



Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Threatened Savanna Woodland in the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda

PIMS 4592, Atlas Award 00072558, Atlas Project No: 00085611

Midterm Review Volume I

Republic of Uganda

GEF BD SO-1, Improve Sustainability of Protected Area Systems

Republic of Uganda

National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA)

United National Development Program (UNDP)

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the project team for giving us their time during the mission in Uganda. In particular, the team in the UNDP assisted us to set up the mission and the Project Manager organised our meetings and accompanied our travels in the field. We are grateful to them as the mission would not have been as smooth as it was without their efforts. In addition, they patiently answered all of our questions and requests for clarification.

We are also grateful to the stakeholders whom we met over the course of the mission for giving us their time and also for answering our many questions.

The evaluation is intended to give a summary of what has been achieved in the project to date as well as glean some of the lessons that can be learned from it in what was a relatively short period. In the report, we have tried to offer constructive criticism where we think it is warranted and we hope that those involved in the project take it as such.

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Acronyms, Abbreviations and Glossary

AFA	Administrative & Finance Assistant
APR	Annual Project Review
BD	Biodiversity
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CEO	Chief Executive Officer (referring to GEF)
CFR	Central Forest Reserve
CWA	Community Wildlife Area
DEO	District Environmental Officer
DLO	District Liaison Officer
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EOP	End of Project (usually in the context of targets for indicators)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIS	Geographical Information System(s)
GOU	Government of Uganda
GPS	Global Positioning System
ha	Hectares
IC/TA	Individual or International Consultant/Technical Advisor
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KCL	Kidepo Critical Landscape
KVNP	Kidepo Valley National Park
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
METT	Monitoring Effectiveness Tracking Tool (for protected areas)
MTR	Midterm Review
NEMA	National Environmental Management Authority
NFA	National Forestry Authority
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIM	Nationally Implemented (referring to a project implementation modality)
NP	National Park

NPC	National Project Coordinator/ Project Coordinator
NPM/PM	National Project Manager/Project Manager
PA	Protected Area
PB	Project Board
PFO	Project Field Officer
PIF	Project Identification Form
PIR	Project Implementation Review
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPG	Project Preparation Grant
PR	Public Relations
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
PRF	Project Results Framework
ProDoc	Project Document (referring to the UNDP operational project document)
PB	Project Steering Committee (replaced throughout report by PB)
RDC	Resident District Commissioners
SMART	Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TOR	Terms of Reference
TSC	Technical Steering Committee
UNDP	United National Development Program
UNDP-CO	UNDP Country Office
UNDP-RR	UNDP Resident Representative
UNDP-GEF RTC	UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Centre (based in Addis Ababa)
USD	United States dollars
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
VHF	Very High Frequency
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WILD LEO	Wildlife Intelligence and Leadership Development program for Law Enforcement Officers

1 Executive Summary

Project Information Table

Project Title	Conservation and sustainable use of threatened savannah woodlands in the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda		
UNDP Project ID	00085611	PIF Approval Date	25/11/2010
GEF Project ID	PIMS 4592	CEO Endorsement Date	18/02/2011
ATLAS Business Unit Award No.	00072558	ProDoc Signature Date	24/07/2013
Country	Uganda	Date PM hired	3/11/2014
Region:	East Africa	Inception W/shop date	December, 2013
GEF Focal Area/Strategic Objective	Improve sustainability of Protected Area systems	MTR completion date	June 2016
Trust Fund	GEF	If revised, proposed op. closing date:	23 July 2018
Executing Agency/Implementing partner	Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development/National Environment Management Authority		
Other executing partners	Uganda Wildlife Authority and National Forestry Authority		
Project Financing	at CEO endorsement (USD)	At MTR (USD)	
[1] GEF Financing	3,080,000	856,067.65	
[2] UNDP Contribution	2,525,000	0	
[3] Government	5,659,700	1,750,000	
[4] Other partners	350,000	85,000	
[5] Total cofinancing	10,684,700	1,835,000	
PROJECT TOTAL COSTS	13,764,700	2,708,591.23	

The long-term solution, as identified in the Prodoc, is an ecologically representative, connected network of protected areas, subject to strengthened management arrangements suitable for the situation in northern Uganda and adequately financed through multiple sources. The Prodoc goes on to state that this can be achieved

through increasing household and community benefits from biodiversity on private land and protected areas; providing planned, targeted and effective support to the operational capacity of core protected areas within the landscape; and through creating a coordinated landscape management approach in the KCL to serve as a shield against human-induced pressures on Uganda's threatened biodiversity.

This long-term solution translates into the following project goal: "The biodiversity and ecosystem values of the Kidepo Critical Landscape, Uganda, are conserved and provide sustainable benefit flows at local, national and global levels through enhanced operational capacity and functional landscape planning approaches." The project will contribute to this long-term goal through achievement of its objective: "The biodiversity of the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda is protected from existing and emerging threats."

The project has been designed with two components: *Component One: Strengthening management effectiveness of the Kidepo Critical Landscape protected area cluster*, and *Component Two: Integrating protected area management in the wider landscape*. Further, the Prodoc is very specific about the outcomes and results from each of the two components.

The project is being implemented under NIM modalities although the actual management arrangements differ significantly from the *designed* management arrangements. NEMA is the lead implementation agency, with UWA and NFA being executing entities as well.

The project suffered significant delays and setbacks. For example, i) the Inception Workshop was held five months after the start of the project, ii) the first Project Manager (PM) was appointed in July 2014 – one year after the commencement of the project. He resigned after just three months because of intractable barriers to efficient and effective implementation, iii) the second PM was appointed in November 2014 – thus, a full 16 months after the commencement of the project., and iv) there are innumerable barriers to efficient and effective implementation of the project, including procurement processes and the transfer of funds. In the terms of a number of interviewees, the project has become "bogged down in bureaucracy".

In practice, then, the project has been operational for the past 12-15 (of a total of 32) months; even then, it has not been operating at optimal speed. As such, the project has really only managed to get relatively few activities going.

Under Component One, these include: i) a series of "sensitization" meetings have taken place in the vicinity of KVNP and Karenga CWA, ii) the procurement and delivery of "security and enforcement" equipment, iii) a training needs assessment has been carried out, iv) various trainings, and v) community scouts were identified – ostensibly to assist with the process of monitoring wildlife and "handling" human-wildlife conflict.

Under Component Two, the activities carried out to date include: i) carrying out three studies on shea trees (an "inventory" of shea trees in the "shea tree belt", a cost-benefit analysis of different use options for the products of shea trees, and an analysis of the shea oil value chain analysis, ii) "sensitisation" has taken place at the district level, ii) some training has been carried out with enforcement officers from

Otuke District receiving training in a two-day training workshop, iii) a study tour with participants was carried out to community conservancies adjacent to Amboseli National Park in Kenya, iv) a district task force on enforcement was formed as a first step towards formation of a district coordination mechanism for biodiversity management, v) a number of microgrants (\leq USD 25,000) have been made to CBOs within the themes of shea tree conservation and mitigating human wildlife conflict – with the additional potential benefit of enhancing livelihoods in the communities involved.

There are, however, some issues beyond the significant delays discussed above. For example, it appears as if the project partners are largely using the GEF funding as additional funding for the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario rather than the incremental activities demanded by the GEF¹.

MTR Ratings & Achievement Summary Table

Measure		MTR Rating	Achievement Description
Project Strategy		N/A	The project is introducing contemporary, cutting edge concepts that will, in principle, lead to additionality well beyond the business-as-usual scenario. The project originally was being conceived as two projects (one to deal with the protected areas and another to deal with the land degradation and sustainable forest management outside of the protected areas). Joining these two projects under the umbrella of one project was an attempt to increase efficiency but it has resulted in complicating matters.
Progress towards Results	Objective	HU	Little has been done to achieve the project objective, which is defined as being “the biodiversity of the KCL is protected from existing and emerging threats”. When examining the threats (poaching, encroachment, charcoal and fuelwood collection, burning), at a <i>landscape level</i> , the project has done little to reduce the threats. Achievement of the project objective, even under a no-cost extension, is unlikely.
	Outcome 1	U	A small number of activities have been carried out (sensitisation, provision of equipment, a training needs assessment for KVNP, some training and the recruitment of some community scouts) but much of the

¹ One of GEF’s principles is to provide funds to cover “incremental” or additional funds to transform a project (or ongoing activities carried out by governments) from one with national benefits to one that provides global environmental benefits (see https://www.thegef.org/gef/policies_guidelines/incremental_costs and <https://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/document/C.31.12%20Operational%20Guidelines%20for%20Incremental%20Costs-2007.pdf>). In reality, however, the GEF catalyzes processes that allow the implementation of national policies and strategies – thus, catalyzing the process to start achieving both national and global environmental benefits. Throughout the MTR report, there are references to the “business-as-usual” scenario as defined in the PRODOC: this is the scenario that the project is attempting to avoid or build upon – so as to improve the situation such that there are global environmental benefits.

Measure		MTR Rating	Achievement Description
			difficult work still remains. In addition, the partners appear to have been using the GEF funds to cover the costs of the 'business-as-usual' activities. Little has been achieved to strengthen the management effectiveness of the KCL PA cluster – which is the aim of this component. Steps <i>could</i> be taken towards achieving the component if the project carefully selects and funds a number of partners with whom to work.
	Outcome 2	U	As above, a small number of activities have been carried out (three studies on shea trees, district level sensitisation, some training with enforcement officers, a study tour to community conservancies in Kenya, a district task force on enforcement was formed and a number of microgrants have been made to CBOs). This has done little to “integrate PA management into the wider landscape” – which is the aim of this component. A vast amount of work remains to be done and it is unlikely that the aim will be achieved even with a no-cost extension.
Project Implementation and Adaptive Management		HU	There have been profound issues with the implementation of the project. It has become bogged down in bureaucracy, it is being inefficient and ineffective, and there are a number of issues with the finances. A total of 96.4% of the project management budget for the entire project has been spent; project partners have not adhered to their own or GEF's policies and procedures on the procurement of vehicles and motorbikes, and, finally, there are periodic questions over some of the expenses that NEMA allocates to the project. In summary, the situation does not build confidence.
Sustainability		U	Because so little has been carried out to date, little can be said about sustainability. Sustainability is rated as “unlikely” here partly because of that and the processes that have been carried out are not currently sustainable. In addition, some of the activities may also inadvertently lead to negative consequences.

Conclusions

The first overriding conclusion is that while the project is relatively well designed, it has been poorly implemented and managed. It has suffered profound delays and, despite efforts to deal with it, it finds itself bogged down in bureaucracy. As such, the management arrangements have proven to be a barrier to efficient and effective implementation of the project. This leads to a further conclusion that until such time as there are profound changes within the institutions involved in the project,

questions should be raised about their capacity and capability to implement such large and complex projects².

The second conclusion is that in what work has been carried out to date, there is little significant additionality. In some areas, there is no additionality at all and project partners are just using the GEF funding to fund their business-as-usual scenarios. And, finally, some activities appear to be carried out not necessarily for the impact that they will have but on the promise of the per diems they offer. A good example is the boundary demarcation of CFRs³: this is a time-consuming exercise (and consequently linked to many per diems) – but is it *really* the pressing priority for the CFRs?

As noted in Section 4.3.3, 96.4% of the total project management budget for the entire duration of the project has been spent. In other words, there are almost no further funds available for project management. Therefore, project implementation cannot continue until such time that this is resolved. **As a result, the project should cease all activities until such time that a source of funds is found to cover all project management costs from now until the end of the project.** Once the source of funds is found, it should be agreed upon by the PB and the UNDP-GEF RTC in Addis Ababa. There are three (not mutually exclusive) options. First, the project management costs incurred to date are retrospectively re-examined and, if allocation errors are found, then these are corrected. This course of action has some merit because (unless there has been gross mismanagement and/or misconduct) it is almost inconceivable that 96.4% of the project management budget for the entire length of the project has already been spent – especially because there was no project manager for the entirety of the first year of the project's implementation. The project management expenditure for YR2 (2014) warrants especial scrutiny because a total of USD 123,121.00 was budgeted that year for project management. This alone represents 79.9% of the *total* project management budget! Second, as indicated below, the project purchased four vehicles and six motorbikes. It is possible (but not confirmed) that this was charged to the project management budget. As indicated below, these funds should be retrospectively reimbursed (through budget reversal) to the project; this would free up a portion of the project management budget for the remainder of the project's life. Third, additional funds are found to cover the remaining project management costs: these additional funds should come from the UNDP-CO TRAC funds.

It should be noted that the budgets from Components One and Two should *not* be reallocated to cover the project management costs.

In addition to the above recommendation, the project purchased four vehicles and six motorbikes that were not included in the budget. Furthermore, as also discussed

² Instead, the MTR recommends that until the institutions are satisfactorily built, such projects should be implemented by a third-party organization under a delivery-based contract; there are many such contractual arrangements with multi- and bilateral donors.

³ Boundary demarcation of CFRs is only arguably included in the PRODOC (only in para 157 of the PRODOC but not elsewhere including Section 1.16 of the PRODOC in which project activities are described in detail).

in Section 4.3.3, the authenticity of the minutes of the first PB meeting⁴ is questionable – particularly because the vehicles and motorbikes were purchased *before* the first PB meeting was held. Irrespective of whether they are authentic or not, the project partners, including the PB and the UNDP-CO have neither followed their own protocols and policies nor those of the GEF – thereby significantly diminishing confidence in their management of the project. It also diminishes confidence in the auditing processes (both the audits carried out by the Auditor General’s office and of the UNDP audits). In conclusion, there should be a budget reversal on the costs of the vehicles and motorbikes with the replacement funds coming from either the Government of Uganda or the UNDP TRAC funds⁵.

In addition to these financial issues, there have been significant delays to the project – both at start-up of the project but also once implementation started. The slow rate of implementation (demonstrated by the low delivery of the project budget) continues even at this stage with various bureaucratic barriers and inefficiencies (despite efforts to overcome them) and can be summarised as low overall absorptive capacity. This is true of **all** of the organisations involved – including the UNDP-CO, NEMA, UWA and the NFA – as well as the CBOs. Some of the principal reasons for continued delays are: i) the inability of the partners to deliver their quarterly report on time, ii) the inability of the partners to spend their budgets each quarter (or at least to 80% of the budget for any given quarter), and ii) the inability of the partners to make timely requests for the subsequent tranches. Finally, the UNDP remains wedded to this system despite there being good examples in Uganda of how to overcome such institutional and organisational barriers⁶ (in other words, UNDP, in its Programming and Operational Policies and Procedures, is not displaying flexibility or adaptive management to the context of Uganda).

Despite this, the project partners (and especially NEMA and UWA) have been reluctant to take on the technical assistance, partner organisations, consultants and/or contractual service companies – despite the fact that there is a total of USD 1,836,000 (across both components and the project management budget) for these things within the project’s budget⁷. Within the framework of future audits, these budget lines should also be examined to determine how these funds have been used – in the knowledge that, in terms of seeking technical assistance, working with

⁴ Specifically the hard copy of the PB minutes of 12 September 2014 provided to the MTR on 08 July 2016 in which an agenda item was added “consideration of the procurement of vehicles and motor cycles for the project districts.”

⁵ The source of the replacements funds needs to be agreed among the project partners although the MTR recognizes that it will almost invariably come from UNDP TRAC funds.

⁶ For example, the multi-donor Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) has developed good practices to overcome this issue: the UNDP-CO should consult with the DGF on the modalities that it has put into practice.

⁷ Various explanations have been mooted why this is the case although it is difficult if not impossible to determine for certain. What is clear is that these organizations are reluctant to contract or sub-contract work.

partner organisations, consultants and/or contractual service companies, only four studies have been commissioned by the project to date⁸.

As such, the project partners are attempting to implement what is a large and complex project – which includes significant additionality beyond the business-as-usual scenarios – using existing staffing within existing staffing structures when their absorptive capacities are low even without these additional pressures.

This is simply incompatible with the sort of rate of implementation that is necessary to implement time bound GEF projects successfully such that they achieve their objective and outcomes. At the current rate of implementation (coupled with other factors, as described below), it is not possible that the targets for the project will be achieved.

In terms of the way forward, the MTR recommends the following steps (the majority of which are *immediate*):

- i) the UNDP requests a one-year no-cost extension for the project from the GEF – thus, if accepted, the project’s closing date will be 23 July 2018 (and while little remains in the project management budget, a total of USD 2,223,932.31 remains overall). If the GEF declines a no cost extension, the project should be closed immediately and the remaining funds returned to the GEF (***action: immediate; UNDP-GEF RTC (Addis Ababa); UNDP-CO with support from NEMA***);
- ii) the funds spent on purchasing the vehicles and motorbikes are returned to the project (thereby freeing up funding that appears to have been allocated to the project management budget); this would effectively be a budget reversal (***action: immediate; UNDP-CO***);
- iii) the project management expenditure is re-examined and re-allocations made if and when justified (***action: immediate; NEMA, UNDP-CO***);
- iv) once the budget reversal and re-allocation is complete, the UNDP-CO, the UNDP-GEF RTC in Addis Ababa and the project partners in Uganda reach an agreement of how the project management costs will be covered until the proposed end of project date (which, including the no cost extension, would be 23 July 2018). In principle, these additional funds would come from either or both the Government of Uganda and/or UNDP-CO TRAC funds⁹ (***action: on completion of the above steps; UNDP-GEF RTC and UNDP-CO with participation of NEMA***);
- v) there is a demonstrated and significant commitment to seek external assistance that will ensure that the additionality that the GEF seeks is achieved to the degree possible in the remaining time for the project. This should come in the form of *two* technical advisors/individual consultants to assist with the implementation and M&E of the PA and shea tree (with market access for shea nuts) aspects of the project, respectively. Other

⁸ These are the capacity needs assessment for the KVNP and the three studies on shea trees and shea products.

⁹ Although the MTR recognizes that it is more realistic to expect that they will come from UNDP TRAC funds.

- partners should be recruited for other aspects of project implementation as well (*action: on completion of step (iv) above; all project partners*)
- vi) with the input of the two technical advisors/individual consultants, develop a workplan and budget for the remaining time of the project (i.e., until 23 July 2018), specifying precisely what will be targeted during the remaining time of the project – in the awareness that a limited amount of things can realistically be achieved in this time. Particular focus should be given to those activities that will i) lead to global environmental benefits and other positive impacts, and ii) be sustainable beyond the life of the project. All other activities should not be considered. This final point is the most important in terms of paving the way forward. (*action: once the IC/TAs are recruited but not later than October 2016; IC/TAs, project partners*).

Other recommendations are to be found in the Recommendation Summary Table.

Recommendation Summary Table

No.	Recommendation	Entity Responsible
Objective: The Biodiversity of the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda is protected from existing and emerging threats (also including recommendations that span both components)		
A.1	Focus on delivering outputs and then results and impacts – rather than just reporting on inputs that have been made. M&E should focus on monitoring these aspects	All partners, both components
A.2	Harmonize the interventions and the results while ensuring that the activities and targeted results remain relevant to the project (as well as to the development priorities of Uganda, the UNDP-CO development framework and the GEF results frameworks). In addition, the results of all interventions should be thought about and, whenever possible, they should be monitored. For example, there has been significant investment in “raising awareness” or “sensitization” – however, little effort has been made to understand the <i>impact</i> or <i>results</i> of this. How has this quantifiably <i>changed behaviour</i> or <i>attitudes</i> ? Similarly for livelihood impacts and inadvertent impacts of activities (e.g., displacement to other species of tree as shea nut trees are protected).	PIU, NEMA, UNDP-CO
A.3	Acknowledge that a number of the targets for indicators in the Project Results Framework will not be achieved (see Table 2), even with a no-cost extension. Targets should be amended (or deleted) where necessary. This must be done in a transparent way – with full disclosure to the GEF. Learn lessons for future projects.	TSC and project partners (to review and validate recommended amendments) PB to approve
A.4	The demanding and additive nature of GEF projects means that additional assistance (in the form of technical assistance, consultants, private sector or NGO partners, and/or	All project partners (UNDP-CO to recruit IC/TA; NEMA, UWA

	<p>contractual service companies) to contribute to delivery of project results is necessary. The project design also allows for this with a total budget of USD 1,836,000 for such assistance (across both components and the project management budget).</p> <p>Two IC/TA (one for PAs and one for shea/markets) should be recruited as soon as possible to lead on implementation and M&E processes and to ensure that all project partners are carrying out activities that relevant to the project's objective and outcomes.</p> <p>The selection of assistance and partnerships that are mentioned below are to be funded by the project and contracts will be issued (e.g., in Recommendations B.1, B.2, etc.)</p>	and NFA)
A.5	<p>The project document describes in some detail the activities that should be taking place in order to achieve the objective and outcomes. One key underlying principle of GEF funding is to ensure additionality: GEF is not simply a source of funding for the business-as-usual scenario. <i>All</i> project partners (NEMA, UWA, NFA) need to focus on the aspects of additionality for which they are responsible; UNDP-CO and the IC/TAs will need to monitor this and provide support and guidance as appropriate.</p>	NEMA, UWA, NFA as implementation partners; UNDP-CO to monitor
A.6	<p>Ensure M&E, and accountability of all project partners. At present, the UWA and NFA are working in isolation with little or no support, or guidance. The IC/TAs, once recruited, (with PM and PC) will carry out M&E and provide such oversight, support and guidance and all project partners should be responsive to this.</p> <p>Reporting also needs to be consistent across all partners.</p>	IC/TAs with PM and PC (for M&E, support, guidance and oversight); project partners (especially UWA and NFA) in implementation.
Component One: Strengthening management effectiveness of the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster (see also objective-level Recommendations)		
B.1	<p>The upgrade of the Karenga CWA to a fully-fledged national park is not possible: it is neither attainable nor desirable as a target and all references to this should be removed.</p>	PB, UNDP-GEF RTC (Addis Ababa)
B.2	<p>In contrast to the above recommendation and building on activities carried out to date, seek a long-term partner (either private sector or NGO, with provision of funding) to develop the Karenga CWA into a fully functional CWA (Output 1.1) along the lines of those of, for example, the Northern Rangelands Trust in Kenya. The selected partner will have to harmonise, and collaborate and cooperate with current actors and build on work that has been carried out to date. The aim of the area would be to <i>strengthen</i> the conservation of biodiversity – and wildlife in particular – in the area.</p>	UWA; selected partner(s)
B.3	<p>The project (and UWA in particular) should seek assistance</p>	UWA & selected

