

**END OF TERM EVALUATION  
FOR  
UNDP MALAWI COUNTRY PROGRAMME  
(2012 – 2016)**

**EVALUATION REPORT  
(15 NOVEMBER 2016)**

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## **A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The evaluation of Malawi UNDP Country Programme (2012 – 2016) was undertaken by an independent consultant over a period of 35 working days from 15 August to 12 November 2016.

The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Assess whether the outcomes and outputs in the Country Programme Document (CPD) have been achieved or the extent to which they have been achieved;
- Provide evidence of UNDP's contribution towards the achievement of CP outcomes;
- Determine the strategic positioning and relevance of UNDP in these sectors;
- Review the factors that influenced the achievement of results;
- Assess the sustainability of the results that were achieved or likely to be achieved;
- Assess the extent to which gender was mainstreamed in design, implementation and reporting;
- Generate lessons learnt and provide recommendations for future programming; and
- Propose areas of re-positioning and re-focusing of future CPDs in light of the evolving development context in Malawi, as well as UNDP's strategic plan.

### **Evaluation Findings**

Overall UNDP performance was rated as satisfactory. 50% (7) of the total 14 outcome indicators were either achieved or on track to be achieved. Four outcome indicators (28.5%) were off-track, while three (21.4%) were not rated due to lack of updated data. At output level, 28 indicators (60.8%) out of a total 46 output indicators were either achieved or on track to be achieved. Eight output indicators (17.3%) were assessed as unsatisfactory, while 10 (21.7%) did not have updated data.

### ***Relevance***

The Country Programme (CP) addresses issues that are highly important for the country. UNDP's strategy targeted three critical areas (a) economic growth, (b) sustainable environment, and (c) responsible and accountable governance. These three areas are central to the emerging global discourse around the sustainable development goals. In this regard, UNDP contribution is highly regarded by all its partners, including government, civil society and Development Partners as a relevant and trusted partner due to its normative and advocacy roles.

However, UNDP did not fully leverage this high regard and good reputation among all stakeholders, to build effective partnerships, particularly with respect to its resource mobilisation. Between 2012 and 2015, UNDP mobilized \$46,890,847 in non-core resources, which represents about 36% of its projected resource mobilisation target of \$130.2 million.

The programme was also too fragmented with too many projects of limited scale. A number of interventions that addressed similar issues were developed and implemented separately when their impact could have been enhanced if they were integrated and/or converged into one programmatic initiative. With regards to its core programming principles, UNDP approach has been to projectise them instead of mainstreaming them in all interventions. Particularly noteworthy, UNDP lacks adequate internal capacity in the area of Results Based Management (RBM) as reflected in its M&E framework, with most indicators not sufficiently capturing UNDP achievements at the results level, but only tracking progress at activity level.

### ***Effectiveness***

UNDP delivered most of the normative outputs, including support for development and review of policies and legislative frameworks, but the outputs had generally limited overall impact in terms of developmental change at outcome level. While this was largely due to factors beyond UNDP's control, including slow government implementation of policies, the CP also lacked coherent theory of change and clear thematic strategies.

With regards to the portfolio on Resilience and Sustainable Growth (RSG), UNDP achieved many of its output-level results, but due to a variety of factors, the outputs did not have the desired causal effect to trigger changes at the outcome level. One of the main factors was inadequate resources, as Development Partners stopped direct budget support in the aftermath of the cash-gate scandal; while also priorities shifted towards support for elections in 2014 and humanitarian support in response to the 2015 floods.

However, UNDP contributed to strengthen national systems, including legislative and policy frameworks, although government's capacity to implement these frameworks was slow. For example, the National Climate Change Programme (NCCP), which is fully funded by UNDP is the national coordination platform that guides all climate-change related projects supported by all the Development Partners. Other UNDP interventions, including the Private Sector Development Programme (PSD) and Malawi Innovation Challenge Fund (MICF) also contributed towards desired developmental outcomes by facilitating legislative and policy frameworks for improving Malawi's export capacity as well as engaging the private sector participation in development.

UNDP performance under the portfolio for Responsive Institutions and Citizen Engagement (RICE) was mixed. With regards to HIV and AIDS, UNDP performed its global mandate for creating an enabling environment and ensuring the human-rights based approach in the national HIV response, including increased awareness and inclusion for the most-at-risk population groups. However, although overall resource allocations for the national response increased, capacity development at district level was lower than expected.

Under the governance sector, UNDP's outcome 4.1 was too diverse to constitute a coherent thematic strategy. However, UNDP contributed in electoral support, social cohesion and peace building, but expected results in public sector reforms, human rights and

decentralisation were not achieved. The Democratic Governance Sector Wide Approach (DG SWAp) was established and functional, but government has been slow to operationalize some of its key outputs, such as the National peace Architecture (NPA).

UNDP contributed to strengthen public accountability in the delivery of public services. The flagship Development Effectiveness and Accountability Programme (DEAP), was instrumental in supporting key components for the Government's continued focus and implementation of critical reforms, although the results of these reforms had not yet started to be felt at the impact level in terms of improved access and quality of public services. However, the programme created a foundation for national institutions to become more results-oriented, and improve the synergies between planning, M&E and aid management functions.

With regards to gender equality, UNDP's normative and advocacy work contributed to strengthen the legislative and policy frameworks, including Malawi's compliance with its international obligations and reporting. However, overall development change in the situation of women has not progressed as expected, while also women's representation in Parliament regressed after the 2014 elections. Nonetheless, UNDP-supported advocacy, including engagement of traditional leaders and faith-based women's groups contributed towards enhancing awareness and increasing national dialogue on gender equality.

### ***Efficiency***

The overall delivery rate was below the corporate threshold of 85%, but it improved to 87% and 91% in 2014 and 2015 respectively. In addition, UNDP restructured its programme into two portfolios from previously four programme units, which enhanced its implementation coordination and improved synergies between interventions.

Implementation efficiency also improved overall as a result of the 'Delivering as One' as UNDP and its partner UN agencies stopped applying independent project documents and adopted a joint work plan approach. However, this also had a negative impact of increasing transaction costs for partners, in terms of increased number of meetings and reporting requirements. Implementing Partners (IPs) generally felt that the 'joint work plans' had facilitated better coordination but not joint planning or joint delivery.

### ***Sustainability***

Many of the UNDP-supported interventions produced expected upstream-level results, including legislation reviews and establishment of policy and strategy frameworks, which by their nature have high likelihood of sustainability. In addition, implementation was embedded within existing national structures and institutions, which also contributed to sustainability.

However, projects generally lacked specific exit strategies and sustainability plans. Several projects that had been independently evaluated also made similar observations about the lack of exit strategies.

### ***Lessons Learned***

This evaluation generated some lessons to inform and strengthen future programming and results achievement:

- Without a clearly defined theory of change to guide planning and formulation of interventions, the interventions may become too diverse resulting in a fragmented programme.
- While most interventions may be important and useful given the development context in Malawi, too many interventions with limited scale may not necessarily add up to expected developmental outcomes.
- Even though UNDP has distinct comparative advantage in normative work, a comprehensive environmental scan to determine where it really adds value for partners can enhance its impact.
- To achieve truly transformational impact, partnership should not only be seen in the context of resource mobilisation, but also in terms of leveraging partner results in order to achieve better up scaling and sustainability.
- To ensure the continued flow of programme benefits, there is a need for well-defined exit strategies and sustainability planning.

### ***Recommendations***

**Recommendation 1.** UNDP should undertake a comprehensive review of its comparative advantage in the context of other development actors, including state and non-state actors, in order to identify strategies and interventions that will have a transformational impact on the development landscape in Malawi. This strategy should reflect UNDP's corporate objectives based on the Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017; as well as the central theme for Agenda 2030 of 'leaving no one behind'.

**Recommendation 2.** UNDP should take advantage of the two-year extension of the UNDAF to explore new approaches and develop new business lines, including identifying and developing new partnerships, as well as exploring ways of engaging with non-traditional donors. In addition, UNDP should use this opportunity to enable its restructured portfolios to develop their respective portfolio strategies as foundation for the future CPD with specific emphasis on resilience-building and strengthening government implementation capacity at all levels.

**Recommendation 3.** UNDP should reduce fragmented project approaches towards more programmatic delivery models through focused development of a clear and strategic theory of change model, as well as continuously evaluating all proposed interventions against this overarching strategy.

**Recommendation 4.** While continuing to focus its interventions at upstream level, UNDP should strengthen implementation capacity at sub-national level. UNDP should also consider ways to strengthen its partnerships, particularly with non-state actors in order to assure implementation and ownership of its upstream policies at downstream level.

**Recommendation 5.** UNDP should enhance the application of its core programming principles by ensuring that all principles are adequately and effectively mainstreamed across all programme interventions.

**Recommendation 6.** UNDP should encourage more national ownership and leadership of its programme and implementation processes, including through reviewing management support to IPs, as well as bringing them on board early enough during the design of proposals to enhance participatory approaches.

**Recommendation 7.** UNDP should strengthen the component of **institutional** capacity-building in addition to individual skills, including through secondment of technical advisors at the decentralised district levels. UNDP should also strengthen advocacy and strategic partnership with civil society to create awareness of existing policies with the objective of strengthening demand-side capacity for implementation of policies as well as scaling up of catalytic interventions to achieve greater impact.

**Recommendation 8.** In order to enhance its accountability and also to show case its added value, UNDP should invest in strengthening capacities of its staff in RBM.

**Recommendation 9.** The Country Office should strengthen its capacity for resource mobilisation to ensure that required resources are available at an early stage. This will also further minimise the tendency towards accepting earmarked funding for interventions that are misaligned with its strategic framework.

**Recommendation 10.** UNDP should ensure that it develops and integrates specific exit and sustainability strategies in all its programming documents as a standard rule.

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## C. ACRONYMS

<b>AfDB</b>	Africa Development Bank
<b>AMP</b>	Aid Management Platform
<b>AWP</b>	Annual Work Plan
<b>CBNRM</b>	Community Based Natural Resources Management
<b>CC</b>	Climate Change
<b>CEDAW</b>	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
<b>CMD</b>	Centre for Multi-Party Democracy
<b>CONGOMA</b>	Council for Non-Governmental Organisations in Malawi
<b>CP</b>	Country Programme
<b>CPD</b>	Country Programme Document
<b>CPI</b>	Corruption Perception Index
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisation
<b>CSW</b>	Convention on the Status of Women
<b>DCP</b>	Democracy Consolidation Programme
<b>DDP(s)</b>	District Development Plan(s)
<b>DGSS</b>	Democratic Governance Sector Strategy
<b>DG-SWAp</b>	Democratic Governance Sector Wide Approach
<b>DEAP</b>	Development Effectiveness and Accountability Programme
<b>DfID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>DP(s)</b>	Development Partner(s)
<b>DRM</b>	Disaster Risk Management
<b>EAD</b>	Environmental Affairs Department
<b>EIA</b>	Environmental Impact Assessment
<b>ENRM</b>	Environment and Natural Resources Management
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation
<b>GBV</b>	Gender Based Violence
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GFATM</b>	Global Fund for HIV and AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis
<b>GoM</b>	Government of Malawi
<b>HRBA</b>	Human Rights Based Approach
<b>IIGI</b>	Ibrahim Governance Indicator Index
<b>IP(s)</b>	Implementing Partner(s)
<b>IRD</b>	Integrated Rural Development
<b>JSSP</b>	Joint Sector Strategic Plan
<b>KPA</b>	Key Priority Areas
<b>LEAD</b>	Leadership for Environment and Development

<b>LGBT</b>	Lesbians, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MBS</b>	Malawi Bureau of Standards
<b>MCCCI</b>	Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
<b>MDAs</b>	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
<b>MEC</b>	Malawi Electoral Commission
<b>MGDS</b>	Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
<b>MHRC</b>	Malawi Human Rights Commission
<b>MICF</b>	Malawi Innovation Challenge Fund
<b>MITC</b>	Malawi Investment and Trade Centre
<b>MoFEPD</b>	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
<b>MoGCSW</b>	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare
<b>MoH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>MoITT</b>	Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism
<b>MoJCA</b>	Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
<b>MoLGRD</b>	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
<b>MoNREM</b>	Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining
<b>MTEF</b>	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
<b>NAPA</b>	National Adaptation Programme of Action
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NICE</b>	National Initiative for Civic Education
<b>NSO</b>	National Statistical Office
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OoO</b>	Office of Ombudsman
<b>OPC</b>	Office of President and Cabinet
<b>PAC</b>	Public Affairs Committee
<b>PED</b>	Performance Enforcement Department
<b>PEER</b>	Public Environment Expenditure Review
<b>PEI</b>	Poverty and Environment Initiative
<b>PFEM</b>	Public Finance and Economic Management
<b>PSCDP</b>	Public Sector Capacity Development Programme
<b>PSD</b>	Public Sector Development
<b>PSIP</b>	Public Sector Investment Programme
<b>RBM</b>	Results Based Management
<b>RCO</b>	Resident Coordinator's Office
<b>RICE</b>	Responsive Institutions and Citizen Engagement
<b>RSg</b>	Resilience and Sustainable Growth
<b>SLM</b>	Sustainable Land Management
<b>SQAM</b>	Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology

<b>TWGs</b>	Technical Working Groups
<b>UNAIDS</b>	United Nations Joint Programme on HIV and AIDS
<b>UNCT</b>	United Nations Country Team
<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UN DESA</b>	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UN Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UPR</b>	Universal Periodic Review
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>WB</b>	World Bank

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The Country Programme (CP) is a five year framework defining the mutual cooperation between the Government of Malawi (GoM) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) covering the period 2012 - 2016. The CP contributes to the realization of Malawi's Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) II, effective from July 2011 - June, 2016. The UNDP Country Office for Malawi commissioned the terminal evaluation of its CP 2012 – 2016 in line with its corporate guidelines as well as the Evaluation Plan approved by its Executive Board. This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

### **1.1. Scope, Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation**

In line with the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidelines, this evaluation examined the relevance of UNDP's interventions, implementation efficiency, and effectiveness in contributing to results, as well as sustainability of results after the end of programme and project support.

The purpose of the evaluation was to fulfil UNDP's accountability to its partners and stakeholders with respect to delivery of expected results. It also provided an opportunity for UNDP to engage key stakeholders to reflect on its performance, lessons learned and adjustments required in response to an evolving development landscape and changing national priorities.

The specific evaluation objectives were to:

- 1) Assess whether the outcomes and outputs in the Country Programme Document (CPD) have been achieved or the extent to which they have been achieved;
- 2) Provide evidence of UNDP's contribution towards the achievement of CP outcomes;
- 3) Determine the strategic positioning and relevance of UNDP in these sectors;
- 4) Review of factors influencing the achievement of results;
- 5) Assess the sustainability of the results that were achieved or likely to be achieved;
- 6) Assess the extent to which gender was mainstreamed in design, implementation and reporting;
- 7) Generate lessons learnt and provide recommendations for future programming; and
- 8) Propose areas of re-positioning and re-focusing of future CPDs in light of the evolving development context in Malawi, as well as UNDP's strategic plan.

### **1.2. Organisation and Structure of the Report**

The report is presented in five chapters as outlined below.

- Chapter 1 introduces the evaluation, including the scope, purpose and objectives;

- Chapter 2 provides a description of the evaluation methodology;
- Chapter 3 presents a background of the CPD and the development context in Malawi;
- Chapter 4 presents the findings of the evaluation in relation to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of UNDP's results. The findings related to Effectiveness are structured around the CP outcomes;
- Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the emerging lessons, and wraps up the report with presentation of conclusions and recommendations.


## 2. METHODOLOGY

### 2.1. Evaluation Approach

The evaluation was carried out by an independent consultant over a 35-day period spread over 15 August to 26 October 2016. The consultant undertook a three-week mission for data collection in Malawi from 5 – 23 September 2016. The overall approach was to focus attention on the UNDP's interventions in order to determine whether or not they had contributed to the expected outcomes. Figure 1 demonstrates that UNDP's accountability in its programming is at the output level and therefore the central question for the evaluation was to determine whether or not the outputs were achieved; and more importantly, whether they contributed to expected outcomes.

The evaluator used a number of methods to capture the extent to which outcomes were achieved, including review of documents such as programme and thematic evaluations, as well as focus interviews with a range of stakeholders. The assessment therefore tried to go beyond counting the number of training programs undertaken, or number of papers developed; but rather assessing whether interventions produced intended outputs, which contribute to expected and sustainable outcomes.

**Figure 1. UNDP's programme results chain**



## 2.2. Data collection

An Inception Report containing and Evaluation Matrix which outlined the evaluation questions and proposed data collection methods, data sources, and key informants was discussed and endorsed by UNDP at the beginning of the evaluation.

