and critical. The minutes from each meeting reveal very little critique of strategy or claims of progress – there is no discussion in the minutes of risks or challenges for example. Had there been more engagement on what was not going according to plan, there may have been more activity in terms of leveraging the required support for the consideration and approval of the new Police Act.
2. Civil society: The formal arrangements with the 10 supporting NGOs to provide free services to victims through the VSC is a national first and a very positive model for future engagement. Discussions with the NGOs revealed that the partnership provided mutual benefits – working cooperatively with the government agencies being part of NGOs' mandate and providing assistance to vulnerable groups being another major common factor. On the police side, the services provided by NGOs in the VSCs are invaluable, both while victims are in residence but also as a place to refer victims after their time at the VSC shelter runs out (5 days). Aside from actual service delivery, the relationship with NGOs also supports awareness raising campaigns and extends the reach of the BP into communities to raise awareness of the services provided by the VSCs. As noted earlier however, it would be more appropriate and effective for the NGOs to take greater responsibility for the shelter services in line with their mandates, and help the police to provide victim-centred protection, support, investigation and prosecution of crimes against women and children.
3. Relevant UNDP projects: The main partnership activities in relation to other UNDP projects was with the; Justice Sector Facility which worked together with PRP to address issues of backlogs in court. By collaborating on solving problems, the tendency to blame other agencies for problems is reduced. Although a small programme with limited scale, the lessons about what can be achieved, such as reduced backlog of cases, through cooperation between agencies in the justice sector are valuable. PRP has worked specifically with the Justice Sector Facility on reforms to the Evidence Act which is yet to be passed.
4. DFID security and justice programmes: The UK has committed to improving safety and justice for women and girls and the PRP has contributed to this, both at the village level where the women's CPFs are operating, but also due to the replication of the PRP constructed Thanas by BP, directly through the work of the VSC and the BPWN and the leveraged women's help desks at non-PRP supported Thanas. The ICAI Review of UK Development Assistance for Security and Justice calls for a more strategic approach to law and justice development, away from institutional support to improved service delivery and towards a problem solving approach to critical issues such as violence against women and girls. The lessons from the PRP II are highly relevant to the development of a

strategic approach based on problem solving moving forward, if this is the way DFID decides to go.

5. Other development projects in the sector: Several informants related the PRP's role in leveraging support and funds from other donors and agencies such as the Australian Federal Police (AFP). The AFP was able to provide free subject matter expertise to help train BP which would have otherwise been logistically difficult. The work on apprehending the child pornography ring was also made possible by the PRP's support to BP and international law enforcement cooperative relationships have now been established. Informants also described support from Japan to establish the DNA lab and from Korea for cyber-investigations – all of which has been easier to facilitate because of the PRP II. The existence of the PRP while facilitating engagement with other areas of support has perhaps precluded the BP from establishing its own network of strategic partnerships which will be important going forward. Currently the support provided seems to be opportunistic rather than strategic.

4.2. Findings regarding other evaluation criteria

4.2 1 Impact

Score: Medium to low

Is it reasonable to conclude that the programme has made a difference?

The PRP has made a difference to the members of the Bangladesh Police with whom it had the most contact. Members on lien from the BP to the PRP report significant changes both for the organisation and personally⁶¹. The key differences noted by these individuals are:

- to the content and delivery of training;
- to the capacity of CID and quality of criminal investigations;
- to gender sensitivity and services for women and children; and
- to the way accused and suspects are treated in stations.

Key informant interviews and the stakeholders involved in the Outcomes Analysis Workshop echoed the sentiments of this cadre of PRP/BP officers, adding improvements in access of the community to better facilities at Thanas and more effective community engagement as well as changes in the general mindset of some BP members towards a service mentality rather than an enforcement one. These incremental shifts require more time and more strategic leadership from within the BP and the government to make an observable impact.

The changes in governance structures within BP to support some reforms for example to CID, ICT and Human Resource Management will make a difference to the efficiency and professionalism of a modern police service, but currently there are systemic barriers in place that mean realising impact is not possible to achieve without addressing those.

The question of where the BP would be now without the support of the PRP II is a difficult one to ascertain with any degree of surety. There is no doubt that there would be an increase in the number and proportion of women in the BP without the PRP II; whether the increase would have

⁶¹ Most Significant Change stories collected from five serving members of BP in September and October

been as high is unknown. The civil service more generally did not see such a high rise in numbers and percentages of female staff. The fact that the BP had the new VSCs to staff and the BPWN exerting pressure is most likely a contributing factor of the PRP II to the scale of increase.

Some key informants⁶² when discussing BP's plans for the future described "hardware" type priorities in the next 5 year plan: buildings, infrastructure, CCTV, etc. rather than "software" such as that which would support reform. It is likely that without the PRP II, "hardware" would have been the focus of the last 5 years also.

To summarise: There have been some changes to the mindset, training and capacity of some BP members, increases in numbers of women in BP and services for women and children and positive changes to community engagement in some areas but measurable impact on police service delivery was thwarted by systemic barriers.

Who else helped?

The PRP II and the BP achievements and reforms were interwoven and it was difficult to separate one entity from the other when asking for information about changes and contribution. What appears to have happened is that the PRP II identified areas needing reform that were consistent with BP's plans, developed concepts for how support could be delivered to address barriers, provided technical, funding and logistical support for the first steps and then the BP did one of two things:

1. Embraced the reforms (as in the case with increased women's inclusion in the service, VSCs, some training and technology advances, and Community engagement mechanisms)
2. Accepted the support without being able progress the reforms or be able to address barriers to reforms (the draft Police Act, Evidence Act, BP staffing structure and management culture, and the majority of training and guidance documents 37 out of 59 documents not formally approved – but some are in use anyway)

In addition to the BP, civil society also played a role in driving and supporting reforms. The media were identified as a group with strong influence over the public image of the Police, driving the police to need to respond to criticism. NGOs have also helped implement reforms in terms of victim services and community engagement.

Was there a difference in the types of outcomes for men and women?

In the case of PRP II, the outcomes for women have been greater than men because of the focus on women both in the police and as community members. More women were trained proportionally (12.5% of trainees as opposed to 6.04% of the BP). Women have and will benefit the most from physical changes to police stations and the VSC services, when operating at full capacity with important victim-centred and rights-based procedures and operational arrangements, will make a dramatic difference to vulnerable women and children who need the service. Men have also benefitted, especially in terms of training and capacity building within the police and new equipment and logistical support provided by PRP II has no doubt made their work easier.

⁶² Interview with MOHA, October 2015

There is a risk of an unintended impact for female police regarding a possible restriction of their career options from needing to be posted to victim support roles. There also may be negative consequences for the victims presenting at the VSCs if their rights to privacy and non-cooperation are not acknowledged and enforced.

Which outcomes are likely to lead to impacts at the community level?

The two main areas that are likely to lead to impacts at the community level are in women's access to police and community engagement. As discussed, delivering improved services for victims of crime in terms of sensitivity and access will make a big difference to their experiences with the justice sector, although not necessarily their lives more broadly. The differences to their lives may be seen through strengthened community engagement between police and the most vulnerable in communities, and the CPFs have the potential to do this, with more time and ongoing leadership from BP. The current IGP is a supporter of community policing so it would be possible to harness this support to build on the successes of the women's CPFs in Bera and Bogra for example.

There is a difference between community policing and community engagement however. Community engagement (or community relations) is often a more informal approach that generally aims to develop the police/local community relationship in the first place (e.g. through open house days where community members are invited to come to the station and talk to police). In very general terms, only after the targeted 'relationship' is established can community policing initiatives be considered because a much deeper interaction is required to develop community policing initiatives. Some examples of community policing seen during the evaluation included community-based (informal) security services being used to apprehend or deter offenders and patrol businesses to prevent crime. Community engagement is more of a two-way process that involves the police investing time and energy in developing and maintaining relationships with the community (rather than outsourcing security services) and the success of community engagement is reliant on the *right* people being engaged, not just the strong, wealthy or powerful.