	<p>and/or partnerships to implement the law enforcement component (Output 1.2). There are some good law enforcement/intelligence/IWT projects being implemented in the country (and regionally) at present and experiences and expertise can and should be shared (this includes projects being implemented by UCF and WCS).</p> <p>Similarly, UWA should seek assistance for the development of sustainable financing plans (Output 1.3)</p>	partner(s)
Component Two: Integrating PA Management in the Wider Landscape (see also objective-level Recommendations)		
C.1	<p>The CBOs will need significant support from District Liaison Officers, the Project Field Officer, the Project Manager, the Project's Administrative and Financial Assistant, and the District Financial Officers: this should be built into the workplans (with associated budgets) for these people. The support should be in the form of technical assistance, ensuring that the funding they have received is used for project expenses. M&E (by IC/TA, PM, district CAOs) should be carried out to ensure that the work carried out by the CBOs remains relevant to the targeted <i>results</i> and <i>impacts</i>.</p> <p>If the opportunity arises or if considered optimal, partner organisations (e.g., development NGOs and the private sector) may be contracted to continue the work with the CBOs – especially when those NGOs and private sector organisations have expertise and experience in the fields in which the project is working (e.g., beekeeping, shea nut production, etc).</p>	DLOs, PFO, PM, AFA, CBOs, districts; partners
C.2	Monitor and audit the expenditure of districts and CBOs to ensure that the funds are spent appropriately	PM, AFA, independent financial auditors
C.3	<p>The Project Manager, with support from the PFO, will need to work with the DLO (and other district staff) to integrated biodiversity (and project objectives) into District Development Plans (DDP), and to develop appropriate ordinances and by-laws.</p> <p>Newly elected district officers will require training.</p>	PM, PFO, districts
C.4	<p>Institutional, financial and socio-economic sustainability are key issues with the CBOs. The project partners should seek sustainability by every means possible – including linking the CBOs with other initiatives and other organisations.</p> <p>If a no-cost extension for the project is secured, consider a second year of funding for those CBOs that are being most successful.</p>	UNDP-CO, districts, other organisations
C.5	Build into workplans and budgets experience-sharing meetings among CBOs and districts	PM, PFO, CBOs, districts
C.6	Link the shea nut producers directly with existing markets:	IC/TA, NEMA,

	for example, the shea butter factory in Lira ¹⁰ and shea nut processors in Jinja ¹¹	districts
Project management		
D.1	Carry out analysis of why project management costs have been so high Sourcing funding and agreement on how to fund project management from now until EOP (and further into a no-cost extension if granted)	UNDP-GEF RTC, UNDP-CO, GOU, auditors
D.2	Request a 12-month no cost extension	UNDP-GEF RTC, GEF
D.3	GEF requires that cofinance expenditure is accurately estimated, including in-kind cofinance. Suggestions are made on how to do this best	PIU
D.4	All fund-flow systems need to be streamlined and accelerated. Reporting, accountability and fund-request schedules to be agreed among partners All partners need to report at the end of each quarter (irrespective of the degree to which a quarter's budget has been spent)	PIU, UNDP-CO
D.5	UNDP needs to be more responsive, active, organised and ensure timely transfers of funding	UNDP-CO
D.6	UNDP-CO cannot undermine decisions of PB; as a member of the PB, UNDP should be using that forum to propose amendments or changes UNDP-CO needs to transfer responsibilities and not micro-manage the project	UNDP-CO
D.7	Lines of communication need to be agreed and maintained	UNDP-CO, PIU, partners
D.8	TOR and consultants' work need to remain relevant to project and project objectives	IC/TAS, PM, PB, contractors
D.9	The TSC is a good mechanism to bring together stakeholders	UNDP-CO, UNDP-

¹⁰ See <http://www.sheabutteruganda.com>

¹¹ For further information, a simple google search gives a huge amount of information on shea activities in the country (many of which are even within the project area and some of which have already sought certification!!). The project should be drawing off these experiences and even joining forces with other partners. For example, see <http://www.bellalucce.com/a-peek-inside-our-shea-butter-facility-in-uganda.html>, <http://www.thesheaproject.org>, <https://www.beadforlife.org/our-work/she-a-program>, http://www.sheaterraorganics.com/Shea-Nilotica-East-African-Shea-Butter-Certified-Organic-p_453.html, <https://www.moyaasheabutter.com>, and <http://www.sheabeauty.ug>; and for information on organic produce in Uganda see http://www.nogamu.org.ug/cope_members.php

	and interested parties. The 'honed-down' TSC is effective and should be replicated in future projects.	GEF RTC
D.10	The "facilitation" and/or per diems given to people as an incentive to attend and participate in meetings should not be necessary. Indeed, the practice of holding extended meetings just beyond the city limits of Kampala in order to boost attendance should not be necessary and the project (and the UNDP-CO) should be striving for a higher level of professionalism than this.	PIU, UNDP-CO, partners, TSC

Summary of lessons learned

Projects that end up being highly satisfactory offer some lessons: these are the mechanisms by which things should be done. In contrast, projects that struggle to succeed arguably offer more lessons. However, we rarely learn from them and, indeed, because they are an embarrassment to the institutions involved, the results (with the lessons) are more often than not buried and the mistakes end up being repeated time and again.

This project offers some extremely useful lessons that are hopefully incorporated into the designs of future projects.

The project tried to transfer responsibilities for a complex project that contains many complex concepts to institutions that remain without the capacity and capability to implement them. Moreover, the project does this with a complicated institutional arrangement. The profound understanding of the project that would otherwise be necessary for its successful implementation is not there. The systems are inefficient, complicated and founded on mistrust. In short, the institutions have not been built or empowered such that they can take on such time-bound, complex projects.

This leaves the GEF two mutually exclusive options: i) to implement projects that focus on building the institutions until such time as they have the capacity and capability to implement such projects in the future, *or* ii) to seek more immediate global environmental benefits through projects that are implemented by third-party organisations (either NGOs or private sector organisations) under delivery-based contracts.

The Kidepo Critical Landscape Project originally was being conceived as two projects (one to deal with the protected areas and another to deal with the land degradation and sustainable forest management outside of the protected areas). While the transaction and administration costs and burdens are higher, given the circumstances, arguably it should have been implemented (by third-party organisations under delivery-based contracts) as *four* discrete projects: i) one building KVNPP (capacity development, law enforcement, financial sustainability), ii) one trialling community-based wildlife management (akin to the community conservancies of the Northern Rangelands Trust in northern Kenya), iii) one trialling participatory forest management in the CFRs in the Kidepo Critical Landscape (akin to the PFM process that has been vastly successful in Ethiopia) and, finally, iv) the integration of landscape level conservation concepts into district level planning and development processes. *Indeed, had there been more time available until the end of*

the project, the MTR would have recommended splitting the project into four such sub-projects, accurately dividing the remaining budget and finding four organisations working under delivery-based contracts to complete the work. In summary, then, under the current levels of capacity and capability, it is better to minimise the complexity of projects by keeping them small, discrete, simple and straightforward.

However, one critical step that *all* the institutions involved in the implementation of this project need to recognise their limitations and the problem: it is only when they (and the government as a whole) recognise their limitations that they might start to work to overcome this issue.

A further critical step is also important: when developing and designing such projects, it is also necessary to have a profound understanding and recognition of the motivations of the people who work for these institutions. For example, in the KCL project, the three government institutions involved with the implementation of the project have all been reluctant to seek any form of external assistance (whether in the form of technical assistance, partner organisations, consultants and/or contractual service companies) – despite the fact that there is a generous budget to do so. The MTR has already recommended that there is a process to determine if and how these funds have been used (because if they have been used then they have not been used in the way that they were intended). However, that is not the question being posed here: why is it that the institutions so reluctant to seek this external assistance? Why is it, in the words of one respondent that they “prefer to do it {them}selves”? An understanding of the institutional cultures and settings leads, in turn, to a deeper understanding of the *actual barriers* that exist to implementation of such projects and, by extension, to achieving long-term solutions such as the one for this project (“the biodiversity and ecosystem values of the Kidepo Critical Landscape, Uganda, are conserved and provide sustainable benefit flows at local, national and global levels through enhanced operational capacity and functional landscape planning approaches”). In summary, then, there has not been a very transparent and honest identification of the barriers: this significantly reduces the chances of achieving any project’s objectives and outcomes, and becomes, as a result, a waste of valuable resources.

Beyond these overall observations and lessons, the MTR has identified a small number of specific lessons.

First (and in acknowledgement that there have been delays), the capacity needs assessment should have taken place either during the PPG phase of the project or in the very early stages once implementation started. This would allow training and other capacity development activities to occur well before the MTR and, thereafter, for the *impact* of the training on changing behaviour and practices – and how this is leading to global environmental benefits – to be evaluated during the project’s Terminal Evaluation.

Second, if any activity becomes unachievable and/or it becomes too late within a project’s lifetime to complete an activity such that it i) has its intended impact and ii) the impact and processes involved with that activity are not sustainable, then projects should, with the explicit approval from the PB, to drop activities.

Third, some of the activities that the project is currently implementing are not so innovative (and may be deviating from the originally conceived ideas in the project document) and there are many other projects and organisations that are currently involved in similar work or they have been in the past. As such, there are many opportunities to learn lessons from past projects, and other opportunities to share experiences or even to contract them to implement these components of the project. Examples abound: apiculture, the growing of chilli for livelihoods and as a tool to mitigate human-wildlife conflict, intelligence-based law enforcement in PAs, etc.

2 Introduction

2.1 Purpose of the review

1. The Midterm Review (MTR) of the UNDP-GEF project “Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Threatened Savanna Woodland in the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda” was carried out according to the UNDP-GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy. Thus, it was carried out with the aim of providing a systematic and comprehensive review and evaluation of the performance of the project to date by assessing its design, processes of implementation, achievement relative to its objectives.

2.2 Scope & Methodology

2. The approach for the MTR was determined by the Terms of Reference (TOR, see Annex I) and by the UNDP-GEF Guidance for conducting Midterm Reviews¹². Thus, it was carried out with the aim of providing a systematic, evidence-based and comprehensive review of the performance of the project to date by assessing its strategy and design, processes of implementation and achievements relative to its objectives. As such, the MTR determined the progress of the project in relation to its stated objectives (through the assessment of results, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, impact and efficiency - requiring a review of the fund allocations, budgets and projections, and the financial coordination mechanisms), to promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing on the results and lessons (both positive and negative) that can be learned from the implementation of the project to date. The MTR examined whether the implementation arrangements – including the relationships and interactions among the project’s partners, including the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), the National Forestry Authority (NFA), the UNDP and other partners – are effective and efficient.

3. The MTR included a thorough review of the project documents and other outputs, financial plans and audits, monitoring reports, the PIF, UNDP Initiation Plan, Inception Report, Annual Project Reviews (APR), Project Implementation Reviews (PIR), monitoring tools (including, for example, the METT), relevant correspondence and other project related material produced by the project staff or their partners.

4. The MTR also included a mission in Uganda between 27 January – 12 February 2016 (see Annex II for the itinerary of the field mission). The mission followed a collaborative and participatory approach and included a series of structured and unstructured interviews, both individually and in small

¹² UNDP-GEF (2014) *Project-level Monitoring: Guidance for conducting midterm reviews of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects*.

groups (see Annex III for the list of people met over the course of the MTR). Site visits were also conducted i) to validate the reports and indicators, ii) to examine, in particular, any infrastructure development and equipment procured, iii) to consult with personnel in the pilot areas, local authorities or government representatives, project partners and local communities, and iv) to assess data that may only be held locally. Particular attention was paid to listening to the stakeholders' views and the confidentiality of all interviews was stressed. Whenever possible, the information was crosschecked among the various sources. In addition, the review examined the achievements of the project within the realistic political, institutional and socio-economic framework of Uganda.

5. The logical framework towards which the project is working formed an important part of the MTR.

6. The review was carried out according to the UNDP/GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy and, therefore, ratings (as per UNDP-GEF policy and procedures for MTR processes) were provided for: i) the progress towards results, by outcome and by the objective, ii) project implementation and adaptive management, and iii) sustainability (and the risks thereto). Overall there was an emphasis on supportive recommendations.

7. The MTR was conducted by one international and one national consultant. The consultants have been independent of the policy-making process, and the delivery and management of the assistance to the project; the consultants have not been involved in the implementation and/or supervision of the project.

8. The preliminary findings of the MTR were presented at two debriefing meetings at the end of the mission – the first on 29 February 2016 at the UNDP-CO offices, and the second to a broad range of stakeholders on 04 March 2016.

9. Finally, the MTR was carried out with a number of audiences in mind, including: i) the various entities of the Government of Uganda that are involved with the project – primarily NEMA, UWA, NFA and Ministry of Local Government, ii) the UNDP-CO and UNDP-GEF RTC in Addis Ababa, and iv) the GEF.

2.3 Structure of the review report

10. The report follows the structure of Project Evaluations recommended in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF-Financed Projects as given in Annex 5 of the TOR. As such, it first deals with the purpose of the review and the methodology used for the review (Section 2), a description of the project and the development context in Belarus (Section 3), it then deals with the Findings (Section 4) of the evaluation within four sections (Project Strategy, Progress

Towards Results, Project Implementation and Adaptive Management, and Sustainability). The report then draws together the Conclusions and Recommendations from the project (Section 5).

3 Project description and background context

3.1 Development context

11. The project document gives an exhaustive account of the biodiversity, socio-economic, institutional and policy context of the Kidepo Landscape (KCL) in northeast Uganda¹³. In brief, the KCL encompasses eight protected areas under a range of management authorities. The area was embroiled in conflict and insecurity that began in the 1980s and ended in 2005. As a consequence, the area received relatively limited investment over the past 20 years.

12. More recently, the government has embarked on a Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) to improve livelihoods of the local communities, rehabilitate infrastructure and also restore and promote good environment management practices. Part of this process is the resettlement of former Internally Displaced People (IDPs) – however, these people could transform the landscape through the construction of new settlements and infrastructure, increasing demand for fuel wood and transforming land to agriculture. In addition, there was the possibility of increased poaching of wildlife and other threats.

3.2 Project description and strategy

13. The long-term solution, as identified in the Prodoc, is an ecologically representative, connected network of protected areas, subject to strengthened management arrangements suitable for the situation in northern Uganda and adequately financed through multiple sources. The Prodoc goes on to state that this can be achieved through increasing household and community benefits from biodiversity on private land and protected areas; providing planned, targeted and effective support to the operational capacity of core protected areas within the landscape; and through creating a coordinated landscape management approach in the KCL to serve as a shield against human-induced pressures on Uganda's threatened biodiversity.

14. This long-term solution translates into the following project goal:

“The biodiversity and ecosystem values of the Kidepo Critical Landscape, Uganda, are conserved and provide sustainable benefit flows at local, national and global levels through enhanced operational capacity and functional landscape planning approaches.”

¹³ See Part 1A: Situation Analysis of the Prodoc.

15. The project will contribute to this long-term goal through achievement of its objective:

“The biodiversity of the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda is protected from existing and emerging threats.”

16. The project has been designed with two components:

1. *Component One: Strengthening management effectiveness of the Kidepo Critical Landscape protected area cluster, and*
2. *Component Two: Integrating protected area management in the wider landscape.*

17. The Prodop is very specific about the specific outcomes from each of the two components. For component one, the identified outcomes are:

1. Increased coverage of PA by 95,600 ha over a baseline of 240,075 ha and strengthened integrity of buffer zones to conserve dry season refugia for wildlife (227,389 hectares)
2. Reduced poaching pressures over an area of 428,311 ha comprising seven PAs (one NP, six CFRs) and a community wildlife management area, verified by 25% greater wildlife abundance over the course of the year by EoP
3. Management Effectiveness (METT) Score for Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster (KVNP), Nyangea-Napole, Morungole, Zulia, Timu, Lwala and Rom CFRs); increased over the baseline score by at least 40%.
4. Key indicator species (elephants, zebra, buffalo) in the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster show measurable increase in numbers of >25% by EoP

18. In addition to these outcomes, further results under Component One are targeted: i) the management and integrity of the Karenga CWA is strengthened, and ii) improved security and law enforcement results in reduced poaching levels.

19. For component two, the outcomes are:

1. A working model for integrating management of PAs and wider production landscapes is piloted and adopted in six districts in North Eastern Uganda (Kitgum, Kaabong, Agago, Otuke, Abim and Kotido) and secures wildlife corridors and dispersal areas covering approximately 227,389 ha - resulting in reduced deforestation of shea by 25%
2. No net loss of natural habitat in the critical landscape and at least 40% reduction in hunting pressures in wildlife corridors and dispersal areas

3. PA buffer zone under approved district management plans in six districts (Kitgum, Kaabong, Agago, Otuke, Abim and Kotido) incorporating BD considerations
4. District governments in six districts cooperate effectively to regulate and plan natural resource use over 227,389 ha of the critical landscape, resulting in a landscape level coordination mechanism that enshrines biodiversity conservation by mandate
5. An organic certification system, based on Soil Association standards, set up and functioning for the export of shea products from the Kidepo Critical Landscape

20. In addition to these outcomes, a further result under Component Two is targeted: the district development plans in the six target districts integrate biodiversity.

21. In terms of outputs and activities to achieve the above-mentioned outcomes, the two components have, respectively, four and seven outputs with a total of 21 and 46 listed activities (see Section 1.16 of the Prodoc).

3.3 Project Implementation Arrangements¹⁴

22. The project was designed to be implemented under Nationally Implementation Modalities (NIM). Under these modalities, UNDP is to act as provider of services and facilities. The UNDP is accountable to the GEF for project delivery. As such, UNDP has overall responsibility for supervision, logistical support and quality assurance.

23. The National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) is the implementing partner for the project. There are two other Responsible Partners for the project – the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the National Forestry Authority (NFA). The Prodoc also describes a long list of “other collaborating partners” (see Section 1.28 of the Prodoc).

24. NEMA’s role is also to coordinate District (local landscape) level activities with the support of UWA and NFA (under component one) as well as through direct engagement with district government offices (under component two). UWA has a specific responsibility for Component 1.

25. A Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was to be established; the PCU reports, in principle, to the Project Steering Committee (PB) and has the responsibility to ensure coordination among NEMA, UWA, NFA and other key stakeholders, and to coordinate national and landscape level activities that are largely linked to policy, and systemic and institutional capacities for managing protected areas and their wider landscapes.

¹⁴ This section describes the *design* of the implementation arrangements; the *actual* situation is described in Section 4.3.1

26. The PCU is also responsible for coordination and mainstreaming of lessons and experiences into government operations, lessons learnt from activities in other related GEF funded projects and linking with additional ongoing related projects. The PCU was to be headed by a Project Coordinator (PC) who is a fulltime salaried resource. At the landscape level, the PC works closely with the district technical staff from the natural resources departments.

27. Overall project responsibility falls to the Project Steering Committee (PB). The PB should allow not only high-level coordination between government agencies, but also provides a mechanism for open and effective project management. It is chaired by the Executive Director NEMA –who acts as the ‘National Project Director’.

28. The PB is responsible for providing strategic guidance during project implementation. It is comprised of Heads of relevant collaborating government agencies and departments as well as representatives of the private sector and NGOs. UNDP has one representative present who advises the PB in its deliberations.

29. In principle, the PB should meet “at least once every six months”. Extraordinary PB meetings may be organized as and when they are necessary. The PC is a member of the PB as an ex-officio observer responsible for taking and distributing minutes. Staff of the PCU working under the PC attend meetings of the PB by invitation and only on a need to basis.

30. The expected role of the PB is described in detail in the Prodoc.

31. In addition to the PB, the Prodoc calls for the establishment of a Technical Committee on Biological Conservation, with the responsibility for technical backstopping during the implementation of the project. The committee supports the PCU and PB in their work to ensure that implementation of project activities is on course and producing the desired outputs. The committee is to meet at least once per quarter.

32. A Project Coordinator (PC) is the head of the project management team and is responsible for day-to-day oversight and coordination on implementation of project activities including supervision of activities contracted to consultants by Government. The PC reports to the PB on a quarterly basis and maintain a direct liaison with UNDP through the Energy and Environment unit.

33. As with the PB, the Prodoc contains a detailed description of the PC’s responsibilities. However, for cross-reference, it is worth noting that the PC’s responsibilities are supposed to include: i) mobilizing micro-capital grants, ii) monitoring financial resources and accounting to ensure accuracy and

reliability of financial reports; and iii) being responsible for preparing and submitting financial reports to UNDP on a quarterly basis.

34. At the level of the districts, the District Environment Officers (DEO) are, in principle, coordinating activities among the project partners. The DEOs are liaising with a Project Officer and other relevant district technical staff for the purposes of enhancing implementation of the project at district level.

35. The Prodoc calls for the PC to be supported by an assistant as well as a project accountant/administration officer.

36. In principle, there are two other members of project staff to facilitate landscape-level activities: a Protected Areas Liaison Officer to be based at UWA (to assist with the implementation of Component 1) and a District Liaison Officer to be based in NEMA (to assist with the implementation of Component 2).

37. Finally, the Prodoc allows provision for technical assistance – both national and international. These are to assist with the process of overcoming barriers and achieve the project outputs/outcomes.

38. According to the Prodoc, the TAs should “be directly contracted by the PB, through a transparent procurement process ... following UNDP regulations”.

39. The argument for using TAs is that “many of the project components are innovative and need some level of consultancy input”.

40. The language used in this section suggests that the actual management arrangements are not as they were designed. This is indeed the case and this will be discussed in Section 4.3.1.

3.4 Project timing and milestones

41. The project was developed to be a four-year (48 month) project. The UNDP Prodoc was signed on 24 July 2013 – two years and eight months after the PIF had been approved (on 25 November 2010). The project was designed along similar lines to the majority of other GEF projects with an Inception Period, a midterm review, a terminal review and a closure.

42. As shall be reiterated through the report, once implementation began, the project has suffered a series of delays and setbacks.

Table 1. The project milestones including the projected end date for the project.

Milestone	Date
PIF Approval	25 November 2010
PPG Approval	18 February 2011
UNDP Prodoc signed	24 July 2013
Inception Workshop	09-13 December 2013

First Project Manager appointed	July 2014
Second Project Manager appointed	November 2014
MTR mission commences	24 January 2016
Initially planned EOP	23 July 2017
Proposed EOP*	23 July 2018

*As per recommendations, see Section 5

3.5 Main stakeholders

43. The Project Document exhaustively identified the project's stakeholders¹⁵. The table in the Project Document not only identifies the stakeholders but it describes their current mandate and their role within the project.

