Terminal Evaluation

Of Democratic Governance

for Development Phase II

(DGD II) Project

(2012-2015)
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................... 2  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 3  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 4 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 14  
2. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE .................................................................................... 20  
3. CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION .................................................................................................... 21  
4. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH .................................................................................................. 26  
5. MAIN FINDINGS .............................................................................................................................. 31  
   Relevance ...................................................................................................................................... 31 
   Effectiveness ................................................................................................................................. 34 
   Efficiency ..................................................................................................................................... 41 
   Sustainability ............................................................................................................................... 46  
6. RESOURCES, PARTNERSHIPS AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS ..................................................... 48 
7. HUMAN RIGHTS ............................................................................................................................. 50 
8. GENDER EQUALITY ....................................................................................................................... 51 
9. IMPACT ......................................................................................................................................... 52 
10. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 54 
11. LESSONS LEARNED .................................................................................................................... 56 
12. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................. 59 
13. ANNEXES ..................................................................................................................................... 61  
   ANNEX I: LIST OF RESPONDENTS FOR DGD II TERMINAL EVALUATION ................................. 62 
   ANNEX II: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW (IDI) GUIDE ........................................................................... 64 
   ANNEX III. LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED ......................................................................... 67 
   ANNEX IV: LIST OF ACRONYMS IN LITERATURE ..................................................................... 69 
   ANNEX V: OVERVIEW OF OUTCOMES, OUTPUTS AND INDICATORS ....................................... 73 
   ANNEX VI: THEORY OF CHANGE MODEL FOR THE DGD II PROJECT ..................................... 78 
   ANNEX VII: DGD II PROJECT RESULTS CHAIN ............................................................................ 79
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The evaluation consultants - Andrew Onwuemele PhD, (National Consultant) and Maureen Wang’ati-Gnagbo, (International Consultant) wish to thank the United Nations Development Programme Nigeria Country Office staff for their excellent support and facilitation to the Democratic Governance for Development Project Phase II Terminal Evaluation. Special thanks to the Country Director- Pa Lamin Beyai and the Deputy Country Director, Programmes- Mandisa Mashologu for your excellent leadership and oversight to the evaluation, including feedback to preliminary, draft and final reports. We acknowledge and appreciate the guidance and contributions of technical staff including Kehinde Bolaji, Team Leader- Governance & Peace Building Unit, Uchenna Onyebuchi, Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst, Segun Olusola, Programme Associate- Governance & Peace Building Unit, Anthony Omata, Programme Associate- Monitoring and Evaluation and Rose Plang, Procurement Analyst ensuring a smooth process and timely, deliverables by the consultant team.

Thanks to all funding partners, including the European Union, the Department for International Development-UK, the Korean International Cooperation Agency and the Canadian High Commission for engaging with the evaluation team, participating in meetings and stakeholder interviews and for the feedback and comments on the Terminal Evaluation drafts. We are thankful especially for the active support and participation by key implementing partners of the DGD II project including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and its Electoral Institute, the State Independent Electoral Commission (Delta), the Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria and the Inter Party Advisory Council. Also for the important contributions of Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) stakeholders including the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, the Centre for Citizens with Disabilities, the Joint National Associations of Persons with Disabilities, the Anglo-Nigeria Welfare Association of the Blind, Media Rights Agenda, Mambayya House- the Center for Democratic Studies, and the Leadership Newspaper). Virtual participation by previous staff of the now defunct Project Management Unit (PMU) including the Media, Governance and Gender Advisors was critical and helped to familiarize the consultants with the project operations and to contextualize the evaluation findings and interpretations. The contributions of all DGD II Project evaluation participants ensured informed, comprehensive understanding on the DGD II project by the consultants, which helped to shape the present report through balanced reporting and practicable recommendations.

The views expressed in the DGD II Terminal Evaluation Report are solely those of the evaluation consultants. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the evaluation commissioner, UNDP, donors or various project stakeholders consulted. This report or portions thereof may not be reproduced without explicit written reference to the source.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The evolution of electoral democracy in Nigeria has been protracted and difficult. Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country has organized nine General Elections (GEs) and numerous regional/state/local elections. Of these, the 1979, 1993, and 1999 polls were conducted by military regimes to allow for transition to civil rule. Others were conducted by incumbent civilian regimes to consolidate democratic rule. The 2011 GE in Nigeria was acclaimed by stakeholders as the most credible, transparent and peaceful elections in the history of democratic elections in Nigeria. In spite of this success, however, several areas of weakness have since characterized the conduct of subsequent elections, with need for further strengthening identified. As noted by the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission to Nigeria “the 2011 General Elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain”. These presented new opportunities for continued donor support to Nigeria’s democratic consolidation and the raison d’etre for the formulation of the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD II) Project- hereinafter referred to as DGD II,

The DGD II was designed and implemented within a context of significant changes in the country programme environment. This includes most significantly, application of the Electoral Cycle Approach (ECA) that considers the systems rather than events surrounding election processes. The ECA starts from the end of the first elections up to the conduct and tabulation of results of the next election. DGD II started with a review by the main partner the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of lessons learned from the 2011 General Elections. This was followed by implementation of the DGD II over a period of four years, culminating in the current Terminal Evaluation following the end of the project funding cycle in December, 2015.

This is a TE report of the now concluded DGD II Project (2012-2015). The evaluation was carried out between May and November, 2016 in Nigeria, by an independent evaluation team. They comprise of an international consultant, Maureen Wang’ati-Gnagbo (Team Leader) and a national consultant, Dr. Andrew Onwuemele. The evaluation report communicates the findings from in depth reviews of primary and secondary literature sources, representative key informant interviews with key implementing partners, donors and other project stakeholders, UNDP Nigeria staff as well as observations from field site visits to seven Nigerian States: (Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, Plateau, Delta, Lagos and Abuja)
OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The overall aim of the TE of the UNDP – DGD II (2012-2015) project is to: “Capture evaluative evidence on the DGD II project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, which can be used to strengthen existing joint donor programmes and to set the stage for new initiatives.” Its specific objectives are to assess the:

- Relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP and other partners’ support to Nigeria on democratic governance.
- Frameworks and strategies that UNDP has devised for its support on good governance, including partnership strategies, and whether they are well conceived for achieving planned objectives.
- Progress made towards achieving election outcomes, through this specific project and advisory services, and including contributing factors and constraints.
- Progress to date and what can be derived in terms of lessons learned for future election and governance support to Nigeria.

Following the assessment the TOR’s objective is to propose practicable recommendations on the design of any future electoral cycle support project based on lessons learned from the DGD II implementation experience and any results.

The scope of the TE considers all four components\(^1\) of the DGD II project. Further, it evaluates the original problem analysis and determines how effectively it was incorporated into the DGD II project’s design and implementation approach. The evaluation further judges how the project scope translated into the achievement (or not) of desired results and impacts focused on deepening democratic governance in Nigeria.

METHODOLOGY

The DGD II project was evaluated using the Results Based Management (RBM) and Theory of Change Approach. Information and citing from literature were used to derive information for an updated Theory of Change (ToC) Model. Mixed methods were employed in the TE. They include Key Informant Interviews (KII) with UNDP staff, donors, and the representatives from the four project components. They include the key implementing partner, Independent National Electoral Commission the Electoral Training Institute, State Independent National Commissions, political parties, democratic governance training institutions, Non-Governmental Organizations representing youth, women and people with disabilities and the

\(^1\): Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes; Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement; Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other marginalized groups; 4: Strengthening Capacity and Voice of the Media.
media. Other methods include reviews of literature from primary and secondary sources. Briefing meetings with the UNDP Nigeria prior to and immediately following the field visits helped to validate the findings to ensure accuracy of interpretation and relevance to the TOR. To augment in the KIIIs, Skype interviews were held with UNDP staff affiliated to the DGD II Project Management Unit that has since been disbanded following the DGD II’s termination.

MAIN FINDINGS

- The Terminal Evaluation judged the DGD II Project implemented by UNDP from (2012-2015) on behalf of its donor partners (European Union, (EU) Canadian High Commission, Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOIKA) and the Department for International Development (DFID)) as largely successful. The Project achieved key milestones that contributed to promotion of democratic governance in Nigeria and influenced successful conduct of the 2015 General Elections (GE).

Relevance

- It was not easy to accurately determine the relevance of the DGD II project’s design. This is due to the lack of deliberate assessment of the project’s relevance to the UNDAF as is the norm with other UN projects. Its rather independent undertakings and its locality in a PMU a distance away from the UNDP Country Office (CO) limited opportunity for joint, periodic reflection and systematic review, to ensure alignment and continued fit with the UNDAF for Nigeria. Fortunately, literature reviews of relevant project and non-project documents and materials revealed that indeed the DGD II project objectives were well aligned and closely matched to the UNDAF mandate, specifically contributing to two outcomes aspired to in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP). Similarly, outputs from each of the four project components confirmed relevance to each of the expected outcomes. The project’s relevance was therefore deemed high.

- UNDP’s support to the DGD II project was found to be appropriate for achieving the desired objectives and results. This clearly confirms the relevance of the Project to the Government of Nigeria and to the UN development strategy. The methodological approach of the DGD II project to the deepening of democratic governance in Nigeria was deemed to be sound in light of the identified challenges. Specifically, adoption of the Electoral Cycle Approach ensured support for all phases of an electoral process which remains relevant in the Nigerian context. The four components of the DGD II project were not only relevant, but also apt and timely in relation to lessons learned from the 2011 General Election in Nigeria.
Effectiveness

The DGD II project’s effectiveness was also judged as high as it adequately supported the four project components with IPs, helping them to achieve their planned targets. The project support strategy was evidence-based as it was derived from the DGD Phase I lessons and experiences. It delivered as originally intended and planned as far as possible and within its context and mandate. Good progress was made towards delivering on log-frame targets, milestones, and outputs. Achieving the intended targets supported components’ contributions to higher-level objectives. The successful conduct of the 2015 election by INEC provided strong evidence of institutional strengthening by the DGD II Project. Although the TE cannot accurately attribute 100% of successful outcomes directly to the DGD II, there is strong evidence demonstrating that the project played a critical role. By facilitating and building capacity of INEC to deliver during the voter registration process, using unconventional approaches such as town-hall meetings in 777 local government areas, the DGD II helped to promote awareness creation at all levels. The project’s support to political parties through its prestigious training center, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPPS) in Jos, Plateau State, promoted collaboration and reflection on the country’s electoral process. The new spaces provided by the project such as the ‘Disability Desk’ newly instituted at INEC helped to enhance visibility for vulnerable and marginalized populations as aspired to in Component III. The Abuja Compact Conference that brought together all the presidential candidates well ahead of the election resulted in a signed pledge by all ensuring a peaceful election. These are just a few of the many examples of the DGD II’s contributions and efforts towards institutional strengthening, a key indicator of democratic and good governance, and leading to the peaceful GE in Nigeria. This finding was supported through triangulation of various sources of information (i.e. literature, stakeholder interviews, field visits, observation).

- UNDP Nigeria assumed a leadership role in supporting donor coordination. The organization cooperated well with local development and international partners as well as CSOs in strengthening democratic governance in Nigeria. The Terminal Evaluation was however unable to establish any evaluative evidence of UNDP’s partnership with private sector in support of democratic governance in Nigeria.

- The DGD II project achieved many important milestones contributing to its overall effectiveness. For example, gender equity was successfully mainstreamed into the design, implementation and monitoring of governance projects, especially with reference to the third component. This was achieved in three dimensions: i) Support to political parties to
strengthen internal processes geared towards advancing the role of women as candidates for public office and as actors within the party structures; ii) training of women to organize and mobilize public support for their election to public office; and iii) support to elected women political aspirants as effective role models and drivers of change, thereby promoting affirmative action and women's empowerment especially in NASS.

While the DGD II project made significant contributions support of democratic governance in Nigeria through the achievement of outputs across the four components, the absence of baseline data on this project made establishment of the counterfactual impossible and attribution difficult. The challenges of establishing a baseline that is uncontested and apolitical cannot be underestimated. However in future, baseline studies necessary for establishing the situation prior to an intervention for more accurate assessment of results of interventions may be more positively viewed. This is due to the fact that the Nigerian government is moving towards more performance and results based governance systems.

**Efficiency**

Overall the evaluators judged the DGD II project’s **efficiency as moderate** for the following reasons: firstly, the joint basket fund approach with pooled donor funds together enhanced efficiencies through horizontal rather than traditional, vertical implementation through the direct, donor-recipient approach. Secondly, the project management structure was designed to enhance efficiencies. The five levels of management for the DGD II project that promoted flexibility in the overall management and coordination of the different project components. This flexibility that ensured that INEC’s and Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria (FOISECON)’ requests for support were adequately addressed and delivered in a timely manner through the JDBF managed by UNDP. Overall there was evidence of prudent use of financial and human resources for programming and administration of the DGD II project. Efficiencies were somewhat compromised in part by inadequate communication and information sharing within INEC departments, concerning the available DGD II facility. Inadequate coordination by management structures such as the Project Steering Committee (PSC) contributed to delayed decisions on the UNDP CO and PMU relationship. Donors acted to prematurely terminate planned DGD II activities, with consequences to the staff, IPs and project mandate.

**Sustainability**
Despite the largely positive literature citations on the DGD II project’s future, the evaluators rated project sustainability as **moderate to low** overall without continued funding support, ideally, through the JDBF and management by UNDP. This finding was arrived at through triangulation of desk reviews with key informant interviews, site visits and observation. This is because as already Casted, there is inadequate funding to sustain the functionality of DGD II project benefits over time as it is now closed. Other institutions that are supporting election processes in Nigeria (e.g. through IFES) do not have the level nor flexibility of funding that came with the DGD II JDBF. Meanwhile, UNDP enjoys the confidence and convening powers as a development partner of the Nigerian government, as an a-political institution. The organization has international global recognition and is a preferred and trusted partner of government departments, ministries and agencies in Nigeria.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

- Several lessons can be learned from the DGD II project. Key amongst which relate to the importance and priority that should be accorded to the management functions of such an important and strategic project involving multi-level stakeholders from all spheres of government and society and focused on enhancing democratic governance in Nigeria.

- A critical lesson learned with the DGD II is that it is indeed possible to implement successful programming even with budget constraints and limitations and management inefficiencies. This is because despite the release and utilization of only 70% of the project budget, the DGD II managed to achieve its most critical objective (i.e. promoting free and fair elections and democratization in Nigeria) contributing to peaceful General Elections in 2015.

- Another useful lesson learned is that it is important to engage with partners as institutions at all levels within institutions and not only with individuals within these institutions at the highest decision making level. This is because the assumption that information is cascaded downwards and outwards towards and within various departments and divisions following initial contacts and engagement with individual decision makers is not supported with evidence of the same.

- Although UNDP attested to having employed transparent and fair processes in the identification and selection of DGD II key stakeholders, perceptions by key stakeholders revealed that it was not 100% water-tight. A project such as DGD II that works with a diverse range of IPs from government and non-governmental institutions should well consider the internal and external
factors that may impact either positively or negatively on project implementation efforts. A lesson learned is that any future project design should consider inclusive and consultative processes and make efforts to bring all factions within organizations to the table to ensure that all their views are well considered.