If there is a focus on community policing rather than community engagement there is a risk that an unintended consequence may be increases in the community providing informal police response or vigilantism, although the better relationship between the police and the community should in theory avert this possibility. All support to community level dispute resolution needs to be especially careful of striking the right balance between the community helping the police and the community doing the police's work.

What role did PRP play in achieving the identified outcomes and what role did others play?

PRP's role has been as a catalyst for change, which is an appropriate role for a development programme to take. Rather than lead change, the PRP has supported the BP through developing concepts, guidance, curriculum and procedures that the BP has the options to take forward. All of the implementation has been the role of the BP, and in the cases of VSC and some CPFs, with help from NGOs.

What conditions are needed to make this type of programme succeed?

It has been difficult to get a consistent picture of what success would look like for the PRP, in the timeframe, from different stakeholders. Improvements for the BP do not necessarily translate to justice for the most vulnerable in the community. What is needed is a clear understanding of the

theory of change (TOC) and the assumptions and risks inherent in achieving expected outcomes. The TOC needs to express the intermediate steps, ways of routinely measuring progress towards these, and clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders for activities and outcomes. Key milestones and essential preconditions and interdependencies to change need to be acknowledged and a strategy for achieving these agreed. Institutional change is difficult and very long term, especially from an advisory position. Focusing on problem solving or thematic areas such as violence against women would help to address the multiple barriers (at different levels and in different institutions) but without the strong relationships built from being embedded in the BP, the level of influence is likely to be less, the level of cooperation needed between agencies higher, and the scale of the reform needed greater. This would require an even more careful articulation of the TOC and more attention to roles of various actors in the community and justice sectors and a very high level of political will.

Sustainability

Score: Medium to high

To what extent will the benefits of the programme continue after funding ceases?

The high degree of ownership of some of the PRP outcomes by the Bangladesh Police increases the likelihood of sustainability of many benefits. For example there is now allocated ongoing BP budget for VSCs (8 in total) and Community Policing forums (over 52,000). The BPWN is also a PRP-initiated reform that will remain with funding from memberships. There is a general lack of clarity about whether the PRP or the BP were responsible for some outputs such as ICT systems – which is also a positive sign for sustainability, but presents risks in terms of quality control of certain outputs that need ongoing technical expertise.

The PRP has done well in some areas to embed training and structures that support reforms such as ICT, HRM, VSC and Community Policing but in the absence of a sustainability plan or exit strategy as recommended by the Mid Term Review, an understanding of the conditions necessary for sustainable reform is not clear. One of the reasons for this lack of forward planning could relate to the lack of a clear theory of change or understanding of the process towards the “end game”. Not everything needs to be sustainable but there should be an assessment of the factors necessary for sustainability and a clear strategy for progressing towards these.

To summarise: structures that support increased efficiency and some other reforms are likely to remain if they have been formally adopted. The VSC, BPWN and Community Policing mechanisms have the strongest likelihood of remaining as ongoing funded BP activities. Improvements to training are less likely to remain, although some courses have reportedly been embedded in the police academy.

Relevance

Score: Medium to High

The PRP II increasingly focused on the issues of gender, community engagement and human rights in the second half of the programme. These were highly relevant to the development problem, but without gaining any traction in key areas of reform such as the Police Act, changes in police service delivery have not been visible.

To what extent was PRP's approach suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor?

Target group - Community (most marginalised) – Being embedded in the Bangladesh Police has made the relevance of PRP to community needs less obvious than it is to police needs. The design of the PRP is partly responsible for this combined with the lack of clarity about the theory of change for ultimate beneficiaries. The design of the programme and its commitment to BP ownership of outcomes meant that it was the BP who decided what the priorities should be. The key confusion rests with the statement in programme documentation “The targeted beneficiaries of PRP II are the Bangladesh people, and in particular the Bangladesh Police, who will benefit from increased capacity, job satisfaction, improved morale, image and social standing”⁶³. The benefits described in this sentence do not lead to, or are even factors in relation to increased access to justice or human rights. Despite this, the outcomes of some community policing forums and victim support elements, if key risks mitigated and access scaled up, have the potential to contribute to real impacts relevant to community needs.

Recipient - Bangladesh Police - The high degree of ownership of the PRP by many in BP has meant that BP priorities have driven the planning to a large extent. PRP activities are largely consistent with the BP strategic plan, but there is a question of whether the Strategic Plan is really very strategic or focused on the most important reforms. For example the goals and targets are not weighted and the relationship between the areas or targets is not explained. There is no sequencing or discussion of risk. There were comments from stakeholders about some of the PRP training and technology outputs being “supply driven” rather than demand driven – and this is a factor in some of the less than expected results. There were also some comments that if the BP did not deliver the training, it was not seen as important⁶⁴.

Donors - UNDP and DFID – The recent ICAI report questions some of the strategies and policies around service delivery in justice sector reform and proposes a problem solving approach. The PRP has emphasised VSC and CP in the second half of the programme but in terms of strategy, remained mostly in the service delivery and institutional strengthening area. In future, opportunities exist for there to be a further refinement but as noted earlier, there are benefits and disadvantages of each approach.

Efficiency

Score – High

How efficiently did the PRP II deliver the programme?

The PRP was highly efficient in delivering activities and outputs and the management of the programme was generally praised by key informants. Significant savings were made in terms of office rental (over USD 500,000) by using the police HQ and using BP training facilities saved an additional USD 138,500. In terms of outcomes however, some outputs have not led to expected outcomes for reasons described in earlier sections. One informant questioned the PRP's use of hotels in some cases as training venues as opposed to the Staff Training College but the costs were very similar so savings would not have been made⁶⁵.

⁶³ Terms of reference for the Impact Assessment and Final Evaluation of the PRP Phase II

⁶⁴ Interview BP, October 2015

⁶⁵ Interviews with Police Staff College and PRP, September 2015

4.3. Lessons Learned

The PRP II Mid-Term Review outlined six key lessons, of which all are still relevant. It is important to add the learnings of the second half of Phase II.

MTR Lesson 1: Need for political will and determined leadership: Sustainable reform is difficult without political will and determined leadership.

PRP final evaluation lesson: Lack of political will for reforming the Police Act has effectively derailed that reform. While this is the reality, it is unclear what the PRP could have done to gain traction politically on that issue, other than abandon the relationship with the BP to build better relationships with MOHA. The relationship between MOHA and BP has impeded reform and cooperation and this issue should have been addressed at higher levels of the development Partnership. The good relationship between BP and PRP II came at a cost of the relationship with MOHA. All informants reported however that having the NPD from BP instead of MOHA overcame significant problems experienced in Phase I.

MTR Lesson 2: Recognise social and political realities. These realities are determinants that shape the extent to which reforms can be paced and pursued politically.

PRP final evaluation lesson: This lesson is an important one as it speaks to some of the barriers that prevent observable improvements in police service delivery at the Thana level. Again, what would “learning the lesson” mean in terms of how the PRP II could have addressed this issue? Lower expectations of outcomes in the timeframe perhaps, or targeting a smaller geographic area may have seen some observable changes. However, without addressing the staff rotations and transfers issue, the results would likely be similar.

MTR Lesson 3: Effective engagement is critical. The lesson is that it takes time to develop effective engagement between the PRP and stakeholders and beneficiaries.

PRP final evaluation lesson: This lesson was learned by the PRP II and in many ways the programme engaged more effectively with the BP than in Phase I, but this also meant limited engagement with others. “Effective” relationships are different to “good” relationships and in this context it means that both parties take responsibility for driving change and both parties acknowledge and address risks and challenges. There is evidence to suggest that this was largely the case between PRP II and the BP. The NPD was integrally engaged in the PRP II and led the cooperation from the BP side with professionalism and integrity. However, the Steering Committee mechanisms could have been strengthened to become more critical and strategic which would have seen a higher level of functioning.

MTR lesson 4: Progressive ownership and budgetary commitment. Sustainable reform requires incremental and progressive ownership and budgetary commitment.

