Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

This report presents key findings and conclusions of the final evaluation of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) Phase II, jointly implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in West and South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei states of Sudan. The programme started in March 2014 and ended in February 2016, and there are currently no plans for a new phase. The evaluation looked into lessons learned and recommendations from this angle, focusing on aspects that can be applied either to other programmes or be considered for a potential similar programme in the future.

The evaluation team was composed of two consultants: an international consultant, responsible for the desk review, methodology, meetings and interviews in Khartoum and this final report, and a national consultant who conducted the field visits in December 2015.

Funded by the European Union (EU), JCRP aimed at addressing immediate conflict risks and contributing to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the targeted areas through five different outputs, UNDP being responsible for the implementation of three outputs and IOM for two. Although two separate agreements were in place with the EU, the overall philosophy and approach were one of partnership and the outputs designed to contribute to the overall objective. There has been added value in this partnership, which capitalised on each of the organisation’s areas of expertise and promoted coordination in approaching a sensitive area in a highly volatile environment.

Overall, the programme has been highly relevant and well perceived across the states, with some differences amongst them mainly due to context specificities and partners’ diverse capacities. The programme fits well within the existing overall strategic plans of both agencies, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the EU strategy for Sudan. IOM and UNDP report achievement of the programme’s objectives as revised during implementation. The last revision of the work plan provided for a more realistic approach that prioritised activities which needed to be finalized to complete the peace dividend cycle and those more likely to be sustainable in the future, even without the programme’s support.

Field interviews confirmed that the overall perception is that the project has indeed managed to reduce levels of conflict in targeted localities and that the peace dividends have greatly contributed to cultural change.

In terms of impact, the mere presence of UNDP and IOM in these areas has had an impact in building trust and hope in the communities. As needs are still pressing in the field, interviewed communities and authorities have expressed disappointment over the closure of the programme. Efforts have been made by the agencies to explain the discontinuation of the programme and limited connections and support.
continue with some of the beneficiaries through other programmes/funding. Re-launching another phase or a different programme will require building on these as well as a well designed communication process to explain new interventions.

Great progress has been achieved in developing capacities for peace across the target States, it would be important for the agencies and other partners to explore options to continue supporting some of the organisations and individuals to continue their work.

As far as lessons learned are concerned, the evaluation confirmed those advanced by the mid-term review (MTR): the importance of the programme in an area with limited international attention, the appropriateness of the peace dividend approach and the need to re-evaluate and increase conflict sensitivity in the future.

Recommendations for IOM will simply reinforce the direction the agency has taken, in terms of incorporating lessons learned and approaches to its projects in the country. As far as UNDP is concerned, and taking into account the ongoing programme re-alignment exercise, it is recommend for lessons learned, components and relationships to inform an overall strategy for peacebuilding for the country, with context specific considerations for each region/State.

Additionally, the agencies are encouraged to explore how to maintain a presence in the areas, to actively participate in the planned conflict analysis and undertake a mapping of activities and capacities for peace, to explore using the peace dividend approach in other programmes and to continue exploring options to increase neutrality and conflict sensitivity.
The Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) aimed to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the former Protocol Areas of South Kordofan State, West Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei in Sudan.

The JCRP has been implemented in two phases. Phase I of the Programme was implemented over the period January 2012 – February 2014. Phase II was implemented, with the generous support of the European Union for 18 months over the period March 2014 – August 2015. The programme was scheduled to come to an end in August 2015. However, UNDP was granted a no-cost extension from the EU and IOM was granted a cost-extension until February 2016.

Phase II of the JCRP builds on the work of the Conflict Reduction Programme (CRP), implemented in 2009 as a pilot programme aimed at prevention and resolution of local conflicts in South Kordofan and Phase I of the JCRP, which expanded the work of the CRP into Blue Nile state and the Abyei Area. The JCRP was initially conceived in a post-conflict setting, in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Since 2011 however, there has been a re-emergence of larger-scale conflicts, with the Abyei Area, Blue Nile and Kordofan states becoming critical, not only for the security of Sudan, but also for South Sudan, owing to the inter-dependent livelihoods of communities across borders. Furthermore, local resource-based conflicts were increasingly becoming entangled with larger political and economic disputes, significantly impacting the security and development of affected communities.

Building on the successes, lessons learned and ongoing analysis of the changing conflict dynamics, the overall objective of the JCRP Phase II was to strengthen Government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism (2013-2016 Country Programme Action Plan CPAP Outcome 7) in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur. The theory of change guiding the work of the programme is as follows:

- IF we build the capacity of state-level Government peace building institutions and of community-level peace builders THEN they will be better able to manage the peace processes they are strategically best placed to deliver

- IF we provide financial and technical support to local peace processes THEN we will have a direct impact on social cohesion at the community level

- IF we provide financial and technical support to actors communicating local voices to negotiators of a peace agreement THEN we will have a direct impact on plural voices being reflected in the negotiation of a peace agreement
• IF we deliver peace dividends focusing on services identified by communities after a peace agreement THEN we will help sustain local peace processes

• IF we support civil society organizations to deliver peace dividends focusing on developing capacities of local peace actors, fostering diversity and improving livelihoods to target communities or groups that are at risk of joining violent conflict THEN we will support community resilience to violent conflict.

The specific objectives for Phase II of the Programme were:

1. Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.

Activities included the provision of tailored on-the-job capacity development support to state peacebuilding mechanisms, together with the provision of training for a broader range of peacebuilding actors including regional and local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Line Ministries, Native Administration, local level peace committees and peace ambassadors.

2. Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.

Activities included collaborating with state peacebuilding partners in the hosting of intra and inter-tribal dialogues, as well as the facilitation of peace processes between conflicting groups. Large events such as peace days and peace festivals were also organized to spread the message of peace and to promote the building of greater social cohesion.

3. Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes.

In collaboration with the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum, activities included: the mapping of national peace actors, workshops on peace advocacy and the establishment of a Peace Innovation Hub and Peace Actors Network as well as the conducting of information campaigns to disseminate information about the outcomes of high level peace processes to people in local communities.

4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities.

Based on priorities determined in collaboration with local communities themselves, peace dividends, such as schools or water-yards were provided to help sustain local peace processes.

5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.
Under this component, JCRP supported local civil society organizations to carry out innovative and creative peacebuilding interventions from a broader range of actors that foster stability, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in general, beyond addressing a specific conflict.

The focus of the projects was to build resilience of communities or groups (at risk of violent conflict as per criteria above) to violent conflict, through activities that:

- Build capacities for peace (training, capacity development etc.) in conflict analysis and monitoring, conflict resolution and reconciliation
- Promote diversity and social cohesion
- Enhance employment and livelihood opportunities
- Support improved natural resource management

Specific objectives 1-3 were implemented by UNDP, and specific objectives 4-5 implemented by IOM. Although the programme was administered through two separate funding agreements, the achievement of the overall objective depended upon the inter-relationship between the specific objectives and programmatic coherence. Close collaboration was maintained between IOM and UNDP to ensure the integrity of the programme through steering committees, grants committee and bi-weekly coordination meetings.

1. Introduction

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide stakeholders with an overall independent appraisal of the programme’s performance and impact.

The scope of the evaluation, as per the terms of reference, is to assess, in accordance with the OECD/DAC criteria, the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability of programme activities to date. A list of indicative questions was provided by the terms of reference. In addition, the following tasks were required from the terms of reference:

i) Describe the programme’s key achievements.

ii) Identify and analyze key constraints impacting the achievement of objectives.

iii) Describe the ‘Best Practices’ that can be drawn from the programme.

iv) What have been the key ‘lessons learnt’?

v) What are the over-all conclusions regarding the programme’s performance and impact?

vi) Based on assessment of the above key questions, list the key recommendations regarding the potential continuation/scaling-up/replication of the programme and future programme planning.

Key limitations facing the evaluation
- The evaluation was conducted as the activities were still coming to an end to take advantage of the possibility to visit projects and colleagues in the field. This however makes it difficult to draw conclusions on medium to long-term impact and sustainability;
- Access continued to pose a challenge for the target States, although the national consultant did obtain permits to travel to project sites and visited West Kordofan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States.
- As there is only a small number of organisations active in the area, possibilities for triangulation are limited. Efforts were made to meet external stakeholders during the field visit and at Khartoum level.
- The evaluation took place only a few months after the MTR, conducted in May-June 2015. Although it aims at looking at the overall picture of the entire Phase II, it builds on and complements key conclusions from the MTR.

2. Methodology

The evaluation has been conducted by an international consultant, Isabel Candela, assisted by a Sudanese expert, Abbas Mohammed Alameen, during the months of December 2015 to May 2016 in Khartoum (Sudan), as well as through field visits in West Kordofan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, in accordance with a work plan submitted by the consultant and agreed upon by IOM and UNDP.

The review has been informed by the following:
- A desk review of relevant materials provided by IOM and UNDP and others available to the consultants including documents and reports on JCRP itself as well as reports on other relevant programmes and overall context;
- Field visit by the national consultant of West Kordofan, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The consultant participated in the project consultation in El Obeid in December 2015 and visited projects/sites. The visit included interviews with individuals, as well as focus groups discussions and meetings with local authorities, state level peacebuilding mechanisms, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and peace centres.
- Meetings with IOM and UNDP project teams and management;
- Interviews\(^1\): interviews and focus group discussions were conducted during the field visits with IOM and UNDP staff and project beneficiaries. A total of 138 individuals were interviewed during the field visit;
- Triangulation: triangulation was done as much as possible during the field visits, in interviews with non-direct beneficiaries, authorities etc and in

\(^1\) An exhaustive list of interviewees and discussions during the field visit and in Khartoum is included in Annex 1.
Khartoum through meetings with other international and national organisations working in the same areas (see annex 1 for details).

The consultant followed international standards and recent practice in monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes, looking at both peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity aspects of the programme. More specifically and as requested in the terms of reference, OECD DAC evaluation criteria, in their interpretation for peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity evaluations, were used in the analysis of the different aspects of the programme.

3. Key findings in relation to the DAC Criteria

3.1. Relevance

The OECD DAC defines relevance in peacebuilding programming as the degree to which the objectives and the activities of the intervention address the driving factors of conflict, and helps link the objectives (implicit or explicit) of an intervention with the conflict analysis.

Overall, and despite changes and developments in the context in the past years, the programme has been highly relevant to the Sudanese context, and more specifically the targeted states. According to both direct beneficiaries and others working in the area, the programme has been able to address driving factors of conflict in line with its periodic conflict analyses and has shown its flexibility in adapting to changes in the context.

Its relevance in conflict sensitivity overall is however affected by the fact that it works mainly through and with government counterparts, which are a party to the ongoing conflict in the area. As explained in the lessons learned section, working with and through government institutions was an active choice by the programme to ensure access and feasibility of the activities, while also targeting these for capacity building and awareness development. The choice was also based on the difficulty to work with armed groups on the other side of the conflict spectrum. Emphasis on working directly with communities and their leaders as much as possible was done in an effort to remain as neutral as possible.

IOM’s components (outputs 4 and 5) continued to use a bottom-up approach, with identification of peace dividends projects through community consultation workshops as well as encouraging supported CSOs to work directly with communities (although their work was in some case facilitated by government representatives) and their leaders (rather than directly with Native Administration). While the perfect balance in ensuring access and feasibility through the government

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2 See Annex 2 for a list of relevant resources and sources.
and been able to maintain a perception of neutrality with communities and beneficiaries is extremely difficult to strike in these areas, lessons learned from the JCRP can definitely be useful for other IOM/UNDP programmes in the future.

The programme fits well within the existing overall strategic plans of both agencies. As a programme realignment exercise is currently ongoing within UNDP, it is expected that JCRP will undergo a transformation within that process, building into the next iteration of peacebuilding strategy for the organization. As far as IOM is concerned, the programme falls well within its strategy for Sudan, especially as part of the organisation’s efforts to support social cohesion and stability in areas of high human mobility.

A conflict analysis exercise was conducted in November 2014 by the EU, hosted and co-sponsored by UNDP, involving a wide range of international and Sudanese partners. The workshop aimed at developing a shared understanding within the EU and partners of the underlying causes of conflict, violence and insecurity in Sudan and to identify implications and priorities for international partners.

While the analysis underlined that until governance improves and resources are distributed in a more equitable way, a lasting reduction of violent conflict, poverty and humanitarian disasters is unlikely to be achieved, it also recommended strengthening of engagement at the local level, encouraging state governments to provide services to their people as well as an increased emphasis on conflict prevention. There are discussions ongoing for a new joint assessment of the Southern states, which should be able to provide some more specific information about the context, needs and latest developments.

Although the first phase of JCRP was designed in the framework of a post-conflict situation following the signature of the CPA that sealed the end of the civil war between Sudan and South Sudan, the context very quickly reverted back to armed conflict in the targeted areas. The programme was adapted to reflect the new environment to a certain degree during Phase I implementation and more radically in the design of Phase II.