4 Findings

4.1 Project Strategy

4.1.1 Project Design

44. The project is identified to fall under GEF Biodiversity Focal Area, Strategic Objective One: *Improving sustainability of Protected Area Systems*. In focusing on the Kidepo Valley National Park (KVNP) and the Central Forest Reserves (CFRs) in the KCL, the project does indeed have the potential to make significant contributions to this strategic objective. However, arguably, the project spans a number of Focal Areas and Strategic Objectives. Indeed, it could be seen to be a number of different projects shoehorned into one package. These include:

1. A protected areas project, with a focus on the KVNP and CFRs, including various aspects and strategic programs.
2. A natural resource management project with a focus on wildlife and shea trees.
3. A sustainable forest management project with a focus on shea trees.

45. Under the more recently introduced objectives under GEF-6, it could also include the strategic objective of reducing threats to biodiversity.

46. Indeed, it was originally conceived as two projects that were shoehorned into a single project. In part, some of the issues that currently exist (and that will be discussed later in this report) arise from the cobbling together of these two aspects of the project.

¹⁵ See the Stakeholder Analysis presented on pg. 33 of the Project Document.

47. In addition, in terms of the activities as designed and as implemented, to call the activities that are being carried out outside of the protected areas (in essence, all of Component Two) as fitting in a “protected area system sustainability” project would be a stretch of the imagination.

48. Further to this, there is some disconnect between i) the description of the project goal, objective, outcomes, components and outputs (Section 1.16 of the Project Document), ii) the summary of activities (para 190 *et seq.* of the Project Document) and iii) the project’s results framework (Part IV of the Project Document). While this is not wholly unusual, it can have the effect of adding confusion and reducing clarity for the people implementing the project.

49. Nonetheless, in the broadest terms, the project design is appropriate. It seeks to go beyond the business-as-usual scenario, and introduce and resource activities that are, for the area, innovative.

50. The one caveat to a statement on the quality of the design was the inclusion of the idea to convert the Karenga Community Wildlife Area (KCWA) to a national park. In the words of the stakeholders this was “never possible” and should not have been included in the project. The issue has caused significant tensions.

4.1.2 Analysis of LFA/Results Framework

51. The principal analysis of the project’s results framework is carried out in Section 4.2.1 (see Table 2 in which both the design of the results framework and the current status are critically examined). However, generally, the linkages between the indicator, EOP target and means of verification are not as explicit as they could be. Because the concepts that underpin the indicators and EOP targets are complex and because the linkages are not explicit, the project has not been as focused as it should have been. The consequence is that the project, at its current trajectory, will not attain the majority (if not all) the targets. In addition, many of the EOP targets are extremely ambitious, some wildly so (see Table 2 for analysis). Indeed, many are so wildly ambitious that they prompt the MTR team to wonder how they were derived.

4.2 Progress Towards Results

4.2.1 Analysis of progress towards outcomes

52. As has been stated (see Section 3.4), the project suffered significant delays (see also Table 1):

1. The Inception Workshop was held just under five months after the start of the project. The Inception Workshop was held *before* the

appointment of the first Project Manager and, therefore, it failed in its objectives¹⁶.

2. The first Project Manager (PM), a position not identified in the Prodoc, was appointed in July 2014 – one year after the commencement of the project. In the interim, the Project Coordinator (PC), a position not as defined in the Prodoc¹⁷, managed the implementation of the project (as well as trying to fulfil all his other duties within NEMA). The first PM resigned after just three months because of intractable barriers to efficient and effective implementation.
3. The second PM was appointed in November 2014 – thus, a full 16 months after the commencement of the project.
4. There are innumerable barriers to efficient and effective implementation of the project, including procurement processes and the transfer of funds. These will be discussed at length later in the report (see Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 in particular). In the terms of a number of interviewees, the project has become “bogged down in bureaucracy”.

53. In practice, then, the project has been operational for the past 12-15 (of a total of 32) months; even then, it has not been operating at optimal speed. As such, the project has really only managed to get some activities going. Under Component One, these include:

1. A series of “sensitization” meetings have taken place in the vicinity of KVNPN and Karenga CWA. These included local leadership and MPs. Interestingly, the project’s 2015 PIR suggests that the buy-in of these people was “secured” – although there are no data to corroborate that assertion: certainly over the course of the MTR mission, none of the stakeholders mentioned “Karenga” as an entity. The project team have not collected data to determine the success or otherwise of other “sensitizations” that have taken place have had any results or lead to changes in behaviour – although it did tangibly diffuse the tensions around the inclusion of the conversion of the Karenga CWA to a National Park in the Prodoc (see the Recommendations section 5.2.1 for further discussion on this).

¹⁶ As described in para 47 *et seq.* in Section 1.28 of the Prodoc. See Section 4.3.1 for further discussion.

¹⁷ See Section 4.3.1 for further discussion on this point.

Further “sensitization” and awareness meetings were held with stakeholders (with a total of 104 participants) from 12 sub-counties bordering KCWA between 03 – 05 December 2015.

2. The procurement and delivery of “security and enforcement” equipment, a suite of equipment was delivered (including GPS units, VHF radios, binoculars, water bottles, knives and first aid kits). This ostensibly falls under Output 1.2 - under the sections that mention the “introduction of a security and enforcement system” and, specifically, the “provision of surveillance equipment”. However, it should be taken in the context of the results that are being targeted here: i) reduced poaching pressures, ii) greater wildlife abundances, and iii) improved management effectiveness – and the TE of the project will want to see evidence for these results.
1. A study tour with participants was carried out to community conservancies adjacent to Amboseli National Park in Kenya.
2. A study of the training needs assessment has been carried out. At the stage of the MTR, the study was nearing completion and preliminary findings were presented to the TSC (and other stakeholders) at a meeting in Lira on 09 April 2016. The draft report was expected shortly after the meeting. There were a few points that the MTR could make having heard the presentation:
 - i. The assessment focused singularly on UWA in the KVNP and the NFA - and not on any of the other project partners: the Karenga CWA or any of the district authorities.
 - ii. This is the sort of study that would have been best carried out either in the PPG stage of the project or in its very earliest months. This would allow for the project to then tailor and carry out the training such that by the end of the project, the training will not have only taken place but it would have started to have an *impact*. As it is, once the procurement for training providers has taken place, by the scheduled end of the project, the training will have only just been completed.
3. Community scouts were identified – ostensibly to assist with the process of monitoring wildlife and “handling” human-wildlife conflict. This activity falls under Output 1.4.3.
4. More recently, various trainings have taken place with UWA staff, including: i) basic criminal procedure with 54 participants from 05 – 08 December 2015, and ii) training on customer care,

communication skills, administration and fire fighting from 10-11 March 2016 for 60 participants (53 from KVNP/UWA and seven from the NFA).

54. Under Component Two, the activities carried out to date include:

1. Carrying out three studies on shea trees: i) the distribution and density (an “inventory”) of shea trees in the “shea tree belt” within the KCL; ii) the cost-benefit analysis of different use options for the products of shea trees and, therefore, the value-addition potential of shea products – with a specific focus on local communities, and iii) the shea oil value chain analysis. As with the training needs assessment described above, these studies were nearing completion and their preliminary findings were presented to the TSC on 09 April 2016.

Having had the opportunity to attend the meeting at which the studies were being presented, the MTR team has a few comments to make:

- The studies and consultancies need to remain relevant to the project and linked to the indicators and targeted results of the project. This was not always apparent from the presentations.
 - The authors/consultants did not keep to their TOR with the result that there was significant overlap among the three studies. Interestingly, one of the consequences of this was that one could compare the conclusions of the studies: on more than one occasion, these were contradictory. This, therefore, begged the question of how exhaustive the studies were and their accuracy (based on the assumption that there should be objective and conclusive answers to the questions that the studies were supposed to be answering).
2. As with Component One, “sensitisation” has taken place at the district level (e.g., in Abim District, technical staff and cultural leaders from the six districts were sensitised in the process to start the development or reinstatement of district ordinances and community by-laws).
 3. One district ordinance (in Abim District) has been developed and passed by the District Council during the project lifetime.
 4. Some training has been carried out with enforcement officers from Otuke District receiving training in a two-day training workshop.

5. As a first step towards formation of a district coordination mechanism for biodiversity management in National Parks, CFRs and wildlife corridors, a district task force on enforcement comprising of Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) and District Environment Officers of six project districts was formed. Similarly, engagement with cultural leaders in the project districts also took place as another starting point for inter-district coordination mechanism but at the community level.
6. A number of microgrants (\leq USD 25,000) have been made to CBOs. Ostensibly, these work within the themes of shea tree conservation and mitigating human wildlife conflict – with the additional potential benefit of enhancing livelihoods in the communities involved. The microgrants focus on beekeeping, processing shea nuts for oil, the growing of chilli and cultural groups and community-based tourism development. There are a number of important points here:
 - i. The area is one of some 12,000km² with an estimated 650,000 people (thus, a average density of 60-70 people/km²). Therefore, in terms of *landscape-level impact*, the microgrants will be negligible if, indeed, they achieve their objectives.
 - ii. Some of the projects are profoundly ill conceived and unsustainable (see also Section 4.4). This will have a number of different impacts – a) expectations have been built, b) the funding will be wasted and iii) there will be no sustainability.
 - iii. In the past three decades, there have ben numerous projects the focus on precisely the same targets as the microgrants (especially the beekeeping, processing shea nuts for oil, the growing of chilli). Some are actually still ongoing. It appears as if i) none of the lessons learned from these previous attempts have been learned and incorporated into the project and ii) no effort has been made to link up with other initiatives.

55. There are, however, some issues beyond the significant delays discussed above.

56. First, as stated above (see Section 4.1.1), in the broadest terms, the project design was appropriate (if somewhat fragmented). However, a number of the activities that have been carried out are only partially related to the project document and project design. The best (but not only) example of this is the work that has been carried out by the NFA. To date, the NFA has surveyed

the boundary of Morongole CFR – with the aim of demarcating it later. Boundary demarcation of CFRs is only arguably included in the PRODOC (only in para 157 of the PRODOC but not elsewhere including Section 1.16 of the PRODOC in which project activities are described in detail). As such, it appears as if the NFA is simply using the funds to fund the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario rather than the incremental activities demanded by the project document. Indeed, sceptics argued that this activity was being carried out not for the impact that it will have but on the promise of the per diems it offers: this is a time-consuming exercise (and consequently linked to many per diems) – but is it *really* the pressing priority for the CFRs?

57. While the NFA has been singled out in this example, other agencies are no less guilty. The work that has been carried out in KVNPN with the UWA is also not well aligned to the project document (which, for example, calls for innovative mechanisms for information and intelligence gathering¹⁸).

58. There may be a number of interlinked reasons why this may be the case. First, there may be limited understanding of the contemporary, cutting edge concepts that the Prodoc attempts to introduce. Second, the primary partners (NEMA, UWA, NFA and the district authorities) have not consulted any expertise outside of their own organisations. This, in turn, suggests that these organisations do not understand the fundamental foundation of GEF projects which is to provide funding for incremental activities and additionality. The GEF funding is *not* to provide additional funding for the “business-as-usual”. Indeed, GEF funding is given in recognition that the “business-as-usual” is failing to deliver global environmental benefits. The MTR makes specific recommendations (see Section 5.2) for overcoming this.

59. When the delays and the implementation of “business-as-usual” are taken into account, the project has a huge amount of work to do (see Figure 1).

¹⁸ **Comment on draft MTR report:** “What does the consulting team consider use of smart phones secured under the project for information gathering to be?” **MTR Response:** The smartphones that have been provided to the KVNPN are primarily a monitoring tool (primarily for ecological monitoring) but they have been used for monitoring infringements. There is some work being carried out to link the data collected using smartphones to an offender database – but, not once again, this is primarily for monitoring. In other words, the *information* and *intelligence* gathering that requires maintaining a group of informers and other forms of intelligence gathering have *not*, to date, been carried out under the auspices of this project as it was intended.

2.7.5. Train existing end users and provide linkages to end users' system

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Table 2. The Project Results Framework showing the MTR status and the MTR comments and ratings.

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
Project Objective: The Biodiversity of the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda is protected from existing and emerging threats	Ecological stability of entire landscapes is increased, biodiversity is less threatened, and habitats are secured;	Landscape level approaches will not be taken up to the extent that the opportunity allows; risks from climate change will impact the buffer zones but also PAs themselves, with net loss to biodiversity and to incomes	Effective Terrestrial protected area coverage increased from a baseline of Increased coverage of PA by 95,600 ha over a baseline of 240,075 ha. and designation of buffer zones to conserve dry season refugia for wildlife (227,389 hectares)	Still early to report on the development objective	Still early to report on the development objective	GIS and ground truthing, elephant monitoring, zebra monitoring, forest canopy cover monitoring, shea distribution and density	The EOP target will not be attained as it hinges on the status of the KCWA (see indicator below).
	Karenga CWA will have the necessary operational and governance capacity built by EoP to be gazetted to full NP status	The existing baseline is centred on KVNP as the core area where wildlife are able to peacefully habitat; refugia are limited and insecure, corridors, like Karenga, are under threat	Increased coverage of PA by 95,600 ha over a baseline of 240,075 ha. and strengthened integrity of buffer zones to conserve dry season refugia for wildlife (227,389 hectares)	As a first step towards strengthening management of Karenga community wildlife area, the local leadership and community members were mobilized and sensitized on the importance of the wildlife area and opportunities for ecotourism	Community groups have been supported to implement conservation interventions geared towards livelihood improvement	Gazettement notice; greater numbers of wildlife - measured by indicator species such as elephant, buffalo and zebra; enhanced operational capacity in KVNP, CFAs and Karenga	The EOP target will not be attained – neither in the form of securing corridors (in whichever form or designation it has) or conferring NP status to the KCWA. The proposal to gazette the area to a full NP was <i>never</i> attainable and the stakeholders should not have included it in the design phase of the project. “Sensitization” and

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
							microgrant schemes will do little if anything to change the status of corridors ¹⁹ and, as a consequence, no significant change is expected by EOP.
	Poaching levels will have decreased	Enforcement in the Kidepo Critical Landscape is currently too weak to deal with armed poachers from politically unstable South Sudan, and poaching is a growing problem	Reduced poaching pressures over an area of 428,311 ha comprising seven PAs (one NP, six CFRs) and a community wildlife management area, verified by 25% greater wildlife abundance over the course of the year by EoP	No progress this year	Security equipment to facilitate enforcement have been bought	Enhanced and installed security operations in KVNPN and six CFA as well as defined management regime in Karenga; reduced poaching, measured by reduction in carcass incidents	While there has been the provision of some equipment to UWA in KVNPN, this alone will do little or nothing to alter poaching levels ²⁰ . In addition, the EOP target is overambitious and unattainable. Poaching should be measured by incident per unit effort (measurable by both WILD LEO and

¹⁹ **Comment on draft MTR report:** “Really? How about attitudinal change and realization that corridors are beneficial through ecotourism initiatives?” **MTR Response:** Sensitization and microgrant schemes have almost never led to attitudinal change; there are many questions about the impact of ecotourism as well on attitudes and behaviours; see, for example, M.J. and C.R. Thouless (2005) Increasing the value of wildlife through non-consumptive use? Deconstructing the myths of ecotourism and community-based tourism in the tropics. In *People and Wildlife: Conflict or Coexistence?* (eds. Woodroffe, R., S. Thirgood & A. Rabinowitz). Cambridge University Press, pp. 122-139.

²⁰ The initiatives of other organisations (WILD LEO introduced by UCF and SMART introduced by WCS/AWF) have the potential to reduce poaching pressures – but these initiatives are little recognized by the project and even the partner.

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
							<p>SMART technologies) and ambitious but attainable targets should have been set.</p> <p>The MTR recommends that wildlife populations are measured to be either stable or with a 5-10% increase over the project life.</p>
	METT scores are improved in the target PAs: Kidepo Valley NP, Nyangea, Morungole, Zulia, Timu, Lwala and Rom CFR.	Baseline METT scores as follows: Kidepo Valley – 65%; Nyangea- 58%; Lwala - 45%, Timu 53%, Morungole – 42%; Zulia – 53% and Rom – 40%. Average score: 52%	Management Effectiveness Score for Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster (KVNP), Nyangea-Napore, Morungole, Zulia, Timu, Lwala and Rom CFRs); increased over the baseline score by at least 40%.	Implementation of activities still on-going and data will be generated as implementation goes on to provide a basis for analysis		Fauna and Flora Monitoring procedures, Biodiversity resources assessments, Ministry and landscape level Reports, and Project Docs, PA and Landscape plans, maps and GIS files, MTE and Terminal Evaluation (TE)	The EOP target is unattainable. The PA managers have not been trained in the use of the METT <i>as a management tool</i> ²¹ and while the METT score for KVNP may increase as a result of project activities (although no change would be expected on the basis of activities to date), little if any change is expected for the CFRs on the basis of activities to date.

²¹ The attitude is that the METT is only a tool for evaluating the management effectiveness of the PAs (and analysis is, therefore, only applied when demanded by the project) – rather than as a tool for improving management by examining the areas in which improvements can be made.

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
	Key indicator species in the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster show measurable increase in numbers	Elephant population in 2012 was 502; zebra: 75; buffalo: 3,990; these are relatively depleted numbers relative to the carrying capacity of the landscape	Key indicator species (elephants, zebra, buffalo) in the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster show measurable increase in numbers of >25% by EoP	Inventory undertaken. Analysis of data on-going	Results of data analysis indicate that elephant numbers are stable as per baseline value	Annual Report on indicator species counts; Wildlife census reports, Project Annual and Quarterly work plans and progress reports, Data base	<p>The EOP target (an increase in numbers of >25%) defies biological possibilities for the selected species in the given time. At best, the EOP target for the indicator species would be either stable or showing a small (~5-10%) increase over the life of the project.</p> <p>The MTR has a further question: has a full census been budgeted for in the project design?</p>
	Deforestation, community wildlife agreements	Cooperation between UWA and NFA is relatively limited; cooperation between different districts is minimal, especially in terms of managing wildlife and forest resources	A working model for integrating management of PAs and wider production landscapes is piloted and adopted in six districts in North Eastern Uganda (Kitgum, Kaabong, Agago, Otuke, Abim and Kotido) and secures wildlife corridors	Consultations with six pilot districts and members of parliament initiated. The importance of landscape approach to management of Kidepo National Park and migratory route including Shea	Inter-district coordination mechanism for biodiversity management in the landscape established and operational	Partnership agreements and constitutions of coordination mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation of related activities; creation of secure wildlife corridors in the Kidepo landscape and documented support to	The concepts that underpin the indicator, EOP targets and means of verification are complex and difficult to grasp, and the MTR team is not convinced that any of the stakeholders have grasped what is being targeted here. For example, while there has been progress in

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
			and dispersal areas covering approximately 227,389 ha - resulting in reduced deforestation of shea by 25 %	belt dispersal area is in the process of being mapped out		establishment of the model.	the establishment of an inter-district coordination committee, what is its mandate and TOR and how do these relate to landscape level conservation? Significant work remains to make the connections and, as a result, it is unlikely that the EOP target will be attained.
	Wildlife numbers are stable in the buffer zones	Wildlife and habitats are not sufficiently monitored nor effectively managed in buffer zones outside PAs; poaching is showing signs of an increase in dispersal areas	No net loss of natural habitat in the critical landscape and at least 40% reduction in hunting pressures in wildlife corridors and dispersal areas	Awareness and enforcement activities to reduce cutting of Shea butter trees for charcoal production on-going and there is observed reduction in cutting of the trees. UWA carries out regular monitoring to detect illegal activities such as poaching	An inter-district enforcement task force coordinated by RDC of Otuke district established and operational	Remote sensing and GIS, backed up by ground truthing and ecological monitoring work, ongoing through to EoP	The reported PIR and MTR levels have little to do with the indicator ("wildlife numbers") or the EOP target ("reduction in hunting pressures"). The means of verification suggest how the monitoring should be done (remote sensing, GIS, ground truthing) and yet no work to date has been done to establish a baseline on this basis (that the MTR has seen) –

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
							thereby undermining the indicator. This reflects poor understanding of the project and its objective and targeted outcomes.
	Common management approaches to habitat conservation.	There are no management plans for PA buffer zones, as a result there lacks a coordinated response to wildlife and habitat conservation in the Kidepo Critical Landscape	PA buffer zone under approved district management plans in six districts (Kitgum, Kaabong, Agago, Otuke, Abim and Kotido) incorporating BD considerations	No progress this year but planned for next year	No progress this year but planned for next year	Management plans, district coordination policies and collective management planning processes in place	Following on from the above indicators, the <i>concept</i> here of management plans in the areas <i>outside</i> of the PAs has not been grasped by the stakeholders – even for discrete and established areas such as the KCWA. The indicator and EOP target will not be attained. ²²
	Six district governments (Kitgum, Kaabong, Agago, Otuke, Abim and Kotido) are	No mechanism is presently in place for joint management planning for natural resource use by	District governments in six districts cooperate effectively to regulate and plan natural resource use	Inter-district coordination mechanism on enforcement and awareness in place and	Inter-district coordination mechanism on enforcement and awareness in place and	Proof of district level commitment to habitat conservation and wildlife management	An inter-district coordination mechanism has been established – but there are significant gaps in terms of mandate and

²² **Comment on draft MTR report:** “Work on development of management plans for biodiversity outside protected areas started after MTR field work?” **MTR Response:** The quality of the management plan(s) will have to be assessed during the TE – as well as i) the degree to which they are being implemented and ii) the degree to which their implementation is sustainable beyond the life of the project.