PRP final evaluation lesson: This lesson has been learned by the PRP and the BP has taken ownership of, and allocated budget to some important reforms such as VSCs and Community Policing Forums, as well as the FTI. Informants reported that PRP concepts and ideas planted the seeds of change. Some of these seeds were then taken forward by the Bangladesh Police and gained significant momentum and a life of their own. There are benefits and trade-offs with this approach – high BP ownership means limited control of the outcomes or quality of outcomes by the PRP. It also means that the BP chose what to take forward and what to leave. In this way the PRP II tended to be more opportunistic than strategic in its design and implementation.

MTR lesson 5: Management of transition periods: Management of any transition period between phases is critical to ensure momentum.

PRP final evaluation lesson: This lesson still applies. There is no transition plan currently for any future engagement.

MTR lesson 6: Effective and efficient program management. A balance needs to be found between efficiency and timely, well planned and effectively monitored implementation.

PRP final evaluation lesson: This lesson still applies. The PRP was very efficient and delivered activities and outputs as scheduled. This may have contributed to a false sense of achievement of outcomes which needed other preconditions and/or more time to be in place. The achievement of activities and deliverables may have distracted attention from the harder, higher level, transformational expected outcomes. One of the common reasons programmes fail to achieve expected outcomes is a lack of understanding about the logic underpinning the programme. If this logic is not clear and tested regularly then the critical assumptions will often serve to thwart progress past a certain stage. If all the key preconditions to achieving outcomes are not articulated and part of the programme of reform, then progress will be hard to achieve. Having a clear logic helps you to be strategic rather than reactive or responsive, and it also helps programmes tell the story of change by increasing the effectiveness of M&E systems. The focus on outputs in PRP led the programme to reasonably believe that they were on track as noted earlier. What was less clear was whether the outputs were going to lead to outcomes and whether the outcomes would be the “right” ones to achieve desired reform. In other words, the assumptions did not hold true.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

Where there has been less than desired progress, many of the reasons are beyond the control of the PRP II. The challenge of access to justice is multifaceted; starting with under-reporting of crime by those who are vulnerable in community due to fear, corruption and cultural barriers; lack of an effective police response to crime due to lack of skill, policing traditions and antiquated laws that encourage the police to serve the powerful⁶⁶; low police-community ratios (1:1052); and, a dysfunctional court system which sees delays in court hearings of up to 15 years⁶⁷. Based on the CIA World Fact Book 2012 Bangladesh has the highest population density among large countries at 1,237.51 persons per square kilometre. This density results in major public order and public safety challenges for which the police are expected to be on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; keeping the community safe from harm. The Bangladesh Police work extremely hard and for long hours, but the questions raised by civil society and the media is whether they are working for the right people and doing the right things.

Other barriers and preconditions to reform would potentially have been identified had there been a program logic or theory of change agreed and assumptions tested and refined regularly. Whether identifying enablers and barriers would have changed the extent of outcome achievement is not clear, but it would have allowed the PRP II and BP to be more strategic. In the end however, police reform takes much longer than 10 years and a positive start has been made by the PRP-BP partnership.

The most promising sustainable reforms that are likely to impact on the community include advances in equality and justice for women both in the BP but also in the community and the increased community engagement with police through some of the Community Policing Forums.

Despite achievements at the activity and output levels in most of the PRP II components, it has been difficult to get a consistent picture of what success would have looked like for the PRP II from different stakeholders. Improvements for the BP do not necessarily translate to justice or better police service delivery for the most vulnerable in the community. Changes in police, for which the PRP and BP have worked together over the last 10 years are not reflected in the Public Opinion Surveys conducted as part of the PRP's Monitoring and Evaluation system. Survey results are disappointing and show little improvements in service delivery over the years generally and in some cases, indicate worse opinions of the PRP supported police stations and staff than control stations. Problems inherent in public opinion surveys and public perceptions and factors that work against reforms at the station level go partway to explaining this disappointing result. The other explanations are more to do with unrealistic expectations about the time it takes to see change on such a large scale (low "dosage"). Buildings, equipment and capacity development alone do not change deeply ingrained systemic police management traditions, endemic corruption or overcome structural obstacles of not enough people in the right jobs.

What is needed is a clear understanding of and agreement about the theory of change of police reform and the assumptions and risks inherent in achieving expected outcomes. The TOC needs to express the intermediate steps; the M&E system need to set out ways of routinely measuring progress towards these; and the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders needs to be clear and agreed. Institutional change is difficult and very long term, especially from a purely

⁶⁶ International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, Asia Report No. 182, 11 December 2009

⁶⁷ Interview in Dhaka PRP, October 2015.

advisory position. Focusing on problem solving or thematic areas such as violence against women would help in some ways to address the multiple barriers (at different levels and in different institutions) but without the strong relationships built from being embedded in the BP, the level of influence is likely to be less, the level of cooperation needed between agencies higher, and the scale of the reform needed greater. This would require an even more careful exploration of the TOC and more attention to roles of various actors in the community and justice sectors and a very high level of political will.

The legacy that PRP II has left behind extends to more than the buildings, equipment and some improved capacity. As one key informant commented:

*PRP changed our mindset. Before we were satisfied, now we want change*⁶⁸

A key question is though, do enough of the BP at the right levels want (the same) change, and can the quality of the reforms be guaranteed without further advisory support. The BP now has some very positive nascent reforms including sustainable Victim Support Centres and Community Policing Forums, but there is a risk of negative and unintended impacts of both of these reforms on female police, victims of crime and community members if these structures are misused for political or publicity purposes or are allowed to become embedded without operational safeguards against discrimination and human rights abuses.

5.1. Recommendations

Recommendation 1. Further support be provided to improve the success of Victim Support Centres and selected Community Policing Forums

The achievements of the BP and PRP II in these two critical areas should be built upon to ensure that their continued evolution is based on international good practices and quality standards.

Recommendation 2. Clarify the Theory of Change and design the M&E system on the TOC

Ensure that any future support is underpinned by a clear theory of change developed with key stakeholders. This process should be facilitated by specialists and revisited regularly throughout implementation to test assumptions and risks. The M&E system should be based around the theory of change.

Recommendation 3. Role and function of Steering Committee

When considering programme governance structures in future, ensure the terms of reference for the Steering Committee (or equivalent) provides the imprimatur to be critical and strategic rather than a “rubber stamp”. If members are not able to contribute at this level of responsibility they should be replaced.

Recommendation 4. Mainstream risk analysis of Human Rights, Gender and Sustainability.

When working in development and in high risk sectors such as policing it is critical that every input, activity, output and outcome go through a “test” for risk of impact on human rights, on women and men, and sustainability. This involves a rigorous process of asking questions about potential risks and impacts before embarking on reforms, and all the way through the process of

⁶⁸ Interview with BP, September 2015

reform. For example, establishing the VSC: A rigorous assessment done prior to its establishment would ask, at a minimum:

- 1. Is there any possibility that the VSC may impact on the human rights of victims?** The answer would be yes (both positive and negative, but we want to avoid the negative impact). On the negative side, there is a risk that women and girls will be detained in custody “for their own good”, or have their images used for publications, or their identity disclosed, or their rights to appropriate and qualified care compromised by the shelter being run by police... etc. How can we mitigate these risks? By developing clear structural and operational guidelines consistent with international good practice.
- 2. Is there a possibility that the VSC may have an impact on gender equality?** Again, the answer would be yes (both positive and negative again). On the negative side, there is a risk that women police will be posted to work at the VSC, regardless of their desire to work at other stations, or that victim support will be seen as women’s work and therefore not taken seriously, or that the staff will be used as welfare workers instead of police, or that victim’s issues will be sidelined to VSC who have limited authority.
- 3. What measures are in place to support sustainability of VSCs?** Things like MOUs between BP and NGOS are a very positive sustainability mechanism and ongoing BP budget also. Clarifying the role of the different partners and developing international good practice procedures and guidelines will further support sustainability.

This type of assessment needs to be done with every reform proposed, even down to the level of a new template or procedure because we cannot assume that in developing countries there are sufficient safeguards in place that will make the impact of changes go as planned.