Some of the partners interviewed highlighted that the work on building sustainable peace architecture/institutions is of particular relevance to the context. From the field interviews, it is worth highlighting the support to the project’s relevance from both beneficiaries and authorities.

The programme has also attempted to incorporate some of the recommendations from its MTR, conducted in June-July 2015 and those from the EU commissioned evaluation of projects supported by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The MTR report is attached as an annex.

3.2. Effectiveness
The OECD DAC uses effectiveness to assess whether an intervention has met its intended objectives, and in peacebuilding, where the stated objectives may not directly be related to peace and conflict, how the immediate and secondary outcomes related to peacebuilding and conflict dynamics. Conflict sensitivity is implicitly part of the DAC’s definition of effectiveness, insofar as it suggests consideration of what the effort did to manage conflict-specific risks.

IOM and UNDP claim to have achieved the programme’s objectives as revised during implementation. Although there are differences between results across the programme’s outputs, the last revision of the work plan provided for a more realistic approach that focused the activities around those which needed to be finalized (peace dividends) to complete the cycle and those more likely to be sustainable in the future, even without the programme’s support.

From the field interviews, the overall perception is that the project has indeed managed to reduce levels of conflict in targeted localities and that the peace dividends have greatly contributed to cultural change through coexistence, awareness raising, etc.

**Interconnection between outputs and contribution to overall objective:** despite efforts during Phase II to link the different outputs, there has been some disconnect between them, particularly when it comes to outputs 3 and 5.

Furthermore, the fact that IOM and UNDP had separate agreements and hence reports to the donor, the EU, it may make it difficult to have a clear overview of activities and their linkages from the reporting formats. During Phase II, IOM and UNDP developed a joint monitoring and evaluation framework, which was very helpful in providing a comprehensive overview in reporting. It is encouraged for this format to be replicated should there be similar situations with two separate agreements for a joint programme.

**Delays and limitations in sequencing:** Implementation started late for different reasons (including late funding decision by the EU, resulting in delays in the signature of the agreement and disbursement of funds due to procedural issues). Delays have however been varied for different outputs, making sequenced implementation and linkages more difficult.

During the last months of the programme, all peace dividends commissioned by the grants committees were delivered in relation to peace processes. However, the time lapse between the conclusion of the peace agreement and the actual implementation of the peace dividend may have had an effect on the community’s understanding of the links between the peace process and the peace dividend. Efforts were put in place by IOM to ensure the link would be made (e.g. school plaque commending peace efforts in Blue Nile, through community meetings etc.) and the field visit confirmed that those directly involved in the programme (through community committees etc.) were aware of the overall logic and linkages.
Activities under output 3 only started late in the process, and actual implementation of grants under output 5 took place during the last months of the project. While grant agreements with CSOs were signed in January 2015, implementation started around April and was finalized in November. IOM prioritized a well-paced and managed process of selection and training of CSOs, leaving limited time for implementation of activities. Although this is commended, it would be important for IOM to factor in potential delays in starting implementation (obtaining permits from HAC in particular) and allow for sufficient time for the entire process. It would also make sense for the actual activities to finish a few months before the overall programme to be able to include some monitoring of the impact within the life of the programme.

In terms of risk analysis and management, learning from Phase I, the programme made efforts to develop a risk analysis and management system and use it to inform decision-making. The risk analysis is linked to conflict analysis and mitigating measures have been put in place when risks are identified, particularly from an operational perspective. Many delays in implementation were due to negotiations with authorities to obtain permits, agreements on locations/activities, etc (see previous paragraph). This risk should be factored into any future planning.

Looking more specifically at effectiveness within each of the outputs, below are some findings and conclusions:

**Output 1: Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.**

Efforts have been made to develop the capacities of the state level peacebuilding mechanisms, the peace ambassadors and peace centres to address local level conflict.

Capacities and ability to operate between the state level peace building mechanisms are very varied: while in West Kordofan the mechanism has continued to produce results such as supporting the inter-tribal dialogue between Misseriya-Reizegat in Babanusa, the newly established mechanism in South Kordofan suffers from very low levels of capacity, very strong ties to the governor (who has changed the structure and posts on political basis) and limited credibility with the communities. The final consultation with stakeholders in El Obeid, conducted in December 2015 saw the state level peace building mechanisms agreeing on establishing a network to facilitate learning, exchange of information and collaborations in the future. This is one of the activities/initiatives that has continued beyond the life of the project with support from AECOM and could become sustainable with the continued technical support from UNDP.

Peace Ambassadors (PA) were selected and trained during the programme and some of them have been supported to undertake proposed activities. While all of the PAs interviewed by the review team were positive about the initial training received, they also agreed on the need to harmonise training, to better select
trainers and curriculum and to provide advanced training for those having completed the first round. The PAs all feel their status in their communities has positively changed as a result of their participation in the programme and feel they can contribute to awareness raising and peace initiatives. There is little expectation for the PAs to continue to carry out initiatives beyond the life of the project, unless additional technical and financial support is provided.

Muna Khalol Armis, a Peace Ambassador in South Kordofan State (SKS), received a grant from JCRP and used it to work with Hakamat. They received handcrafts training and materials as part of the project and through discussions, started to support peace with their songs instead of their traditional conflict hailing.

In August 2015, as new tension arose in SKS between two groups and men were preparing to attack, the women through discussions and songs convinced them not to participate and avoided the confrontation.

Local communities then requested the PA to do the same for the rest of them. Local authorities gave her permission to have a space at the market exempt of taxes, which has allowed for the multiplication of activities.

Peace Centres: there have been some efforts in supporting capacity development of the centres, particularly through a partnership with the Peace Research Institute (PRI) of the University of Khartoum (UoK) under the programme. Success with capacity development for the Centres seems to have been limited during the programme, although in many instances they might be best placed to conduct impartial trainings and support to peace processes.

Civil society and community level capacity: support to capacity development with CSOs was undertaken mainly through activities under output 5, although CSOs are also regularly invited to events organized under the programme’s umbrella hence contributing to their overall capacity development.

Output 2: Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.

According to interviews and observations in the field, JCRP has had a direct impact on the reduction of conflict levels and flashpoints through the sustainability of supported peace processes and three new processes. According to the JCRP final report, 95% of the local peace processes supported are holding at the end of the project, with 6 processes supported in total during Phase II and a total of beneficiaries estimated at 66,500 people. Additionally, the project supported intra and inter-ethnic dialogues and farmers-pastoralists dialogues leading to the reactivation and implementation of local laws and organization of seasonal migration. It would be interesting for UNDP/IOM, perhaps together with other agencies and actors in the area, to (re)establish a monitoring system to follow up on conflict and violent episodes. The conflict analysis planned for later in the year could
be a useful tool to monitor whether levels of violence remain low and analyze the success of the peace processes, in comparison to other areas, in a few months time. The conflict analysis could also explore the possibility of monitoring mechanisms for the future, exploring innovative options compatible with the limited access.

Although JCRP claims to have responded to all major conflict points occurring during the life of the programme, this needs to be strongly substantiated. The map included in the first year report by UNDP to the EU identifies conflict points in areas where there is no JCRP activity, although it is difficult to assess the causes, intensity levels and results of these conflicts/flashpoints.

Additionally, it is difficult to assess whether the supported processes were inclusive, the quality of the mediation and the factors that affect their sustainability (also linked to the peace dividends). UNDP’s assessment is that tribal representation is inclusive while that of women remains a challenge. Overall, literature and field interviews indicate that there seems to be a direct correlation between the peace agreements and the decrease of violent incidents as reported locally. Those are most evident in relation to some of the activities undertaken as peace dividends, and particularly in the case of corridor demarcation.

**Output 3. Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;**

Activities under this output only started late in 2014 and the original design and objectives of the output were somewhat ambitious as they reflected a certain optimism in the time of formulation and assumed the existence of a higher-level dialogue with an opportunity for engagement. This has not been the case during the life of the programme.

UNDP managed however to re-direct activities under this output and organized a well attended and received Peace Symposium in September 2015. Other innovation activities under this output have the potential to be scaled up and produce some important results, particularly with the youth, were they to be supported in the future. Amongst the key results under this output are the Futures thinking for peacebuilding dialogue (under the Peace Symposium), the establishment of a Peace Innovation Hub at UoK and the launch of Raik Shino online gamified dialogue platform.
Output 4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;

There were delays in the commencement of the programme overall, in the conclusion of new peace agreements and then the rainy season (June-September) prevented works to take place during that period. In order to avoid a major delay in the overall project implementation, IOM and UNDP assessed and anticipated that peace processes that were initiated and being implemented during Phase II would take much time before conclusion and, together with EU decided to focus a portion of Output 4 budget on delivery of peace dividends pending from some of the peace agreements reached during Phase I at a time when neither the remaining available time nor funding could support implementation.

Thanks to the cost extension received from the EU, UNDP was able to complete two additional peace processes during Phase II, leading to swift identification of new peace dividend ideas that were then approved by the Grants Committees and delivered by IOM (it is worth noting that despite delays in contract signature and cash flow issues, IOM went ahead with the Grants Committees for the selection of projects, which were then implemented once the funds were received).

According to interviews in the field and Khartoum, activities under this output are of key importance to the success of the project: in many ways, they opened the door for soft interventions and facilitated local authorities’ support. During the field trip, the national consultant established that most communities and beneficiaries understood the link between the two, and requested an increase in support through peace dividend/hardware projects. Discussions at the field level confirmed corridor demarcations to be a particularly successful project in decreasing levels of violence, while schools and water projects are also very well received by the communities. In some instances, there have been reports of nearby communities requesting similar interventions in their areas.

In terms of lessons learned, IOM highlights the need to possibly re-think the selection process used for identifying peace dividends in each community, as the level of understanding and capacity of the state level peacebuilding mechanisms and possibly their own institutional and personal agendas largely influenced this. IOM suggests increasing the relevance of peace dividend projects by enhancing the mechanisms’ conflict analysis capacities and verification by a technical team of the
final lists. Overall, the process is still assessed as satisfactory, but additional efforts could be made in raising awareness and understanding of the purpose of the peace dividends for community representatives and state counterparts.

IOM recognizes that West Kordofan State received more attention than the other states during this phase of the JCRP, reflecting a higher number of concluded processes there. This is possibly due to the fact that the agencies have better presence there and access is somewhat easier. It might also be linked to the increased capacities of the state level peacebuilding mechanism.

It would be important to continue certain monitoring of the impact of these projects in the communities, beyond the life of JCRP and through presence of IOM/UNDP or partners in these areas for other projects. Taking advantage of presence in the area, this could be followed up by UNDP/IOM colleagues incorporating it into other tasks. Additionally, it would be interesting for UNDP/IOM to discuss the possibility of a short review one year after the finalization of the programme, possibly using surveys and technology as much as possible, perhaps working with other organisations in the area which are developing community based monitoring systems (such as Care or Peace Direct). Information could then serve to inform analysis but also further lessons learned for potential future interventions.

IOM built a school in Gesan locality (BNS). The national consultant met with the headmaster and the Director General from Ministry of Education during his field visit.

According to them, drop out levels were very high in the area before the school was built (the nearest school was 10km away). The school is now also open to older students and it is a building the community is proud of. It also has a kindergarden and has attracted students above capacity.

Output 5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict:

The process to identify areas of intervention, select and train CSOs and conclude grant agreements for the activities to be undertaken took longer than anticipated. This is however justified, as it was important to ensure the process also served as a way to support capacity development and the right communities and activities were identified. As a result, 6 CSOs were selected to implement activities in 3 States. This excludes Abyei which was never included in the call for proposals as it was judged potentially conflict insensitive in the absence of a joint administration. This decision was taken in consultation with key stakeholders. All activities have been implemented during the programme’s life, although all CSOs complained that the time was too tight, particularly in cases where negotiations with authorities were required and resulted in delays. The cost extension granted by the EU was based, partly, on the need to provide CSOs with additional time for implementation. CSOs
which required additional time were given the opportunity to continue within the overall extension. There are still some challenges worth mentioning with the CSOs, particularly in aggregating results and reporting at the outcome level.

The actual impact of the capacity development intervention is difficult to assess as there was no baseline study at the beginning of the project and opinions by the evaluation are based on observations by IOM, beneficiaries and meetings with the CSOs themselves.

Interviews with IOM and CSOs indicate that all projects were implemented although the time frames were very tight. Some of the CSOs experienced challenges in implementation, particularly due to lengthy negotiations with the authorities in terms of access and signature of technical agreements, which translated into a very tight time frame for the actual activities. While it is unclear whether the communities are able to link these activities to the broader JCRP programme, all CSOs reported an increased awareness of and capacity in conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and peace building in general. Some of them also presented examples of how they have put these new skills to use in other projects. A longer and more sustained effort to support CSOs capacities in this area is definitely worth looking into for any future interventions.

Informal interviews with the supported CSOs, both in the field and Khartoum, indicate that the capacity building component was quite successful despite the short duration and scope. It would be important for IOM/UNDP to make efforts to continue working with these CSOs where relevant/appropriate to sustain capacity development efforts, and to encourage others to also work with/through them. Although some networking between the CSOs exists, IOM/UNDP could also encourage a stronger/more systematic networking effort between the CSOs beyond the life of the JCRP.