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
	collaborating on shared management issues	local governments in the critical landscape	over 227,389 ha of the critical landscape, resulting in a landscape level coordination mechanism that enshrines biodiversity conservation by mandate	operational involving district political and technical staff	operational involving district political and technical staff		TOR (with respect to the objective and targeted outcomes of the project). In addition, outside of the PAs, the focus has been almost singularly on shea trees – ignoring the landscape level conservation issues and wildlife. Significant changes need to be made if there is to be progress towards this indicator and EOP target.
Component 1: Strengthening management effectiveness of the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster	Karenga is qualified for upgrading to higher PA status through consultative process	Karenga is managed on a meagre budget, there is almost no management nor operational capacity; the area is at high risk from poaching and the loss of the wildlife corridor	Management and integrity of the 95,600 ha Karenga community wildlife management area strengthened, leading to its potential gazettement by end of project to safeguard a crucial wildlife corridor and dispersal area	As a first step towards strengthening management effectiveness in the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster, sensitization meetings with the local leadership including Area Members of Parliament in the project area were	Two community groups supported to implement biodiversity conservation measures geared towards livelihood improvement	Survey report, boundary marks, physical inspection, resolutions, minutes of meetings, annual and quarterly reports, workshop reports	Having given up on the establishment of KCWA as a NP (see indicators above), the process of systematic improvement of the management of KCWA has fallen by the wayside with the exception of the microfinance investments with CBOs. This is far from the result envisioned in the

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
				conducted and their buy-in on biodiversity conservation secured.			project document and it is unlikely that the EOP targets will be attained. See Recommendations for alternatives including the establishment of a community conservancy (along the lines of those of NRT in northern Kenya – which emphasize wildlife conservation and wildlife-based livelihoods).
	Existence of a functional and operational security system in 8 PAs.	The Kidepo Cluster PAs, particularly the CFRs and Karenga lack operational capacity to manage secure PA operations in an effective manner, gaps exist in HR across park operations, lack of equipment means difficulty to manage fires, poaching and monitoring the ecosystem.	Introduction of a security and enforcement system with a platform for information sharing and intelligence gathering among parks and other institutions; with databases that will be continuously updated. Includes provision of surveillance equipment, ranger uniforms, fire	To boost the security enforcement mechanisms of the PA cluster, equipment (GPS, radio motor rollers, binoculars, water bottles, knives, first aid kits) for Ranger use during enforcement patrols procured.	Effectiveness in enforcement measures registered	Security System. Surveillance equipment – radios, repeaters, GPS, cameras, night vision and fire fighting equipment purchased, trained on, logged and in use.	Again, the provided equipment is only a small part of the results envisaged in the PRODOC. However, the project is fortunate that there are other initiatives that are going on in the KVNP (SMART roll out by AWF; WILD LEO roll out by UCF) as these are much more in line with the envisaged results (although they

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
			management tools				are only partially acknowledged as cofinance). It is unlikely that the EOP targets will be attained for KVNP; it certainly will not be attained in the CFRs.
	A business plan for the PA clusters	Business planning in northern Uganda's Kidepo PA cluster lacks local context and full understanding of the international dimension of financial and business planning requirements; business planning is limited as a result. Financial scorecards show scores of 72% for UWA and 39.5% for NFA	A sustainable financing plan for the PA cluster providing accurate revenue forecasts (from gate fees, concessions, film rights and other permissible uses to private sector investments), is developed approved and implemented, and matches revenue to priority management needs, measured by improvement in financial scorecard results by >25% and the creation of community trusts.	No progress but planned for next year	No progress but planned for next year	PA Management plan; Business plan; Project Annual and Quarterly work plans and progress reports; NFA Data bank; Project Annual and Quarterly work plans and progress reports; Number of Beneficiaries Field, quarterly and annual reports; field visits; field inspection reports of pilot sites	It is possible that this EOP target could be achieved for the KVNP – but it unlikely to be achieved for the other PAs in the landscape without a radical (and extremely unlikely) change within the NFA. The management plan for KVNP was previously developed and it is unlikely that it will be updated during the project's life (despite the project's call for a change in paradigm, e.g., in law enforcement)

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
	Ranger and staff training programme in existence and functioning in KVNP, Karenga and 6 CFR	Rangers have insufficient capacity in KVNP, Karenga and 6 CFR to gather intelligence on poaching and fires; relations with tour operators and tourists often strained because of lack of customer care capacity; lack of value-add services.	Staff training programme in place covering all aspects of PA cluster operations ensuring 120 rangers and other field staff meet necessary competencies for planning, administration, conflict resolution, policing and enforcement).	To improve on UWA's capacity in terms of numbers to monitor wildlife and habitats plus handling human/wildlife conflict, community wildlife scouts were trained on simple animal and habitat data collection methods.	A training needs assessment for PA staff has been conducted and a final report is yet to be produced	Staff training programmes are in place across spectrum of operations in KVNP, Karenga and 6 CFR, covering necessary competencies for planning, administration, marketing, customer care, conflict resolution, policing and enforcement.	The training needs assessment is now complete and the training can be planned and implemented. In an ideal world, the training needs assessment would have been carried out either during the PPG phase of very early in the project's life – thereby allowing the training to occur well before the MTR and the <i>impacts</i> of the training to be measured by the project's TE and closure.
Component 2: Integrating PA Management in the Wider Landscape	Sustainable use options (a) Shea and (b) wildlife species that are regulated for sport hunting are implemented and the data is available for operational use	No data available for sustainable use options for Shea tree harvesting and wildlife hunting: as a result there is unsustainable use of key species	Sustainable use options for Shea tree resources and wildlife established and implemented - resulting in reduction of pressure on savannah habitat in the landscape, particularly shea	To enable determination of sustainable use options for shea tree resources and wildlife, Inventory of shea butter trees and resources as well as animal counts in Karenga	An inventory of shea butter trees was conducted and an acceptable final report is yet to be submitted by the team of Experts that undertook the exercise	District resource centres, minutes of meetings, reports	Because of the project's institutional arrangements, the project has only focused on shea trees to date – with no work, to date, on the wildlife (except, apparently, wildlife counts in the KWCA – but these data were

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
			and elephant populations-	Community Wildlife Area were conducted to provide data on status of both shea butter trees and resources including key animal species.			not given to the MTR team) The studies are now completed – but they do not draw at all off the huge body of work that is available globally <i>and even</i> within the landscape in which the project is taking place!!! The EOP target calls for <i>the implementation</i> of sustainable use options: it is unlikely that under the pressures in northern Uganda that this will be attained.
	Biodiversity management is factored into decision-making governing land use management in District Development Plans	Management activities are carried out on NP, CFR district and community levels but with a lack of a landscape level coordination mechanism	Mechanisms (landscape level coordinated management plans and institutional governance systems) for enhancing sustainable management of Kidepo critical landscape	No progress but planned for next year	No progress but planned for next year	Existence of landscape level management plans and institutional mechanisms, minutes of meetings and subsequent actions. Central and district government consent and ratification of plans	Among the six districts that are the focus of the project, the project has the opportunity to influence a small number because there are those districts with existing plans (and they are only renewed every three years). Had the

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
			promoted, with landscape management plan in place and enforced				project started on this task from the outset, it would have had more opportunities. As it is, this indicator has been ignored to date and it is only possible that the project will have the time to influence one or two district development plans.
	District governments in six districts (Kitgum, Kaabong, Agago, Otuke, Abim and Kotido) have proven capacity for managing natural resources sustainably	District Governments lack the competence and staff skills to monitor and enforce laws - as a result there is a lack of understanding of the situation vis-à-vis sustainable hunting and Shea utilisation, leading to habitat degradation.	Local Governments have the competence and staff skills to monitor and enforce laws on sustainable hunting and sustainable use of Shea tree in target districts, measured by a 40% increase in scores in capacity development scorecard	In order to improve on the competence and staff skills of local governments, enforcement officers from one district (Otuke) were trained during a two days workshop on enforcement.	The competence and staff skills of local governments in enforcement have been enhanced through involving them in enforcement errands	Training manual, strategic plan, number of people trained and equipped, interdistrict committee in existence, enforcement guidelines and bylaws, regulation, ordinances in place	There is some understanding of the shea tree issues ²³ . There is <i>almost no</i> understanding of wildlife issues and how to tackle them in a meaningful and sustainable way ²⁴ . In addition, other significant barriers (e.g., corruption) stand in the way of effective law enforcement.

²³ It is impossible to determine whether this is a result of the work of the project – or of the previous projects working on shea tree issues in the area.

²⁴ **Comment on draft MTR report:** “How about interventions under small grants targeting human – wildlife conflict mitigation?” **MTR Response:** It is highly unlikely that the microcredit grants being provided to CBOs will have any impact whatsoever on human-wildlife conflict, particularly at the scale of the project area.

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
	National export strategy for shea products in place; 25% increase in sales; an operational market information centre for shea products; Certified products in marketplace	The Shea nut / butter market is currently not yielding sufficient returns to producers to justify the conservation of Shea: average yields are 122.5 kg/household/year and average prices for oil 2,500/+ UGX per litre	Measures to improve market access for Shea products in place, and employment and income generation among rural women in the pilot area increased through access to markets, leading to a 30% rise in the value of shea products and a 25% increase in sales from start of project	No progress this year but planned for next year	As a first step in the development of an export strategy for shea products, a strategy for shea butter tree conservation developed	Record from UNBS and Uganda Export Promotion Board; Copies of Shea products export strategy; Sales values of Shea products at household level	The project design and implementation ignores the body of work that exists, not only internationally, but also within the focal area. There is an existing market (the Guru Nanak Oils Mills in Lira) that provides an excellent opportunity to which local producers can be linked. This should be the single focus of the project.
	Existence of interdistrict coordination body in place and functioning, with an M & E Plan	Presently there is no District coordination mechanism in place, leading to a lack of coordination over the management of crucial savannah woodland habitats, Shea trees and wildlife	A District coordination mechanism in place in the project target area (six districts) to ensure that biodiversity management in National Parks, CFA and wildlife migration corridors and dispersal areas is factored into integrated decisionmaking governing land use	As a first step towards formation of a district coordination mechanism for biodiversity management in National Parks, CFRs and wildlife corridors, a district task force on enforcement comprising of Resident District Commissioners	An operational district task force on enforcement in place	Records at the coordination offices and districts, UWA and NEMA records, M& E reports	See comment on objective-level indicator "Deforestation, community wildlife agreements".

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
			management	(RDCs) and District Environment Officers of Kitgum, Agago, Otuke, Abim, Kaabong and Kotido was formed. Similarly, engagement done with cultural leaders in the six project districts of Abim, Kaabong, Kotido, Otuke, Agago and Kitgum was another starting point for formation of an inter-district coordination mechanism.			
	Management plan, including zonation plan and regulations in place	Management plans and regulations critical for wildlife dispersal are presently nonexistent in the wider landscape	Management plans and regulations on BD-friendly management in blocks identified as critical for wildlife dispersal developed and applied by local governments-	In order to fasten the management planning process for critical dispersal areas and formulation of regulations for BD-friendly management in	Five CBOs supported to implement biodiversity conservation interventions geared towards livelihood improvement	Project records and District Government documentation, management plans	The CBO micro-grants – as reported here as being the PIR and MTR status – bear little relation to the indicator. The indicator relates to land use planning and regulations. It is

Strategy	Indicators	Baseline levels	EOP target	2015 PIR level	MTR level	Means of verification	MTR rating, justification and comments
			resulting in security of buffer zones and wildlife corridors	identified blocks, incentives in form of community livelihood improvement projects were initiated whereby four community project proposals were approved for funding.			unlikely to be attained.
	Ordinances and bylaws and being enforced by EoP	EoPDistrict ordinances and community bylaws are non-existent for Shea tree harvesting and wildlife hunting	District ordinances and community by-laws on the harvest of Shea trees and wildlife hunting reinstated or developed - resulting in 25% reduction in shea tree deforestation and a 50% drop in the use of shea for charcoal	To kick start the development and or reinstatement of district ordinances and community bye laws on harvest of shea butter tree products and wildlife hunting, the District Council and technical staff of Abim including cultural leaders from the six project districts were sensitized.	A bill for an Ordinance was passed by the District Council on 27/11/2015	Records at the coordination offices and districts, UWA and NEMA records, M& E reports	The project has a large amount of work to do to achieve this indicator and only one ordinance has been produced (although others already exist). In addition, there is an argument that in relation to the shea tree, the indicator is redundant because of national level legislation.

4.2.2 Remaining barriers to achieving project objectives

60. The project has suffered innumerable delays (see Section 4.2.1) and, as described below, the management arrangements are a barrier to effective and efficient project implementation. Given this situation, it would be expected that project implementation will continue at a sluggish rate and the majority of the outputs, outcomes and the project objective will not be attained by the end of project.

61. In addition, the majority of project partners demonstrate little understanding of the details of the project, its objective and its targeted outcomes; indeed, as discussed above (see para 55 *et seq.*), the partners are using the GEF grant to fund the “business-as-usual” scenario rather than the additional, incremental activities.

62. As also discussed below (see section 4.3.3), the project management budget for the entire project (i.e., for all four years of the project) is exhausted. Unless other funds are found, the project simply cannot continue.

63. In summary, there are significant barriers to continued implementation of the project and to the attainment of the objectives of the project.

4.3 Project Implementation and Adaptive Management

4.3.1 Management arrangements

64. The actual management arrangements differ significantly from the *designed* management arrangements (as presented in section 3.3):

- a. In a good display of *adaptive management*, the NFA has assumed a greater responsibility for its aspects of the project – rather than falling under the auspices of UWA.
- b. In the project design, the Project Coordinator (PC) was to be a fulltime, salaried position. Instead, the PC is fulltime member of NEMA’s staff.
- c. A Project Manager (PM) has been hired: this position was not mentioned in the project design.
- d. The PM does not have the authority for: i) mobilizing micro-capital grants, ii) approving requests for funds; and iii) being responsible for preparing and submitting financial reports to UNDP on a quarterly basis – as indicated in the PRODOC.
- e. The DEOs are not coordinating activities among the project partners; rather the Project Field Officer (who replaces the Project Officer described in the PRODOC)

- f. One other position (a Protected Areas Liaison Officer to be based at UWA to assist with the implementation of Component 1) has not been filled.
- g. None of the technical assistance (whether national or international) that is provided for in the project budget has been sought.
- h. In some cases, the UNDP-CO is acting as a 'gatekeeper' to some of the processes – including going back on decisions that were taken by the PB and in the microgrants that have been made to CBOs.

65. As indicated above (see para 55 *et seq.*), in many instances, the project is simply using the GEF grant to fund the business-as-usual scenario – rather than seeking additionality and incremental gains. As also suggested above (see Section 4.2.2), this may be partly due to a lack of understanding in the project objective, outcomes and outputs and how these should be best attained. Such a scenario could have been avoided if the project had done what almost all GEF projects do: seek support from national and international consultants, academics and consultancy companies (all of whom can be taken on under delivery-based contracts). Finally, distrust exists among the project partners: this acts as a further barrier to efficient and effective implementation of the project.

66. In the sections below, the workplanning and project finance processes are discussed but overall the conclusion that the institutions involved in project implementation are simply not strong enough to implement a project of this complexity. In addition, while it is difficult to state definitively why the institutions have been reluctant to seek external assistance, the respondents interviewed over the course of the mission offered a number of different suggestions, including: i) the people involved supposed that if they sought external assistance, it would be an admission of their own weaknesses, and ii) they wanted to do the work themselves which, translated, means retaining the funds for themselves.

67. Overall, the management arrangements and institutions involved have been a profound barrier to efficient and effective implementation of the project. As described in the coming sections, this has resulted in the project becoming bogged down in bureaucracy.

68. The acute lesson from the project implementation to date is that future projects should consider very carefully their management arrangements. The suggestion made by one respondent that the funds in future projects should be transferred direct to NEMA (thereby circumventing the UNDP-CO) is inconceivable: as stated above, NEMA, as an institution, has not been built such that the capacity and efficiency do not exist.

69. Instead, until such time as the institutions have been built, the MTR proposes that project implementation is done by a third-party organisation or company under a delivery-based contract (with an emphasis on delivery of the objective and outcomes of the project – not just delivery of expenditure of the budget). The precedent for this is well established and many multi- and bilateral donors are using this as a mechanism for project delivery.

70. In contrast, some elements of project implementation are working well. The TCS is a good example of this with a group of active participants who are contributing to the technical aspects of the project in a useful way²⁵.

71. In contrast to the very point made above, the project has been providing “facilitation” and/or per diems to people as an incentive to attend and participate in meetings (thus, at rates that are well over and above the costs of transport, accommodation and subsistence). Indeed, the project has adopted the practice of holding extended meetings just beyond the city limits of Kampala in order to boost attendance. This should not be necessary and the project (and the UNDP-CO in particular) should be striving for a higher level of professionalism than this both for its own personnel and among its partners.

4.3.2 Work planning

72. The work planning is being carried out approximately – but not completely – along standard UNDP-GEF lines. The annual workplan and budget is first scrutinised by the TSC before being passed to the PB for approval.

73. On at least one occasion, the UNDP-CO has undermined the decisions made by the PB on the annual workplan: once the workplan was approved by the PB, the UNDP-CO interfered with some of the processes that undermined the PB decisions. Such actions only engender mistrust and should be avoided. The UNDP-CO has a seat at the PB and if it has issues with the PB decisions, these should be raised at the PB meetings.

4.3.3 Project Finance and Co-finance

74. The project has a grant of USD 3.08 million from the GEF Trust Fund. In principle, the project has an additional USD 10.685 million in co-finance from the GOU, other partners and the UNDP-CO (see Table 3). To date, the project has spent a total of USD 856,067.65 – thus leaving a total of USD 2,223,932.31 (or 72.2% of the total budget) for the remainder of the project.

²⁵ However, the difference in attendance between the meetings held in Lira over the course of the MTR mission and the MTR debriefing/feedback session was telling about the attitude about meeting attendance and participation. When the meeting was held in Lira (with ‘facilitation’), attendance was high; in contrast, at the MTR debriefing, held in Kampala and, consequently with no ‘facilitation’ except for the out-of-town attendees), attendance was low.

Table 3. The planned value and actual expenditure, to date, of co-finance (all figures in USD)

Project Financing	at CEO endorsement (USD)	At MTR (USD)	Actual % of Expected Amount
[1] GEF Financing	3,080,000	856,067.65	28.36%
[2] UNDP Contribution	2,525,000	0	0
[3] Government	5,659,700	1,750,000	30.9
[4] Other partners	2,500,000	85,000	3.4%
[5] Total cofinancing	10,684,700	1,835,000	17.2%
PROJECT TOTAL COSTS	13,764,700	2,708,591.23	19.7

75. As also described above, in principle, financial oversight for the project is provided by the PB – especially in its role to scrutinise and approve the project’s annual budgets and workplans; in addition, there is further financial control within UNDP.

76. According to the PRODOC, the PM (together with the Administrative and Financial Assistant) is supposed to provide the UNCP-CO RR with “certified periodic [quarterly] financial statements, and with an annual audit of the financial statements relating to the status of funds according to the established procedures set out in the Programming and Finance manuals”.

77. In principle, project funds pass from the GEF to UNDP and, thereafter, to NEMA and UWA on the basis of the annual workplans. Now the NFA also receives funding direct from UNDP (as part of adaptive management that brings it out from being under the auspices of the UWA in the context of the project). In addition, the UNDP transfers the microfinance grants to the CBOs direct (thereby circumventing the need to transfer these funds first to NEMA and then onto the CBOs).

78. A significant part of the delays that the project has suffered is associated with fund flows. In 2015, the UNDP-CO made only two transfers of funding to NEMA. In 2016, the Q1 fund transfer was made towards the end of January. Such delays severely hamper the implementation of the project. In

addition, there have been other delays in fund transfers – e.g., to some of the CBOs and to the NFA²⁶.

79. The delays have come to the attention of the PB and numerous discussions have been held to find ways to overcome these fund flow barriers. Letters have been written to urge improvements and, by all accounts, things have improved but they are far from perfect. *All* project partners are guilty in this as recipients have been just as slow in providing reporting and accounts as UNDP-CO has been in providing the funding.

80. One of the consequences of the delays is that delivery is very low: only 28% of the total GEF grant had been disbursed at the point of the MTR mission (see Table 3). The delays only partly explain the low delivery rate; the project has also been afflicted by extreme inefficiencies. In the words of numerous respondents over the course of the MTR mission, “the institutions are simply incapable of efficient implementation of a time-bound, results-oriented project.”

81. In contrast to the overall delivery of the project, 96.4%% of the total project management budget – for the entire length of the project – has already been spent. In other words, the overall project management budget for the entire project has been overspent and there are few further funds available to cover project management costs for the remaining life of the project.

82. At this point, the project implementation cannot continue until such time that this is resolved. **Therefore, all project activities should cease until a solution is found.** There are three (not mutually exclusive) options:

1. The project management costs incurred to date are retrospectively re-examined and, if allocation errors are found, then these are corrected. This course of action has some merit because (unless there has been gross mismanagement and/or misconduct), it is almost inconceivable that the project management budget for the entire length of the project has already been spent – especially because there was no project manager for the entirety of the first year of the project’s implementation. The project management expenditure for YR2 (2014) warrants especial scrutiny because a total of USD 123,121.00 was budgeted that year for project management. This alone represents 79.9% of the *total* project management budget!

²⁶ Because this is not an uncommon issue among donor agencies and recipient organizations, solutions have been found. For example, one successful precedent and example is demonstrated by the multi-donor Democratic Governance Facility (DGF). They allow for rolling quarterly tranches, with two quarters being forwarded at any one time, and a further quarter is forwarded dependent on quarterly reporting and workplans. There is no reason

2. As indicated below, the project purchased four vehicles and six motorbikes. It is possible (but not confirmed) that this was charged to the project management budget. As indicated below, these funds should be retrospectively reimbursed to the project; this would free up a portion of the project management budget for the remainder of the project's life.
3. Additional funds are found to cover the remaining project management costs: these additional funds should come from the UNDP-CO TRAC funds.

83. It should be noted that the budgets from Components One and Two should *not* be reallocated to cover the project management costs.

84. Once the project management team has found a solution to this issue, it should be presented to the PB and the UNDP-GEF RTC in Addis Ababa for approval. If a solution is not found, then the project should be closed immediately and the remaining funds returned to the GEF.

85. The analyses above demonstrate the low delivery of the project (expenditure relative to the overall GEF grant). However, when the analysis is done on a year-by-year basis, the expenditure approximates more closely to the budgeted amounts in the annual workplans (see Table 4 and Table 5). And yet, this further demonstrates that the financial management is not as it should be and that the project, in the first two years of its implementation, is significantly under-budgeting – with the notable exception of the project management budget in 2014 (as indicated above)!

Table 4. The actual expenditure against the amounts budgeted *in the annual workplans* (and not in the PRODOC).

Outcome	Budgeted	Actual	% spent
1	504,551.00	335,046.70	66.4
2	480,414.00	372,600.00	77.6
ProjMgt	186,666.00	148,420.99*	79.5
Total	1,171,631.00	856,067.69	73.1

* The figure used here is the project management expenditure resubmitted to the MTR following the submission of the draft MTR report.

Table 5. The year-on-year budget (as it appears in the annual, approved workplan) and actual expenditure, by Outcome and funding source, for the project to date.