- The five tier management arrangements of the project that involved the PSC, TC, PMU, UNDP and Project Assurance was a well thought out approach. However a key lesson learned is that if lower level staff are to be considered into the PSC membership, those with decision making authority should be non-partisan and higher level in authority to promote fairness in decision making and efficiency of response, avoiding delays in decision making. Newer offices such as INEC’s donor liaison office that was established later could in future be a useful coordination outfit within INEC which should be invited to be part of the PSC membership. This would promote the smooth running and workings a future project through enhanced coordination and wider participation.

- The UNDP CO and PMU seemed to run in parallel, and in competition than in a cooperative and consultative framework. This precludes the need for a clear project design and framework of engagement. Each member of the PMU should go through a comprehensive induction on their role, duty, responsibilities and reporting authorities to facilitate smooth running of the project. This will promote the credibility of the team and ensure the confidence of key project stakeholders including international and local development partners for effective and efficient programming

- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities of the project were compromised by the lack of these functions attached to the PMU. Beyond the technical support provided by donors on the project's logical framework, and M&E Officer attached to the project could have helped to track progress of project against the log frame, identify any bottlenecks, challenges and opportunities well in advance of the TE. This information could have been used by the project management to address both positive and negative issues as they arrive in an opportune way, thereby supporting achievement of desired objectives and adequate funds use by the project. A clear consequence of weak M&E systems was the lack of baseline data against which to measure achievements of the DGD II. It is important to develop baseline data against which performance indicators will be measured. As shown in the report, while the DGD impacts were high, the absence of baseline data for the DGD II project makes the establishment of the counterfactual impossible and attribution difficult. The opportunity to ‘prove’ or substantiate the DGD II impacts and achievement of democratic governance milestones in Nigeria was essentially lost due to lack of baseline and data from monitoring reports.
Members of the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) who were similarly disappointed by the internal management problems evidenced between the PMU and UNDP CO lost confidence in the project’s ability to resolve the stalemate with the PMU. This is a clear lesson and cause of concern for any future project managed by UNDP and funded through a JDBF involving multiple donors. Firstly, when it was realized that these relationship problems existed within UNDP and the PMU, the DGD II could have been quicker to rewrite a more focused work plan with more effort into ensuring sound programme management and relationships; rather than focus on continual mobilising of funds with limited prospects of success in that context. This would have enabled donors to intervene and prioritise programmatic interventions aimed at resolving management challenges. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms apart from the five level management arrangements could be introduced in a future project, such as the office of the Ombudsman. This office could potentially help to address challenges with internal staff relations that are bound to occur with such a sensitive and critical project located outside of the main UNDP CO facility.

It is important to demonstrate maturity in the handling of project matters involving multiple stakeholders. JDBF members could develop an MOU for collaboration which clearly articulates the modus operandi of joint funding and management of activities. This would provide direction and guidance on how to handle challenges faced in a project such as the DGD II that requires high levels of cooperation and collaboration to fulfill expectations of all stakeholders. This is even more important considering the nature of the DGD II project that adopted the ECA for promoting democratic governance in Nigeria. Also important is the need to ensure harmony amongst to promote the project’s intentions. One example is the DGD’s weak focus on parliamentary support denied the project opportunity to achieve results with this important and critical stakeholder group.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The TE of the DGD II project proposes the following key recommendations which have been informed by the study findings and conclusions;

1. Going forward in light of the successes recorded by the 2015 election, there are still more areas that require improvements in the processes of democratic governance in Nigeria. The TE believes that this can best be achieved through a third follow on phase (i.e. DGD III). A follow on project: DGD Phase III is recommended based on the achievements so far of the DGD I and II projects and the contributions so far to the successful General Elections in 2015 in Nigeria. A third phase should give considerable attention to national level as well as to state level partners and activities. Consideration should be given to
UNDP in managing a follow on project. The lessons learned by the project will help to improve this important facet going forward if properly addressed. The convening powers of the UN agency and the goodwill and trust shown to it by the major IPs (INEC, Political Parties, and SIECs) should be harnessed and maximized for the future project.

2. UNDP should strengthen the collaboration and management mechanisms between the Country Office, the PMU and project partners to ensure fair division of labour. Thorough induction of staff and clear Memorandum of Understanding agreements (informal documents detailing the collaboration arrangements and clearly articulating expectations) should be well considered as one of the potentially useful resources. The PSC members’ delegation of their juniors to attend PSC meetings on their behalf should be discouraged or deliberately worked into the committee with clear roles and decision making responsibilities and processes agreed in advance. The PSC, TC and Quality Assurance members should collaborate jointly and ensure attendance at all scheduled meetings to enable timely support to the project. It important for project beneficiaries across the four components of the DGD II project to participate in the design meetings of DGD III. An institutional rather than an individual approach should be applied to all aspects of a future projects workings with IPs and other key stakeholders. Priority activities and areas of support should be identified prior the implementation of the activities and not after the project implementation have started. Proper channels of communication and information dissemination should similarly be identified and piloted to ensure transparent processes and high level of awareness of opportunities with the project among potential key stakeholders and partners.

3. It is important for the UNDP and project design to ensure the visibility of partners equally. The UNDP’s commitment to this role means that it should follow up more closely with all JDBF members to ensure that they are satisfied with the level of visibility accorded to them. Further to this, donor partners should avoid any parallel activities with IPs on the DGD Project in order to centralize the management activity and enhance efficiencies and effectiveness.

4. Nigeria has 36 states and 36 state assemblies. A new project should pilot the project in a few states by geographic zone and clearly demonstrate how the intervention is translating at the state level by relating these results back to the federal level. A parliamentary support component should be included as the new trend is towards ‘open government’ featuring social media as a powerful tool. Interventions are needed to support parliamentary committees to support the elections component. The parliamentary intervention was
limited in DGD II only to constitutional support processes and not the electoral code.

5. A future DGD project should commence with a clear performance monitoring and evaluation plan detailing the studies to be conducted including baseline, monitoring and evaluation studies and budgets. This is important for ensuring proper timing and reporting on the project as well as adequate funds to support this important management function that was overlooked to the detriment of the DGD II impact findings. M&E functions of a follow on project should be well considered through support by qualified and professional team members, with technical inputs from the donors on the log frame to ensure clear lines of responsibility for activities. A budget line equivalent to at least 5% of the total budget should be accorded to the M&E function to ensure adequate facilitation of its activities.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This is a Terminal Evaluation (TE) report of the concluded Democratic Governance for Development (DGD II) Project (2012-2015) implemented by UNDP. The evaluation was carried out between May and August 2016 in Nigeria, by a team comprising of an independent, international consultant (Team Leader) and a national consultant (Team Member). The report communicates the findings from reviews of primary and secondary literature sources, key informant interviews with project stakeholders, and key staff and observations from field visits to seven states (i.e. Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, Plateau, Delta, Lagos and Abuja). It concludes with recommendations on the way forward for UNDP based on the findings, conclusions and lessons learned.

1.2 Report Structure

Section 1 introduces the subject matter of this report. It discusses the background leading up to the DGD II project and describes the initiative under review. Section 2 presents the evaluation scope. Section 3 presents the context of the evaluation and provides the basis for report users to understand the logic and assess the merits of the evaluation methodology and understand the applicability of the evaluation results. Section 4 discusses the evaluation approach and methodology as well as data analysis processes. Section 5 presents the general findings based on selected evaluation criteria (i.e. relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability). Section 6 presents an analyses of the project’s resources, partnerships and management structure. Section 7 assesses the extent to which the human rights based approach was applied with key stakeholders and implementing partners of the project according to internationally ratified agreements and global standards. Section 8 analyses gender equity concerns of the project. Section 9 reports on identified impacts of the DGD II project. Section 10 presents the conclusions, based on the key findings deduced from the evaluation questions. Section 11 presents the main lessons learned from the DGD II project. Section 12 presents a key of key recommendations arising from the conclusions and lessons learned. Finally, Section 13 presents a list of annexes including the evaluation TOR, protocol used in the evaluation, an overview of key outputs, outcomes and impacts, an updated theory of change model of the project, the list of respondents and a list of acronyms.

1.3 Background

Elections are generally accepted globally as the hallmark of democracy. A basic characteristic and element of any democratic election is that it must be free and fair. However, the conduct of elections in an evolving democracy such as Nigeria is notably challenging. Election violence is generally recognized as the greatest deterrent to democracy in Nigeria.\(^2\) Electoral violence, ballot

---

snatching, rigging and conflicts have been a terminal problem of Nigeria politics since the 1950’s\(^3\). However, there can be no democratic election, democratization, consolidation of democracy, growth in democratic culture or internalization of best democratic practice in any country if electoral violence is prevalent\(^4\).

1.4 Since the return to civil rule in 1999, two major elections- in 2003 and 2007 respectively- have been lampooned by many critics as being far from free and fair. In fact, the general election of April 2007 was described as the ‘worst election ever held in Nigeria’ as a result of indescribable irregularities marring it\(^5\). The main beneficiary of the election, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, concurred with observers’ views that the elections did not meet international standards and expressed a desire for electoral reform\(^6\). Following the 2007 elections, a consensus seemed to have been reached on the need to reform the electoral process with the aim of improving the conduct of the 2011 General Elections and subsequent ones in Nigeria.

1.5 The DGD Phase 1 project was a contribution of the international donor community, and supported by the Nigerian Government. It was managed though a basket fund aimed towards improvement of the conduct of the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria. This project ran for three years- from 2009 to May 2011- with a one year transition period from June 2011 to May 2012 which saw the implementation of a second phase of the project: DGD II from 2012-2015.

1.6 The 2015 elections conducted during the life of the DGD II project were historic, with the opposition winning for the first time since the transition from military rule in 1999. These elections were however not without their challenges. The highly competitive process was marred by incidents of violence, abuse of incumbency at state and federal levels, and attempts at manipulation\(^7\). While, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) made commendable attempts to strengthen electoral

arrangements, procedural shortcomings were evident, in particular during collation and from analysis of polling unit results.8

1.7 **Description of the intervention**
The six components characterizing the first phase (DGD 1) were reassessed through a strategic review that was conducted at the project’s end. Lessons learned from implementation of the first phase were used to inform the design of a follow-on project (DGD Phase II). At this stage, the original six components were reformulated into four: (i.e. Promoting credible, transparent and sustainable electoral processes; ii) improving the democratic quality of political engagement; iii) enhancing participation by women, youth and other marginalized groups and; IV) strengthening channels for civic engagement). This was aimed at streamlining the DGD II to ensure that there was no overlap with other international partners’ projects.

1.8 UNDP-Nigeria was tasked with management of the follow on, DGD Phase II project (2012-2015). Support to the project through the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) was focused on deepening democracy in Nigeria. Five international development partners namely, the European Union (EU), UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFTAD) (formerly known as CIDA), the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) all contributed to the fund. As with the previous DGD I project, the EU’s contribution was highest at approximately 63% of the total funds basket.

1.9 The DGD II project had a pledged total budget of USD 53 million. During the funding period, US$38,939,027.90 approximately (71%) of the pledged total budget was released and spent. The vast majority (86%) of these funds were applied towards development activity costs. Project running, costs were moderate at (14%) of the total budget released9, The DGD II was coordinated by the UNDP through a Project Management Unit (PMU) that was set up separately from the UNDP Country Office (CO). The PMU was a mirror image of the UNDP CO. The PMU staff were also UNDP personnel (e.g. the programme finance units at UNDP and at the PMU finance team were similar or identical).10

1.10 The PMU was managed by a Project Director. Others included senior consultants and staff in governance, finance, procurement, communications, gender and media. A Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)
Officer position was however distinguishably absent. The PMU Manager and his team were mandated to provide technical and financial support to implementing partners (IPs) and key stakeholders of the DGD II project. They included the main partner, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), political parties, national and state assemblies and institutions such as the judiciary; civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media. These partners were categorized under four separate project components discussed above, according to the project’s multi-pronged approach. This was aimed at strengthening accountable and responsive governance institutions and consolidating democratic governance in line with international best practices.

1.11 Each of the four DGD II project components had a number of expected outputs to be achieved with their implementing partners (IPs). (See Table 1 below)

**Table 1: Summary of DGD II Components, Outputs and Beneficiaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component One</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Implementing Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable</td>
<td>1. Strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC</td>
<td>1. INEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Processes</td>
<td>strengthened;</td>
<td>2. SIEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. INEC capacity to use ICT enhanced;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Legal and policy framework for election improved;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Professional capacity of INEC staff and SIECs enhanced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component Two</strong></td>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Beneficiaries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the Democratic Quality of Political</td>
<td>1. Capacity of political parties strengthened;</td>
<td>1. Political Parties,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>2. Improved effectiveness of targeted NASS committees and processes.</td>
<td>2. Members of the NASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component Three</strong></td>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Beneficiaries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other</td>
<td>1. Legal reforms and women’s empowerment initiatives to promote</td>
<td>1. Women, Youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalized Groups;</td>
<td>affirmative action and women’s participation in politics;</td>
<td>2. People with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. CSOs capacity to advocate for affirmative action enhanced.</td>
<td>Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component Four</strong></td>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Beneficiaries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Channels for Civic Engagement</td>
<td>1. CSO’s capacity developed</td>
<td>3. CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Strengthening the capacity and voice of the media</td>
<td>4. Media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.12 The DGD II was designed and implemented within a context of significant changes in the Country Programme (CP) environment. This includes most significantly the application of the Electoral Cycle Approach (ECA) that considers the systems rather than events surrounding election processes. The ECA starts from the end of the first elections up to the conduct and tabulation of results of the next election.

1.13 The DGD II project was initiated with a review by the main partner INEC of lessons learned from the 2011 General Elections. It culminated in the development of strategic and operational plans addressing identified weaknesses and institutional capacity strengthening. A broad range of cross-cutting and mainstreamed issues focused on the elections were equally considered: (i.e. gender, capacity development, legal frameworks, electronic track of the electoral management and logistical planning for elections).

1.14 The DGD II utilized a more focused and systematic approach compared to its predecessor, DGD I, for identifying its beneficiaries and collaborators. This was aimed at minimizing duplication of efforts between this project and others that are similarly engaged in efforts to deepen democratic governance in Nigeria. These and other strategies adopted by the DGD II centered on improving the project’s design, to ensure that the issues envisaged in its formulation were well considered.

1.15 The DGD II Project was implemented as part of the UNDP Nigeria Country Programme. It was aligned to Outcome A.2: “Improvements in the three main pillars of accountable governance: elections, justice and anti-corruption; achieved in accordance with the rule of law and in response to public demand” of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) II (2009-2012), extended to 2013. The project was predicated on the UNDP CP Action Plan (CPAP) programme component: ‘Capacity for Governance Program (CGP)’.

1.16 **Target Beneficiaries**
Target beneficiaries of the DGD II were INEC, Political Parties, Civil Society, Media, the National Assembly, Youth and Women’s Groups. These were later expanded to include organizations working with Persons With Disabilities (PWDs). DGD II provided technical and financial assistance for building overall capacity of these institutions and groups.

1.17 **Program Management Strategy**
The DGD II project had five levels of management: i.e.

i. A Project Steering Committee (PSC)

ii. The Technical Committee (TC)
iii. UNDP as the Overall Implementing Partner

iv. A Project Management Unit (PMU)

v. Project Assurance

1.18 The PSC constituted the overall management and coordination structure of DGD II. It was mandated to meet on a quarterly basis, providing direct project oversight, and ensuring the achievement of stated project objectives. It was further tasked with quality assurance for the project with additional responsibility for programmatic priorities. This was purposed towards ensuring focus on annual implementation plans, with commensurate allocation of resources across the four components.