The data collection approach included an initial review of project files and outcome evaluation reports, followed by triangulation with key national and implementing partners (IP), including government officials and non-state actors. The evaluator also participated in two separate IP Review Workshops convened by UNDP's respective portfolios: Resilience and Sustainable Growth (RSG), and Responsive Institutions and Citizen Engagement (RICE). One site visit was undertaken in Blantyre district in southern Malawi to a grantee of the Malawi Innovation Challenge Fund (MICF) and a group of community beneficiaries. An exit debriefing was undertaken with UNDP senior management and portfolio managers to solicit their feedback on preliminary findings and observations following completion of primary data collection in Malawi.

The following data collection tools were used:

- **Document review.** The evaluator reviewed the key background documents, including UNDP reports, outcome and project evaluation reports and other donor-specific documents, as well as external assessments. The detailed list of documents reviewed is attached in Annex 1.
- **Semi-structured interviews and small group meetings.** A total of 67 individual and group interviews were conducted. Interviews were conducted with UNDP senior managers and programme staff, as well as partner UN agencies. Semi-structured interviews were also carried out with government partners, donors and other IPs as individuals or in small focus groups. The interviews covered the key partners across the six outcome areas to which UNDP contributed. The detailed list of interviewees is attached in Annex 2.
- **IP Review Meetings.** The evaluator participated in two separate review meetings for the Resilience and Sustainable Growth (RSG) and the Responsive Institutions and Citizen Engagement (RICE) portfolios, respectively. Participants included national and district-level project staff, who presented their respective progress reports followed by plenary discussions.
- **On-site field visit.** A site visit was undertaken to a recipient of the MICF grant and community group in southern Malawi.

### 2.3. Data Analysis

A significant quantity of data was obtained from the review of documentation and analysed through qualitative methods, including comparative analysis. Where the indicators had quantitative baseline data and targets, quantitative techniques were applied to assess progress. A qualitative assessment of UNDP's performance was made based on the output and outcome indicators using a 'traffic light' rating scale where low is represented by red; medium by yellow and green indicating high level of performance. The rating was based on evaluator's qualitative assessment as well as where applicable, quantitative assessment in terms of the number of 'relevant'<sup>1</sup> indicators achieved.

### 2.4. Limitations

The first limitation of the methodology concerns attribution of results. Some interventions were implemented by national counterpart institutions based on joint work plans, with instances that involved several UN agencies, it was difficult to have direct attribution of results to UNDP, even at the output level. This was more so in those cases where the implementing partners were not receiving direct funding support from UNDP; they were not able to distinguish between different UN agencies. That was also very much apparent with respect to the distinction between UNDP and the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO). Some of the interviewees referred to the work that would ordinarily be within the realm of the RC mandate as being UNDP work, clearly because they were referring to the same individual in the person of the Resident Representative who is also the Resident Coordinator.

The second limitation was about availability of updated data on indicators. While data was available for output indicators, there were gaps for some of the outcome indicators. The evaluation therefore relied heavily on the independent outcome evaluations to obtain some of that data, but these evaluations were done in July – December 2015, and therefore the data may not reflect the most accurate status of those indicators in September 2016.

The third limitation concerned site visits. The evaluator was able to visit only one grantee and community group benefiting from the Malawi Innovation Challenge Fund (MICF), although UNDP supported quite a number of interventions at community level. The evaluation mitigated this limitation through reference to the independent outcome and project evaluations, with the potential risk that the information therein may have been out of date.

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<sup>1</sup> The qualification of 'relevant indicators' here reflects the fact that some of the indicators did not necessarily measure UNDP's contribution to developmental changes, but only progress at activity level

Overall however, there was quite substantial triangulation of information with implementing partners and documents to mitigate these limitations.

### **3. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT**

The start of the CPD coincided with the term of a new Government, which came to power in April 2012. The new government undertook to implement a number of critical economic reforms to address Malawi's macroeconomic and structural imbalances. The reforms aimed to address imbalances by removing market distortions, creating a conducive environment for inflows of private investment, encouraging diversification, providing a robust base for government tax revenues, limiting monetization of budget shortfalls, and promoting inclusive growth.

The CPD was formulated during a period of optimism. The UN noted at the time that economic growth had averaged 7.1 percent from 2006 - 2010; the national poverty headcount had dropped from 52 to 39 percent (1999 - 2010); and the proportion of the 'ultra-poor' decreased from 22 to 15 percent.<sup>2</sup> The UN also observed an increasing trend towards rapid urbanization, estimated at 5.3% per annum by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA). The locus of poverty was gradually shifting from rural to urban areas and causing various dimensions of urban poverty that were not adequately captured by income based indicators such as social exclusion and poor quality of and poor access to basic urban infrastructure and social services.

#### **3.1. Country Context**

Malawi is a landlocked country in Southern African with an estimated population of 16.8 million as of 2014.<sup>3</sup> Malawi's development continues to be affected by low industrialization largely because of low human capital due to low levels of education and skills development; a weak export base that is characterised by highly concentrated exports of mainly unprocessed agricultural commodities; dominance of low-productivity smallholder agriculture based on traditional technologies; environmental degradation and gender disparities. Poverty remains a consistent challenge with women representing a disproportionate majority of the poor.

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<sup>2</sup> Malawi UNDAF 2012 - 2016

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malawi/overview>



According to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) end line survey, Malawi achieved four of the eight MDGs (Box 1). The country poverty levels were still very high and according to estimates, poverty head count was registered at 50.7 percent (IHS 2012) and much higher than the 2015 MDG target. Income inequality as measured by the share of poorest quintile in national consumption worsened from 10.1 percent in 2005 to 5.5 percent in 2012. The ultra-poor population has also worsened from about 22 percent in 2005 to about 25 percent in 2012.

Box 1: Malawi MDG Progress	End line status
1 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger	Not achieved
2 Achieve Universal Primary Education	Not achieved
3 Promote Gender Equity and Empower Women	Not achieved
4 Reduce Child Mortality	Achieved
5 Improve Maternal Health	Not achieved
6 Combat HIV and AIDS, Malaria and other diseases	Achieved
7 Ensure Environmental Sustainability; reverse loss of environmental resources	Achieved
8 Develop Global Partnership for Development	Achieved
Source: Malawi MDGs End line Survey, 2015	

Malawi's economy has a narrow base. Agriculture, the main source of growth and exports represents approximately 37 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employing about 80 percent of the labor force and accounting for 82.5 percent of foreign exchange earnings.<sup>4</sup> Gender disparities in the agricultural sector remain as the major constraint to the achievement of development objectives. The AfDB also noted other constraints to the creation of decent and productive employment, especially in rural areas, including: significant shortages of skills; poor labour productivity; high population and labour force growth; high incidence of informal employment particularly in the agricultural sector and rural areas; pervasive gender inequalities; inadequate labour market information; poor foreign exchange policy; inadequate access to finance; and inadequate investments and poor infrastructure.

According to the World Bank, the agricultural sector in Malawi is highly vulnerable to adverse weather events, with consequences for the whole economy.<sup>5</sup> In the period from 1980 to 2012, the average annual value of losses resulting from such shocks on major crops amounted to US\$ 149 million or 4.3 percent of the average gross agricultural output. This is a significantly higher level of loss than experienced by other economies in the region.<sup>6</sup> Risks affecting the agricultural sector impact food security at national and household levels, introduce major fiscal impacts by reducing the availability of foreign exchange and have an overall destabilising effect on the macro economy. In the 2014/15 season, the impact of floods in the southern and central parts of the country

<sup>4</sup> Africa Development Bank, 2016

<sup>5</sup> Malawi Economic Monitor; May 2016, p 20

<sup>6</sup> For example, in the period 1995 – 2012, Rwanda experienced average annual losses resulting from similar shocks to a value of US\$ 65 million or 2.2 percent of gross agricultural output (ibid. WB, MEM, 2016)

resulted in losses to the agricultural sector of US\$68 million (WB, 2016). As of 2015, 14 districts<sup>7</sup> were classified as disaster prone, against a total of nine in 2001.

AfDB reports indicate that unsustainable natural resource use costs Malawi US\$191 million or 5.3 percent of GDP every year; reflected in the percentage of forest cover in the country that has decreased from 41 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2008.<sup>8</sup> Increased climate variation experienced in the form of prolonged dry spells, droughts, floods, and temperature variability, compounded population-induced stress on the natural resource base, negatively affect the performance of sectors such as water and irrigation, agriculture, natural resources and energy, and aggravate poverty, especially for the already vulnerable population in marginal areas. Notably, 98.7 percent of the population still used burning of natural bio-mass for their energy needs.

In the governance sector, according to the Ibrahim Governance Indicator Index (IGII) for example, Malawi had a marginal decline over the period 2011 to 2014, demonstrating diminished progress.<sup>9</sup> Malawi's decline in overall governance was largely prompted by deterioration in sustainable economic progress. Even though Malawi demonstrates improvement in the other three categories, progress is marginal (**Figure 2**). At the sub-category level, Malawi has made impressive gains in Personal Safety and Rights, the third largest on the continent. At the same time, Malawi's declines in Accountability and Rural Sector making it the most deteriorated country in Southern Africa in these two sub-categories. However, compared with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Malawi's score was above the average for Africa and almost at par with Southern Africa's average. On the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Malawi's score went down from 3.4 (out of 10) in 2010 to 3.1 in 2014<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Chikwakwa, Nsanje, Phalombe, Zomba, Machinga, Mangochi, Balaka, Ntcheu, Salima, Nkhotakhota, Karonga, Blantyre, Dedza, Rumph

<sup>8</sup> AfDB (2013); Malawi Country Strategy Paper 2013 - 2017

<sup>9</sup> [http://static.moibrahimfoundation.org/u/2015/10/02201410/30\\_Malawi.pdf](http://static.moibrahimfoundation.org/u/2015/10/02201410/30_Malawi.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> [www.transparency.org/country#MWI](http://www.transparency.org/country#MWI)

**Figure 2. Malawi Governance Indicators**

Indicator	Malawi		Average for Africa
	2011	2014	
Rule of Law	62.9	68.5	51.3
Judicial Process	58.3	58.3	
Judicial Independence	64.0	61.2	
Accountability	42.2	35.1	
Public Accountability/transparency	59.8	54.8	
Participation and Human Rights	62.5	63.0	49.3
Participation	64.2	62.8	
Rights	55.1	60.1	
Gender	68.1	66.1	
Sustainable Economic Opportunity	48.6	45.6	43.2
Public administration	64.6	56.3	
Statistical Capacity	82.1	79.1	

Source: Adapted from 2015 IIAG: Country Insights -

[http://static.moibrahimfoundation.org/u/2015/10/02201410/30\\_Malawi.pdf](http://static.moibrahimfoundation.org/u/2015/10/02201410/30_Malawi.pdf)

### **3.2. Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) 2011 - 2016**

The MGDS II (2011-2016) is the overarching medium term strategy designed to attain Malawi's long term aspiration as spelt out in its Vision 2020. The objective of MGDS II is to continue reducing poverty through sustainable economic growth and infrastructure development. The MGDS II identified the following six broad thematic areas: (i) Sustainable Economic Growth; (ii) Social Development; (iii) Social Support and Disaster Risk Management; (iv) Infrastructure Development; (v) Improved Governance; and (vi) Cross-Cutting Issues.

The thematic areas constitute the pillars that support the following nine key priority areas: (i) Agriculture and Food Security; (ii) Transport Infrastructure and Nsanje World Inland Port; (iii) Energy, Industrial Development, Mining and Tourism; (iv) Education, Science and Technology; (v) Public Health, Sanitation, Malaria and HIV/AIDS Management; (vi) Integrated Rural Development; (vii) Green Belt Irrigation and Water Development; (viii) Child Development, Youth Development and Empowerment; and (ix) Climate Change, Natural Resources and Environmental Management.

### **3.3. Malawi United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)**

The Malawi United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2012-2016 is the overarching strategic framework that sets out the specific outcomes that the United Nations and the Government of Malawi aim to achieve jointly by 2016. The UNDAF is aligned to the MGDS II,

and aims to contribute to the following four priority areas that the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) identified as particularly critical for United Nations support to the people and the Government of Malawi:

- a) **Key Priority 1:** National policies, local and national institutions effectively support equitable and sustainable economic growth and food security by 2016.
- b) **Key Priority 2:** National institutions effectively deliver equitable and quality basic social and protection services by 2016.
- c) **Key Priority 3:** National response to HIV and AIDS scaled up to achieve Universal Access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support by 2016.
- d) **Key Priority 4:** National institutions effectively support transparency, accountability, participatory democracy and human rights by 2016.

At the time of its formulation, the UNDAF had 17 outcomes out of which UNDP planned to contribute to six of those outcomes. The UNDAF was implemented through the UNDAF Action Plan, thereby eliminating the need for UN agencies to develop individual Country Programme Action Plans (CPAPs).

### 3.4. UNDP Country Programme

The UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD 2012 - 2016) was developed concurrently with the UNDAF and was effectively completed before the UNDAF document. The original four CPD outcomes were subsequently adopted as the UNDAF's priorities on its completion, and in line with its corporate programming principles, UNDP in turn adopted the UNDAF outcomes, eventually taking on six of them (**Figure 3**).

**Figure 3. CPD outcomes**

UNDAF/CP outcome	Indicator	Baseline	Target (2016)	Estimated progress by end of 2016
<b>Outcome 1.2. Improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development at national and district level by 2016.</b>	Annual decrease of forest cover	2.5% (2009)	0%	-1%
	Proportion of population using solid fuel	98.70%	92%	89%
<b>Outcome 1.3: Productive poor benefit from decent work, income generation and pro-poor private sector growth by 2016.</b>	Poor quintile share in national consumption	10.1% (2009)	22%	28%
	Share of women and men in wage employment in non-agriculture sector	15% (2006)	20%	30%

UNDAF/CP outcome	Indicator	Baseline	Target (2016)	Estimated progress by end of 2016
<b>Outcome 3.2: Critical enablers for the implementation of the national response enhanced and utilized by 2016</b>	Percentage of Government Budget allocated to HIV and AIDS	< 3% (2011)	>= 5%	<3%
	% of financial resources allocated to HIV and AIDS provided to local councils	0.44% (2011)	2%	<1%
	National Composite Policy Index	8.4 (2010)	9	<9
<b>Outcome 4.1: National institutions foster democratic governance for all, especially children, women, persons with disabilities and the youths by 2016</b>	Proportion of the public holding duty bearers accountable.	40%	65%	70%
	% of people (men, women, youth, children) accessing formal justice.	10%	60%	15%
	Voter turnout	70%	90%	70.62%
<b>Outcome 4.2 Public institutions are better able to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016.</b>	% of senior public servants trained in leadership and management	45% (2010)	70%	65%
	Percentage of aid reported in the national budget	55% (2009)	75%	24%
<b>Outcome 4.3: National institutions advance gender equality and status of women by 2016.</b>	1. Proportion of women in decision making at all levels {P: Parliament; LC: Local council; CS: Civil service; Ps: Parastatal}	P: 22% (2009) LC: 8.3% (2000) CS: 23%; Ps: 22% (2010)	P: 50% LC: 20% CS: 30% Ps: 25%	P: 16% LC: 11% CS: 30% Ps: 27%
	2. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector	15% (2006)	20%	30%
	3. Ratio of Girls to Boys in Secondary Education	0.79 (2010)	1	1.01
	4. Gender Status Index	0.639 (2010)	0.75	0.639

UNDP implementation was based on programme/project support documents developed in order to facilitate planning, output target setting and facilitate monitoring. A total of 25 projects were developed during the implementation period, and were at various stages of completion at the time of the evaluation. The CPD had a total planned budget of US\$169 million, of which \$38.8 million (22.9%) was regular resources, with a funding deficit of \$130.2 million to be mobilised.

## 4. EVALUATION FINDINGS

In this Chapter, the main findings of the evaluation are presented on the basis of the evaluation questions outlined in the terms of reference (TORs). The analysis attempts to provide evidence to answer the evaluation questions and sub-questions based on the analysis of available data at the level of the indicators for outputs and outcomes. As noted in the section on the limitations however, some of the indicators were poorly defined and insufficiently monitored such that an objective and conclusive assessment of their development impact is difficult.

### 4.1. Findings on the Relevance of the Country Programme

This section contains the evaluation findings on the relevance of the CP. The relevance of UNDP's CP was assessed in terms of its appropriateness in the context of Malawi, including its responsiveness to national needs and priorities as well as UN core values and principles.

**Finding 1: Despite its limited resources, UNDP in Malawi is highly regarded as a relevant and trusted partner due to its normative and advocacy roles**

According to official government reports, the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Malawi over the period from 2012 – 2015 (FY2012/13 to FY 2014/15) was US\$3.2 billion<sup>11</sup>. Out of that, the UN contribution was 3.5% (\$112.7 million), of which 23% originated from UNDP. Although UNDP is itself not a 'donor', these data illustrate that UNDP has very limited capacity compared to multilateral agencies such as the WB and AfDB, or other development partners such as for example, the European Union (EU), USA and Norway.