Income generating activities provided by Muzan Organization for Peace & Development (Muzan) (under output 5) in Messiriya area in West Kordofan State targeted groups of youth previously involved in violence. Muzan gave them agricultural tools and local authorities provided land and farming training. The youths spent the rainy season in their farms in the area and after the harvest, income was generated, encouraging other youths in the area to start alternative livelihoods.

Muzan supported the youths to have a stall at the market and also trained them on peacebuilding. They have now become peacebuilders in their area and are included in the peace committees.

The evaluation national consultant met 3 of the youths in El Fula, where they are now doing mobile markets, becoming more active and self-reliant. Local authorities have now given them title deeds to their farming lands.
As per overall comments on effectiveness, activities under this output remain somehow isolated from the others. They do however directly contribute to JCRP’s overall objective through increased capacities on peacebuilding and conflict mediation and providing support to livelihoods and income generating activities to youth at risk of being drawn into the conflict. They also allow to balance support, albeit shyly, to government structures by working directly with civil society.

The lack of direct link of output 5 with outputs 1 and 2 was implicit in the programme design, with a view to reach other areas not covered by the peace processes. The scale of this output is relatively small compared to the overall size of the programme and can therefore only have a limited contribution to the achievement of the overall objective. It can however offer important entry points and lessons learned for an increase in activities in support to civil society.

3.3. Efficiency:

The consultant only had access to general information on the budgets and overall expenditures under the programme.

It is understood that the cost of doing work in the targeted areas is high because of their remoteness, access limitations, costs related to security, very limited number of implementing partners in the field etc. This is reflected in the overall budget and expenditure.

In terms of activities under output 4, which take the highest proportion of the budget to support infrastructure projects, unit costs correspond to market values and are comparable to other contexts in Sudan. All contracts (with the exception of WES, as governmental partner) were awarded following public tenders in accordance to Standard Operating Procedures and validated by the EU.

Delays in finalizing agreement and disbursement of funds, as well as those caused by the rainy season, have translated into implementation difficulties, disconnect between the phases and to some extent the outputs within the programme. In terms of implementation modality, the partnership between UNDP and IOM seems to have brought efficiency and added value to the programme overall, allowing for different procedures and approaches for increasing efficiency.

Sequencing and timing have been key factors in this programme, as there needs to be a flow and link between the peace processes and the peace dividends. In some occasions schedules have resulted in some sequencing problems and delays, which might have affected the overall impact of the project. The most important gap occurred between Phase I and II, as some of the peace dividends were identified at the end of the first phase and implemented during the second one.
3.4. Impact:

The overall objective of JCRP’s Phase II was to strengthen government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur and the outputs are designed to all contribute to this objective.

There are important limitations in measuring the overall impact of the programme as it has just come to an end and activities have been discontinued. It would be important to plan for a further evaluation, possibly in at least one year’s time, to be able to assess the sustainability and impact of the activities.

A few conclusions can be derived at this point in time, taking into consideration interviews in the field and Khartoum and review of materials:

The mere presence of UNDP and IOM in these areas has had an impact in building trust and hope in the communities. As there is very limited international/national interventions in these States, the presence of offices, staff members and activities have certainly contributed to making communities not feel “forgotten”. It is however worth noting that there has been overall disappointment in the field because of the closure of the project. All interviewees during the field visit and Khartoum highlighted the need to continue and expand the programme activities, making reference to the existing needs but also to the importance of having international presence and programmes in the area. It should be considered that any new initiatives may need to build relationships, presence and trust almost from scratch. There has been a missed opportunity by the agencies to secure funding for the continuation of the activities, whether under the JCRP umbrella or a different one.

In terms of capacities, the project has definitely contributed to capacity development of its key target beneficiaries, including the state level peacebuilding mechanisms, peace ambassadors, CSOs, etc. There are however still pressing needs with all of these. In this sense, the decision in El Obeid by programme partners to establish a network to continue working together is very welcome. There are however limitations to how much the network will be able to accomplish and for how long without any further support.

The programme reports an important direct impact in terms of reduction of levels of conflict, through the mediation and facilitation of peace agreements and the delivery of peace dividends.

Results vary across states, depending on the existing capacities and entry points, issues related to access and security and overall opportunities. Abyei has received limited implementation of activities as it constitutes a particularly challenging context and in the absence of a government counterpart.
3.5. Sustainability

Some references to sustainability have already been made above under each output. There are some question marks overall around sustainability, intrinsic to the general context and situation. As conflict between the government and the armed opposition continues and there are no immediate plans for the resurrection of the peace process, it is expected that the situation remains fragile and volatile in the target areas. In other words, there is no clear indication that an end to the conflict is near. This said, the programme has focused on reducing conflict and its impact at the community level, between pastoralists and farmers, different tribes and groups, etc. It would be important to ascertain whether the gains attained through the programme are sustained in this context.

It is worth noting in terms of sustainability, that IOM has incorporated the “JCRP approach” to other projects in the Darfur region, including the Cross Border Peace and Cooperation Project, also funded by the EU. While in this case the peace dividends are not formally linked to peace processes, IOM brings together conflicting tribes to consultative processes to engage in community stabilization and identification of peace dividends and there is recognition of the importance to sustain peace in the areas where activities are implemented. IOM plans to continue applying lessons learned from the JCRP model to its social cohesion and community stabilization programming.

Sustainability of the state level peacebuilding mechanisms needs to be further considered and strengthened, both in terms of increasing their capacity to mobilise resources and decreasing their dependency on the local administrations. The network recently established between the mechanisms offers an entry point to continue work in the future with the mechanisms as an organized network, for any reincarnation of JCRP or other programmes working in the area. UNDP has succeeded in identifying support for the network for a limited period of time and should encourage others to partner with these structures and other partners, to contribute to their sustainability as well as to continue with capacity development.

An important investment has been made in the selection and training of PAs, which could be an incredible asset in the continuation of the programme as well as for others. The end of the programme means that most of them will not be able to continue their activities. Once again, UNDP should encourage others, be it programmes or partners, to use this asset when working in the southern States.

Investment in CSOs has an important sustainability aspect, depending on their capacity to fundraise in the future. All CSOs meeting the minimum criteria (around 25) were supported with training on conflict sensitivity and do no harm, an important step in supporting peace building capacity in the area. Support to the CSOs in resource mobilization could help in providing them with other sources of income, as this is unlikely to come from the communities themselves or the
government. Sustainability of the impact of their activities, and their actual contribution to stability and resilience needs to be measured in a longer time frame.

The sustainability of some of the activities undertaken under output 3 can be questioned, as some would require sustained assistance to continue. Networking between actors and low cost innovative tools can be explored in the future through other programmes as they can offer a platform for different purposes, particularly working with youth. UNDP has succeeded in securing some funding for some of the innovation activities, through the British Council, UNICEF and UNDP (global). UNDP should continue its efforts to maintain the sustainability of these activities.

During the last months of the project, UNDP has supported the development of harmonized training manuals specifically for Sudan. These could be very useful to other activities undertaken by UNDP and other agencies in providing a harmonised approach to training on peacebuilding across the board. It is encouraged that UNDP, perhaps also through the new Peace & Development Adviser (PDA), promote the use of these manuals in the future.

Outside of the project implementation, UNDP has been commended by partners in Khartoum for increasing coordination efforts, both bilaterally and in groups, of partners working in the southern States. This in an activity that the PDA might carry over as part of its tasks, capitalizing on the existing partnerships. UNDP should however continue to play a role in coordination. It would be important, according to partners, to maintain this coordination informal and practical, as well as results oriented. Two potential areas for coordination could include the conflict analysis and discussions around monitoring and evaluation with limited access, where there seems to be an appetite (and need) for joining efforts.

4. Lessons learned/promising practices

Key lessons learned during the programme are listed below:

1. **Presence in the area**: All of the respondents agreed that the mere presence of a programme in support of social cohesion and peace building in the bordering States was per se an important asset. The fact that there is a very limited number of interventions in the area and that challenges of access and security make it very difficult to operationalize activities, makes it important to maintain a presence and activities supporting local actors. Interviews confirmed that the presence of international organizations give a sense of stability and support to communities.

2. **Hardware versus software**: The peace dividend activities and support to CSOs outputs provide the project with an important entry point to both government officials and communities. It allows for the software parts of the programme to take place, although with some difficulties, in a context
where it would be very challenging to intervene otherwise. It is important to find the right balance between the two types of activities and ensure their linkages.

3. **Double edged sword?** Working with and through government entities has both advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand it facilitates access and support to the activities by the government while on the other it taints the programme with a certain bias. This issue is addressed in other parts of the report more in detail but it is important to emphasise the need to collaborate with government partners to be able to implement activities. Building awareness of government actors (including HAC and security services) about the importance of the programme’s objectives has been key in creating the necessary environment for the activities to take place.

4. On a smaller scale, field interviews concluded that any intervention supporting peacebuilding and reconciliation in the area would need to partner more strongly with community leaders, as they are perceived as more neutral than the native administration and are closer to communities. Activities should also target women more specifically, particularly for income generating activities.

5. **Recommendations for the future**

    JCRP is now officially closed. As efforts to develop a third phase, whether jointly or separately, did not bear fruit, the agencies have taken a different approach to incorporating lessons learned and/or elements from JCRP in their operations. IOM has now incorporated a conflict sensitive approach to its programmes in the southern States and Darfur, including a conflict analysis to inform the design. UNDP has been able to secure funding to maintain a series of small activities but it is still determining the way forward for its peacebuilding activities.

    Recommendations for IOM are to reinforce the direction the agency has taken, in terms of incorporating lessons learned and approaches to its projects in the country. It would be useful for this to be done in a systematic way and be documented as much as possible, so that it can also be useful globally. Capacity development for staff members and partners on conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding could perhaps be undertaken in a more systematic way.

    As far as UNDP is concerned, and taking into account the ongoing programme realignment exercise, it is recommend for lessons learned, components and relationships to inform an overall strategy for peacebuilding for the country, with context specific considerations for each region/State.

    1. All those interviewed highlighted the importance of presence in the area, not only as a sign of stability and hope, but also to maintain the links and relationships with organisations, institutions and communities. It would be important for UNDP and
IOM to consider how this presence will continue and how to capitalize on it for potential future interventions.

2. A joint conflict analysis of the conflict affected areas, particularly the Southern States, would be fundamental to inform a strategy going forward. It is important for the analysis to be carried out jointly with other partners working in the area (or interested to do so) both from the implementation as well as the donor sides. The analysis could be complemented with a detailed mapping of activities, peace stakeholders (local peace committees etc.) lessons learned, opportunities for synergies and/or scaling up etc.

3. Explore the incorporation of the peace dividend/hardware approach into other ongoing or planned programmes in other sectors, particularly in relation to stabilization and livelihoods, Demobilization Disarmament Reintegration (DDR), governance and rule of law, but also in relation to climate change and natural resource management. JCRP has shown that support to the software components of peace and reconciliation can have a bigger acceptance, success and sustainability if accompanied by clear and tangible "peace dividends". Other programmes could be used as entry point to promote social cohesion using this approach.

Depending on the results of the conflict analysis, UNDP could explore with other agencies the possibility of incorporating this approach using complementary expertise (as it was done with IOM). As the Resident Coordinator’s Office in Sudan will now have the capacities of a PDA, he/she could coordinate the analysis, mapping and ensuing strategy.

4. Continue to explore all possible options to increase neutrality and conflict sensitivity and balance off the focus on support to the government and government linked bodies and individuals for peacebuilding programmes and others in conflict affected areas.

More specific recommendations linked to the outputs are offered in the findings section for each output.

6. Conclusions

Working in a highly complex and volatile environment, facing important challenges in access, security, limited capacity etc., the JCRP has managed to learn and adapt since its inception and to deliver tangible results in the targeted areas. Reduction of the conflict levels at the community level, particularly between farmers and pastoralist and tribal/ethnic groups, has been one of the main achievements of the programme. Additionally, increased awareness around peaceful coexistence and capacity development of key actors have contributed to the development of an environment more conducive to reconciliation and social cohesion. Needs are however still very present in these area and JCRP will leave a difficult space to fill.
As there is no clarity yet on the potential of a new phase or programme, agencies are encouraged to review lessons learned for their application in other interventions while exploring the possibility of continuing support in the southern States. A planned conflict analysis will be very useful in informing any future planning processes.
## ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

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<td>Aiysha Ali</td>
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<td>Salwa Abdellkareem</td>
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<td>138</td>
<td>Hager Musa</td>
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<td>BN Focus g.d.</td>
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Additionally, the field visit consisted of:
08 focus group discussion (direct beneficiary, community)
04 focus group discussion (community leaders, RPCM members)
05 interviews with IPs NGOs (Mozan, FPDO, SUDIA, GAH, Asahab, IPDO)
03 Interviews with 3 Peace Studies Centers of the 3 States’ universities

**Khartoum meetings**
IOM
UNDP
Care
AECOM
World Bank
CSOs supported under output 5:
SUDIA Abdelrahman El Mahdi
FPDO Talat Abbas
IPDO Asmahan Yassir
GAH Mohamed Adam

Skype/email
Peace Direct
Annex 2- Bibliography, resources and documents reviewed


EU- Conflict Analysis report- Workshop November 2014

EU- Evaluation of IFS programmes in Sudan September 2013

JCRP Phase I Mid-term evaluation, March 2013

IOM and UNDP programme documents and reports to the EU, monitoring reports (UNDP and PRI)
Annex 3- Terms of reference

Terms of Reference (TOR)
For the final programme evaluation of JCRP Phase II
Type of consultancy: International Individual Contractor (Intellectual Service)

A. Project Title: Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP)

B. Project Description:

The Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) works to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the former Protocol Areas of South Kordofan State, West Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei in Sudan.

