**Independent Evaluation of OSF/UNDP supported CDF Project in Kyrgyzstan**

Final report

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The findings and the conclusions of this report might not necessarily coincide with those of certain project stakeholders.

# List of acronyms and abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AWP | Annual Workplan (UNDP) |
| BRC | UNDP Bratislava Regional Center |
| CDF | Capacity Development Facility |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization  |
| CC | Coordinating Council of PACs |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee (OECD) |
| DFID | Department for International Development  |
| EU | European Union  |
| EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund  |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technologies  |
| GoK | Government of Kyrgyzstan  |
| GGIWG | Good Governance Initiative Working Groups  |
| HRBA  | Human Rights Based Approach  |
| KR | Kyrgyz Republic |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| LSG | Local self-government |
| MTR | Midterm review  |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation  |
| MoI | Ministry of Interior  |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MoH | Ministry of Health  |
| MoE | Ministry of Economy |
| MSC | Most Significant Change (MSC) |
| NSSD | National Strategy for Sustainable Development |
| OSF | Open Society Foundation  |
| OM | Outcome Mapping  |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PM | Prime Minister |
| PIU | Program Implementation Unit (UNDP) |
| PD/ProDoc | Project Document  |
| PAR | Public Administration Reform  |
| PAC | Public Advisory Council |
| RBEC | Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS (UNDP) |
| SDRD | State Directorate on Reconstruction and Development  |
| SIAP | Service Improvement Action Plan |
| SALSGIR | State Agency of the KR on Local Self Government and Interethnic Relations  |
| TOR | Terms of Reference  |
| TTF | Thematic Trust Fund |
| PACDE | Global Thematic Programme on Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme  |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group  |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework  |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WB | World Bank |

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# Executive Summary

**Background**

The Open Society Foundations (OSF) and UNDP in the Kyrgyz Republic[[1]](#footnote-1) have been funding a “Capacity Development Facility (CDF)” which was initiated immediately after the 2010 revolution and ethnic conflict. CDF was designed as a flexible, responsive and a proactive facility to provide capacity development to the Government of Kyrgyzstan (GoK) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) with the objectives of:

1. *strengthening capacities for policy -making and coordination;*
2. *enhancing public sector organizations and staffing capacities at organizational and individual levels;* and
3. *promoting transparent, inclusive and efficient public and municipal services delivery*.

More generally, the CDF aimed at getting the government structures operational and support advisory services to the Prime-Minister’s Office, the President’s Office and the key public institutions to secure stability and good governance and allow the effective and efficient delivery of services based on the respect for human rights and gender equality.[[2]](#footnote-2) The project envisaged two key components:

1. "***Change-agent support***", seeking to flexibly (and urgently) address capacity bottlenecks in the Government’s and President's effort to secure stability and good governance throughout the elaboration and implementation of ongoing constitutional reform; and.
2. ***Long-term capacity development support to key institutions*** in the reform process,

Since the revolution the country underwent more turbulence including ethnic conflict in the south; changes in the constitution, a shift to a parliamentary system; transformations in the Presidency and coalition based government. CDF’s design and outputs changed accordingly, with the latest changes following the CDF internal midterm review (MTR) held with the assistance of RBEC Capacity Development experts in February 2013, which recommended revising the scope of the project and focusing more on **Public Administration Reform (PAR)** while retaining flexible Capacity Development assistance to key partner institutions. The revised expected results for CDF were reformulated as follows:

1. *Professionalism, efficiency, transparency and accountability of public administration improved* through policy support and capacity development; and
2. *Improved internal operations of identified state* institutions *leading to strengthened policy development and implementation*

The total project budget is $4,366,704 with $2.0 million from the OSF and the remaining $2,366,704 as UNDP mobilized funds (including UNDP source funds at $1,766,704 and non UNDP sources at $600,000[[3]](#footnote-3)). This is in line with the cost sharing agreement between OSF and UNDP, signed in March 2011 stipulating 1:1 distribution between OSF and UNDP source funds and 1:3 with non –UNDP funds. EU funds, part of the UNDP and EU funded project on “*Operationalizing Good Governance for Social Justice*”[[4]](#footnote-4), were part of the CDF co-funding.

Implementation began in October 2010 (effectively in 2011) and initially the project was designed to last until the end of 2012. However, due to the changes in its design, the budget allocations were changed and the project was extended until December 2014 within the same budget. UNDP manages project implementation under the guidance of a Steering Committee, where OSF holds a seat. The Government (and the Office of PM in particular), the office of the President, a number of government agencies are the main project partners along with several CSOs.

**Summary of Evaluation findings**

Over time CDF developed from a facility flexibly providing predominantly the Prime Minister’s and the President’s offices advisory and executive post-crisis support to a facility that more structurally supports the policy development cycle and strategic planning in the context of elaborating PAR approaches and advancing corresponding legislative/regulatory reform. Such flexibility was envisioned at the start as part of the project design.

***Relevance***

The project itself stayed overall relevant responding to the country’s changing needs, which, after the 2010 revolution, was recovering from ethnic conflict and undergoing constitutional changes. Focusing on public administration reform (PAR), after decades of concentration and abuse of power at the Presidential level was relevant due to widespread corruption, very low salaries, dominant patronage networks, and the replacement of experienced civil servants rarely based on professional performance and merit. Within PAR it was decided to focus on public services to address the large number of services introduced by various government agencies charging fees (more than 20000) which was a cause of strong citizens' dissatisfaction. Equally, working through 2 main components: change management and long term capacity building was also relevant, even though the original idea of “change agents” working *inside* the ministries (hired as civil servants but receiving top-ups to salaries)) did not materialize and the project engaged local experts working *closely* with government agencies. However it is debatable if the relevance of the design of the projectwas helped or hindered by the decision to:

1. opt for entirely step by step reforms instead of attempting at least some “quick –wins” so that the results could have been more publicly visible by the close of the project, which is not the case now. Other countries’ experience and relevant research[[5]](#footnote-5) highlight the importance of quick-wins to change perceptions of corruption and allow it to reduce faster;
2. maintain a very flexible approach, at the expense of a more strategic one, even after there was a shift towards policy reforms after the legitimate need to address the immediate needs of post revolution situation were completed (e.g. improved communication with the public and the assistance with the National Strategy on Sustainable Development (NSSD)): while it enabled the government to take full ownership and shape the CDF to meet its immediate needs, it also meant that ad hoc requests were inevitable in a cash–constrained country; and
3. diminish the focus on anticorruption even while the project goals’ focused on transparent, effective and efficient public services (or rather relying mostly on Public Advisory Councils (PACs) and restricting the list of allowable paid public services).

***Effectiveness***

The project helped develop a vast amount of policy/legal documents, including strategy papers, laws, government decrees, regulations, M&E systems, etc. In relation to public services the adopted legislative acts were part of a logical continuum. Regardless of the changes of the Government the reformist priority was maintained. However the lack of a PAR blueprint, envisioned at the onset of the reforms but replaced by the relevant section in the NSSD, meant that there was no strong framework in which the activities would be prioritized.

Under a recent WB supported initiative on developing a roadmap for PAR more than 30 strategies related to PAR were inventorized and the lack of solid connections and prioritization was evident. CDF supported regulatory reforms fit under the roadmap, but the question is more about priorities rather than overall relevance. Overall much of what was planned in the Annual Workplans was implemented or changed over time, due to the project’s flexible nature.

There are ***verifiable improvements in the area of public administration***, ***optimization of public services system and ICT for Development*** (e-governance).

* *Certain important foundation Laws and Strategies were adopted* including the Laws on Public and Municipal Services (2014), the National Strategy on Local Self Government Development (2013), the Government’s Program of Transition to Sustainable Development (2013-2017) and it’s Action Plan and the Law on Public Advisory Councils (2014)*;*
* *The regulatory framework for public services was established: there was virtually no legal basis for this before CDF.* This statement needs to be qualified in two respects, as it is true (a) in relation to a narrow definition of public services (i.e. covering only those that are explicitly requested and paid directly by citizens) and (b) more so at the central government level than local (it had to start from the central level and only then move to the local level but time ran out to complete that; the focus was on the latter at the time of writing this report). With this caveats in mind, it could stated that the regulatory framework for public services was improved thanks to the CDF. The Unified Public Service Registry (with standards and regulations) envisaging 386 public services mandatory for all ministries/agencies (down from around 20000) is an important achievement limiting the possibility of adding more in a discretionary manner. All of these are important stepping stones to pursue deeper reforms later;
* *The regulatory framework for E-governance was advanced with CDF support:* The E-governance Strategy and Action Plan for 2014-2017 (with the definition of technical standards and requirements for e-services) which were developed with CDF support are key documents to frame the further reforms. The key decision to establish an e-Governance Center within the PM’s office to coordinate e-governance work was influenced by CDF supported transfer of experience from Estonia; and
* *The regulatory framework for local self governance was somewhat improved with CDF’s help*. It supported the development of the first Program on local self-governance development and its Action Plan 2013-2017

*CDF's contribution to civil service reform has not been as significant as envisioned at the start of the reforms and reemphasized in the MTR*. CDF helped the State Personnel Service (SPS) with (a) the analysis of legislation and policies related to civil servants salary payment regulation I 2012; (b) comparative analysis of the labour laws and legislation on civil service with recommendations on introduction of a real career "fair" promotion of civil servants (submitted to the Prime Minister’s (PM) Office in 12/2012) and (c) draft law “On Civil and Municipal Service” (submitted to the PM Office 08/2014). While over the past few years the government has undertaken some important steps towards enhancing pay systems and improving competitiveness of pay in public health and education[[6]](#footnote-6) (CDF contributed to this through the analysis of the legislation and policies related to civil service pay mentioned above), unreformed civil service pay limits incentives for career progression in civil service, making it almost impossible to attract and retain qualified staff. The cooperation with the State Personnel Service was to some extent affected by the changes in the leadership at the start of CDF

There are ***verifiable*** ***improvements in capacity development*** ***for policy -making and coordination*** of key institutions

* *The capacities of such key institutions as the Prime-minister Office, President’s Office and a number of key government units was enhanced* through classroom and on-the-job trainings, peer-to-peer exchanges, study tours, websites and manuals. *Arguably* these achievements in the line ministries would have been more significant if preceded by comprehensive functional analyses[[7]](#footnote-7) by CDF. The Government’s covered functional analysis as part of its reorganization; as for CDF, it supported less comprehensive gap assessments in 4 agencies (Ministries Interior and Foreign Affairs, State Register Service and State Health Insurance Fund), before committing on the capacity building activities there. 5 Government agencies (*the former State Directorate on Rehabilitation and Further Development (SDRD) of Osh and Jalal-Abad; the State Agency on Local Self Government and Interethnic Relations (SALSGIR), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Health Insurance Fund* and *the Ministry of Interior (MOI)*) received more significant capacity development support. Parts of this assistance was more relevant for the project goals than others (e.g. of questionable relevance at the MOI) and based on MTR, CDF moved away from fragmented assistance packages to the line ministries in 2013. A similar subproject with the State Registry Service did not materialize as a result of the apparent lack of interest in the changed leadership of this institution;
* *The coordination of the implementation* and *the M&E of the two flagship* *documents were improved* with CDF support (*NSSD and the Government Program of the Kyrgyz Republic for Transition to Sustainable Development (2013-2017*);
* *The capacities of CSOs, particularly Public Advisory Councils (PACs) were strengthened with CDF support through* trainings, improved cooperation mechanisms (Coordinating Council), handbooks and manuals, and alike;
* *The capacities of the state institutions and CSOs to cooperate was enhanced* through platforms and PAC mechanism; and
* *The capacity of the state institutions was enhanced in terms of soliciting feedback from the citizens* through on- line public reception centers.

The capacities of the staff of key government agencies, the President’s Office, and CSOs were enhanced *inter alia* through the transfer of knowledge from the experts’ groups and so even though the initially planned model of “*change agents*” did not materialize (as it turned out not to be welcome by some of the important international partners, like the WB and IMF), the approach worked well overall, except that perhaps the list of experts could have been expanded to insure more knowledge sharing from the larger region. There was an independent survey of the participants of the trainings, supported by CDF, which revealed that 82% of the respondents considered the trainings effective and the vast majority reported that they at least some aspects of the training in their work.

As for the goal of ***promoting transparent, inclusive and efficient public and municipal services delivery, the situation is more mixed.***

* ***Transparency /anticorruption and rule of law:*** In 2011 the CDF began building the capacity of some 40 PACs. The performance of the PACs over the past few years has been mixed however. The evidence indicates that the role of the PACs was much appreciated at the beginning, in 2010, right after the revolution since they responded to the demands of the population for more transparent operation of the government. Later however some PACs have been taken hostage by private interests (Ministry of Transport for example) while others have thrived (Ministry of Finance). One of the root causes of this was seen in the fact that PACs worked on the basis of a Presidential decree which was not sufficiently specific about their mandate. With CDF support a Law on PACs was developed and signed in May 2014 and the process of selecting new PAC members was ongoing at time of this evaluation, based on the requirements of the new Law, which, arguably, addressed the observed shortcomings. Whether this time round their performance would be better remains to be seen.
* PACs turned out to be the main vehicle for the achieving of the “transparency” goal of CDF, apart from relying on the perceived transparency- outcome of the restricted list of public services from the Register. There were also limited actions related to civil monitoring of public services, and corruption risk assessments for 2 ministries (Education and Health, with no follow up actions supported by CDF as was tentatively planned. although they served as a basis for both ministries in developing their anticorruption programs), and support for the establishment of the Anticorruption Service of the State Committee on National Security (with the rules, procedures and structure). Thus overall CDF’s contribution to directly combating was somewhat limited
* ***Inclusiveness:*** A roadmap for implementation of the National Gender Strategy 2012-2020 was draws up and sectoral gender action plans completed in select ministries with CDF support and gender focal points were trained. It is likely that the gender balance in the delivery and monitoring of public services, setting the standards and their monitoring will improve in the future, also thanks to CDF contribution.

***Efficiency***

The project has produced a remarkably large number of policy related documents in a short time. The focussed PAR work only really started in late 2012 and in 2 years did much to establish a regulatory framework for public services. The fact that the citizens have not as yet experienced the results of the changes in this regulatory framework is explained more by the short duration of the policy related work. Having said that, the passage of some of the draft laws took a rather long time most likely because legislators did not prioritize them, achieving consensus in a coalition government can be difficult and there was some resistance from within. Also, CDF could have been more efficient to assign pilot areas/services to reach their implementation towards the end of the project.

More coaching for the project team by high caliber international experts provided by both funding agencies post 2011 could have been beneficial (there was a Senior Adviser overseeing CDF’s capacity building activities from October 2010 till the end 2011). CDF has built close synergies with the UNDP/EU funded “*Open Justice Project*” and there were trainings activities co-funded with OSCE. There were also some synergies built with the OSF funded “Public Monitoring” project and some other project from the UNDP portfolio. Cooperation with other donors, and the WB and USAID in particular could have been stronger.

Cost effectiveness was not part of the TOR of this evaluation but the quick review of the budget did not reveal any major unjustified spending items.

***Country ownership***

The state institutions of Kyrgyzstan – both the Government and the President’s office have assumed overall strong ownership of the project, including through the creation of a dedicated Unit in the Ministry of Economy coordinating public services reforms. Most Government agencies demonstrated commitment to agreed actions (with the notable exceptions of the State Registration Service). Yet the overall speed of reform was somewhat slow being hampered by the country’s weak institutional capacities; with the abolishment of the national agency for the prevention of corruption, the country lacks an effective institutional mechanism for corruption prevention and awareness-raising (OECD (2012))[[8]](#footnote-8). Some of the more painful changes, like overhaul of the civil service (the need of which emphasized at the onset) were avoided by the Government.

***Sustainability***

As most of the deliverables have been formalized as laws, government decrees and documents, it seems most likely that the reform will be implemented, without a need for significant new financial resources. That the WB supported PAR is commencing now also ensures a degree of assured sustainability. But of course the implementation of some project Outputs, especially the strategies and monitoring plans, depend on the availability of funds. The overall budgetary standing of the country is a threat to sustainability (for an example the NSSD has committed funding for only 35% of the envisioned measures)[[9]](#footnote-9).