Annex 1: Contribution Stories

Outcome Achieved: Increase in number and proportion of women in Bangladesh Police and the establishment of Victim Support Centres results in more sensitive services for 4,370 victims and vulnerable women and children

Short version of Outcome

Description:

There has been an increase in the number and proportion of female police in the Bangladesh Police since 2008 from 1.8% to 6.04% in 2014 (a rise of 223%). There are currently nearly 9,000 police women in the Bangladesh Police. Eight Victim Support Centres (VSCs) have been established since 2009 providing services to 4,370 women and children. This has the potential to create a safer and more accessible entry point for marginalised women.

Significance:

Female police are needed in higher numbers to encourage women victims of crime to report these crimes to the police and to seek justice. Female officers need to be visible at Victim Support Centres, police stations and in the community.

Contribution:

PRP was able to harness growing momentum and provide some ideas for supporting women's equality and justice through the following:

- Establishment of the Bangladesh Police Women's Network in 2008 (improving the work experience of police women)
- Support to awareness campaigns in schools and colleges on women in policing (possibly increasing numbers of applicants)
- 5529 police members received training on gender sensitivity
- Establishment of Victim Support Centres that needed staffing by female police 2009
- 125 VSC staff have been trained on victim management
- Formal agreements with 10 NGOs to support VSC service users developed and signed
- Building of 35 Model Police Stations with women-friendly service delivery centres (and facilities for female police) and assurances from BP that female police will be posted to staff these
- Leverage created 101 new police stations based on the same design (costing USD 84 million from BP budget)
- Gender focus and support to a senior female officer has leveraged support for the establishment of women's help desks in one district so far (64 cases recorded in two months)

Long version of Outcome

Description:

There has been an increase in the number and proportion of female police in the Bangladesh Police since 2008 from 1.87 to 6.04 in 2014 (a rise of 223% or 4.15 percentage points). This is a higher rise than in the civil service more broadly which over a similar time period saw an increase of 52% (or 13 percentage points). To increase the certainty of the contribution of the PRP it would have been good to have access to data on numbers of female applicants annually over a longer time period and annual comparative figures of recruits selected but this information was not available.

Since 2009, more than 4,370 women and child victims of crime (or other circumstances through which they have become vulnerable) have been provided with services through one of eight Bangladesh Police Victim Support Centres. These services have been made possible by the increase in police women in the Bangladesh police and the training provided to the VSC staff and other police.

Significance:

Crime against women and children is a grave problem in Bangladesh. In 2010 the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act was passed but the National Woman Lawyers Association notes that as of March 2013, only 102 cases (supported by legal aid service providers) had been filed under this Act, and that there were 49 districts out of 64 where no cases had been filed at all.⁶⁹ In a country of 158 million where approximately 60% of ever-married women report lifetime physical or sexual violence⁷⁰ these low numbers of reports go some way to describe the vastness of the challenge faced by women in the justice system.

Criminological theory maintains that through increasing reporting of violence against women, victims are more able to receive justice and offenders will be dealt with according to the law. In order to increase reporting of violence against women, the police need to be accessible and victim-sensitive. Female police are not necessarily always more sensitive to the needs of female victims of violence. Female victims have a right, however, to report their crimes to female police, and are more likely to do so in a more private setting than the front desk of a police station. Child victims also have a right to have their cases dealt with sensitively and in many cases (but not all), a female officer is less threatening than a male officer. The existence of eight VSCs and women's help desks, as well as the new model police stations, provides better facilities for both police women and female and child victims who require police services.

The Bangladesh Police plan to double the number of women in the service by 2020. There is currently a group of 28 female sergeants being trained (the first ever women at this rank). This indicates a commitment towards a more equitable and responsive police service.

Contribution:

PRP's contribution to the increase in police women and the increase in services for female victims and vulnerable women and children:

⁶⁹ Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers Association, *Ending Impunity, Monitoring Report for the implementation of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act 2010*. Page 32.

⁷⁰ *From Evidence to Policy: Addressing Gender Based Violence against Women and Girls in Bangladesh*, ICDDR,B and Population Council, Jan 2013

- Establishment of the Bangladesh Police Women’s Network in 2008 (progress towards improving the work experience of police women)
- Support to awareness campaigns in schools and colleges on women in policing (possibly increasing numbers of applicants)
- 5529 police members received training on gender sensitivity
- Establishment of Victim Support Centres that needed staffing by female police 2009
- 125 VSC staff have been trained on victim management
- Formal agreements with 10 NGOs to support VSC service users developed and signed
- Building of 35 Model Police Stations with women-friendly service delivery centres (and facilities for female police) and assurances from BP that female police will be posted to staff these
- Leverage created 101 new police stations based on the same design (costing USD 84 million from BP budget)
- Gender focus and support to a senior female officer has leveraged support for the establishment of women’s help desks in one district so far (64 cases recorded in two months)

PRP’s contribution to the VSC and gender mainstreaming was considered by four groups of stakeholders at the Final Evaluation’s Outcome Analysis Workshop. The four groups were comprised of two groups of BP members and two groups of CSO/NGO/Donor/PRP representatives. The average proportion of contribution of PRP II and others was as follows:

| PRP II Contribution 42.5% | BP 32.5% | NGOs Civ Soc 12.5% | Development partners & National momentum 7.5% | Media & Ministries 5% |
|---|----------|--------------------|---|-----------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introducing Concept • Policy of increasing women in BP • BPWN and developing women in leadership • Training • Operational costs of the VSC (2009-2011) • MOU with NGOs • Equipment and Instruments • Victim Expert • Gender specialist • Requests for female police • Awareness raising - campaigns, publications • Capacity development – manuals, TOT • Exposure to methodology and international good practice | | | | |

There is relative certainty that the PRP II contributed to this outcome in important ways. The combination of concepts and policy, creation of important relationships with NGOs, and capacity building and enabling factors all contributed to the environment in which an increase in female police was both desired and achievable.

Outcome Achieved: Improved access to police and local problem solving for some communities through Community Policing Forums

Short version of Impact

Description:

In three districts of Bangladesh there are a number of Community Policing Forums (CPFs) that are providing community members improved access to their local police and helping to address issues facing women and families.

When the police used to come to the village people would run away. Now we work together to stop problems in the community⁷¹.

Significance:

There is a serious problem of low police numbers in Bangladesh and low police to community ratios overall 1:1052 and in some places as low as 1 police to 10,000 community members. The proportion of female police is rising but is still low at 6.04% in 2015. This combined with other factors affects the police's ability to respond to crime in communities, especially crime affecting poor women in remote locations.

Contribution:

PRP has supported the Bangladesh Police to develop relationships with women's community policing forums in Bera and Bogra and with active community policing forums in Cox's Bazar. PRP has:

- Supported 144 women's CPFs with logistical and organisational support and training
- 1260 women's CPF members trained on subjects such as drugs, family violence, dowry system
- Supported 3,024 out of 52,228 CPFs across Bangladesh
- Trained Community Police Officers in the Bangladesh Police
- Lobbied for Community Policing Officers to be in every station
- Successfully lobbied BP to exempt Community Police Officers from early transfers and rotations
- Developed a Community Policing Strategy (not formally approved) and have at least partially achieved 84% of the targets
- Lobbied BP Policy Group to require a commitment to Community Policing (CP) be demonstrated by applicants to the position of Officer in Charge of stations
- Developed and distributed awareness materials
- Supported Open House Days
- Trained Village Police

In CP we have no way to go back. Our IGP has lamented – I have not yet institutionalised CP. But we have made such forward steps we can't step back. It is not a national issue now it is an international issue. It will be forever. ⁷²

⁷¹ Comment made by women's CPF member Bogra, October 2015

Long version of Impact

Description:

In three districts of Bangladesh there are some Community Policing Forums (CPF) that are providing community members improved access to their local police and helping to address issues facing women and families.

When the police used to come to the village people would run away. Now we work together to stop problems in the community⁷³.