The JCRP has been implemented in two phases: Phase I of the Programme was implemented over the period January 2012 – Feb 2014. Phase II of the JCRP is now being implemented, with the generous support of the European Union for 24 months over the period March, 2014 – February 2016.

Phase II of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) builds on the work of the Conflict Reduction Programme (CRP), implemented in 2009 as a pilot programme aimed at prevention and resolution of local conflicts in South Kordofan and Phase I of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme, which expanded the work of the CRP into Blue Nile state and the Abyei Area. The JCRP was initially conceived in a post-conflict setting, in the context of the CPA. Since 2011 however, there has been a re-emergence of larger-scale conflicts, with the Abyei Area, Blue Nile and Kordofan states becoming critical, not only for the security of Sudan, but also for South Sudan, owing to the inter-dependent livelihoods of communities across borders. Furthermore, local resource-based conflicts are increasingly becoming entangled with larger political and economic disputes, significantly impacting the security and development of affected communities. Building on the successes, lessons learned and ongoing analysis of the changing conflict dynamics, the overall objective of the current phase of JCRP is to strengthen Government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism (CPAP Outcome 7) in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur. The theory of change guiding the work of the programme is as follows;
• IF we build the capacity of state-level Government peace building institutions and of community-level peace builders THEN they will be better able to manage the peace processes they are strategically best placed to deliver

• IF we provide financial and technical support to local peace processes THEN we will have a direct impact on social cohesion at the community level

• IF we provide financial and technical support to actors communicating local voices to negotiators of a peace agreement THEN we will have a direct impact on plural voices being reflected in the negotiation of a peace agreement

• IF we deliver peace dividends focusing on services identified by communities after a peace agreement THEN we will help sustain local peace processes

• IF we support civil society organizations to deliver peace dividends focusing on developing capacities of local peace actors, fostering diversity and improving livelihoods to target communities or groups.

The specific objectives for Phase II of the Programme are;

1. Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.

Activities include the provision of tailored on-the-job capacity development support to state peacebuilding mechanisms, together with the provision of trainings to a broader range of peacebuilding actors including regional and local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Line Ministries, Native Administration, local level peace committees and peace ambassadors.

2. Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.

Activities include collaborating with state peacebuilding partners in the hosting of intra and inter-tribal dialogues, as well as the facilitation of peace processes between conflicting groups. Large events such as peace days and peace festivals are also organized to spread the message of peace and to promote the building of greater social cohesion.

3. Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;

In collaboration with the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum, activities include; the mapping of national peace actors, workshops on peace advocacy and the establishment of a Peace Innovation Hub and Peace Actors Network as well as the conducting of information campaigns to disseminate information about the outcomes of high level peace processes to people in local communities.
4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;

Based on priorities determined in collaboration with local communities themselves, peace dividends, such as schools or water-yards are provided to help sustain local peace processes.

5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.

Under this component, JCRP will support local civil society organizations to carry out innovative and creative peacebuilding interventions from a broader range of actors that foster stability, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in general, beyond addressing a specific conflict.

The focus of the projects will be to build resilience of communities or groups (at risk of violent conflict as per criteria above) to violent conflict, through activities that;

- Build capacities for peace (training, capacity development etc.) in conflict analysis and monitoring, conflict resolution and reconciliation
- Promote diversity and social cohesion
- Enhance employment and livelihood opportunities
- Support improved natural resource management

Specific objectives 1-3 are being implemented by UNDP, with specific objectives 4-5 implemented by IOM. Though the programme is administered through two separate funding agreements, the achievement of the overall objective depends upon the inter-relationship between the specific objectives and programmatic coherence. Close collaboration has been maintained between IOM and UNDP to ensure the integrity of the programme through steering committee, grants committee and bi-weekly coordination meetings.

**Final Programme Evaluation Stakeholders:**

Key stakeholders of the final evaluation will include: programme beneficiaries, the management and staff of IOM and UNDP, EU Delegation, Peace-building Mechanisms in the respective target states, and CSO partners. Additional relevant bodies, such as other Implementing Partners under EU’s IcSP and Sudan’s federal-level governmental counterparts, can be considered.

**C. Scope of work:**

The purpose of this Final Programme Evaluation is to provide stakeholders with an overall independent appraisal of JCRP programme performance and impact.

The Final External Evaluation will cover the entire implementation period of JCRP II.

The Final External Evaluation consultant/s will be required to draft and provide deliverables outlined in Section E below. The international consultation will provide
overall guidance to the development of the final external evaluation. A national consultant has been recruited to undertake field mission and interview key stakeholders.

D. Final External Evaluation Scope and Key Evaluation Questions:

The Final External Evaluation international consultant will be required to;

vii) Assess, in accordance with the OECD/DAC criteria, the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability of programme activities to date. Below is a list of related questions, to be fine-tuned following the desk review.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Given the changing context in Sudan, to what extent were the programme objectives valid, with reference to the Country Programme Document, the Country Programme Action Plan and the UNDP Strategic Plan? Based on current conflict analysis, are we doing the right things? How relevant is the intervention in light of local and national policies and priorities? Are the activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and intended impact?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>To what extent are the programme objectives being achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the programme objectives? Are programme risks being appropriately managed or contingency plans implemented where necessary?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Are the objectives being economically achieved by the programme? What is the utilization ratio of the resources used to date? Are activities cost-efficient? Are objectives being achieved on time? Is the programme being implemented in the most efficient way compared to the alternatives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Is the development intervention contributing to the higher level development objectives? What is the impact of the programme in proportion to the overall situation of the target group? What real difference is the programme making to beneficiaries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>To what extent are positive effects of the programme being sustained or are likely to be sustained? What steps could be taken to increase the likelihood of project benefits being sustained beyond the life of the project?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

viii) Describe the programme's key achievements.
ix) Identify and analyze key constraints impacting the achievement of objectives.
x) Describe the ‘Best Practices’ that can be drawn from the programme.
xii) What have been the key ‘lessons learnt’?
xii) What are the over-all conclusions regarding the programme's performance and impact?
xiii) Based on assessment of the above key questions, list the key recommendations regarding the potential continuation/scaling-up/replication of the programme and future programme planning.

E. Final Programme Evaluation Report Approach and Methodology
It is expected that the Evaluation team would undertake a desk review of relevant project documents including the Programme Document, Logframe, M&E Framework, Reports, Reviews and ongoing monitoring data. JCRP aims to have their own final report draft ready by end of January 2015. The evaluation team will prepare a brief Inception Report summarizing the preliminary findings of the desk review, confirm the evaluation questions, the evaluation methodology, any limitations to the evaluation and the time-table for completion of tasks. On completion of the review activities, the consultant will provide a Draft Final External Evaluation Report, which will be reviewed by IOM and UNDP JCRP focal persons, who will provide initial feedback and request any outstanding issues to be addressed, upon which the consultants will then submit the final version of Final External Evaluation Report.

**F. Expected Deliverables and Schedule of Payments:**

**Expected deliverables are the following:**
- i) Inception report
- ii) Draft external evaluation report
- iii) Final evaluation report

The consultant will be recruited for 7 days over a two month period with the following tentative schedule of work:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Estimate Duration to Complete</th>
<th>Due Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Submission Requirements</th>
<th>% of Payment</th>
<th>Review and Approvals Required</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Desk Review of key project documents</td>
<td>1 days</td>
<td>Dec 1 – Jan 10</td>
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<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>JCRP/IO M focal points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inception Report</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Jan 10</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Inception Report</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>JCRP/IO M focal points</td>
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<td>3. Draft Final Programme Evaluation Report</td>
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<td>Nil</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Final Programme Evaluation Report</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>March 1</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Final draft</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>JCRP/IO M focal points</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Tentative meetings / interviews:
- Government partners: RPCM, SPPCC and the Peace Council
- Native Administration leaders
- Federal-level Government counterparts: Ministry of Finance and National Economy
- UNDP teams: CPRU and Governance projects in South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei
- NGO small grant recipients
- Programme Beneficiaries
- Other international organizations working on peacebuilding: AECOM, UNICEF, UNHCR

J. Institutional Arrangements:

Under the overall direction and supervision of both the Programme Manager, UNDP and Programme Coordinator IOM, the consultant is expected to liaise with the JCRP team, both within IOM as well as UNDP, as well as other colleagues if and when necessary.

Duty Station:

Home based & Khartoum

K. Qualifications of the Successful Final Programme Evaluation Consultant/s:
- A master’s degree in conflict management, international development, programme evaluation or a related field;
- At least seven years of experience in programme evaluation, including three years in an international development setting and in post-conflict contexts;
- Skilled in designing and implementing programme reviews and evaluations using a broad range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies and in accordance with DAC evaluation principles and standards;
- Solid understanding of the conflict dynamics and socio-economic development trends in Sudan;
- Skilled in facilitating key informant interviews, focus groups, workshops, and grassroots community consultations in a participatory and inclusive manner;
- Experienced in conducting and applying political and conflict analysis in post-conflict environments and;
- Highly developed communication and report writing skills

L. Scope of Price Proposal and Schedule of Payments
The consultancy will be remunerated through a Lump Sum amount which is “all-inclusive”. The Lump Sum is payable upon delivery and acceptable of all three products indicated in Section E above. The clearance of final products must be obtained by the persons identified in Section F above. This contract price is fixed regardless of changes in the cost components.
### Annex 4- List of Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>County Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CRP</td>
<td>Conflict Reduction Programme</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization Disarmament Reintegration</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Commission</td>
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<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>JCRP</td>
<td>Joint Conflict Reduction Programme</td>
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<td>MTR</td>
<td>Mid Term Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD/DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>PA</td>
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<td>PDA</td>
<td>Peace &amp; Development Adviser</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UoK</td>
<td>University of Khartoum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WES</td>
<td>Water, Environment and Sanitation</td>
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Executive Summary
Background

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8. Methodology
9. Key findings in relation to DAC criteria
   9.1. Relevance
   9.2. Effectiveness
   9.3. Efficiency
   9.4. Impact
   9.5. Sustainability
10. Lessons learned and best practices
11. Recommendations
   11.1. For the remaining of the programme
   11.2. Considerations for next phase/iteration
12. Conclusions

Annex 1: List of interviewees
Annex 2: Bibliography and resources
Annex 3: Terms of reference
Annex 4: List of Abbreviations
Executive Summary

This report presents key findings and conclusions of a mid-term evaluation of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme phase II, jointly implemented by UNDP and IOM in West and South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei states of Sudan. The report also offers some recommendations for the remaining of the programme as well as for the design process for its potential next iteration.

The international consultant, working with a Sudanese consultant carried out a desk review, meetings with key stakeholders in Khartoum and conducted telephone interviews with those in the states. The review team could not travel to the field due to problems in obtaining travel permits and triangulation was in general limited as there are few other organisations working in these areas. The review took place in parallel to an evaluation by the European Union of programmes supported by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), under which JCRP is supported.

JCRP works to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the targeted areas through five different outputs, UNDP being responsible for the implementation of three and IOM for the remaining two. Although two separate agreements are in place with the EU for each organisation, the overall philosophy and approach are one of partnership and the outputs are designed to contribute to the overall objective in a coordinated manner. There is some merit in this partnership, which capitalises on each of the organisation’s added value and promotes coordination in approaching a sensitive area in a highly volatile environment.

Overall, the programme is highly relevant and well perceived across the states, with some differences amongst them mainly due to context specificities and partners’ diverse capacities. While the overall approach remains valid in pursuing the objectives, the programme’s conflict sensitivity suffers from the fact that it works mainly with and through government counterparts. This is necessary to guarantee access and support to the activities, but it also creates some concerns around neutrality. Efforts have been made to increase this neutrality in different ways, but these can be enhanced.

Lessons learned during the programme implementation should inform a prioritization of activities during the remaining months as well as the design of the next phase/iteration, for which a participatory process, under the umbrella of UNDP’s ongoing programme re-alignment process, is proposed. The consultant proposes that geographic and thematic extensions are considered, with suggestions around scaling up the peace dividend/hardware approach, a swift from conflict reduction to conflict transformation and prevention and exploring potential cross border cooperation.
Background Information on the project

The Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) works to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the former Protocol Areas of South Kordofan State, West Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei in Sudan.