UNDP has developed a project-proposal on the improvement of public services’ in consultation with the PM, CSOs and expert’s community in November 2014. It spells out the priority Government’s actions in PAR within implementation of NSSD. On a positive note UNDP in Kyrgyzstan is committed to continuing the support and completing the work started under CDF on the regulatory framework of public services and this area is in the roadmap of PAR developed recently by the Government with WB support. However it is less certain if there will be sufficient donor interest to monitor and evaluate a new service delivery system.

The introduction of training-materials on public service in the curricula of the Public Administration Academy is likely to ensure a sustainable stream of professionals well versed in the concept and policies. However the piecemeal nature of civil service reforms poses challenges: in light of a significant increase of wages in health and education, unreformed civil service pay limits incentives for career progression in civil service, making it almost impossible to attract and retain qualified staff (WB (2014))[[10]](#footnote-10). This is a threat for the sustainability of the PAR reforms. There are also concerns related to the sustainability of the PACs especially in relation to the funding for their coordination: there is a Coordinating Council (CC) of PACs but the new law does not envision any logistics expenses for it (rent, website, secretariat, experts, etc).

As for the socio-political factors, the picture is rather mixed. In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan remains a leader with regards to state-civil society cooperation, and the government appears genuinely committed to improving public service provision. Even with the frequent changes in Kyrgyzstan government, and transformation since June 2010 of the country into a parliamentary republic, reform is ongoing, albeit at a slow pace. The implementation of the reforms is being hampered however by the country’s weak institutional capacities.

***Potential for Impact:***

The CDF has a good potential to have a positive impact for citizens as users of public services at the central government level, once the reforms are implemented. There is a good chance that the adopted regulations will be put into practice though the quality of the implementation is less assured. The certainty of implementation at the local government level is less clear as the reforms there are much less mature and capacity limited. The Government Action Plan includes step by step actions to be undertaken towards municipal services optimization however.

As for the transparency of public services, there is a chance that the PACs will help assure their transparency, being a bridge between the Government and the citizens. However in the past while some PACs were very efficient, others overstepped their mandate or pursued their members’ narrow interests. More measures should be put in place to ensure government transparency and accountability for service provision, e.g. through further development of public monitoring mechanisms.

The table below summarizes the ratings for the project along the evaluation criteria

Evaluation Ratings

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1. Monitoring and Evaluation** | ***rating*** | **2. IA& EA Execution** | ***rating*** |
| M&E design at entry | **MS** | Quality of UNDP Implementation | **S** |
| M&E Plan Implementation | **MS** | Quality of Execution - Executing Agency | **S** |
| Overall quality of M&E | **MS** | Overall quality of Implementation / Execution | **S** |
| **3. Assessment of Outcomes**  | **rating** | **4. Sustainability** | **Rating** |
| Relevance  | R | Institutional framework and governance | L |
| Effectiveness | S | Socio-political: | ML |
| Efficiency  | MS | Financial resources: | ML |
|  |  | Human Resources:  | ML |
| Overall Project outcome Rating | S | Overall likelihood of sustainability: | ML |
| Potential for Impact:  | ML |  |  |

*S- satisfactory; MS- moderately satisfactory, L-likely, ML-moderately likely, R-relevant,*

**Summary of conclusions**

The CDF has supported the implementation of a remarkable number of initiatives since 2011, with a focus on public services and the process of policy making to guarantee more effective governance and service provision, and not on carrying out visible and tangible change. The diversity of these interventions came at the price of a strategic approach to reform and the citizens have not as experienced the impact of the regulatory improvements. Factors to justify this include changes in the government, the establishment of a parliamentary republic, the legalistic and administration-heavy culture of decision making, personal and institutional interests obstructing reform and the general looseness of the project’s outputs and objectives.

The very flexible nature of the project gave the ability to the government to take full ownership and shape the CDF to meet its immediate needs. But at the same time this has meant that some potentially more important, more visible reforms were not pursued. Even though the reforms that CDF supported were needed, and reflected in the annual Government Programs, the lack of a PAR blueprint, with priority areas identified, weakened the CDF’s strategic focus, and meant that at times the available resources were spread too thin.

Certain mechanisms developed through the CDF – especially the PACs – are extremely advanced for the region and seem to give Kyrgyz civil society an opportunity to have a real oversight role in decision making. The implementation however was not without flaws: indeed, partly this is because of the novelty of idea, as it was bound to take time for the PACs to become the bridge between the civil society and the state bodies (their main mission). Whether they will be eliminated remains to be seen, a lot will depend on the maturing of the civil society.

**Lessons learned**

After a revolution and inter-ethnic strife, the OSF and UNDP should be credited for supporting the government at the time when many other donors withdrew or were in a waiting mode. Flexibility in design in such circumstance is very important to meet new emergent needs. In more stable environments when more structured reforms are pursued, flexibility in project design should ideally be coupled with engagement with the government to ensure that international best practice is used in designing and implementing reforms (at the time of time of writing this report this was happening in Ukraine or Albania for example).

Step by step reforms that follow the whole policy formulation-implementation cycle are important. In the Kyrgyz case this “technical” approach was useful because there was no strong political vision and across-the board strong will from the executive to reform. But consequently, at the end of the project there are no “quick wins” (supported by CDF) to show average citizens. They do not see much project impact. In such circumstances, especially if there is a very active and vocal civil society, including their representatives in the project design could have helped secure popular buy-in and prioritization of the reforms needed. Similarly stronger partnerships and synergies with other agencies like the WB, USAID, etc., working on similar issues could have helped with pressing ahead with important but painful reforms and hence increase impact exponentially. More precise implementation timing could have allowed CDF managers to also ensure that at the close of the project there were at least some of visible for the public

The CDF which started with a focus on proving “change agents to work in the government” did not pursue this aim until the end. It was decided early on not to use salary top-up schemes to remunerate high caliber professionals to work inside the government (for a variety of reasons: legislation, civil service pay related, reform, etc) but to hire temporary local consultants.. Transfer of knowledge did take place but civil service reform is important to ensure a stream of high quality professionals into government. Transfer of knowledge and civil service pay related reforms should be pursued in parallel. It is also important to ensure a good balance between local and international expertise especially in the countries where the number of high caliber specialized local experts is still relatively limited.

Platforms and councils like the PACs could serve as important bridges between the government and the citizens, and provide public oversight, but their mandates and operation principles need to be well detailed and elaborated. Such bodies could help fight corruption but cannot fully replace public monitoring mechanisms and other measures, like regulatory measures which would increase the risks of corruption while in parallel increasing the rewards for effective civil servants (related to increased pay for the civil servants)

**Recommendations for follow up**

It is important to complete the reforms started by the CDF. Given the Government’s financial limitations, this will require more international donor support. Any future support should fit into the PAR roadmap, identifying sectoral priorities, which the World Bank helped formulate. Potential areas which OSF could support through a (partial) continuation of the CDF include:

1. anticorruption in the civil service;
2. public monitoring of service provision; and
3. the implementation of the e-governance strategy, possibly piloting it in Bishkek. The latter could help open electronic access to public services whose standards and regulations were developed under the CDF.

As a corrective measure the Law on PACs should be amended or supplemented with regulations which will allow for (a) covering of the logistics expenses of the PACs’ and the Coordinating Council’s operations; and (b) sustainable mechanism for the training of the PACs.

# INTRODUCION

## Background

UNDP in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR hereafter) is implementing the project “Capacity Development Facility (CDF hereafter)” co-funded by the Open Society Foundation (OSF). CDF was initiated with the support of UNDP Regional Bureau of Europe and Central Asia (RBEC) immediately after the revolution and ethnic conflicts of 2010. CDF was designed as a *flexible, rapidly responsive and a proactive facility* to *provide capacity development to the Government (GoK) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) of Kyrgyzstan* with the following three-fold *objectives****:***

1. strengthening capacities for policy -making and coordination;
2. enhancing public sector organizations and staffing capacities at organizational and individual levels; and
3. promoting transparent, inclusive and efficient public and municipal services delivery.

More generally, CDF aimed at getting the government structures operational and support advisory services to the Government to allow the effective and efficient delivery of services to the populations based on the respect for human rights and gender equality.[[11]](#footnote-11) The project aimed at supporting the Prime-Minister’s Office, the President’s Office and the key public institutions to secure stability and good governance, envisaging ***two key components*:**

1. "***Change-agent support***", seeking to flexibly (and urgently) address capacity bottlenecks in the Government’s and President's effort to secure stability and good governance throughout the elaboration and implementation of ongoing constitutional reform; and.
2. ***Long-term capacity development support to key institutions*** in the reform process,

The Provisional Government that came into power following the 2010 April revolution set forth an ambitious reform agenda, including introduction of a Parliamentary system to reduce the scope and power of the President and limit the worst abuses of the preceding two regimes. The new Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic was adopted by a public referendum on 27 June 2010 and Kyrgyzstan became the first parliamentary democracy in Central Asia. Relatively free parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 2010 and 2011 respectively. It was recognized also that, in addition, internal and external oversight mechanisms needed to be strengthened, including the watchdog role of civil society and the idea of the Public Advisory Councils (PAC hereafter) was born. Political developments continued to unfold however, with changes in the parliamentary majority coalition in August 2012 leading to the formation of a new political alliance.

During this time CDF operated based on the 2 subsequent versions of the Project Document (ProDoc hereafter): the first time it was revised in 2012 in the light of the changing political developments. In February 2013 the CDF internal midterm review (MTR hereafter) was held with the assistance of RBEC Capacity Development experts. It recommended revising the scope of the project and focusing more on Public Administration Reform (PAR hereafter) while retaining flexible Capacity Development assistance to key partner institutions. This revision suggested reformulation of the envisaged expected results for CDF, as follows:

1. Professionalism, efficiency, transparency and accountability of public administration improved through policy support and capacity development; and
2. Improved internal operations of identified state institutions leading to strengthened policy development and implementation

 Mr. Soros pledged an initial $500,000, with a further $1.5 provided after matching UN funds were raised. In March 2011 a cost sharing agreement was signed between OSI and UNDP according to which UNDP contributed a similar amount and all project management and reporting responsibility was handed over to UNDP. The implementation began in October 2010 (effectively in 2011). Initially the project was designed to last until the end of 2012. However, due to the changes in design (after it became apparent that the model of salary top ups for “change agents” will not be followed and a different approach was pursued) the budget allocations were changed and the project was extended until December 2014 within the same amount of budget.

UNDP manages the project implementation under the guidance of a Steering Committee in which OSF Kyrgyzstan also holds a seat. The project is managed by UNDP PMU, which was set up as a result of the restructuring in UNDP in 2012 whereby the strategy function was separated from the implementation. The Government (and the Office of PM in particular), the office of the President, a number of key government agencies are the main project partners along with a number of CSOs.

## Purpose of the Evaluation

The current independent Final Evaluation was conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP as reflected in the Cost-sharing Agreement between the Open Society Foundation and the UNDP as well as the UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Policy.[[12]](#footnote-12) The Final Evaluation:

* assesses the achievement of project objectives in relation to the goals and expected results expressed in the program documents, reviews their sustainability, as well as assesses the impact/potential impact of the Project in building national capacity;
* reviews and assesses partnerships between the government bodies, civil society, international organizations as well as the links/joint activities with other UNDP Programmes/Projects, UN Agencies and other donors;
* draws lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP and OSF programming; and provides recommendations for follow-up activities.

## Outline of the Report

The remaining of this report is organized as follows

* **Chapter 2** describes the scope of the evaluation and the approach taken, evaluation questions, along with methodologies employed, as well as limitations and mitigation strategies;
* **Chapter 3** presents the findings for the evaluation along with the following evaluation criteria: relevance (of the project *per se* and its design), effectiveness (achievement of outputs and outcomes planned), including the extent of mainstreaming of gender balance into government decision making; efficiency of implementation and execution; country ownership sustainability and impact;
* **Chapter 4** presents the Conclusions;
* **Chapter 5** discusses Lessons Learnt; and
* **Chapter 6** concludes with Recommendations.

# EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, QUESTIONS AND APPROACH

Evaluating capacity development and change management is a challenging task in general. This complexity is related to the notion of capacity itself and the multitude of the many factors affecting capacity building.[[13]](#footnote-13) In this case it is particularly challenging given the intentionally flexible design as planned and the de-facto changes that had occurred. To address this challenge, the evaluation:

1. ***Relies on the traingulation*** of findings from various sources. Trinagulation involves developing the reliability of the findings through multiple data sources of information bringing as much evidence as possible into play from different perspectives in the assessment of hypotheses and assumptions. These sources included documents, Key informant interviews (KII hereafter) and field visits. The desk review included both *Project documentation[[14]](#footnote-14)*; and *3rd party reports* (e.g. WB, EU, OSCE, etc). The list of the interviewees (see Annex 2) was drawn carefully to ensure that the respondents represent all types of stakeholders (Government, International organizations, experts, ordinary residents, UNDP and OSF staff);
2. ***Relies on contribution analysis*** when in the assessments of the outcomes it is not possible to attribute the results observed solely to the project;[[15]](#footnote-15)
3. Uses elements of ***Outcome mapping*** *(OM)* in the evaluation. OM focuses on behavioral changes of individuals and organizations that are straightforward to measure with the assumption that change in these areas will eventually translate into visible, behavioral change and lead to changes in systems and resources. OM recognizes complexity, and the fact that capacity building providers cannot control or force change in boundary partners (Government of KR in this case as well as CSOs), as these have the ultimate responsibility for change within their own organizations; [[16]](#footnote-16) and
4. Uses elements of ***Most Significant Change (MSC)*** approach in the evaluation (for the reasons above), heavily relying on the qualitative analysis of the feedback received during the interviews including the stories and experiences of the respondents.[[17]](#footnote-17)

The final evaluation assesses the ***relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact/potential for impact of the project.*** The lattereffectively amounts to the evaluation of project’s contribution to the UNDAF/CDP Outcome #3 “*By 2016, national and local authorities apply rule of law and civic engagement principles in provision of services with active participation of civil society*”, which was stipulated in the TOR. Table 1 contains the definitions of the evaluation criteria from OECD Development Assistance Committee[[18]](#footnote-18) (but which correspond to UNDP definitions) together with the approaches taken under this evaluation for each criterion. The evaluation includes a short case study on PACs (see Box 2). And finally, in line with the TOR the evaluation report contains rating along the set performance criteria in Chapter 4 on Conclusions).

Table 1: Glossary of evaluation terms, including evaluation criteria

| Term | Definition | approach to the evaluation as applied to the key main 5 evaluation criteria |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Relevance* | The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies. Note: Retrospectively, the question of relevance often becomes a question as to whether the objectives of an intervention or its design are still appropriate given changed circumstances.  | In line with the definition of relevance the evaluation assesses whether the objective of the project and its design were relevant to the needs of the country and not duplicative of the other efforts. Since the Outputs and Activities have changed often the evaluation looks into the possible changes in the relevance as well as processes employed by CDF management to ensure continued relevance |
| *Effectiveness* | The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. | The evaluation assesses effectiveness of the results at the level of Outputs and Outcomes. This includes a review of the achievements against targets set out in the Project Results and Resources Framework. This applies to the “Output” level. As for the level of Outcomes, the assessment is based mostly on qualitative information solicited through the interviews, as well as references from the 3rd party reports, backed up by quantitative evidence where applicable, to capture for example the extent of capacity building, improvements in transparency and accountability, etc; |
| *Efficiency* | A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results. | Several aspects of efficiency are assessed, namely: quality of project implementation and execution, quality of M&E framework and its execution; extent to which potential synergies were pursued and key financial aspects(e.g. the extent of co-financing planned and realized and variances between planned and actual expenditures). Evaluating cost efficiency is not part of the TOR and would have been hardly possible given the timeframe and resources available |
| *Sustainability* | The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time. | Several aspects of sustinability could be distinguished. The TOR identified three, namely: Institutional framework and governance; Socio-political and Financial resources. This is in line with the best practice of assessing sustainability but there is one more aspect which is important: human resources. Hence the evaluation assessed the likelihood of and threats to sustinability along these four lines; |
| *Impact/* *Institutional development impact* | Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.The extent to which an intervention improves or weakens the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources, for example through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Such impacts can include intended and unintended effects of an action. | In line with the TOR, the evaluation assesses the extent of the achievement of (a) *verifiable* *improvements in capacity development* of key government institutions such as the Prime-minister Office, President’s Office and other selected government units, and civil society organizations, particularly Public Advisory Councils, and (b) *verifiable improvements in the area of public administration*, *optimization of public services system and ICT for Development* (e-governance). It is argued however that these indicators are Outcome indicators, while the impact is at the level of the ultimate beneficiaries, i.e. improvements in the effectiveness of the public service and the rule of law. This is reflected in the ProDocs and TOR in relation to assessing the contribution to UNDAF Outcome. This is a methodological question as per “*where do we stop*”, as coined in INTRAC (2010)[[19]](#footnote-19). In other words, is it enough for a capacity building provider to show that its efforts have helped an organization (or individual) to improve its capacity, or should providers go further and measure the wider effects of these changes? It is argued here that because organizations touch so many lives we can only ever *illustrate* the changes that occur as a result of improved capacity. However the project did not mature enough to have concrete measureable impact on citizens Hence the *potential for impact/* *progress towards impact* is assessed rather the actual impact.  |

## Evaluation Questions

According to the TOR, as part of the current evaluation a list of evaluation questions was developed and agreed both with UNDP and OSF (as below in Table 2). Annex 1 contains the same table but matched against the information sources.