1.19 The Technical Committee (TC) was positioned under the PSC and chaired by the DGD Project Director (PD). Its membership comprised of the PD and technical personnel from the PSC. The TC was tasked with reviews of the work of various DGD II project components and with advising the PMU on activity implementation. This group met regularly to review monthly reports, offer recommendations and monitor implementation of DGD II activities against approved work plans.

1.20 The overall DGD II project management was by UNDP Nigeria. It was positioned under the TC managerially for this project. The UNDP CO was responsible for project management, including M&E of project interventions and ensuring achievement of project outputs. The CO was also responsible for ensuring effective use of project resources; communication and reporting on project results; and assuring visibility of Joint Donor Basket Fund the (JDBF) partners.

1.21 Project Management Unit (PMU)

The DGD II Project Director, a UNDP appointee, had authority to run the project on a day-to-day basis on behalf of the organization, within the laid down constraints of the PSC. The PD’s primary responsibility was to ensure that the DGD II project produced the results (outputs) specified in the project document, to the required quality standards and within the specified constraints of time and cost. The PMU PD was however separate from the COs representation in the PSC and the TC.

1.22 Project Assurance

Project Assurance was the responsibility of the Governance team leader. However, the PSC was also carrying out objective and independent project oversight and monitoring functions.
2 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

2.1 The overall aim of the UNDP – DGD II project’s terminal evaluation is to: “Capture evaluative evidence on the DGD II project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, which can be used to strengthen existing joint donor programmes and to set the stage for new initiatives.” Specific objectives of the TE are to assess the:

- Relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP and other partners’ support to Nigeria on democratic governance.
- Frameworks and strategies that UNDP has devised for its support on good governance, including partnership strategies, and whether they are well conceived for achieving planned objectives.
- Progress made towards achieving election outcomes, through this specific project and advisory services, and including contributing factors and constraints.
- Progress to date and what can be derived in terms of lessons learned for future election and governance support to Nigeria.
- Make recommendations about design of any future electoral cycle support project based on lessons learned from project implementation over the 2012-2015 funding period.

2.2 UNDP Nigeria is the primary stakeholder and commissioner of the DGD II Terminal Evaluation. It is anticipated that the CO will use the evaluation findings as a performance management tool for existing programme components and to inform future policy and programme design. The Terminal Evaluation (TE) findings will be shared within UNDP and with donor partners and key stakeholders involved in deepening democratic governance in Nigeria. It is expected that the TE findings which focus on results from project implementation and on lessons about what worked and what did not and why; and challenges faced, will be applied to the design of a follow on project if implemented according to the TE recommendations.

2.3 The TE covers the period from the inception of the DGD II project in June 2012 to its conclusion in December 2015. The evaluation considers all four components of the DGD II project. Further, it evaluates the original problem analysis and determines how effectively it was incorporated into the DGD II project’s design and implementation approach. The evaluation further judges how the project scope translated into the achievement (or not) of desired results and impacts focused on deepening democratic governance in Nigeria.
3 CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION

3.1 The name ‘Nigeria’ was said to have been coined by British colonialists to describe the vast land around the River Niger and its basin. It was then called Niger-area, however after long usage it was shortened to Nigeria (Yesufu, 1982). It is located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa and surrounded by French speaking countries; in the West by Benin Republic, in the North by Niger Republic, in the North-East by Chad Republic, and in the East by Cameroon Republic. In terms of land area, Nigeria is the fourth largest country in West Africa after Niger, Mali and Mauritania. It has a total land area of 923,768 square kilometers.

3.2 Nigeria currently has 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). These are divided into six geo-political zones (Table 2). Figure 2.1 is a map of Nigeria showing the 36 States/FCT and the six geo-political zones. There are about 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria with the main ones being Hausa/ Fulani in the North, Ibos in the South-East and Yoruba’s in the South West. About 4,000 dialects are spoken in Nigeria. Nigeria’s has a federal system with a FCT that is divided into 773 Local Government Areas (LGAs). National elections are held for the Federal Presidency and the National Assembly -which is made up of the Senate and House of Representatives- every four years. The Senate has 109 members, while the House of Representatives has 360 members. Nigeria has 36 State House of Assembly and 1205 State House of Assembly legislators. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) administers these elections and the political processes behind them at the Federal level as well as those for State Governors and State Assemblies. Within Nigeria’s states, the State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs) administer local government elections.\footnote{Final Evaluation of the “Support to the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2012-2015” and “EU Additional Support to Nigeria Electoral Cycle 2011-2015” Projects}.
Table 2: Classification of Nigerian States by Geopolitical Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geo-Political Zones</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>Lagos, Ekiti, Ogun, Osun, and Oyo States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers and Akwallbom States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>Anambra, Imo, Abia, Enugu, and Ebonyi States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Taraba States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Kano, Jigawa and Kaduna States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1. Nigeria map Showing 36 States/FCT and 6 Geo-political Zones
3.3 The Nigerian Fourth Republic started in 1999 with the return to democratic elections. These witnessed the handing over of power to the elected government of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, his re-election in 2003 and the election of President Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007. The death of Umaru Yar’Adua in 2010 brought Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (the Vice President at the time) to power. The evolution of electoral democracy in Nigeria has been protracted and difficult. Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country has organized nine General Elections and numerous regional/state/local elections. Of these elections, the 1979, 1993, and 1999 polls were conducted by military regimes to allow for transition to civil rule. The others were conducted by incumbent civilian regimes to consolidate democratic rule.\textsuperscript{12}

3.4 Political parties are the main contestants for offices. Their development in Nigeria dates back to 1923, when the Nigerian National Democratic Party was launched. At the beginning of the Fourth Republic, only three political parties were registered. However, a Supreme Court decision allowed for the liberalization of the regime allowing many more parties to be registered\textsuperscript{13}. Nigerian political parties in general have programmes, but they are more personality and coalition based rather than on policy or ideology. As a result, there appears to be little loyalty of leaders and members towards any particular political party. Leaders often defect from their party when they or their candidate loose the primaries, in order to join another party or found a new one. Party leaders are also often prone to defect to join the ruling party, the party that has won executive office at the Federal or State level or a preponderance of seats in assemblies\textsuperscript{14}.

3.5 Following the Supreme Court’s judgment, there were 63 registered political parties by April 2011. However, it was believed that many small parties took advantage of the liberalization of the political space to register parties that have proven to be unviable, but meant to be vehicles through which INEC’s funding support to parties could be cornered.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, at the end of 2012, the number of registered political parties was reduced to 27. In the 2011 General Elections, competition for the Presidency of Nigeria was between three major candidates and political parties. They were: Incumbent Goodluck Jonathan-from the People

\textsuperscript{13}JEREMY LIEBOWITZ, JIBRIN IBRAHIM, (2013).A CAPACITY ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIESDEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (DGD) PROGRAMME, UNDP, NIGERIA
\textsuperscript{14}Final Evaluation of the “Support to the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2012-2015” and “EU Additional Support to Nigeria Electoral Cycle 2011-2015” Projects
\textsuperscript{15}JEREMY LIEBOWITZ, JIBRIN IBRAHIM, (2013).A CAPACITY ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIESDEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (DGD) PROGRAMME, UNDP, NIGERIA
Democratic Party (PDP); Muhammadu Buhari – from the Congress for Political Change (CPC) Party; and Nuhu Ribadu – from the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) Party.

3.6 However, in 2015 elections, this trend has changed with the emergence of a strong national opposition party. In February 2013, four major opposition parties in Nigeria, namely the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), merged into a new party known as the All Progressives Congress (APC). This merger was accompanied by a protracted internal crisis in the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) which led to the defection of five state governors, 11 senators, 37 members of the House of Representatives, and several other notable politicians to the APC. This singular act left the PDP without a majority in the House of Representatives for the first time since 1999.

3.7 At the polls, the PDP polled 22,495,187 after winning from 24 out of the 36 states and FCT. The important aspect about the 2011 elections was the marked improvement in the integrity of the elections and the significant reduction of electoral fraud. The 2011 General Elections in Nigeria were acclaimed by stakeholders as the most credible, transparent and peaceful elections in the history of democratic elections in Nigeria. In spite of this success, however, several areas of weaknesses characterized the conduct of the election with need for further strengthening identified. Similarly, the European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission to Nigeria noted “the 2011 General Elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain”. These challenges presented new opportunity for continued donor support to Nigeria’s democratic consolidation and the raison d’etre for the formulation of the DGD II project.

3.8 The DGD II was designed and implemented within a context of significant changes in the country programme environment. This includes most significantly the application of the Electoral Cycle Approach (ECA) by the project that considers the systems rather than the events surrounding election processes. The ECA starts from the end of the first elections up to
the conduct and tabulation of results of the next election. DGD II started with a review by the main partner INEC of lessons learned from the 2011 General Elections. It resulted in the development of strategic and operational plans addressing the identified weaknesses and institutional capacity strengthening. A broad range of cross cutting and mainstreamed issues related to the elections were equally considered by the ECA: i.e. gender, capacity development, legal frameworks, electronic track of the electoral management and logistical planning for elections.

3.9 The DGD project utilized a more focused and systematic approach for identifying its beneficiaries and collaborators, compared to its predecessor, DGD I. This was to minimize duplication of efforts between the project and others focusing on deepening democratic governance in Nigeria. These and other strategies adopted by the DGD II centered on improving the project’s design to ensure that the issues envisaged in its formulation were well considered. As aforementioned, the 2015 elections conducted during the life of the DGD II in 2015 were historic, with the opposition winning for the first time since the transition from military rule in 1999. These elections were however not without its challenges. The highly competitive process was marred by incidents of violence, abuse of incumbency at State and Federal levels, and attempts at manipulation20. While, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) made commendable attempts to strengthen electoral arrangements, procedural shortcomings were evident, in particular during collation and from analysis of polling unit results21.

---


21 Ibid
4 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

4.1 Results Based Management (RBM) Approach: Theory of Change
The DGD II project was evaluated against the Results Based Management (RBM) - Theory of Change Approach. Information sources and citing from project and other documents were reviewed and used to derive information for an updated Theory of Change (ToC) Model (see draft TOC figure below). The revised ToC diagram and notes helped to promote clear understanding about project logic, inputs and outputs as well as planned and expected outcomes and impacts, risks, and underlying assumptions. The Stakeholder Map with information about each stakeholder’s role in the project was used to guide the line of questioning by the consultants and the analysis of findings for the Terminal Evaluation.

4.2 Evaluation Questions
The evaluation questions are set out in Table 3 below. They are structured according to the evaluation criteria and Theory of Change against which DGD II has been evaluated. In order to respond to each question, component-specific evaluation questions were developed. These overarching questions were used to structure the evaluation.

Table 3: Overarching Evaluation Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relevance:   | • Was the initial design of the project adequate to properly address issues envisaged in formulation of the project and provide the best possible support to the INEC?  
• Has it remained relevant? |
| Efficiency:  | • Was UNDP support to the project appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and intended results? If not, what were the key weaknesses?  
• Has there been an economical use of financial and human resources?  
• Were the results delivered in reasonable proportion to operational and other costs?  
• Could a different type of intervention lead to similar results at a lower cost? How?  
• Did the monitoring and evaluation systems that UNDP had in place helped ensure that the project was managed efficiently and effectively? |

22 See list of programme documents reviewed (Annex IV)
23 See Stakeholder Map (Annex I)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Effectiveness**                            | • What evidence is there that UNDP support has contributed towards an improvement in national government capacity, including institutional strengthening?  
• Has UNDP been effective in helping improve governance at the local level in Nigeria? Do these local results aggregate into nationally significant results?  
• Has UNDP worked effectively with other UN Agencies and other international and national partners to deliver governance services?  
• How effective has UNDP been in partnering with civil society and the private sector to promote democratic governance in Nigeria?  
• Has UNDP utilized innovative techniques and best practices in its governance programming?  
• Is UNDP perceived by stakeholders as a strong advocate for improving government effectiveness and integrity in Nigeria?  
• Taking into account the technical capacity and institutional arrangements of the UNDP country office, is UNDP well suited to providing governance support to national and local governments in Nigeria?  
• What contributing factors and impediments enhance or impede UNDP performance in this area? |
| **Sustainability:**                          | • Will the outputs delivered through the project be sustained by national capacities after the end of the project duration? If not, why?  
• Will there be adequate funding available to sustain the functionality over the short, medium and longer term?  
• Has the project generated the buy-in and credibility needed for sustained impact? |
| **Resources, partnerships, and management analysis** | • Were project partners, stakeholders and/or beneficiaries involved in the design of interventions?  
• If yes, what was the nature and extent of their participation? If not, why not?  
• Was the structure and management of the project appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and intended results of the project? If not, what were the key weaknesses?  
• Has the intervention developed the necessary capacities (both human and institutional) for sustainability? |
| **Human rights**                              | • To what extent have poor, indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefitted from UNDPs work in support of democratic governance? |
| **Gender Equality**                          | • To what extent has gender been addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of governance projects? Is gender marker data assigned to the project representative of reality?  
• To what extent has UNDP governance support promoted positive changes in gender equality? Were there any unintended effects? Information collected should be checked again data from the UNDP country office’ Results-oriented Annual Reports (ROAR) during the period 2012 - 2015. |
4.3 **DGD II TE Staged Approach**

4.4 Mixed methods were employed for the DGD II TE in three stages as follows: Stage 1 i) The Desk Review Phase (9th May - 8th June, 2016). During this stage, preliminary answers to the evaluation questions were identified based on literature sources. The literature review consulted several documents including: the project document, work plans and budgets; project progress and final narrative reports; and meeting minutes among others. The product from this stage was a Desk Review Report with preliminary conclusions and hypothesis to be tested during the field visits.

4.5 Stage 2 ii) Field visits and consultations were undertaken over a three week period, between (15th June - 7th July, 2016), by the two-member consultant team. During this stage field visits were conducted in seven states in order to test the validity of the findings of the desk study and to supplement them. The states covered through field visits include Lagos, Delta, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Katsina. These were selected out of 36 states in Nigeria based on the following guidelines: 1) Security concerns; 2) DGD II pilot activities conducted there (e.g. in Katsina and Delta States); active level engagement, (Kano and Kaduna States) intensity and scope of activities based on gender and vulnerability concerns (Enugu and Delta States), availability of CSO network (Lagos State) capacity building to government entities (Abuja and Plateau States). Relevant interview protocol was used with key informants during field visits and direct observation. Key stakeholders interviewed include UNDP CO and DGD III PMU senior management and key officers. Also, JDBF members (EU, Canada) and IPs (INEC, SIECs, Political Parties, CSOs and media representatives). Overall, the evaluators met with over 35 individuals. The interviews followed a semi-structured approach with an interview guide. They involved specific discussions, with interlocutors on the project’s outputs, outcomes and indicators (measures). Interviews were based on the premise of non-attribution. However, the evaluators kept track of statements in their internal interview protocol logs.

4.6 iii) Stage 3 of the TE (from July 8th - 20th, 2016) involved initial drafting of a summary and synthesis of the preliminary TE findings as well as presentation in the form of a Power Point Presentation to the UNDP CO.