	YR1 (2013)			YR2 (2014)			YR3 (2015)			YR4 (2016)
Outcome	Budgeted	Actual	% spent	Budgeted	Actual	% spent	Budgeted	Actual	% spent	
1	-	-	-	135,818.00	36,346.70	26.8	368,733	298,700.00	81	
2	-	-	-	157,614.00	110,600.00	70.2	322,800	262,000.00	81.2	
ProjMgt	20,845.00	20,845.00	100	123,121.00	115,100.00	93.5	42,700	30,000.00	70.3	
ProjMgt*		10,080.35			22,462.51			110,075.67		5,802.46
Total	20,845.00	20,845.00	100	416,553.00	262,046.70	62.9	734,233	590,700.00	80.5	

**The additional Project Management line contains the project management expenditure data that were resubmitted to the MTR team following the circulation of the first draft of the MTR Report. That draft reports the previously submitted financial data which indicated that 108% of the total project management budget had been spent (cf. 96.4% in the resubmitted data). See body of report for details.*

86. The story of financial mismanagement does not end. In addition to the inefficiencies introduced by the UNDP-CO and NEMA, there have been a number of occasions when the NEMA Financial Office has included expenses into the project accounts that bear no relationship to the project. These additional and extraneous expenses then need to be retrospectively reversed. Such irregular financial management does not build confidence.

87. Further, the project purchased four vehicles (two for NEMA and one each for the UWA and the NFA) and six motorbikes (one each for the project districts) – and yet these were unbudgeted for in the original budget in the PRODOC. While the MTR recognises the need for vehicles – especially in the field – if they are so important, why did the stakeholders (especially NEMA, UWA and the NFA) not insist that they were included in the project budget during the PPG stage (e.g., as co-finance using UNDP TRAC funds – because GEF was, apparently, reluctant to include vehicles in budgets at that point)?

88. It appears as if the vehicles were paid for out of the project management budget (see above). There should be a budget reversal on this – thereby freeing up a portion of the project management budget. The costs of purchasing the vehicles should then be either covered by the Government of Uganda or using UNDP-CO TRAC funds²⁷. The decision will have to be made by the PB with direct input from the UNDP-CO Country Director.

89. It should be noted that the first draft of the MTR Report (submitted on 02 June 2016), on the basis of the documents originally submitted to the MTR, it was pointed out that the PB had not approved purchase of the vehicles (with the budgetary reallocation that such an approval would need): i) in the report of the Inception Workshop (which took place from 09-13 December 2013), it was reported that “the PMU provided specifications for purchase for vehicles ... for the project to UNDP. UNDP is following up on the procurement of the vehicles” (see page 14 of the report appended in Annex IV), and ii) in the (digital version of the) originally submitted of the first PB meeting (which took place on 12 September 2014), not only was there no mention of vehicle procurement but there was a mention of how the vehicles should be fuelled (also appended in Annex IV).

90. In response to the first draft of the MTR report (including this point), a meeting was held in the offices of UNDP with project stakeholders (on 28 June 2016). In response to the point regarding approval for vehicle purchase, members at the meeting suggested that there *had* been an approval process. The MTR responded that if this was the case: i) the minutes of the meeting at

²⁷ Although the MTR recognizes that it is more likely that the funds will come from the UNDP-CO TRAC funds.

which the approval was granted should be shared with the MTR and ii) the point would be retracted from the MTR report.

91. A hard copy of the minutes of the first PB meeting (signed by the Chair of the PB and the Minute Secretary on 27 November 2016) was thereafter submitted to the MTR on 08 July 2016. In this version of the PB minutes, there is an additional point in the minutes that explicitly approves the procurement of the vehicles (this version of the minutes is also appended in Annex IV).

92. There are a number of issues: i) the procurement of the vehicles was already underway during the Inception Workshop (as indicated above), and ii) data from the UNDP Atlas system indicates that the vehicles were paid for on 14 August 2014. Therefore, the procurement took place before the first PB meeting took place.

93. In summary, then, it appears as if the authenticity of the hard copy of the minutes of the first PB meeting submitted to the MTR on 08 July 2016 is questionable and, even if they are authentic, they postdate the procurement of the vehicles. As such, the project partners (and especially NEMA and UNDP) have adhered neither to their own policies and procedures nor to those of the GEF. This is not acceptable and it profoundly undermines trust in the project partners. The UNDP-CO – with whom the responsibility for project quality assurance lays – should ensure that mismanagement of this kind does not occur.

94. In addition, the management and use of the vehicles was, on occasions through the project's life to date, been questionable (although it is now somewhat resolved). For example, the vehicle in Name HQ in Kampala was initially placed into the NEMA vehicle pool and the project personnel had to apply to use it (as did other NEMA personnel) and on some occasions, it were unavailable for their use. Further, at no point during the MTR mission was the connection made between the vehicles, as project inputs, and the results that were being targeted.

95. Finally, despite the fact that there is a total of USD 1,836,000 for technical assistance, partner organisations, consultants and/or contractual service companies within the project's budget (across both components and the project management budget), with the exception of four consultancy contracts (a training needs assessment for KVNP; and three studies on shea trees: i) the distribution and density (an "inventory") of shea trees in the "shea tree belt" within the KCL; ii) the cost-benefit analysis of different use options for the products of shea trees and, therefore, the value-addition potential of shea products – with a specific focus on local communities, and iii) the shea oil value chain analysis), no further external assistance has been sought. Therefore, the expenditure against these budget lines needs to be closely re-examined.

96. In summary, then, the financial management from all parties does not build confidence and, as indicated above, there are aspects that warrant deeper scrutiny.

97. On a slightly more positive note, in terms of the in-kind contribution of the government which, allegedly, amount to USD 1.75 million²⁸ to date has included (but is not limited to):

- a. The NPD is the high level official who is chairing the Project Steering Committee, and responsible for providing government oversight and guidance to the project implementation.
- b. Support provided to the project by other officials of the various ministries involved in the project and who are paid by state budget (including in the PB and TSC)

98. However, it is a little unclear how this in-kind, co-finance figure is derived as the project is currently making little effort to monitor the co-finance expenditure in an accurate way (in contrast, for example, with the UNDP-GEF project “Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Uzbekistan’s oil-and-gas sector policies and operations” which represents best practice with regard to monitoring co-finance expenditure – especially of in-kind expenditure).

99. Given the state of the project management budget, little can be said about the cost effectiveness of the project. At the very least, the project is using the usual UNDP procurement rules that are designed to optimise value-for-money. However, in contrast, NEMA has been using in-house, “roster” consultants for some of the services – rather than enter into a transparent, tendering process. Some respondents interviewed over the course of the MTR questioned both the cost-effectiveness of this as well as the quality of these “roster” consultants and services.

4.3.4 Project-level Monitoring & Evaluation Systems

100. The project’s M&E framework is similar to the majority of all UNDP-GEF projects with a generous budget of USD 150,000 allocated for project monitoring.

101. The TSC has proven to be a good mechanism for monitoring the technical aspects of the project and, as indicated above, participation in the TSC has been satisfactory. This mechanism for project monitoring should be replicated in future projects – although there is still room for improvement (see Footnote 10).

102. The MTR, itself, is an essential aspect of monitoring. Apparently, there was some debate about whether the MTR should have been held at this juncture or, alternatively, at a point later in the project “when there were

²⁸ This amounts to twice the amount of the GEF grant that has been expended to date.

results to show". However, it has proved informative to hold the MTR at this point – primarily because of the financial issues (as described above) as well as the issues with progress towards results.

103. Given the number of issues faced by the project, it is arguable that M&E could have been improved. And yet, the key people in NEMA and UNDP were and are fully aware of the issues so the issue is less to do with the M&E but, rather, more to do with the ability to find mechanisms to overcome the barriers to effective and efficient implementation of the project.

4.3.5 Stakeholder engagement

104. The stakeholders are described in the PRODOC (and see Section 3.5). Stakeholder engagement has been satisfactory over the course of the project. The TSC has, once again, proven to be a good mechanism for stakeholder engagement.

105. The project is engaging with a large number of stakeholders at all levels:

- a. The PB has broad representation
- b. The TSC has broader representation – even in its current, honed down form
- c. At a more local level and with respect to the pilot sites, all the appropriate stakeholders are involved – the local authorities, protected area managers, etc.

106. In addition, the project has chosen to hold meetings in locations such that the stakeholders are attending and participating because they are attracted by the "facilitation" funds. This course of action has its pros and cons. On one hand, this has proven a pragmatic mechanism to increase participation. On the other hand, numerous studies have demonstrated that financial incentives for participation result in low level of engagement and contributions with the processes. As discussed above (see Footnote 10), this has already been witnessed during the MTR mission. In an ideal world, the participants of these processes would view that being nominated to a given structure within such a project would be viewed as a professional privilege and one that they not only voluntarily contribute to but do so to the very best of their abilities – rather than doing it simply for the sake of some "facilitation" funds²⁹.

²⁹ That being said, it is understandable that people wish to have their transport and subsistence costs covered; this is very different from "facilitation" funds that are designed to incentivize attendance.

4.3.6 Reporting

107. The reporting processes, as designed in the project document, are standard for UNDP-GEF projects. As such, the project reporting includes the following: i) Inception Report; ii) Annual Project Reports; iii) Project Implementation Reports; iv) Quarterly Progress Reports; and, eventually, v) Project Terminal Report.

108. The reporting that the project has been carrying out is marginally satisfactory. In the PIR – which is the most important report for the project – the project is making the mistake that many projects do which is to consider the PRF (or logframe) as a narrative section. It should not be filed with a narrative; rather, it should be a pithy, concise and precise statement of progress towards the EOP target for the indicator. The narrative section of the PIR is Section E (Progress in Implementation).

4.3.7 Communication

109. The project has done little to communicate – on the basis that “there is nothing to say” because so little has been done. In addition, the “project website”, the URL for which is listed in the PIR³⁰, is “Not Found” when entered into a browser³¹.

110. The MTR team suggests, instead, that *there is a story to be told*. Indeed, the MTR report is written on the basis that there is a story here! Because it is a story of poor planning and management, delays and problematic management of finances, people tend to think that there is no story. But how are we to learn anything if only the positive stories are told, how can we change behaviours if everyone thinks that everything is fine?

4.4 Sustainability

111. With so little done, it is almost impossible to say anything about sustainability – when sustainability, in these circumstances, is about the continuity of processes and the impacts of the project being maintained or even enhanced. To date the project has neither established processes nor has it had any impacts. Nonetheless, the MTR will highlight the areas of greatest risk in the sections below.

4.4.1 Financial Risks to Sustainability

112. There are some risks to financial sustainability because the project has provided some equipment. In order to achieve financial sustainability,

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http://www.ug.undp.org/content/uganda/en/home/operations/projects/environment_and_energy/TheKidepoCriticalLandscapeProject/

³¹ **Comment on draft MTR report:** “In NEMA, information about the project can be accessed through; <http://chm.nemaug.org?>” **MTR Response:** When this second website was tested, it also did not work!

depreciation of the equipment (which allows for maintenance and replacement) needs to be built into the budgets of the recipient organisations: there was no evidence that this was the case.

113. However, overall, because the project has done so little to date, the risks to financial sustainability are relatively low.

4.4.2 Socio-economic Risks to Sustainability

114. Probably the greatest risk to sustainability lies with the Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) that have been the recipient of microgrants.

115. The CBOs are opportunistic and some are even good. They will take the funding and do the best that they can. They may even make some gains. Others are less good. Their capacity is low, and their ideas are poorly conceived and unsustainable³². In providing some support to these CBOs, expectations and hopes are built – which only come crashing down when the funding runs out (ostensibly after only one year).

116. There are, therefore, a number of issues. The project's work with the CBOs is in the realms of livelihood development, reducing environmental degradation and human-wildlife conflict. These are long-term processes and require time, resources and the building of capacity through training and mentoring to achieve their objectives. They are also extremely challenging.

117. In addition, recent work³³ has demonstrated that *perceived injustice* is one of the drivers of wildlife crime. Perceived injustice is exacerbated when expectations are built and can, in some cases, lead people to seek retribution that may exacerbate situations.

118. As mentioned above, this aspect also strongly illustrates that the lessons from numerous projects are not being learned especially with interventions that involve local communities. Indeed, the MTR considers it irresponsible to consider providing such grants to CBOs whose financial situation is that they function in a hand-to-mouth way³⁴, especially when

³² **Comment on MTR Report:** *There was some concern regarding this statement.* MTR Response: The MTR choose not to specifically mention those CBOs with poorly conceived or potentially unsustainable projects; however, this information could be conferred verbally if the project partners request this.

³³ Harrison, M. (2015) *Wildlife crime: a review of the evidence on drivers and impacts in Uganda*. IIED Research Report, London.

³⁴ **Comment on MTR Report:** *There was a comment on the use of the term "hand-to-mouth" when describing the CBOs with the implication that it might have been derogatory.* MTR Response: With one of the MTR team members having worked for over a decade for international NGOs – many of whom describe themselves as working in a "hand-to-mouth" way, the comment was in no way derogatory but the reality of many non-state, civil society actors. In addition, the TE will examine the degree to which the work with CBOs: i) has impact on global environmental benefits, ii) has tangible impacts on the livelihoods of the people involved and the community as a whole and iii) the work is sustainable beyond the life of the project.

there are other potential partner organisations that are working on the same issues in the same area. Surely it would be better for the project, with the small grants, to act as a catalyst to bring together the targeted local communities with long-term programmes that are operating in the area?

119. Finally, the UNDP-CO requested that the MTR analyse how the project could be upgraded from being a GEN-1 project (i.e., “some contributions to gender equality”) to a GEN-2 (significant contributions to gender equality) or even a GEN-3 project (gender equality is a principal objective). While in the circumstances, the project has many other issues to deal with (see Section 5), there are a number of steps that the project can take:

1. Ensuring representation through all project processes. There is good representation in some of the processes (e.g., in the CBOs that are being supported) but in other forums, representation is heavily skewed. The project can make demands of partner organisations to work on gender parity, especially those that may be selected as partners for the implementation of various aspects of the project.
2. Using gender sensitive language. In this particular area, there is a big scope for improvement. Over the course of the MTR mission, derogatory language and attitudes were repetitively encountered and if the UNDP-CO in Uganda is serious about having gender as a principal objective, then this is unacceptable. Clauses need to be incorporated into all personal and organisational contracts stating that the use of derogatory language will be sanctioned.
3. Ensuring that gender stereotypes were not being perpetuated. This is a particularly difficult area because gender stereotypes are deeply embedded in Ugandan society. The UNDP-CO should, at the very least, show leadership in not perpetuating gender stereotypes and taking a stand when they encounter issues in others – particularly among government partner organisations.
4. In order to *understand* the changes that need to be made and *why* it is important, trainings should take place with all the project partners. However, the changes in Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (KAP) should be monitored such the improvements can be demonstrated (using a modified KAP survey).
5. Finally, the project should build a relationship with the UN Women office in Kampala as this will contribute to ensuring that the direction will be appropriate.

4.4.3 Institutional Framework and Governance Risks to Sustainability

120. One of the lingering barriers is that the institutions that are involved with the implementation of the project – NEMA, UWA and the NFA – are

good examples of institutions that have not been built. Their capacity remains low and the “business-as-usual” scenario is deeply entrenched. They are either not open to external assistance (as witnessed in this project – in which no external assistance has been sought, with the exception of four studies/consultancies that have been carried out) and/or they prefer to keep the work (and consequently the money) in-house (as is happening in the project). Either way, the “business-as-usual” scenario remains entrenched and the additionality (with the concurrent global environmental benefits) that GEF is seeking is not achieved.

121. The project has provided a limited amount of training, some equipment and some exposure in the form of study tours – but there is no indication (nor any attempt to monitor) whether these have led to changes in practices, attitudes or behaviour. In addition, there is no indication or evidence that the institutions have responded to the increased capacity with the necessary increases in budgets.

122. In summary, then, the project is being implemented by institutions that have not been fully built. This remains a risk to all aspects of project delivery – thus, both delivery of the financial aspects of the project as well as the attainment of the targeted objective and outcomes.

4.4.4 Environmental Risks to Sustainability

123. Because few activities have taken place to date, there is an obvious risk to environmental sustainability as the threats and their root causes, and the barriers to the long-term solution (the biodiversity and ecosystem values of the Kidepo Critical Landscape, Uganda, are conserved and provide sustainable benefit flows at local, national and global levels through enhanced operational capacity and functional landscape planning approaches) persist.

124. In addition and as mentioned above, the project could inadvertently lead to exacerbated perceived injustice among the local communities³⁵ which, in the worst case scenarios, could lead to reprisals.

125. Finally, other interventions could also lead to inadvertent, negative impacts. For example, an acute focus on shea trees may, inadvertently, lead to the accelerated loss of other species of tree as well. It also does not get to the *root cause* – which is that people across the country are dependent on biomass for their energy needs (although there are, of course, other interventions in the country that are working on solutions to that core issue).

³⁵ **Comment on MTR Report:** “But how, when the project is trying to work with communities to improve their livelihoods?” **MTR Response:** That is precisely the point: if the project does not manage to deliver this aspect of the project – particularly with respect to the expectations that have been built – then there may be perceived injustice which can lead to reprisals (see Harrison, M. et al. (2015) *Wildlife crime: a review of the evidence on drivers and impacts in Uganda*. IIED Research Report, London.)

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

126. The first overriding conclusion is that while the project is relatively well designed, it has been poorly implemented and managed. It has suffered profound delays and, despite efforts to deal with it, it finds itself bogged down in bureaucracy. As such, the management arrangements have proven to be an additional barrier to efficient and effective implementation of the project. This leads to a further conclusion that until such time as there are profound changes within the institutions involved in the project, questions should be raised about their capacity and capability to implement such large and complex projects³⁶.

127. The second conclusion is that in what little work has been carried out to date, there is no significant additionality. In some areas, there is no additionality at all and project partners are just using the GEF funding to fund their business-as-usual scenarios. And, finally, some activities appear to be carried out not necessarily for the impact that they will have but on the promise of the per diems they offer. A good example is the boundary demarcation of CFRs³⁷: this is a time-consuming exercise (and consequently linked to many per diems) – but is it *really* the pressing priority for the CFRs?

128. As noted in Section 4.3.3, 96.4% of the total project management budget for the entire duration of the project has been spent. In other words, there are almost no further funds available for project management. As noted in Section 4.3.3, project implementation cannot continue until such time that this is resolved. **Therefore, the project should cease all activities until such time that a source of funds is found to cover all project management costs from now until the end of the project. Once the source of funds is found, it should be agreed upon by the PB and the UNDP-GEF RTC in Addis Ababa.**

129. There are three (not mutually exclusive) options:

1. The project management costs incurred to date are retrospectively re-examined and, if allocation errors are found, then these are corrected. This course of action has some merit because (unless there has been gross mismanagement and/or misconduct), it is almost inconceivable that the project management budget for the entire length of the project has already been spent – especially because there was no project manager for the entirety of the first year of the project's implementation. The project management

³⁶ Instead, the MTR recommends that until the institutions are satisfactorily built, such projects should be implemented by a third-party organization under a delivery-based contract; there are many such contractual arrangements with multi- and bilateral donors.

³⁷ Boundary demarcation of CFRs is only arguably included in the PRODOC (only in para 157 of the PRODOC but not elsewhere including Section 1.16 of the PRODOC in which project activities are described in detail).

expenditure for YR2 (2014) warrants especial scrutiny because a total of USD 123,121.00 was budgeted that year for project management. This alone represents 79.9% of the *total* project management budget!

2. As indicated below, the project purchased four vehicles and six motorbikes. It is possible (but not confirmed) that this was charged to the project management budget. As indicated below, these funds should be retrospectively reimbursed to the project; this would free up a portion of the project management budget for the remainder of the project's life.
3. Additional funds are found to cover the remaining project management costs: these additional funds should come from the UNDP-CO TRAC funds.

130. It should be noted that the budgets from Components One and Two should *not* be reallocated to cover the project management costs.

131. In addition to the above recommendation, the project purchased four vehicles and six motorbikes that were not included in the budget. Furthermore, as also discussed in Section 4.3.3, the authenticity of the minutes of the first PB meeting³⁸ is questionable – particularly because the vehicles and motorbikes were purchased *before* the first PB meeting was held. Irrespective of whether they are authentic or not, the project partners, including the PB and the UNDP-CO have neither followed their own protocols and policies nor those of the GEF – thereby significantly diminishing confidence in their management of the project. It also diminishes confidence in the auditing processes (both the audits carried out by the Auditor General's office and of the UNDP audits). In conclusion, there should be a budget reversal on the costs of the vehicles and motorbikes with the replacement funds coming from either the Government of Uganda or the UNDP TRAC funds³⁹.

132. In addition to these financial issues, there have been significant delays to the project – both at start-up of the project but also once implementation started. The slow rate of implementation (demonstrated by the low delivery of the project budget) continues even at this stage with various bureaucratic barriers and inefficiencies (despite efforts to overcome them) and can be summarised as low overall absorptive capacity. This is true of **all** of the organisations involved – including the UNDP-CO, NEMA, UWA and the NFA – as well as the CBOs. Some of the principal reasons for continued delays are: i) the inability of the partners to deliver their quarterly report on

³⁸ Specifically the hard copy of the PB minutes of 12 September 2014 provided to the MTR on 08 July 2016.

³⁹ The source of the replacements funds needs to be agreed among the project partners.

time, ii) the inability of the partners to spend their budgets each quarter (or at least to 80% of the budget for any given quarter), and ii) the inability of the partners to make timely requests for the subsequent tranches. Finally, the UNDP remains wedded to this system despite there being good examples in Uganda of how to overcome such institutional and organisational barriers⁴⁰ (in other words, UNDP, in its Programming and Operational Policies and Procedures, is not displaying flexibility or adaptive management to the context of Uganda).

133. Despite this, the project partners (and especially NEMA and UWA) have been reluctant to take on the technical assistance, partner organisations, consultants and/or contractual service companies – despite the fact that there is a total of USD 1,836,000 (across both components and the project management budget) for these things within the project's budget⁴¹. Within the framework of future audits, these budget lines should also be examined to determine how these funds have been used – in the knowledge that, in terms of seeking technical assistance, working with partner organisations, consultants and/or contractual service companies, only four studies have been commissioned by the project to date⁴².

134. As such, the project partners are attempting to implement what is a large and complex project – which includes significant additionality beyond the business-as-usual scenarios – using existing staffing within existing staffing structures when their absorptive capacities are low even without these additional pressures.

135. This is simply incompatible with the sort of rate of implementation that is necessary to implement time bound GEF projects successfully such that they achieve their objective and outcomes. At the current rate of implementation (coupled with other factors, as described below), it is not possible that the targets for the project will be achieved.

136. **In terms of the way forward, the MTR recommends the following steps:**

1. The UNDP requests a one-year no-cost extension for the project from the GEF – thus, if accepted, the project's closing date will be 23 July 2018 (and while little remains in the project management

⁴⁰ For example, the multi-donor Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) has developed good practices to overcome this issue: the UNDP-CO should consult with the DGF on the modalities that it has put into practice.