Table 2: Evaluation Questions

| Evaluation Criteria and main questions from the TOR  | Expanded list of Evaluation Questions  |
| --- | --- |
| **Relevance**: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the UNDP focal area, and to the good governance and sustainable development priorities at the national level? | How does the project relate to the main objectives of the UNDP focal area? |
| How does the project relate to the good governance and sustainable development priorities at the national level? |
| How did these changes affect the relevance of the project?  |
| What were the most relevant and least relevant aspects? |
| How relevant was the project design?  |
| Did the project address unmet needs? Where the activities complementary to other initiatives or duplicative? |
| **Effectiveness:** To what extent have the expected outcomes and outputs of the project been achieved? | To what extent have the expected activities, outcomes and outputs of the project been achieved? What was the project’s contribution to these changes? What would have happened in the no-project scenario? |
| What were the factors helping or hindering to achieve the planned results?  |
| What was the most significant positive change achieved and what consequences it could have?  |
| In particular what were the most important changes in the PA framework that the project contributed to? |
| Were there observable changes in the behavior of the institutions concerned? If yes, what type? If not then why? |
| **Efficiency:** Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards? | Was the project implemented efficiently in terms of time? |
| Was the project cost effective? Did the expected leveraging in funding materialize?  |
| How adequate was the M&E framework?  |
| How effective was the project in partnership building? How well were the potential synergies with other initiatives utilized?  |
| How were the changes introduced? Was there an established process of review? |
| **Sustainability:** To what extent are there political, institutional, social-economic, and/or financial risks to sustaining long-term project results? | To what extent are there political risks to sustaining long-term project results? |
| To what extent are there institutional risks to sustaining long-term project results? |
| To what extent are there social-economic risks to sustaining long-term project results? |
| To what extent are there financial risks to sustaining long-term project results? |
| To what extent are there risks to sustaining long-term project results in terms of the availability of the qualified human resources? |
| How adequate was the project design to ensure sustainability? |
| **Impact:** Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, a) development of capacities of key government institutions such as the Prime-minister Office, President’s Office and other selected government units, and civil society organizations, particularly Public Advisory Councils, b) improvements in the area of public administration, optimization of public services system and ICT for Development (e-governance)?  | To what extent did the project affect the capacity of the institutions? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future? |
| To what extent did the project affect the behavior and processes of the institutions? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future? |
| To what extent did the project affect the capacity of the stakeholders to monitor and evaluate change? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future? |
| How did the project affect the effectiveness of public service delivery? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future? |
| How did the project affect the rule of law in the context of the work of the organizations concerned? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future? |

## Evaluation Approach

The evaluation process adhered to the international norms and standards for independent evaluations by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). It was carried out in a participatory manner, soliciting feedback from a variety of sources and continuously verifying these, including through validation sessions with project management. At the same time all measures were put in place to assure the independence of the evaluation and the elimination of the bias (e.g. assuring the anonymity of the responses to the KII questions).

## Limitations

The flexibility of the project, i.e. the fact that its Planned Outputs (with Targets) changed several times over its lifetime posed a challenge for the evaluation. The described methodology (above) was thought to be the best way to address this challenge.

# FINDINGS

## Relevance

### Relevance of the project

The project went through 3 rather distinct phases, and the revisions in the ProDocs (of which there were three) reflect these phases of change. Throughout this time the **project stayed relevant** to the needs of the country. In particular:

* **1st phase (2011):** starting right after the revolution and before Mr. Atambayev taking over the Presidency in December 2011. The flexibility of the project and the focus on communication with the public (especially in the context of the ethnic conflict in the south of the country[[20]](#footnote-20)), together with the mechanisms of the civil society oversight over the operations of the Provisional government and urgently addressing the capacity gaps were very much needed at the time. The focus on Public Administration Reform (PAR) was very relevant. Kyrgyzstan’s public administration lacked adequate resources and was underperforming due to widespread corruption, very low salaries, dominant patronage networks, and the replacement of experienced civil servants, rarely based on professional performance and merit (Balmyrzaeva: 2011)[[21]](#footnote-21). Moreover, laws and regulations governing public administration were controversial, ambiguous, and frequently changed without notice. There was also a lack of predictability in the enforcement of the law, with high levels of discretionary power given to public officials. This offered further incentives for officials to apply the law according to their interests;[[22]](#footnote-22)
* **2nd phase (2012).** The project responded to the needs emerging from the new President and the government coming to power in 12/2011 and changes in the Constitution leading to the changes in the relative roles of the Government and the President’s Office. The project responded to many requests of the Government for the support in several areas pertaining to reforms, including public administration (but not only). According to WB (2013)[[23]](#footnote-23), if the Kyrgyz Republic's economic and social development agenda was viewed through the single lens of improved governance, three wide-ranging areas of activity would come into focus as key challenges and opportunities, and s*trengthening public administration and public services,* especially those relating to lowering poverty, improving accountability and oversight, enhancing human capital, and reducing ethnic, gender, and social disparities was one of them and perhaps the key one.[[24]](#footnote-24) Thus the increasing *relative focus* on public services among the other areas of PAR was also relevant. Prior to reforms there were a large number (more than 20000) services introduced by various government agencies, charging fees. This was an area where the government agencies directly interacted with citizens and hence the reforms *had a potential* to manifest in visible positive behavior change by the government bodies;
* **3rd phase (2013-2104):** after the MTR the project focused on PAR more and in a more structured way, building on the achievements related to public services from the 2nd stage.Third party reports vouch for the widespread recognition of the continued importance of improving public services. For example, WB (2013) stresses that while since mid-2010, the Kyrgyz authorities have made important progress towards restoring economic, political, and social stability in the new constitutionally-mandated division of responsibilities between the presidency, the prime minister, and the parliament, the transition to a more inclusive, open, and representative government was at an early stage and susceptible to occasional volatility and the social reconciliation remained very much a work in progress, with the fundamental causes of the conflict remaining still to be fully addressed. Despite certain laudable achievements, improved governance in state institutions and in virtually all aspects of the economy and society remained the country's overriding development challenge.

The project is in line with the tasks related to PAR outlined in

* National Strategy on Sustainable Development (2013-2017) and the Government Program of the Kyrgyz Republic for Transition to Sustainable Development (2013-2017);
* the recent WB supported Public Sector Governance reform roadmap (started in 2013)

Thus to conclude, targeting improvement of public services as part of improved governance and improved public administration was relevant, as an overall topic. Whether this was the most important sole aspect in a wider notion of public administration is a different matter. This however, brings the discussion then to the relevance of project design in the next section.

### Relevance of the project design

The planned project outputs have changed in the course of the project. According to the original Project Document, CDF envisioned the following subcomponents under the 2 main components

1. "***Change-agent support***", seeking to flexibly and urgently address capacity bottlenecks in the Government’s and President's effort to secure stability and good governance throughout the elaboration and implementation of ongoing constitutional reform. According to the original ProDoc CDF envisioned 2 main subcomponents, namely; (a) engaging a group of consultants as change agents and (b) Communications and Advocacy Strategy for the change agents to reach out to people, media, variety of stakeholders as well as proactively involving the political leadership; and
2. ***Long-term capacity development support to key institutions*** that were thought would emerge through the reform process, and in particular through the overhaul of the civil service administration. The original ProDoc envisioned the following 4 subcomponents: (a) preparation of a blueprint for the broader PAR; (b) creating a core group of civil servants; (c) creating an Incentive and Innovation Fund; and (d) monitoring and evaluation (M&E hereafter) of capacity building efforts

Over time CDF developed from a facility flexibly providing advisory and executive support to predominantly the Prime Minister’s Office and the President’s office in a post crisis situation to a facility that more structurally supports the policy development cycle and strategic planning in the context of elaborating PAR approaches and advancing in the corresponding legislative/regulatory reform. Such flexibility**,** as mentioned earlier was envisioned at the start, as part of the project design and its feature. Changes occurred in relation to specific Outputs planned (discussed later in this Section). It should be mentioned that the ProDocs fail to convincingly argue for the choice of the changing Outputs over time (except for the latest one from 2013 perhaps, which also has better formulated Outcomes and Outputs as it incorporated the recommendations from the MTR report). None of the ProDocs contains a theory of change (TOC) clearly spelled out and the results chain developed (this is not a requirement under UNDP procedures, but a best practice). In Figure 1 an attempt is made to develop it marking the changes over time (without “Activities” and spelling out of the assumptions due to space limitations of the space).

There are aspects of the project design that have been relevant without any doubt. For example, the idea of the expert group advising the Interim President and the Provisional Government o the communication agenda with the public and in the south in particular related to the ethnic conflict in the beginning of CDF was very relevant. The same is true for the assistance with the main strategy documents (NSSD and the Government Program). Some of the other features of in the project design and the changes in it merit a more detailed discussion in relation to the relevance. This discussion follows below.

#### Flexible design

The idea of keeping the project largely flexible was justified in the evolving circumstances of Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of the revolution in 2010. This was the reason of designing it as a Facility back in 2010. But the project stayed very flexible even after the MTR when tackling PAR in a more structured way came into play. The merits of the flexibility in this later stage are not entirely certain. The interviewees in their vast majority thought that this was needed given the evolving situation, e.g. with s shift to parliamentary rule. As one key member of the PM office put it: “…*we could have set many very specific tasks with deadlines in the ProDocs, but I can assure that we would not have managed to stick to them….*’ The flexibility allowed the Government to take full ownership and shape the CDF to meet its immediate needs, There were a few other opinions as well however, claiming that perhaps it was too flexible, with certain side effects, including challenges in planning and building synergies between various components of the project and large number of ad-hoc requests from the Government which became overwhelmingly numerous in 2011-2012. Somewhere in 2012 the project management itself recognized that it was being snowed under ad-hoc requests and requested the RBEC expertise to have a more structured approach to the project. This did result in the reduction of ad hoc requests but did not eliminate those.

Figure 1: Reconstructed Results Chain for CDF as it evolved over time



#### Project Outputs

***Starting from a PAR blueprint vs. focusing on specific areas:*** Instead of starting from a blueprint of the PAR (as was envisioned but not pursued)[[25]](#footnote-25) and then deciding where would the investment of CDF money bear the most significant results pertaining to the goals of the project, CDF based on the request from the Government focused on reforming the process in which the public services are provided by state institutions. As one of the key partners for CDF from the PM’s office put it: “... *earlier we had spent years working out grand strategies which did not led anywhere…here we started form the narrower task and only then moved to the bigger picture … and we learnt while doing it,,,*”. It could be argued that this is a valid approach. Such an approach, i.e. concentrating on very specific areas of PAR where progress is more likely to be achieved and could serve as an example, is advocated also by some international expert practitioners.[[26]](#footnote-26) At the same time, such piecemeal approach to PAR has led to a situation when a recent WB expert group identified more than 30 various strategies related to PAR one way or another; this inventory has led to the decision by the Government in 2014 to develop a road map for PAR with the WB support, whereby each Ministry would concentrate on 3 main areas of reform. This is something that could have been done back in 2012 with CDF support.

***Quick wins (big bang) vs. step-by step approach.*** Citizens have not as yet experienced the positive impact of the project. There is a good chance that they will, when the regulations developed are implemented. Given that there were essentially only 2.5 years of a focused work on reforming the regulatory framework for public services, it is hard to imagine that it could have been done much quicker so that at the close-out of the project there were visible results for the citizens. The experience from similar countries and the research available[[27]](#footnote-27), on the other hand, mostly point to the merits of at least some “quick wins”, as the visible reforms induce behavior change and increase the trust in the reforms. The importance of this “big bang” approach has been well documented and so has the importance of a committed political leadership, acting quickly. This is particularly relevant for the reforms aimed at tackling corruption, as reducing the perceptions of corruption can help to reduce the corruption *per se* This approach was taken in Georgia where the authorities concentrated on 2 sectors only initially (energy and traffic police). While it could be argued that the situation in Kyrgyzstan with its coalition Government was quite different from the situation of post-revolution Georgia, the merits of tackling at least a few quick-wins could have been considered. WB (2013) stressed that improved governance needs to encompass the delivery of essential public services in Kyrgyzstan, such as education, health, and social protection: such specific issues for quick-wins could have been attempted in these areas.

***Change management must be very closely linked to Capacity Development and policy reform.*** As an example, PAR policy framework must be very closely linked to change management. As noted in the MTR change management in public institutions should rest on several core functions, and one of the key issues is that public sector wide change management requires both improved policy directions and a harmonized operational methodology to structure the change management approach[[28]](#footnote-28). The MTR called for the CDF management to ensure this understanding translates into an adapted approach as to how to support the national partners in this change process. While CDF could be credited in pursuing a harmonized approach in reforming the regulatory framework for public services, the links to the overall PAR policy could have been stronger. As an example, it could be argued that developing the register of services for each Ministry should have been preceded by detailed functional analysis of these Ministries (see Section 3.2.1 for further discussion).

***Definition of public services:*** An additional issue is that public services were defined narrowly, only as services which are explicitly requested and paid by the citizens directly. And hence the services which are paid for from the budget did not qualify. It could be argued that for citizens there is no significant difference how they pay for a service: directly or through the taxes that they pay. As an example, traffic police is not defined as a public service now in Kyrgyzstan in the framework of the reforms (since this is not an explicitly requested by the citizens service), while this is an area where corruption is widespread and an area where the improved and transparent service would have been welcome by the citizens.

***Fragmented support to line Ministries***. The way this support was structured was based competition which was announced among the Ministries for proposals. This limited the potential of supporting the activities most relevant for the goals of the project activities. The MTR recommended that CDF moves away from sketchy support measures to line ministries and this type of measures reduced in number post- MTR (see Section 3.2.1)

#### Anticorruption/rule of law

As the project evolved, the emphasis on anticorruption efforts diminished. Mainly there were only 2 corruption risk assessments conducted for 2 ministries:[[29]](#footnote-29) assessments were used by sectoral ministries for the development of sectoral anticorruption action plans in 2013 but with no follow up by CDF *per se* (although the follow up was tentatively planned); . There were also (a) recommendations related to the establishment of a new organ on corruption prevention (*the Anticorruption Service of the State Committee on National Security),* with the rules, procedures and structure (with no follow up), as well as some support to the Council of Selection of Judges. Thus the Public Advisory Councils (PACs) remained by and large the sole avenue to carry this aspect of the reforms apart from the anticipated anticorruption outcome of restricting the number of public services provided for a fee. The evaluation team heard various explanations for this diminishing focus on anticorruption efforts from UNDP, ranging from the fact that UNDP had other projects tackling corruption (e.g. the UNDP-USAID funded project on Budget Transparency, which was completed in March 2014) to the claim that there is no evidence of a strong will at the Government to forcefully tackle corruption and any such focus on behalf of CDF would have been misplaced. At the same time corruption was and is one of the key ingredients in the problems associated with public services, along with the capacity constraints and cumbersome regulations. 3rd party reports indicate that while the challenges with corruption persist, there have been several initiatives undertaken by the government aimed at reducing opportunities for corruption[[30]](#footnote-30). And hence it could be asked whether a different design for the CDF was warranted with a more highlighted attention to tackling corruption. True, the flexible design the project meant that it responded to the requests from the Government and the ultimate design meant that there was no desire for such a design. But then perhaps, there should have been more inclusive identification of the problems to be focused on at the onset, with the participation of the civil society, with the involvement of relevant international experts and with closer engagement with development partners from the international community.