Despite its limited resources, all stakeholders including government, civil society, and Development Partners all had very high regard for UNDP's normative role and contribution. Leveraging its convening power, UNDP contributed to the peaceful transfer of power following the 2014 elections. Through the Political Parties project, the major political parties signed a non-violence pact at the highest level, including by the State President in his capacity of leader of a political party. Many stakeholders acknowledge this as a significant contribution by UNDP to peace building and social cohesion.

Several other examples were cited by various stakeholders regarding UNDP's contribution to sometimes sensitive national issues such as harmful traditional practices. One example is early marriages. UNDP brought together key stakeholders including traditional and religious leaders to

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<sup>11</sup> Malawi Development Cooperation Atlas, pp 13 - 15

address the issues of child marriages. In one of the examples given to the evaluator, one of the traditional leaders went so far as to annul the marriage of a girl-child who was married before the legal age of consent. Similarly, for the HIV and AIDS response, the issue of rights of Lesbians, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) is considered taboo; but through its advocacy work, UNDP in collaboration with other partners successfully convinced key stakeholders to acknowledge their rights as a social group, which led to improvements in Malawi's national response.

**Finding 2: UNDP has not fully leveraged its good reputation and high regard by its partners**

Majority of stakeholders that were consulted in government, civil society and among development partners, expressed high regard for UNDP leadership, especially in coordination. The development partners particularly highlighted UNDP's coordination role in the 2014 elections and also in the emergency response following the 2015 floods. It was evident however, that in most cases, development partners did not make a distinction between UNDP and the RC system, apparently because the UNDP Resident Representative (RR) is also the UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC).

Between 2012 and 2015, UNDP mobilized \$46,890,847 in non-core resources, which is way below its projected resource mobilisation target of \$130.2 million (**Figure 4**).

**Figure 4: Cost-sharing Resources by Donor, 2012-2015 (\$)**

DONOR	2012	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
EU/EC	904,556	5,643,318	4,276,559	1,147,278	11,971,711
DFID		2,227,867	3,461,377	3,093,538	8,782,782
NORWAY	865,113	4,102,414	2,164,723	519,763	7,652,013
IRISH	289,856	1,716,509	588,804	882,154	3,477,323
MALAWI	1,224,513	1,670,254			2,894,767
UNITAR	145,150	26,750	10,000	38,200	220,100
ONE FUND	858,412	1,022,488	761,686	3,239,037	5,881,622
MILLIMIUN PROMISE ALLIANCE	14,359				14,359
GEF	769,570	980,056	1,061,391	3,185,152	5,996,169
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,071,528</b>	<b>17,389,655</b>	<b>12,324,540</b>	<b>12,105,123</b>	<b>46,890,847</b>

The data above reflects that most of the donor resources were earmarked to support the elections processes in 2013 and 2014, causing a sharp decline in resources from the three biggest donors in 2015. Some development partners observed that UNDP has not effectively leveraged its unique position as a trusted partner by both the government and development partners in its resource mobilisation. For example, the Norwegian Embassy noted that they were willing to support Public Sector Reforms, but they had not been approached by UNDP. Other development partners also observed that UNDP often missed funding opportunities due to limited collaboration with non-state actors. For example, they noted that the Democratic Consolidation Programme (DCP) was

working in parallel with many other non-state actors who were also involved in community work at district level. This presented an opportunity for UNDP to expand its partnership network, and would also make it easier for donors to consolidate their funding programmes.

**Finding 3: UNDP's country programme is aligned with the country's priorities, but it is too fragmented and lacks a clear theory of change**

The MGDS II is the overarching medium term strategy of the GoM. The government's strategic objective to accelerate poverty reduction through sustainable economic growth and infrastructure development was based on a number of key assumptions, including: (i) the country would sustain and accelerate real GDP growth rates, (ii) maintain prudence in the management of fiscal and monetary policies, (iii) consistent political stability, (iv) conducive macroeconomic environment, (v) increased diversification and value addition of export commodities to effectively drive export-led growth, (vi) effective aid management and further improvement in domestic debt management, (vii) commitment of adequate resources and implementation capacity, (viii) good governance is entrenched and institutionalised to avoid wastage of scarce resources, (ix) effective social protection programmes to mitigate negative side effects of shocks, and (x) consistent political will<sup>12</sup>.

UNDP's programme portfolio addresses several of these strategic assumptions across its portfolios. UNDP aimed to strengthen market-driven growth through its programme on private sector development (PSD), which includes: Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM), and the Malawi Innovation Challenge Fund (MICF). These projects extend beyond 2016 and have potential to contribute to accelerated GDP growth. At the same time, the Strengthening Institutional Capacity for Development Effectiveness and Accountability Programme (DEAP) was seen as a vehicle through which effective aid management and coordination would be achieved. In the areas of good governance, political stability and social protection, UNDP also developed a number of projects, including support to elections, Democracy Consolidation Project (DCP), and Strengthening Political Parties project, among others that contribute towards these strategic objectives.

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<sup>12</sup> MGDS II, page 3



However, the portfolio appears to be too fragmented with too many projects of limited scale. Under Outcome 1.2 on environment, natural resources management and climate change for example, UNDP has 12 projects (Box 2)<sup>13</sup>. It can be argued that all the projects are relevant and contribute towards the human development needs of the country. And indeed they do. For example, the NCCP is fully funded by UNDP and is used by the GoM as the national coordination platform for climate change-related projects supported by all Development Partners. However, there is some overlap between some of the projects. For example, the two projects - Implementation of Adaptation Measures and Climate Proofing Development Gains, these projects essentially address the same issues in different geographic locations. Going forward, it is conceivable that elements of these projects could be integrated and/or converged into one programmatic initiative.

**Box 2. UNDP projects on environment, natural resources and climate change**

- 1) Sustainable Land Management
- 2) Implementing Urgent Adaptation Measures
- 3) Climate Proofing Development Gains
- 4) National Climate Change Programme (NCCP)
- 5) Environment and Natural Resources Management
- 6) Decentralised Energy Services
- 7) Sustainable Energy Management
- 8) Early Warning Systems
- 9) Increasing Energy Access
- 10) Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI)
- 11) Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Support Programme
- 12) Support under UN REDD

The question may be asked why it should even be an issue that there are too many projects. The real issue is about the scale of the projects and their ability to deliver concrete results that have an impact on the development landscape. Many of these projects were very low scale with planned budgets of US\$ 500,000 over 3 to 4 years; which in practice means an average of \$100,000 a year. For example, the PEI project had budget of about \$670,000 over a three-year period from 2013 – 2016; while the DRM project had a planned budget of \$555,000 implemented from 2012 – 2015.

Indeed many of the key stakeholders consulted during the evaluation noted that most of UNDP's interventions lacked impact. All the Development Partners (DPs) that were interviewed said that UNDP spread itself too thinly and consequently made very little impact due to limited resources. Several government counterparts also made similar observations, noting that UNDP interventions did not seem to be driven by any clear strategic plan, instead they often appeared to be retroactively developed whenever UNDP accessed unplanned resources from donors. A visit to the

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<sup>13</sup> This is cited as illustrative example only, and does not imply that it is the worst. At the time of evaluation, there was total of 29 projects.

Country Office website indicates that UNDP had over 40 projects in 54 subnational locations,<sup>14</sup> which generally illustrates the point about ‘spreading too thinly’.

**Finding 4: The extent of effective integration of UN’s core programming principles was varied as it was mainly projectised and not adequately mainstreamed**

The UN system’s values and standards entail that UN agencies should integrate five principles in their programming - human rights-based approach (HRBA), gender equality, environmental sustainability, results-based management (RBM) and capacity development. The evaluation noted that not all of these principles were effectively integrated in a consistent manner across the country programme.

**HRBA.** UNDP has developed and implemented a specific project to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights – the Malawi Human Rights Support Project. This project was designed within the context of enhancing and operationalization of the Democratic Governance Sector Wide Approach (DG-SWAp), with the key Implementing Partners (IPs) being the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC), Office of the Ombudsman (OoO) and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA). Through the support of the project, the GoM has taken steps to strengthen protection and promotion of human rights, including formulation of the National Human Rights Action Plan (NAP). UNDP support also enabled MoJCA to participate in the defence of reports under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Protocol on the Rights of Women. Majority of stakeholders that were interviewed noted that UNDP’s key contribution was in the strengthening of institutional capacities of relevant human rights institutions. An independent evaluation of the project also observed that “...*through the project, commitment to promoting and protecting human rights in Malawi has been awakened with hopes of better outcomes and impact in the long term provided the current momentum is maintained and/or scaled up*”<sup>15</sup>.

**Gender equality.** UNDP also supports a specific project on gender – Political Empowerment of Women. This support is provided through the Gender Working Group in which UNDP was very active. The evaluation noted however that gender mainstreaming was generally weak. Based on evaluative evidence from individuals interviewed, there was no targeted tracking and monitoring of gender within specific UNDP projects. Some of the members of the Gender Working Group also observed that generally, UN agencies did not know what and how to track and gender equality outcomes, and the gender scorecard assessment had not been done. An independent outcome

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<sup>14</sup> [http://open.undp.org/#2016/filter/operating\\_unit-MWI](http://open.undp.org/#2016/filter/operating_unit-MWI) (data as of 8 November 2016)

<sup>15</sup> End of term evaluation of Malawi Human Rights Support project, pp24

evaluation undertaken in July 2015 noted that *“the CO has committed itself to the promotion of gender mainstreaming by implementing a corporate gender equality strategy (GES) but not in a systematic manner due to absence of strong internal institutional mechanisms such as a CO Gender Strategy or Gender Action Plan and intra gender team”*<sup>16</sup>.

**Environmental Sustainability:** Protection and management of the environment is among the pillars of the Malawi Vision 2020. This long term strategy recognizes the importance of ensuring the environmental sustainability of development. As noted above, UNDP supported several projects on environmental sustainability. However, other than the development and establishment of policies and legal frameworks, government implementation of these policies remains a challenge (**Box 3**). Moreover, the independent evaluation of Outcome 1.2 undertaken in December 2015 observed that *“The downstream interventions that the UN has supported have resulted, in many cases, in important developments, improvements in livelihoods, reduced risk, and community-based adaptation to climate change. However, there are (as with many of these localized interventions) issues due to their rather limited influence. In order to enhance these successes and effects, special care and attention should be paid to up scaling, having a catalytic effect and improving impact by connecting the downstream best practices with upstream work”*<sup>17</sup>.

**Box 3. Environmental sustainability**

“Every year there are high level reports about national tree planting, etc.; but the country still has net loss of forest cover. One wonders whether we are making any impact at all at the community level”

**Observation by one interviewee**

**RBM.** The CP has 20 outcome indicators and 50 output indicators, which provided the basis for monitoring progress and reporting. Periodic reviews were being undertaken, including quarterly IP reviews that the evaluator had the opportunity to attend. However, reporting tended to be activity-focused and did not adequately capture UNDP’s contribution to developmental results through the indicators. The evaluation noted that the M & E frameworks in some cases did not ensure logical flow of results in line with RBM principles. The underlying challenge for reporting is that the IPs were required to report against the annual work plan, which itself outlined the specific activities that were to be undertaken on an annual or quarterly basis; such as for example, “2 training workshops conducted by end of first quarter”. Invariably, the indicators for the activity would be measured in terms of the number of participants, and this is what ends up in the progress reports. Clearly the CO needs to strengthen its RBM capacity in order to effectively document its success and generate appropriate lessons from its experience.

<sup>16</sup> Mid-term evaluation of outcome 3.1 and Gender Mainstreaming across all Outcomes

<sup>17</sup> Mid-term evaluation of Outcome 1.2; p 9

**Capacity development:** Capacity development is the central feature in UNDP's delivery approach. Interventions are jointly signed with IPs, who in majority of cases were represented by counterpart line Ministries or departments. This 'in theory' ensures national ownership and promotes capacity development by engaging government in the actual planning, implementation and monitoring of activities. In some projects, UNDP seconded Technical Advisors to the IPs to coordinate the projects as well as facilitate knowledge transfer; as was the case with the Malawi Electoral Support project. However, the extent to which capacity was effectively developed is not clear. Many IPs doubted that some of UNDP's interventions would be continued beyond the project's life. This was the case for example with the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) project. While this is mainly about government's commitment and political will, it also implies lack of capacity at a higher level than individual skills; i.e. integrating interventions into national systems and processes. In addition, the emphasis was to develop individual-level capacity mainly through workshops and seminars, at the expense of supporting national partners to build systems and tools which are likely to be institutionalised and thereby sustainable.

Some of the government officials that were interviewed observed that UNDP capacity building approach mainly entailed participation in training workshops, but these often times had very limited value as in some cases participants were already familiar with the subject matter. Indeed, an independent evaluation of capacity development across the UN system also made the following conclusions<sup>18</sup> *"...turnover and transfer levels are high in many ministries and departments, making effective individual training irrelevant when staff depart. When turnover and transfer levels are high, individual training should be carefully considered, knowing that it may be ineffective, or require repeating on a regular basis. In these cases, more cost effective repetitive training approaches should be considered (e.g., computer-based training, videos, etc.)"*.

Evaluator's Assessment on the Relevance of the Country Programme		
	Narrative	Rating
<b>Responsiveness to national needs and priorities</b>	Overall the country programme and addresses issues that are highly important for the country. UNDP's strategy seems appropriately targeted at three critical areas (a) economic growth, (b) sustainable environment, and (c) responsible and accountable governance. These three areas are central to the emerging global discourse around the sustainable development goals.	
<b>Integration of UN core values and principles</b>	UNDP approach has been to projectise some of the core programming principles instead of mainstreaming them in all interventions. Notably, there is also a lack of adequate internal capacity within UNDP itself, most notably in the area of RBM as illustrated in its M&E framework. Most of the indicators do not sufficiently	

<sup>18</sup> UN in Malawi – Capacity Development Review Report, p28

	capture UNDP achievements at the results level, but only track progress at activity level.	
<b>Internal coherence of the programme outcomes</b>	Although UNDP is highly regarded as a key strategic partner to support Malawi to move in a positive direction towards its long term development objectives, its programme portfolio is too fragmented and lacks strategic coherence. In addition, there has not been sufficient focus on building national institutional capacity to ensure sustainable implementation of systems and policies beyond individual capacity building through workshops and seminars.	

## 4.2. Findings on Progress towards Development Outcomes (see also Annex 3)

This sections contains an assessment of the extent to which the primary objectives of UNDP's interventions have been achieved and its contribution towards the intended development outcomes. The analysis relied heavily on information obtained through stakeholder interviews as well as documentary evidence from project and outcome evaluations. The indicators outlined in the CPD results matrix were used as the primary markers for assessing UNDP's achievement of outputs and contribution to outcomes.

In 2014, UNDP restructured its programme into two portfolios, (i) Resilience and Sustainable Growth (RSG), and (ii) Responsive Institutions and Citizen Engagement (RICE), from initially four programme units.<sup>19</sup> The findings are therefore structured in line with the two respective portfolios taking into account the CPD Outcomes that each portfolio was responsible for.

### A. Resilience and Sustainable Growth Portfolio

Two Programme Units – Inclusive Growth, and Environment and Natural Resources were integrated under a new RSG portfolio. The portfolio is responsible for two outcomes (**Figure 5**).

<sup>19</sup> The initial programme units were (a) Capacity Development, (b) Inclusive Economic Growth, (c) Environment and Natural Resources, and (d) Local Governance

**Figure 5. RSG Portfolio outcomes**

Outcome	Indicators	Progress achieved
<b>Outcome 1.2.</b> Improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development at national and district level by 2016.	Annual decrease of forest cover <b>Baseline:</b> 2.5% (2009) <b>Target:</b> 0%	No significant change in rate of decrease
	Proportion of population using solid fuel <b>Baseline:</b> 98.7% <b>Target:</b> 92%	Rate decreased to 97% (source: draft National Charcoal Strategy, 2016)
<b>Outcome 1.3:</b> Productive poor benefit from decent work, income generation and pro-poor private sector growth by 2016.	Poor quintile share in national consumption <b>Baseline:</b> 10.1% (2009) <b>Target:</b> 22%	No data available
	Share of women and men in wage employment in non-agriculture sector <b>Baseline:</b> 15% (2006) <b>Target:</b> 20%	No data available

#### **4.2.1. Outcome 1.2: Improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development at national and district level**

Management of the environment, natural resources and climate change was one of the key priority areas (KPAs) identified in the MGDS II. Section 9.1 and 9.2 of the MGDS II highlights the country's goals and strategies for these priorities.