⁴¹ Various explanations have been mooted why this is the case although it is difficult if not impossible to determine for certain. What is clear is that these organizations are reluctant to contract or sub-contract work.

⁴² These are the capacity needs assessment for the KVNP and the three studies on shea trees and shea products.

budget, a total of USD 2,223,932.31 remains overall). If the GEF declines a no cost extension, the project should be closed immediately and the remaining funds returned to the GEF.

Action: immediate; UNDP-GEF RTC (Addis Ababa); UNDP-CO with support from NEMA.

2. The funds spent on purchasing the vehicles and motorbikes are returned to the project (thereby freeing up funding that appears to have been allocated to the project management budget); this would effectively be a budget reversal.

Action: immediate; UNDP-CO

3. The project management expenditure is re-examined and re-allocations made if and when justified.

Action: immediate; NEMA, UNDP-CO

4. Once the budget reversal and re-allocation is complete, the UNDP-CO, the UNDP-GEF RTC in Addis Ababa and the project partners in Uganda reach an agreement of how the project management costs will be covered until the proposed end of project date (which, including the no cost extension, would be 23 July 2018). In principle, these additional funds would come from either or both the Government of Uganda and/or UNDP-CO TRAC funds⁴³.

Action: on completion of the above steps; UNDP-GEF RTC and UNDP-CO with participation of NEMA

5. There is a demonstrated and significant commitment to seek external assistance that will ensure that the additionality that the GEF seeks is achieved to the degree possible in the remaining time for the project. This should come in the form of *two* technical advisors/individual consultants to assist with the implementation and M&E of the PA and shea tree (with market access for shea nuts) aspects of the project, respectively.

Action: on completion of step (4) above; all project partners

6. With the input of the two technical advisors/individual consultants, develop a workplan and budget for the remaining time of the project (i.e., until 23 July 2018), specifying precisely what will be targeted during the remaining time of the project – in the awareness that a limited amount of things can realistically be achieved in this time. Particular focus should be given to those activities that will i)

⁴³ Although the MTR recognizes that it is more realistic to expect that they will come from UNDP TRAC funds.

lead to global environmental benefits and other positive impacts, and ii) be sustainable beyond the life of the project. All other activities should not be considered. It is really this final step that will pave the way forward – having first dealt with all the above administrative and bureaucratic issues.

Action: *once the IC/TAs are recruited but not later than October 2016; IC/TAs, project partners*

Table 6. The summary of MTR recommendations for the project

No.	Recommendation	Entity Responsible
Objective: The Biodiversity of the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda is protected from existing and emerging threats (also including recommendations that span both components)		
A.1	Focus on delivering outputs and then results and impacts – rather than just reporting on inputs that have been made. M&E should focus on monitoring these aspects	All partners, both components
A.2	Harmonize the interventions and the results while ensuring that the activities and targeted results remain relevant to the project (as well as to the development priorities of Uganda, the UNDP-CO development framework and the GEF results frameworks). In addition, the results of all interventions should be thought about and, whenever possible, they should be monitored. For example, there has been significant investment in “raising awareness” or “sensitization” – however, little effort has been made to understand the <i>impact</i> or <i>results</i> of this. How has this quantifiably <i>changed behaviour</i> or <i>attitudes</i> ? Similarly for livelihood impacts and inadvertent impacts of activities (e.g., displacement to other species of tree as shea nut trees are protected).	PIU, NEMA, UNDP-CO
A.3	Acknowledge that a number of the targets for indicators in the Project Results Framework will not be achieved (see Table 2), even with a no-cost extension. Targets should be amended (or deleted) where necessary. This must be done in a transparent way – with full disclosure to the GEF. Learn lessons for future projects.	TSC and project partners (to review and validate recommended amendments) PB to approve
A.4	The demanding and additive nature of GEF projects means that additional assistance (in the form of technical assistance, consultants, private sector or NGO partners, and/or contractual service companies) to contribute to delivery of project results is necessary. The project design also allows for this with a total budget of USD 1,836,000 for such assistance (across both components and the project management budget). Two IC/TA (one for PAs and one for shea/markets) should be	All project partners (UNDP-CO to recruit IC/TA; NEMA, UWA and NFA)

	<p>recruited as soon as possible to lead on implementation and M&E processes and to ensure that all project partners are carrying out activities that relevant to the project's objective and outcomes.</p> <p>The selection of assistance and partnerships that are mentioned below are to be funded by the project and contracts will be issued (e.g., in Recommendations B.1, B.2, etc.)</p>	
A.5	<p>The project document describes in some detail the activities that should be taking place in order to achieve the objective and outcomes. One key underlying principle of GEF funding is to ensure additionality: GEF is not simply a source of funding for the business-as-usual scenario. <i>All</i> project partners (NEMA, UWA, NFA) need to focus on the aspects of additionality for which they are responsible; UNDP-CO and the IC/TAs will need to monitor this and provide support and guidance as appropriate.</p>	NEMA, UWA, NFA as implementation partners; UNDP-CO to monitor
A.6	<p>Ensure M&E, and accountability of all project partners. At present, the UWA and NFA are working in isolation with little or no support, or guidance. The IC/TAs, once recruited, (with PM and PC) will carry out M&E and provide such oversight, support and guidance and all project partners should be responsive to this.</p> <p>Reporting also needs to be consistent across all partners.</p>	IC/TAs with PM and PC (for M&E, support, guidance and oversight); project partners (especially UWA and NFA) in implementation.
Component One: Strengthening management effectiveness of the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA cluster (see also objective-level Recommendations)		
B.1	<p>The upgrade of the Karenga CWA to a fully-fledged national park is not possible: it is neither attainable nor desirable as a target and all references to this should be removed.</p>	PB, UNDP-GEF RTC (Addis Ababa)
B.2	<p>In contrast to the above recommendation and building on activities carried out to date, seek a long-term partner (either private sector or NGO, with provision of funding) to develop the Karenga CWA into a fully functional CWA (Output 1.1) along the lines of those of, for example, the Northern Rangelands Trust in Kenya. The selected partner will have to harmonise, and collaborate and cooperate with current actors and build on work that has been carried out to date. The aim of the area would be to <i>strengthen</i> the conservation of biodiversity – and wildlife in particular – in the area.</p>	UWA; selected partner(s)
B.3	<p>The project (and UWA in particular) should seek assistance and/or partnerships to implement the law enforcement component (Output 1.2). There are some good law enforcement/intelligence/IWT projects being implemented in the country (and regionally) at present and experiences and expertise can and should be shared (this includes projects being implemented by UCF and WCS).</p>	UWA & selected partner(s)

	Similarly, UWA should seek assistance for the development of sustainable financing plans (Output 1.3)	
Component Two: Integrating PA Management in the Wider Landscape (see also objective-level Recommendations)		
C.1	<p>The CBOs will need significant support from District Liaison Officers, the Project Field Officer, the Project Manager, the Project's Administrative and Financial Assistant, and the District Financial Officers: this should be built into the workplans (with associated budgets) for these people. The support should be in the form of technical assistance, ensuring that the funding they have received is used for project expenses. M&E (by IC/TA, PM, district CAOs) should be carried out to ensure that the work carried out by the CBOs remains relevant to the targeted <i>results</i> and <i>impacts</i>.</p> <p>If the opportunity arises or if considered optimal, partner organisations (e.g., development NGOs and the private sector) may be contracted to continue the work with the CBOs – especially when those NGOs and private sector organisations have expertise and experience in the fields in which the project is working (e.g., beekeeping, shea nut production, etc).</p>	DLOs, PFO, PM, AFA, CBOs, districts; partners
C.2	Monitor and audit the expenditure of districts and CBOs to ensure that the funds are spent appropriately	PM, AFA, independent financial auditors
C.3	<p>The Project Manager, with support from the PFO, will need to work with the DLO (and other district staff) to integrated biodiversity (and project objectives) into District Development Plans (DDP), and to develop appropriate ordinances and by-laws.</p> <p>Newly elected district officers will require training.</p>	PM, PFO, districts
C.4	<p>Institutional, financial and socio-economic sustainability are key issues with the CBOs. The project partners should seek sustainability by every means possible – including linking the CBOs with other initiatives and other organisations.</p> <p>If a no-cost extension for the project is secured, consider a second year of funding for those CBOs that are being most successful.</p>	UNDP-CO, districts, other organisations
C.5	Build into workplans and budgets experience-sharing meetings among CBOs and districts	PM, PFO, CBOs, districts
C.6	Link the shea nut producers directly with existing markets: for example, the shea butter factory in Lira ⁴⁴ and shea nut processors in Jinja ⁴⁵	IC/TA, NEMA, districts

⁴⁴ See <http://www.sheabutteruganda.com>

⁴⁵ For further information, a simple google search gives a huge amount of information on shea activities in the country (many of which are even within the project area and some of which

Project management		
D.1	Carry out analysis of why project management costs have been so high Sourcing funding and agreement on how to fund project management from now until EOP (and further into a no-cost extension if granted)	UNDP-GEF RTC, UNDP-CO, GOU, auditors
D.2	Request a 12-month no cost extension	UNDP-GEF RTC, GEF
D.3	GEF requires that cofinance expenditure is accurately estimated, including in-kind cofinance. Suggestions are made on how to do this best	PIU
D.4	All fund-flow systems need to be streamlined and accelerated. Reporting, accountability and fund-request schedules to be agreed among partners All partners need to report at the end of each quarter (irrespective of the degree to which a quarter's budget has been spent)	PIU, UNDP-CO
D.5	UNDP needs to be more responsive, active, organised and ensure timely transfers of funding	UNDP-CO
D.6	UNDP-CO cannot undermine decisions of PB; as a member of the PB, UNDP should be using that forum to propose amendments or changes UNDP-CO needs to transfer responsibilities and not micro-manage the project	UNDP-CO
D.7	Lines of communication need to be agreed and maintained	UNDP-CO, PIU, partners
D.8	TOR and consultants' work need to remain relevant to project and project objectives	IC/TAS, PM, PB, contractors
D.9	The TSC is a good mechanism to bring together stakeholders and interested parties. The 'honed-down' TSC is effective and should be replicated in future projects.	UNDP-CO, UNDP-GEF RTC
D.10	The "facilitation" and/or per diems given to people as an incentive to attend and participate in meetings should not be necessary. Indeed, the practice of holding extended meetings	PIU, UNDP-CO, partners, TSC

have already sought certification!!). The project should be drawing off these experiences and even joining forces with other partners. For example, see <http://www.bellalucce.com/a-peek-inside-our-shea-butter-facility-in-uganda.html>, <http://www.thesheaproject.org>, <https://www.beadforlife.org/our-work/shea-program>, http://www.sheaterraorganics.com/Shea-Nilotica-East-African-Shea-Butter-Certified-Organic-p_453.html, <https://www.moyaasheabutter.com>, and <http://www.sheabeauty.ug>; and for information on organic produce in Uganda see http://www.nogamu.org.ug/cope_members.php

	just beyond the city limits of Kampala in order to boost attendance should not be necessary and the project (and the UNDP-CO) should be striving for a higher level of professionalism than this.	
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5.1.1 Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

137. Projects that end up being highly satisfactory offer some lessons: these are the mechanisms by which things should be done. In contrast, projects that struggle to succeed arguably offer more lessons. However, we rarely learn from them and, indeed, because they are an embarrassment to the institutions involved, the results (with the lessons) are more often than not buried and the mistakes end up being repeated time and again.

138. This project offers some extremely useful lessons that are hopefully incorporated into the designs of future projects.

139. The project tried to transfer responsibilities for a complex project that contains many complex concepts to institutions that remain without the capacity and capability to implement them. Moreover, the project does this with a complicated institutional arrangement. The profound understanding of the project that would otherwise be necessary for its successful implementation is not there. The systems are inefficient, complicated and founded on mistrust. In short, the institutions have not been built or empowered such that they can take on such time-bound, complex projects.

140. This leaves the GEF two mutually exclusive options: i) to implement projects that focus on building the institutions until such time as they have the capacity and capability to implement such projects in the future, *or* ii) to seek more immediate global environmental benefits through projects that are implemented by third-party organisations (either NGOs or private sector organisations) under delivery-based contracts.

141. The Kidepo Critical Landscape Project originally was being conceived as two projects (one to deal with the protected areas and another to deal with the land degradation and sustainable forest management outside of the protected areas). While the transaction and administration costs and burdens are higher, given the circumstances, arguably it should have been implemented (by third-party organisations under delivery-based contracts) as *four* discrete projects: i) one building KIVNP (capacity development, law enforcement, financial sustainability), ii) one trialling community-based wildlife management (akin to the community conservancies of the Northern Rangelands Trust in northern Kenya), iii) one trialling participatory forest management in the CFRs in the Kidepo Critical Landscape (akin to the PFM process that has been vastly successful in Ethiopia) and, finally, iv) the integration of landscape level conservation concepts into district level

planning and development processes. *Indeed, had there been more time available until the end of the project, the MTR would have recommended splitting the project into four such sub-projects, accurately dividing the remaining budget and finding four organisations working under delivery-based contracts to complete the work.* In summary, then, under the current levels of capacity and capability, it is better to minimise the complexity of projects by keeping them small, discrete, simple and straightforward.

142. However, one critical step that *all* the institutions involved in the implementation of this project need to recognise their limitations and the problem: it is only when they (and the government as a whole) recognise their limitations that they might start to work to overcome this issue.

143. A further critical step is also important: when developing and designing such projects, it is also necessary to have a profound understanding and recognition of the motivations of the people who work for these institutions. For example, in the KCL project, the three government institutions involved with the implementation of the project have all been reluctant to seek any form of external assistance (whether in the form of technical assistance, partner organisations, consultants and/or contractual service companies) – despite the fact that there is a generous budget to do so. The MTR has already recommended that there is a process to determine if and how these funds have been used (because if they have been used then they have not been used in the way that they were intended). However, that is not the question being posed here: why is it that the institutions so reluctant to seek this external assistance? Why is it, in the words of one respondent that they “prefer to do it {them}selves”?⁴⁶ An understanding of the institutional cultures and settings leads, in turn, to a deeper understanding of the *actual barriers* that exist to implementation of such projects and, by extension, to achieving long-term solutions such as the one for this project (“the biodiversity and ecosystem values of the Kidepo Critical Landscape, Uganda, are conserved and provide sustainable benefit flows at local, national and global levels through enhanced operational capacity and functional landscape planning approaches”). In summary, then, there has not been a very transparent and honest identification of the barriers: this significantly reduces the chances of achieving any project’s objectives and outcomes, and becomes, as a result, a waste of valuable resources.

⁴⁶ When these questions were put to interviewees over the course of the MTR mission, a number of different responses were given, for example: i) “they want to keep the money for themselves,” ii) “they are afraid that they will be shown up by external experts such that their superiors will think them not capable of their jobs,” iii) “the competition among different departments in [this institution] is such that they need to keep the money to demonstrate to their superiors that they are valuable.”

144. Beyond these overall observations and lessons, the MTR has identified a small number of specific lessons.

145. First (and in acknowledgement that there have been delays), the capacity needs assessment should have taken place either during the PPG phase of the project or in the very early stages once implementation started. This would allow training and other capacity development activities to occur well before the MTR and, thereafter, for the *impact* of the training on changing behaviour and practices – and how this is leading to global environmental benefits – to be evaluated during the project’s Terminal Evaluation.

146. Second, if any activity becomes unachievable and/or it becomes too late within a project’s lifetime to complete an activity such that it i) has its intended impact and ii) the impact and processes involved with that activity are not sustainable, then projects should, with the explicit approval from the PB, to drop activities.

147. Third, some of the activities that the project is currently implementing are not so innovative (and may be deviating from the originally conceived ideas in the project document) and there are many other projects and organisations that are currently involved in similar work or they have been in the past. As such, there are many opportunities to learn lessons from past projects, and other opportunities to share experiences or even to contract them to implement these components of the project. Examples abound: apiculture, the growing of chilli for livelihoods and as a tool to mitigate human-wildlife conflict, intelligence-based law enforcement in PAs, etc.

Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Threatened Savanna Woodland in the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda

PIMS 4592, Atlas Award 00072558, Atlas Project No: 00085611

Midterm Review Vol II (Annexes)

GEF BD SO-1, Improve Sustainability of Protected Area Systems

Republic of Uganda

National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA)

United National Development Program (UNDP)

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Annex 1 Terms of Reference

1. BACKGROUND

The Government of Uganda through the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) with support from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is implementing the project “Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Threatened Savannah Woodland in the Kidepo Critical Landscape in North Eastern Uganda”.

This UNDP/GEF-GOU initiative is a partnership programme implemented as a joint venture of national government partners. The partners include:-

- a) The National Environment Management Agency (NEMA,
- b) Uganda Wildlife Authority
- c) National Forestry Authority
- d) District Local Governments of Kaabong, Kotido, Abim, Otuke, Agago and Kitgum.

The Project Document covering the period 2013-2017 was signed by Government and UNDP in July 2013 and full project implementation began in 2014. The project is scheduled to end on 31-Jul-2017.

The Government of Uganda has made significant investments in most protected areas (PAs) in the country. However, the Kidepo Critical Landscape of North Eastern Uganda, encompassing eight protected areas under a range of management authorities received limited investment over the past 20 years due to protracted conflict, and proportionately suffer from lower management effectiveness compared to other sites. The long-term solution proposed by this project is to strengthen the national system of protected areas in Uganda by improving the management effectiveness of protected areas in the Kidepo Critical landscape in the North Eastern part of the country, thus affording biodiversity sufficient protection from emerging and future threats. This can be achieved through providing planned, targeted and effective support to the operational capacity of core PAs within the landscape and through creating a coordinated landscape management approach in the KCL to serve as a shield against human-induced pressures on Uganda’s threatened biodiversity.

This proposed project in the Kidepo Critical Landscape of PAs and buffer zones in northern Uganda satisfies the requirements for GEF financing under GEF Biodiversity Focal Area, Strategic Objective one: Improve sustainability of Protected Area systems. The project will directly bring 416,485 ha of land under strengthened PA management arrangements designed to conserve biodiversity, involving three different forms of PA Status (NP, CFR and CWA) as well as public lands, with a wider positive influence on an additional 239,215 ha of dispersal areas. In total the project will thus bring enhanced biodiversity protection to over 655,700 ha of target PAs and linked dispersal areas. The project will comprise two complementary components, which will be cost shared by the GEF and co-financing. Each addresses a different barrier and has discrete outcomes.

Component 1. Strengthening Management Effectiveness of the Kidepo Critical Landscape PA Cluster.

Component 2. Integrating PA Management in the Wider Landscape.

By addressing management deficits in these sites, the proposed project is expected to strengthen the national PA system in Uganda as a whole as well as improve livelihoods for communities within the landscape. This is to be achieved through enhanced management both of PAs and of biodiversity outside PAs, such as that of the Shea tree, which provides significant economic benefits to communities, thus demonstrating the importance of biodiversity to livelihoods of the rural communities.

2. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policy at the project level in UNDP has four key objectives namely:- i) to monitor and evaluate results and impacts; ii) to provide a basis for decision making on necessary amendments and improvements; iii) to promote accountability for resource use; and iv) to document, provide feedback on, and disseminate lessons learned. A mix of tools is used to ensure effective project M&E. These might be applied continuously throughout the lifetime of the project, e.g, periodic monitoring of indicators, or as specific time-bound exercises such as mid-term reviews, audit reports and independent evaluations. From the GEF guidance notes, MTRs are a monitoring tool to assess project status and challenges, identify corrective actions to ensure that projects are on track to achieve planned outcomes. MTRs are required for full-sized UNDP supported projects with GEF financing such as this one.

The Mid-Term Reviews (MTR) are beneficial for project implementation as they provide an independent in-depth review of implementation progress, and this is responsive to the need for transparency and better access of information during implementation. This MTR is going to cover the project period up to date. The MTR will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP in the UNDP Evaluation guidelines.

Overall Objective of the MTR:

This MTR is intended to identify potential project design problems, assess progress towards the achievement of objectives, identify and document lessons learned (including lessons that might improve design and implementation of other UNDP projects), and to make recommendations regarding specific actions that might be taken to improve the project. It is expected to serve as a means of validating or filling the gaps in the initial assessment of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency obtained from monitoring. The MTR provides the opportunity to assess early signs of project success or failure and prompt necessary adjustments. The specific objectives of the MTR are to:-

- identify unforeseen project design problems;
- assess progress towards the achievement of objectives we can say here – especially objectives towards delivering global environmental benefits and improving livelihoods;;
- identify the changes caused by the project to sustainable livelihoods

- make recommendations regarding what should be done during the rest of the project life;
- analyze the project performance up to now in the context of the institutional framework and events in Uganda.

Scope of work and Evaluation questions:-

The MTR will assess the overall relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Kidepo programme and will be guided by the following key questions (but not limited to these) relating to the above highlighted issues.

1. Relevance: Assess the relevance of the project to the problems it was intended to address **and** how the project relates to the main objectives of the project outputs, outcomes, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?

2. Efficiency: Assess the project implementation efficiency/ arrangement through the government structures in line with international and national norms and standards?

3. Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?

4. Impact: Assess whether there are indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status. Clearly specify the unexpected positive and negative results that the project has registered to date?

5. Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental mechanisms to address project risks so as to sustain long-term project results? Clearly specify project sustainability measures and/or exit strategies in place to sustain the key initiatives/outcomes identified.

6. Role of UNDP: To what extent has UNDP fulfilled its roles during implementation of the project and to what extent has the project developed human and institutional capacity

In addition to the above the Lead Consultant will:

- Review of documentation to be provided by the project (implementation/evaluation reports) (list in Annex A)
- Conduct fieldwork together with the national consultant and interview stakeholders, national and local Government officials, and communities to generate authentic information and opinions.
- Write and compile the information and reports as needed.
- Responsible for presentation of key findings highlighting achievements, constraints, and make practical recommendations to decision makers and stakeholders.
- Finalize the Mid-term Evaluation Report using the Outline in Annex E.

Evaluation Approach and Method

An overall approach and method for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported /GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects. A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR (Annex B) The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

The evaluation must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, in particular the GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders.

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – incl. Annual APR/PIR and other Reports, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, and GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other material that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in Annex A of this Terms of Reference.

In addition, interviews with key informants and stakeholders will be held. Questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions, Interviews, Field visits, Observations, Participation of partners and Benchmarking should be used.

EVALUATION CRITERIA & RATINGS

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact**. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary.