#### Change agents

The initial idea of the experts acting as *change agents inside the government* agencies did not work: it became clear at the start of the project that it will be difficult to implement the planned “Incentive mechanism” (salary top ups) as there were legislative complications and some of the key international partners opposed the idea (e.g. WB and IMF). Perhaps this should have been clarified at the onset, although is clear that the 1st ProDoc was developed rather quickly in the circumstances when there was turmoil in the country. Eventually the project chose to work with expert groups, who both assisted the ministries in the policy-related work and trained the staff: overall this worked well, but while the project engaged some of the best local experts, it could have widened the scope, e.g. inviting more experts from the region.

#### External communication

The MTR emphasized that the government external communication structure is important in two directions. Firstly the government wishes to demonstrate to the citizens that it succeeds in improving services, and secondly the government wishes to convey to the development partners (the EU, World Bank, UN-system, and the bilateral donors) the progress it is making on its commitments to development and reform. During the interviews conducted for this evaluation some of the key Government representatives admitted that more focus was needed on external communication (although some activities did take place, see Section 3.2.1). This brings the discussion back to the focus of the project and the available timeframe: the project draws to its close and the citizens have not as yet experienced the benefits that could have been then highlighted in the communication to them: the external communication so far included only certain measures to explain the reforms in the public media.

## Effectiveness

### Achievement of Outputs

**Policy documents**

There is a vast amount of policy documents the development of which was supported by the project, including strategy papers, laws, government decrees, regulations, etc. One positive element is that in relation to public services the adopted legislative acts marked a logical continuum, covering polices, laws, regulations, M&E systems (although not necessarily in that order in time), serving as a learning path both for the expert teams and the government staff. The list of accomplishments by subtopic is presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Policy documents developed with the help of the project

| Area  | Document | Status  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Overall PAR Process** | Support to the development of the National Strategy on Sustainable development and the Government Program  | The NSSD was endorsed by the President Decree of the Kyrgyz Republic on January 21, 2013, # 11. The Government Program of the Kyrgyz Republic for Transition to Sustainable Development (2013-2017)  |
| Program on the development of the Local Self Government (LSG)  | The Program on LSG development and its Action plan for 2013-2017 was approved by the Government Decree of the KR on December 18, 2013 # 678 |
| **Optimization of Public Service Delivery**  | Inventory of registry of Public Services, leading to new unified registry of Public Services  | Public services of 45 governmental units were inventoried by the group of national experts with the aim to optimize them. Based on results of the inventory Government issued Decree # 85 dated February 10, 2012 on establishment of the Unified Registry of Public Services envisaging 386 public services mandatory for all ministries/agencies, limiting their authority to issue their own registries |
| Development of typical standards to access public service (‘passport of public service delivery’)  | The typical standard of public services was approved by Government Decree of the KR on September 3, 2012, # 603. First 11 standards of public services were approved by the Government Resolution of the KR # 303 dated 3 June 2014. Most of draft standards of public services have developed and passed through the Interdepartmental Commission under the Government on forming Unified Registry of public services under the Government of the KR |
| Development of Administrative Regulation of public service delivery (rule of procedures/ business processes)  | The manual on drafting and the template of the administrative regulation of provision of public service were approved by the Government Order of the KR # 287-p dated 22 July 2014. The process of developing administrative regulations for public services has been launched. |
| Law on the provision of public and municipal services  | The Law of the KR "On public and municipal services" was approved by the President Decree of the KR in July 17, 2014 # 139. |
| Inventory of Municipal Services | The Regulations on the procedure of registry of municipal services was approved by the Government Resolution of the KR # 302, 3 June 2014.  |
| First draft of Registry of Municipal Services  | Draft of basic municipal services register has been developed and submitted to the Prime-Minister Office for approval. |
| Development of Typical Standard of Municipal Services  | Amended resolution # 603 of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic "*On typical standard of public services*" dated 3 September 2012. At present the typical standard and instruction can be used in the field of municipal services (Government Resolution of the KR # 311 dated 4 June 2014) |
| Methodology to assess performance of governmental units and LSG  | The methodology on the assessment of performance of the governmental units was updated based on the results of pilot introduction of this methodology in 2012 and approved by the Government Decree of the KR of the KR dated on March 25, 2013 # 147.The additional baseline indicators approved for insertion in the overall system was passed by the Government Resolution of the KR # 126-p dated 18 April 2014. The Law of the KR "On amendments to some legislative acts of the Kyrgyz Republic” was adopted on 15 January 2014. The Law aimed at improving M&E of legal acts (strategies programmes) |
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| Development of Methodology for Citizen’s Monitoring on Public Service Delivery/Public units’ functioning  | Draft methodology on civic monitoring of public service delivery has been developed and submitted to the PM Office for approval in February, 2014. |
| Additional follow-up legal and regulatory arrangements following the approval of the main laws presently under consideration/ approved | A list of normative-legal acts was developed on the required amendments for smooth implementation law on Provision of Public and Municipal Services, which was submitted to the Prime-minister Office of the KR in June 20, 2014. It was based a legal analysis of current national legislation.  |
| **Civil Service Reform** | Analysis of legislation related to Civil Servants salary payment regulation, the budget estimation on the financial resources requested to maintain the Civil Service Fund and to establish salary top-up arrangements for the civil servants  | The analyses of current legislation and policies related to Civil Servants salary payment regulation and the budget estimation on the financial resources requested to maintain the Civil Service Fund on salary increase were done and submitted to the State Personnel Service of the KR in December 2010. ***Not implemented after all***  |
| Analysis/Review of current Civil Service system  | The analytical review based results of analysis of contradictions of labor laws and legislation on civil service was developed with recommendations on introduction of a real career "fair" promotion of civil servants. Submitted to the Prime-Minister’s Office of the KR in December 2012 |
| Draft law on state and municipal civil service arrangements  | The unified draft law “On Civil and Municipal Service” was developed and submitted to the Prime-minister Office of the KR in August 6, 2014. |
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| **E-Governance** | E-readiness assessment – directly related to optimization of public service delivery  | Assessment was submitted to the PM Office of the KR and based on this assessment, E-Governance Strategy and its Action Plan was drafted |
| Draft Unify Catalogue of the Technical Standards for E-Services  | Submitted to the Prime-minister Office of the KR on December 2013. The Prime-office will use this document during of implementation of E-Governance Strategy and its Action Plan.  |
| Draft organizational structure to support policy development, implementation and coordination of E-governance  | Adopted by Government Decree of the KR #310 dated June 03, 2013. |
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| E-Governance Strategy | Adopted by Government Decree of the KR #651 dated November17, 2014. |
| Support the development and implementation of the E-Governance Action Plan | Adopted by Government Decree of the KR #651 dated November17, 2014. The implementation of this action plan will be started. |
| **Gender** | Roadmap for implementation of National Gender Strategy 2012-2020  | Approved by the Order of the Ministry of Youth, Labor and Employment on September 10, 2012.  |
| Sectoral gender action plans completed and approved by selected ministries  | Completed and approved by Orders of ministries and agencies in 2012: - State Agency for Communication of the KR, October 31, 2012;- National Bank of the KR, July 27, 2012; - Ombudsman Institute of the KR, November 11, 2012; - National Statistic Committee of the KR, November 13, 2012; and - State Penitentiary Service of the KR, November 6, 2012, etc. |
| Pilot activities under the National Gender Strategy for 2012-2012 and action plan. | The methodology of monitoring of National Gender Action Plan (NGAP) was developed and submitted to the Ministry of Social Development of the KR in July 2013. Based this methodology this Ministry monitored NGAP implementation in 2013. The report was sent to the Prime-minister Office and reviewed on the session of the National Council on Gender Development under the Government of the KR on November 5, 2013.Draft standards of gender competence in hiring and promotion of public and municipal servants and recommendations on introducing of gender-sensitive recruiting, promotion and retirement were submitted to the State Personnel Service in October 2013.Draft law “On social and legal protection from domestic violence” was developed and submitted to the Ministry of Social Development of the KR in November 2013. Currently under finalization in the Ministry of Social Development.Draft methodology for assessing of gender sensitivity public services was developed based on draft standards on school education in October 2013 and submitted to the ministry of Economy of the KR in November 2013. Based on of this methodology have been finalized and developed the draft standards of public services during 2014. Now this methodology is approval by Order of the Ministry of Economy of the KR |
| **Functional Review of government structures** | Functional Review of President Office  | Functional Review Report of President Office with respective recommendations was submitted to the President’s Office in June 28, 2011: were used during designing of their new structure |
| Draft law ‘Head of State and new structure of President Office’  | These documents were submitted to the President Office in June 2011. *Taking into account a political environment in the country the President Office decided to hold this draft law and not to promote it through the Parliament.* |
| Functional (gap) analysis of PM Office  | Report on gap analysis of the Prime-minister Office with respective recommendations to increase their institutional capacity was submitted to the PM Office in October 17, 2011: these were used during designing of the new structure. |
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| **Government – Society relation management** | Analytical review of PAC activities and achievements  | The Analytical Review on PACs activities and achievements was developed to inform the community about PACs achievements and challenges that occurred to PACs functioning since their establishment. This review was submitted to the President Office in May 22, 2012. The information and analytical handbook for members of PACs - “Public councils as an effective tool for accountability of the Government afore the society" was published in Kyrgyz and Russian languages in June 2014 |
| Law on Public Advisory Councils  | The Law "On public councils of state bodies“ was adopted by the President Decree of the KR in May 24, 2014, # 74  |
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**Capacity Building related to core executive functions**

***1. Capacity Building for the President’s Office***

* A group of strategic communication advisors (Group “K”) was formed to provide advisory support to the President and her press-unit. The Group developed a number of projects: «Ethnic» project. - strategy on post-conflict situation after June 2010 events; “Democracy package” with sub-projects: (Public Advisory councils as the President’s and CSO initiative; “Green Memorandum” on Bishkek green space; Court Inventory; and Election package);
* Strategic Communication recommendations and a Public Information Strategy for the Office of the President in 2010 were developed. According to the available information the President at the time (Roza Otunbaeva) has personally expressed her satisfaction with this work;
* The President’s web site was upgraded to provide timely information about President and President’s Office activities to the population in 2011;
* Support the President Office in implementation of action plan on the public communication strategy, e.g. a weekly TV program (ongoing at the time of writing this report); and
* Needs assessment of the Information Policy Department of the President’s Office of the KR was conducted as well as draft of action plan for the Information Policy Department of the President’s Office of the KR in 2012. This action plan was used by this Department of the President Office in its activities. We received the official thank you letter from the President Office about it in May 8, 2013

***2. Capacity Building for the Prime Minister’s Office***

* Communication plan and implementation support related to the coverage of the reform process of the Government in the media at the local and international level; plus training for the press secretaries of the ministries and agencies;
* Network of the electronic public receptions (on central, regional and district level) in the country (63 points) and the modernization of the Government’s web-site;
* Support with the establishment of the *dialogue platform* between PM’s Office, expert community and CSOs to identify priority actions for PAR;
* Support for the senior administrative and political officials’ orientation for E-Governance, including: a series of E-Gov trainings and study tours organized in 2013-2014 in Bishkek and outside country, active and interested persons & agency’s identified and involved further into the process of E-Gov introduction;
* support with the implementation of NSSD and Government Program of the KR for Transition to Sustainable Development (2013-2017) through the *Expert Advisory Group*under the PM of the KR, which helped draft 15 normative-legal acts in specific areas of these 2 key documents and results framework for line Ministries; and
* Expert advice to the ‘*Commission on Optimization of Administrative System and Development of New Structure of the Government’*: the recommendations were used by this Commission during reorganization of ministries and agencies in 2012.

***3. Capacity Building for the Line Ministries***

* State Directorate on Rehabilitation and Further Development of Osh and Jalal-Abad cities (SDRD) was coached and mentored with a view to build its capacity in effective rehabilitation and restoration activities in the south at the start of the project;
* The project planned to support selected capacity building measures in 4 government agencies (selected after announcing a competition). The bullet points below provide further details (the planned project with the State Registry Service did not materialize, see later in this Section); for each of the 3 agencies below an Action Plan on capacity building was elaborated:
	+ ***Ministry of Foreign Affairs*** was supported with the introduction of the corporate ICT strategy (e-visa, electronic document flow system, e-archive, e-signature, IP-telephony, web portal, etc.). The best practice from Estonia and Armenia was incorporated;
	+ ***Mandatory Health Insurance Fund*.** The Database and softwareon “Treated cases” was upgraded in order to improve the internal business processes and better service delivery. The social video clips, brochures and posters raising awareness among the population on their rights for obtaining medical services were produced and broadcast/disseminated (it was noticed that the number of inquiries from the citizens increased after that). Normative legal documents were developed improving the regulatory framework on pharmaceutical products (adopted by the Government Decree dated December 11, 2012 # 823); and
	+ ***Ministry of Interior*** was supportedwith the introduction of the corporate ICT-based network and software applications for Human Resource Management (this did not include however support for the establishment of a testing center to promote more transparent hiring practices; the database has information only on the existing staff, see later in this Section);
* The newly established ***State Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic on Local Self Government and Interethnic Relations (SALSGIR)*** was supported with:(a)mapping of all international and donor organizations’ activities in LSG field; (b)training and expert advice and implementation support related to the *Programme on LSG development* (developed with CDF support) in the form of trainings, development of mechanisms for implementation of the Law on delegated functions; peer to peer exchange[[31]](#footnote-31).

**4. *Capacity Building for the Local government bodies*** *with* (a)training on the basic competencies of local councilors andCSOs (on the promotion of inter-ethnic reconciliation and conflict prevention/management; and (b) M&E of activities in selected municipalities.

**5. *Capacity Building for the intergovernmental bodies, funds and councils***

* ***Support to Peace-Building Fund***: the Council of Judges **was** supported in conducting transparent and impartial selection of judges through development of the selection tools, trainings on HR and communications, enhancing public relations; website; and training of journalists about the mandate of the Council for the Selection of Judges;
* ***Support to Thematic Trust Fund (TTF) – Global Thematic Programme on Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness (PACDE)****:* Corruption risks assessments in Heath and Education sectors were developed with involvement of the international and national experts and submitted to both of ministries and to the Working Group on identification corruption schemes in different sectors of economy under the National Defense Council of the KR in 2013. These assessments were used by sectoral ministries for development of anticorruption action plans in 2013. The planned follow up by CDF was not pursued further by the project;
* The ***General Prosecutor’s Office*** was supported in improvement of its communication, investigation and prosecution of the inter-ethnic conflict related crimes, with the advice from BiH experts. A manual on inter-ethnic conflict crimes investigation and prosecution was produced;
* The ***Secretariat of the National Council on Sustainable Development of the KR*** was supported in coordination and monitoring on the NSSD realization. An Expert Group was established (and supported by CDF) under Secretariat of NSSD to monitor the implementation of NSSD; and
* ***National Gender Mechanism*** was supported with training of the focal points of respective agencies and with the monitoring of the implementation of the National Gender Action Plan 2012-2014

5. ***Capacity Building for the Civil Society Agencies***

* The web-sites of the ***International Foundation “The Initiative of Roza Otunbaeva”*** and the National Forum of Compatriots were developed;[[32]](#footnote-32) and
* ***PACs***were trained in auditing, strategic planning and developing the regulative and legal frameworks[[33]](#footnote-33); the website for the Coordination Council of PACs was created with CDF support; and a handbook for members of PACs on “*Public councils as an effective tool for accountability of the Government before the society*" was developed and published.