The JCRP has been implemented in two phases: Phase I of the Programme was implemented over the period January 2012 – Feb 2014. Phase II of the JCRP is now being implemented, with the generous support of the European Union for 18 months over the period March, 2014 – August 2015. The programme is scheduled to come to an end in August 2015. However, UNDP is planning to submit a no-cost extension request to the EU until December 2015 and IOM has requested a cost-extension most likely to February 2016.

Phase II of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) builds on the work of the Conflict Reduction Programme (CRP), implemented in 2009 as a pilot programme aimed at prevention and resolution of local conflicts in South Kordofan and Phase I of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme, which expanded the work of the CRP into Blue Nile state and the Abyei Area. The JCRP was initially conceived in a post-conflict setting, in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Since 2011 however, there has been a re-emergence of larger-scale conflicts, with the Abyei Area, Blue Nile and Kordofan states becoming critical, not only for the security of Sudan, but also for South Sudan, owing to the inter-dependent livelihoods of communities across borders. Furthermore, local resource-based conflicts are increasingly becoming entangled with larger political and economic disputes, significantly impacting the security and development of affected communities. Building on the successes, lessons learned and ongoing analysis of the changing conflict dynamics, the overall objective of the current phase of JCRP is to strengthen Government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism (CPAP Outcome 7) in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur. The theory of change guiding the work of the programme is as follows;

- IF we build the capacity of state-level Government peace building institutions and of community-level peace builders THEN they will be better able to manage the peace processes they are strategically best placed to deliver

- IF we provide financial and technical support to local peace processes THEN we will have a direct impact on social cohesion at the community level

- IF we provide financial and technical support to actors communicating local voices to negotiators of a peace agreement THEN we will have a direct impact on plural voices being reflected in the negotiation of a peace agreement
• IF we deliver peace dividends focusing on services identified by communities after a peace agreement THEN we will help sustain local peace processes

• IF we support civil society organizations to deliver peace dividends focusing on developing capacities of local peace actors, fostering diversity and improving livelihoods to target communities or groups.

The specific objectives for Phase II of the Programme are:

1. **Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.**

   Activities include the provision of tailored on-the-job capacity development support to state peacebuilding mechanisms, together with the provision of trainings to a broader range of peacebuilding actors including regional and local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Line Ministries, Native Administration, local level peace committees and peace ambassadors.

2. **Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.**

   Activities include collaborating with state peacebuilding partners in the hosting of intra and inter-tribal dialogues, as well as the facilitation of peace processes between conflicting groups. Large events such as peace days and peace festivals are also organized to spread the message of peace and to promote the building of greater social cohesion.

3. **Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;**

   In collaboration with the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum, activities include; the mapping of national peace actors, workshops on peace advocacy and the establishment of a Peace Innovation Hub and Peace Actors Network as well as the conducting of information campaigns to disseminate information about the outcomes of high level peace processes to people in local communities.

4. **Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;**

   Based on priorities determined in collaboration with local communities themselves, peace dividends, such as schools or water-yards are provided to help sustain local peace processes.

5. **Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.**
Under this component, JCRP will support local civil society organizations to carry out innovative and creative peacebuilding interventions from a broader range of actors that foster stability, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in general, beyond addressing a specific conflict.

The focus of the projects will be to build resilience of communities or groups (at risk of violent conflict as per criteria above) to violent conflict, through activities that:

- Build capacities for peace (training, capacity development etc.) in conflict analysis and monitoring, conflict resolution and reconciliation
- Promote diversity and social cohesion
- Enhance employment and livelihood opportunities
- Support improved natural resource management

Specific objectives 1-3 are being implemented by UNDP, with specific objectives 4-5 implemented by IOM. Though the programme is administered through two separate funding agreements, the achievement of the overall objective depends upon the inter-relationship between the specific objectives and programmatic coherence. Close collaboration is maintained between IOM and UNDP to ensure the integrity of the programme through steering committee, grants committee and bi-weekly coordination meetings.

2. Introduction

The purpose of the mid-term review is to provide stakeholders with an overall independent appraisal of JCRP programme performance and impact, and propose recommendations to inform programme adjustments in the current programme phase and how to strategically build on current efforts to strengthen programming on conflict management and peacebuilding given the political and security environment of Sudan.

The objectives of the Mid-Term Review are to evaluate programme relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, including from a conflict-sensitivity perspective how the programme is addressing peacebuilding at the local, State and national levels. Furthermore, it will also assess the programme’s key achievements, constraints, best practices and lessons learnt to date along with key recommendations for future programming. Lastly, considering that the Review is taking place at the later stage of the programme cycle, it will also look into the fundraising aspects in terms of needs and opportunities, and financing among different programme components.

The scope of the Mid-Term review, as per the terms of reference, is to assess, in accordance with the OECD/DAC criteria, the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability of programme activities to date. A list of indicative questions was provided by the terms of reference. In addition, the following tasks were required from the terms of reference:

- Describe the programme’s key achievements.
• Identify and analyze key constraints impacting the achievement of objectives.
• Describe the ‘Best Practices’ that can be drawn from the programme.
• What have been the key ‘lessons learnt’?
• What are the over-all conclusions regarding the programme’s performance?
• Based on assessment of the above key questions, list the key recommendations regarding the potential continuation/scaling-up/replication of the programme and future programme planning.

Key limitations facing the Mid-Term Review include lack of access to the field and therefore reliance on interviews in Khartoum and on the phone and a tight timeframe and limited number of days for the exercise. Following an initial discussion with IOM and UNDP at the beginning of the assignment and considering the limitations above, it was agreed to focus the review on 1. General review of progress so far with recommendations for possible adaptations before the end of the programme and 2. Recommendations for the possible continuation of the programme.

Additionally, as the programme is in its final stretch (until the end of 2015 should both extensions be approved by the EU), recommendations for actions/adaptations within the life spam of the programme had to be realistic and actionable within the limited time left.

2. Methodology

The Mid-Term Review has been conducted by an international consultant, Isabel Candela, assisted by a Sudanese expert, Elsadeg Kara, during the months of May and June in Khartoum (Sudan), in accordance with a work plan submitted by the consultant and agreed upon by IOM and UNDP.

The review has been informed by the following:
• A desk review of relevant materials provided by IOM and UNDP and others available to the consultants including documents and reports on JCRP itself as well as reports on other relevant programmes and overall context;
• Meetings with IOM and UNDP project teams and management;
• Interviews\(^3\): face-to-face interviews and three focus group discussions with relevant stakeholders in Khartoum (taking advantage of different events taking place in the capital during the time frame of the review) and phone interviews with stakeholders in the field. Interviews were semi-structured around six general questions and allowed for open discussions with the informants. Phone interviews followed the same structure, although

\(^3\) An exhaustive list of interviewees is included in Annex 1
conversations over the phone were more challenging and gave less opportunity for an open conversation;

- **Observation** of meetings of the JCRP in Khartoum during the period, including a meeting organized by the EU of partners funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP);
- Meetings with past/potential donors and experts\(^4\) and other international actors working in the area.

The review took place in parallel to an evaluation commissioned by the EU, only donor to the JCRP Phase II, on projects funded under the IcSP. As the EU evaluation assessed the JCRP within that framework, coordination with the evaluation team was sought through several meetings and exchange of information, joint interviews etc. to ensure complementarity and alignment as much as possible.

A planned visit to Blue Nile State for one day, in coordination with the EU IcSP evaluation team, did not take place as no permits were obtained for all mission members and flights were not available on that day due to a last minute declaration of national holiday\(^5\).

Triangulation in general was a key challenge facing the review, as there are very few actors active in the area and triangulation in the field was not possible. As much as possible, triangulation was carried out through the interviews, as well as in conversations with other organisations working in the area and through phone interviews with residents in the area. There was also an effort to discuss with authorities, both at local and national level to gather their views on the programme.

These challenges had been anticipated by the IOM and UNDP teams and were discussed at the beginning of the assignment. They need to be taken into account in the design of the impact evaluation planned at the end of the programme.

The consultant followed international standards and recent practice in monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes\(^6\), looking at both peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity aspects of the programme. More specifically and as requested by the terms of reference, OECD DAC evaluation criteria, in their interpretation for peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity evaluations, were used in the analysis of the different aspects of the programme.

### 3. Key findings in relation to the DAC Criteria

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\(^4\) Although a meeting with the EU Delegation was not possible during the time frame of the review, the consultant met with the Evaluation team as well as the EU Peacebuilding consultant in Khartoum.

\(^5\) President Bashir had declared a national holiday for the day his investment as President following the April elections. The national holiday was subsequently cancelled but flights could not be organized at such short-notice.

\(^6\) See Annex 2 for a list of relevant resources and sources.
The mid-term review terms of references required the consultant to assess the programme in relation to identified DAC criteria and guiding questions. The results of this assessment, overall for the programme and in relation to specific outputs when appropriate are summarized below:

3.1. Relevance

**Guiding questions:** Given the changing context in Sudan, to what extent are the programme objectives still valid, with reference to the Country Programme Document, the Country Programme Action Plan and the UNDP Strategic Plan? Based on current conflict analysis, are we doing the right things? How relevant is the intervention in light of local and national policies and priorities? Are the activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and intended impact?

The OECD DAC defines relevance in peacebuilding programming as the degree to which the objectives and the activities of the intervention address the driving factors of conflict, and helps link the objectives (implicit or explicit) of an intervention with the conflict analysis.

Overall, and despite changes and developments in the context in the past years, the programme continues to be highly relevant to the Sudanese context, and more specifically the targeted states. While the programme continues to address driving factors of conflict in line with its periodic conflict analyses and has shown its flexibility in adapting to changes in the context, its relevance in conflict sensitivity overall is affected by the fact that it works mainly through and with government counterparts, which are a party to the ongoing conflict in the area. We elaborate later in the review on this issue, but the overall perception of the programme by both insiders and outsiders is that it is biased towards one party to the ongoing conflict.

The programme sits well within the existing overall strategic plans. As a programme realignment exercise is currently ongoing within UNDP, it is expected that JCRP will undergo a transformation within that process, building into the next iteration of peacebuilding strategy for the organization. As far as IOM is concerned, the programme falls well within its strategy for Sudan, specially as part of the organisation’s efforts to support stability in areas of high human mobility.

A conflict analysis exercise was conducted in November 2014 by the EU, hosted and co-sponsored by UNDP, involving a wide range of international and Sudanese partners. The workshop aimed at developing a shared understanding within the EU and partners of the underlying causes of conflict, violence and insecurity in Sudan and to identify implications and priorities for international partners.

While the analysis underlined that until governance improves and resources are distributed in a more equitable way, a lasting reduction of violent conflict, poverty and humanitarian disasters was unlikely to be achieved, it also recommended
strengthening of engagement at the local level, encouraging state governments to provide services to their people as well as an increased emphasis on conflict prevention.

Although the first phase of JCPR was designed in the framework of a post-conflict situation following the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that sealed the end of the civil war between Sudan and South Sudan, the context very quickly reverted back to armed conflict in the targeted areas. The programme was adapted to reflect the new environment to a certain degree during Phase I implementation and more radically in the design of Phase II.

The programme did incorporate most of lessons learned from Phase I as indicated by the mid-term review and final reports from the project. Of key importance to its relevance, the programme team conducts regular (quarterly) conflict analyses of each of the states, which are used to inform decision making and overall management of activities, adaptation when necessary etc.

3.2. Effectiveness

**Guiding Questions:** To what extent are the programme objectives being achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the programme objectives? Are programme risks being appropriately managed or contingency plans implemented where necessary?

The OECD DAC uses effectiveness to assess whether an intervention has met its intended objectives, and in peacebuilding, where the stated objectives may not directly be related to peace and conflict, how the immediate and secondary outcomes related to peacebuilding and conflict dynamics. Conflict sensitivity is implicitly part of the DAC’s definition of effectiveness, insofar as it suggests consideration of what the effort did to manage conflict-specific risks.

The programme is on its way to achieve objectives as originally designed, with some differences between the outputs, which are detailed below. Firstly, some overall remarks:

**Interconnection between outputs and contribution to overall objective:** despite the fact that linkages between the outputs in pursuing the overall objective have been strengthened through lessons learned during Phase I, there continues to be some disconnect, particularly when it comes to outputs 3 and 5. None of the interviewees had knowledge of the programme’s overall framework and objective beyond the output to which they were directly related, which shows an opportunity to increase link and aggregate results. However, all of them were able to refer to the programme’s overall objective, mentioning peace, stability, coexistence etc. Furthermore, the fact that IOM and UNDP have separate agreements and hence reports to the donor, the EU, make it difficult to have a clear overview to activities and their linkages from the reporting formats.
**Delays and limitations in sequencing:** Implementation started late for different reasons (including late funding decision by the EU, resulting in delays in the signature of the agreement and disbursement of funds due to procedural issues). Delays have however been varied for different outputs, making sequenced implementation and linkages more difficult. In terms of sequencing, planning for output 4, delivery of peace dividends, had been planned to address first the backload from Phase I and continue working in line with progress in peace agreements during Phase II. The latter has not happened to date due to lack of funds but it is planned if additional funding is approved by the EU under a programme cost-extension. Activities under output 3 only started late in the process, and actual implementation of grants under output 5 have only started recently as the process for identification, selection etc took some time. These delays will make it difficult to monitor results and impact during the life of the programme.