In the districts with Women's CPFs, members report having more confidence in problem solving in their communities in cases of domestic violence, child marriage, drugs and gambling. They note that the relationship with the police has improved, that the police respond more quickly and suggest that their community may even get preferential treatment from police. The PRP training subjects such as the Dowry system, sexual harassment and gambling resonated with these CPF members and they feel better able to handle small disputes without the help of the police. With larger or more serious issues such as child marriage, these women first try to counsel the parents and if not able to deter, then the police are called. They report that dealing with the social issues when they are small stops them getting bigger and turning into major problems such as violence or serious crimes later.

In Bogra the CPFs run with support of a women's empowerment NGO Thengamara Mohila Sabuj Shongho (TMSS). This model has the advantage of perhaps being more sustainable and providing the community-police engagement in a broader context of other community development activities. The risk of this model potentially is that the issues that the CPFs deal with may be more aligned with the NGO priorities than the needs of the community members but there is currently no evidence of this.

In Cox's Bazar the district CPF is highly engaged with local issues of business and tourism, for peace and social harmony. The CPFs are very active and have members from business, social workers, community members and a human rights lawyer. They have created a help desk for tourists and drawn in 32 volunteers to help do school education, especially on the issues of drugs. Examples of some achievements of the CPFs include the discovery of a trafficking gang and the rescue of more than 50 trafficking victims. The CPF hires 56 night guards to protect businesses and patrol areas that need protection. Sharing phone numbers of police with CPF members and the community has been beneficial.

Community policing is a modern version of our traditional system⁷⁴

Significance:

There is a serious problem of low police numbers in Bangladesh and low police to community ratios overall 1:1052 and in some places as low as 1 police to 10,000 community members. The proportion of female police is rising but is still low at 6.04% in 2015. This combined with other factors affects the police's ability to respond to crime in communities, especially crime affecting poor women in remote locations.

⁷² Interview with BP October 2015

⁷³ Comment made by women's CPF member Bogra, October 2015

⁷⁴ CPF member, October 2015

The Bangladesh Police traditionally do not spend time in the community doing crime prevention activities. Police are often not called due to fears of corruption and /or fears of political influence. For there to be any hope of sustainable reform, the community needs to demand a change in police services as well as the police providing better services. The community must also play a role in providing oversight and monitoring police behaviour.

Community Policing Forums have a potential to impact not only on the relationship between police and the community, but on the experience of the community in relation to safety and peace: providing a win-win situation. With more confident and capable CPFs, communities can handle their own minor issues before they become big problems. When there are big problems, police are more willing to respond because a relationship of trust is already established. When police come, the community is more cooperative. Community members can extend the reach of the police by being their eyes and ears – especially in relation to drugs and gambling – the community are more likely to know where the problems are especially if they are causing family conflict. Child marriage is against the law – it is beyond the scope of the police to know of and address individual cases of pending child marriage, but the CPFs can intervene and try to avert the marriage through awareness raising or refer to the police if their efforts are unsuccessful. Community policing forum members are proud and brave and keen to be part of the solution.

Contribution:

PRP has supported the Bangladesh Police to develop relationships with women’s community policing forums in Bera and Bogra and with active community policing forums in Cox’s Bazar. PRP has:

- Supported 144 women’s CPFs with logistical and organisational support and training
- 1260 women’s CPF members trained on subjects such as drugs, family violence, dowry system
- Supported 3,024 out of 52,228 CPFs across Bangladesh
- Trained Community Police Officers in the Bangladesh Police
- Lobbied for Community Policing Officers to be in every station
- Successfully lobbied BP to exempt Community police Officers from early transfers and rotations
- Developed a Community Policing Strategy (not formally approved) and have partially achieved 84% of the targets
- Lobbied BP Policy Group to require a commitment to Community Policing (CP) be demonstrated by applicants to the position of Officer in Charge of stations
- Developed and distributed awareness materials
- Supported Open House Days
- Trained Village Police

The difference between the effective CPFs and the less than effective CPFs is where the contribution of PRP II can be seen. By delivering training and targeted support to groups that were led by community members who have the needs of their own communities as their only agenda, a level of confidence, some structure and a voice has been created that has meant that the police are compelled to listen and cooperate because it is in their best interests to do so. While still only growing, the role that the CPFs can play with regard to holding police to account should not be underestimated.

Annex 2: Evaluation TORS

Terms of Reference (TOR) for International Consultant

International Consultant (Team Leader) – Impact Assessment and Final Evaluation of the Police Reform Programme (PRP) Phase II, Bangladesh.

| | |
|---|--|
| Location: | Dhaka with travel to selected districts/metropolitan areas |
| Position: | 1 |
| Application Deadline: | |
| Additional Category: | Democratic Governance |
| Type of Contract: | Individual Contract |
| Post Level: | International Consultant |
| Languages Required: | Fluency in written and spoken English |
| Starting Date : (date when the selected candidate is expected to start) | 30 August 2015 |
| Expected Duration of Assignment : | 60 working days (18 of these days could be home based) over 3 months |

TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)

1. Background and Context

Bangladesh is a developing nation and a fledgling democracy. Steady economic growth since the early 1990s has resulted in rapid gains in Human Development. Despite impressive achievements in a variety of fields, Bangladesh suffers from weak governance, poverty and limited government capacity to deliver basic services. For example, access to justice, respect for the rule of law and knowledge of human rights are generally acknowledged as inadequate. The 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy paper acknowledged that the vulnerable, particularly women and children, struggle to access justice from the police and the formal and informal justice sector.

Law and order, crime and corruption remain serious problems adversely affecting individual safety, national security and economic growth. There is broad acknowledgment that the justice sector needs to be strengthened. Overall, crime remains underreported and inadequately investigated by the police, the court system is slow and prisons are overcrowded.

Thus, an accountable, transparent and efficient police service in Bangladesh is essential for the safety and well-being of all citizens, national stability and longer-term growth and development, particularly the creation of a secure environment which is conducive to consumer and investor confidence.

Within this context the Police Reform Programme (PRP) Phase I was launched in 2005 under joint collaboration of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), European Commission, UNDP and the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). Phase I of the PRP concluded in September 2009 and established the foundation for police reform initiatives by supporting the introduction of Model Thanas, a Victim Support Centre and a community policing philosophy across the country.

PRP Phase II commenced in October 2009 and is supported by the Government of Bangladesh, UNDP and DFID and will conclude on 31 December 2015. The PRP's development goal is a safer, more secure and stable Bangladesh, where the human rights of citizens, particularly the vulnerable and marginalized, are promoted and protected to accelerate progress on the MDGs, economic growth and social justice. The programme's purpose is to improve safety, access to justice and human rights for all citizens, particularly disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. The targeted beneficiaries of Phase II are the Bangladesh people, and in particular the Bangladesh Police, who will benefit from increased capacity, job satisfaction, improved morale, image and social standing.

The PRP Phase II is composed of six outcome areas:

- Strategic Direction and Organizational Reform
- Human Resource Management and Training
- Investigation, Operations and Prosecution
- Crime Prevention and Community Policing
- Promoting Gender Sensitive Policing
- Information, Communications and Technology

PRP Phase II was designed in the pre-business case era and therefore did not have value for money (VfM) indicators and measures incorporated at commencement. A 'light-touch' VfM assessment was conducted for PRP in 2015 and a copy of this report can be shared with the successful candidate(s). Furthermore, as a consequence of being designed in 2008, there was no contemporary theory of change (ToC) process introduced at the beginning of PRP but an implied ToC can be derived from the project's logframe and documents.

Further detail including objectives, indicators and expected key outputs and outcomes can be found in the project's Results Framework which will be provided to the consultancy. In addition, project related information is also available online at: www.prp.org.bd

In accordance with UNDP policy, a final (terminal) evaluation on PRP Phase II will be undertaken in the second half of 2015, to be completed before project closure on 31 December 2015. This terminal evaluation will be supplemented by a focused impact assessment in order to better understand the causal links between some of the better performing outputs and their respective outcome areas. To ensure value for money, avoid duplication of efforts, and maximise complementarity the two tasks will be undertaken as one evaluation by the same evaluation team.