---

24 See Annex 3: List of Documents Consulted
1.1 25 A planned visit to an Eighth state, Enugu was not undertaken, however, due to unavailability of the key informant who had traveled at the time. An interview is still planned with her as a representative of a gender based CSO.

26 See Annex 2: Key Informant Interview Guide
27 See Annex: 4. Detailed list of respondents still under development
28 i.e. while all stakeholders are accounted, specific statements cannot be traced back to them
management in Nigeria. This was in line with the consultative TE approach where the consultants met with UNDP senior management for a briefing/de-briefing session meetings at the beginning and at the end of the field study, to discuss and clarify the TE plan, approach, implementation schedule and preliminary findings. The evaluators strived to arrive at accurate and objective evaluation findings through triangulation. This helped to relay statements made by stakeholders during the in-country work and that could be corroborated through additional information sources in order to promote the credibility and objectivity of the TE findings and conclusions.

4.7 Analysis
Data that was collected was cross-checked for consistencies and errors and for possible identification of overall patterns and relevant either to the evaluation questions, or to findings of a more general nature. By logical juxtaposition with objectives of the DGD II project, the evaluation team arrived at the descriptive findings and conclusions. These were subsequently transformed into normative recommendations in those cases that were deemed sufficiently important and operational.

4.8 Limitations of the Terminal Evaluation
As expected with evaluations of this kind focusing on democratic governance programme following the ECA, the DGD II TE was not without its own challenges. The consultants however mitigated against these by ensuring collection and analysis of sufficient valid and reliable data focused on the evaluation objective.

4.9 The first major limitation presented on the DGD II TE was the challenge of meeting with key stakeholders. In part due to the time lapse between the closure of the DGD II project in December 2015 and implementation of the TE in May 2016, most of these key informants were either unreachable, unavailable or had problems of accurate memory of events associated with the project. This especially concerns partners that were to be interviewed in Abuja where most of the project activities were implemented. This also applied to PMU staff who for the most part were either not reachable or did not respond to requests for interviews. The time lapse between the project end and the TE presented difficulties in accessing relevant documents and cross-checking specific information and some findings.

4.10 Finally, the DGD II TE was largely qualitative and therefore also very involving and time consuming as expected with these types of studies. The DGD II relied heavily on the views and opinions of key international and local partners at national and state level, augmented by findings from desk review. This was needed to better understand the DGD II implementation process, its achievements towards of component targets, its overall
outcomes and impacts. Inadequate quantitative data on the DGD II project limited the level of precision that could be demonstrated on achievement of key project results through evidence.
5 MAIN FINDINGS

RELEVANCE

5.1 Assessment of relevance in terms of the DGD II project’s design took into consideration the following evaluation question and other aspects discussed below:

Q. Was the initial design of the project adequate to properly address the issues envisaged in formulation of the project and provide the best possible support to the INEC? Has it remained relevant?

5.2 Relevance to UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) mandate. There is no doubt that the DGD II project objectives fit well with the UNDAF mandate: (i.e. Improvements in the three main pillars of accountable governance: elections, justice and anti-corruption in accordance with the rule of law and in response to public demand achieved).

5.3 Relevance to Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP). The DGD II project was also well aligned with two CPAP expected outcomes: Outcome 1: To build national election management bodies’ (INEC, SIEC) capacity and promote sustainable electoral processes, improve public awareness and confidence, and boost civic responsibilities. Outcome 2: To deepen democracy in Nigeria, with the aim of developing the capacity of National (Federal and State) institutions, networks and processes (both government and private) to contribute to the further entrenchment of democratic governance.

5.4 Relevance to Nigeria. The DGD II remains relevant to Nigeria even following its closure in 2015. The 2011 General Election in Nigeria was acclaimed by stakeholders as the most credible, transparent and peaceful elections in the history of democratic elections in Nigeria. In spite of this success, however several areas of weaknesses that characterized the conduct of the election requiring further strengthening were identified.29. These weaknesses include a weak constitutional and legal framework; endemic procedural irregularities; logistical inefficiencies; intimidation and violence. They constitute the key challenges that were addressed by DGD II.

5.5 Relevance of the methodology of the intervention. The methodological approach to deepening of democratic governance in Nigeria proved sound and relevant in light of the identified challenges addressed by the DGD II

29Revised Project Document: Democratic Governance for Development Project in Nigeria, June 2012
One of these methodological approaches is its broad nature which enabled it to consider the interests of various stakeholders by providing support and capacity building for key democratic institutions. Application of the ‘Electoral Cycle Approach’ that ensures support for all phases of an electoral process – before, during and after Election Day is relevant to the Nigerian context. This approach ensures that key institutions and stakeholders in the electoral processes are strengthened long before, during and after the Election Day. In addition, the design of the project embraced mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues across the four project components. This ensured that each component was responsive to each of the cross-cutting issues in a coherent and systematic manner. These strategies adopted by the DGD II enhanced its relevance, and promoted adequacies for properly addressing the issues envisaged in its formulation, thereby offering the best possible support to key democratic institutions in Nigeria.

5.6 Relevance of Components:

5.7 Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes: This component recognized the need to build both institutional capacity and to provide financial support to INEC. This helped to provide technical assistance, strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC & SIECs. A key informant noted the contribution of financial assistance delivered by the DGD II to INEC greatly helped to bridge financial gaps within the institution. INEC estimated that the 2015 elections would cost approximately 120 Billion Naira. However, state budget allocated only 45 billion Naira (less than half of the estimated requirements) to INEC for these needs, which was just enough to cover the bare essentials of an election in Nigeria. Financial and capacity building support from the DGD II project support made it possible for INEC to do more towards building an inclusive and participatory electoral environment conducive to more credible and transparent elections. This was evidenced through support to voter education, provided through DGD II.

5.8 Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement: Political parties are a central feature of any democracy. They are the vehicles by which citizens come together freely to campaign for public office, express their interests and needs, and define their aspirations for their society. While there are parties existing where there is no democracy, there can be no democracy without political parties. Therefore, without parties, modern representative democracy is unworkable. However, it has been observed in recent times that many political parties in Nigeria find it very difficult to adopt an open system that will not only allow party members to participate in decision-making but also give them unrestricted opportunities to contest in elections under
the party’s platform. This kind of socio-political restriction and constraint has increasingly resulted in party wrangling, wars of attrition, recrimination, acrimony, coordination dilemmas, and cross-carpeting in any Nigerian political parties. Thus, the DGD II support to improved democratic qualities of political engagement is highly relevant to achievement of democratic governance in Nigeria.

5.9 **Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups:** Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, women in Nigeria have tried to gain access to political decision-making positions by contesting for elective positions at various levels. Their efforts, however, have not translated into appreciative gains as subsequent elections since 1999 revealed. This state of affairs is also evident amongst youth and other marginalized groups including PWDs. In recognition of this challenge, DGD II provided support specifically targeting women, youth and PWDs, recognizing these groups as priorities for stronger democratic inclusion in Nigeria. The support of DGD II to this area is not only germane but a ‘sine qua non’ for promoting enduring democratic governance in Nigeria.

5.10 **Component 4: Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagement:** One of the challenges facing Nigeria today is democratic consolidation. ‘Consolidation suggests there is a democratic foundation being strengthened and built upon.’ After years of prolonged military rule, Nigeria came under civil rule (again) in 1999. Nigeria’s return to civil rule was not until some traumatizing experiences of oppression. During this period of military rule, the protagonist in opposition was civil society and the media, whose basic objective were the search for a more humane, responsive and responsible social order. These were the means through which citizens expressed their intense indignation to the misrule of the military. For instance, during the general elections in 1999, civil society and the media played a key role both in the debates and discussions that preceded the elections and in the conduct of the elections as well. Thus, it became important to strengthen this channel of civil engagement. Therefore, recognition of the civil society community and the media by DGD II as important constituencies to be supported in deepening democratic governance in Nigeria was not only apropos but a timely effort in consolidating democratic governance in Nigeria. Project activities and support in this component was thus highly relevant.

5.11 On the whole, the initial design of DGD II project was viewed by key stakeholders interviewed as appropriate and coherent for the needs and issues envisaged in promoting democratic governance in Nigeria. The project’s design was considered relevant for providing much needed support to the main partner, INEC and other key democratic institutions in Nigeria. The outcome of the 2015 elections with inputs by INEC also confirmed the project’s relevance within the Nigerian context. An identified weakness of the project design, was the over-emphasis on national level institutions such as the INEC with de-emphasis on state institutions such as the SIECs that received negligible support and attention despite being a major project concern (Component 2). This approach neglected and underrated local democratic institutions which are basically the foundations of democratic governance in any nation.

5.12 The evaluators judged the relevance of the DGD II Project as high.

**EFFECTIVENESS**

5.13 The DGD II Project TE sought to respond to the following questions of interest under the effectiveness criterion:

**Qs:** Are the project outputs appropriate, sufficient, effective and sustainable for the desired outcome? What evidence is there that UNDP support has contributed towards an improvement in national government capacity, including institutional strengthening?

**Effectiveness Achievements**

5.14 The DGD II evaluation findings suggest that on the whole, the project delivered as originally intended and planned. Excellent progress was made towards delivering on log-frame targets, milestones, and outputs. Achieving the intended targets supported components’ contributions to higher-level objectives (i.e. improvements in the three main pillars of accountable governance: elections, justice and anti-corruption achieved in accordance with the rule of law and in response to public demand).

5.15 Various outputs listed under each project component were deemed generally appropriate and sufficient. Successful conduct of the 2015 election by INEC points to high level evidence of institutional strengthening. In the last year of DGD II operations, Nigeria held its 2015 General Elections (GE), which was generally acclaimed as credible, peaceful and orderly. DGD II significantly contributed to record-setting outcomes of these GE s, historically marking the first time since
independence in 1960 that power transferred democratically and peacefully since military rule in 1999, from the ruling to an opposition political party\textsuperscript{31}. Application of the ICT (card reader) for the 2015 GE was another major milestone and institutional strengthening outcome for INEC. The DGD II’s strengthening of CSOs and the media in advocating for affirmative action and violence free elections are two notable confirmations of institutional strengthening. Together these outcomes contributed to the successful conduct of the 2015 election promoting democratic governance in Nigeria.

**Qs. Has UNDP been effective in helping improve governance at the local level in Nigeria? Do these local results aggregate into nationally significant results?**

5.16 To a notable extent, the evaluators confirmed that the UNDP has effectively contributed to improved governance at the local level in Nigeria. The DGD project facilitated a needs assessment of SIECs which identified several organizational, technical and human capacity gaps. Based on this study, DGD II supported engagements between the leadership of the Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria (FOSIECON) consisting of the 36 Chairpersons of the SIECs, and over 190 SIEC Election Commissioners across the 36 states; as well as supported pilot electoral system in Katsina and Delta States towards the conduct of local government elections in these two states. In addition, 5 SIECs (Katsina, Bauchi, Yobe, Niger, and Delta) were provided with capacity development support for enhanced institutional capacity to conduct credible local government elections. Through the capacity development support, the project made a significant contribution to strengthening the capacities of SIECs in the conduct of local government elections\textsuperscript{32}. The implementation of the EMS at the state level also helped to improve governance at the state level. The DGD II’s support to CSOs on advocacy activities on violence free election at the state and local government level contributed to violent free elections especially in 2015. All these have aggregated nationally to positively impact on the conduct of a free, fair and transparent conduct of the 2015 election.

**Q. Has UNDP worked effectively with other UN Agencies and other international and national partners to deliver governance services?**

5.16. UNDP has cooperated well with development and international partners in strengthening democratic governance in Nigeria and has assumed a leadership role in supporting donor coordination. Right from the design

\textsuperscript{31} ibid
\textsuperscript{32} ibid
stage of the project, the issue of partnership was taken on board because of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of governance issues in Nigeria. The project’s main national counterpart was the INEC which participated in the entire project process, from design to implementation. Besides INEC, the project worked through partnership with a broad range of election stakeholders who have acknowledged the strong quality of the partnership and collaboration with the project. Some of the key partnerships were with Government agencies such as the NILS, the FMWASD and the NOA. Other partners are media organizations, security forces, CSOs and CSO networks, political parties, academia and UN agencies. The involvement of such a broad range of institutions and organizations was reported as strength of the DGD II project and has provided the basis for consolidating the gains of the 2015 electoral process. Many recognize the positive role played by UNDP given its explicit mandate to promote democratic governance in the countries where it operates. In Nigeria, for instance, UNDP has established partnerships bilateral donors in the establishment of the joint basket of fund to support democratic governance in Nigeria. While the coordination role of UNDP has often been appreciated, it has not necessarily meant that the joint basket of fund initiatives have been meaningfully coordinated. However, there were evaluative evidence demonstrating that the UNDP has partnered with other United Nations agencies such as UNWOMEN and UNESCO to promote democratic governance. While there is strong evidence of cooperation between UNDP and other international partners in Nigeria, however, the issues of competition and visibility among partners seems to be threatening this relationship.

Q. How effective has UNDP been in partnering with civil society and the private sector to promote democratic governance in Nigeria?

5.17. The evaluator’s review of documents and the field visits confirmed that the UNDP has effectively partnered with the CSOs in support for democratic governance in Nigeria. The volume of UNDP partnerships with civil society has been high. There, were many levels of engagement, with strong partnerships in many cases. Some CSO partners of the project include the Centre for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) that was involved at the design stage. Also the Women Trust Fund, Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement (YIAGA), Youngsters Foundation, Youth Alliance on Constitution Review and Elections (YACORE), among others. However, there is little if any evaluative evidence UNDP’s partnership with the private sector in support of democratic governance in Nigeria.

---

33Interim Final Project Review Report, December 2015
Q. Has UNDP utilized innovative techniques and best practices in its governance programming?

5.18. Reviews of relevant project and other documents by the evaluators indicate that the challenges that informed the initiation of the DGD II were multi-dimensional and involved several stakeholders in the democratic governance process. Addressing these challenges demanded innovative approaches. This was clearly understood in the governance programming of the DGD II project. Thus, the design of the DGD II project adopted several innovative techniques and best practices. Firstly it took a multi-stakeholder approach that took into consideration the needs and interests of various stakeholders. The project supported these key democratic institutions with capacity building on the entire democratic governance processes. Secondly, the project design reflected the “Electoral Cycle Approach” that ensures support for all phases of an electoral process (i.e. before, during and after Election Day). This approach ensured that key institutions and stakeholders in the electoral processes were capacitated long before, the Election Day. However the project did not follow through with many post-election activities as demanded by the ECA approach.

5.19. As part of it design strategy, the project featured a broader role of support to several actors in the democracy building arena in order to enhance its effectiveness and sustainability. In addition, the design of the project embraced mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues across the four components of DGD II. This ensured that each component was responsive to each of the cross-cutting issues in a coherent and systematic manner. The project also utilized a more focused and systematic approach in target beneficiary identification and with collaborators. This in an effort to avoid duplication of efforts between it and other projects engaged in deepening democratic governance in Nigeria. These innovative techniques and other strategies adopted by the DGD II project contributed to a design that was adequate for properly addressing issues envisaged in its formulation.

Other questions concerning the effectiveness of the DGD II project are addressed in the section below. These address the perception of UNDP by other stakeholders as a key player in promoting democratic processes in Nigeria.