One of the major claims of the programme, in achieving its overall objective of reducing conflict and promoting social cohesion, is that **all major conflicts in the area have received attention from the programme.** This claim is very difficult to substantiate and would require additional efforts in monitoring (see recommendations in section 5).

In terms of **risk analysis and management,** learning from Phase I, the programme has made efforts to develop a risk analysis and management system and use it to inform decision-making. The risk analysis is linked to conflict analysis and mitigating measures have been put in place when risks are identified, particularly from an operational perspective.

Looking more specifically at effectiveness within each of the outputs, below are some findings and conclusions:

**Output 1:** Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.

The programme has mixed results under this output, as follows:

Efforts have been made to develop the capacities of the state level peacebuilding mechanisms, the peace ambassadors and peace centres to address local level conflict. While trainings and capacity development initiatives have been undertaken, the programme has faced certain challenges.

Capacities and ability to operate between the state level peace building mechanisms are very varied: while in West Kordofan the mechanism has continue to produce results, the newly established mechanism in South Kordofan suffers from very low levels of capacity, very strong ties to the governor (who has changed the structure and posts on political basis) and limited credibility with the communities. One interviewee claimed that the mechanism in Blue Nile has had some serious problems regarding capacity and credibility and that himself, a member of the PC, has never participated in meetings/processes as it represents only one ethnic group.
in its current composition. UNDP’s assessment of the PC is however overall positive, with increased implementation of independent activities and fundraising efforts ongoing. There is no such a mechanism on Abyei. The programme has undertaken a capacity assessment of the mechanisms with a view to tailoring its support. Additionally, there have been some issues with other state authorities which have challenged the mechanisms’ capacity to operate in general and the facilitation of CSO projects under Output 5 in particular.

Peace Ambassadors (PA) have been selected and trained during the programme and some of them have been supported to undertake proposed activities. It is unclear whether the selection process and criteria have resulted in a balanced (tribal, political) group of Peace Ambassadors (see below recommendations in section 5). While all of the peace ambassadors interviewed by the review team were positive about the initial training received, they also agreed on the need to harmonise training, to better select trainers and curriculum and to provide advanced training for those having completed the first round. Some of them have taken the initiative to organise activities in promotion of social cohesion and peace (e.g. musical festival) but all requested more support to be able to carry out their role as PA. Although the PAs are already supporting a diverse range of activities such as dialogues, peace festivals and peace processes, there is potential in increasing and improving their role. The PA Forum organized in October 2014 and in general opportunities to network and learn from each other are very appreciated by the PA. They all feel their status in their communities has positively changed as a result of their participation in the programme and feel they can contribute to awareness raising and peace initiatives.

Peace Centres: there have been some efforts in supporting capacity development of the centres, particularly through a partnership with the Peace Research Institute (PRI) of the University of Khartoum (UoK) under the programme. There is however perhaps a missed opportunity to further use some of them for trainings, mediation etc. Recent efforts to create a network of peace centres for learning, mentoring, support etc are welcome by the centres themselves as well as other interviewees who support an increased role for the centres overall. There is room to consider a stronger link with the work of the PA where possible, as the centres are perceived as academic and more neutral than the State level peacebuilding mechanisms.

Civil society and community level capacity: support to capacity development with CSOs has been undertaken mainly through activities under output 5, although CSOs are also regularly invited to events organized under the programme’s umbrella hence contributing to their overall capacity development. While there has definitely been an effort to train and support the six organisations selected to implement activities, continued by an “on the job training” approach while activities are ongoing, much more could be done in supporting civil society through the programme where possible. There is no evidence of direct work with or support to peace committees at the community level, with the exception of training of peace committee members in Abyei in May 2014. This represents an extremely important entry point for conflict prevention and mediation at the local level, preventing
escalation and promoting sustainability of the processes and needs to be looked at for future work (particularly in Abyei in the absence of a government counterpart, but overall for the programme and learning from others’ experience: World Bank, Peace Collaborative Network, etc). Increased and sustained engagement at this level would be fundamental in increasing the neutrality and credibility of the programme.

Output 2: Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.

JCRP has had a direct impact on the reduction of conflict levels and flashpoints through the sustainability of 16/17 supported peace processes and three new processes (two in West Kordofan and one in South Kordofan) resulting in peace agreements (up to February 2015).

Although JCRP claims to have responded to all major conflict points occurring during the life of the programme, this needs to be strongly substantiated. The map included in the first year report by UNDP to the EU identifies conflict points in areas where there is no JCRP activity, although it is difficult to assess the causes, intensity levels and results of these conflicts/flashpoints.

Additionally, it is difficult to assess whether the supported processes were inclusive, the quality of the mediation and the factors that affect their sustainability (also linked to the peace dividends). UNDP’s assessment is that tribal representation is inclusive while that of women remains a challenge. Recommendations to strengthen monitoring of this output, also in relation to conflict prevention by identification of potential triggers, are made in section 5 of the report. Overall, there seems to be a direct correlation between the peace agreements and the decrease of violent incidents as reported locally. Those are most evident in relation to some of the activities undertaken as peace dividends, and particularly in the case of corridor demarcation.

Output 3. Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;

Activities under this output only started late in 2014 and it is difficult to assess their effectiveness to date. The original design and objectives of the output might have been over ambitious as they assumed a higher-level dialogue with an opportunity for engagement would be in place, which is unfortunately not the case today. That said, some of the initiatives have been launched and have been very well received at the level of innovation, capacity development and networking.

Plans to hold a Peace Symposium in September to coincide with the Peace Day are underway and could represent an important opportunity to create awareness and attract attention to the need for peace and social cohesion in Sudan.

Recommendations on the continuation of activities under this output in the remaining of the programme life and beyond are covered in section 5.
Output 4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;

During Phase II, IOM first concentrated in addressing activities pending from Phase I (delivery of peace dividends from peace processes supported during Phase I), which had not been implemented because of lack of time/funds. There were delays in the commencement of the programme overall and then the rainy season (June-September) prevented works to take place during that period, resulting on a concentration of activities in this output linked to peace agreements from Phase I. Reviewing evidence and reports shared by IOM, it is difficult to establish how many activities linked to peace agreements reached in Phase II have actually been implemented/concluded, particularly as IOM has now also utilized all funds allocated to this output and would require a cost extension from the EU to complete planned works.

Peace dividends are designed within the programme to provide incentives to the communities maximizing the impact and sustainability of local peace processes by linking these to targeted peace and recovery interventions carried out to address the prioritised root causes of conflict identified as part of the peace process. The programme recognizes the importance of linking the peace dividends to the actual agreements and ensuring the time lapse between the conclusion of the agreements and the start of the works is not to large. This has however not been possible in all cases due to the concentration on the backlog of activities from Phase I and lack of funds to support interventions around agreements supported in Phase II.

Additionally, according to the interviews, it is not clear the communities understand the peace dividends as such and it seems they rather perceive them as isolated activities implemented by IOM through a sub-constructor. There is a need to make the communities aware of the peace dividend approach for it to be useful in supporting and maintaining the peace agreements.

As Phase II was being developed, it was expected for other donors (Norway and DFID) to join efforts by the EU and provide substantial funding to the programme. As the other donors pulled out from the process, resources had to be re-allocated within a much smaller total amount. Priority should have been given to the allocation of enough resources to address both the backlog of activities from Phase I as well as new activities arising from needs during Phase II.

As expectations are created during the peace processes with communities in terms of peace dividends, should these not be implemented in a reasonable period of time, the peace dividend approach could be counterproductive and create conflict and/or animosity. It is important for the approach to be designed and implemented in the right sequence and with the appropriate linkages and resources to avoid this situation.
Otherwise, activities implemented by IOM as peace dividends seem to overall have the desired effect/impact in sustaining peace and stability. Of particular relevance, due to their high impact, are corridor demarcations, which should be expanded on and promoted where relevant. Limited follow up or monitoring has been undertaken on the works delivered so far (with the exception of one field visit by the UNDP M&E officer) so the actual impact of the works still needs to be established. Recommendations on ways to do so are included in section 5 of the report.

**Output 5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.**

The process to identify areas of intervention, train and select NGOs and conclude grants for the activities to be undertaken took some time. This is however justified, as it was important to ensure the process also served as a way to support capacity development and the right communities and activities were identified. As a result, six CSOs are currently implementing activities in 3 States. This excludes Abyei which was never included in the call for proposals as it was judged potentially conflict unsensitive in the absence of a joint administration. This decision was taken in consultation with key stakeholders). It is therefore difficult at this stage to measure the effectiveness of the activities themselves and efforts should be made to monitor them during the remaining period of the programme.

During the discussion with implementing CSOs, it became clear that the concept of resilience to conflict remains a complex one not well understood by all implementing CSOs. Efforts to continue on the job training and support during implementation should continue to emphasize the links between the activities and stability and resilience.

As per overall comments on effectiveness, activities under this output remain somehow isolated from the others, as they do not directly link to mediation/peace processes neither to capacity development under output 1. This was implicit in the programme design to reach other areas not covered by the peace processes. Activities under this output have been made possible, particularly regarding access, thanks to the relations and collaboration with State level mechanisms and authorities. As the selection process was based on a local conflict analysis, assessment of conflict flash points and thematic priorities, the output does contribute to the overall objective. There might however be space for exploring further links between the outputs to increase sustainability.

The scale of this output is relatively small compared to the overall size of the programme and can therefore only have a limited contribution to the achievement of the overall objective. It can however offer important entry points and lessons learned for an increase in activities in support to civil society.

- **Efficiency:**
**Guiding questions**: Are the objectives being economically achieved by the programme? What is the utilization ratio of the resources used to date? Are activities cost-efficient? Are objectives being achieved on time? Is the programme being implemented in the most efficient way compared to the alternatives?

The consultant only had access to general information on the budgets and overall expenditures under the programme. This section would therefore require further elaboration by the impact evaluation.

It is understood that the cost of doing work in the targeted areas is very high because of their remoteness, access limitations, costs related to security, very limited number of implementing partners in the field etc. This is reflected in the overall budget and expenditure.

Delays in finalizing agreement and disbursement of funds, as well as those caused by the rainy season, have translated into implementation difficulties, disconnect between the phases and to some extend the outputs within the programme. In terms of implementation modality, the partnership between UNDP and IOM seems to bring efficiency and added value to the programme overall, allowing for different procedures and approaches to increase efficiency.

Sequencing and timing are key factors in this programme, as there needs to be a flow and link between the peace processes and the peace dividends. Failure to deliver promises could actually result in conflict or threaten gains obtained through the peace processes. It is therefore fundamental that the project aims at providing peace dividends in relation to all peace processes.

- **Impact:**

  **Guiding questions**: Is the development intervention contributing to the higher level development objectives? What is the impact of the programme in proportion to the overall situation of the target group? What real difference is the programme making to beneficiaries?

The overall objective of the current phase of JCRP is to strengthen government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur and the outputs are designed to all contribute to it.

The review could not assess details related to the impact of the activities as the programme is still ongoing (with some activities having started only a few months prior) and because of lack of time and resources. Additionally, a thorough review of
the impact would have required access to the field and an extended time frame. Some recommendations to address this are made under section 5 of the report.

Within those limitations, a preliminary overview of the impact concludes the following pointers, which can perhaps also guide further monitoring and evaluation:

In terms of capacities, details on some of the progress are captured under each output for effectiveness. Capacities seem to be overall quite limited and would require continuation of support. The focus has been mainly on government bodies and peace ambassadors, with some opportunities to extend and increase this support to other actors (CSOs, peace centres, peace committees).

The programme reports an important direct impact in terms of reduction of levels of conflict, through the mediation and facilitation of peace agreements and the delivery of peace dividends. 70% of the interviewees refer to the overall conflict as the main challenge for JCRP’s impact to be increased. While resolution of conflict at the community level has a direct impact on the affected communities and their daily lives, the continuation and in some cases intensification of the conflict between the government and armed groups make those gains less significant.

Results are overall mixed across states, depending on the existing capacities and entry points, issues related to access and security and overall opportunities. Abyei has received limited attention by the programme as it is a particularly challenging context and in the absence of a government counterpart. However, some efforts have been made to explore opportunities to increase the level of activities within the current environment.

- **Sustainability**

**Guiding questions**: To what extent are positive effects of the programme being sustained or are likely to be sustained? What steps could be taken to increase the likelihood of project benefits being sustained beyond the life of the project?