#### **Finding 5: There is mixed evidence to demonstrate that UNDP's interventions effectively achieved desired developmental outcomes**

Firstly, there is an apparent disconnect between UNDP interventions and overall outcome indicators. As seen in **Figure 5** above, one of the indicators is 'annual decrease in loss of forest cover'. It is evident therefore that deforestation, including engagement of local communities in Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) and forest governance was among the primary focus areas of the CPD. However, while UNDP supported some policy analysis work on soil loss and forest governance under the UN REDD project, actual implementation by the government has been slow at all levels. Moreover, a number of key planned interventions were not done. These include: national Forest management Strategy (NFMS) roadmap, and knowledge sharing and awareness raising.

Indeed, as noted earlier, some stakeholders observed that there were many interventions being undertaken on sustainable environment management, but their impact was not at all visible as the country continued to face challenges of land degradation, population-induced resource scarcity, and desertification. In addition, as will be noted in subsequent sections dealing with outputs, it would appear that many of the outputs, particularly those that sought to deliver specific products such as policy documents or guidelines were generally achieved. This means therefore that the actual implementation of these policies and guidelines is lacking at the national and more importantly at the district levels. This is clearly demonstrated through the second indicator about reducing the proportion of the population using solid fuel, which apparently missed the planned target by about 85 percent.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, an independent evaluation of Outcome 1.2 reached similar conclusion; *“products are not thoroughly efficient in delivering the expected outcome of tangible and specific improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development”*<sup>21</sup>.

Some of the stakeholders interviewed also noted that the UNDP portfolio was affected by two major constraints. Firstly, the portfolio was highly fragmented with too many small projects, while also there was no specific thematic strategy or theory of change addressing how UNDP planned to get to the expected outcomes. In this regard, they noted that specific linkages between poverty and environment were not adequately addressed by government, or emphasised that in order to ensure that the majority of the population is not overly dependent on the environment for their livelihoods, further economic diversification is required. The second constraint observed was that UNDP interventions tended to over-emphasise global benchmarks and sometimes lacked local realism in the context of Malawi. One of the examples that they gave was about UNDP support towards the UN REDD, which they said Malawi was not yet ready for that level of intervention, in part because there was very limited national awareness, even among policy makers and legislators about its basic components such as carbon credits, and so on. Other stakeholders also noted that the Environment Management Act has remained a draft bill for quite some time because of limited awareness of its import and impact among parliamentarians<sup>22</sup>.

Notwithstanding, UNDP provided programme support in a range of intervention areas, through the Environment and Natural Resources Thematic Working Group including the development of

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<sup>20</sup> The planned target was to reduce by 7 percentage points, but a reduction of only 1 percentage point (14%) was achieved

<sup>21</sup> Mid-term evaluation of UNDAF Outcome 1.2, p 44

<sup>22</sup> UNDP supported a consultative meeting of the parliamentary Committee on Natural resources and Climate Change on the Environmental management Bill from 12 – 15 September 2016. Following that meeting, it was expected that the Bill would be tabled before Parliament in November for enactment.



the Environment and Natural Resources Sector Wide Approach. However, the upstream approach that has been the hallmark of UNDP interventions has not resulted in developmental changes, mainly because of the weak absorptive capacity of the government as well as the lack of adequate coordination within the Environment SWAp. This issue will be further explored under the section on efficiency and coordination, but suffice to note that the independent outcome evaluation also concluded that *“...except for some joint programming (PEI or the Strengthening Community Resilience to Climate Change in Blantyre, Zomba, Neno and Phalombe Districts) there is very little joint programming to analyse how the UNCT (sic) worked effectively with other international and national development partners to improve the management of the climate change, environment and disasters risk. Yet by all accounts and previous analysis (at the UNDAF level, but also at the country programming and at the project level) there is very little joint implementation or joint programming taking place”*<sup>23</sup>.

#### **Output 1.2.1. Environment, natural resources and climate change mainstreamed in policies, development plans and budgets at national and district level**

##### **Finding 6: Several relevant policies have been developed but their implementation or developmental impact is not yet apparent**

One of the consequences of the UNDAF review in 2013 was to streamline the UN’s collective focus, but at the same time shifted UN agency work more at the upstream level. As lead agency for the outcome, UNDP work focused on mainstreaming policies at national and district levels, including in budgets, which according to the independent UNDAF evaluation (2015) somewhat reduced impact by diluting the linkages between upstream and downstream work<sup>24</sup>.

UNDP supported interventions contributed to strengthen mainstreaming ENRM into national policies and programmes. In particular, the UNDP project ‘Support to National Climate Change’ supported the GoM to develop methodologies for climate-proofing its policies, strategies and plans in those sectors of the economy most directly affected by climate change, and to create an enabling policy and regulatory environment within which vulnerable communities will be empowered to adapt to these challenges. The project’s main focus was on mainstreaming climate change response into policy and planning, leading to the development and operationalization of the National Climate Change Policy as well as review of the National Adaptation Programmes of

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p 46

<sup>24</sup> “The work of the Outcome now concentrates on mainstreaming policies at national and district levels, including in budgets. This shift has somewhat reduced impact. Recently launched projects have had a downstream and community level focus. Connections between upstream and downstream work need to be strengthened” - UNDAF evaluation page 54



Action (NAPA) of 2006 in order to inform the development of a much wider National Adaptation Plan for Malawi. Two other particularly notable UNDP projects include the Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI), and the “Private Public Partnership in Sustainable Land Management in the Shire River Basin” (SLM) that specifically targeted the 14 most disaster-prone areas. The upstream component of the SLM project also included support for the Public Environment Expenditure Review (PEER), aimed at providing a benchmark for fiscal support to the broad environment sector and the generation of best-bet practices for sustainable land management.

The output had three specific indicators, all of which were achieved to some extent. The first indicator was to measure the resources allocated to ENR, climate change and DRM; of which the baseline was established as US\$2.5 million with a target of \$3.5 million. Specific updated data for the first indicator was unavailable, but the 2014 GoM Public Expenditure Review on ENR and DRM reported that \$275 million had been allocated to the sector over the period 2006 – 2012. The second indicator measured the number of new policies, development plans and programmes reflecting ENR, CC and DRM concerns, with a planned target of six. This indicator was achieved, with the following policies, laws and regulatory frameworks/guidelines developed:

- Climate Change Management Policy,
- National climate Change Investment Plan,
- Forest Policy - reviewed
- Environment Management Act – draft bill
- National Disaster Risk Management Policy
- National Resilience Plan
- Post-Disaster Needs assessment (2015 -2016)
- Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) under UN REDD, and
- Documenting Indigenous Knowledge Systems for NRM in Malawi

#### **Output 1.2.2. Data and knowledge on the impact of climate change, environmental and natural resources degradation collected and made accessible to decision makers in Government, Private Sector and Civil Society**

##### **Finding 7: National awareness in sustainable environment, natural resources management and climate change has been enhanced**

UNDP has supported training and capacity building of technical personnel and farmers in sustainable land management practices; capacity building on environment, agriculture, education, water and health for disaster risk management for governmental staff; and through the incorporation of DRM in primary school curriculum. Some of the UNDP projects supported studies, analyses and knowledge management products, including development of handbook and

operational guidelines for DRM; and guidelines on the integration of environment and natural resource management into local development plans and national budgets.

This output had two specific indicators; the first of which was the establishment of two websites on climate change and ENR linked to databases. The website for the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining ([www.nccpmw.org](http://www.nccpmw.org)) was established. A visit to the website revealed that it contains some useful information for environmental practitioners as well general awareness, including for example links to National Climate Change Response Framework and a Frequently Asked Questions site on Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA). There is also a 'Media Gallery' with a link to an audio-gallery which measures the number of hits to the site {at the time of drafting, the site reflected 547 hits}.

The second indicator measured the number of districts with climate change information centers, with a planned target of 15 districts. At the time of drafting, the centers were established in seven districts, but only five (5) were fully functioning.<sup>25</sup>

#### **Output 1.2.3. Coordination mechanisms and implementation arrangements for CC and ENR established and used at national and district level**

##### **Finding 8: Sector coordination mechanisms were established, but overall the SWAp agenda has not been very successful**

Various coordination platforms were established to coordinate work under the outcome. A Development Partners Working Group was established and co-chaired by UNDP in 2014<sup>26</sup>. The donor working group coordinates actions of all development partners working in the sector. One such example, is the project '*Strengthening Community Resilience to Climate Change in Blantyre, Zomba, Neno and Phalombe Districts*' which is led by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

The project was launched in June 2015, and attempts to address the multivariate issues of climate change adaptation through a joint co-applicants' implementation and coordination approach for agencies that have applied jointly for EU support, thereby also compelling to some degree, government counterparts to work jointly.

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<sup>25</sup> Districts with functioning climate change information centres: Karonga, Salima, Zomba, Nsanje and Mulanje. The centres in Kasungu and Chikwawa were not functioning.

<sup>26</sup> USAID was the co-chair in 2015, and FAO is the co-chair in 2016.

Sector Working Groups (SWGs) were established for all the sectors supported by UNDP. Overall, the SWGs provided a forum for coordination of work and information sharing. This had contributed to reduce duplication overlap. However, some of the SWGs were not as effective as was originally intended and often became a burden on staff that increased transaction costs. For example, there were two Steering Committees for ENR and Climate Change respectively, which many stakeholders noted was too demanding on their time. These have since been amalgamated into one. In addition, Technical Working Groups were also established to coordinate work at the technical level on a project basis. These too, facilitated coordination.

It is noteworthy however, that coordination within the UN system was not considered to be very effective. Some of the development partners that were interviewed observed that there was lack of coordination among UN agencies, who often appeared to be competing for resources. They said this usually manifest in two or more UN agencies submitting proposals separately to the same donor for essentially similar projects. The independent UNDAF evaluation for Outcome 1.2 also noted lack of coordination among UN agencies, and concluded that *“except for very few instances, there has been weak coordination and frail synergies within the UNCT; which has implied high transaction costs and decreased efficiency in the implementation and delivery of projects, programmes, and processes”*.

Of the three output indicators, only one that measured the establishment of SWG for ENR and Climate Change has been achieved. The SWGs were established and convening quarterly as per their TORs. However, the two SWGs have areas of overlap to a certain extent since both are convened by the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining (MNREM) and co-chaired by UNDP. The second indicator measured the number of target Districts coordinating and implementing CC and ENR programmes, with a planned target of 15 districts. Based on UNDP reports, only 6 districts had so far started implementing such programmes. The third indicator measured the establishment of SWAp funding mechanism for the sector. However, this has not been achieved due to general divestiture of donors from SWAps in the aftermath of the ‘cashgate’ scandal<sup>27</sup>.

#### **4.2.2. Outcome 1.3: Productive poor benefit from decent work, income generation and pro-poor private sector growth by 2016.**

Outcome 1.3 was integrated under the RSG portfolio when UNDP restructured its country programme in 2014. Based on interviews with UNDP staff, the move initially affected performance

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<sup>27</sup> “Cashgate” is a financial scandal that unfolded in 2013 – 2014, highlighting misuse of donor funds as well as other transparency and corruption issues by government officials involving millions of US dollars

due to the uncertainties associated with change. In addition, the move was also seen as bringing together two seemingly different technical areas under one portfolio. However, by the time of this evaluation, the transition had been completed and staff were beginning to see the positive effects of integrating the portfolio, including in terms of creating synergies through joint planning and enhanced information sharing. Although still in planning stages, one area of potential synergy that staff noted would arise from this integration was for example, promoting private sector investments in the renewable energy sector.

**Finding 9: UNDP contributed to improve systems and policies at the macroeconomic level but impact at household and community level was still minimal**

The flagship programme supported by UNDP under this outcome was the Private Sector Development Programme (PSD).

UNDP supported the development of strategies and policies, including (i) National Export Strategy, (ii) Industrial Policy and (iii) National Quality Policy and National Quality Strategy. Stakeholders interviewed noted however, that the government has been slow in adopting and putting in place the necessary legislative instruments to enable full implementation of these frameworks. For example, the national testing laboratory was delayed because government had not provided its share of the required funding<sup>28</sup>. UNDP also supported the establishment of the Trade, Industry and Private Sector (TIP) SWAp to help coordinated approach towards the broader sectoral objectives.

Two UNDP supported projects have been particularly successful in contributing to the intended outcomes. The MICF has provided a platform for private sector engagement in the development arena. The Fund supports private sector companies by funding part of the risk associated with innovation, provided that the innovation can demonstrably benefit the poor and marginalised through employment creation, livelihood diversification and scalability. In one project site visited during this evaluation, the grantee had outsourced egg production to community groups, a large majority of whom were women. The first round of competition in Agriculture and Manufacturing contracted 10 grantees and projects started implementation in early 2015. The total amount contracted for the first round of competition was US\$ 5,000,000. As of September 2016 the total expenditure of the 10 projects amounts to \$5,155,721 of which the MICF contributed \$2,102,297 and the Grantee \$3,053,423 thereby giving a leverage of 59%. A total of 35,000 households benefitted from increased incomes, while 1,100 new jobs were created.

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<sup>28</sup> At the time of this evaluation, construction of the laboratory had started, with government committing MWK 2 billion

Through the SQAM project, UNDP also contributed to enhance the competitiveness of Malawi products in international markets by supporting development of National Quality Policy and Strategy as well as accreditation of the Malawi Bureau of Standards (MBS).

Updated data on the two outcome indicators was not available at the time of drafting. However, the independent UNDAF evaluation projected that both indicators could be achieved by 2016. The first indicator measured increase in national consumption by the lowest quintile of the population, with planned target to increase their consumption from 10.1% in 2009 to 22%. The evaluation projected an achievement of 28% by 2016. The second indicator measured the proportion of women and men in wage employment in non-agriculture sector, with planned target to increase it from 15% in 2006 to 20%. The projection was for 30% increase by 2016.

**Output 1.3.1. Policy frameworks (Employment and labour, Industrialisation, and Trade) are developed with gender and rights based lenses and are in place**

**Finding 10: Policy frameworks that contribute to the expected outcome were developed**

As noted earlier, UNDP performance in terms of delivering results at output level has been commendable. The expected policy frameworks identified under this output were achieved, including the National Industrial Policy, the National Trade Policy, National Export Strategy and the National Quality Policy. In addition, UNDP also supported and contributed to the review of the Economic Zones Regulations to determine why they were not performing according to expectations. Following this review, UNDP is funding a technical consultant to develop revised framework, which at the time of the evaluation were undergoing legal review by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA). UNDP also supported the review of Investment, Production and Export Incentives that will feed into the Comprehensive Tax Review planned by the Ministry of Finance.

Under the National Quality Policy, UNDP supported development of the 'Buy Malawi' strategy by supporting the government to develop its implementation plan and establishing market linkages for different sectors. UNDP also supported a sensitization and awareness raising campaign for the review of the Business Licensing Act and Regulations. By law, businesses with a foreign dimension of any form have to be licensed at the national level, while all domestic businesses are licensed at local level. However, local authorities were also requesting foreign business to license at the local level in contravention of the statutory requirements.

Stakeholders observed however that the gender dimension envisaged in the output statement has not been adequately addressed. For example, a number of trade mainstreaming workshops were

conducted without the involvement of the Ministry of Women, thereby missing an opportunity for gender mainstreaming. Some informants also noted that a number of planned key deliverables such as review of the Cooperative Policy and Strategy were not done, and this affected effective contribution to the intended outcome for pro-poor growth<sup>29</sup>. UNDP clarified that this component was not part of its deliverables. In that respect, it is noteworthy that many stakeholders observed that UNDP interventions were seemingly ad hoc and did not reflect a theory of change logic.

The CPD results and M&E framework has only one indicator for this output, which measured the number of policies regulated and gazetted with a planned target of three policies. Based on that measurement, the output and its attendant indicators has been fully achieved.

### **Output 1.3.2. TIP Swap, ASWAp & JSSP for gender and youth implementation strengthened.**

#### **Finding 11: The UN has provided technical support for promotion of SWAps**

Although the SWAp agenda has not been very successful in Malawi, UNDP has continued to advocacy and provide support to enhance government's capacity to implement them. In 2015, UNDP provided technical and financial support for the establishment of the TIP SWAp, which was subsequently funded by the EU. UNDP also facilitated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the GoM and donors to operationalize a capacity development plan for the TIP SWAp, as well as support to the Malawi Investment and Trade Center (MITC) to do an Investment Mapping Exercise and publishing of the Malawi Projects Compendium.

While these products were intended to incentivise manufacturers in line with the National Export Strategy, stakeholder noted that there was no follow up by the government. For example, 500 copies of the Malawi Projects Compendium were distributed to various embassies and potential foreign investors, but there has been no follow up on them and as of the time of the evaluation, the exercise had not yielded the anticipated foreign investment.