Evaluation deliverables (Products Expected from the MTR)

- An Inception Report (within 3 working days of signing the contract), this should provide details of the methodological approach to be used by the consultants to undertake the study as well as well specified time schedule/frame.
- A Draft evaluation report of approximately 40 pages, excluding annexes, according to the attached detailed breakdown. The report will be in English and will be prepared and submitted in MS Word, font 12, with tables in Excel where necessary.
- A PowerPoint presentation (10 – 15 slides) covering the key points of the MTR with the main findings and recommendations also provided.
- A Final MTR Report submitted within a week of receiving written comments on the drafts from UNDP and partners.

N.B The Evaluator Must Provide Evidence Based Information That Is Credible, Reliable And Useful**1. EVALUATION TIMEFRAME**

Deliverables / Outputs	Estimated Duration to Complete	Target Due Dates	Review and Approvals Required
Desk review of documents and preparation of inception Report (home-based)	3 days	TBD	UNDP Team Leader
Travel for international consultant	2 day	TBD	UNDP Team Leader
Presentation of Inception Report	1 day	TBD	UNDP Team Leader E&E and KCL Project Coordinator NEMA
Fieldwork (at both national level and in the districts)	6 days	TBD	Program Manager
Power point presentation of field work findings to Key stakeholders including UNDP, Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, NEMA, UWA, NFA and, the District Local Governments of Kaabong, Kotido, Abim, Otukey, Agago and Kitgum	1 day	TBD	Program Manager, KCL Project Coordinator NEMA, Program Officer UNDP and Team Leader E&E
Prepare and submit Draft Report to UNDP for review by Regional Technical Advisor, Project Coordination Unit, GEF Operational Focal Point	2 days	TBD	KCL Project Coordinator NEMA, Program Analyst UNDP and Team Leader E&E
Travel for international consultant	1 day	TBD	None
Preparation and submission of Final Mid Term Review Report (Home based)	4 days	TBD	Program Analyst and Team Leader E&E , RTA, KCL Project Board
Total	19 days + 2 travel days	TBD	

N.B If there are any significant discrepancies between the impressions and findings of the evaluation team and stakeholders these should be explained in an Annex attached to the final report.

WORKING ARRANGEMENT**Institutional Arrangement**

a) With overall reporting to the UNDP Country Director, the Consultant will work on day to day basis with KCL Project Manager and the Project Coordinator NEMA, and shall be supervised by the Team Leader, Energy and Environment Unit. The consultant will include travel costs and per diems within the country in their financial proposals. The Project Implementing partner will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluation team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits and coordinate with Government. The planning and the administrative arrangements for the MTR

will be done in collaboration with the UNDP Head Quarters and the RTA. UNDP will support organization of stakeholder workshops to review the report.

b) The Consultant will liaise, interact, and collaborate/meet with officials from District Local Governments of Kaabong, Kotido, Abim, Otuke, Agago and Kitgum as well as relevant Central Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies.

c) UNDP will support the Consultant in the following areas;

- Access to required information (copy of project document, Annual Work plans, Progress reports and other project related reports);
- Access to UNDP Office and its infrastructure (e.g conference room and internet while at UNDP);
- Support and assistance to gain access to relevant stakeholders for consultations;
- Transport for visits both within Kampala and in the field (for official purposes only);
- UNDP Kampala and the Project Office will coordinate the study and keep abreast of the mission's activities during the consultant's stay.

Reporting Arrangements

The Lead Consultant will report to NEMA on all technical obligations and to UNDP on all contractual obligations.

DURATION OF THE WORK

The assignment will be executed in a 30 working days (spread over one month) from November to Mid-December, 2015. The Consultant is expected to adhere to the specific dates.

2. TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be composed of a total of two consultants including 1 international (Lead/ Team Leader) Consultant and 1 national consultant. The consultants shall have prior experience in evaluating similar projects.

Duties and Responsibilities of Team Leader

The Lead Consultant/Team Leader will have overall responsibility for the work and operations of the evaluation team, including the coordination of inputs from the national consultant. The lead consultant is responsible and overall accountable for the production of the agreed products. S/He will deliver on the following:

- i. Identify strengths and weaknesses in the Programme design and implementation, in particular implementation arrangements and its impacts on efficiency and effectiveness of converting resources (money, time) into results and impacts;
- ii. Ascertain achievements and impacts to date; to what extent the Programme has moved towards achievement of the objectives and outputs under the three outcomes in the results framework and the need for continued focus (in particular achieving global environment benefits and improvement in livelihoods);
- iii. Assess likelihood of sustainability of results and determine the key elements of the exit strategy that would increase the likelihood of sustaining critical results;
- iv. Examine the significance of un-expected effects, whether beneficial or detrimental

in character

- v. Assess to what extent the Programme has contributed to building capacity at national, district and community levels to formulate, implement and monitor actions/activities for sustainable land management
- vi. Assess the validity of assumptions used in the development of the Kidepo Critical Landscape programme, and this Kidepo Critical Landscape project;
- vii. Identify and assess lessons learnt and best practices in relation to achievement of the programme objectives and outputs
- viii. Assess how the Kidepo Critical Landscape Project has adapted to emerging issues and trends such as climate change, energy and other emerging issues, etc.

Evaluation questions are suggested in Annex B.

Required Skills and Experience of the Lead Consultant

- PhD or MSc degree and at least 10 years experience in natural resources management, Agriculture, climate change adaptation/ mitigation, socio-economic development or related fields.
- Familiarity with Biodiversity conservation related projects in Uganda and particularly the national parks and community wildlife management areas, either through managing or evaluating donor-funded projects.
- Substantive knowledge of participatory M&E processes is essential, and experience with CBOs/community development processes; design, implementation and/or management of community and local level sustainable livelihoods initiatives and experience in East and Central Africa are advantages.
- A good wealth of experience in the evaluation of technical assistance projects, if possible with UNDP or other UN development agencies and major donors, is required. A demonstrated understanding of UNDP principles and expected impacts in terms of poverty reduction and sustainable development is essential.
- Familiarity and knowledge of the UN Convention to Conserve Biodiversity, and knowledge of integrated approaches to drylands development and capacity development for management of Biodiversity loss would be an asset
- Excellent English writing and communication skills. Demonstrated ability to assess complex situations in order to analyse critical issues succinctly and clearly and draw forward-looking conclusions.
- Experience in leading small multi-disciplinary, multi-national teams to deliver quality products in high stress, short deadline situations.

Competencies

- Excellent Analytical Skills;
- Positive, constructive attitude towards work;
- Ability to act professionally and flexibly to engage with government officials, donor representatives, and local communities.

Language Requirement

- Excellent English writing and communication skills;

Evaluator ethics

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'.

Annex 2 MTR Mission Itinerary

Date	Item
28 Nov (2015)	Contract signed with UNDP-CO
08 Dec	Inception meeting with TSC
18 Jan	UNDP-CO sharing many of the background documents for the MTR
27 Jan	Meeting at UNDP-CO Meeting with Project Manager
28 Jan	Meeting with NFA Meeting with representatives (including Chair) of the TSC
29 Jan	Meeting with Financial Director, NEMA
31 Jan	Meeting with Project Manager Travel to Lira
01 Feb	Travel to Otuke District Meeting with RDC, Otuke District Meeting with Fountain of Life Uganda (CBO, Otuke District) Meeting with FAPA/FAUGO
02 Feb	Travel to Agago District Meeting with District Natural Resource Officer, Agago District Meeting with CBO, Agago District Travel to Kitgum Meeting with District Natural Resource Officer, Kitgum District Meeting with NFA Sector Manager
03 Feb	Travel to meet CBO based near Kitgum (Waneno Amiam Farmer's Association) Meeting in Orom sub-county (Together We Stand – a CBO) Meetings in Karenga sub-county (Karenga Cultural and Drama Group – a CBO) Meetings with UWA staff, KVNP and representatives from AWF/USAID project
04 Feb	Meeting with CAO, Kaabong District Meeting with Aware Uganda, Kaabong District (a CBO) Meeting with CAO, Kotido District Meeting with RDC, Kotido District Meeting with Jierdi, Kotido District (a CBO)

Date	Item
	Meeting with Help Child, Kotido District (a CBO)
05 Feb	Meeting with ASEDI (a CBO) in Abim District Meeting with Rock of Ages Family Initiative - RAFI (a CBO) in Abim District Meeting with CAO (Acting), Abim District Meeting with District Environmental Officer and District Forestry Officer, Otuke District
08 Feb	Meeting with representative from UWA
10 Feb	MTR team attended the TSC meeting in Lira with meetings by consultants of four studies that had taken place and which were presenting their preliminary results Meeting with the District Liaison Officers from Kotido, Abim and Kaabong Districts Meeting with representative from NFA
15 Feb	Meeting with ED NEMA
17 Feb	Meeting with Project Manager
23 Feb	Meeting with Project Coordinator, NEMA
29 Feb	Meeting with representatives from UNDP-CO (first debriefing)
04 Mar	Debriefing and validation meeting with broad range of stakeholders
07 March	Skype call with UNDP-GEF RTA
02 June	Submission of draft MTR report to UNDP-CO
21 June	Meeting of stakeholders and project partners to discuss MTR report
28 June	Meeting at UNDP-CO with high level stakeholders to discuss MTR report
04 July	Meeting with Programme Analyst, Energy & Environment, UNDP-CO and Project Manager
04 July	Project partners provide feedback on draft MTR report as well as data on project management expenditure
13 July	UWA provides reports on training activities in KVNP
17 July	Meeting with UNDP-GEF RTA
18 July	Clarification from UNDP-CO regarding the date that the vehicles were purchased
21 July	Final financial data submitted by UNDP-CO to MTR team
27 July	Final report submitted to UNDP-CO

Annex 3 List of persons met and interviewed over the course of MTR

This list includes all those consulted over the course of the MTR – both during the mission and in the time that has elapsed since the mission took place.

Name	Position	Organisation
Mr. Innocent Akampurira	Member	National Council of Science and Technology
Mr. Onesmus Muhwezi	Team Leader Energy and Environment	UNDP
Mr. Polly Mugisha	Team Leader & M&E Specialist	UNDP
Mr. Daniel Omodo Mc Mondo	Programme Analyst	UNDP
Ms. Jenester Atuhaire	Programme Associate	UNDP
Mr. Elias Tumuhimbise	Finance and Administration Associate	UNDP
Ms. Jeniffer. T. Kiiza	Finance and Administration Associate	UNDP
Mr. Buyana Kareem	Consultant	UNDP
Ms. Harriet Karusigarira	Programme Finance Analyst	UNDP
Dr. Tom Okurut	Project Board Chairman	NEMA
Mr. Allan Kasagga	Accountant	NEMA
Mr. Francis Ogwal	Project Coordinator	NEMA
Mr. Aggrey Rwetsiba	Project Coordinator	UWA
Mr. Levi Etworu	Project Coordinator	NFA
Mr. Okiria-Ateker James	Project Manager	NEMA
Ms. Agnes Atwongo	Project Field Officer	NEMA
Mr. Emmanuel Mbirontono	Project Finance and Finance Officer	NEMA
Prof. Joseph Obua	TSC Chairperson	Makerere University
Dr. Mary Namaganda	TSC Member	Makerere University
Mr. Robert Abak	Resident District Commissioner	Otuke District Local Government
Ms. Florence Ogwang	Project Manager	Fountain of Life Uganda (CBO) – Otuke District
Mr. Okeng Alfred	Project Coordinator	Facilitation for Peace and Development (CBO) – Otuke

Name	Position	Organisation
Mr. David Olai	District Natural Resources Officer	Agago District Local Government
Ms. Jane Margaret Adong	Project Coordinator	Gwoko Kene (CBO) - Agago
Mr. David Wany Oyok	Senior Environment Officer	Kitgum Local Government
Ms. Ester Nekesa	Sector Manager – Gulu	NFA
Mr. Jimmy Akena	Project Manager	Waneno Anyim (CBO) – Kitgum
Mr. Otim Charles	Board Chairman	Together we stand group (CBO) - Kitgum
Mr. Albine Lopeyok	Chairman	Karenga Cultural Drama Group - Kaabong
Mr. Masereka Johnson	Conservation Area Manager	Kidepo Valley National Park
Mr. Nyadu Stephen	Warden Tourism	Kidepo Valley National Park
Mr. Okileng David	Assistant Warden Research and Monitoring	Kidepo Valley National Park
Mr. Walter Odokorwot	Warden Community Conservation	Kidepo Valley National Park
Mr. Christopher Tiyo	Project Officer	Africa Wildlife Foundation – Kidepo Valley National Park
Mr. Lokwee John Jujan	Assistant Chief Administrative Officer	Kaabong District Local Government
Mr. Benaton Lokalanyi	Field Coordinator	AWARE – Uganda (CBO) - Kaabong
Mr. Jackson Ocen Okoth	Personnel Officer	Kotido District Local Government
Mr. Emmanuel Kelli Lobedi	Project Manager	Help Child Karamoja (CBO)
Mr. Elijah Lobur	Coordinator	JIECODI (CBO) - Kotido
Mr. Adbenson Ongom	Clerk to Council	Abim District Local Government
Mr. Christopher Opio	Programme Manager	Rock of Ages (CBO) - Abim
Mr. Sam Akello Ayen	Programme Coordinator	ASEDI (CBO) - Abim
Mr. Lomongin Emmanuel	Ag. District Natural Resources Officer	Kaabong District Local Government
Mr. George Oming	District Natural Resources Officer	Kotido District Local Government
Mr. George Okot	Ag. District Natural Resources Officer	Abim District Local Government

Annex 4 Materials relating to procurement of vehicles

As indicated in Section 4.3.3, there were issues with the procurement of the vehicles and motorbikes. The evidence is presented here.

1. The report of the Inception Workshop (which took place from 09-13 December 2013), it was reported that “the PMU provided specifications for purchase for vehicles ... for the project to UNDP. UNDP is following up on the procurement of the vehicles”

Ladies and gentlemen, although the project is being launched today, some progress has been made in implementing some activities. ¶

¶

1. → The PMU provided specifications for purchase for vehicles and other equipment for the project to UNDP. UNDP is following up on the procurement of the vehicles and equipment. ¶

2. → Invitations were sent to institution to serve on Project Steering Committee (PSC). Response is being received and the PMU expects to have the PSC in place before end of December 2013. ¶

3. → The Technical Committee on Biodiversity Conservation will provide overall technical guidance during the implementation of the project. Members of the Taskforce who contributed to the development of project will be coopted to serve on the Technical Committee on Biodiversity Committee and will constitute the Technical Steering Committee (TSC) for the Project ¶

4. → Invitations have been sent to pilot districts (of Otuke, Abim, Agago, Kaabong, Kotido and Kitgum) to nominate a technical officer to serve as District Liaison Officer for the project in each of the pilot districts. NEMA is awaiting response from the districts. ¶

5. → Advertisement for project personnel (Project Manager, Project Administrator, Drivers) was done and applications have been received. The step is for NEMA to convene a meeting for with UWA short listing of the candidates. This is being handled the Human Resources Manager. ¶

¶

In conclusion, NEMA will continue to engage stakeholders to mobilize financial resources for environmental management, undertaking research, promoting public awareness and education as well as integration of environmental concerns in national and district planning processes. These are among the statutory functions of NEMA which this project will contribute to. This project provides NEMA with the opportunity to liaise with the private sector in the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity through value addition. Liaison with the private sector and NGOs is a statutory function of NEMA as well. ¶

¶

I would like to end by thanking the team from NEMA, UWA and UNDP for the team work that has made it possible for the project to be launched today. Thank you for your attention. For God and My Country ¶

¶

¶

Annex 3: Remarks from Chairman Board of NEMA ¶

REMARKS BY PROF P.H. NYEKO PEN-MOGI CHAIRMAN – NEMA BOARD OF DIRECTORS ¶

¶

I would like to make some few remarks on behalf of the members of the NEMA Board of Directors. First and foremost, I welcome you to northern Uganda, the region where I was born and raised. I am therefore very familiar with the current environmental conditions in the region and would like to commend the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for supporting the project

Report of the launch and inception workshop for the KCL project, 9-13 Dec, 2013, Kitgum district ¶

¶

2. In the (digital version of the) originally submitted of the first PB meeting (which took place on 12 September 2014), not only was there no mention of vehicle procurement but there was a mention of how the vehicles should be fuelled



MINUTES OF THE FIRST PROJECT BOARD MEETING

GOU/GEF/UNDP PROJECT ON THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF THREATENED SAVANNA WOODLAND IN THE KIDEPO CRITICAL LANDSCAPE IN NORTH EASTERN UGANDA

12TH SEPTEMBER 2014, RIDAR HOTEL MUKONO



Present

	Name	Designation	Institution
1.	Dr. Tom .O.Okurut	Chairman	National Environment Management Authority
2.	Dr. Andrew .G. Seguya	Co-chair	Uganda Wildlife Authority
3.	Mr. Michael Mugisha	Member	National Forestry Authority
4.	Mr. John Francis .O. Esegu	Member	National Forestry Resources Research Institute
5.	Mr. Paul Mafabi	Member	Ministry of Water and Environment
6.	Dr. Esther Katuura	Member	Natural Chemotherapeutics Research Institute
7.	Mr. Onesimus Muhwezi	Member	United Nations Development Programme
8.	Mr. Gitta .S. Paul	Member	Uganda Export Promotion Board

In attendance

	Name	Designation	Institution
1.	Mr. Aggrey Rwetsiba	Co-opted member	Uganda Wildlife Authority
2.	Mr. Francis Ogwal	Project Coordinator/ Co-opted member	National Environment Management Authority
3.	Martin George Epuu	Project Assistant	National Environment Management Authority

Agenda

1. Self introduction
2. Communication from the Chair
3. Opening remarks
4. Presentation of project overview and consideration of progress of implementation
5. Consideration of Terms of the Reference for the Project Board
6. Consideration of inception report
7. Presentation of UNDP-GEF Policies and procedures
8. Consideration of annual work-plan, procurement plan and budget for 2014 and prioritized activities for 2015

The agenda of the meeting was adopted.

MINUTES	ACTION
Minute 1/PB/01/2014: Self introduction The Chairperson called the meeting to order at 9.30 a.m. He requested members to introduce themselves since it was the first meeting of the Project Board	All to note
Minute 2/PB/01/2014: Communication from the Chairperson (a) The Chairperson informed the meeting that the Project Manager resigned citing delays in release for implementation of project activities and therefore did not want to be blamed for failure to implement project activities. (b) The Chairperson said the second best candidate from the interview for the post will be contacted with a view to appointing him as Project Manager if he accepts to take up the job. (c) The Chairperson briefly highlighted the work of the Project Board which he said among others include providing strategic guidance to steer the project in the right direction. He said members had before them the draft Terms of Reference for the Project Board which has more details on what the Board is expected to do. (d) The Chairperson expressed gratitude to the Project Coordinator (Mr. Francis Ogwal) and the Project Assistant for their hard work which had made it possible for implementation of project activities to commence despite the resignation of the Project Manager. (e) The Chairperson concluded by inviting his co-chair, Dr. Andrew .G. Seguya the Executive Director of Uganda Wildlife Authority and the representative of UNDP Mr. Onesimus Muhwezi make some remarks.	All to note NEMA All to note All to note All to note
Minute 3/PB/01/2014: Remarks from Co-chair Dr. Andrew Seguya (a) He pointed out the following: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. The project is very important to UWA and to the management of the Kidepo Valley Conservation Area (KVCA) and will contribute to addressing the challenges of poaching, fires and community outreach programmes among others. Thus the project will add value to already on-going effort by UWA in addressing threats to KVCA. ii. The Project Manager should be replaced as soon possible to ensure implementation of project activities is not delayed any further. 	All to note NEMA

iii.	Timely disbursement by UNDP and timely accountability is very important in meeting the timelines set for implementing project activities and deliverance of project outputs.	UNDP NEMA UWA
iv.	The timeline for implementation of project activities should take into account the time already lost.	
v.	The delay in procurement often contributes to failure in implementing project activities. Effort should be made to start the process early enough.	NEMA UWA
vi.	The outcomes and good practices/lessons learnt from the project should be mainstreamed into existing policy and institutional framework at the end of the project.	NEMA UWA
(b) Remarks from the representative of UNDP Mr. Onesimus Muhwezi		
(i)	Appreciated the time the Board members had accorded to the project and thanked them for allocating time to attend the meeting	All to note
(ii)	Expressed appreciation for the good turn for the first Project Board meeting and prayed for this to be maintained grateful.	
(iii)	Pointed out that Project Boards for UNDP GEF project provides voluntary since. He however pointed out that their input contributes to the in-kind co-financing to the project.	All to note
(iv)	The Project Board is responsibility for successful implementation of the project.	All to note
(v)	The project should address the causes/threats contributing biodiversity loss identified in the project document and also contribute to livelihood improvement of the local communities through value addition to biodiversity based products and eco-tourism	All to note
(vi)	Fast tracking of implementation of project activities is critical bearing in mind the time lost	All to note
(vii)	The function of UNDP during the implementation of the project will mainly be on provision of funds, quality assurance and ensuring timely accountability for funds advanced to the implementing partner (NEMA)	
(viii)	UNDP is committed to working with Government to ensure that the project achieves its objectives and delivers on the outputs and outcomes	NEMA UWA
		All to

<p>(c) Issues that raised from the opening remarks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Delayed submission of workplans contributes to delay in disbursement of funds by UNEP. Quarterly workplans should be submitted early to UNDP. (ii) To expedite release of funds for 2015, the Annual Work-plans should be submitted to UNDP by 15 December of each calendar year so that funds are processed early for Quarter I (January – March) (iii) It was resolved that NEMA should submit the workplans early to UNDP 	<p>note UNDP</p> <p>All to note UNDP</p> <p>NEMA UWA</p>
<p>Minute 4/PB/01/2014: Presentation of project overview and progress of implementation</p> <p>The presentation was made by the Project Coordinator Mr. Francis Ogwal and it covered the following key areas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Background to the Kidepo critical Landscape (KCL) including Kidepo Valley National Park (KVNP) and the shea belt districts; (ii) Importance of KVNP and the shea butter trees; (iii) Engagement of local governments by UWA and NEMA in the protection and sustainable use of biodiversity in the KCL (iv) Value addition to sheas based products (v) Threats to biodiversity in KCL which the project is to address namely: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Wildlife Hunting /Poaching 2. Encroachment 3. Charcoal burning especially cutting of shea butter trees for charcoal production 4. Uncontrolled burning 5. Human-wildlife conflict. (vi) The goal, objectives and the project components as well as the outputs and outcomes of each component (vii) Project management and implementation arrangement, project cost and co-financing (viii) Progress in implementing project activities including the inception and launch of the project from 9-13 December 2013 in Kitgum district (ix) Budget performance as on 12th September 2014 which was 59% (x) Issues that have emerged so far which include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) strengthening enforcement for protection of shea in the pilot districts, (b) use of the national Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) website to increase visibility of the project, 	<p>All to note</p>