Q. Is UNDP perceived by stakeholders as a strong advocate for improving government effectiveness and integrity in Nigeria?

5.20. The views of key informants clearly revealed that the UNDP is well perceived by stakeholders as a strong and capable advocate for improved government effectiveness and integrity. Respondents generally recognized the important role played by the UNDP in enhancing democratic governance in Nigeria through its non-partisan approach and global standing as a globally recognized organization focused on development. The main DGD II
beneficiaries acknowledged the role of the UNDP especially in promoting successful conduct of the 2015 election. INEC for instance noted the importance of DGD II’s support in the development of policy and operational plans and in capacity strengthening. The political parties benefitted severally through enhanced internal party democracy and development of party codes of conduct. All these were noted as having contributed to improved functioning of key democratic institutions and by extension positively impacting on governance effectiveness and integrity in Nigeria.

5.21. Taking into account the technical capacity and institutional arrangements of the UNDP CO, the organization is well suited to providing governance support to national and local governments in Nigeria. UNDP has, over the years, built strong working relations with central Governments on issues of local governance. This has been the outcome of a long history of cooperation in many countries. The trust and credibility that UNDP has established as a catalytic partner in development is an important factor enabling it to play an effective role in supporting electoral and governance reforms in Nigeria. UNDP representatives and programme officers in country offices have, by and large, done well in terms of handling sensitivities surrounding issues of democratic governance in Nigeria. Dealing with Governments on issues of democratic governance requires considerable skills. However, conversely, the UNDP has been less successful in developing appropriate modalities for working with sub-national (state or provincial) and local levels of government.

5.22. The effectiveness criterion of the DGD II was also assessed against the success of outputs used to achieve programmatic outcomes (results). The extent to which the outputs contributed to the achievement of desired outcomes is evaluated with reference to ‘DGD II Road Map’ document, the Final Project Review Report and the Mid-Term Evaluation Report.

5.23. As aforementioned, the DGD II project featured activities under four components. An analysis of the outputs from each of these components indicates that they are relevant to the stated outcome. With respect to Component One, the DGD II activities contributed to the achievement of the following four outputs: (1) strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC/SIECs strengthened. This helped SIECs to gained expertise in conducting local government elections (Delta and Katsina) and enhanced reporting. The first report on elections was produced by Delta State SIEC. (2) Electoral systems (voter registration) and processes (tallying and transmission) improved through ICT, (3) legal and policy framework for elections improved, and (4) professional capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SIECs enhanced. This component also helped to build the capacity of FOISECON executive by sponsoring of national delegate

conference in Abuja in 2014 and enhanced partnership and support to electoral process. It is on record that all FOISECON requests to UNDP before elections in 2015 were granted. These Component One outputs were found to be appropriate, sufficient, effective and sustainable. For instance, Output One provided support for the designing of INEC strategic plan which served as master plan for the electoral activities and processes which enabled INEC to remain focused and deliver on its mandate. The project provided support to M&E Directorate of INEC by furnishing its first ever budget funding from DGD II.

5.24. Under Component Two, the DGD II activities contributed to achievement of two main outputs. These are i) strengthening of the capacity of political parties and ii) improving the effectiveness of Targeted NASS Committees and Processes. Under these two outputs, DGD II supported the establishment of a political parties center which provided a platform for regular and robust engagement among political parties, INEC, CSOs and the general public. This paved the way for improved democratic quality of political engagement and resulted in enhanced inter-party coordination, leading to enhanced internal democratic processes in political parties. This component also contributed to the establishment of the Party Code of Conduct and the political party training centers at NIPSS in Jos, Plateau State.

5.25. With respect to Component Three, DGD II activities contributed to the achievement of three main outputs, namely: (1) legal reforms and women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative action and women’s empowerment in politics (2) an enlarged pool of women aspirants for elective offices at various levels (3) enhanced CSO capacity to advocate for affirmative action. Under these outputs, DGD II supported youth, women and PWDs to ensure inclusive political participation, enhancing visibility of PWDs and youth in election processes in Nigeria. DGD II also potentially contributed to a reduction in youth violence in 2015 elections through enhanced capacity of CSOs to engage positively with youth. Although this was stated by several stakeholders at different levels, due to the lack of baseline data, the TE could not accurately substantiate this claim. The findings are therefore anecdotal mainly based on opinions and views of key stakeholder institutions consulted.

5.26. Project activities under the fourth component of the DGD II project contributed to the achievement of two main outputs, namely: (1) development of CSOs Capacity (2) Strengthening of both capacity and voice of the Media. Within these two outputs, DGD II engagement of CSOs both at local and national levels; support provided to media networks and the reinforcement of accountability through the FOI Act assisted the EMB to get closer to the people. The above outputs are relevant to the CPAP outcome. Most of the component’s outputs were delivered in a timely with the exception of electoral reforms. This was delayed due to the Constitution
Review Process that was running in parallel. Coupled with failure to reach consensus this completely undermined all the project’s efforts towards electoral reform.\(^{35}\)

5.27. The development of INEC’s strategic plan, Gender Policies and the Electoral Processes Manual can be considered as effectiveness outcomes of the DGD II project. On the other hand, the project was largely ineffective in increasing the numbers of women in Federal, State, and Local government legislator positions as well as the numbers holding political appointments and those holding elected offices at these levels. For the third consecutive elections, the number of women parliamentarians both at the national and state levels actually decreased during the DGD II project lifecycle. Identified challenges that hampered the delivery of intended outputs for women were cited as persistent insurgency and insecurity in the North-Eastern part of the country. Others include urgent and unplanned requests from INEC, the need to ensure that requests of partners did not constitute duplication of efforts; and the departure of key programme staff. These challenges and omissions notwithstanding, the TE judged the DGD II project as effective overall as evidenced by the specific benefits to IPs and the conduct of the 2015 election in Nigeria:

**Effectiveness Limitations**

5.28. Specific limitations to DGD II effectiveness are highlighted below in line with fair and accurate reporting on the evaluation and to inform the key lessons and ensuing recommendations later in this report.

- The DGD II’s over-emphasis on national level engagement and less on state level initiatives limited the project’s impacts at the lower level with SIECS in particular. These do not share the independent status enjoyed by INEC at the national level with budgetary support for activities. This presents limitations to their performance and effectiveness due to inadequate funds and capacity building support for continued activities post election according to the ECA approach advocated by the DGD II.

- Inadequate staff at state level continues to present a limitation in terms of sustainability of election monitoring systems (EMS) initiated by the DGD II project with INEC. Lack of funding for full time staff positions resulted in non-payment of dues of ad hoc staff recruited to manage the EMS implemented through DGD II support, at the national and state levels. This and inadequate consultation with INEC led to ‘EMS shut down’ signifying incomplete and unsustainable activities by the project’s end in 2015.

\(^{35}\)Interim Final Project Review Report: December 2015
Inadequate skills to evaluate practices, policies, strategies and results at INEC poses a limitation for follow through on development and implementation of key DGD II contributions. This contributes to sustainability limitations and loss of benefits to Nigeria from the DGD II project.

The project’s targeting of leaders of political parties who are easily accessible and centrally based in large cities limited participation by local leaders with influence at the grass roots. This limited the project’s achievements in ensuring completely non-violent elections in 2015, adequate participation and the inclusion of youth PWDs and women in elective positions.

The DGD II’s training programme for media organizations were considered too general and not adequately tailored for the special needs of PWDs. Individual media houses have their own independent writing styles which most will not depart from. The training though appreciated therefore failed to achieve the relevant level of impact with media houses due to the lack of congruence with and consideration for individual preferences in terms of writing and communication style. Low capacity of media to communicate appropriately and accurately for instance on PWDs continue to persist. A key informant cited a specific example where the media would refer to ‘a disabled van’ Tailored training for media that was considered by PWDs to be more biased towards gender and less on human rights (disability) reporting. This limited the project’s impact on media reporting on PWDs and their visibility as central key stakeholders in the 2015 General Election.

Considering the achievements of the DGD II project as described above and despite the challenges and limitations, the the project was found to be highly effective.

EFFICIENCY

5.29. The DGD II efficiency criteria was assessed by providing answers to the following questions:

Qs, Was UNDP support to the project appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and intended results? If not, what were the key weaknesses? Has there been an economical use of financial and human resources?

Efficiency Achievements

5.30. UNDP’s support to the DGD II project was appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and the intended results. The DGD II adequately supported the four component of the project with IPs, influencing achievement of their set targets. Besides, the project support strategy was evidenced as it was derived from the DGD I lessons and experiences. This was similarly echoed by project beneficiaries interviewed.

5.31. The TE was however unable to accurately establish cost efficiencies of the DGD II in terms of accurately measuring the value, costs, or benefits of the
project investment. This would have helped answer the second question that concerns the economical use of financial and human resources and any cost benefits achieved. Due to lack of data and information on each itemized cost and payment by the project, the opportunity to assess cost efficiencies against the original investment was missed.

5.32. Reviews of the project budget however reveal no indication of misappropriation of JDBF resources by the DGD II project. The project that had duration of approximately three and a half years had a planned budget of approximately USD$53 million. However, only about $38,939,027.90 (71 %) of the total budget was released and utilized. Of this, USD 33,510,862.00 (or 86%) was spent on development activity costs, while USD 5,428,166.00 (or 14%) was spent on project running costs, including GMS. In the 3.5 years implementation period of the DGD II, the project had not utilized 30% of the project budget that was initially committed. This is a significant amount considering the non-completion of activities such as the EMS system and M&E capacity building that was started with INEC.

5.33. Table 2 below presents a summary of financial support to the four project components. It reveals that Component 2 received the highest level of financial support: 24 per cent ($9,367,921) of the released budget, followed by Component 3 and 4 which received 22 per cent of the same budget each. Component 1 which comprised support to the main partner (INEC) however received the lowest level of financial support at only 18 per cent of the released budget, comparable only to the PMU that received 14 per cent of the budget which was considered high by the main partner INEC.

\[\text{ibid}\]
Table 2: Summary of Support to Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Component</th>
<th>USD</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Management</td>
<td>5,428,166</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent Electoral Process</td>
<td>6,849,259</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement</td>
<td>9,367,921</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other marginalized Groups</td>
<td>8,717,274</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 4: Strengthening Channels of Civic Engagement</td>
<td>8,576,408</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditures</td>
<td>38,939,028</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.34. Concerning adequacy of the project’s funding, the committed budget was found to be sufficient to contribute to the desired outcome. However, due to its partial release (70% over the funding period) and reduction of the project implementation period (by six-months towards the end), the DGD II project outputs and outcomes could not be fully realized as no new planned activities were approved. The project was however able to redefine and reprioritize its focus during the implementation period, in order to ensure the achievement of planned objectives. In the course of implementation, the DGD II project focused on the following key principles for cost effective use of inputs.

5.35. **Innovative resource utilization:** The UNDP supported a number of strategies that factored in cost effectiveness, capacity development, sustainability and national ownership in the course of the project implementation. One such strategy is the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) approach which pooled several country donor funds together into common pool. This helped to enhanced efficiencies by significantly increasing the level of funding available to the DGD II compared to other projects (e.g. IFES). The JDBF approach also enhanced efficiencies of human resources through a
horizontally rather than through traditionally vertical approaches featuring direct, donor-recipient funding. The flexibility of the JDBF further ensured that requests for support by the main partner INEC and FOISECON were fully addressed in a timely and flexible manner to maximize opportunities. The DGD II project management structure was designed to enhance efficiencies in human resources utilization through the five levels of management. This promoted sharing of roles and duties to enable the PMU to focus on its core business which was management of the DGD II and implementation of the programming with IPs.

5.36. **Value for Money:** In accordance with the UNDP procurement policy, the project ensured that it had obtained the maximum benefit from the goods and services it acquired within the resources available, through competitive open tendering process and other administrative procedures. Economical use of human resources was promoted through partnerships with IPs and sharing of duties and roles between the PMU and UNDP CO. Delays in procurement reduced the project’s ability to realize 30% of its planned budget, subsequently affecting fiscal resources available for implementation of project outputs. However the value for money achieved through this project’s outcomes as compared to the actual funds released (70% of the budget) and utilized was deemed high. Enhanced management efficiencies would have enhanced the value for money of this project by ensuring timely release of 100% of the project funds, promoting achievements of all planned outputs and leading to the full realization of results. This is a key lesson learned that should be well considered when implementing similar projects using the JDBF model and ECA in future. Mitigation measures could also help address expected challenges with similar projects involving multiple donors, several management tiers and a wide range of key stakeholder groups.

Q. Did the monitoring and evaluation systems that UNDP have in place help to ensure that the project was managed efficiently and effectively?

5.37. The TE findings reveal that the M&E systems put in place by UNDP helped to ensure that the project was managed efficiently and effectively, overall. Most notably, the Results and Resources Framework (RRF) and Annual Work Plans by the DGD II. This system provided a reference for continuous monitoring throughout the implementation period. However despite these systems, the reliance on ad-hoc M&E support from the UNDP CO to monitor progress of the DGD II activities under their respective components was inadequate. The DGD II Technical Committee played a central role in monitoring progress towards the outcome through a monthly TC meeting, while the SC committee also reviewed progress and provided guidance when they met which was not often (at most once or twice annually rather than quarterly as mandated). The role of the PSC and the frequency of meetings

---

37 ibid
was raised by UNDP, especially during the most critical build up to the elections -2014/15. The evaluation team believes that the PSC’s role and contributions were inadequate for ensuring compliance of the DGD II to efficiency standards, a factor that may have contributed to the premature end of planned activities later in the programme cycle.

**Efficiency Limitations**

5.38. Several limitations to DGD II efficiency are summarized in the section below:

- The weakest area in the project’s monitoring process was the absence of a designated M & E framework with clear baseline figures, relevant targets and monitoring process to be followed with roles and responsibilities at different levels within the project. Despite the ad-hoc support from the UNDP CO M&E Team and the TC’s efforts, these were inadequate for informing the project on its progress towards objectives in a continuous manner.

- The Constitution Review process which DGD II committed significant technical and financial assistance which did not scale through due to the change in priorities of the Government of Nigeria.

- Due to the tight schedule that INEC was operating with, especially following the rescheduling of the elections, the DGD II project was constantly under high pressure to respond to INEC demands on time\(^ {38} \).

- The ECA requires implementation of project activities pre, during and post elections. The DGD II project however focused primarily on pre-election and some election activities with little attention to post-election activities, partially due to early project closure and partial release of project funds.

- Despite the reference to competitive bidding processes by UNDP CO in the literature (Interim Final Project Review Report 2015) this was not evidenced in the evaluation findings as most participants were selected through loose, informal, referral processes that were prone to bias.

- The main partner of the DGD II (INEC) has consistently asserted that the assistance had not gone far enough for them to maximize effectiveness of project support.

- Similarly, several project beneficiaries and CSOs reiterated the negative impacts of late payments, delays in reimbursements and generally cumbersome and non-consultative decisions on logistical project activities. In some cases, these contributed to delays in the start-up of activities that were planned to run concurrently, thereby exposing their organizations to risk. In others the cumbersome processes reduced the level of participation by political parties.

- Evidence from the evaluation shows that CSOs especially PWDs were dissatisfied by the voluntary nature of their participation that demanded inputs of their valuable time and experience, yet with no monetary compensation.