#### Achievements of Outputs in relation to the targets

In line with the requirements of the TOR, the achieved outputs of the project (from the Annual progress reports) were compared to the plans from the Annual Work Plans (AWPs) based on the targets specified; also the information from ATLAS (UNDP’s results reporting system) was used for this comparison. It could be stated that the **planned deliverables were mostly achieved[[34]](#footnote-34)**. Apart of the planned mode of the “change agents” mechanism, some of the other main items that *were planned* and did not materialize include:

* the blueprint for PAR was not formulated as a final product at the onset of the project as was planned. The interviews indicated that the relevant Sections in the NSSD and the Government Program of the Kyrgyz Republic for Transition to Sustainable Development (2013-2017) were considered to suffice;
* functional analyses of 4 ministries were not conducted bar the assessments of the requests for support of the 4 government agencies (and these do not constitute a comprehensive functional analysis). MTR stressed the high desirability for this to happen. NB: the GoK adopted several decrees during 2011-2012 with revisions of the Government structure with some elements of functional analysis). [[35]](#footnote-35);
* the plan to capacitate the 10 Ministries to implement socioeconomic development plans did not materialize (with the exception of SPRD activities in the South). Instead, there were trainings on strategic planning within implementation of NSSD in 2014 for 31 state agencies carried out by the State Personnel Service and Action Plans were developed for 4 government bodies (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, State Registry Service, and Mandatory Health Insurance Fund), forming a basis for the follow up projects in three of these (described earlier);
* the planned activity with the State Registry Service initially developed and approved as a result of the competition which was announced by CDF was not implemented due to the frequent changes in the management team of this institution during 2012;
* using diaspora as a resource for expertise did not materialize, even though CDF supported the 1st ever Meeting of Compatriots in Kyrgyzstan, organized by Roza Otunbaeva Initiative, and the database of the experts was passed on to the State Personnel Service. According UNDP PIU no suitable candidates could be identified in this list;
* The idea of developing a Citizen’s Confidence Index on Public Service Delivery/Public units’ functioning was cancelled based on the request from the Government with an argument that the National Institute for Strategic Research is conducting an analysis in the framework of developing the M&E framework for public services (and this includes Citizen’s Confidence Index on Public Bodies)

One striking observation from this comparison is related to large number of ***additional activities carried out*** (as opposed to those planned). This is particularly true for 2012, before the MTR, when the CDF, according to the project managers was snowed under the ad hoc requests (according to the experts who had conducted the MTR, “*there was no overarching story… everyone was doing separate individual activities*”)[[36]](#footnote-36)

A few other observations seem to be worth noting, including:

* Some of these additional actions are rather loosely connected with the goals of the Project, e.g. those related to gender based violence; and
* Some of the activities raise questions about the merits of funding under CDF, e.g. language training courses for the MFA personnel or the purchase of office equipment and furniture for the newly established LSG agency and the conferencing equipment for the General Prosecutor’s office.

At the same time, some of the important areas which merited more forceful reforms to contribute to the overall PAR reform did not receive the adequate focus, e.g. civil service reform despite the fact that MTR suggested that it becomes a priority and the original ProDoc underscored the necessity of the overhaul of the civil service administration. The reforms related to civil service supported by CDF have been patchy so far. CDF has helped State Personnel service with (a) and analyses of current legislation and policies related to Civil Servants salary payment regulation; (b) comparative analysis of the labour laws and legislation on civil service with recommendations on introduction of a real career "fair" promotion of civil servants (submitted to the PM of the KR in December 2012) and (c) draft law “On Civil and Municipal Service” submitted to the Prime-minister Office of the KR in August 6, 2014 (see Section 3.2.2)

### Achievement of Outcomes

The reformulated in the MTR project Outcome is **“…*The respective government units and relevant civil society agencies have improved capacities to implement and contribute to the Public Administration Reform*”,** while the original 3 strategic goals from the first ProDoc were:

1. *strengthening capacities for policy -making and coordination*
2. *enhancing public sector organizations and staffing capacities at organizational and individual levels*
3. *promoting transparent, inclusive and efficient public and municipal services delivery.*

In the analysis below both versions of the formulation of the CDF Outcomes are assessed incorporating the indicators suggested in the TOR (para A below).

1. There is ***a notable progress along the first two points of the strategic goals/outcomes.*** In particular:
* There are ***verifiable improvements in the area of public administration***, ***optimization of public services system and ICT for Development*** (e-governance).
	+ ***The regulatory framework for public services was established: there was virtually no legal basis for this before CDF.***  This statement needs to be qualified in two respects, as it is true (a) in relation to a narrow definition of public services and (b) more so at the central government level than local (it had to start from the central level and only then move to the local level but time ran out to complete that; the focus was on the latter at the time of writing this report).. With this caveats in mind, it could stated that the regulatory framework for public services was improved and this could be attributed to CDF. The Law on provision of public and municipal services was passed (2014); the basic standard for the public services (2012); the template for the regulations and the first registry of basic municipal services, are important stepping stones to pursue deeper reforms further. The Unified Public Service Registry envisaging 386 public services mandatory for all ministries/agencies (down from around 20000) is an important achievement limiting the possibility of adding more in a discretionary manner.
	+ ***The regulatory framework for E-governance was advanced with CDF support:*** The E-governance Strategy and Action Plan for 2014-2017 which were developed with CDF support are key documents to frame the further reforms. The same is true for the definition of technical standards and requirements for e-services. The key decision to establish an e-Governance Center within the PM’s office to coordinate e-governance work was influenced by CDF supported exchange of experience with the Estonian professionals and infused by the very advanced experience of Estonia related to e-governance.
	+ ***The regulatory framework for local governance was somewhat improved*** CDF contributed to the advancement of the Local self-government (LSG) supporting the first Program on local self-governance development and its Action Plan 2013-2017 (approved in 2013); and
	+ ***While there is some progress related to civil service reform the situation is rather mixed. CDF's contribution to civil service reform has not been as significant as envisioned at the start of the reforms***. The key CDF contribution was so far in the form of the draft law “On Civil and Municipal Service” submitted to the Prime-minister Office of the KR in August 6, 2014. The *“Program for Enhancing Pay System in Civil and Municipal Service in 2013 – 2020*” was developed by the SPS and approved by the Government of KR (Statute N 383 from June 28, 2013). CDF contributed to this through the analysis of the legislation and policies related to civil service pay conducted n 2012. Over the last few years, the government has undertaken some important steps towards enhancing pay systems and improving competitiveness of pay in public health and education – sectors accounting for almost 66 percent of the wage bill. Pay systems in the above mentioned sectors were streamlined and the number of allowances reduced, while greater focus was placed on individual performance, through performance pay. However, in light of a significant increase of wages in health and education, unreformed civil service pay limits incentives for career progression in civil service, making it almost impossible to attract and retain qualified staff. Therefore, civil service remuneration reform, launched in summer 2013, remains an important area, where government action is crucial to address inconsistencies and drawbacks within the current system (WB (2014))[[37]](#footnote-37).
* There are ***verifiable*** ***improvements in capacity development*** ***for policy -making and coordination*** of key institutions
	+ *The capacities of such key institutions as the Prime-minister Office, President’s Office and a number of key government units was enhanced* through classroom and on-the-job trainings, peer-to-peer exchanges, study tours, websites and manuals. Arguably these achievements in the line ministries would have been more significant if preceded by functional analysis, as discussed;
	+ *The coordination of the implementation and the M&E of the two flagship documents were improved* with CDF support (NSSD and the Government Program of the KR for Transition to Sustainable Development (2013-2017));
	+ *The capacities of CSOs, particularly Public Advisory Councils were strengthened with CDF support* throughtrainings, improved cooperation mechanisms, handbooks and manuals, and alike;
	+ *The capacities of the state institutions and CSOs to cooperate was enhanced* through platforms and PAC mechanism;
	+ *The capacity of the state institutions was enhanced in terms of soliciting feedback from the citizens* through on- line public reception centers; and

The capacities of the staff of key government agencies, the President’s Office, and CSOs were enhanced through the transfer of knowledge from the experts’ groups. There was a survey of the participants of the trainings, which revealed that 82% of the respondents considered the trainings effective and the vast majority reported that they at least some aspects of the training in their work (there were 243 respondents out of 494 training participants identified)[[38]](#footnote-38)

1. As for the 3rd Strategic goal namely ***promoting transparent, inclusive and efficient public and municipal services delivery, the situation is more mixed.***
	* ***Transparency /anticorruption and rule of law:*** In March 2011 then President Otunbayeva announced the creation of PACs to improve interaction between public administration and civil society, by empowering the mainly civil society composed councils (working on a voluntary basis) to ask for information from public bodies and make recommendations to them. In 2011 the CDF began building the capacity of some 40 PACs which were set up based on the Presidential decree. A PAC Coordination Council assists addressing cross cutting issues and liaises with the PM and President’s offices when needed. The performance of the PACs over the past few years has been mixed however. The evidence indicates that the role of the PACs was much appreciated at the beginning, in 2010, right after the revolution since they responded to the demands of the population for more transparent operation of the government. Later however some PACs have been taken hostage by private interests (Ministry of Transport for example) while others have thrived (Ministry of Finance). There were also challenges, related to, in particular, the attempts of some of the PACs to act as auditors, while not having such mandate and not being qualified. One of the root causes of this was the fact that PACs worked on the basis of a Presidential decree which was not sufficiently specific about their mandate. Some PACs were in fact dissolved before the expiry of their mandate (2 years). The claim that the performance of the PACs was rather mixed is based both on feedback received from the interviewees and reports (e.g. the “Analytical Review of PACs” (2011), supported by CDF. At the time of conducting the current evaluation there were no functioning PACs. A Law on PACs was signed in May 2014 and the process of selecting PAC members was ongoing based on the requirements of the new Law. A nomination commission has been set up to decide on PAC members. According to the interviews, the new Law has addressed the drawbacks which were observed before, but it remains to be seen whether this time round their performance would be better (see also Section 3.8.3 and **Box 2**).

As discussed earlier, PACs turned out to be the main vehicle for the achieving of the “transparency” goal part from the perceived anticorruption-bearing role of the Unified Registry of Services itself, coupled with some actions related to civil monitoring of public services, corruption risk assessments for 2 ministries and support for the establishment of the Anticorruption Service of the State Committee on National Security. A number of interviewees thought that much more attention should be given to merely ensuring that the requirements of the laws are implemented, e.g. related to the requirements for the agencies to have websites, to publish specified documents for public consultations as specified by the laws, to conduct public hearings, etc. Since combating corruption is an essential ingredient in promoting transparent, inclusive and efficient public and municipal services delivery, limited avenues to tackle corruption (and in CDF such plans got increasingly limited) on the top of the decision of not pursuing the big-bang approach meant limited outcomes of the project in the part of the transparency of public services.

* + ***Inclusiveness:*** A roadmap for implementation of the National Gender Strategy 2012-2020 was draws up and sectoral gender action plans completed in select ministries and gender focal points were trained. It is likely that the gender balance in the delivery and monitoring of public services, setting the standards and their monitoring will improve in the future, also thanks to CDF contribution.

## Efficiency

### Quality of Implementation

As is evident from Chapter 1, the first half of the project was implemented in the circumstances of instability starting from the post-revolutionary period, followed by the constitutional changes, elections, and the new President coming to power, and then further reshuffling in the government following the changes in the coalition. This could not have had its influence on the project implementation. In addition, UNDP was going through structural changes following downsizing of the office in 2012 and changes were happening at OSF Kyrgyzstan.

The project has supported a remarkably large number of policy related documents in a short time. The fact that the deliverables have not matured to the extent as yet that citizens experience the changes at the government agencies is explained more by the short duration for this more focused work on the regulatory framework of public services (2.5 years effectively). At the time of writing this report, close to the end of the project this has not materialized. There are also certain actions that took rather long time. For example certain drafts were under the review of government for over 3 years e.g. the Law on State and Municipal Services. One interlocutor that OSF representative met in September explained that the process of standardization is slow because there has been significant resistance from ministries and other agencies to hand over authority over services. Indeed, this one the factors explaining the slowness of some of the activities.

Having said with a different design, at least some of the public services could have been piloted with the reformed regulations to demonstrate resulting improvement of the quality and access to public services by citizens and legal entities.

OSF maintained extremely light oversight over the project, only taking a seat in the Steering Committee. UNDP staff has generally been open to greater OSF involvement but in practice they took all management decisions – for example on the 2013 refocusing of the CDF – with little or no OSF involvement (beyond presenting them at the steering group meetings). There was also a light-touch oversight by UNDP in the face of the extremely flexible design of the project. All these factors resulted in a situation in 2012, when, according to the experts who had conducted the MTR, “*there was no overarching story… everyone was doing separate individual activities*.[[39]](#footnote-39)” The project management could be credited in taking the needed action at that point inviting the RBEC experts for the internal MTR. The latter recommended that the project focus more tightly on PAR especially with the President and Prime Ministers’ office. Since then the project followed a better structured route, although the ad-hoc requests continued, albeit in declining numbers. Even in the ever changing circumstances that CDF faced, it could claimed that the time could have been better used somewhat more efficiently if there was a more structured approach to the project early on. It could be questioned whether a more active support from OSF with international experts coaching the program staff post 2011 (after the departure of Mr. Ercan Murat[[40]](#footnote-40), was appointed as a Senior Advisor to oversee capacity building part of CDF project’s activities from October 2010 till the end 2011) would not have been a welcome idea

### Quality of Execution

The staff at UNDP PIU was highly praised by all interviewees for their professionalism and hands-on approach to project management.

The MTR suggested reformulating the Monitoring framework for the project, urging to move away from the then existing results framework organized around the support provided to specific partners (e.g. President Office and the Prime Minster Office) to the one organized around the PAR process. While this was done, one more point still needs to be highlighted: the Progress reports do not contain explicit reporting against pre-specified in the AWPs targets and the divergence is not explained.

## Building synergies

**UNDP Projects:** The project actively built synergies with the UN and EU funded project on Operationalizing Good Governance for Social Justice (Social Justice Project or SJP hereafter). Box 1 contains a description of SJP. The most obvious synergies built between this project and the CDF so far has been in the form of the training of the local councilors; there were also workshops funded by CDF where the experiences of the 30 Community Service Centers were shared among the municipalities. Plus there were surveys which were conducted to inform CDF in the part of local register of public services in these 30 municipalities.[[41]](#footnote-41) There are synergies with other UNDP projects (listed below), but the evaluation team did not hear of any specific activities to build these synergies.

* Recently completed***USAID-UNDP “Budget Transparency Project”,*** which had the objective of the development of an anticorruption framework, introduction of international audit standards and performance audits, and assistance in increasing transparency of state and area budgets;.
* *“****Andarak – a Route to Peace through Rebuilding Trust****”:* to raise women and youth participation in peace building in two villages (started in 2012);
* ***Enhancing Democratic Rule of Law and Preventing Conflict in Kyrgyzstan*** designed to build the capacity of justice and security actors to better implement laws, conduct oversight of government and security services, combat corruption, provide service delivery and security and afford citizens and most vulnerable groups with access to justice, community security and legal empowerment;
* ***Widening access to justice for legal empowerment in the Kyrgyz Republic***: The project contributes to legal empowerment of disadvantaged groups and vulnerable population with a focus on rural women, children, youth at risk, and persons with disabilities.

**OSCE**: CDF has built successful cooperation with OSCE’s project *“Improving good governance though efficient service delivery in Kyrgyzstan*”. The two projects co-funded trainings for the PAC members as well as supported a study visit to Austria for 12 government and CSO representatives (10/2013). CDF supported participation of 2 persons.

**OSF:** Some synergies were built with OSF in the context of developing public monitoring mechanisms of public services. However there are more opportunities which could have been explored more (e.g. the Mining transparency initiative)

**USAID**: Since the spring of 2013 USAID is implementing a 5-year, $8.1 million worth ***Collaborative Governance Project***in Kyrgyzstan (through East-West Management Institute), one of components of which is aimed at supporting CSO advocacy.[[42]](#footnote-42) The evaluation team’s meeting at USAID indicated that there were no proactive efforts to build synergies between this program and CDF.