2. Purpose of the Final Evaluation

The purpose of this final evaluation is to independently assess the extent that the Police Reform Programme (Phase II) contributed to outcomes as defined in the PRP Project Document and the programme's supporting documents. The evaluation will be considered by UNDP, DFID (the major Donor), the Government of Bangladesh and the Bangladesh Police and may be used to identify key areas for possible post-2015 support to the Bangladesh Police.

3. Evaluation scope and objectives

This final evaluation will consist of two components: the final evaluation that covers all of the programme and analyses achievements and what worked and what did not work; and the impact assessment that looks more in depth at certain identified key focus areas to assess their contribution to the outcomes.

Scope of work, methodologies and deliverables:

The output of this consultancy will be a final evaluation report that includes a rigorous impact assessment. PRP has already undertaken a range of quantitative assessments involving various public perception surveys so a greater focus of the impact assessment should be on qualitative assessments. Please see the Annex for a list of surveys facilitated by PRP and these surveys and their data tables will be made available to the evaluators at the commencement of the contract.

The evaluation team has primary responsibility for the preparation of an objective and high-quality evaluation report. The team will meet with key national and international stakeholders and at a minimum including representatives from the: Ministry for Home Affairs; Bangladesh Police; national justice experts; Victim Support Centre personnel; and community beneficiaries. The team will also meet with donor partners (DFID), development partners and other UNDP projects operating in the criminal justice sector. The evaluation will predominately be conducted in Dhaka, however, field missions will also be undertaken.

The evaluation activities shall be based, at a minimum, on UNDP evaluation principles, norms and standards that are outlined in the UNDP *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation* (2010), the [addendum to that Handbook Updated Guidance on Evaluation](#) (2011) and *Outcome Level Evaluation: a companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators* (2011). In addition to UNDP's evaluation principles contained in the UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, the team should also consider the OECD DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance.

4. Suggested Evaluation Areas for the Final Evaluation

Effectiveness: what extent did the Police Reform Programme attain its objectives. In evaluating the effectiveness of the project it is useful to consider:

- To what extent were the objectives achieved?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- Has PRP successfully leveraged its partnerships with: 1) government agencies; 2) civil society, including victim support services; 3) relevant UNDP projects; 4) DFID Security and Justice Programme and 5) other development projects in the sector?

Relevance: what extent was PRP suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor. In evaluating the relevance of a project, it is useful to consider:

- To what extent the objectives are still valid?
- Were the outputs and activities consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
- Were the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended impact and effects?

Efficiency: is measuring the outputs, qualitative and quantitative, in relation to the inputs. When

evaluating the efficiency of a project, it is useful to consider:

- Were activities cost-effective?
- Were objectives achieved on-time?
- How well has the project translated inputs into outputs?⁷⁵

Impact: The impact assessment should, *inter alia*, assess the following issues:

What are the positive and negative changes produced by PRP's interventions (direct and indirect)?

When evaluating impact it is useful to consider:

- What has happened as a result of the project?
- What real difference has the activity made to beneficiaries?
- What is the impact from a gender perspective?
- How many people have been affected?
- Have outputs been achieved? And if so, to what extent have outcomes been achieved?

The six components of PRP are outlined in s. 1 above. The impact assessment will involve a rigorous assessment of the key focus areas under those components and may include specific impact assessments of the PRP support provided to:

- The strategic planning process of the Bangladesh Police;
- Strengthening awareness on human rights responsibilities by police;
- Developing a framework for sustainable development of police training structures;
- Strengthening the investigation process, including improvements in the collection of evidence;
- Targeted police stations;
- Community Policing Forums;
- Promoting gender sensitive policing strategies;
- ICT governance; and
- The use of ICT in police decision making processes.

The final decision on what key focus areas will be included in the impact assessment will be agreed upon between the evaluation team and PRP. The suggested areas above are provided as guidance for candidates at this time.

Sustainability: is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. When evaluating the sustainability of a project, it is useful to consider:

- To what extent did/will the benefits of the project continue after funding ceased?
- To what extent has the development theory been accurate? Have other theories of change emerged?
- What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability or non-sustainability of the project?
- Should UNDP continue its work in this area?
- Are risk management/mitigation processes adequate?
- How should the development approach/theory of change adjust for future programming?

South-South cooperation: How did PRP/UNDP contribute to the development of national capacities and the promotion of South-South cooperation?

⁷⁵ DFID's 3Es Framework and Value for Money Policy Note, 2011

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67479/DFID-approach-value-money.pdf

Partnerships: play a key role in ensuring that primary stakeholders achieve outcomes. How were partnerships relevant in the PRP context? How effective were they in contributing to the achievement of outcomes? How efficiently were they managed? and how sustainable are they?

Comparative strengths and weaknesses: What are the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the PRP and UNDP support, including in relation to other programs/projects in the criminal justice sector?

Lessons learned: the evaluation will also document the innovations and lessons learned from the project. This includes analysis of what has worked and what has not as well as observations related to the project design, management and operation of the PRP. Acknowledging that the PRP project design aimed to support the Bangladesh Police as a major beneficiary, this assessment shall also analyse the extent to which PRP was able to influence change in internal police oversight and the extent to which PRP could appropriately challenge the Bangladesh Police in terms of the reform process. The assessment should also consider the content of relevant reviews that have suggested that any future support should consider a greater cross-disciplinary approach to tackling specific issues and to also utilise wider themes such as gender equality, labour rights, urban insecurity, better services to the community at local levels and better compliance with human rights and accountability.

5. Methodology for the Impact Assessment and the Final Evaluation Report

At a minimum, the final evaluation will involve the following:

Briefing of evaluators: by PRP/UNDP on the requirements of the final evaluation.

Document review: of project documents, quarterly reports, results reports, M&E framework, indicator progress sheet, AWP monitoring tool, DFID's annual review reports, different workshop and training reports, PSC and PIC meeting minutes, conference report etc.

Evaluation Inception Report: Shall be prepared by the evaluators before commencing the evaluation. This report shall detail the evaluators' understanding of what is being evaluated and why, showing how each evaluation question will be answered by way of: proposed methods, proposed sources of data and data collection procedures. The inception report will also include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, designating a team member with the lead responsibility for each task or product.

Stakeholder interviews: The evaluation team will conduct evaluation related interviews with project staff, community beneficiaries and senior officials from the Bangladesh Police, UNDP, and DFID.

Observation of PRP Initiatives: The evaluation team will identify and visit relevant PRP initiatives operating in the field. This may include, inter alia, observing the operations of Victim Support Centres, Community Policing Forums, the Forensic Training Institute and/or PRP-supported Thanas to gain a better understanding of these initiatives.

Debriefing Session: A draft report/summary of major findings shall be presented to PRP/UNDP in accordance with the timeframe included in section 6 below. A preliminary draft of the findings will be shared with UNDP prior to the debriefing session to ensure that the evaluation meets the required quality criteria.

Final Evaluation Report: That incorporates comments from the debriefing session.

6. Evaluation Deliverables

The output of the contract will be an evaluation report that consists of two parts (impact assessment and the final evaluation report). The report will include an executive summary, which will use the project's results framework as defined in the Project Document and that also considers any revisions of the framework. The body of the report shall provide a detailed assessment of the performance of the project, including lessons learned. A section that includes recommendations for future programming shall also be included.

| Tasks associated with the impact assessment | Estimated working days | Tentative dates for delivery | % of payment on satisfactory completion |
|---|------------------------|------------------------------|---|
| Review documents and consult with stakeholders | 5 | 3/9/15 | |
| Submission of a detailed inception report that includes the overall evaluation plan, refinement of objectives, sampling design, questions and indicators. The plan will also identify the team member with the lead responsibility for each task. | 4 | 9/9/15 | 25% |
| Develop data collection instruments that detail the evaluators' understanding of what is being evaluated and why, showing how each key evaluation area will be answered by way of: proposed methods, proposed sources of data and data collection procedures. | 15 | 30/9/15 | 25% |
| Conduct field visits | 20 | 28/10/15 | |
| Data analysis and impact assessment report writing | 10 | 11/11/15 | |
| Draft report presentation to PRP/UNDP | 2 | 15/11/15 | |
| Revision of draft report and submission of final evaluation report | 4 | 19/11/15 | 50% |

7. Evaluation Team Composition

The International Consultant will be assigned as the Team Leader for the impact assessment and the evaluation and is responsible for:

- The overall management and coordination of the mission and team's activities;
- Review of relevant project documents;
- Planning and design of the assessment and evaluation tools;
- Ensuring that the mission objectives are completed and delivered within the given schedule;
- Ensuring the independence, impartiality and accuracy of all conclusions, recommendations and/or findings reported;
- The compiling and drafting of the final report and coordinating the presentation of its findings.