- The strategy adopted for funds disbursement in tranches to CSOs negatively impacted on implementation efficiencies. Conversely, the lump sum payments to INEC negatively impacted on implementation efficiencies due to the IPs low level of

\(^ {38} \text{Ibid}\)
readiness to manage and account for these funds. This points to limitations of efficiency promoted by unique institutional requirements that need to have been more carefully considered in advance through careful planning and consultation.

Despite having clear cut responsibilities in the PRODOC, it seems that the PMU (by default-not design) overshadowed the other management structures.

The procurement system of the DGD II that adheres strictly to demands of the UNDP procurement system without simultaneously prioritizing according to procurement needs from and between country offices adversely affected the efficiency of the project to deliver against results.

Within the context of the DGD II’s performance **efficiency was judged as moderate**

**SUSTAINABILITY:**

5.39. The Sustainability criterion provides an assessment of the likelihood that the benefits produced by projects will continue beyond the project cycle period once external funding has ended. The DGD II’s sustainability was assessed by investigating the following questions:

**Qs. Were the outputs delivered through the project sustained by national capacities after the end of the project duration? If not, why? Will there be adequate funding available to sustain the functionality over the short, medium and longer term?**

**Sustainability achievements**

Desk reviews cited the project’s sustainability as “one area where DGD II’s strength lies, as it is geared towards building institutions capacity to promote credible and peaceful elections and encourages dialogue at all levels to build consensus and establish forward looking strategies to improve the process and to deepen democracy.”

The consultant’s agree that sustainability was an important principle that was mainstreamed in all DGD II major interventions. For example, through the instituted strategic plan, policies and systems for sustainability and enhanced INECs strategic planning capacity and process support to development of the INEC Gender policy, the Political Party Code of Conduct, with continued engagement of political parties. Also through enhanced capacities of FOSIECON to share knowledge and information among SIECs. In addition, the DGD II’s support to development and deployment of the EMS, (an electronic monitoring system that enabled INEC to monitor the deployment of election materials, the progress of the election, to pin point challenges in the field and to work to quickly resolve them) formed the bedrock for INEC to build upon and improve on future elections in Nigeria. Electoral support systems for SIECs piloted in Katsina and Delta States furthered this goal.

---

39Mid-term evaluation of the “Support to the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2012-2015”
5.40. Similarly, the project worked hard to develop long term institutional capacity of other electoral actors. Key frameworks such as the Political Parties Code of conduct, the Nigeria Media Code of Election Coverage, and the strategic plan for the National Association of Women journalists and the reviewed National Guidelines for Reporting on Implementation of the Freedom of Information Act- a National Policy on ICT and Elections - were developed and disseminated. As such, these strong systems will continue to provide benefits beyond the 2015 elections for future elections and the deepening of democracy in Nigeria.

**Sustainability limitations**

5.41. Despite the largely positive literature citations on the DGD II project’s future, the evaluators rated project sustainability as moderate to low overall without continued funding support through the JDBF and management by UNDP. This finding was arrived at through triangulation of desk reviews with key informant interviews, site visits and observation. This is because as already experienced, there is inadequate funding to sustain the functionality of DGD II project benefits over time as it is now closed. Other institutions such as IFES that are supporting election processes in Nigeria do not have the level and flexibility of funding that came with the DGD II JDBF. Meanwhile, UNDP enjoys the trust and convening powers as a development partner rather than political institution. The organization has international global recognition and is a preferred and trusted partner of government departments, ministries and agencies in Nigeria.

5.42. Despite that the DGD II project was designed using the Electoral Cycle Approach, there were no financial provisions for IPs’ post-election activities. Some planned activities were prematurely terminated by decision of the JDBF in June 2015, following the resignation of the PMU PD, six-months before the project was expected to formally close, in December of the same year. This left a ‘bad taste in the mouths’ of some key PMU officers who were responsible for various project components. In the same vein, establishment of the EMS Secretariat in the 36 states of the Federation could not be achieved, whilst the EMS Secretariat that was established by the DGD II at INEC was shut even before the close of the DGD II project due to funding challenges. This implies that the EMS is not sustainable.

5.43. Due to lack of implementation, adherence and respect for the ECA, many activities of the DGD II project are potentially unsustainable without a follow on project that conforms to this approach and funding mechanism. The
Political Party Center at NIPS, CSOs and Media trainings, FOISECON’s MOU are no longer sustainable initiatives. Lack of funding for follow up activities hinders SIECs from implementing the ECA approach and limit INECs ability to continue the networking activities with political parties and the SIECs.

Overall the DGD II project’s sustainability was deemed moderate to low without a follow up programme and adequate funding by government and partner organizations.

6. RESOURCES, PARTNERSHIPS AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS

6.17. The DGD II project TE sought to analyze the project’s achievements against the resources, partnerships and management approaches, adopted according to the following key questions of interest:

Qs. Were project partners, stakeholders and/or beneficiaries involved in the design of interventions? If yes, what was the nature and extent of their participation? If not, why not? Was the structure and management of the project appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and intended results of the project? If not, what were the key weaknesses? Has the intervention developed the necessary capacities (both human and institutional) for sustainability?

6.18. There is evaluative evidence confirming project partners, stakeholders and/or beneficiaries’ involvement in the design of DGD II interventions. Partners and project beneficiaries noted that there was some level of consultation with them in the project design phase. The main beneficiary, INEC noted that consultations were limited to the Chairpersons office. The various INEC departments were hardly involved in the design and information was not well cascaded throughout the organization. This they believe resulted in the lack of requests by various departments within INEC for support because they were not aware of what opportunities existed or what budget levels were available for the project. They assumed that there was little if any budget available and therefore did not make many requests. The consultants believe that this state of affairs may have contributed to the low (70%) funds absorption rate by the project as indicated by the main partner INEC. This finding is substantiated through triangulation of hard data with anecdotal evidence from Key Informant Interviews. These opinions although subjective find credence when assessed against the literature and budgetary data forming the hypothesis that the low level of knowledge about the resources available in DGD II the project leads to similarly low level of requests for support by potential beneficiaries and consequently lower levels of funds use and disbursement by the project.
6.19. Evidence from the TE however indicate that the structure and management of the project was appropriate to achieving the desired results. As noted above, the DGD II project management strategy comprised five levels of management. These are:

i. Project Steering Committee (PSC)

ii. Technical Committee (TC)

iii. UNDP as the Implementing Partner

iv. Project Management Unit (PMU)

v. Project Assurance

6.20. Theoretically, this strategy ideally promotes checks and balances among partners. It further enables participation by all stakeholders and enhances visibility of international partners in the JDBF in decision making for the project. However, the TE findings reveal that the actual status of this arrangement was less than ideal in practice. Due to challenges of coordination of diaries of PSC members, there was continuous delegation of duties by the PSC members. Despite the playing down of the effects by the international partners interviewed, the evaluation team believes that the limited participation in the few PSC meetings held tended to hinder effective deliberation and high level decision making by the project.

6.21. Attendance at PSC meetings by subordinate staff without decision making powers meant that problems encountered by the project could not be resolved in good time. The tendency therefore was to derogate responsibility for problem solving to the implementing partner (UNDP) on matters especially concerning project management by the PMU. Conversely, the consultants found anecdotal evidence of over-shadowing of the UNDP CO by the PMU management through non-transparent procurement processes and inadequate consultation and communication. The role of the PSC in streamlining issues of mutual concern to the JDBF members and UNDP was inadequately enacted with disastrous yet avoidable consequences to the DGD II project, staff and key stakeholders.

6.22. On whether the DGD II project developed the necessary capacities, both human and institutional, for sustainability, as stated earlier under the sustainability findings, the absence of continuous donor support and funding of IPs and beneficiaries is a major threat to sustained human and institutional capacity under this now closed project.
7. HUMAN RIGHTS

7.17. Human rights are the inherent dignities and freedoms to which we are all entitled as human beings, wherever we live. Participation and inclusion are key principles of the human rights-based approach (HRBA). In an impact assessment context, working towards implementing these principles require us to question the extent to which the poor, indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefitted from any project. Hence, for the DGD II, the key question raised under this criteria is stated below:

Q. To what extent have poor, indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefitted from UNDP's work in support of democratic governance?

7.18. Evidence from the evaluation shows those women, youth, PWDs and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefitted from UNDP's work in support of democratic governance. For instance, component three of the DGD II focuses on Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups and provided support and capacity building activities for Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups in Nigeria. Other key areas of human right mainstreaming in the DGD II include:

- **Participation**: utilised a participatory approach from planning to implementation and regularly sought inputs from key electoral actors.
- **Disadvantaged groups**: activities across all project components targeted under-represented groups including women, youth and first time voters, PWDs, and non-literate.
- **Building awareness of rights and laws**: awareness of rights and laws were promoted through focused trainings including BRIDGE trainings on Gender.
- **Support for reform of legal frameworks**: invested technical and financial resources into the constitution amendment process, working with INEC to submit memoranda for the amendment of the Electoral Act and enabled other key actors to organize and submit memoranda.
- **Reduction and prevention of violence**: initiated an Election Contextual Analysis (ECA) project which focused on the main drivers and retardants of political tension and electoral manipulation in order to provide an early warning system highlight particular areas of concern and guide DGD activity accordingly as the 2015 elections drew near.
8. GENDER EQUALITY

8.17. Gender equality in development intervention is about good programming and about effectively reaching all segments of the affected population. Crises impact women, girls, boys and men of all ages differently. As a result, their needs and interests differ, as do their resources, capacities and coping strategies. Women are often the first responders to a crisis, and they play a central role in the survival and resilience of families and communities. It is therefore important that the design of development interventions mainstreamed gender considerations to meet the needs of young and old, male and female, and ensure that all have safe and equal access to intervention activities. To achieve this, all groups must be consulted and actively participate in needs assessments and decision-making processes. In addition, gender equality and the empowerment of women are human rights that lie at the heart of development.

8.18. The DGD II gender equality criteria was assessed by providing answers to the following questions:

Qs To what extent has gender been addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of governance projects? Is gender marker data assigned to the project representative of reality? To what extent has UNDP governance support promoted positive changes in gender equality? Were there any unintended effects?

8.19. The evaluation found that gender equality was mainstreamed in design, implementation and monitoring of governance projects especially with component three of the DGD II project. This is achieved in three dimensions: supporting political parties to strengthen internal processes geared to advancing the role of women as candidates for public office and as actors within the party structures; training women to organize and mobilize public support for their election to public office; and supporting those women who get elected to become effective role models and drivers of change to promote affirmative action and women's empowerment especially in NASS. However, there was no evidence of gender equality from the evaluation in terms of monitoring. Beyond this, there was no gender marker data assigned to the project representation as revealed by the desk review of project documents and the field visits.

8.20. Results of the evaluation shows that there were concrete efforts to promote positive changes in gender equality; however, without much effect by the UNDP in this respect. For instance, the evaluation results show that in 2007
the number of women who won elective positions at the parliamentary level was 11%. This percentage dropped in the 2011 elections to 6.4% and dropped further down to only 5.3% in the 2015 election.

9. IMPACT

9.17. This examines the effects of the project on the wider environment, and their contributions to wider policy or sector objectives. However, the absence of a baseline for the DGD II project makes the establishment of the counterfactual impossible and attribution difficult. However, the evaluators found that DGD II has made a significant impact in supporting democratic governance in Nigeria.

9.18. Key areas where the project had impact in component one include:

- DGD II support for the development, validation, and implementation of the INEC Strategic Plan
- DGD II support for the development, validation, and implementation of the INEC Gender policy
- DGD II support for the development, validation, and implementation of the INEC Election Management System.
- Political Party Code of Conduct and engagement with the political parties on party
- Building the ability of FOSIECON to share knowledge and information among SIECs.
- Potential impact from piloting electoral support systems for SIECs in Katsina and Delta States.
- DGD supported the development at NIPSS of a dedicated training programme for party leaders and its use.
- DGD II enhanced networks of women already holding public office.
- DGD II networked youth groups for electoral participation resulting in reduced violence during 2015 elections.
- CSO capacity built for election monitoring and observation for the Osun state elections.
- Capacity development for CSOs to improve their prospects for partnering with DGD II and enhanced visibility.

9.19. Key areas where the project demonstrated impact include:
DGD supported development at NIPSS of a dedicated training programme for party leaders and its use.
Support for IPAC’s ability to coordinate among parties, and for their work towards approval of the code by parties.
High-level dialogues between party leaders on peaceful competition.
Support enabled the Youth Agenda on Political Participation to help structure peaceful participation by young people.
Substantial support to NILS enabled the Institute to conduct a capacity assessment for the National Assembly, build capacity in the National Assembly, and draft manuals and proposals for changing procedures.
Facilitation for a stakeholder conference with political parties on the results and impact of the 2015 elections.

9.20. Key areas where the project had impact in component three include:

- DGD II networked women already holding public office.
- DGD II supported meetings targeting women for voter education.
- DGD II supported and networked youth groups for electoral participation.
- The project funded set of activities to support electoral participation by PWD.
- Project support enabled the building and operation of the Women’s Situation Room for the general elections.
- Support for CSO advocacy on affirmative action in elections in Ekiti and Osun states.
- Facilitation of a youth conference on the results and impact of the 2015 elections

9.21. Key areas where the project had impact in component four include:

- CSO observation for the Osun state elections.
- Capacity development for CSOs to improve their prospects for partnering with DGD II.
- Support for training journalists on electoral reporting.
- Support for the use of the Freedom of Information Act within government institutions and among civil society and the media.
- Facilitation for a stakeholder meeting with the media on the results and impact of the 2015 elections.

**Impact Limitations**

9.22. A key limitation of the impacts of DGD II across the components was the absence of baseline data. This informs the situation that the DGD II intervention aims to change. Baseline data and information provide a critical reference point for assessing the levels and types of change. It establishes a basis for before and after comparisons that are used for making inferences about the effectiveness and impact of interventions. Thus, concerning the desired impacts of DGD II discussed above, it was difficult to determine these
results with any measure of accuracy. However the challenges associated with baseline studies of this nature including political sensitivities involved should not be a hindrance to promoting accurate and focused programming through empirical baseline studies that contribute to measurable results.

9.23. Secondly, the ‘spillover effect’ was not well considered during the project design phase. Despite efforts by the JDBF to address this, there are several other organizations that are not part of the bashed fund yet implementing similar activities as the DGD II. (e.g. IFES). Hence, it is impossible really to wholly attribute all changes and impacts listed above in democratic governance in Nigeria solely to the DGD II.

10. CONCLUSIONS

10.17. In conclusion, the TE judged the DGD II project as largely successful, having achieved many milestones that contributed to promotion of democratic governance in Nigeria. It is generally fair to conclude that the DGD II project made important contributions to the achievement of successful conduct of the 2015 elections in Nigeria. The DGD II project objectives fit well into the UNDAF mandate and contributed to the two CPAP expected outcomes. The DGD II therefore remains relevant to Nigeria. Going forward in light of successes recorded by the 2015 election, there are still more areas that require improvements democratic governance processes in Nigeria. The TE believes that this can best be achieved through a third follow on phase (i.e. DGD III).