The output has one indicator which measures the number of capacity development initiatives delivered to respective SWAp secretariats, with a planned target of three. Based on UNDP reports, one capacity development plan was produced for the TIP SWAp.

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<sup>29</sup> UNDP clarified that review of this policy was being done by FAO.

**Output 1.3.3. National Export Strategy clusters are supported through enterprise and skills development, financial services, cooperative development, promotion of structured markets and national quality infrastructure.**

**Finding 12: The national export strategy clusters have not been fully operationalized**

Based on information from interviewees, several national export strategy clusters were established in the (a) oil seeds products, (b) sugar cane products, and (c) manufacturers. In the manufacturing sector, four clusters were established: (i) beverages, (ii) agro-processing, (iii) plastics, and (iv) packaging and assembly.

UNDP supported the establishment of TWGs under the TIP SWAp. The TWGs were functional and held regular quarterly meetings as per their terms of reference. However, there was a challenge that technical issues have not been taken up at decision making level for real developmental change to happen. Some key informants also noted that a key constraint for some of the TWGs was lack of specific deliverables, including specific strategy and implementation plan.




The output indicator measures the proportion of commodities traded through formal platforms. However, updated data was not available at the time of this evaluation.

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**Evaluator's Assessment on Performance of the RSG Portfolio**

	Narrative	Rating
<b>Outcome 1.2. Improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development at national and district level</b>	While UNDP achieved many of its output-level results, the outputs did not have the desired causal effect to trigger changes at the outcome level. The outcome lacked a coherent thematic strategy based on a clearly defined theory of change. In part this was because of inadequate resources due to donor prioritisation of humanitarian support over the last two years.	
<b>Outcome 1.3. Productive poor benefit from decent work, income generation and pro-poor private sector growth by 2016.</b>	UNDP contributed to strengthen national systems, including legislative and policy frameworks. However, government's capacity to implement these frameworks was also slow. In addition, the selection and formulation of indicators lacked a 'big picture approach'.	

Note: The qualitative assessment is based on the traffic light system where:

-  indicates low or unsatisfactory performance and progress;
  -  indicates medium level performance and progress; and
  -  indicates highly satisfactory performance and progress.
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## B. Responsive Institutions and Citizen Engagement Portfolio

As noted earlier, after the integration of UNDP's country programme into two portfolios, perhaps the RICE became the most diversified portfolio. It includes outcomes on HIV and AIDS, Gender equality, as well as the general domain usually included under the Governance practice area (human rights, public service delivery, elections, peace building, etc.). The integrated RICE portfolio is comprised of the following four outcomes (**Figure 6**).

**Figure 6. RICE Portfolio outcomes**

Outcome	Indicators	Progress achieved
<b>Outcome 3.2.</b> Critical enablers for the implementation of the national response enhanced and utilized by 2016.	% of Government Budget allocated to HIV and AIDS <b>Baseline:</b> <3% (2011); <b>Target:</b> ≥ 5%	14% (2015)
	% of financial resources allocated to HIV and AIDS provided to local councils <b>Baseline:</b> 0.44% (2011); <b>Target:</b> 2%	Data unavailable
	National Composite Policy Index <b>Baseline:</b> 8.4 (2010); <b>Target:</b> 9	< 9
<b>Outcome 4.1:</b> National institutions foster democratic governance for all, especially children, women, persons with disabilities and the youths by 2016	Proportion of the public holding duty bearers accountable. <b>Baseline:</b> 40% ; <b>Target:</b> 65%	70%
	% of people (men, women, youth, children) accessing formal justice. <b>Baseline:</b> 10%; <b>Target:</b> 60%	15%
	Voter turnout <b>Baseline:</b> 70%; <b>Target:</b> 90%	70.78%
<b>Outcome 4.2:</b> Public institutions are better able to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016.	% of senior public servants trained in leadership and management <b>Baseline:</b> 45% (2010); <b>Target:</b> 70%	65%
	Percentage of aid reported in the national budget <b>Baseline:</b> 55% (2009); <b>Target:</b> 75%	28% (2015)
<b>Outcome 4.3:</b> National institutions advance gender equality and status of women by 2016.	Proportion of women in decision making at all levels {P: Parliament; LC: Local council; CS: Civil service; Ps: Parastatal} <b>Baseline:</b> P: 22% (2009); LC: 8.3% (2000); CS: 23%; Ps: 22% (2010) <b>Target:</b> P: 50%; LC: 20%; CS: 30%; Ps: 25%	P: 16% LC: 11% CS: 30% Ps: 27%
	Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector <b>Baseline:</b> 15% (2006); <b>Target:</b> 20%	30%



Outcome	Indicators	Progress achieved
	Ratio of Girls to Boys in Secondary Education <b>Baseline:</b> 0.79% (2010); <b>Target:</b> 1	1.01
	Gender status index <b>Baseline:</b> 0.639 (2010); <b>Target:</b> 0.75	0.639

**Finding 13: Due to the diversity of the RICE portfolio, some of UNDP's interventions do not particularly fit in the results and monitoring framework**

Before the integration of the country programme into two portfolios, the CPD comprised of four components of which the fourth was 'Governance and Public Sector Management Reform'. Under this component, UNDP had prioritised its support into seven specific areas; (a) access to justice, (b) accountability, (c) electoral support, (d) human rights, and (e) public sector reform, (f) service delivery and decentralisation, and (g) aid effectiveness.

These areas continued to form the basis of UNDP's interventions even after the integration of its country programme with four outcomes merged under the RICE portfolio. However, some of the prioritised areas did not naturally fit together under the revised outcomes. For example, UNDP's priority on human rights is implemented under Outcome 4.1 on democratic governance, which based on closer review of the outcome and output indicators also addresses issues to do with conflict management and peace building; access to justice; decentralisation and public service delivery; rural development; electoral support; gender equality; and aid coordination. At the time of this evaluation, UNDP had nine projects under Outcome 4.1, all very diverse and remotely linked with each other to constitute a coherent thematic strategy and could probably be better addressed as independent outcomes (Box 4).

**Box 4. Outcome 4.1 projects**

Malawi Electoral Cycle Support  
Social Cohesion  
Democratic Consolidation Programme  
Integrated Rural Development and Decentralisation  
Strengthening Political Parties  
Human Rights Support  
Democratic Governance SWAp  
Political Empowerment of Women  
National Identification Registration System

Many stakeholders that were interviewed also noted that the portfolio was too fragmented, with one interviewee saying *'it's as if UNDP is just pushing its donors' agenda without checking how this fits in with its strategic objectives. They (sic) should have the courage to say no, when offered earmarked funds that don't fit with their strategic framework'*.

**4.2.3. Outcome 3.2: Critical enablers for the implementation of the national response enhanced and utilized by 2016.**

The HIV and AIDS cluster was affected at two levels, firstly by revision of the UNDAF in 2013 and also by UNDP's restructuring exercise. Prior to the UNDAF revision, there were four outcomes covering the cluster and addressing prevention, treatment, protection and legislative as separate outcome areas. The UNDAF revision merged them into two outcomes in which prevention and treatment became one outcome, while protection and legislative were also combined. In addition, as UNDP restructured its country programme, HIV and AIDS was moved under the RICE portfolio, which also coincided with the move towards 'delivering as one', whereby implementation was through joint work plans rather than dedicated project documents.

**Finding 14: Despite the revised outcomes and restructuring, UNDP has performed its global mandate on HIV and AIDS**

HIV and AIDS is addressed through a joint programme involving 11 UN agencies, with UNAIDS as the Secretariat and UNDP as the lead agency for Outcome 3.2. UNDP has a dual global mandate for creating an enabling environment for national HIV AIDS response as well as ensuring the human-rights based approach in the national response.

UNDP has continued to perform its global mandate, despite the changes were made in the outcomes. UNDP supported the development of the HIV prevention Control Bill, which at the time of drafting was pending Cabinet approval. Within its second role, UNDP supported mapping of the key population groups, including advocacy for their recognition as social groups, even as some of them such as the lesbians, gay bisexual and transgender groups were considered taboo in Malawi. In that connection, UNDP also championed advocacy among national opinion leaders, including traditional leaders resulting in the 'Chief's Declaration' in support of the ban of harmful traditional practices such as early marriages and female genital mutilation (FGM).

The evaluation noted however that UNDP restructuring also coincided with government restructuring in which the department of Nutrition and HIV was moved from the Office of President and Cabinet (OPC) to the Ministry of Health (MOH). However, the MOH already had two separate and independent departments for Nutrition and HIV respectively, a situation which somewhat diminished clarity as to UNDP's direct counterpart for its interventions. To mitigate this, UNDP leveraged on the joint programme and signed an MOU to channel funding through UNAIDS, which in itself constituted a good practice.

As noted in Figure 5 above, two of the outcome indicators have been achieved while the third has not been measured. It is noteworthy however that there are some clarity issues around the first indicator on the proportion of Government Budget allocated to HIV and AIDS, which was reported as having increased to 14% from 3% in 2011. Stakeholders interviewed observed that the 14% reflected total national funding to HIV and AIDS response, including from non-state actors; and as such could not be strictly considered as 'government budget'. This constitutes a lesson point about the clarity of indicators.

**Output 3.2.1. National institutions have capacity to develop and implement human rights and gender-appropriate HIV and AIDS related legal frameworks, policies, plans and strategies.**

**Finding 15: UNDP support was a catalyst for enhancing government policies on HIV and AIDS**

The draft bill on HIV and AIDS was drafted with technical support from UNDP. Although the draft was still pending Cabinet approval, some stakeholders observed that the bill had created awareness on some of the contentious issues that may need to be addressed to protect the gains that have been so far achieved. One example is the issue of the criminalisation of deliberate or negligent infection, and how this may potentially impact on voluntary testing and protecting the rights of the girl child.

A number of other legislative instruments have also been reviewed, including (i) review of the Prisons Act focusing on such issues as distribution of condoms and allowing spousal visits; (ii) review of the Environment Management Act and Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessments, also focusing on issues such as the social dimensions of large infrastructure development projects on spread and control of HIV.

While all three output indicators were not fully achieved, there has been considerable progress. With regards the first indicator, one legislative instrument was developed against a planned target of two; while on the second indicator, labour inspection reports<sup>30</sup> indicated that 140 public and private sector institutions had HIV and AIDS policies in place, against a planned target of 150. On the third indicator, sectoral reports reviewed indicated that six sector strategies/plans have mainstreamed HIV and AIDS against a planned target of 10 sectoral strategies.

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<sup>30</sup> From UNDAF Evaluation Report, p 73

**Output 3.2.2. Gendered, rights based strategic information generated, accessed and utilized by all stakeholders.**

**Finding 16: Knowledge generation and dissemination of information is not sufficiently documented and its utilisation has not been visible**

Based on interview information, there was insufficient documentation of the extent to which information on HIV and AIDS has been generated and disseminated. Using stigmatisation as a proxy indicator for general knowledge generation and dissemination, stakeholders observed that the stigma index showed signs of improvement; but new signs of stigmatisation were emerging within the general public reflecting a shift in perceptions on the effectiveness of treatment<sup>31</sup>.

These stakeholder observations are also confirmed through analysis of the output indicators. Based on UNDP reports, progress was limited on all three indicators. The first indicator measured the proportion of district councils that utilize strategic information in programme planning and implementation; for which UNDP project performance reported 21% of district councils against a planned target of 80%. This performance also reflects on the implementation capacity and resourcing of district councils as noted on page 29 above. The second indicator reflects on UNDP's performance as provider of technical support. Available data indicates that 10 HIV related studies were supported by the UN system against a planned target of 20 studies. Similarly, there wasn't much effort put on providing capacity building support to district councils as reflected through the third indicator in which 21% of district councils were reported to have staff trained in policy, monitoring, evaluation, and resource tracking in line with the Three Ones against a baseline of 18% and a target of 100%.

**Output 3.2.3. National response is sustainably resourced.**

**Finding 17: The proportion of national funding for HIV and AIDS response increased**

As noted in page 29 above, the proportion of national resources allocated towards HIV response increased from under 3% in 2011 to 14% by 2016. According to stakeholder observations, this is a mandatory requirement of the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (GFATM) of which the MOH is a principle recipient. While this touches on issues of political will and therefore difficult to substantiate, it however raises questions about the sustainability of national resources for HIV response.

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<sup>31</sup> Some stakeholders observed that previously stigmatisation manifested through ridiculing people perceived as infected, now it manifested through ridiculing those perceived as taking anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment

Of the two indicators for this output, only one that tracked whether or not the resource mobilisation strategy was developed had updated data, and it was achieved. The second indicator measured the reduction in the funding gap which was planned to be reduced by 20%. The independent UNDAF evaluation projected that a 5% reduction would have been achieved by 2016, which would be way below the planned target.

**Output 3.2.4. Most vulnerable populations are protected from adverse impacts of HIV and AIDS by 2016.**

Updated data on the output indicators was not available at the time of the evaluation. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that widely held perception that with increased awareness of preventive measures such as use of condoms, combined with effective treatment, the incidence (rate of new infections) of HIV was declining.

*An official GoM<sup>32</sup> report noted “...no recent nationally representative survey has been conducted in Malawi to estimate HIV prevalence. Nevertheless, based on previous survey data, Malawi has a generalized HIV epidemic. HIV prevalence among persons aged 15 to 49 years has been declining steadily from 16.4% in 1999 to 11.8% in 2004 and then 10.6% in 2010. In a previous survey, HIV prevalence was noted to be higher in specific occupational groups such as female sex workers, truck drivers, estate workers, police officers, teachers and female border traders compared with the general population”.*

UNDP has been contributing under output 3.2.1 to promote development of non-discriminatory legislative and policy instruments, but their implementation is the critical element to achieve the intended results. Moreover, as noted earlier, some of these instruments have been delayed due to perceived controversial issues. One example is the question of ‘recruitment testing’ in the uniformed services.

**4.2.4. Outcome 4.1: National institutions foster democratic governance for all, especially children, women, persons with disabilities and the youths by 2016.**

**Finding 18: UNDP lacked coherent thematic strategy to effectively contribute to the expected developmental change**

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<sup>32</sup> Malawi AIDS Response Progress Report 2015

The outcome statement is vague and too broad to provide strategic focus for implementation; and as noted earlier, the interventions were too diverse to constitute a coherent thematic strategy. In addition, the outcome statement suggests a disaggregated and targeting approach, while the indicators do not disaggregate the monitoring framework.

Overall however, UNDP contribution has been most effective and visible in the areas of electoral support, social cohesion/peace building; but less so in decentralisation, public sector reforms and human rights. In the area of electoral support, UNDP supported the harmonisation of electoral laws leading to the successful conduct of the first ever tripartite elections in 2014. UNDP also supported voter education in collaboration with the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE), the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), among others. With regards to social cohesion, one of UNDP's major advocacy achievement was its support towards the signing of peace pact by major political parties as well as establishment of local peace committees.

Based on available documentary data, two of the outcome indicators have been achieved (although the authenticity of one of them is questionable)<sup>33</sup>. The first indicator measured the proportion of the population holding duty bearers accountable. A baseline of 40% was established with a planned target to increase that to 65%. Data provided to the evaluator indicates that the target was achieved with 70% of the population holding duty bearers to account. The second indicator measures the proportion of people (disaggregated by men, women, youth and children) accessing formal justice with a baseline of 10%. UNDP reports that only 15% of the population were accessing formal justice against a planned target of 60%. The data was not disaggregated. With regards to the third indicator, the evidence suggests that voter turnout increased marginally to 70.78% from a baseline of 70%.

#### **Output 4.1.1. Democratic Governance Sector Strategy operationalized**

#### **Finding 19: UNDP support contributed to operationalize the DGSS**

The Democratic Governance sector in Malawi consists of nineteen institutions<sup>34</sup> responsible for the administration of justice and democratic accountability. It cuts across the three arms of

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<sup>33</sup> Since this indicator requires a specific survey to be conducted, the evaluator was unable to verify if indeed such a survey had been conducted. In addition, rather coincidentally, the independent UNDAF mid-term evaluation had projected that 70% would be achieved by 2016.

<sup>34</sup> The Judiciary, National Assembly, Financial Intelligence Unit, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Security, Malawi Police Service, Prison Service, Immigration Department, MoJCA, Directorate of Public Prosecution and State Advocate, the Registrar General, The Administrator General, Legal Aid Department, Human Rights Commission, Malawi Electoral Commission, Anti-corruption Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman, Law Commission, Ministry of Defence and Malawi Defence Force.

government: the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary, and embraces organized civil society and citizen actions in the area of democratic governance. UNDP's flagship programme for this output has been the Democratic Governance Sector Support Program with the MoJCA as lead IP. The programme's main objective was the operationalization of the Democratic Governance Sector Strategy (DGSS) 2013-2017, which seeks to improve service delivery and address systemic challenges facing sector institutions.