A maximum of two national consultants (to be recruited by UNDP) may also work with the International Consultant as team members: one being a national subject matter expert with extensive understanding of policing in Bangladesh, engaged for the same or similar duration as the Team Leader; and a national support officer that is sufficiently experienced in criminal justice related matters and evaluation to provide high level support to the team throughout the final evaluation process. The Team Leader of this evaluation will determine how the 30 working days allocated to the Support Officer will be allocated.

8. Evaluation Ethics

This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the *UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation*⁷⁶ and at a minimum shall include in the design and implementation of the evaluation procedures to safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, for example: measures to ensure compliance with legal codes governing areas such as provisions to collect and report data, particularly permissions needed to interview or obtain information about children and young people; provisions to store and maintain security of collected information; and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.

9. Implementation arrangements

PRP/UNDP will provide office space (no computer). While travelling to the field to conduct assessment and evaluation activities necessary vehicle support (flights if appropriate) would be provided by PRP. Staff from PRP will also assist the evaluation team to arrange various meetings, consultations, and interviews and ensure access to key officials as mentioned in proposed methodologies.

In addition to this, UNDP will bear the cost of arranging consultation meetings and debriefing sessions and other events as required and agreed between PRP and the Evaluation Team Leader.

10. Timeframe for the evaluation process

The total number of working days for the International Consultant (Team Leader) of the impact assessment and evaluation team will be 60 working days (18 of the total days could be home based) over a maximum period of three months.

11. Supervision and Performance Evaluation

The PRP Project Manager or a delegate will supervise the activities of the consultant on a regular basis and evaluate the performance and approve the deliverables/outputs in accordance with the following steps:

Progress Control: Payment for services of the consultant at each stage will be made upon satisfactory certification by the PRP Project Manager.

Payments: Payment for services of the consultant will be made in 3 instalments:

- 1) 25% upon receiving and acceptance of the inception report;
- 2) 25% upon receipt and acceptance of the data collection instruments; and
- 3) 50% upon receipt and acceptance of the final evaluation report.

Payment will be made through Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT). For each instalment the consultant has to submit a request letter duly signed and describing the agreed accomplishment.

12. Experience and qualification requirements

Academic Qualifications and Experiences:

A Master's degree in Law, Public Administration, International Affairs or in a relevant field of study.

Technical experience/Years of Experience:

⁷⁶ *Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation*, June 2008. Available at <http://www.uneval.org/earch/index.jsp?q=ethical+guidelines>

- At least 8 years of professional experience working at a senior programme level in democratic governance, rule of law or criminal justice;
- Practical experience in designing, leading and managing an evaluation of comparable programmes;
- Experience in designing and implementing impact evaluations and contribution analysis;
- Experience of managing a team of evaluators;
- Experience with qualitative methodologies to assess impact; and
- Previous experience in applying UNDP and/or other prominent development partner approaches to planning, monitoring and evaluation is preferred

Competencies

- Independent and flexible;
- Ability to work under pressure in a challenging and complex environment;
- Excellent communication skills;
- Creative and result-oriented; and
- Client-oriented

Other requirements

- Demonstrated fluency in written and spoken English;
- Previous experience in developing countries. Previous experience in South Asia and/or Bangladesh is preferred;
- Strong analytical and time management skills.

Annex 3: Persons interviewed

| Name | Position and agency / location |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Mr. Md. Mokhlesur Rahmam | National Project Director, PRP and Additional Inspector General Programme staff |
| Mr Rustam Pulatov | Assistant Country Director UNDP |
| Ms Mahmuda Afroz | Programme Analyst UNDP |
| Mr Andre Redman | Team Leader, PRP |
| Mr Gerard Smith | Technical Specialist |
| Ms Sehela Parvin | Executive members of the Bangladesh Women's Police Network |
| Ms Rebekka Sultana | |
| Mr Md Feroz Al Mozahid Khan | Additional DIG (training and sports) |
| Ms Farida Yasmin | Deputy Police Commissioner, WSID, Victim Support Centre Dhaka And 7 NGO Reps, 5 Police women investigators |
| Mr Muhammad Rafiquzzaman | Governance Adviser, DFID Bangladesh |
| Ms Fran Martin | Evaluation Specialist, DFID |
| Mr Saiful Alam | DIG, CID |
| Mr Shah Alam | Commandant, FTI, CID |
| Mr Mahfuzur Rahman | Superintendent of Police Manikgonj |
| Mr Christian Eldon | Chief Technical Advisor, Justice Sector Facility (UNDP) |
| Mr. K.M Abul Kashem | OC Police Station (some support from PRP), Narsingdi Police station |
| Mr. Md. Abul Kalam Azad | OC Police station (no support from PRP) location |
| Ms Amena Begum | Superintendent Narsingdi District |
| Ms Shalma Ali | Executive Director, Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers Association and Member of the PRP Steering Committee and 2 lawyers (F) |
| Ms Fatema Begum | Rector, Bangladesh Police Staff College |
| Professor Ishrat Shamim (F) | President, Centre for Women and Children Studies and member of PRP steering committee |
| Mr Wojcheich Koprowicz | PRP, ICT and M&E |
| Mr Ratan Kumar Deb | PRP, Community Policing |
| Mr Abdur Razzak | Head of Community Policing – BP |
| Mr Tabrezur Rahman AIG Establishment | In Charge PIMS and ID card cell / inspector BP |
| Ms Mily Biswas | DIG finance and {resident of BPWN |
| Ms Salma Begum | Commanding Officer of Women's Armed Battalion |
| Mr Chris Wood | Australian Federal Police |
| Mr Md. Moslem Ali | PRP |
| Mr Md Mahtab Hossain | PRP and Inspector BP |
| Ms Sunanda Roy | PRP |
| Ms Shamima Begum | SP |
| Duty officer and OC (M) | Two non-PRP supported stations (Highway Thana) on the way to Bera |
| Women Community Police Forum members | Three Community Policing Women's Forums 45 women (officially 15 each) but many more in attendance and men too |
| Mr Md Zakir Hossain Mahmud | ASP Bera circle + 2 x M 1x F |
| Professor Dr Hosne-Ara Begum (F) | Founder and Executive Director, TMSS and |
| Md Mamunur Rashid Mamun | Senior Assistant Director, TMSS |
| Women community police forum members | 150 women |
| Mr Al Asad Md Mafuzul Islam | ASP Bogra |

| | |
|---|---|
| Ms Kazi Nusrat Edib (Luna) | ASP CID, Human Rights trainer |
| Mr Sarker Omar Faroque | Just returned from Masters of Human rights in York UK Former PRP staff |
| Dr Bilkis | Coordinator, One Stop Crisis Centre, Dhaka and 2 Sub-inspectors (1F 1M) 3 other staff (F) |
| Mr Quamruzzaman | Deputy Commissioner of Police at Magistrates Court and the Officer in charge of exhibits at Magistrates court |
| Mr Ali Akbar Mr Shishir | Addl Chief Magistrate, Magistrates Court Dhaka |
| Mr Monjur A-Khoda | PRP and BP |
| Mr Sheikh Abdul Ahad Mr Kamal Atahar | Addl Secretary Law and Planning Ministry of Home Affairs Deputy Chief - In charge of development projects |
| Mr Ismain | OC Chittagong Model Thana and his team |
| Mr Mohir Uddin Mahmood | OC Chittagong Model Thana (no construction) |
| Ms Mahmooda Begum | OC Chittagong Victim Support Centre and her team plus four NGO reps |
| Mr Abu Morshed Chowdhury | Chairperson, Cox's Bazar District Community Policing Forum and other members of the forum, volunteers and local police |