Some references to sustainability already made above under each output. There are overall some question marks around sustainability, intrinsic to the general context and situation. As overall conflict between the government and the armed opposition continues and there are no immediate plans for the resurrection of the peace process, it is expected for the situation to remain fragile and volatile in the target areas. In other words, there is no clear indication that an end to the conflict is near. This said, the programme has focused in reducing conflict and its impact at the community level, between pastoralists and farmers, different tribes and groups, etc. Those efforts need to be maintained in order to sustain the direct impact on the communities achieved so far.
More specifically, it would be important to consolidate peace processes and agreements as much as possible to ensure their sustainability. Some recommendations are made in section 5.

Sustainability of the state level peacebuilding mechanisms needs to be further considered and strengthened, both in terms of increasing their capacity to mobilise resources and decreasing their dependency to the governors and local administrations.

An important investment has been made in the selection and training of PA, which could be an incredible asset in the continuation of the programme as well as for others. UNDP has started considering options to ensure their sustainability, there needs to be a realistic expectation about how much they can achieve by themselves, linking them to other initiatives, selecting some champions for future activities etc.

As far as the Peace centres are concerned, they are existing institutions linked to universities, but with limited resources. The PC network, currently being established with the support of PRI, should help in maintaining the information sharing and capacity building aspects between the centres and overall contribute to their sustainability. Other ways to support their sustainability and capacity to support activities can be explored within the programme.

CSOs are perhaps the less sustainable aspect of the programme, as only a small number has been targeted and they do in principle require external support to operate. The supported extended to all CSOs meeting the minimum criteria (around 25) with training on conflict sensitivity and do no harm represents an important step in supporting peace building capacity in the area. Support to the CSOs in resource mobilization could help in providing them with other sources if income, as this is unlikely to come from the communities themselves or the government. Sustainability of the impact of their activities, and their actual contribution to stability and resilience need to be measured by the impact evaluation and in a longer time frame. Some positive examples have already taken place however, including in West Kordofan, where Muzan supported activities entered into a partnership with the Ministry of Information for the broadcasting of a radio show, the establishment of peace committees by many of the CSOs, etc.

The sustainability of some of the activities undertaken under output 3 can be questioned, as some would require sustained assistance to continue. Networking between actors and low cost innovative tools can be explored in the remaining period of the programme to promote sustainability.

5. Lessons learned/promising practices

Key lessons learned during the programme are listed below. Some of them had already been identified during Phase I. They need to be taken into account for any
continuation and they can also be useful for other projects to be
designed/implemented by the organisations in the target area:

6. **Presence in the area:** All of the respondents agreed that the mere presence
of a programme in support of social cohesion and peace building in the
bordering States was per se an important asset. The fact that there is a very
limited number of interventions in the area and that challenges of access and
security make it very difficult to operationalize activities, makes it important
to maintain a presence and activities supporting local actors.

7. **Hardware versus software:** The peace dividend activities and support to
CSOs outputs provide the project with an important entry point to both
government officials and communities. It allows for the software parts of the
programme to take place, although with some difficulties, in a context
where it would be very challenging to intervene otherwise. It is important to
find the right balance between the two types of activities and ensure their
linkages.

8. **Double edge sword?** Working with and through government entities has
both advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand it facilitates access
and support to the activities by the government while on the other it taints
the programme with a certain bias. This issue is address in other parts of the
report more in detail but it is important to emphasise the need to collaborate
with government partners to be able to implement activities. Building
awareness of government actors (including HAC and security services) about
the importance of the programme’s objectives has been key in creating the
necessary environment for the activities to take place.

9. **Capitalizing on returns:** there have been important investments by IOM and
UNDP, but also the donors and mainly the European Union, during both
phases of the programme. These have paid off and resulted in the building of
trust with communities and government institutions, the development of
processes and approaches that work in the area and the establishment of
knowledge and systems. These include amongst others the regular and
systematic update of detailed conflict analyses for each of the states, which
in turn inform decision making, the establishment of a robust monitoring
and evaluation plan and efforts towards assessing peace capacities and
supporting networking amongst peace actors, in the areas covered by the
programme and beyond. It would be important to capitilise in these
investments either through the continuation of the programme, whichever
shape and form that might take, and/or for other interventions in the area.

5. **Recommendations**

Recommendations are put forward for both, the remaining of the programme
(expected to be extended until the beginning of 2016) as well as for a potential new
phase/iteration of the JCRP.
5.1. Remaining of the project:

With a few months left (six to eight months subject to approval by the EU) in the life of the programme in its current iteration, UNDP and IOM should concentrate on consolidating gains obtained so far, prioritizing activities as follows:

**Peace dividends:** no activities have been implemented as peace dividends in support to peace processes undertaken under Phase II of the programme. These should be prioritized as expectations have been created within the communities in regards to priorities identified during the process. As IOM has already used of all the funding allocated to output 4, additional funding (already requested to the EU) would be required to complete interventions in these communities.

Activities that can be completed during the remaining period and particularly those who either contribute to increasing the sustainability of interventions or actors or who represent entry points for planning and design of the next phase. Some activities contained in the workplan, which have not been undertaken so far and are unlikely to be completed within the life of the programme should probably be de-prioritised in coordination with the EU.

The remaining time can be very useful in the consolidation of monitoring as much as possible, with a focus on demonstrating and substantiating some of the key results of this phase. UNDP and IOM teams could explore ways to increase triangulation (through other projects active in the area as well as field visits when possible), to undertake additional remote monitoring (perhaps through the use of national consultants with access to the area and no links to the programme, through external national consultant services with the same purposes, etc). Some of the aspects where monitoring should pay special attention in the next few months include:

- It would be fundamental for the system to be able to show results around the quality and equity of peace processes, assessing their sustainability and identifying potential triggers which would jeopardise the agreements and translate into a return to conflict;
- Assessing levels of capacity and sustainability of the mechanisms supported by the programme, and particularly the state level peacebuilding mechanisms;
- Assess affiliation of direct beneficiaries of the programme (particularly community organisations and peace ambassadors) to inform strategies to increase diversification in future programmes;
- Assess the impact of activities undertaken under outputs 4 and 5. While the timeframe does not allow for a full impact assessment of these activities, some of them having been completed only very recently or still underway, the programme could assess impact of activities undertaken previously as an overall indication. The assessment should also look at ways in which these
activities could be capitalised on and supported further as peacebuilding tools/initiatives (e.g. schools built as a peace dividend could be further supported to promote social coexistence and peace)

- Ensure a full impact evaluation is carried out at the end of the programme and possibly within a timeframe which allows its results to inform planning for the next phase

The remaining months provide an important opportunity to launch a planning process for the next stage. As this process takes place within a broader initiative for programme re-alignment within UNDP, it would be important that it is designed as part of it rather than independently for JCRP. UNDP’s programme re-alignment, part of efforts by the organisation to rationalize and mainstream interventions globally, aims at integrating and aligning strategies in the areas of peacebuilding/social cohesion, livelihoods and governance. There are programmes ongoing in all of these areas across the country with different approaches and geographical focus. The process provides an opportunity to identify and confirm aspects and elements from JCRP which can contribute to the overall strategy and be replicated in other areas. It is recommended for the planning process to take into account the following elements:

- Consultations need to be undertaken early on in the process: both at the state/community level as well as in Khartoum. Ongoing activities can provide entry points for consultations in the field, and with other Sudanese and international actors active in the areas. A dedicated consultation with donors and international agencies in Khartoum needs to be launched in parallel to make sure the strategy falls within a broader international approach and attracts as much buy-in as possible. This would be important for coordination purposes as well as for future support;
- As far as the JCRP is concerned, the process should identify which elements of JCRP that can be carried over and adapted within the new framework.
- The planning process should be undertaken jointly by all three sectors teams (peacebuilding, livelihoods and governance) to ensure alignment at the level of strategy, rather than project/activities, from early on.

5.2. Considerations for next phase/iteration

Without prejudice to the process suggested above and its potential outputs, some recommendations are made below for consideration for the next phase/iteration of the JCRP, whichever form and shape this might take:

Scale up and extend the peace dividend/hardware approach: this could be done through the alignment with other sectors particularly around support to livelihoods, as well as through links with other agencies/actors, with a special focus on education and projects targeting the youth (e.g. UNICEF for schools/education). Most
interviewees during the review stressed this point and referred to the lack of basic infrastructure, the importance of natural resources management and water projects.

Seriously explore all possible options to increase neutrality and conflict sensitivity and balance off the focus on support to the government and government linked bodies and individuals, including:

- While preparing and presenting arguments (backed by results) on the benefits of engaging with state level mechanisms, explore ways in which they can play a more neutral role (non-governmental funding, increased independence to the governor and local authorities, etc);
- Improve and increase measures to ensure a neutral approach to the selection of beneficiaries and partners: from communities to implementing CSOs and peace ambassadors;
- Explore further engagement with the peace centres as a more neutral/academic body;
- Explore options for engagement with government bodies to raise awareness and increase their support to programme activities;
- Explore increased engagement with/through peace committees at the community level where possible (instead of mediation by the state level Peacebuilding mechanisms). Some peace committees already exist and can become important partners in the pursuit of peacebuilding objectives;
- Identify key partners/counterparts at the federal level that provide a more balanced approach and dilute the power over decision making by anyone specific actor on the government side.

Consider the expansion of levels of intervention and geographical areas: explore the possible use of JCRP elements and lessons learned to be applied at different levels or phases of conflict, including conflict prevention, management and transformation. In parallel, explore the extension of the approach to other regions with different contexts in relation to conflict (Darfur and the East in particular), while taking into account ongoing projects and lessons learned (e.g. DCPSF) in those areas.

In terms of linkages to higher-level dialogue/peace process, develop a more realistic approach that concentrates on the development and coordination of messages and experiences at the local level. While building capacities at the local level, explore possible (separate) strategies to support the establishment of space at the higher-level dialogue/peace processes for local participation through different entry points.

As there is currently no ongoing dialogue and it is not clear yet what shape it might take in future and which actors will be involved, planning needs to be flexible and opportunistic around this area. Some possible considerations:
• Continue supporting innovative/technology vehicles for the development and coordination of messages;
• Continue supporting capacities at the local level to inform and possibly influence higher level discussions if and when these take place (local consultations could be part of a future national dialogue, providing space for some participation);
• Strongly coordinate with donors and other actors involved in the higher-level dialogue (AUHIP, UN Special Envoy, embassies) support to the creation of space for participation and consultation.
• Explore ways of increasing awareness and preparation at the local level, through media and others.

Abyei has received very limited attention from international and national efforts in the past years due to the very challenging and volatile situation, lack of government counterparts, lack of access etc. The situation also represents an opportunity in terms of defining a different way of operating in support to social cohesion and peace dividends. The planning process should continue to explore ways in which a targeted strategy could be designed for Abyei, exploring coordination/collaboration with the mission and UNDP/IOM South Sudan country programmes on the other side of the border, assessing other local actors which activities could be implemented, etc.

In line with the above recommendation regarding Abyei specifically, it is proposed that cross-border cooperation (South Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia) is explored and taken into account for the programme design. This would require coordination with actors working on the other side of the borders, but considering the nomadic and other movements it is an aspect that cannot be ignored.

6. Conclusions

Working in a highly complex and volatile environment, facing important challenges in access, security, limited capacity etc, the JCRP has managed to learn and adapt since its inception and continues to deliver tangible results in the targeted areas. Reduction of the conflict levels at the community level, particularly between farmers and pastoralist and tribal/ethnic groups, has continued to consolidate through the second phase of the programme. Additionally, increased awareness around peaceful coexistence and capacity development of key actors have contributed to the development of an environment more conducive to reconciliation and social cohesion.

However, the programme still faces some important challenges, some of which can still be addressed in the remaining of its life spam (should the extensions be approved by the EU). Some of the priorities during this period include consolidation of gains produced by the programme interventions, strengthening of the
monitoring system to substantiate results and investment in aspects related to sustainability of the results and institutions supported.

Other challenges can become lessons learned to inform the planning process and decision making for the next iteration of the programme. These challenges refer to the need for a balanced approach in supporting peacebuilding and social cohesion, concentrating work at the community level as much as possible, stronger links and sequencing of project activities to underpin the peace dividend approach and a more realistic approach in linking with higher-level peace processes.

The partnership between IOM and UNDP has also progressed during the programme implementation and important results have been achieved thanks to the combination and integration of expertise and activities. This needs to be acknowledged and built on as much as possible.