UNDP support has been instrumental in enabling the DG SWAp and establishment of a coordination infrastructure, including support to the Secretariat, the SWG, the TWGs and the Sector Coordination Committee. According to the 2015 independent outcome evaluation, the sector approach to reform implementation, including establishment of partnerships and resource mobilization that was taking shape was severely affected by cashgate scandal. Fourteen out of 19 institutions have aligned their strategies to the DGSS, while also the one-stop center approach to services has been successfully piloted at district level.

**Figure 7** provides a snapshot of other notable UNDP contributions through associated projects.

**Figure 7. UNDP contribution to Output 4.1.1**

Project	UNDP contribution
Electoral Cycle Support	Technical support for the harmonization of electoral laws Establishment of Complaints Handling Unit
Strengthening Political Parties	Revised Political Parties Registration and Regulation Bill drafted and endorsed by major political parties; undergoing review by Attorney General Office (AGO) Multi-party Liaison Committees established at district level
Human Rights Support	The Human Rights Commission Act was reviewed; pending Cabinet approval National Human Rights Action Plan was developed Survey on Gender and Human Rights in Malawi was conducted and finalized State Party Reporting is done in responses to issues raised by the Human Rights Committee on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

#### **Output 4.1.2. Capacity of national institutions strengthened for collaborative dialogue to support the establishment and operationalization of the national peace architecture (NPA)**

**Finding 20: Dialogue on the NPA has been started but full implementation has not started due to delays in the establishment of relevant legislative instruments**

UNDP contributed to the development of a five-year strategic plan and draft policy to guide the establishment and operationalization of the NPA, under review by the OPC at the time of drafting. A communication strategy was also developed along with regional consultations involving stakeholders representing a cross section various social groups. However, some activities, including notably, the piloting NPA in three districts, sensitization meetings on NPA Bill and

establishment of District Peace Committees were on hold due to delays in establishment of necessary legislative instruments.

UNDP also supported the PAC to facilitate the signing of the Lilongwe Peace Declaration through shuttle diplomacy, resulting in all 12 presidential candidates in the 2014 tripartite elections, signing a pact committing to peace before, during and after the elections. The process was gender sensitive and aligned with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which advocates for women participation in peace and security. The NPA policy stipulates that its membership should comprise fifteen members, with equal representation of women and men (6 each) and two youth representatives who should also be male and female, as well as one person with disability. The policy further provides that at least seven of the members shall be women at all levels.

Fourteen PAC leaders (10 Men and 4 Women) were undertook mediation training with simulated election-related scenarios; and 29 women were trained in basic peace building and conflict transformation skills. A network of 'women in faith' was established resulting in the formation of three regional teams of Women in Faith Peace networks. Some of the network members were subsequently included in the six member-core national mediation team, in which two of them were women. Some stakeholders noted the effectiveness of women in mediation and as peace builders, with one of them adding that *"one of the women mediators was subsequently appointed as Malawi Ambassador abroad"*.

UNDP also supported training of 35 journalists in conflict and gender sensitive reporting as well as development of guidelines for media houses and journalists in conflict and gender sensitive reporting; and Traditional Chiefs training in Conflict Management. Based on the output indicators however, UNDP's performance was below expectations. The first indicator measured the number of districts piloting early conflict warning early response teams, with a planned target of 5 and achievement in three districts. The second indicator aimed to achieve a total raise women's participation in conflict mediation and dialogue initiatives at the national level to 20% but the achievement was only 10%. The third indicator measured the number of media houses adopting conflict sensitive reporting guidelines, with planned target of 8, while only three media houses adopted the guidelines.

**Output 4.1.3. Local governance structures strengthened in participatory planning, budgeting and managing integrated rural development.**



**Finding 21: The pace of government reforms towards devolution has been very slow and raising doubts about its commitment for decentralisation**

Although the MGDS II placed IRD and decentralisation as one of the nine KPAs, previous attempts to establish an IRD framework at district level dating back as early as the seventies and the eighties have not been successful. One of the output indicators attempts to measure government's commitment for decentralisation by tracking the percentage of 'net Government Revenues allocated to the District Councils through the General Resource Fund'. The baseline was established at one percent and a planned target set at 5%.

During the FY 2015/16 the national budget allocated 5 billion MWK of the Development Budget to district councils; which UNDP reported as a 3% increase. Although this is still very modest, it is noteworthy that previous councils received almost no development grants, which limited their ability to provide services and implement development plans. However, some progress is being made at the upstream level, with reforms of the Local Government Act and Chiefs Act having undergone stakeholder consultations, including a two-day workshop supported by PAC; while the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MoLGRD) was working on draft bill.

Anecdotal evidence suggests however that there is a degree of donor fatigue emerging around government's decentralisation agenda, with some stakeholders noting that government has not demonstrated its full commitment as evidence by the slow pace of the reforms. The IRD strategy has been under development since 2010, and as at the time of this evaluation, the strategy had just been completed but still pending Cabinet approval.

With regards to capacity development of local governance structures, UNDP facilitated a study tour to Tanzania by staff from the MoLGRD. The 2015 independent outcome evaluation observed that the study tour had *"...induced a new level of confidence of key MoLGRD officials about the ramifications of the IRD concept"*.<sup>35</sup>

**4.2.5. Outcome 4.2. Public institutions are better able to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016.**

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<sup>35</sup> Mid-term Evaluation: outcome 4.1; December 2015, p 74

**Finding 22: UNDP contributed to strengthen public accountability in the delivery of public services**

UNDP's main focus for Outcome 4.2 was to support government's agenda for reform of the public service; and public finance and economic management (PFEM); as well as strengthening RBM and effective aid management. UNDP's support for government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) to sign a performance compact at the highest level promotes transparency and accountability in public service delivery. However, at the time of this evaluation, progress was limited with regards to establishment of service charters and performance standards for the targeted institutions, including health and agriculture.

As a key partners under the flagship joint programme – Development Effectiveness and Accountability Programme (DEAP), UNDP was instrumental in supporting key components for the Government's continued focus and implementation of critical reforms. Although the results of these reforms had not yet started to be felt at the impact level in terms of improved access and quality of public services, the programme created a foundation for national institutions to become more results-oriented, and improve the synergies between planning, M&E and aid management functions.

Most stakeholders interviewed acknowledged UNDP's contribution as critical, noting that UNDP technical support for placing a Technical Advisor in the Ministry of Finance had enhanced implementation coordination for the SWG. However, some stakeholders also noted that the strategy was too ambitious and may face sustainability challenges due to inadequate government commitment as well as an overly advanced expected outcome which was beyond the current capacity of the government to implement (Box 5). None the less, UNDP was working in close collaboration with key MDAs, including the OPC – Performance Enforcement Department – which is important to ensure that the programme outputs are enforced at the highest level. For example, the new performance contract system developed to replace the Organisational Performance Agreement involves the Principal Secretaries of respective line Ministries counter-signing a performance contract with the Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, while also the respective Minister countersigns the contract with the President. At the time of the evaluation, a total of 26 MDAs had signed their performance contracts, and plans were underway to roll it out to all 81 MDAs as well to local district level.

**Box 5. Programme-Based Budgeting**

Some stakeholders observed that replacing output-based budgeting system with the more advanced programme-based budgeting was too ambitious for Malawi's current development situation

### Output 4.2.1. Capacity for public sector management strengthened for effective service delivery

#### **Finding 23: UNDP contributed to strengthen public sector management capacity**

UNDP support for achieving the output centered on implementation of the Public Service Capacity Development Programme (PSCDP) in collaboration with the Public Sector Reforms Management Unit in OPC. From the onset however, it is noteworthy that one of the two indicators for the output is essentially at activity level – functional Public Administration SWG – which does not enable UNDP to measure its developmental results. The PA SWG was however established and functioning, although the 2015 independent outcome evaluation noted that ‘the group is yet to begin working using the model of SWG’<sup>36</sup>. The second indicator was much more appropriate, measuring the number of MDAs delivering at least 60% of their organizational performance agreements targets, whose planned target of 60% was reported as achieved.

At upstream level, UNDP contributed to the review of the Public Service Act (1994) and development of the National Capacity Development Strategy, Action and Financing Plan; development and adoption of gender-sensitive recruitment guidelines; and the establishment and operationalisation of the Public Administration Sector Wide Approach (PA-SWAp). However, at the time of this evaluation, the revised Public Service Act was yet to be enacted by Parliament. With respect to ‘Leadership, Management and Public Service Ethics and Integrity’, the evaluation was informed that capacity development was stopped in the lead up to the 2014 elections and was never re-started.

The Government developed and launched the Public Service Code of Conduct and Ethics in 2013 as well as the Malawi Public Service Charter whose primary aim is to ensure that holders of public offices are accountable. However, the cashgate scandal has cast doubts as to the efficacy of the training. The independent outcome evaluation also made an interesting observation which talks to how UNDP should approach ‘theory of change’ practice in the future (see below).

“...the way the trainings were executed, particularly the sessions that targeted staff cadres below the level of Principal Secretaries, were inspired by the assumption that public employees were not aware of ethics and that, if they were made aware, the looting of public resources would have been stopped. For example, the indicator for success of the trainings was the number of public employees trained that would no longer get involved in financial misappropriation. Interviews with senior civil servants indicate that people are aware of the ethical and professional requirements and that unethical behaviour proliferates simply

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<sup>36</sup> Mid-term evaluation of Outcome 4.2 p 24

because the oversight institutions, rules, regulations and procedures are not robust and deterrent enough to prevent the temptations that resulted in the scandal”.

#### **Output 4.2.2. Public institutions utilize RBM systems for planning, monitoring and evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results**

##### **Finding 24: RBM and in particular national M&E system is still generally weak and does not effectively measure developmental results**

The planned output indicators were very much activity oriented and do not provide useful insights about the developmental changes taking place as a result of UNDP supported interventions. It is however noteworthy that almost all stakeholders interviewed generally alluded to weak M&E systems. In particular, the independent outcome evaluation also observed that *“...the links between the inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts are often unclear and in some cases not well thought through. Consequently, the M&E Matrix is not very helpful in systematically tracking performance, generally, and results-based performance, in particular (page 37)”*.

The outcome evaluation also quoted a 2014 Government report, which says *“...Efforts to strengthen and consolidate M&E as a key tool for accountability and evidence based planning and management appears to have had only limited results. The incentives to produce and the demand for quality M&E have been insufficient and more realism is required on the political economy context for data utilization.”*<sup>37</sup>

#### **Output 4.2.3. Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance**

##### **Finding 25: Government capacity in aid management has been enhanced**

UNDP has supported the preparation of the Development Cooperation Strategy (DCS) 2014-2018. In June 2016, UNDP also facilitated the 2<sup>nd</sup> High Level Forum on Development Effectiveness (HLF2), which brought together government, development partners, civil society, academia, private sector and youth to deliberate on breaking the cycle of food insecurity in Malawi in response to the Declaration of State of the National Disaster. This culminated with development of a five-year Action Plan on how Malawi can build resilience.

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<sup>37</sup> Mid-term evaluation of Outcome 4.2 (page 42) from M&E Division, State of M&E in Malawi: A Report to put Monitoring and Evaluation in the Driving Seat of Malawi's Development Agenda, Lilongwe, Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning & Development, December 2014, p. 11.

UNDP also supported government to develop and publish the Malawi Development Cooperation Atlas covering three financial years from 2012/13 – 2014/15. The Atlas provides for and enhances transparency in how much development aid is being received and how it is utilised. In addition UNDP supported the development of a web-based Aid Management Platform (AMP) that tracks foreign aid and debt commitments and disbursements, thereby enabling all partners to track and share information on aid-funded activities. Government also added, with support from UNDP, a geo-coding initiative to the AMP that allows for tracking of the geographic location of all aid activities in the AMP. Besides providing enhanced transparency in resource application, this feature also gives a visual geographic funding gap at the sub-national levels.

The most relevant indicator for the output measured the proportion of development aid reported through the national budget. UNDP reported that 61% of development aid was reported against a target of 85% from a baseline of 40%.

#### **Output 4.2.4. National institutions have the capacity to align policies, programmes and budgets with national development strategies and the MDGs**

##### **Finding 26: Progress has been slow due to slow pace of related key result areas**

This output focused on ensuring effective alignment between policies, programmes and budgets with the MGDS, and in particular aligning the budget with the key planning tools - the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) and District Development Plans (DDP).

UNDP support has provided support through the DEAP joint programme, but the pace of results has been slow. Firstly, there has been slow progress towards programme-based budgeting as noted earlier in page 38 above; and secondly the district development plans have largely remained unfunded due also to the slow progress with regards to decentralisation.

Some stakeholders interviewed observed that budgetary resource allocations and development work plans were not directly speaking to the aspirations expressed in the MDGs, mainly due to lack of skills in planning for MDGs. In 2013, UNDP had supported a training needs assessment for the ministries of Health, Education, Energy, Local Government and Rural Development, Gender, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, but the follow up training was not done.

#### 4.2.6. Outcome 4.3: National institutions advance gender equality and status of women

**Finding 27: Although UNDP is contributing at the normative level, evidence suggests limited progress leading to improvement of status of women in Malawi.**

There is evidence that UNDP support in collaboration with other partners has been effective with regards to changes in gender equality at the policy level. In particular UNDP support facilitated Malawi to submit its 2016 national reports – Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Status of Women (CSW). UNDP also supported the simplification of national laws on gender equality, including translation into local languages as well as printing and distribution of the Gender Equality Act at district level.

Some notable achievements facilitated with UNDP support include engagement of faith-based women's organisations in gender equality work, including advocacy on Marriages and Divorce Laws. UNDP advocacy support also facilitated the Ministry to engage with traditional leaders, focusing specifically on the Marriage, Divorce and Family Act; and as noted earlier, one of the traditional leaders actually annulled the marriage of an under-age girl. A Community Victims Support Unit was established to promote and protect women and girls against domestic and gender-based violence (GBV). UNDP also contributed to enhance women's participation in peace building in the context of UNSCR 1325.

In the areas of participation in leadership however, the numbers of women parliamentarians actually decreased in the 2014 elections. Stakeholders noted that UNDP support at the grass root level was minimal, with no follow up on several interventions. For example, they observed that UNDP had supported women candidates to campaign for the 2014 elections, but had stopped that support after the elections, instead of continuing to nurture and prepare them for the next elections.

The outcome had 4 indicators, all of which show limited progress, except for the indicator on girls' education (Box 7). Gender has not been visibly and effectively mainstreamed across other UNDP supported outcome areas, which is critical element towards achieving the gender equality and women's empowerment objective. Indeed, the independent outcome 4.3 evaluation

<b>Box 6. Outcome 4.3 Indicators</b>		
Proportion of women in decision making at all levels	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Current</b>
	Parliament: 22%	16%
	Local council: 8%	11%
	Civil service: 23%	30%
Share of women in non-agriculture wage employment	Parastatal: 22%	27%
	15% (2006)	30%
Ratio of Girls/Boys in secondary education	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Current</b>
	0.79 (2010)	1.01
Gender Status Index	0.639 (2010)	0.639

similarly observed that “...the CO sought to mainstream gender in its CP through a stand-alone outcome which was very strategic to address special interventions for creating fundamental structural changes in institutions, policies and legislation. However, CO’s efforts are not uniform in strength across the other outcomes. Projects and programmes contributing to various outcomes depict un-even level of gender mainstreaming with a majority projects ad hoc and after thought in mainstreaming gender”.

#### **Output 4.3.1. Government capacity to integrate gender in prioritized sectors enhanced**

##### **Finding 28: Gender has not been effectively mainstreamed in all sectors**

Since UNDP support has mainly been delivered through government-led coordination platforms, a good starting point for assessing gender mainstreaming is in the SWApS in which UNDP was active, including the DG SWAp, TIP SWAp and the Gender, Youth and Sports Joint Sector Strategic Plan (JSSP). Based on documented evidence, gender was not effectively mainstreamed in any of these. The independent Outcome 4.3 evaluation noted that the draft Joint Sector plan for TIP SWAp prepared in 2014 did not include any gender analysis or priority actions. The report also notes that while there was good gender analysis in the DG policy framework, majority of UNDP interventions contributing towards DG outputs were generally weak in terms of gender mainstreaming. The Democratic Governance Sector Strategy 2013-2017 was specifically singled out as having a total of 32 indicators out of which only one was gender sensitive “relevant electoral laws engendered”.