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| Box 1: UN and EU Project on Operationalizing Good Governance for Social Justice* Good Governance Initiative Working Groups (GGIWG) were established for the facilitation of good governance initiatives on improvement of service delivery in 30 target rural municipalities;
* To improve service delivery and create equal and better access of the most vulnerable groups to services, the project facilitated the creation of 30Community Service Rooms/Multifunctional Service Delivery Centers;
* Service Improvement Action Plans (SIAPs) were developed in each target municipality and endorsed, addressing the most acute (priority) needs of the local populations in improvement of the public and municipal services, as well as envisaging the detailed plan on improvement of their access and quality with concrete measurable results, indicators, timelines and responsible parties. Priority actions were implemented;
* The modern ICT tool, so-called “E-information booth” based on touch-screen PC with wireless access for central level content administration, were installed in Community Service Rooms of Orok and Mukhailovka municipalities;
* In cooperation with the Ministry of Health (MoH), the electronic patient card and medical management information system were introduced in Orok AO (GoFP), Sokuluk CoFM, and the National Hospital in order to create vertical information flow, proper interconnectivity between three levels of the healthcare system and integration with MoH central data bases. The entire system is presently in a testing phase;
* The major project’s indicator – Social Justice Index – was developed based on international practice and measured in each pilot municipality to help them to track their social development progress (Development Policy Institute - DPI). Training module was developed and trainings on the MSJI conducted (including ToT);
* A Social Justice Demonstration Fund was established within a framework of the project to finance interventions to improve delivery quality of key services in 30 pilot rural municipalities;
* In order to promote youth programmes, UNDP provided technical support for the development of Youth Municipal Action plans;
* A new concept on introduction of recourse mechanism was tested in pilot municipalities. The piloting process demonstrated the need to increase the level of legal awareness of the population .The partnership was established between Ombudsman Institute and the legal aid clinic “LBD”. In November 2013, the recourse mechanism has been launched in full-fledge;
* Territorial public self-governance (TPSG) initiated in 28 villages of pilot LSGs is a mechanism for involving villagers into decision making at local level, including improving the access to some of the services. All of them are in close collaboration with their relevant LSGs today and are running different development activities.

*Source: based on CDF project reports* |

## Use of financial resources

Annex 3 presents the project budget as it stood towards the end of 2013 (i.e. 2014 not included). UNDP mobilized both own source funds and the EU funds to meet the co-funding requirement by OSF. OSF funding covered $400,000 in costs in 2011, $122,176 in 2012, $768,950 in 2013 and are expected to total $705,950 in 2014.

A review of the budget demonstrates that the expenditures fit the project description and appear reasonable. In 2013 the most costly budget line was for $126,460 which went to cover the salaries of 7 domestic experts who served for 10 months in an Expert Advisory Group established under the PM: The large number of deliverables speaks to the large amount of work done by this group. [[43]](#footnote-43) The financial report for 2014 is not yet available, but payments to this expert group continued.[[44]](#footnote-44). As argued earlier the scope of the current evaluation does not allow for a though assessment of cost effectiveness. However the absence of the strategic focus, especially in 2012, is likely to have meant that the available financial resources were spread too thinly.

## Country Ownership

The state institutions of Kyrgyzstan – both the Government and the President’s office have demonstrated overall strong ownership of the project. The fact that there is now a dedicated Unit in the Ministry of Economy coordinating the reforms in public services points to both strong ownership and potential for sustainability. Most Government agencies demonstrated commitment to agreed actions with the notable exceptions of the State Registration Service.

The large number of the delivered regulatory documents and strategies support the claim that the country ownership was strong. However, while there are laudable achievements in various areas of reforms, including in the PAR overall and related to public services more specifically, the more painful reforms, including under CDF were avoided. This was reflected in the path that was chosen for this project as the detailed design was essentially in the hands of the Government.

## Sustainability

### Institutional framework and governance

The fact that there is a structural unit in the MoE to lead the coordination of the reforms related to public services supports the chances that the reforms will be followed through.

As noted in the MTR from a Capacity Development angle, the following entries are important:

* Translation of adopted policies and legal instruments into an operational implementation arrangements;
* Ex-ante assessment of impact and feasibility of policy implementation; and subsequent identification of (organizational and individual) capacity development assets and needs;
* Quality control on the detailed arrangements to implement the agreed upon policies and legal instruments;
* Evidence based (M&E) assessment and subsequent policy and strategy adaptation decisions; and
* Horizontal and vertical coordination.

Broadly, CDF followed this logic, and the fact that there are many new regulations imbedded in the legislative framework speaks in favor of the sustainability of the initiatives supported by CDF. However the operational implementation arrangements are the parts lacking due to fact that the project did not reach the stage as yet and this is the weak link in this logical chain.

Also the fact that the register of services was developed without functional analysis of the Ministries increases the chances that revisions will be needed once such analyses are conducted in the framework of a larger PAR agenda resulting in the overhaul of the competencies of the Ministries.

### Socio Political Factors

There is mixed evidence to ascertain that the socio-political climate is such that the sustainability of reforms is assured. In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan remains a leader with regards to state-civil society cooperation, and the government appears genuinely committed to improving social service provision. Overall it appears as though the government has recognized that it does not have the capacities to carry out all its obligations and is ready to partner with civil society for assistance. And indeed, even with the frequent changes in Kyrgyzstan government, and transformation since June 2010 of the country into a parliamentary republic, reform is ongoing. A new body was established in 2011, the Anticorruption Service of the State Committee on National Security, with the aim of further strengthening the country’s law enforcement capacities to fight corruption. Additionally, the government started an ambitious reform to improve the country’s business environment[[45]](#footnote-45). Several agencies and government bodies were restructured or merged, reducing the number of civil servants by 15% (EBRD, 2012).[[46]](#footnote-46)The public procurement framework was significantly improved[[47]](#footnote-47) (EBRD (2011)[[48]](#footnote-48); OECD (2012)).

However, implementation of this relatively strong legal framework is being hampered by the country’s weak institutional capacities (OECD (2012)). Overall, the reforms are happening at much slower pace than initially hoped. Some back sliding has occurred, e.g. overall violations of freedom of expression are apparently becoming more prevalent. And with the abolishment of the national agency for the prevention of corruption, the country lacks an effective institutional mechanism for corruption prevention and awareness-raising (OECD (2012)).

### Financial Factors

There is a makes a strong case in favor of arguing that the reform will be implemented and for sustainability in the part that would not require significant financial resources, e.g. regulations related to the public services. Of course this will hold unless the reforms are reversed, which does not seem likely especially given that the WB supported PAR is commencing now.

At the same time the implementation of some of the project Outputs, especially the strategies, monitoring plans alike depend on the availability of the financial means. The overall budgetary standing of the country is a threat to sustainability as there is no committed funding for all the measures for all the programs. As an example the National Strategy for Sustainable Development has committed funding for only 35% of the envisioned measures[[49]](#footnote-49).

There is some risk that now when the legal basis and regulation have been put in place for transformations in fields such as public and municipal service provision, international donors will pull out and no support will be available for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a new service delivery system. UNDP has developed project-proposal on the improvement of public services’ system in accordance with the NSSD and in consultation with the PM Office, CSO, and expert’s community in November 2014. On a positive note UNDP in Kyrgyzstan is committed to continuing the support and complete the work started under CDF on the regulatory framework of public services and it is possible that some funding would be found, especially given that this is in line also with the roadmap of PAR developed recently by the Government with WB support.

Implementation of the e-governance framework on the other hand is very costly and the evaluation team has not as yet heard about any committed funding for that. However, the recent joint World Bank/UNDP workshop on Open Data, held in Bishkek demonstrated growing interest of the national partners and international community to the subject: Open Data could become a strong entry point for the implementation of the e-governance framework, potentially opening up some funding opportunities like Open Government Platform.

There are concerns related to the sustainability of the PACs especially in relation to the funding for their coordination: there is a National Unions of PACs but the new law does not envision any logistics expenses for it (rent, website, secretariat, experts, etc)

### Human Resources

In terms of human resources the fact that the training-materials were introduced in the curricula of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic is a solid basis to hope that there will be a sustainable stream of professionals into civil service trained in the new concepts of public service (NB: CDF has not worked explicitly with the Academy, and this change in curricula has happened rather indirectly, mostly due to the fact that a number of the experts of the project also teach there). The question is more about retaining the better qualified civil servants. The fact that there is some progress in terms of the salaries of the civil service is a positive factor, but, as argued in Section 3.2.2 (and indicated in WB (2014)) overall the civil service faces significant challenges in attracting and retaining highly qualified staff.

The project funded ToT courses for PACs; however given that the financial basis of the PACs’ operations is not developed (at least not yet, see Section 3.7.3) does not infuse confidence that there is a sustainable mechanism for the training of the new PAC members.

## Potential for Impact

The CDF Jan-December 2013 Progress Report summarizes the projects main outputs: *“In 2013 the project contributed significantly to the improvement of public and municipal service system delivery...”* This description appears a bit optimistic. While much was done in the field of service provision, e-governance, local self-governance development and civil society inclusion in decision making processes, this involved the drafting of regulations and other administrative/legal texts and has not as yet reached the implementation stage. Asked to point out one area where service provision has improved recently for example, interlocutors were only able to mention the streamlined delivery of passports (NB**:** UNDP had some contribution to this but under a different project, plus this was supported mostly by other international partners in the context of the improvement of the conduct of elections and their monitoring).

There is a good potential that CDF will have a positive impact for the citizens as the users of public services at the central government level, once the reforms are implemented and there is a good chance that the adopted regulations will be put into practice (the quality of the implementation is less assured however). The same is less certain for the local government level, as the reforms there are much less mature, and here it is essential to follow through with the reforms and in particular at the implementation level. The fact that there is a joint with the Government Action Plan in accordance with which step by step actions are planned to be undertaken towards municipal services optimization is a basis for optimism

As for the transparency of the public services, there is a chance that PACs will resume playing the important role of being the bridge between the Government and the citizens, but given some of the previous experience makes one cautious and it will have to be seen. Apart from PACs it would be important to advance in measures ensuring the adherence to the laws by the government agencies in the parts concerning their transparency and accountability

# CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, CDF has supported the implementation of a remarkable number of initiatives since 2011. There were many improvements in the regulatory area of various areas of PAR (see Figure 2): in some areas, like related to public services, more than in some others (e.g. civil service reform).

Figure 2: Areas of PAR, were CDF had contributions to various degree



*Source: MTR*

Even though the reforms that CDF supported were needed, and reflected in the annual Government Programs, the lack of a PAR blueprint, with priority areas identified and the diversity of these interventions weakened the CDF’s strategic focus, and meant that at times the available resources were spread too thin; the citizens have not as experienced the impact of the regulatory improvements.

Factors to justify this include changes in the government, the establishment of a parliamentary republic, the legalistic and administration-heavy culture of decision making, personal and institutional interests obstructing reform and the general looseness of the project’s outputs and objectives.

Positively, the very flexible nature of the project gave the chance to the government to take full ownership and shape the CDF to meet their immediate needs. But at the same time this has likely meant that some potentially more important, more visible reforms were not pursued.

Certain mechanisms developed through the CDF – especially the PACs – are extremely advanced for the region and seem to give Kyrgyz civil society an opportunity to have a real oversight role in decision making. The implementation however was not without flaws so far. Indeed, partly this is because of the novelty of idea, as it was bound to take time for the PACs to become the bridge between the civil society and the state bodies (their main mission). Whether these flaws would be eliminated remains to be seen; a lot will depend on the maturing of the civil society overall

The ratings of the project along the evaluation criteria are presented in Table 4. The rating scales are spelled out in Table 5. The ratings are based on the scale proposed in the TOR (with slight modifications)

Table 4: Evaluation Ratings

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1. Monitoring and Evaluation** | ***rating*** | **2. IA& EA Execution** | ***rating*** |
| M&E design at entry | MS | Quality of UNDP Implementation | S |
| M&E Plan Implementation | S | Quality of Execution - Executing Agency  | S |
| Overall quality of M&E | S | Overall quality of Implementation / Execution | S |
| **3. Assessment of Outcomes**  | **rating** | **4. Sustainability** | **rating** |
| Relevance  | R | Institutional framework and governance | L |
| Effectiveness | S | Socio-political: | ML |
| Efficiency  | MS | Financial resources: | ML |
|  |  | Human Resources:  | ML |
| Overall Project outcome Rating | S | Overall likelihood of sustainability: | ML |
| Potential for Impact:  | ML |  |  |

*S- satisfactory; MS- moderately satisfactory, L-likely, ML-moderately likely, R-relevant*

# LESSONS LEARNT

In the post-revolution environment especially with ethnic conflicts the governments need urgent support and OSF and UNDP could be credited with providing it at the time when many other partners withdrew or were in a waiting mode. Flexibility in design in such circumstance is very important since the situation might change quickly with new emergent needs. In more stable environments when more structured reforms are pursued, flexibility in project design should ideally be coupled with more engagement with the government n the form of high level expertise and coaching to ensure that international best practice is used in designing and implementing reforms

Step by step reforms and focusing on specific areas (developing these in detail to encompass laws, regulations, standards and M&E mechanisms) is useful especially in circumstances when there is no overwhelming buy-in from all parts of the executive but the importance of selected quick-wins with demonstrated results at the level of experiences of the citizens cannot be ignored. In such circumstances, especially if there is a very active and vocal civil society, it would be important to include the representative in the project design. For the same reason stronger partnerships need to be built with other agencies, like the WB, USAID, etc. Also, good time management and planning ahead are needed so that to the close of the project there at least some of the results visible to the public

Tackling important issues in the context of PAR is important even if these are related to different areas. It is true that regardless of the changes of the Government the reformist priority was maintained, but too many too different actions might risk spreading the available resources too thin and losing somewhat the strategic focus. To ensure that indeed the resources are put to the best use it is important to start with a well thought through blueprint of PAR with priority areas identified.

Using salary top-up schemes to remunerate high caliber professionals who would work inside government agencies might be complicated for a variety of reasons (legislation, civil service pay related reform, etc). Using local expert teams to work closely with the government agencies is also a good option, but it needs to be assured that the transfer of knowledge takes place and the civil service (including civil service pay) related reforms are pursued in parallel. However it is important to ensure a good balance between local and international expertise especially in the counties where the number of high caliber specialized local experts is not too large.

Platforms and councils like PACs could play a very important role to act as a bridge between the government and the citizens and also oversight role but their mandate and principles of operation need to be well detailed and elaborated. Such bodies could be useful in fighting corruption but they should not be the almost sole mechanism to rely on. Public monitoring mechanisms and other measures are equally important

# RECOMMENDATIONS

It would be important to pursue completion of the reforms which were started with CDF. Given the Government’s financial standing it would be important for the international community to continue supporting the Government. Given that with the WB’s support there is now a roadmap for the PAR, identifying the priorities in various areas, any future support should fit into this framework.

Potential areas where OSF could support this process include: (a) anticorruption measures related to civil service; (b) furthering the reforms related to public monitoring; and (c) further support to the implementation of e-governance strategy, possibly piloting it in Bishkek. This could be linked with support to implementing some of the public services for which the standards and regulations were developed with CDF support.