<p>(c) challenges in the provision of fuel for the motorcycles already availed to the pilot districts,</p> <p>(d) need to involve Members of Parliament from the pilot districts to raise the profile of the project; and</p> <p>(e) request by NFA for 1 vehicle to facilitate field activities</p>	
<p>Decision by the Board after discussions on the presentation</p>	
<p>The board took note of the progress so far made in implementation of project activities and resolved as follows:</p>	
<p>(1) On the fuel for field vehicles and motorcycles, NEMA should pay the fuel stations in the pilot districts that do not have facilities for fuel cards. The District Liaison Officers will provide accountability and this will form the basis for the subsequent release of funds for fuel.</p>	NEMA
<p>(2) For component 1, UWA has an arrangement with Shell to supply fuel (in tanks) to KVNP. This should be integrated with the fuel card system for the project vehicle under component 1.</p>	NEMA UWA
<p>(3) The PMU should, at an appropriate time, organize a meeting to brief the MPs from the pilot districts about the project</p>	NEMA UWA
<p>(4) The Website Administrator for the CHM website should be supported by the project to specifically upload and update information about the project on the CHM website. A monthly salary of USD480 as proposed by the PMU was approved beginning January 2015. The CHM (www.chm.nemaug.org) is global website under CBD and will thus help to create awareness about the project nationally, regionally and globally.</p>	NEMA
<p>(5) Integration of Environmental Protection Force to strengthen enforcement activities was approved.</p>	NEMA
<p>(6) The PMU should, in consultation with UNDP, explore opportunities for procuring 1 vehicle for NFA from the project funds and report in the next board meeting.</p>	NEMA UNDP
<p>(7) NFA should appoint one of the sector managers to coordinate NFA activities on the project. The officer should be knowledgeable about the project.</p>	NFA
<p>(8) The budget should be revised and only leave those activities that can be implemented by December 2014 so that the minimum project performance of 80% is achieved by end of December 2014</p>	NEMA UWA
<p>(9) PMU should develop and put in place a system for disbursement of funds to support community based activities for example tree planting and value addition to shea based products</p>	NEMA UWA

Minute 5/PB/01/2014: Consideration of Terms of the Reference for the Project Board	
<p>The Terms of Reference for the Project Board was presented by the Project Coordinator. The TORs were reviewed and some changes made as follows:</p>	
(a) The words Project Steering Committee should be replaced by Project Board	
(b) Additional sections on decision making and quorum were included in the TORs as well as the co-option of the Chairperson of the Technical Steering Committee, the Project Coordinator, the Project Manager and Focal Point for component one of the project from UWA to attend meetings of the Project Board.	NEMA
(c) It was agreed that representatives from the following institutions be included on the Project Board; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; Chief of Party African Wildlife Foundation and an NGO representative from Karamoja Region	NEMA UWA
(d) The Terms of Reference approved by the Board after amendments is attached as Annex1 .	NEMA
Minute 6/PB/01/2014: Consideration of Inception Report	
<p>This was presented by Aggrey Rwetisba from UWA which highlighted the following.</p>	
(a) The objectives of the inception workshop;	
(b) Statements by UWA, NFA, NEMA, Chairman NEMA Board of Directors and statement from the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Water and Environment on the launch of the project	All to note
(c) Issues that were raised by stakeholders;	
(d) GEF monitoring and reporting requirements as well as risk management.	All to note
Decision by the Board after discussions on the presentation	
(i) UNDP disburses funds to UWA and NEMA accordingly to activities approved in the Quarterly work plan submitted by NEMA	
(ii) UWA will account for the funds directly to UNDP with a copy to NEMA	All to note
(iii) NEMA will compile the whole accountability for component 1 and 2	
(iv) Accountability for funds disbursed by UNDP should be prompt to facilitate faster release of funds for the next quarter by UNDP.	UWA NEMA UNDP

9. Minute 7/PB/01/2014: Presentation of UNDP-GEF Policies and procedures	
<p>Mr. Onesimus Muhwezi from UNDP highlight the following:</p>	
<p>(a) First Annual Report for the project (PIR) will be prepared in June 2015 to provide information on what the project has so far achieved in terms of implementation of project activities.</p>	<p>All to note</p>
<p>(b) The UNDP Regional Coordination Unit in Addis Ababa will review the above report and the report and a final report will have to be ready by September 2015.</p>	<p>All to note</p>
<p>(c) Accountability for funds advanced by UNDP is on a quarterly basis basing on the Quarterly workplan against which the funds were released. UNDP has come up with a policy to release funds by 15th of the first month of the quarter.</p>	<p>All to note NEMA UWA</p>
<p>(d) In situations where funds are advanced and stays for 6 months before it is utilized, this will signal to UNDP CO that there is operational risk that the funds may not be used.</p>	<p>UNDP NEMA UWA</p>
<p>(e) UNDP does not pay sitting allowance. More detailed information is in the Operations Manual for UNDP Government supported projects which will be provided to Board members</p>	<p>All to note NEMA UNDP</p>
Minute 8/PB/01/2014: Consideration of annual work-plan, procurement plan and budget for 2014 and prioritized activities for 2015	
<p>The Annual workplan for 2014 and prioritized activities for 2015 were presented at the first meeting of the Technical Steering Committee 8-10 September 2014 at Source of the Nile Hotel in Jinja. The Committee reviewed and realigned the activities.</p>	<p>All to note NEMA UWA</p>
<p>The Project Coordinator and the Project Assistant presented the Annual work-plan and prioritized activities for 2015 as reviewed and adopted by the Technical Steering Committee. The key issues that members of the Project Board raised were:</p>	<p>All to note UNDP</p>
<p>(a) Focus should be on what can be implemented in 2014 taking into account the time left since UNDP operates using a Calendar year.</p>	<p>All to note NEMA UWA</p>
<p>(b) The Annual Work-plan for 2014, the procurement plan for 2014 and the prioritized activities for 2015 were approved by the Project Board.</p>	<p>All to note</p>

<p>Minute 9 /PB/01/2014: Adjournment</p> <p>The Chairman adjourned the meeting at 1. 40 p.m. Date and venue for the next meeting to be communicated by the NEMA early enough to members. Documents for the meeting to be provided prior to the meeting.</p> <p>Signed:</p> <p>Chairperson: Date..... Dr. Tom .O. Okurut</p> <p>Minute Secretary..... Date..... Mr. Francis Ogwal</p>	<p>All to note NEMA</p>
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3. In the hard copy of the minutes of the first PB meeting (signed by the Chair of the PB and the Minute Secretary on 27 November 2016) was thereafter submitted to the MTR on 08 July 2016. In this version of the PB minutes, there is an additional point in the minutes that explicitly approves the procurement of the vehicles



MINUTES OF THE FIRST PROJECT BOARD MEETING

GOU/GEF/UNDP PROJECT ON THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF THREATENED SAVANNA WOODLAND IN THE KIDEPO CRITICAL LANDSCAPE IN NORTH EASTERN UGANDA

12TH SEPTEMBER 2014, RIDAR HOTEL MUKONO



Present

	Name	Designation	Institution
1.	Dr. Tom .O.Okurut	Chairman	National Environment Management Authority
2.	Dr. Andrew .G. Seguya	Co-chair	Uganda Wildlife Authority
3.	Mr. Michael Mugisha	Member	National Forestry Authority
4.	Mr. John Francis .O. Esegu	Member	National Forestry Resources Research Institute
5.	Mr. Paul Mafabi	Member	Ministry of Water and Environment
6.	Dr. Esther Katuura	Member	Natural Chemotherapeutics Research Institute
7.	Mr. Onesimus Muhwezi	Member	United Nations Development Programme
8.	Mr. Gitta .S. Paul	Member	Uganda Export Promotion Board

In attendance

	Name	Designation	Institution
1.	Mr. Aggrey Rwetsiba	Co-opted member	Uganda Wildlife Authority
2.	Mr. Francis Ogwal	Project Coordinator/ Co-opted member	National Environment Management Authority
3.	Martin George Epua	Project Assistant	National Environment Management Authority

Agenda

1. Self introduction
2. Communication from the Chair
3. Opening remarks
4. Consideration of the procurement of vehicles and motor cycles for project districts
5. Presentation of project overview and consideration of progress of implementation
6. Consideration of Terms of the Reference for the Project Board
7. Consideration of inception report
8. Presentation of UNDP-GEF Policies and procedures
9. Consideration of annual work-plan, procurement plan and budget for 2014 and prioritized activities for 2015

<p>(vi) Fast tracking of implementation of project activities is critical bearing in mind the time lost</p> <p>(vii) The function of UNDP during the implementation of the project will mainly be on provision of funds, quality assurance and ensuring timely accountability for funds advanced to the implementing partner (NEMA)</p> <p>(viii) UNDP is committed to working with Government to ensure that the project achieves its objectives and delivers on the outputs and outcomes</p>	<p>NEMA UWA</p> <p>All to note UNDP</p> <p>All to note UNDP</p>
<p>(c) Issues that raised from the opening remarks</p> <p>(i) Delayed submission of workplans contributes to delay in disbursement of funds by UNEP. Quarterly workplans should be submitted early to UNDP.</p> <p>(ii) To expedite release of funds for 2015, the Annual Work-plans should be submitted to UNDP by 15 December of each calendar year so that funds are processed early for Quarter I (January – March)</p> <p>(iii) It was resolved that NEMA should submit the workplans early to UNDP</p>	<p>NEMA UWA</p> <p>NEMA</p> <p>NEMA</p>
<p>Minute 4/PB/01/2014: Consideration of the procurement of vehicles and motor cycles for project districts</p> <p>The Project Coordinator briefed the Board on the on-going procurement process for three project vehicles and six motor cycles initiated by UNDP and NEMA. He brought to the attention of the Board the fact that there is no mention of purchase of vehicles and motor cycles in the project document, but there is a budget for equipment and furniture under each component which will be used for the purchase of vehicles and motor cycles. He further explained that the three vehicles will be distributed as follows: one for UWA and the other two for NEMA (one in Kampala and one in the field) while the six motor cycles will be given to each of the six project districts.</p> <p>Decision of the Board after the presentation</p> <p>The Board approved the purchase of project vehicles and motor cycles for project districts to facilitate project activity implementation.</p> <p>Minute 5/PB/01/2014: Presentation of project overview and progress of</p>	<p>All to note</p>

implementation

The presentation was made by the Project Coordinator Mr. Francis Ogwal and it covered the following key areas.

- (i) Background to the Kidepo critical Landscape (KCL) including Kidepo Valley National Park (KVNP) and the shea belt districts;
- (ii) Importance of KVNP and the shea butter trees;
- (iii) Engagement of local governments by UWA and NEMA in the protection and sustainable use of biodiversity in the KCL
- (iv) Value addition to sheas based products
- (v) Threats to biodiversity in KCL which the project is to address namely:
 - 1. Wildlife Hunting /Poaching
 - 2. Encroachment
 - 3. Charcoal burning especially cutting of shea butter trees for charcoal production
 - 4. Uncontrolled burning
 - 5. Human-wildlife conflict.
- (vi) The goal, objectives and the project components as well as the outputs and outcomes of each component
- (vii) Project management and implementation arrangement, project cost and co-financing
- (viii) Progress in implementing project activities including the inception and launch of the project from 9-13 December 2013 in Kitgum district
- (ix) Budget performance as on 12th September 2014 which was 59%
- (x) Issues that have emerged so far which include:
 - (a) strengthening enforcement for protection of shea in the pilot districts,
 - (b) use of the national Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) website to increase visibility of the project,
 - (c) challenges in the provision of fuel for the motorcycles already availed to the pilot districts,
 - (d) need to involve Members of Parliament from the pilot districts to raise the profile of the project; and
 - (e) request by NFA for 1 vehicle to facilitate field activities

All to
note

NEMA

Decision by the Board after discussions on the presentation



The board took note of the progress so far made in implementation of project activities and resolved as follows:

- (1) On the fuel for field vehicles and motorcycles, NEMA should pay the fuel stations in the pilot districts that do not have facilities for fuel cards. The District Liaison Officers will provide accountability and this will form the basis for the subsequent release of funds for fuel.
- (2) For component 1, UWA has an arrangement with Shell to supply fuel (in tanks) to KVNP. This should be integrated with the fuel card system

NEMA
UWA

NEMA
UWA

for the project vehicle under component 1.	NEMA
(3) The PMU should, at an appropriate time, organize a meeting to brief the MPs from the pilot districts about the project	NEMA
(4) The Website Administrator for the CHM website should be supported by the project to specifically upload and update information about the project on the CHM website. A monthly salary of USD480 as proposed by the PMU was approved beginning January 2015. The CHM (www.chm.nemaug.org) is global website under CBD and will thus help to create awareness about the project nationally, regionally and globally.	NEMA
(5) Integration of Environmental Protection Force to strengthen enforcement activities was approved.	NEMA UNDP
(6) The PMU should, in consultation with UNDP, explore opportunities for procuring 1 vehicle for NFA from the project funds and report in the next board meeting.	NFA
(7) NFA should appoint one of the sector managers to coordinate NFA activities on the project. The officer should be knowledgeable about the project.	NEMA UWA
(8) The budget should be revised and only leave those activities that can be implemented by December 2014 so that the minimum project performance of 80% is achieved by end of December 2014	NEMA UWA
(9) PMU should develop and put in place a system for disbursement of funds to support community based activities for example tree planting and value addition to shea based products	
Minute 6/PB/01/2014: Consideration of Terms of the Reference for the Project Board	
The Terms of Reference for the Project Board was presented by the Project Coordinator. The TORs were reviewed and some changes made as follows:	NEMA
(a) The words Project Steering Committee should be replaced by Project Board	NEMA UWA
(b) Additional sections on decision making and quorum were included in the TORs as well as the co-option of the Chairperson of the Technical Steering Committee, the Project Coordinator, the Project Manager and Focal Point for component one of the project from UWA to attend meetings of the Project Board.	NEMA
(c) It was agreed that representatives from the following institutions be included on the Project Board; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; Chief of Party African Wildlife Foundation and an NGO representative from Karamoja Region	

<p>(e) UNDP does not pay sitting allowance. More detailed information is in the Operations Manual for UNDP Government supported projects which will be provided to Board members</p>	<p>All to note</p>
<p>Minute 9/PB/01/2014: Consideration of annual work-plan, procurement plan and budget for 2014 and prioritized activities for 2015</p>	
<p>The Annual workplan for 2014 and prioritized activities for 2015 were presented at the first meeting of the Technical Steering Committee 8-10 September 2014 at Source of the Nile Hotel in Jinja. The Committee reviewed and realigned the activities.</p>	<p>NEMA UNDP</p>
<p>The Project Coordinator and the Project Assistant presented the Annual work-plan and prioritized activities for 2015 as reviewed and adopted by the Technical Steering Committee. The key issues that members of the Project Board raised were:</p>	<p>All to note NEMA UWA</p>
<p>(a) Focus should be on what can be implemented in 2014 taking into account the time left since UNDP operates using a Calendar year.</p>	<p>All to note UNDP</p>
<p>(b) The Annual Work-plan for 2014, the procurement plan for 2014 and the prioritized activities for 2015 were approved by the Project Board.</p>	<p>All to note</p>
<p>Minute 10 /PB/01/2014: Adjournment</p>	
<p>The Chairman adjourned the meeting at 1. 40 p.m. Date and venue for the next meeting to be communicated by the NEMA early enough to members. Documents for the meeting to be provided prior to the meeting.</p>	<p>All to note NEMA</p>
<p>Signed:</p>	
<p>Chairperson:  Dr. Tom .O. Okurut</p>	<p>Date: <u>27/11/14</u></p>
<p>Minute Secretary:  Mr. Francis Ogwal</p>	<p>Date: <u>27/11/2014</u></p>

Annex 5 List of members of Project Board and Technical Steering Committee

Project Board

Name	Institution
Dr Tom O. Okurut	National Environment Management Authority
Dr Andrew Seguya	Uganda Wildlife Authority
Ms Pauline Akidi	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
Mr Michael Mugisha	National Forestry Authority
Ms Margaret Lomonyang	Community Based Organizations representative
Mr Onesimus Muhwezi	UNDP
Executive Director	National Forestry Resources Research Institute
Mr Paul Mafabi	Ministry of Water and Environment
Mr Gitta S. Paul	Uganda Export Promotion Board

Technical Steering Committee

Name	Institution
Professor Obua Joseph	Makerere University
Dr Eilu Gerald	Makerere University
Tugumusirize Obed	National Forestry Authority
Namaganda Mary	Makerere University
Dr Olupot William	Community Livelihood Organization
Akampurira Innocent	National Council of Science and Technology
Omodo Daniel	UNDP
Bakunda Aventino	Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries
Onyai Fred	National Environment Management Authority
Rwetsiba Aggrey	Uganda Wildlife Authority

Annex 6 List of documents reviewed

1. PIF
2. Baseline Report in PPG process
3. UNDP Project Document
4. Project Inception Report
5. All Project Implementation Reports (PIR's)
6. Food Security Nutrition & Early Warning in Karamoja
7. Technical Progress Reports
8. Minutes of the Project Board and the Technical Steering Committee meetings
9. Minutes of the KDPPG Open Group Meeting (28 January 2016)
10. Back-to-the-office reports (UNDP-CO)
11. UNDP country programme document
12. General literature on landscape conservation, drivers of wildlife crime in Uganda, natural resource management, etc.

Annex 7 Example questionnaire used for data collection

1. What is the achievement, so far, of which you are most proud?
2. If you could go back in time, what would you change or do differently?
3. If you could go back in time, which activities would you definitely do again?
4. If the project had an extra USD 2 million and an extra two years, what else would you consider doing?
5. What are you doing to ensure take up/replication of the concept and processes in other landscapes?
6. What are the effects of inflation or changes in the exchange rates to the budgeting and/or expenditure?
7. Please give examples of how you are ensuring cost effectiveness?
8. Please provide all information on cofinance to date, including both cash and in-kind expenditure and a summary of the items on which the co-finance has been spent.
9. What is your role/relationship with the project?
10. What are you doing to ensure sustainability of the project's processes and impacts?
11. This (xxx) success seems very good: what did you do to achieve it?
12. Who are the partners (i.e., people actively working to the same goals) on the project?
13. Who would you say *owns* the project?
14. Who are the stakeholders in the project (i.e., people that are involved in the project, either actively or passively or will be affected by the project in some way)?
15. Who prepares the TOR for all contracting?
16. Who signs the contracts?
17. Imagine this scenario: if the Minister phones you up and says that he needs to make a brief report on the project to the President and he needs 5 bullets on the following subjects:
 - Key successes
 - what would you advise the next door country to do if they were to implement a similar project
 - what works and why
 - what does not work and why
 - key challenges
18. Is the project having any useful (but unplanned) spin-offs?
19. Is the project having any detrimental or negative (but unplanned or unintended) impacts?
20. This is a UNDP project – what advantages or disadvantages does this bring?
What if it was a World Bank project instead – what difference would that bring?
21. If you were to re-write the Project Document, what would you change?
22. Who are the project's champions?
23. Standard issues:
 - Project Manager Forum

- Procurement rules and efficiencies
 - UNDP training/support
 - Financial audits
 - Cofinance information
 - Communication strategy?
 - Monitoring awareness/knowledge
 - Backing up data and digital information
 - Team functionality
 - Staff turn over
 - If training is provided, how is training is now being used in job?
 - How including gender and/or indigenous peoples issues?
 - Need to provide all information, including equipment, inputs, infrastructure, tracking tool data.
 - If there was a delay, what was the reason?
24. How is the project aligned to the national development plan, region-level development plans and the UNDAF?
 25. Is the project trying to increase awareness? If so, among which target groups? How is the project monitoring changes in awareness and attitude? How has any changes in attitude and awareness affected project implementation, and how is it being used in the daily, professional lives of the target groups?
 26. Infrastructure has been developed over the course of this project. Was it in alignment with the strategic plan developed at the landscape level? If not, how was the decision made for any given infrastructural input?
 27. New institutions have been created over the course of the project (specifically the landscape management committees). How will these be sustainable? In five years' time, how do you imagine the committees functioning?
 28. Why did the Financial and Administrative Assistant resign?
 29. At a landscape level, what monitoring activities are being undertaken to determine the impact of the project?
 30. How does the project interface with the land reform processes in the country?
 31. The Project Advisory Committee (PAC) appears to be largely unsuccessful: we aim to propose that no further effort be expended to make it active. However, in the long-term, particularly once the GEF project has ended, will there be a role for i) an umbrella coordination body (to continue the work of the PCU – and if so, should it be independent or remain within govt?) and/or ii) a centralised technical body to assist landscapes with technical issues?
 32. It appears as if some key stakeholders are not part of the landscape management committees – e.g., Regional Governments, Roads, Water, etc. Would it be useful to try to include some of these organizations, at least on an ad hoc basis?
 33. How is the project – and landscape management committees in particular - interfacing with regional governments?
 34. To what extent is the project strategy relevant to country priorities, country ownership, and the best route towards expected results?
 35. To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved thus far?
 36. Has the project been implemented efficiently, cost-effectively, and been able to

adapt to any changing conditions thus far?

37. To what extent are project-level monitoring and evaluation systems, reporting, and project communications supporting the project's implementation?
38. To what extent are there financial, institutional, socio-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?
- 39.

Six questions to overcome fear of failure:

1. What would you attempt to do if you knew you could not fail?
2. What if I fail — how will I recover?
3. What if I do nothing?
4. What if I succeed?
5. What's truly worth doing, whether you fail or succeed?
6. In this failure, what went right?

Annex 8 UNEG Code of Conduct Form

Evaluators/Consultants:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

MTR Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System:

Name of Consultant: Stuart Williams

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at Kampala, Uganda (Place) on 20 July 2016 (Date)




Signature: _____

Name of Consultant: Joseph Mukasa Ngubwagye

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at Kampala, Uganda (Place) on 20 July 2016 (Date)



Signature: _____

Annex 9 MTR Final Report Clearance Form

Midterm Review Report Reviewed and Cleared By:

Uganda UNDP Country Office

Name: _____

Signature: _____ Date: _____

UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor

Name: _____

Signature: _____ Date: _____