#### **Output 4.3.2. Women have the capacity and benefit from an enabling environment to claim and exercise their right to participate in decision making in public and private sectors**

##### **Finding 29: Progress has been slow due to slow pace of related key result areas**

It is logical to assume that this output was specifically developed with a view to increasing women’s representation in parliament in the 2014 elections. However, despite great effort and resources towards that outcome, the number of women was not only below the minimum 50:50 representation, it also declined from previous levels. However, in collaboration with UN Women, UNDP support enhanced awareness and capacity of women to run as candidates; and 11 out of the 12 major political parties signed a communiqué on strategies to promote women’s political participation in 2014 elections.

In terms of the output indicators, the first indicator measuring the number of political parties participating in the 2014 election with quotas for women was not achieved; only two parties had such quotas against a planned target of four. The second indicator was about increasing the

proportion of women holding senior positions in the Civil Service. The target of 50% was not achieved, with the number of senior women civil servants increasing from 20% in 2010 to 30% as of this evaluation. The third indicator measured the proportion of women in Parliament which actually declined from 22.3% in 2010 to 16% after the 2014 elections.

#### **Output 4.3.3. Advocacy for effective response to key gender issues enhanced**

##### **Finding 30: Institutional capacity for the national gender machinery was still weak**

There was a lot of advocacy work undertaken with good results especially at upstream level, and in particular with regards to traditional leaders and women in faith. However, implementation capacity was still weak and the national gender machinery did not have the capacity to lobby for enforcement and implementation of laws. Many stakeholders interviewed generally observed that despite the existence of favourable laws, the status of women, particularly the most vulnerable women – less educated, no economic resources - had not changed significantly due to lack of enforcement.

The independent outcome evaluation also noted that UNDP and its partner UN agencies had supported various stop-gap measures to enhance capacity of the Ministry, including supporting international gender experts and national technical experts on Political Empowerment of Women and Economic Empowerment of Women. *“...However, these are only short time measures. Long term commitment to staffing will have to come from the Government reducing the vacancy rate in the Ministry which at the moment stands at 50%. Frequent turnover of staff hampered effective skills transfer by the international gender advisors who have since left the Ministry”* (page 32).

The first of the two output indicators measuring the number of gender related laws revised to promote gender equality was surpassed; with 6 laws revised against a planned target of three. Updated data for the second indicator was not available at the time of drafting.



### Evaluator's Assessment on Performance of the RICE Portfolio

	Narrative	Rating
<b>Outcome 3.2. Critical enablers for the implementation of the national response enhanced and utilized by 2016</b>	UNDP performed its global mandate for creating an enabling environment and ensuring the human-rights based approach in the national HIV response. Resource allocations increased, but capacity development at district level was lower than expected. UNDP was catalytic in creating dialogue and inclusion for the most-at-risk population groups.	
<b>Outcome 4.1. National institutions foster democratic governance for all, especially children, women, persons with disabilities and the youths by 2016.</b>	This outcome was too diverse and therefore lacked coherent strategy. UNDP contributed in electoral support, social cohesion and peace building, but expected results in public sector reforms, human rights and decentralisation were not achieved. Although the DG SWAp is functional, government has been slow to operationalize outputs, such as the NPA.	
<b>Outcome 4.2. Public institutions are better able to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016</b>	While the flagship DEAP programme has achieved some of its intended outputs, the overall public sector reforms are yet to demonstrate impact in terms of improved service delivery and accountability.	
<b>Outcome 4.3. National institutions advance gender equality and status of women</b>	The overall development change in the situation of women has not progressed although some normative outputs were achieved. Advocacy has facilitated support of traditional leaders for gender equality, and women's participation in peace processes. Mainstreaming in projects has however been weak, as has been capacitation of the national gender machinery.	

### 4.3. Findings on the Efficiency of the Country Programme

This section contains the evaluation findings on the relevance of the CP. In this regard, efficiency relates to UNDP's utilisation of resources, including the manner in which resources were converted into outputs; whether or not there were appropriate synergies between interventions; the effectiveness of UNDP's partnerships; and the effectiveness of UNDP's M&E system to inform management decision-making and accountability.

#### **Finding 31: CO delivery was below the minimum corporate threshold but has been improving during the last two years**

The minimum delivery threshold for country offices established by UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa is 85%. Based on CO reports, the delivery rate for the first 4 years from 2012 to 2015 was 73%, which is below the minimum threshold (**Figure 8**). Delivery was low during the first two years

of CP implementation but picked up in 2014 and 2015, actually surpassing the minimum threshold in those years. Going forward, the challenge is about maintaining the momentum; and also strengthening resource mobilisation efforts to move to scale on intervention areas.

**Figure 8. Budget and Expenditures, 2012-2015**

	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Planned Budget \$</b>	11,324,575	16,588,937	21,045,136	12,808,194
<b>Expenditure \$</b>	6,466,205	9,950,295	18,368,475	11,659,188
<b>Delivery %</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>91</b>

Source: 2016 – 2017 Resource Mobilization Action Plan

At outcome level, UNDP allocated over half of its total resources to the democratic governance sector, which reflects its perceptions about its own comparative advantage (**Figure 9**). However, when one looks at donor resources relative to UNDP's core resources within the democratic governance sector, donors funded 72% of outcome 4.1 interventions compared to just 30% for outcomes 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. This was due largely to the funding provided for support to the 2014 elections, but also reflects donors' perceptions and underscores UNDP's comparative advantages, specifically in the area of electoral support.

**Figure 9. UNDP expenditure by outcome (2012 – 2015)**


	UNDP Expenditure			% of Total
	Trac (\$)	Other (\$)	Total (\$)	
Outcome 1.2	8,513,531	10,596,864	19,110,395	24.1
Outcome 1.3	1,563,457	4,636,184	6,199,642	7.8
Outcome 3.2	3,341,504	3,629,256	6,970,759	8.8
Outcome 4.1	8,525,363	21,174,224	29,699,587	37.4
Outcome 4.2	6,887,017	3,808,836	10,695,853	13.5
Outcome 4.3	4,504,448	2,260,091	6,764,539	8.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>33,335,320</b>	<b>46,105,455</b>	<b>79,440,775</b>	

Source: UNDP


In most of the interventions UNDP was using the national implementation modality, whereby the advance disbursements were made quarterly against the planned work plan and submission of expenditure reports. The majority of IPs interviewed, highlighted that most of the interventions were characterised by delayed fund disbursements. Some of them observed that disbursement delays were most common during the first quarter where funding could sometimes be delayed by as much as 6-8 weeks. Given that the IPs also needed a certain amount of lead time in order to

prepare and put in motion their activities, the delays often meant that there was no delivery during the first quarter.

During the IP review meetings attended by this evaluator, one of the most frequently mentioned challenges by majority of the IPs was disbursement delays. For example, the DEAP programme, which is one of UNDP's flagship projects reported four major challenges, all of which were exclusively about funding and disbursement delays (Box 7).



### CHALLENGES



- HIGH LEVEL LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE TO START FORMULATING THE MGDS III AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION.
- INADEQUATE RESOURCES TO UNDERTAKE COMPREHENSIVE PBB TRAINING FOR ALL KEY STAKEHOLDERS ESPECIALLY PARLIAMENT
- DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO SDGS
- DELAYS IN APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATORS CAUSED RESCHEDULING OF KEY ACTIVITIES

**Box 7. IP review presentation - DEAP**

The independent UNDAF evaluation also made similar observations, noting that: *"Sometimes such delays may be caused by irregularities in project management and accountings, other times it might be caused by delays in funds (sic) disbursements. The MTE team got the impression that both factors cause delays in funds disbursements. Some projects are quite capable of doing proper financial management and cannot be blamed for delays. Other projects, e.g. the MHRC support project with its multiple funding sources, attract audit comments, which then need to be complied with before new disbursements can be released"*.

UNDP management also observed that in a limited number of cases, receipt of project funds by IPs was delayed due to extended holding time at the Reserve Bank of Malawi. UNDP had started to address the issue through an MOU with banking service providers.

**Finding 32: Implementation through joint work plans has strengthened joint planning but has not reduced transaction costs for partners**

The UNCT decided to develop a joint UNDAF Action Plan in line with the principle of 'Delivering as One'. Consequently, UNDP ceased to apply independent project documents, and adopted a joint work plan approach in 2013. This approach enhances government's ownership and leadership of projects. This evaluator observed during the IP review meetings that government counterparts were very actively engaged and appeared to be fully in control of project processes. However, many stakeholders interviewed, including both government and civil society partners, noted that the exercise of national ownership and leadership was more theoretical than practical.

Many government counterparts observed that they were not engaged in the development of projects from the onset. In most cases, UNDP developed project concept notes and proposals independently, which was used for resource mobilisation. Only after resources have been

guaranteed by donors would UNDP then approach the national counterpart with information on the proposed project. However, it is also noteworthy that government has high staff turnover, which often means few staff are in place long enough to cover the full cycle from the time a concept note is prepared to when funding is confirmed and implementation commences.

On the other hand, UNDP partners within the UN family also noted that the change from project documents to joint work plans did not really constitute a substantial change in how business was conducted. In practice, each UN agency developed its work plan independently, which was then brought together at some point to be compiled into a 'joint' work plan'. For government counterparts, this was seen as an increase in transaction costs manifesting through large number of meetings and reporting requirements, particularly in cases where they had to implement several interventions with different UN agencies. One of the interviewees observed that *'joint work plans only facilitated better coordination, but not necessarily joint planning or joint delivery'*.

Another observation about joint work plans was that it also somehow affected delivery efficiency. This is because disbursement are usually conditional after achieving a certain threshold; so even when funds from one funding agency have been delivered 100%, but the combined delivery is below the threshold, the IP would not be able to request the next advance.

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#### Evaluator's Assessment on Implementation Efficiency

	Narrative	Rating
<b>Resource mobilisation and delivery</b>	While the overall delivery rate has been below the corporate threshold, there has been improved performance during the last two consecutive years. Resource mobilisation has also been below expectations, and may need to be strengthened in light of recent improvement in delivery rate.	
<b>Partnerships and synergies</b>	Although UNDP is highly regarded for its coordination role, its partnership has not been driven by its strategic priorities. Many interventions appear to have been 'donor' driven, resulting in a highly fragmented portfolio.	
<b>Implementation management</b>	Some progress has been achieved partly due to the improved UN DaO environment as well as through the Joint Work Planning process.	

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#### 4.4. Findings on the Sustainability of the Country Programme Interventions

This section addresses the question about whether or not UNDP supported interventions are likely to continue after termination of funding.

**Finding 33: Although many UNDP supported results are likely to continue after the end of funding, their contribution to sustainable development is at risk**

As noted throughout the analysis, many UNDP supported interventions delivered first level outputs such as revision of policies and legislative instruments. If sustainability is considered strictly in terms of those outputs, there is clear likelihood that these products will continue even after the end of project funding. Many of the projects, including some flagship projects such as DEAP, SQAM, Climate Change and others all produced expected upstream results in reviewed legislation and establishment of policy and strategy frameworks. The evaluation also noted that most implementation was embedded within existing national structures and institutions. All these factors are critical to sustainability of UNDP supported processes and results.

Many stakeholders interviewed noted however that most UNDP interventions did not have clear exit strategies outlining a sustainability plan. The independent evaluation of the Malawi Human Rights Support project noted for example that “...the project document didn’t provide for any specific exit strategy which would have helped in envisioning the way forward should the Development Partners stop supporting such projects yet there is still need for addressing the human rights situation in Malawi coupled with inadequate government support and institutional and organisational capacity challenges.”<sup>38</sup>

At the more strategic level however, the UN defines sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. From this perspective therefore, the key question is about whether UNDP has contributed to put Malawi on the path towards sustainable development. It is noteworthy that many stakeholders including from government and civil society, were quite sceptical. Many of them said that there was no visible development change in all the outcome areas.

In the area of ENR and CC, they observed that so much has been done for many years; but the problems continued to persist; deforestation and land degradation was increasing despite all the interventions and resources that have been poured in; and more and more communities seem to

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<sup>38</sup> End of term evaluation: Malawi Human Rights Support Project, p 10

be regressing into further vulnerability. In the area of democratic governance, transparency and accountability was not seen to be improving; and human rights are not getting better. The same was also observed for gender equality – many outputs delivered, especially normative such as CEDAW reporting, CSW issues in terms of policies – Gender Equality Act was simplified and translated into local languages; but the country is still not where it wants to be, GBV is not getting better, and women continued to bear a disproportionate burden of poverty.

This evaluator acknowledges that the issues outlined above are not specific to UNDP, nor indeed to the wider development community. A large part of it is about government's capacity and commitment to manage the socio-economic dynamics that influence growth and development progress in Malawi. Nonetheless, these observations also challenge UNDP to do some introspection to see how and where it can be truly catalytic in supporting the GoM to turnaround from stalled development progress. Long term sustainability of the country programme implies that UNDP should undertake a more comprehensive review of its strategies to identify truly transformational interventions that will have a lasting impact on the development landscape in Malawi.

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#### Evaluator's Assessment on Sustainability

	Narrative	Rating
Exit strategy and sustainability planning	While UNDP's output-level results were likely to be sustainable due to their nature as upstream policy instruments, there was lack of clear sustainability planning to ensure long-term developmental sustainability.	

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## 5. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1. Conclusions

Although UNDP has delivered most of the normative outputs, including support for development and review of policies and legislative frameworks, it has generally had limited overall impact in terms of developmental change. The causes for this are varied, with some of them internal to UNDP while other factors were also external. For example, the policy setting in Malawi is generally characterised by very slow progress – there are several examples of bills that have been in draft form for several years, sometimes dating back to 2012 and 2013<sup>39</sup>. Thus most of the normative outputs could very well be drafts that have not started implementation, and therefore cannot have demonstrable impact as yet.

On the other hand however, the CP also lacked coherent theory of change and clear thematic strategies. Many interventions, even some that fell under a common outcome were sometimes very diverse and did not have cumulative effect on the expected outcomes. In addition, UNDP needs to strengthen its capability to manage for development results by reviewing its implementation modalities, reporting regimes, implementation arrangements through multiple partners, and governance structures for its programming. The M&E framework generally falls short of measuring UNDP's contribution to development changes, with most indicators measuring first-level outputs such as number of trainings undertaken, or number of policies developed; instead of focusing on longer-term developmental outcomes arising from the implementation of policies.

Consequent to the foregoing, stakeholders, including notably, non-state national actors, were quite skeptical about the developmental impact of the strategies that have been pursued by government and its development partners. Many of them observed, as noted earlier, that so much has been done for many years; but the country's development challenges have not changed.

Clearly, the country faces huge challenges that have limited the pace of its development. These challenges include a population growth that is higher than economic growth rate, lack of market-based livelihood opportunities that is underpinned by low levels of education, low institutional capacity and slow technology adoption. These are further compounded by fiscal pressures due to declining external budget support as well as low domestic revenues. Looking at it from this perspective, UNDP's could consider to reposition itself by focusing on three central issues: (a) as the government continues efforts to regain its credibility among Development Partners, UNDP is in good standing to create enabling environment for engagement; (b) ensuring inclusive and

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<sup>39</sup> Based on additional information availed to the evaluator, the Land and Energy Bill were 15 and 10 years old respectively. This further illustrates the extent of legislative and regulatory reforms required to move forward.

equitable access to development opportunities by facilitating the participation of disadvantaged groups, and promoting the spirit of 'leave no one behind', and (c) to support the country to realise the values and norms established by international conventions and treaties by leveraging its comparative advantage as a trusted partner by both government and non-state actors.

## 5.2. Lessons learnt

The preceding summary of conclusion revealed a number of noteworthy emerging lessons that can inform and strengthen future programming and results achievement.

Firstly, the analysis shows that despite UNDP's achieving many of its intended results at the output level, desired developmental changes at outcome level remain elusive. There are two specific issues associated with this finding, which constitute important learning points.

- 1) Many of the projects and interventions falling under one outcome were too diverse and did not constitute a coherent thematic strategy. This also manifests itself through disjointed indicators that did not reflect a causal association between activities, indicators and outputs. The key lesson is about developing and defining a logical theory of change model to inform and guide planning and formulation of interventions. Any intervention that falls outside the overarching strategic framework as defined by the theory of change should not be taken on; or at the very least should not be integrated into the existing programme portfolio.
- 2) The second associated issue is that too many interventions with limited scale may not necessarily add up to expected developmental outcomes. Given the development context in Malawi, it goes without saying that all and any intervention that may be planned may very well be important and useful; but the question is whether those interventions will trigger sustainable developmental results.

The analysis also revealed a general high regard of UNDP's normative contribution by its partners. On the other hand, some of the outcome areas had received rather limited cost-sharing resources, with UNDP providing the larger proportion of its core resources in a number of outcomes. These observations also give rise to the following two associated learning points.

- 3) Firstly, UNDP has distinct comparative advantage in normative work. However, to enhance its strategic impact, there is a need for UNDP to do a comprehensive environmental scan to determine where exactly it brings value-addition for its partners. Other actors may have better leverage and competitive advantages in some areas such as public financial management, for example, where the WB is the clear leader.