As a corrective measure it is recommended that the Law on PACs is amended or supplemented with regulations which will allow for (a) covering of the logistics expenses of the operations of PACs and the Coordinating Council; and (b) sustainable mechanism for the training of the PACs.

|  |
| --- |
| Box 2: Case Study: PACsThe idea of creating Public Advisory Councils (PACs) at government bodies came up during formation of new government structures and was initiated by the President’s Office (personally by ex-President Roza Otunbaeva). The idea of creating the PACs was to address the lack of public trust in government, and when necessary to find quick and reliable way of restoring this trust. They were meant to be the bridge between the citizens and the Government agencies. The idea of PACs was discussed with key international development partners (UN agencies, OSF, OSCE and USAID) before the implementation in 2011. They were established in practically all ministries and agencies based on a Presidential Decree receiving a rather wide mandate. PAC members were selected by a special Commission comprising civil servants and civil society representatives. Considering that PACs included nearly 10 members each (sometimes more), the process engaged more than 400 representatives of from a spectrum of quite vocal civil society organizations. The selection was followed by quite an extended period of time needed to organize the PACs in government bodies. Despite all the preparatory work there no sufficient clarity about the mandate and ways of operating. CDF helped to provide expert support for organizing PACs, as well as in the form of regular trainings for PAC members in various topics, sharing of successful practices. Formal tasks were rarely identified; activities depended on PAC members and their agreements between themselves and with government bodies. Certain donor organizations (UNDP, OSCE, Soros Foundation of Kyrgyzstan, USAID) have actively supported PACs and PAC activities. Sometimes support concerned specific PAC action plans, monitoring of ministry activities, or raising capacities of PAC members. PAC performance in various ministries and agencies varied. Some have been taken hostage by private interests (Ministry of Transport for example) while others have thrived (Ministry of Finance). There are indications that PACs are not equally active in all the instances when they are invited participate (related to public services). A government representative from the PM office claimed that even though civil society groups were invited to contribute to the preparation of these standards they “*were very passive*.” This is related to the civil monitoring of the public services: while the project helped to develop some formal guidelines (a methodology on civic monitoring of public service delivery was developed and submitted to the PM’s office), the attention to this was limited. PACs had 2 years mandate which expired in June 2013. A number of PACs were disbanded sooner than the expiration of the mandate because the relations with the respective agencies soured. The key contentious point was that some of the PACs attempted to act as auditors without having the clear mandate for it and training. The fact that they were established based on a Presidential decree and not a law was the root cause. And hence the idea of drafting and passing a Law on PACs was born. At the time of conducting this evaluation the options about having PACS again are divided. The idea was thought be an excellent one at the start, as the PACs combined the idea of public participation in the activities of government bodies and represented a form of people’s control over Government activities. 3 years later some think that PACs have served their role, and currently much more focus needs to be placed on strengthening the mechanisms of public monitoring and ensuring that the requirements of the laws are implemented related to the communication of state agencies with the public. The Law on the PACs was passed in 2014. According to some experts it remedied the shortcomings identified during the 2 years that they existed, related, in particular to their tasks, mandate, selection process (not only the of the PAC member but of the Selection Commission of the selection of PAC members to ensure that the latter is not dominated by the Government). Certain debates still persist, for example related to the idea of delegating the right to carry out public monitoring of public services to PACs (some argue that PAC members are not M&E professionals and that this kind of delegation would not ensure capturing the opinions of the actual beneficiaries in a representative manner). Some argue that there was an over institutionalization of PACs, turning them into almost another public institution, but without the corresponding detailed institutional and financial framework. Some also argue that PACs are not publically elected representatives and the selection commission is not in power to grant them a status that would imply this. There are concerns related to the financial sustinability of PACs, and more specifically the Coordinating Council of PACs. Currently the CC is located at the premises of one of the NGOs and the NG staff performs the secretarial duties for the CC on an unpaid basis. Hence there are questions related to the coverage of the financial expenses of the CC, as well as experts. And there will be a need in experts, in some narrow fields which will emerge. According to the current Law on PACs, the PACs need to find financial resources themselves e.g. applying for grant funding. This could not be a suitable and/or assured however. There are also concerns related to the absence of a sustainable mechanism for the training mechanism of PAC members. With CDF support there was TOT conducted for PACs but still, this is not institutionalized. Without doubt regular analyses will be needed of PAC effectiveness to help identify the emergent learning lessons not only to take corrective action but also a learning for other countries in the region*Sources: Analytical Review of PACs” (2011); KIIs, project documents*  |

# ANNEXES

## Annex 1: TOR

**Objective:**

An independent Final Evaluation (FE) will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP as reflected in the Cost-sharing Agreement between the Open Society Foundation and the UNDP as well as the UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Policy:

 http://web.undp.org/evaluation/policy.htm.

The final evaluation will look at relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact, including evaluation of project’s contribution to the UNDAF/CDP Outcome #3 “By 2016, national and local authorities apply rule of law and civic engagement principles in provision of services with active participation of civil society”. The Final Evaluation should assess the achievement of project objectives in relation to the goals and expected results expressed in the program documents; provide recommendations for follow-up activities; and draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP and OSF programming. It will include a short case study analysis of the project’s efforts to support the government’s capacities to provide e-services and e-governance and/or to strengthen public advisory council

**Scope of Work:**

An overall approach and method for conducting project final evaluation of UNDP supported projects have been developed over time. The Evaluation Team will consist of two consultants: one independent international consultant and one national expert. The international expert will be hired by the Open Society Foundations (Team Leader) and the national consultant by UNDP. The national consultant will work closely with the International Consultant and coordinate all activities with the responsible staff of UNDP Country Office in Kyrgyzstan. The national and international consultants may bid for this evaluation separately or as a team. The evaluation team is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact, as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Final Evaluations of UNDP-supported Projects. A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR (see Annex B). The evaluation team is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report. The evaluation report should include assessment on gender responsiveness of key project results.

The evaluation must provide evidence‐based information that is credible and reliable. It should not only consider what laws or strategies have been passed as a result of this project but also how the provision of government services has improved in practice for local citizens. The evaluation team is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with Government counterparts, the UNDP Country Office, project team and key stakeholders including public sector organizations (local NGOs). Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum: Project team; UNDP Country Office; Soros Foundation –Kyrgyzstan; Prime-minister Office of the KR; President’s Office of the KR; Ministry of Economy of the KR; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the KR; Ministry of Interior of the KR; Coordination Council of Public Advisory Councils of the KR; The Delegation of the EU in Kyrgyzstan, responsible persons for the Joint EU – UN project “Operationalizing Good Governance for Social Justice”.

The evaluation team will review all relevant sources of information including Annual Work Plan project budget revisions, midterm review mission report, progress reports, project files, national strategic, government and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluators for review is included in Annex A of this Terms of Reference.

The evaluators should make an analysis on Project’s achievements:

* Analyse the Project’s results against the planned ones;
* Identify achievements undertaken by the Project and review their sustainability;
* Assess impact made by the Project in building national capacity;
* Identify areas for improvement and lessons learnt;
* Review and assess partnership with the government bodies, civil society and international organizations;
* Review the links/joint activities with other UNDP Programmes/Projects, UN Agencies and other donors

**Evaluation Criteria and ratings:**

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against targets set out in the Project Results and Resources Frame-work. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary in line with the obligatory rating scales

|  |
| --- |
| **Evaluation Ratings:** |
| **1. Monitoring and Evaluation** | ***rating*** | **2. IA& EA Execution** | ***rating*** |
| M&E design at entry |       | Quality of UNDP Implementation |       |
| M&E Plan Implementaton |       | Quality of Execution - Executing Aency  |       |
| Overall quality of M&E |       | Overall quality of Implemenation / Execution |       |
| **3. Assessment of Outcomes**  | **rating** | **4. Sustainability** | **rating** |
| Relevance  |       | Institutional framework and governance:  |       |
| Effectiveness |       | Socio-political: |       |
| Efficienc  |       | Financial resources: |       |
| Overall Project utcome Rating |       | Overall likelihood of sustainability: |       |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, I&E Execution*** | ***Sustainability ratings:***  | ***Relevance ratings*** |
| 6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings 5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS)3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings2. Unsatisfactory (U): major problems1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems | 4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability | 2. Relevant (R) |
| 3. Moderately Likely (ML):moderate risks | 1.. Not relevant (NR) |
| 2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks1. Unlikely (U): severe risks | ***Impact Ratings:***3. Significant (S)2. Minimal (M)1. Negligible (N) |
| *Additional ratings where relevant:* Not Applicable (N/A) ; Unable to Assess (U/A |

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. The evaluator will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the final evaluation report.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Co-financing (source)** | **Planned** | **Actual**  |
| OSI |  |  |
| UNDP |  |  |
| Non-UNDP sources |  |  |
| Total |  |  |

**Impact**

The evaluator will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in capacity development of key government institutions such as the Prime-minister Office, President’s Office and other selected government units, and civil society organizations, particularly Public Advisory Councils, b) verifiable improvements in the area of public administration, optimization of public services system and ICT for Development (e-governance), and/or b) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.

**Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons**

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of conclusions, recommendations and lessons.

**Implementation arrangements**

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP CO in Kyrgyzstan. The UNDP CO will contract the evaluator. The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluator to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits (if needed), and coordinate with the Prime-minister Office, President’s Office, etc.

**Evaluation timeframe**

The total duration of the evaluation will be 25 working days according to the following indicative plan:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Activity** | Timing (indicative) | Completion Date (indicative) |
| **Preparation (desk review)** | *7* days  |  |
| **Evaluation Mission – interviews** | 10 days  |  |
| **Draft Evaluation Report** | *5* days  |  |
| **Final Report** | *3* days  |  |

**Evaluation Deliverables**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Deliverable | Content | Responsibilities |
| **Draft methodology of evaluation** | Scope & methodology of evaluation | Draft methodology of evaluation should be discussed and agreed by evaluator with UNDP CO, OSF, Prime-minister Office and Project management  |
| **Draft Final Report** | Full report, (per annexed template) with annexes | Evaluator submits to UNDP CO, OSF, Prime-minister Office and Project management.  |
| **Presentation** | Initial Findings  | Evaluator submits to project management, UNDP CO, OSF, Prime-minister Office and key stakeholders |
| **Final Report\*** | Revised report. Integrating all comments.  | Evaluator submits to UNDP CO, OSF, Prime-minister Office and Project management. |

***\*When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report.***

**Reporting requirements:**

The consultant will submit the reports based on the results achieved in agreed format stating all actions taken during the assignment. Report to be submitted after each deliverable result achieved according to schedule. All information should be presented in typed and electronic versions. Upon completion of the assignment the Consultant will submit final report for the whole assignment to be agreed with the Prime-minister Office and approved by UNDP ARR will serve as a justification for final payment. Even though the national and international Consultant are expected to work together on the Final Report, the final product is the responsibility of the international consultant and if there are any major disagreements between the two consultants the national consultant may submit a separate note with his/her dissenting opinions.

**Travel Requirements:**

The assignment requires travel to Kyrgyzstan

**List of documents to be reviewed:**

* *General documentation*: UNDP Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP);UNDP Handbook for Monitoring and Evaluating for Results;
* *Project documentation*: Project document; Cost-sharing Agreement between the Foundation Open Society Institute – Zug and the UNDP; Annual Work Plans; Annual Project Progress Reports; Midterm Review Mission Report; Management response to Midterm Review Mission Report; Revised Project documents; Project Steering Committee Meeting minutes.

**Code of Ethics:**

 Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people’s right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people’s right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders’ dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Annex 2: Evaluation Questions Matrix

| **Evaluative Criteria Questions** | **Indicators** | **Sources** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the UNDP focal area, and to the good governance and sustainable development priorities at the national level?  |
|  | * How does the project relate to the main objectives of the UNDP focal area?
 | * reflection of the objectives of the CDF in UNDP and UN strategy documents
 | * UNDP CPAP; UNDAF
 |
|  | * How does the project relate to the good governance and sustainable development priorities at the national level?
 | * reflection of the objectives of the CDF in the country Strategy documents
 | * country Strategy documents (e.g. «Government Program for Transition of the KR to Sustainable Development for 2013-2017"; NSSD)
* interviews
 |
|  | * How did these changes affect the relevance of the project?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections on the changes in relevance of project outputs and activities due to changes
 | * interviews
* project documents
 |
|  | * What were the most relevant and least relevant aspects
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews
* project documents
 |
|  | * How relevant was the project design?
 | * logical consistency of the project activities
* feedback of the respondents
 | * interviews
* project documents
 |
|  | * Did the project address unmet needs? Where the activities complementary to other initiatives or duplicative?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
| Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and outputs of the project been achieved? |
|  | * To what extent have the expected activities, outcomes and outputs of the project been achieved? What was the project’s contribution to these changes? What would have happened in the no-project scenario?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents ( Project Results and Resources Framework); third party reports
 |
|  | * What were the factors helping or hindering to achieve the planned results?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents ( Project Results and Resources Framework); third party reports
 |
|  | * What was the most significant positive change achieved and what consequences it could have?
* In particular what were the most important changes in the PA framework that the project contributed to?
 | * feedback of the respondents
 | * interviews
 |
|  | * Were there observable changes in the behaviour of the institutions concerned? If yes, what type? If not then why?
 | * feedback of the respondents
 | * interviews
 |
| Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards? |
|  | * Was the project implemented efficiently in terms of time?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents ( Project Results and Resources Framework)
 |
|  | * Was the project cost effective? Did the expected leveraging in funding materialize?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project financial documents
 |
|  | * How adequate was the M&E framework?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents;
 |
|  | * How effective was the project in partnership building? How well were the potential synergies with other initiatives utilized?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * How were the changes introduced? Was there an established process of review?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews
* project documents
 |
|  Sustainability: To what extent are there political, institutional, social-economic, and/or financial risks to sustaining long-term project results? |
|  | * To what extent are there political risks to sustaining long-term project results?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * To what extent are there institutional risks to sustaining long-term project results?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * To what extent are there social-economic risks to sustaining long-term project results?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * To what extent are there financial risks to sustaining long-term project results?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * To what extent are there risks to sustaining long-term project results in terms of the availability of the qualified human resources?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * How adequate was the project design to ensure sustinability?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents
 |
| Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, a) development of capacities of key government institutions such as the Prime-minister Office, President’s Office and other selected government units, and civil society organizations, particularly Public Advisory Councils, b) improvements in the area of public administration, optimization of public services system and ICT for Development (e-governance)? |
|  | * To what extent did the project affect the capacity of the institutions? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * To what extent did the project affect the behaviour and processes of the institutions? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * To what extent did the project affect the capacity of the stakeholders to monitor and evaluate change? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * How did the project affect the effectiveness of public service delivery? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews; project documents; third party reports
 |
|  | * How did the project affect the rule of law in the context of the work of the organizations concerned? What is the likelihood and risks of this in the future?
 | * feedback of the respondents
* reflections in the documents
 | * interviews
* project documents
* third party reports
 |
|  | Source: Evaluation team |

## Annex 2: List of respondents

**Dates of Mission 4 - November 13, 2014. Place: Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic**

| **№№** | **Participants of meetings**  | **Date** |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Meeting with UNDP PMU program "Democratic Governance" staff:Ainura Bekkoenova, Democratic Governance Programme Dimension Chief; Ainura Kaparova, CDF Project Coordinator; Chynara Suiumbaeva, ICTD Component Coordinator; Jamilya Arbanalieva, National expert; Admir Kurman CDF Project Assistant | November 4, 2014 |
|  | UNDP Country Office staff:Erkinbek Kasybekov, Assistant Resident Representative; Lilia Ormonbekova, Programme Analyst (M&E); Aidai Arstanbekova, Programme Associate; Jyldyz Moldokulova, National UNDP PMU Manager; Ainura Kaparova, CDF Project Coordinator | November 4, 2014 |
|  | Shamil Ibragimov, executive director of the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan (SFK) | November 5, 2014 |
|  | Shadybekov Kuvanychbek, Head of the Department of Public Administration and HR work of the Government Office of the Kyrgyz Republic | November 5, 2014 |
|  | Khalitov Mikhail, Deputy Director of the State Agency for Local Self-Government and Inter-Ethnic Relations under (SALSGIR) the Government of the KR  | November 5, 2014 |
|  | Baltagulov Dzhalalbek, Director of the Union of Local Self-Governments | November 5, 2014 |
|  | Jibek Koychukulova, former executive director of the International Public Foundation "Initiative of Roza Otunbayeva" (Fund IRO) | November 6, 2014 |
|  | Kurmanova Aidai Erkinovna; State Secretary of the Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic (ME KR) | November 6, 2014 |
|  | Alexander Kashkarev UNDP Policy and Programme Analyst, DGP leader (together Ainura Kaparova) | November 6, 2014 |
|  | Menshova Oksana, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Emir Sultangaliyev, Deputy Chief of HR Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the KR | November 6, 2014 |
|  | Kochorbaeva Zulphia, Chairperson of the Commission for the selection of members of Public Councils | November 7, 2014 |
|  | UNDP PMU Ainura Kaparova; Chynara Suiumbaeva; | November 7, 2014 |
|  | Tarbinsky Oleg, Deputy director of the State Personnel Service of the Kyrgyz Republic (SPS) | November 7, 2014. |
|  | The Expert Group on the development of administrative regulations of public services Aijan Satybekov, Team Leader; Yuri Bedash, Expert;Gulira Borubaeva, Expert; Tamara Ganieva, Expert; Nurlan Isaev, Expert; Aida Sharsheeva, Expert; | November 7, 2014 |
|  | Ahmat Madeyuev, Director of the Center for Public Policy | November 7, 2014 |
|  | Team of the Joint project of the European Union and the United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic " Operationalizing Good Governance for Social Justice" Damira Sulpieva; Nazira Satyvaldieva; Turat Azymbakiev; | November 10, 2014 |
|  | Mukanova Nuripa, Chairperson of the Coordination Council of the Public Advisory Council | November 10, 2014 |
|  | Akhmetova Nursuluu, Head of the Department of financial and economic analysis and monitoring of development, with the rank of Deputy Head of the President Office of the Kyrgyz Republic Ulan Nogoybaev, Expert;Kemal Ismailov, Expert of National Council Ulan Ryskylov, Expert of National Council | November 11, 2014 |
|  | Alexander Tretyakov, director of the Institute of Humanitarian Projecting (IGP) | November 11, 2014  |
|  | Aida Beyshenova, Head of Orok aiyl aimak, pilot municipality  | November 11, 2014 |
|  | Kiyal Sultanbaeva, Project Officer Civil Society Fund GIZ | November 11, 2014 |
|  | Dobretcova Nadejda ChairmanPolicy Development Institute | November 12, 2014 |
|  | EC Mia Fatima, Gulnara Botobaeva, Project Manager Operations Section  | November 12, 2014 |
|  | ARIS Mirlan Aytkaziev Social Mobilization and Capasity Building Specialist, Nutlanbek Rakhanov project coordinator JSDF | November 12, 2014 |
|  | Azimbekova Jipara, Head of Department of the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic  | November 12, 2014 |
|  | Salih Murzaev, Expert  | November 12, 2014 |
|  | Kalys Hasanova OSCE  | November 13, 2014 |
|  | USAID Owen Goldfab, Senior Democracy Specialist Demacracy and Governance Office | November 13, 2014 |
|  | Rafkat Hasanov, Economic and Financial Expert, former WB national expert on development of Public Sector Road Map | November 13, 2014 |
|  | Wrap-up meeting with the UNDP:Alexander Avanessov, UN Resident Coordinator/ UNDP Resident Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic; Pradeep Sharma, Deputy Resident Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic; Erkinbek Kasybekov, Assistant Resident Representative; Alexander Kashkarev, Policy and Programme Analyst ; Lilia Ormonbekova, Programme Analyst (M&E); Aidai Arstanbekova, Programme Associate; Jyldyz Moldokulova, National UNDP PMU Manager; Ainura Bekkoenova, Democratic Governance Programme Dimension Chief; Ainura Kaparova, CDF Project Coordinator.  | November 13, 2014 |
|  | Zhanybek Ybraiym uulu, Public Sector Specialist, World Bank, Kyrgyzstan | December 7, 2014, by skype |