10.18. The methodological approach of the DGD II project to the deepening of democratic governance in Nigeria is sound and relevant in light of the identified challenges being addressed. Specifically, utilization of the Electoral Cycle Approach that ensures support for all phases of an electoral process will remain relevant to the Nigerian context. The four components of the DGD II project are not only relevant, but also apt and timely in relation to identified challenges of the 2011 General Election in Nigeria.

10.19. The DGD II delivered as originally intended and planned as far as possible and within the context and mandate of the project. Good progress was made towards delivering on log-frame targets, milestones, and outputs. Achieving the intended targets supported components’ contributions to higher-level objectives. The various outputs as listed under each component were deemed appropriate and sufficient. The successful conduct of the 2015 election by INEC provided strong evidence of institutional strengthening by the DGD II Project. This finding was supported through triangulation of various sources of information (i.e. literature, stakeholder interviews, field visits, observation)
10.20. UNDP Nigeria assumed a leadership role in supporting donor coordination. The organization cooperated well with UN, local development and other international partners as well as CSOs in strengthening democratic governance in Nigeria. According to UNDP, the Women’s Situation Room was a key output for the DGD II which according was implemented jointly with UNWOMEN and UNESCO. The Terminal Evaluation was however unable to establish any evaluative evidence demonstrating that UNDP partnered with private sector in support of democratic governance in Nigeria.

10.21. Outputs from each of the four components indicate that they are relevant to each of the expected outcomes UNDP’s support to the DGD II project was appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and the intended results. The DGD II adequately supported the four components of the project with IPs achieving their set targets. Besides, the project support strategy was evidence-based as it was derived from the DGD I lessons and experiences. The evaluators also conclude that there was economical use of financial and human resources for this project.

10.22. Overall the evaluators judged the DGD II project’s efficiency as moderate for the following reasons: firstly, the joint basket fund approach with pooled donor funds together enhanced efficiencies through horizontal rather than traditional, vertical implementation through the direct, donor-recipient approach. Secondly, the project management structure was designed to enhance efficiencies. The five levels of management for the DGD II project that promoted flexibility in the overall management and coordination of the different project components. This flexibility that ensured that INEC’s and FOISECONs’ requests for support were adequately addressed and delivered in a timely manner through the JDBF managed by UNDP.

10.23. However efficiencies were also compromised in part by inadequate communication and information sharing within INEC departments, concerning the DGD II facility. Efficiencies were further compromised by the lack of proper coordination of management structures due to difficulties with meeting scheduling and delayed decisions. Further efficiencies were curtailed through the UNDP CO and PMU relationship that was inadequately coordinated and managed resulting in a decision by the PSC to terminate the project prematurely with consequences to the staff, IPs and project mandate.

10.24. The DGD II project mainstreamed gender equality in design, implementation and monitoring of governance projects especially with Component Three. This was achieved in three dimensions: i) supporting political parties to strengthen internal processes geared towards advancing the role of women as candidates for public office and as actors within the party structures; ii) training women to organize and mobilize public support for their election to
public office; and iii) supporting those women who were elected to become effective role models and drivers of change to promote affirmative action and women’s empowerment especially in NASS.

10.25. While the DGD II project made significant contributions in supporting democratic governance in Nigeria through the achievement of outputs across the four components, the absence of a baseline data on project made establishment of the counterfactual impossible and attribution difficult.

11. LESSONS LEARNED

11.17. Several lessons can be learned from the DGD II project. Key amongst which relate to the importance and priority that should be accorded to the management functions of such an important and strategic project involving multi-level stakeholders from all spheres of government and society and focused on enhancing democratic governance in Nigeria.

- An important lesson learned with the DGD II is that it is indeed possible to implement successful programing even with budget constraints and limitations and management inefficiencies. This is because despite the release and utilization of only 70% of the project budget, the DGD II managed to achieve its most critical objective (i.e. promoting free and fair elections and democratization in Nigeria) contributing to peaceful General Elections in 2015.

- Another useful lesson learned is that it is important to engage with partners as institutions at all levels within institutions and not only with individuals within these institutions at the highest decision making level. This is because the assumption that information is cascaded downwards and outwards towards and within various departments and divisions following initial contacts and engagement with individual decision makers is not supported with evidence of the same.

- Although UNDP attested to having employed transparent and fair processes in the identification and selection of DGD II key stakeholders, perceptions by key stakeholders revealed that it was not 100% water-tight. A project such as DGD II that works with a diverse range of IPs from government and non-governmental institutions should well consider the internal and external factors that may impact either positively or negatively on project implementation efforts. A lesson learned is that any future project design should consider inclusive and consultative processes and make efforts to
bring all factions within organizations to the table to ensure that all their views are well considered.

- The five level management arrangements of the project that involved the PSC, TC, PMU, UNDP and Project Assurance was a well thought out approach. However a key lesson learned is that if lower level staff are to be considered into the PSC membership, those with decision making authority should be non-partisan and higher level in authority to promote fairness in decision making and efficiency of response including technical support and financial procurement. Newer offices such as INEC’s donor liaison office that was established later could in future be a useful coordination outfit within INEC which should be invited to be part of the PSC membership. This would promote the smooth running and workings a future project through enhanced coordination and wider participation.

- The UNDP CO and PMU seemed to run in parallel, and in competition than in a cooperative and consultative framework. This precludes the need for a clear project design and framework of engagement. Each member of the PMU should go through a comprehensive induction on their role, duty, responsibilities and reporting authorities to facilitate smooth running of the project. This will promote the credibility of the team and ensure the confidence of key project stakeholders including international and local development partners for effective and efficient programming

- Monitoring and evaluation activities of the project were compromised by the lack of M&E functions attached to the PMU. An M&E officer attached to the project could have helped to track the progress of project implementation, identify bottlenecks and challenges as well as opportunities well in advance of the TE. This information could have been used by the project management to address both positive and negative issues as they arrive in an opportune way, thereby supporting achievement of desired objectives and adequate funds use by the project. A clear consequence of weak M&E systems was the lack of baseline data against which to measure achievements of the DGD II. It is important to develop baseline data against which performance indicators will be measured. As shown in the report, while the DGD impacts were high, the absence of baseline data for the DGD II project makes the establishment of the counterfactual impossible and attribution difficult. The opportunity to ‘prove’ or substantiate the DGD II impacts and achievement of democratic governance milestones in Nigeria was essentially lost due to lack of baseline and data from monitoring reports.

- Members of the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) who were similarly disappointed by the internal management problems evidenced between the PMU and UNDP CO lost confidence in the project’s ability to resolve the stalemate with the PMU. This is a clear lesson and cause of concern for any
future project managed by UNDP and funded through a JDBF involving multiple donors. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms apart from the five level management arrangements could be introduced in a future project, such as the office of the Ombudsman. This office could potentially help to address challenges with internal staff relations that are bound to occur with such a sensitive and critical project located outside of the main UNDP CO facility.

- It is important to demonstrate maturity in the handling of project matters involving multiple stakeholders. JDBF members could develop an MOU for collaboration which clearly articulates the modus operandi of joint funding and management of activities. This would provide direction and guidance on how to handle challenges faced in a project such as the DGD II that requires high levels of cooperation and collaboration to fulfill expectations of all stakeholders. This is even more important considering the nature of the DGD II project that adopted the ECA for promoting democratic governance in Nigeria. Also important is the need to ensure fair division of labour amongst donors to promote the project’s intentions. One example is the DGD’s weak focus on parliamentary support reportedly due to unclear division of labour amongst donor partners denied the project opportunity to achieve results with this important and critical stakeholder group.
12. RECOMMENDATIONS

The TE of the DGD II project proposes the following key recommendations which are informed by the study findings and conclusions;

1. Going forward in light of the successes recorded by the 2015 election, there are still more areas that require improvements in the processes of democratic governance in Nigeria. The TE believes that this can best be achieved through a third follow on phase (i.e. DGD III). A follow on project: DGD Phase III is recommended based on the achievements so far of the DGD I and II projects and the contributions so far to the successful General Elections in 2015 in Nigeria. A third phase should give considerable attention to national level as well as to state level partners and activities. Consideration should be given to UNDP in managing a follow on project. The lessons learned by the project will help to improve this important facet going forward if properly addressed. The convening powers of the UN agency and the goodwill and trust shown to it by the major IPs (INEC, Political Parties, SIECs) should be harnessed and maximized for the future project.

2. UNDP should strengthen the collaboration and management mechanisms between the Country Office, the PMU and project partners to promote harmonious and complementary support. Thorough induction of staff and clear Memorandum of Understanding agreements (informal documents detailing the collaboration arrangements and clearly articulating expectations) should be well considered as one of the potentially useful resources. The PSC members’ delegation of their juniors to attend PSC meetings on their behalf should be discouraged or deliberately worked into the committee with clear roles and decision making responsibilities and processes agreed in advance. The PSC, TC and Quality Assurance members should collaborate jointly and ensure attendance at all scheduled meetings to enable timely support to the project. It important for project beneficiaries across the four components of the DGD II project to participate in the design meetings of DGD III. An institutional rather than an individual approach should be applied to all aspects of a future projects workings with IPs and other key stakeholders. Priority activities and areas of support should be identified prior the implementation of the activities and not after the project implementation have started. Proper channels of communication and information dissemination should similarly be identified and piloted to ensure transparent processes and high level of awareness of opportunities with the project among potential key stakeholders and partners.

3. It is important for the UNDP and project design to ensure the visibility of partners equally. The UNDP’s commitment to this role means that it should follow up more closely with all JDBF members to ensure that they are satisfied with the level of visibility accorded to them. Further to this, donor partners should avoid any parallel
activities with IPs on the DGD Project in order to centralize the management activity and enhance efficiencies and effectiveness.

4. Nigeria has 36 states and 36 state assemblies. A new project should pilot the project in a few states by geographic zone and clearly demonstrate how the intervention is translating at the state level by relating these results back to the federal level. A parliamentary support component should be included as the new trend is towards ‘open government’ featuring social media as a powerful tool. Interventions are needed to support parliamentary committees to support the elections component. The parliamentary intervention was limited in DGD II only to constitutional support process and not the electoral code.

5. A future DGD project should commence with a clear performance monitoring and evaluation plan detailing the studies to be conducted including baseline, monitoring and evaluation studies and budgets. This is important for ensuring proper timing and reporting on the project as well as adequate funds to support this important management function that was overlooked to the detriment of the DGD II impact findings. M&E functions of a follow on project should be well considered through support by qualified and professional team members. A budget line equivalent to at least 5% of the total budget should be accorded to the M&E function to ensure adequate facilitation of its activities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abubakar Jikajiddene</td>
<td>Deputy Director - Mambayya House Training</td>
<td>Mambayya House</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moses T. Aluaigba</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow - Mambayya House</td>
<td>Mambayya House</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ado Mallam Bello</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow - Mambayya House</td>
<td>Mambayya House</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Prof HabuGaladima</td>
<td>Director of Research - NIPSS</td>
<td>NIPSS</td>
<td>Jos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Prof TijaniBande</td>
<td>DG - NIPSS</td>
<td>NIPSS</td>
<td>Jos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dr. Mrs Hanatu Binya</td>
<td>Former Commissioner - SIEC</td>
<td>SIEC</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Abubakar Lawal Malumfashi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Okechukwu Ndeche</td>
<td>Director, Planning &amp; Monitoring - INEC</td>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mr Dike Ogbuehi</td>
<td>Publicity Secretary - IPAC</td>
<td>IPAC</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dr. Onwubuya Abraham Breakforth</td>
<td>IPAC - IPAC</td>
<td>IPAC</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Babanigda Wagini</td>
<td>Secretary - SIEC</td>
<td>SIEC</td>
<td>Katsina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hajiya Amina Zakari</td>
<td>Commissioner - INEC</td>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>David Anyaele</td>
<td>Executive Director - Centre for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD)</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Judith EkaeteUmoh</td>
<td>National President - JONAPWD</td>
<td>JONAPWD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Danlam Bashiru</td>
<td>Director - ANWAB</td>
<td>ANWAB</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Edetaen Ojo</td>
<td>Executive Director - Media Rights Agenda</td>
<td>Media Rights Agenda</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pa Lamin Beyai</td>
<td>Country Director - UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mandisa Mashologu</td>
<td>Deputy Country Director - UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Kehnide Bolaji</td>
<td>Team leader Governance and Peace Building</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Segun Olosola</td>
<td>Programme Associate - UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ucehnna Onyebuchi</td>
<td>Programme Analyst - UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Zebulon Takwa</td>
<td>Peace and Development Advisor - UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Anthony Omata</td>
<td>Programme Associate Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Rose Plang</td>
<td>Procurement Analyst - UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Esther Eghobamien</td>
<td>Director-Women and Gender Affairs - UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Prof Tijani Bande</td>
<td>DG,NIPSS - NIPSS</td>
<td>NIPSS</td>
<td>Jos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Tunde A. Ojedokun</td>
<td>International Liaison and Outreach - Electoral Institute</td>
<td>Electoral Institute</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kehnide Bolaji</td>
<td>Team leader Governance and Peace Building</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Zebulon Suifon Takwa, PhD</td>
<td>Peace and Development Adviser</td>
<td>United Nations Systems in Nigeria</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Pa Lamin Beyai, PhD</td>
<td>Governance Advisor</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ekanem Bassey</td>
<td>Governance Advisor</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Betty Wabunoha</td>
<td>Deputy Country Director-Operations</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Engr. Okop Umobong</td>
<td>Director, Dev. Partners liaison</td>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>John E. Irem</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Mintwab Zelelew</td>
<td>Democratic Governance Specialist - Political Parties, Parliament Portfolio, Supervisor, Gender Portfolio</td>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Skype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Mufuliat Dasola Fijabi</td>
<td>National Expert on Gender</td>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Skype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Toyin Adewale</td>
<td>Communication and reporting advisor and Media Expert</td>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Skype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Akpoyame Moses Abo Ogbe</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Delta SIEC</td>
<td>Asaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Barrister Bright Igbako</td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td>Delta SIEC</td>
<td>Asaba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Linda Ehrichs</td>
<td>Counselor and Head of Development Cooperation</td>
<td>Canadian High Commission</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Josephine Obinyan</td>
<td>Development Officer</td>
<td>Canadian High Commission</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Oliver Blake</td>
<td>Team Leader Governance and Social Development</td>
<td>DFID Nigeria</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX II: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW (IDI) GUIDE

Component 1: IDI Guide for INEC

1. What are the different kinds of support the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) received from DGD II in preparation for the 2015 General Elections?
2. Was there consultation with INEC leadership on an ongoing basis to review the status of the voter registry, modalities for the nationwide distribution of Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) and conduct of Continuous Voter Registration (CVR)?
3. Was there technical and material assistance for the INEC to conduct several National Stakeholders’ Consultative Forums/Summits on peaceful elections in 2015?
4. What role did DGD II played in enhancing INEC use of ICT for distribution of PVC and conduct of CVR?
5. What roles did DGD II played in improving legal and policy framework for election in Nigeria?
6. Explain how the pilot electoral support system for conduct of local government elections in Katsina and Delta States enhanced INEC staff and SIECS capacities?
7. What kind of support was provided for FOSIECON by the DGD II project?
8. What role did the DGD II played in the formulation of INEC gender policy?
9. Was the initial design of the project adequate to properly address the issues envisaged in formulation of the project and provide the best possible support to the INEC?
10. Was UNDP support to the project appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and intended results? If not, what were the key weaknesses?
11. What evidence is there that UNDP support has contributed towards an improvement in national government capacity, including institutional strengthening?
12. Will the outputs delivered through the project be sustained by national capacities after the end of the project duration? If not, why?
13. Will there be adequate funding available to sustain the functionality over the short, medium and longer term?
14. Has the intervention developed the necessary capacities (both human and institutional) for sustainability?
15. Taking into account the technical capacity and institutional arrangements of the UNDP country office, is UNDP well suited to providing governance support to national and local governments in Nigeria?