Annex 4: Question Guide

| General questions | UNDP | Police | Project | NGO | VSC | Other prog | Donors |
|--|------|--------|---------|-----|-----|------------|--------|
| Effectiveness | | | | | | | |
| What do you think has gone well in the programme and why? | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| To what extent has it gone equally well for men and women? | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Who else helped? | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| Partnership | | | | | | | |
| What has been leveraged from the partnership with the project? | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| How did the project work together with other agencies / projects? | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| Sustainability | | | | | | | |
| How sustainable are the benefits? | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| What structures or mechanisms are in place that will remain? | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Recurrent / other costs being allocated from GoB | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| Relevance | | | | | | | |
| How aligned is PRP's approach with GoB? Donors? The needs of the community? | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| Efficiency? | | | | | | | |
| How efficient was the project? | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| What hasn't gone well and why? | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| What could have been done differently? | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| What would have happened without PRP support? | | X | X | X | X | | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| Impact | | | | | | | |
| What are the most promising outcomes that are likely to lead to impact on the community? | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

| Questions for field / unit visits |
|---|
| Effectiveness |
| Are any of the police women in the BWPN? What has the BWPN done for them in the last six months? |
| What did the PRP do to support this station? |
| How many police in the station have done training with PRP? What are they doing differently after the training? |
| Do you have an investigation kit? When was it last used and who by? Who pays for refills? If not used, why would people not use it? |
| VSC – is there a VSC in this area? How many victims has the police referred in the last month? What were the cases? What were the results? |
| Advancing women police How has PRP contributed to advancing women in the police? What are the results? What are the challenges? What needs to happen to improve advancement of female police? |
| Community Police forums How many members? What forums have been held in the last six months and what happened as a result? What are the challenges? |
| ICT What PRP supported ICT is being used at the station? How is it being used? |
| Village police Has the PRP trained them? Do they help the police and how? |
| Partnership |
| What has been leveraged from the project? |
| How did the project work together with other agencies / projects? |
| How do the police work together with other agencies? |
| Sustainability |
| How sustainable are the benefits? |
| What structures or mechanisms are in place that will remain? |
| Recurrent / other costs being allocated from GoB |
| Relevance |
| How aligned is PRP's approach with GoB? Donors? The needs of the community? |
| Efficiency? |
| How efficient was the project? |
| What hasn't gone well and why? |
| What could have been done differently? |
| What would have happened without PRP support? |
| Impact |
| What are the most promising outcomes that are likely to lead to impact on the community? |

Annex 5: Key outcomes and evidence from Program Logic Workshop

| Key Outcomes Identified by PRP team | (selected) Evidence proposed and collection arrangements |
|---|--|
| <p>Component 1. – Strategic Direction and Organisational Reform</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ownership of Police Act • Wider human rights awareness • Better planning – results based planning | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police Act drafting Committee (interview conducted phase 1) • Training records (confirmed phase 1) • Strategic plans (sighted phase 1) |
| <p>Component 2 – Human Resource Management and Training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Informed HRM decisions • Better support from Village Police – motivated workforce • Improved training delivered in training centres | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PIMS (interview conducted) • Interview VP and OCs (interviews conducted, more planned Phase 2) • Training reports, policy, photo of infrastructure, training curriculum (training curriculum review proposed Phase 2) |
| <p>Component 3 – Investigations, operations and prosecution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AFIS is being used to identify suspects • Number of exhibits sent to lab is increasing • Forensic Training Institute is operating in a sustainable manner | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statistics of AFIS from CID (confirmed by reports phase 1) • Exhibit increased in the last 5 years (confirmed by reports phase 1) • FTI – Budget of FTI (To get from FTI Phase 2) |
| <p>Component 4 – Community Policing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bangladesh police has replicated the design of the model police stations • Increased mass awareness of Community policing • Number of positive interactions between police and community increased | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building plans (confirmed through interviews phase 1) • Public perception surveys (comparative analysis done Phase 1) • Observations of CPF and interviews with OCs (Phase 1 and 2) • Minutes of CPFs (requested Phase 1) |
| <p>Component 5 – Promoting gender sensitive policing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4368 victims received services from VSCs and 1353 cases investigated by WSID • Increase in number of female police and at higher levels • Gender orientations are conducted by Bangladesh Police • Bangladesh Women’s Police Network Functions as a platform for women police | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VSC statistics (interviews phase 1 and stats requested) • Comparative statistics from Civil Service Commission (requested Phase 1) • Review of curriculum (Phase 2) • Interviews conducted with BPWN and lower level members and hotline data requested (Phase 1 and Phase 2) |
| <p>Component 6 – Information, Communication and Technology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better and easy accessibility to specialised information • Sustainable and coordinated implementation and use of ICT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid ICT usage survey (confirmed phase 1) • Interviews and observation in police stations and business owners (phase 1 and 2) • Plans, organograms, government orders (confirmed phase 1) |

Annex 6: Example Program Logic for Police Reform

Program logic for police reform - summary

The **broader goal** of a safe and secure Bangladesh requires the involvement of many sectors and falls well outside the remit of the PRP or any one ministry or donor.

The level below this focuses more on the role of the police in contributing towards the broader goal. This **end of engagement outcome** statement is: Bangladesh Police deliver safety, access to justice and human rights for all, particularly the most marginalised. Focusing on the most marginalised is critical as one of the major weaknesses of the BP has been its reputation as serving only the powerful in society, rather than the poor.

In order to achieve the end of engagement outcome, at the highest level (green), the **preconditions** fall into four main areas:

1. Operations – BP effectively detects and investigates crime, including against the most marginalised
2. Corporate Services – (“back of house”) BP corporate services enable the police to deliver high quality services
3. Leadership – Police leadership ensures the delivery of ethical and accountable police services
4. Community engagement – Community has trust and confidence in the BP

The logic infers that if all of these outcomes are achieved then the end of engagement outcome will be realised.

The **intermediate outcomes** needing to be in place to achieve the four preconditions are in blue boxes clustered below each precondition.

PRP has made contributions to all four preconditions and has had varying degrees of success in all four. The component outcomes for PRP are described in the **Yellow boxes** under the relevant precondition and these include:

- Improved police operations, investigations and prosecutions (Operations)
- Improved representation at all levels and equitable and gender sensitive policies and victim services (Corporate Services)
- HRM systems and structures strengthened and training capacity enhanced (Corporate Services)
- BP progressively use ICT to provide better services to the community (Corporate Services)
- Strategic Direction and organisational report supports accountability (Leadership)
- Greater trust and interaction between the community results in improved access to justice (Community engagement)

Intermediate outcomes, in **blue boxes** have not been fully achieved but some progress has been made towards them. The highest contributions made by PRP to the intermediate outcomes are written in **red text**.

What this shows is that there are gaps in the logic that need to be achieved in order to reach outcomes higher up in the logic. Under Operations, what is lacking are laws and regulations that enable police to do their work to the highest professional standards. While much work has been

done in the area of corporate services, the BP lacks the numbers at the right levels. Community engagement has improved but the service delivery standards required to build respect and cooperation from the community has not occurred. The leadership precondition is the most difficult to reach and has seen the least progress.

Under the clusters of intermediate outcomes are the direct results of PRP's work. The outputs that PRP achieved that contributed to the intermediate outcomes are in pale yellow boxes just above the inputs and activities of the PRP that were implemented in order to achieve change.

There are three **principles** which naturally underpin this logic – Human rights generally, rights and inclusion of marginalised people and women's advancement. These three principles are cross cutting and should be considered as part of each outcome, output and activity.

Assumptions

There are some critical assumptions in this logic.

1. That the quality of the amendments to laws, training and procedures is of a high enough standard – currently this is quite variable
2. That the relationship between the BP and MOHA and other relevant ministries is good enough to enable legislative reform – currently this is not the case
3. That societal attitudes will not act as a barrier to victims seeking or receiving justice – there are indications this is slowly changing but not enough to have any noticeable effect yet.