## Annex 3: Project budget spending by 2014

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Donor** | **Total budget** | **Proportion of funds** | Expenditures | Balance |
| **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** |
| **OSI**  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| I tranche (Sept. 2011) | $500,000.00 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| II tranche (Nov. 2011) | $1,500,000.00 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| **Total OSI Funds** | $2,000,000.00 |   |   | $399,649.00 | $125,451.00 | $768,950.00 | $705,950.00 |
|  |  |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| UNDP source funding | $1,766,704.00 | 1 to 1 | $302,794.00 | $372,815.00 | $1,045,400.00 | $26,000.00 | $19,695.00 |
| Non-UNDP sources | $600,000.00 |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| **Rus.G(SDRD) 300,000$** | $100,000.00 | 1 to 3 |   | $100,000.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
| EC (S.Justice) 1,5 mln$ | $500,000.00 | 1 to 3 |   | $10,930.15 | $233,774.67 | $302,849.33 | $0.00 |
| **Total UNDP mobilized funds**  | $2,366,704.00 |   | $302,794.00 | $483,745.15 | $1,279,174.67 | $328,849.33 | $19,695.00 |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| **Total CDF budget**  | $4,366,704.00 |   | $302,794.00 | $883,394.15 | $1,404,625.67 | $1,097,799.33 | $725,645.00 |

## Annex 4: List of Documents reviewed

**CDF documents**

1. CDF Annual work plan 2010
2. CDF Annual work plan revised 2011
3. CDF Annual work plan revised 2012
4. CDF\_ProgressReport\_January\_December\_2012\_final
5. CDF Annual work plan revised 2013
6. CDF\_ProgressReport\_January\_December\_2013
7. CDF Annual work plan revised 2014
8. CDF Annual work plan and results for 2014
9. Cost -sharing Agreement UNDP OSI CDR final
10. CDF Mission Report\_Feb'13
11. CDF project document\_2010
12. CDF pro-doc revised\_2012
13. CDF pro-doc revised\_2013
14. Evaluation\_Report\_template
15. UNDP Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures
16. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee 17 декабря 2013
17. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee \_15.05.2012\_ signed
18. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee \_17.02.2012
19. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee \_27.12.2012
20. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee \_CDF\_09.07.2013
21. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee \_CDF\_06.10.2011\_ signed
22. Draft Roadmap activities PAC 02.09.2011
23. Public Advisory Boards in Kyrgyzstan: A Central Asian Experiment with Diagonal Accountability
24. Mid-term Report on the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund of the Kyrgyz Republic (November-December, 2011)
25. Final Report on the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund of the Kyrgyz Republic (November-December, 2011)
26. [Analytical Review on PACs\_2011](https://e.mail.ru/attaches-viewer/?x-email=ttatiana2000%40mail.ru&offset=0%3B2&id=14168926200000000237&_av=14168926200000000237%3B0%3B2)

**Government and legal documents**

1. The National Strategy for sustainable development of development of the Kyrgyz Republic for the period 2013-2014
2. The Program for the transition to sustainable development of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2013-2017
3. National Strategy for the Local Self Government Development,2013
4. Development of typical standards to access public service (‘passport of public service delivery’)
5. Support the development of E-Governance Strategy, 2014
6. Support the development and implementation of the E-Governance Action Plan,2014
7. The Law "On public councils of state bodies“, 2014
8. Methodology for Citizen’s Monitoring on Public Service Delivery,2014
9. Kyrgyz Republic: Roadmap public sector reform , 2014

**Other reports**

Baimyrzaeva M. (2010): "Analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s Administrative reforms in light of its recent governance challenges". International Public Management Review (IPMR)

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2011): “Public procurement assessment: Review of laws and practices in the EBRD region”

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2012):“Kyrgyz Republic Country Assessment”

INTRAC (2010): “Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity Building: Is it really that difficult?”, by Nigel Simister with Rachel Smith, Praxis Paper 23

Kartanbaeva N.A. (2013). Final Report on the Independent evaluation of the Effectiveness of trainings conducted with CDF support”

Mayne J., “Addressing Attribution Through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance Measures Sensibly’, The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation Vol. 16 No. 1 Canadian Evaluation Society, 2001

Transparency International, Anticorruption Resource Center/CMI; “Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Kyrgyzstan” [no date],

OECD (2012): Anti-corruption Network Second Round of Monitoring: Kyrgyz Republic.

World Bank (2013): “Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the period of 2014- 2017” Report No. 78500-KG

 World Bank (2014):” Kyrgyz Republic Public Expenditure Review Policy Notes Public Wage Bill”

1. With the support of UNDP Regional Bureau of Europe and Central Asia (RBEC) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic\_governance/capacity-development-facility.html [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. in turn comprising $500.000 from the EU and $100.000 from other sources [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic\_governance/operationalizing-good-governance-for-sj/ [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See for example a good summary in Rothstein Bo (2009):” Anti-Corruption: A Big-Bang Theory” University of Gothenburg http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1338614 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The *“Program for Enhancing Pay System in Civil and Municipal Service in 2013 – 2020*” was developed by the SPS and approved by the Government of KR (Statute N 383 from June 28, 2013) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. a functional analysis of any government body/ministry should include a thorough and systematic examination of : (a) the mandates and attributions of the ministry and the component parts; (b) the relationship between the ministry’s structure, functions and tasks; (c) the organization of and use of information in the ministry; (d) the ministry’s reward structures in relation to its staffing patterns; and (e) the role of procedures and regulations in guiding an individual behaviour within the organization [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. OECD (2012 ): Anti-corruption Network Second Round of Monitoring: Kyrgyz Republic. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Based on the interview with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Economy [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. WB (2014):” Kyrgyz Republic Public Expenditure Review Policy Notes Public Wage Bill” [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. <http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/capacity-development-facility.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/policy.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. There are many different definitions of capacity building, some of which are contradictory. At its most basic capacity can be understood as ‘the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully’. The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working towards good practice, OECD DAC Network on Governance). Organizational capacity can be defined as ‘the capability of an organization to achieve effectively what it sets out to do. The capacity of an individual, an organization or a society is not static. It changes over time, and is subject to both internal and external influences. Many of these changes are unplanned. For example an organization can lose capacity if key individuals leave or change positions within that organization. However, capacity development can be seen as a more deliberate process whereby people, organizations or society as a whole create, strengthen and maintain capacity over time. It is important to distinguish whether capacity building is supply or demand driven. If an organization develops its own capacity building programmed to address its own needs the capacity building can be seen as demand driven. In reality, however, the driver for change often comes from the outside – as in this case. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Project document; Cost-sharing Agreement between the Foundation Open Society Institute – Zug and the UNDP; Annual Work Plans; Annual Project Progress Reports; Midterm Review Mission Report; Management response to Midterm Review Mission Report; Revised Project documents; Project Steering Committee Meeting minutes [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. based on John Mayne, “Addressing Attribution Through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance Measures Sensibly’, The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation Vol. 16 No. 1 Canadian Evaluation Society, 2001 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. see www.outcomemapping.ca [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. see for example, betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/most\_significant\_change [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Based on a glossary prepared by OECD’s DAC Working Party on aid evaluation, May 2002 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. INTRAC (2010): “Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity Building: Is it really that difficult?”, by Nigel Simister with Rachel Smith, Praxis Paper 23 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The opposition leader Otunbayeva headed the interim government in 2010 for a period of six months. In the

meantime, disputes between different ethnic groups in the South of Kyrgyzstan led to a violent conflict with hundreds of deaths and serious human rights violations. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Baimyrzaeva M. (2010): "Analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s Administrative reforms in light of its recent governance challenges". International Public Management Review (IPMR) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Transparency International, Anticorruption Resource Center/CMI; “Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Kyrgyzstan” [no date], [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. World Bank (2013): “Country Partnership Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the period of 2014- 2017” Report No. 78500-KG [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. along with improving the business environment and investment climate; and (c) managing scarce natural resources such as forests, pastureland, and water, and maintaining physical infrastructure [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. it was decided that the Section on PAR in NSSD was sufficient, see the discussion in Section 3.2.1) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. see for example http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/better-public-sector-projects-which-dont-matter [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See for example a good summary in Rothstein Bo (2009):” Anti-Corruption: A Big-Bang Theory” University of Gothenburg http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1338614 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. The key elements of such an approach include: identification of the specific policy objectives and results the change is expected to realize; assessment of the institutions of their readiness to implement the policy and strategy; assessment of the coordination mechanisms and needs to coordinate, both on a horizontal and vertical levels; development of an appropriate M&E mechanism to track progress of the implementation of the policies and associated change in the organization; and documentation and accountability framework of intended change. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. ***s***upport to TTF – PACDE (Anti-corruption) and Corruption Risk Assessment Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health. Corruption risks assessments were conducted jointly with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education in the area of public service delivery in education and health sectors. Preliminary analysis and recommendations on improving the action plans for each ministry for addressing the identified corruption risks, enhancing integrity mechanisms and introducing participatory decision-making process were developed. It was planned to identify further sectoral anticorruption activities upon submission of final report by the experts’ team. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. These include the establishment of a ‘one stop shop’ to streamline and simplify business registration processes, and the abolishment of licenses and other regulatory measures (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development:2012; US Department of State: 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. e.g. to share the experience of the Voenno-Antonovka LSG of Chui Province related to collaboration of LSG with CSOs and local communities for better services delivery [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. : www.roza.kg and www.forum.roza.kg [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Several trainings courses throughout the course of the project, including two day workshop with participation of President of the KR (Ms. Otunbaeva) were conducted in 2011. The workshops were attended by about 150 participants (3-4 persons from each of the 41 PACs). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. the Needs assessment and analysis of decision making in public policy format by CSO in the area of public and municipal service delivery, PAR and local self-governance. This action was moved to the Social Justice project in early 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. a functional analysis of any government body/ministry should include a thorough and systematic examination of : (a) the mandates and attributions of the ministry and the component parts; (b) the relationship between the ministry’s structure, functions and tasks; (c) the organization of and use of information in the ministry; (d) the ministry’s reward structures in relation to its staffing patterns; and (e) the role of procedures and regulations in guiding an individual behaviour within the organization [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. OSF internal CDF assessment Note from 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. WB (2014):” Kyrgyz Republic Public Expenditure Review Policy Notes Public Wage Bill” [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Kartanbaeva N.A. (2013). Final Report on the Independent evaluation of the Effectiveness of trainings conducted with CDF support” [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. OSF internal CDF assessment Note from 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. a Senior Adviser of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS, and 1st UNDP Resident Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic who set up the office back in 1993 serving in the country till 1996, and who later on, unprecedentedly, was appointed as the UNDP Resident Representative to the same country again in 2001 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The survey on access of target groups (children, youth and women) to public services and a survey on identification of gaps in service delivery process and service providers’ activities in selected 30 municipalities were done in 2012 under the Social Justice Project. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. On March 12, 2013, USAID awarded a 5-year, $8.1 million agreement to the East-West Management Institute to implement a new Collaborative Governance Project in Kyrgyzstan. The project has three components that aim to 1) develop a mechanism for the government to undertake social procurements; 2) build capacity of civil society through the development of a non-profit management degree program and training courses in rural regions for local civil society organizations; and 3) provide nearly $2 million in small grants to support CSO advocacy. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. The Expert Group in particular developed in 2013: 2013 results based plans for each ministry and agency

and assisted in the development of the same in 2014; Agreement on responsibilities between members of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; Goals and objectives for the Prime Minister and Vice Prime Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic; Based on above-mentioned a draft structure of the Government; Distribution of responsibilities between the Prime Minister, the First Vice-Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic; Government Decree of the KR "On the functional and structural changes in the system the state executive bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic" (approved in March 5, 2013 # 109; Government Decree of the KR “On the standard form of annual goals, objectives and action plans of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic” (approved November 6, 2013 # 590); Expertise of the Government Program and Plan for Transition of the KR to Sustainable Development for 2013-2017was conducted ; Advisory services and prompt and institutional support were provided to the Prime Minister and his office on a daily basis on main areas of the country development such as public administration, socio-economic, administrative-territorial system and Local Self-Governance, agriculture and public service, etc.; Special letter was received on behalf of the Prime-minister of the KR officially appraising results of this expert group (dated December 4, 2013, # 26-1584). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Within 5 months in 2014 the Expert Advisory Group (5 experts) developed and submitted to the Prime-minister Office in particularly followings Drafts of Government Decrees: On measures to implement the requirements of the Customs Code of the Kyrgyz Republic; Applying for the EU to get the status of the beneficiary General System of Preferences + (GSP +) to the Kyrgyz Republic; Simplification and optimization procedures for certification and issuing the certificate of origin of goods in the Kyrgyz Republic; New principles of forming and using of personnel reserve for the Board of Directors, Audit Committee and the secretaries of state business entities; Regulations on the assessment of the Board of Directors of the business entities with state participation (further developed a similar document to evaluate the Audit Commission members); The Committees of the Board of Directors of business companies with state participation; State representative to the Board of Directors and the Audit Committee of business companies with state participation and independent members of the Board of Directors; The authorized person to protect the rights of business entities; On measures of liberalization of international civilian carriage in the Kyrgyz Republic; The elimination of customs duties for the temporary importation of aircraft air by domestic carriers; Transfer of tax reporting and payment of taxes for small businesses and non-profit organizations from monthly to quarterly basis, and for the middle to transfer the tax reporting from monthly to quarterly basis; Transfer reporting and payments to the Social Fund from monthly to quarterly basis; and On the implementation of state purchases through the new electronic public procurement e-portal . The following draft laws were developed: Drafts laws: Draft law "On External Labour Migration"; Draft Code of corporate governance principles in the KR; Draft law on the amendments and additions to the Law "On mortgage"; Draft law on the amendments and additions to the Tax Code; .and Draft law "On Mortgage Securities" and other drafts normative-legal acts. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. On top of creating a ‘one-stop shop’ to deal with businesses, the government is cutting/simplifying the number of procedures, inspection, licenses and permits required in the country. In 2012, more than 72 types of licenses were abolished, and the number of activities subject to licensing requirements will be reduced from 500 to 220 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2011): “Public procurement assessment: Review of laws and practices in the EBRD region” [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. The new Law on public procurement has also been amended leading to a prohibition on breaking-up tenders into parts, the establishment of clear criteria for excluding bidders, and the adoption of standardized tender documents for all types of procurement. The public procurement process has also been decentralized, and procurement units have been set up in all state institutions responsible for public purchases [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2012):“Kyrgyz Republic Country Assessment” [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Based on the interview with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Economy [↑](#footnote-ref-49)