Component 2: Political Parties and NASS IDI Guide

1. In what ways did DGD II contributed to strengthening capacities of political parties?
2. In what ways did DGD II contributed to improved effectiveness of targeted NASS committees and processes?
3. Has UNDP been effective in helping improve governance at the local level in Nigeria? Do these local results aggregate into nationally significant results?
4. Has the intervention developed the necessary capacities (both human and institutional) for sustainability?
Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and Other Marginalized Groups= FMWASD and Federal Ministry of Youth Development IDI Guide

1. What role did the DGD II played in the formulation of INEC gender policy?
2. What role did Women Situation Room (WSR) Initiative played during the 2015 general election?
3. Did the DGD II contribute to enlarging the number of women aspirants for elective officers at various levels during the 2015 general election?
4. To what extent have poor, indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefitted from UNDPs work in support of democratic governance?
5. To what extent has gender been addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of governance projects? Is gender marker data assigned to the project representative of reality?
6. To what extent has UNDP governance support promoted positive changes in gender equality? Were there any unintended effects?
7. Has the intervention developed the necessary capacities (both human and institutional) for sustainability?

Component 4: Strengthening Channels of Civic Engagement: Civil Society and Media IDI Guide

1. How DGD II did strengthened Zonal networks and individual CSOs?
2. What are the activities under taken by DGD II in supporting civil society engagement in democratic reforms and monitoring?
3. How would you describe the capacity of civil society capacity to carry out election observation as a result of DGD II intervention?
4. How would you describe civil society capacity to carry out civic education as a result of DGD II intervention?
5. How would you describe the capacity of the media to monitor and report on democracy and election related issues as a result of DGD II intervention?
6. Are there changes in Capacity for media monitoring as a result of DGD II intervention?
7. How effective has UNDP been in partnering with civil society and the private sector to promote democratic governance in Nigeria?
8. Is UNDP perceived by stakeholders as a strong advocate for improving government effectiveness and integrity in Nigeria?
9. Has the intervention developed the necessary capacities (both human and institutional) for sustainability?

Donor Partners: IDI Guide

1. Was the initial design of the project adequate to properly address the issues envisaged in formulation of the project and provide the best possible support to the INEC?
2. Were project partners, stakeholders and/or beneficiaries involved in the design of interventions? If yes, what was the nature and extent of their participation? If not, why not?
3. Was the structure and management of the project appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and intended results of the project? If not, what were the key weaknesses?
4. Are the project outputs appropriate, sufficient, effective and sustainable for the desired outcome?
5. Will the outputs delivered through the project be sustained by national capacities after the end of the project duration? If not, why?
6. Has UNDP worked effectively with other UN Agencies and other international and national partners to deliver governance services?
7. Has UNDP utilized innovative techniques and best practices in its governance programming?
8. Was UNDP support to the project appropriate to achieving the desired objectives and intended results? If not, what were the key weaknesses?
9. Has there been an economical use of financial and human resources?
10. Were the results delivered in a reasonable proportion to the operational and other costs?
11. Could a different type of intervention lead to similar results at a lower cost? How?
12. Did the monitoring and evaluation systems that UNDP had in place helped ensure that the project was managed efficiently and effectively?
13. Has the outputs been delivered as planned?
14. Which aspects of the project have been most effective so far? Which ones are least effective?
15. What key challenges have hampered the delivery of intended outputs?
16. How can the effectiveness of support to the project be strengthened in future projects?

UNDP and PMU Staff Guide

1. What was your role in the DGD II Phase II? (probe when they started, how long in PMU and UNDP)
2. In your view how was the DGD II’s relevant and aligned to the UNDAF strategy for Nigeria?
3. How was the DGD II designed? (probe; process, consultations with INEC,)
4. How did you contribute to the DGD II design and implementation strategy?
5. In your view, what were the main achievements of the DGD Phase II?
6. What factors influenced the achievement of these outcomes?
7. How efficient was the support provided to UNDP/PMU to facilitate your activities on the project? (probe cost effectiveness strategies employed, timing of funds, adequacy of human resource support)
8. Conversely what challenges or missed opportunities did you encounter in the DGD II implementation?
9. What lessons did you learn through this project’s implementation that you would like to carry forward?
10. Do you have any suggestions for the future of this project?
ANNEX III. LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

PROJECT DOCUMENTS

5. Democratic Governance for Development Project (DGD II) Good Practices and Lessons Learned (September 2015)
6. DEX Quarterly Report Reporting Period: (July – September 2014)
7. DEX Quarterly Reports Reporting Period: (April – June 2014)
8. DEX Quarterly Reports Reporting Period: (January – March 2014)
9. DEX Quarterly Reports Reporting Period: (October – December 2014)
12. DGD Phase II Procurement Plan – (Nov to Dec 2012)
13. DGD Road Map to the 2015 Nigerian Elections – DGD Phase II
14. DGD Staff member and Contact Details
15. DGD-II Work plan, (July to December 2015)
16. EU Final Financial Report Jul%2712 to Dec%2715 v 2 (003)
17. EU Interim Annual Financial Report (Jul'14 to Jun'15) v3
18. Minutes of Meeting of DGD Partners (11 February 2015)
21. Interim Final Project Review Report
22. Minutes of Meeting of DGD Partners, Venue DGD Project Office (March 2015)
24. Minutes of Committee Meeting Venue: DGD Project Office (2 April 2014 Technical)
25. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (25 May 2014)
26. Minutes of Meeting of DGD Partners, Venue DGD Project Office (8 November 2012)
27. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (16 September 2015)
28. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (17 January 2013)
29. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (5 June 2013)
30. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (10 October 2013)
31. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (27 November 2013)
32. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (17 April 2013)
33. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (27 February 2013)
34. Minutes of Technical Committee Meeting, Venue DGD Project Office (30 May 2013)
35. Signed DGD-II PRODOC.PDF
36. Terms of Reference the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD II) Terminal Project Evaluation
37. Updated DGD Partners Contact List
38. Independence National Electoral Commission – Gender Policy
# ANNEX IV: LIST OF ACRONYMS IN LITERATURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym/Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Affirmative Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Alternative Dispute Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANWAB</td>
<td>Anglo-Nigeria Welfare Association of the Blind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWP</td>
<td>Annual Work Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAP</td>
<td>Climate Change Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>Citizens with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>Capacity for Governance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Country Programme Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>Continuous Voter Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGD II</td>
<td>Democratic Governance for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Daily Subsistence Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAD</td>
<td>Electoral Assistance Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Electoral Cycle Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECN</td>
<td>Electoral Commission of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMBs</td>
<td>Electoral Management Bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>Election Monitoring Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym/Abbreviation</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBOs</td>
<td>Faith Based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>Federal Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDECO</td>
<td>Federal Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus groups discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMWASD</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMYD</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Youth Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOI</td>
<td>Freedom of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSIECON</td>
<td>Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>General Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMS</td>
<td>Grants Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTU</td>
<td>Gender Technical Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAC</td>
<td>Inter Party Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPs</td>
<td>Implementing Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDBF</td>
<td>Joint Donor Basket Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JONAPWD</td>
<td>Joint National Associations of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIIIs</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOICA</td>
<td>Korean International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym/Abbreviation</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M &amp; E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASS</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NECON</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILS</td>
<td>National Institute for Legislative Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPSS</td>
<td>National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOA</td>
<td>National Orientation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Planning Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Project Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPLPDC</td>
<td>Political Parties Leadership and Policy Development Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPRAC</td>
<td>Political Party Registration and Regulation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVC</td>
<td>Permanent Voter Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWDS</td>
<td>People living with disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Result-Based Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROAR</td>
<td>Results-Oriented Annual Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Results and Resources Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIECs</td>
<td>State Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym/Abbreviation</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Short Messaging Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TE</td>
<td>Terminal Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To C</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Guideline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United State Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YACORE</td>
<td>Youth Alliance on Constitution Review and Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIAGA</td>
<td>Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth &amp; Advancement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: overview of the Outcome and Outputs, and the indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</th>
<th>VERIFIABLE INDICATORS</th>
<th>SOURCES OF VERIFICATION</th>
<th>ASSUMPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **OVERALL GOAL**  | • % Reduction in inter-party conflicts  
                   • % Increase in the number of legislations passed at National, State and Local Levels | Election Reports, Independent Monitors reports, Legislative reports | • Continuing support of Democratic governance  
FOI will be fully enforced |
| **PROGRAMME OBJECTIVE** | • % Reduction in electoral results petitions at National, State and Local Levels  
                            • % Reduction in electoral conflict/violence during National, State and Local level elections | INEC Reports, Electronic and print media reports, Independent Monitors report | |
| Component 1: Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes | | | |
| Strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC/SIECs strengthened | • Development of Strategic Plan  
                                • No of Gender Policies developed  
                                • Communication Policy Developed  
                                • Development of Electoral Processes Manual | INEC Reports | |
| **Electoral Systems**  
(voter registration) and processes (tallying and transmission)  
Improved voter registration through ICT | • % change in the Number of Voter registration cards issued  
• Development of functional INEC Website | **INEC Periodic reports, Website** | •  
•  
Qualified IT Personnel  
Adequate hardware and software |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</strong></td>
<td><strong>VERIFIABLE INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td><strong>SOURCES OF VERIFICATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>ASSUMPTIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Legal and Policy framework for elections improved** | • No. of INEC/NASS meeting Conducted  
• No. INEC/CSO consultations conducted  
• No. of INEC/Political Party Leadership meetings conducted | **National Assembly reports, Political party reports** |  |
| **Professional Capacity of INEC and SIECs enhanced** | • Development of Training Curriculum  
• No. of INEC staff participating in Exchange Programme | **INEC Reports** | •  
•  
Availability of consultants  
Availability of funds |
| **Component 2: Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement** |  |  |  |
| **Capacity of Political Parties strengthened**  
**Improved Effectiveness of Targeted National Assembly Committees/Processes** | • Establishment of Institute of Party governance  
• % increase in the number of Local government election monitoring groups | **DGD periodic reports**  
**DGD reports; INEC reports**  
**CSO Periodic reports; DGD reports** |  |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• No of political parties/CSO consultation meetings held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No. of CSOs trained to deliver civic education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Component 3: Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other marginalized groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal reforms and women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative action and women’s empowerment in politics and elections undertaken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• % increase in the number of women in Federal, State, and Local government legislators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of Verification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC reports; Legislative Houses reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pool of women aspirants for elective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• % increase in the number of women having political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sources of Verification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Houses reports; Electronic and Print media reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Narrative Summary</strong></th>
<th><strong>Verifiable Indicators</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sources of Verification</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>offices at various levels enlarged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appointments at Federal, State and Local Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO’s capacity to advocate affirmative action enhanced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased advocacy by civil society on affirmative action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of women holding elected public office enhanced.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No of women holding elected office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Component 4: Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagement</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component 4.1: Civil Society Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Development**                                     | **Zonal networks and Individual CSOs strengthened** | • No of CSOs providing mentoring activities  
• Development of training module for CSOs  
• No. of CSO/Key stakeholder meetings held  
• No. of stakeholder networks developed | CSO reports |  |
| **Civil society engagement in Democratic reforms and Monitoring supported** | • No of FOI Trainings conducted  
• No. of enforcements of FOI applied | Public institutions report |  |  |
| **Public awareness and implementation of Freedom of Information Act (FOI) facilitated.** | • % increase in the number of CSOs involved in electoral reform process  
• % Increase in number of CSOs involved as election observers | CSOs reports |  |  |
| **Civil Society capacity to carry out election observation enhanced** | • No INEC/CSO collaborative meetings conducted  
• % change in the number of CSOs involved in voter education | CSO reports |  |  |

**NARRATIV E**

**VERIFIABLE INDICATORS**

**SOURCES OF**

**ASSUMPTIONS**
### SUMMARY

**Component 4.2: Strengthening Capacity and Voice of the Media**

**Capacity of the Media to monitor and report on democracy and election related issues strengthened**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verification</th>
<th>Print and Electronic Media reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of media fora conducted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Baseline survey conducted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Media practitioners trained</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Capacity for Media Monitoring strengthened**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verification</th>
<th>Print and Electronic Media reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of biased and inflammatory articles in the media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX VI: THEORY OF CHANGE MODEL FOR THE DGD II PROJECT

**PROJECT INPUTS**
- Funding (EU)
- Funding (Korea)
- Funding (Canada)
- Project Management (UNDP)
- Facilitation (Government of Nigeria)

**PROJECT OUTPUTS**
- Component 1
  1. Strategic Planning of INEC strengthened; 2. INEC capacity to use ICT enhanced;
  3. Legal and Policy Framework for election Improved;

- Component 2
  1. Capacity of Political Parties Strengthened;
  2. Improved Effectiveness of targeted NASS Committees and Processes.

- Component 3
  1. Legal Reforms and women’s empowerment initiatives to promote affirmative action and Women’s Empowerment in Politics;
  2. CSOs capacity to advocate for affirmative Action Enhanced.

- Component 4
  1. Civil Society Organizations’ Capacity Developed. 2. Strengthening the capacity and voice of the media

**PROJECT OUTCOMES**
- Component 1
  Improve INEC and SIEC capacity to conduct credible elections.
  Capacity of a critical mass built to facilitate wider understanding, appreciation of Election Cycle

- Component 2
  Improved capacity of inter-party dialogue and democratic practices
  Adequate resources mobilized to support the ECA

- Component 3
  Improve participation of women, youth and PWDs in elections and elected offices
  Government committed to sustaining the ECA

- Component 4
  Improved capacity of the media and CSOs to monitor and report election-related

**INT STATE 1**

**PLANNED IMPACTS**
- Deepening Democracy and Entrenchment of Democratic Governance in Nigeria

**POTENTIAL IMPACTS**
- Effective and sustainable democratic governance system
Strategic Objective: To strengthen accountable and responsive governance institutions, and consolidate democratic governance in line with international best practices

Component 1. Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral Processes
- (1) Strengthened capacities of INEC/SIECs for strategic planning, policy and operational activities
- (2) Improved electoral systems (voter registration) and processes (tallying and transmission) through ICT
- (3) Improved legal and policy framework for elections
- (4) Enhanced professional capacity and collaboration of and between INEC and SIECs

Component 2. Improving the Democratic Quality of Political Engagement
- (1) Strengthened capacity of political parties
- (2) Improved effectiveness of targeted National Assembly Committees/Processes

Component 3. Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalized Groups
- (1) Legal Reforms and Women’s Empowerment Initiatives to Promote Affirmative Action and Women’s Empowerment in Politics
- (2) Pool of Women Aspirants for Elective Offices at Various Levels Enlarged
- (3) Enhanced CSO Capacity to Advocate for Affirmative Action

Component 4. Strengthening the Channels of Civic Engagement
- (1) CSOs Capacity Developed
- (2) Strengthened capacity and voice of the Media.