While reviewing progress towards achieving the programme’s objectives, this review has also focused on identifying key lessons learned and providing some recommendations for a planning process to design the next iteration of the JCRP, in the framework of the ongoing programme re-alignment process recently launched by UNDP. The review needs to be read in conjunction with the ongoing evaluation of IcSP supported programmes commissioned by the EU.
ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Face to face interviews
Goma Judal Kreeem (Male, SPPCC – SKS)
El Tayeb Badawi (Male, ASHAB organization, funded by IOM)
Tahani Abdel Rahman (Female, Peace Ambassador, WKS)
Al Taher Mohammed (Male, Peace Ambassador, Abyei Area)
Dr Abdel Magid Mohamed Ahmed (Male, Peace Ambassador, BNS)
Al-Gedi Saeed Faragalla (male) SKS\WKS
Fairouz Farah (female) SKS UNDP/JCRP
Dr. Nagla Mohammed S Darfur State Peace Research Institute Nyala
Hassan Hamza BNS BN University
Ali Mo’men Musa SKS Lawyer, ex-governor advisor

Focus Group Discussions:
1. Dialogue meeting participants:
   Mohamed Rahal (native administration)
   Al Fatih Al Mak (Head of Peace Council, BNS)
   Mohammed Alderk (RPCM, WKS)
   Ismael Hagana (Global Aid Hand)
   Sefat Abdallah (Female, Peace Ambassador, SKS)
   Manahil Ibrahim (Female, Peace Ambassador, BNS)
   Abdel Rahman Daldom (Male, Native Administration, WKS)
   Suliman Mohamed Suliman (East Darfur activist)

2. Peace centres’ network discussion:
   Dr Mohamed haroun (University of Khartoum)
   Dr. Yassir Satti (University of Fasher)
   Dr. Emadeldine Mohamed Salih (University of Zalinge)
   Dr. Abdelmagid Ahmed Mohamed (Alslam university)
   Dr. Mohamed Abdelgader Mohamed (university of Dalanj)
   Dr. Abdelaziz Mohamed Adam (Blue Nile University)

3. Focus Group Discussion CSOs grantees under output 5
   Araf Mohammed IPDO\KRT
   Talaat Abass FPDO\KRT
   Adam Mukhtar SUDIA\KRT
   Mohammed Adam GAH\KRT

Phone interviews

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<td>Abdelrahim Hamid</td>
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<td>Rasha Ahmed</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Elsadig Adam</td>
<td>Deputy Director, National Office for IDPs Affairs, HAC</td>
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Meetings in Khartoum
UNDP JCRP team and Country Director
IOM JCRP team
Ingrid Skjoolas- Norwegian Embassy
Iris Wielders- Conflict Adviser- DFID
Jonas Horner- EU Peacebuilding Consultant
Fernanda Faria- EU consultant- evaluation of IsCP
Tom Gillhespy- Peace Centre (supporting Peace Collaborative Network in South Kordofan)
Prof. Munsoul (PRI)
Other organisations (CARE, World Bank, Search for Common Ground)
Implementing programmes in the target areas and supported by the EU/IcSP were met in the margins of a EU IsCP coordination meeting on 4th June.
Annex 2- Bibliography, resources and documents reviewed


EU- Conflict Analysis report- Workshop November 2014

EU- Evaluation of IFS programmes in Sudan September 2013

JCRP Phase I Mid-term evaluation, March 2013

IOM and UNDP programme documents and reports to the EU, monitoring reports (UNDP and PRI)
Annex 3- Terms of reference

Terms of Reference (TOR)
Mid-term Review

G. Project Title: Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP)

H. Program Background:

The Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) works to address immediate conflict risks and contribute to long-term conflict resolution and peace building in the former Protocol Areas of South Kordofan State, West Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei in Sudan.

The JCRP has been implemented in two phases: Phase I of the Programme was implemented over the period January 2012 – Feb 2014. Phase II of the JCRP is now being implemented, with the generous support of the European Union for 18 months over the period March, 2014 – August 2015.

Phase II of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme (JCRP) builds on the work of the Conflict Reduction Programme (CRP), implemented in 2009 as a pilot programme aimed at prevention and resolution of local conflicts in South Kordofan and Phase I of the Joint Conflict Reduction Programme, which expanded the work of the CRP into Blue Nile state and the Abyei Area. The JCRP was initially conceived in a post-conflict setting, in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Since 2011 however, there has been a re-emergence of larger-scale conflicts, with the Abyei Area, Blue Nile and Kordofan states becoming critical, not only for the security of Sudan, but also for South Sudan, owing to the inter-dependent livelihoods of communities across borders. Furthermore, local resource-based conflicts are increasingly becoming entangled with larger political and economic disputes, significantly impacting the security and development of affected communities. Building on the successes, lessons learned and ongoing analysis of the changing conflict dynamics, the overall objective of the current phase of JCRP is to strengthen Government and civil society initiatives that promote social cohesion, peace consolidation and pluralism (CPAP Outcome 7) in South and West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Area and to contain spill-over conflict and human mobility along the borders with East Darfur. The theory of change guiding the work of the programme is as follows;
• IF we build the capacity of state-level Government peace building institutions and of community-level peace builders THEN they will be better able to manage the peace processes they are strategically best placed to deliver

• IF we provide financial and technical support to local peace processes THEN we will have a direct impact on social cohesion at the community level

• IF we provide financial and technical support to actors communicating local voices to negotiators of a peace agreement THEN we will have a direct impact on plural voices being reflected in the negotiation of a peace agreement

• IF we deliver peace dividends focusing on services identified by communities after a peace agreement THEN we will help sustain local peace processes

• IF we support civil society organizations to deliver peace dividends focusing on developing capacities of local peace actors, fostering diversity and improving livelihoods to target communities or groups.

The specific objectives for Phase II of the Programme are;

1. Effective mechanisms at the State level are in place supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention.

Activities include the provision of tailored on-the-job capacity development support to state peacebuilding mechanisms, together with the provision of trainings to a broader range of peacebuilding actors including regional and local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Line Ministries, Native Administration, local level peace committees and peace ambassadors.

2. Current and future local flashpoint conflicts are mitigated through inclusive peace processes.

Activities include collaborating with state peacebuilding partners in the hosting of intra and inter-tribal dialogues, as well as the facilitation of peace processes between conflicting groups. Large events such as peace days and peace festivals are also organized to spread the message of peace and to promote the building of greater social cohesion.

3. Local stakeholders are linked to high-level peace processes;

In collaboration with the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum, activities include; the mapping of national peace actors, workshops on peace advocacy and the establishment of a Peace Innovation Hub and Peace Actors Network as well as the conducting of information campaigns to disseminate information about the outcomes of high level peace processes to people in local communities.
4. Local peace processes are sustained through the delivery of targeted peace dividends to communities;

Based on priorities determined in collaboration with local communities themselves, peace dividends, such as schools or water-yards are provided to help sustain local peace processes.

5. Initiatives are delivered to support community stabilization and resilience to violent conflict.

Under this component, JCRP will support local civil society organizations to carry out innovative and creative peacebuilding interventions from a broader range of actors that foster stability, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in general, beyond addressing a specific conflict. The focus of the projects will be to build resilience of communities or groups (at risk of violent conflict as per criteria above) to violent conflict, through activities that;

- Build capacities for peace (training, capacity development etc.) in conflict analysis and monitoring, conflict resolution and reconciliation
- Promote diversity and social cohesion
- Enhance employment and livelihood opportunities
- Support improved natural resource management

Specific objectives 1-3 are being implemented by UNDP, with specific objectives 4-5 implemented by IOM. Though the programme is administered through two separate funding agreements, the achievement of the overall objective depends upon the inter-relationship between the specific objectives and programmatic coherence. Close collaboration is maintained between IOM and UNDP to ensure the integrity of the programme through steering committee, grants committee and bi-weekly coordination meetings.

**Mid-term Review Stakeholders:**

Key stakeholders of the Review will include: programme beneficiaries, the management and staff of IOM and UNDP, EU Delegation, Peace-building Mechanisms in the respective target states, and CSO partners. Additional relevant bodies, such as other Implementing Partners under EU’s IcSP and Sudan’s federal-level governmental counterparts, can be considered.

**I. Purpose and Objectives of the Mid-term Review:**

The purpose of this mid-term review is to provide stakeholders with an overall independent appraisal of JCRP programme performance and impact, and propose recommendations to inform programme adjustments in the current programme phase and how to strategically build on current efforts to strengthen programming on conflict management and peacebuilding given the political and security environment of Sudan. The objectives of this Mid-Term Review are to evaluate programme relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, including from a conflict-sensitivity perspective how the programme is addressing
peacebuilding at the local, State and national levels. Furthermore, it will also assess the programme’s key achievements, constraints, best practices and lessons learnt to date along with key recommendations for future programming. Lastly, considering that the Review is taking place at the later stage of the programme cycle, it will also look into the fund-raising aspects in terms of needs and opportunities, and financing among different programme components.

J. Mid-term Review Scope and Key Evaluation Questions:

The Mid-term Review consultant/s will be required to;

xiv) Assess, in accordance with the OECD/DAC criteria, the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability of programme activities to date. Below is a list of related questions, to be fine-tuned following the desk review.

| Relevance | Given the changing context in Sudan, to what extent are the programme objectives still valid, with reference to the Country Programme Document, the Country Programme Action Plan and the UNDP Strategic Plan? Based on current conflict analysis, are we doing the right things? How relevant is the intervention in light of local and national policies and priorities? Are the activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and intended impact? |
| Effectiveness | To what extent are the programme objectives being achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the programme objectives? Are programme risks being appropriately managed or contingency plans implemented where necessary? |
| Efficiency | Are the objectives being economically achieved by the programme? What is the utilization ratio of the resources used to date? Are activities cost-efficient? Are objectives being achieved on time? Is the programme being implemented in the most efficient way compared to the alternatives? |
| Impact | Is the development intervention contributing to the higher level development objectives? What is the impact of the programme in proportion to the overall situation of the target group? What real difference is the programme making to beneficiaries? |
| Sustainability | To what extent are positive effects of the programme being sustained or are likely to be sustained? What steps could be taken to increase the likelihood of project benefits being sustained beyond the life of the project? |

xv) Describe the programme’s key achievements.

xvi) Identify and analyze key constraints impacting the achievement of objectives.

xvii) Describe the ‘Best Practices’ that can be drawn from the programme.

xviii) What have been the key ‘lessons learnt’?

xix) What are the over-all conclusions regarding the programme’s performance?

xx) Based on assessment of the above key questions, list the key recommendations regarding the potential continuation/scaling-up/replication of the programme and future programme planning.

K. Mid-Term Review Approach and Methodology
It is expected the Review team would undertake a desk review of relevant project documents including the Programme Document, Logframe, M&E Framework, Reports, Reviews and ongoing monitoring data. They would then prepare a brief Inception Report summarizing the preliminary findings of the desk review, confirm the evaluation questions, the evaluation methodology, any limitations to the evaluation and the time-table for completion of tasks. On completion of the review activities, the consultant/s will provide a Draft Mid-Term Review Report, which will be reviewed by IOM and UNDP JCRP focal persons, who will provide initial feedback and request any outstanding issues be addressed, upon which the consultants will then submit the Final Evaluation Report.

L. Expected Outputs and Deliverables:
   i) Inception Report
   ii) Draft Mid-term Review Report
   iii) Final Mid-term Review Report: The report should include:
       - Title Page
       - Index and List of Abbreviations
       - Executive Summary
       - Background Information on the project
       - Introduction outlining purpose, objectives & scope of review, including any limitations on the review
       - Methodology
       - Review questions and findings in relation to the DAC Criteria and key Review Questions
       - JCRP Best Practices
       - Lessons Learnt
       - Conclusions (Summary of Review findings)
       - Recommendations
       - Annexes

M. Work Schedule and Time-table for Deliverables:

The consultant/s will be recruited for 15 days over a two month period with the following tentative schedule of work:

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<th>Dates</th>
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<td>Desk Review of key project documents</td>
<td>April 15-31</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inception Report</td>
<td>May 31</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travel to field if security allows / Review activities</td>
<td>May 1-15</td>
<td>Field locations</td>
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<td>Draft Mid-term Review Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Mid-term Review Report</td>
<td>June 15</td>
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Tentative meetings / interviews:
- Government partners: RPCM, SPPCC and the Peace Council
- Native Administration leaders
- Federal-level Government counterparts: Ministry of Finance and National Economy
- UNDP teams: CPRU and Governance projects in South Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and Abyei
- NGO small grant recipients
- Programme Beneficiaries
- Other international organizations working on peacebuilding: AECOM, UNICEF, UNHCR

J. Institutional Arrangements:

Under the overall direction and supervision of both the Programme Manager, UNDP and Programme Coordinator IOM, the consultant/s are expected to liaise with the JCRP team, both within IOM as well as UNDP, as well as other colleagues if and when necessary.

Duty Station:

Home based & Khartoum (with travel to Blue Nile State, South and West Kordofan States and the Abyei Area, if/as security permits).

K. Qualifications of the Successful Mid-term Review Consultant/s:

- A master’s degree in conflict management, international development, programme evaluation or a related field;
- At least seven years of experience in programme evaluation, including three years in an international development setting and in post-conflict contexts;
- Skilled in designing and implementing programme reviews and evaluations using a broad range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies and in accordance with DAC evaluation principles and standards;
- Solid understanding of the conflict dynamics and socio-economic development trends in Sudan;
- Skilled in facilitating key informant interviews, focus groups, workshops, and grassroots community consultations in a participatory and inclusive manner;
- Experienced in conducting and applying political and conflict analysis in post-conflict environments and;
- Highly developed communication and report writing skills.
### Annex 4- List of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>AA</td>
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<td>Annual Work Plan</td>
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<td>Blue Nile State</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>County Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CRP</td>
<td>Conflict Reduction Programme</td>
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