- 4) Partnership should not only be seen in the context of resource mobilisation, but also in terms of leveraging partner results in order to achieve better up scaling and sustainability. This is the context in which transformational impact is achieved – not in isolation, but as part of comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies a niche within the wider contribution of the other actors.

The analysis revealed that many stakeholders viewed UNDP as good in starting interventions but not following through sufficiently to sustain impact. Some development partners noted that they had been continuously involved in specific interventions for periods up to 10 years, and therefore they were able to demonstrate their long term impact. UNDP on the other hand has a rather short programme cycle, which often changes every five years with development of successive CPDs. A key lesson also emerges:

- 5) Sustainable development is about ensuring continued flow of programme benefits. Given UNDP's operational reality, the need for well-defined exit strategies and sustainability planning could not be over-emphasised.

### **5.3. Recommendations**

As noted above, overall UNDP performance has been mixed across its outcome areas. While some output-level results were achieved, they did not seem to have had the desired developmental impact at outcome level. In that connection therefore, the first four recommendations propose actions for UNDP's consideration to improve its strategic impact, while the other six recommendations propose actions for improving operational performance and effectiveness.

#### **A. Strategic- level Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1.** UNDP should undertake a comprehensive review of its comparative advantage in the context of other development actors, including state and non-state actors, in order to identify strategies and interventions that will have a transformational impact on the development landscape in Malawi. This strategy should reflect UNDP's corporate objectives based on the Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017; as well as the central theme for Agenda 2030 of 'leaving no one behind'.

**Recommendation 2.** The UNCT decided to extend the UNDAF for two years in order to align with the national development planning cycle. UNDP should use this opportunity to explore new approaches and develop new business lines. This should include identifying and developing new partnerships, including exploring ways of engaging with non-traditional donors. In addition, UNDP

should use this opportunity to enable its restructured portfolios to develop their respective portfolio strategies as foundation for the future CPD with specific emphasis on resilience-building and strengthening government implementation capacity at all levels.

**Recommendation 3.** While the restructuring of its programme units into two portfolios was a move in the right direction, UNDP should reduce fragmented project approaches towards more programmatic delivery models. This will entail focused development of a clear and strategic theory of change model; as well as continuously evaluating all proposed interventions against this overarching strategy. Stated differently, this also means that UNDP should have the courage to say no to any earmarked resources that do not fit into the overall framework of its programme framework and strategy.

**Recommendation 4.** As observed throughout the foregoing analysis, UNDP has been more effective in its normative work, particularly in advocacy for Malawi to adopt and implement its international obligations. In addition, most of its partners also recognise UNDP's comparative advantage in upstream-level work, establishing systems and policy frameworks. UNDP should focus its interventions at that level, including strengthening implementation capacity at sub-national level. UNDP should also consider ways to strengthen its partnerships, particularly with non-state actors in order to assure implementation and ownership of its upstream policies at downstream level. This approach ensures that UNDP can do what it does best, while also adding value for its partners.

## **B. Operational-level Recommendations**

**Recommendation 5.** UNDP should enhance the application of its core programming principles by ensuring that all principles are adequately and effectively mainstreamed across all programme interventions. Even in instances where there are specific projects that address core programming principles, such as human rights and gender equality, they should still be mainstreamed across all programmes.

**Recommendation 6.** While national implementation has been applied in the majority of interventions, UNDP should encourage more national ownership and leadership of its programme and implementation processes. This also entails reviewing management support to IPs, as well as bringing them on board early enough during the design of proposals to enhance participatory approaches, both as a capacity building tool as well as to promote sustainability through stronger ownership and leadership.

**Recommendation 7.** While focusing on normative role to support the development of national systems, policies and tools, UNDP should strengthen the component of **institutional** capacity-building in addition to individual skills. The secondment of technical advisors is a particularly good practice for knowledge transfer, including at the decentralised district levels. In addition, this entails strengthening advocacy and strategic partnership with civil society to create awareness of existing policies with the objective of strengthening demand-side capacity for implementation of policies as well as up scaling of catalytic interventions to achieve greater impact.

**Recommendation 8.** In order to enhance its accountability and also to show case its added value, UNDP should invest in strengthening capacities of its staff in RBM. This also has direct linkages to its resource mobilisation strategy, and will further enhance its visibility and positioning as a neutral and trusted partner among stakeholders.

**Recommendation 9.** In line with its push towards increased delivery, the CO should also strengthen its capacity for resource mobilisation to ensure that required resources are available at an early stage. This will also further minimise the tendency towards accepting earmarked funding for interventions that are misaligned with its strategic framework.

**Recommendation 10.** By their nature, upstream level results tend to be self-sustaining in that legal instruments and policies continue to exist beyond the lifetime of the projects that supported their development. However, the implementation of those policies and frameworks are usually embedded in political will, commitment and institutional capacity, including budgetary resources. UNDP should therefore ensure that it develops and integrates specific exit and sustainability strategies in all its programming documents as a standard rule.

## **ANNEX 1. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

1. UNDP Country Programme Document 2012 - 2016
2. Malawi UNDAF 2012 – 2016
3. Malawi Growth and Development Strategy II
4. AfDB Malawi Country Strategy Paper (2013 – 2017)
5. UNDP Malawi Resource Mobilisation Action Plan 2016 – 2017
6. Annual Review of the Private Sector Development Programme
7. Mid-Year Progress Report of the DEAP Project, August 2016
8. Final Report: Malawi Capacity Development Review; May 2016
9. Final Report: Mid-term Evaluation of UNDAF Outcome 4.1; December 2015
10. Final Report: Mid-term Evaluation of UNDAF Outcome 4.2; July 2015
11. Final Report: End of Term Evaluation of Malawi Human Rights Support Project; September, 2016
12. Final Report: Mid-term Evaluation of UNDAF Outcome 3.2; July 2015
13. Final Report: Mid-term Evaluation of UNDAF Outcome 1.2; December 2015
14. Final Report: Evaluation of Sustainable Land Management in the Shire River Basin; April 2016
15. Final Report: Mid-term Evaluation of SQAM Project ; April 2015
16. Final Report: Evaluation of UNDAF 2012 -2016; May 2015
17. Malawi Development Cooperation Atlas 2013 – 2015

**ANNEX 2. INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED****UN Agencies**

1.	Abdelrahim, R (Dr)	Deputy Representative	UNFPA
2.	Birungi, C	Investments/Efficiency Advisor	UNAIDS
3.	Chimbiri, A	Portfolio Manager, RICE	UNDP
4.	De Burca, R	Deputy Representative	UNICEF
5.	Flore-Smerekczniak, C	DRR (P)	UNDP
6.	Gausi, E.N	M&E Officer	UN Women
7.	Kulemeka, P	Planning, M&E Specialist	UNDP
8.	Mehrlander, M	Programme Analyst	UNDP
9.	Mirza, S.A	Chief: Planning, M&E	UNICEF
10.	Mkwamba, P	Programme Officer	UN Women
11.	Nyirenda, S	Programme Analyst	UNDP
12.	Nzima, M	Strategic Information Advisor	UNAIDS
13.	Seppo, M	Resident Representative	UNDP
14.	Spezowka, A	Portfolio Manager, RSG	UNDP
15.	Woldegorgis, M	Research and Evaluation	UNICEF

**National Implementing Partners – Government, Civil Society, Private Sector**

16.	Botolo, B	Commissioner, Disaster Management	MoFEPD
17.	Chadima, C	Director of Trade	MoITT
18.	Chigona, G (Dr)	Programme Manager	CMPD
19.	Chilabade, B	Principal Secretary, Human Resources	OPC
20.	Chinthu Phiri, C. WS	Principal Secretary, Admin	OPC
21.	Chirwa, M	A/Director, Debt and Aid	MoFEPD
22.	Chisalo, M	Director of Industry	MoITT
23.	Chiunda, C	Principal Secretary	MoITT
24.	Chunga, D.E	Chief Director	PED
25.	Chunga, T. N	Grants Officer	MICF
26.	Dawa, D	Finance and Admin	CMPD
27.	Gawamadzi, S	Director	MoLGRD
28.	Kaferapanjira, C L	Chief Executive	MCCCI
29.	Kalembe, C	Director, Rural Development	MoLGRD
30.	Kalowekamo, J	Deputy Director	MoNREM
31.	Kamphale, Y	A/Chief Director	MoFEPD
32.	Kanyadza, A	Chief Systems Analyst	PED
33.	Kawaye, J	Project Coordinator, DEAP	MoFEPD
34.	Kayira, P	Chief State Advocate	MoJCA
35.	Kumar, N	Fund Manager	MICF

36.	Lihiku, N. G	Investment Promotion Manager	MITC
37.	Mawa, S	Director Decentralisation	MoLGRD
38.	Mhango, L	Director, Energy Services	MoNREM
39.	Mnthambala, N	Chief Director, Public Sector Reform	OPC
40.	Mphande, H	Director of Planning	MoITT
41.	Mphepo, G. Y	Head of Programmes	LEAD
42.	Mponda, M	Principal Statistician	NSO
43.	Mtupanyama, Y (Dr)	Chief Director, Environment &CC	MoNREM
44.	Muleso, E.T	Planning and Research Officer	MITC
45.	Munkhondya, H. S	Director, Electoral Services	MEC
46.	Muyila, W. H	Deputy Director-General	MBS
47.	Mwalubunju, O	Executive Director	NICE
48.	Mwansambo, C. (Dr)	Chief of Health Services	MoH
49.	Ndawala, J	Deputy Commissioner	NSO
50.	Namagoa, S	Director	PED
51.	Nthakomwa, J	Director, Investment Promotion	MITC
52.	Nyambose, M	Director, Debt and Aid	MoFEPD
53.	Phiri, R. M	Executive Director	PAC
54.	Safalaoh	Deputy Director (RBA)	PED
55.	Shawa, M (Dr)	Principal Secretary	MoGCSW
56.	Sikwese, L	Clerk to Cabinet	OPC
57.	Yusufu, H	Chief Economist	PED






#### Development Partners

58.	Garden, B	Minister Counsellor	Royal Norwegian Embassy
59.	Mkandawire, A	Governance Advisor	DfID
60.	Mkoka, F	DRR Specialist	World Bank
61.	Munthali, J	Programme Manager	EU
62.	Msowoya, C	Programme Manager	EU
63.	Navarro, J. M	Team Leader, Trade & Governance	EU
64.	Niebej, A	Programme Manager	EU
65.	Nyirenda, M	Senior Programme Officer	Royal Norwegian Embassy
66.	Record, R	Senior Economist	World Bank
67.	Smith, P	Head of DfID	British High Commission



**ANNEX 3. PERFORMANCE MATRIX (STATUS OF INDICATORS AND EVALUATOR'S ASSESSMENT)**

Performance rating scale:  Unsatisfactory;  Average;  Satisfactory;  Unrated

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Current reported status	Rating
<b>Outcome 1.2.</b> Improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development at national and district level by 2016.	Annual decrease of forest cover	2.5% (2009)	0%	No significant change in rate of decrease	
	Proportion of population using solid fuel	98.70%	92%	Rate decreased to <b>97%</b> (source: Draft National Charcoal Strategy, 2016)	
<b>Output 1.2.1.</b> Environment, natural resources and climate change mainstreamed in policies, development plans and budgets at national and district level	Resources allocated to ENR, CC and DRM	US\$ 2.3 m	US\$ 3.5 m	\$275m from 2006 to 2012 (source: 2014 GoM Public Expenditure Review on ENR and DRM).	
	New policies, development plans and programmes reflecting ENR, CC and DRM concerns	None	6 Approved	UNDP supported: 1. National CC Investment Plan 2. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 3. CC Management Policy 4. National Resilience Plan 5. National Disaster Risk Management Policy 6. Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (2015 and 2016)	
	Number of District Development Plans reflecting ENR, CC and DRM	3	15	Updated data unavailable	
<b>Output 1.2.2.</b> Data and knowledge on the impact of climate change, environmental and natural resources degradation collected and made accessible to decision makers in Government, Private Sector and Civil Society	Malawi CC, ENR websites developed, linked to databases and functional	0	2 websites with >1000 hits/month	One web site developed <a href="http://www.nccpmw.org">www.nccpmw.org</a>	
	Number of District climate change information centres	0	15 with updated information	Information centers established in 7 districts but only five (5) were functional due to administrative issues in the other two	
<b>Output 1.2.3.</b> Coordination mechanisms and implementation arrangements for CC and ENR established and used at national and district level	Functional Sector Working Groups on CC, ENR	SWG on CC+ENR established	SWGs fully operational	Quarterly meeting of CC & ENRM convened with MNREM	
	Number of target Districts coordinating and implementing CC and ENR programmes	0	15	6	



End of Term Evaluation of UNDP Malawi CP 2012 - 2016

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Current reported status	Rating
	CC & ENR Sector funding mechanism in place	No SWAP	Functional SWAp established	Funding mechanism not achieved; Donor support for SWAp declined since outbreak of cashgate. However, TWGs were established and functioning.	
<b>Outcome 1.3:</b> Productive poor benefit from decent work, income generation and pro-poor private sector growth by 2016.	Poor quintile share in national consumption	10.1% (2009)	22%	Updated data unavailable	
	Share of women and men in wage employment in non-agriculture sector	15% (2006)	20%	Updated data unavailable	
<b>Output 1.3.1:</b> Policy frameworks (Employment and labour, Industrialisation, and Trade) are developed with gender and rights based lenses and are in place	# of policies / regulations adopted and gazetted	0	3	- National Export Strategy - National Trade Policy - National Industrial Policy - National Quality Policy	
<b>Output 1.3.2:</b> TIP Swap, Aswap & JSSP for gender and youth implementation strengthened.	# of capacity development initiatives delivered to respective secretariats	0	3	TIPSWAp Secretariat capacity development plan	
<b>Output 1.3.3:</b> National Export Strategy clusters are supported through enterprise and skills development, financial services, cooperative development, promotion of structured markets and national quality infrastructure.	# of farmer organizations (FOs) (involved in NES product clusters) classified in low and medium capacity level which progress to high capacity	2011/2012; 11 FOs classified as low capacity and 6 classified as medium capacity	2014: 10 FOs progressing from medium to high and 17 progressing from low to medium	Updated data unavailable	
	% of commodities traded through formal platforms	2012: WFP purchases through ACE were 62% of the total volume traded	WFP purchases through ACE represent 50 % of the total traded. WFP starts purchases through AHGX.	Updated data unavailable	

End of Term Evaluation of UNDP Malawi CP 2012 - 2016

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Current reported status	Rating
<b>Outcome 3.2.2:</b> Critical enablers for the implementation of the national response enhanced and utilized by 2016	Percentage of Government Budget allocated to HIV and AIDS	< 3% (2011)	>= 5%	14% (2015)	
	% of financial resources allocated to HIV and AIDS provided to local councils	0.44% (2011)	2%	Updated data unavailable	
	National Composite Policy Index	8.4 (2010)	9	<9	
<b>Output 3.2.1</b> National institutions have capacity to develop and implement human rights and gender-appropriate HIV and AIDS related legal frameworks, policies, plans and strategies.	# of HIV sensitive legislations enacted that are also human rights- and gender-appropriate	0	2	1	
	# of public institutions, large private companies and informal sector associations that have HIV/AIDS workplace policies and mainstreaming programmes (2010: 105; 2016: 150)	105	150	140	
	# of sector strategies/plans that have mainstreamed HIV and AIDS 2010: 3; 2016: 10	3	10	6	
<b>Output 3.2.2:</b> Gendered, rights based strategic information generated, accessed and utilized by all stakeholders.	% of district councils that utilize strategic information in programme planning and implementation.	0	80%	21%	
	# of HIV related studies supported by the UN system for strategic information	0	20	10	
	% of district councils with staff trained in policy, monitoring, evaluation, and resource tracking in line with the Three Ones	18%	100%	21%	
<b>Output 3.2.4:</b> Most vulnerable populations are protected from adverse impacts of HIV and AIDS by 2016	% of vulnerable households that benefit from IM services				
	Number of vulnerable individuals that benefit from IM (disaggregated appropriately)				
<b>Outcome 4.1:</b> National institutions foster democratic governance for all, especially children, women, persons with disabilities and the youths by 2016	Proportion of the public holding duty bearers accountable.	40%	65%	70%	Survey?
	% of people (men, women, youth, children) accessing formal justice.	10%	60%	15%	
	Voter turnout	70%	90%	70.78%	
<b>Output 4.1.1</b> Democratic Governance sector strategy operationalized	Number of sector institutions with M&E frameworks aligned with DGSS	0	19	19	
	Number of Development Partners aligning their support to the DGSS	0	4	3	

End of Term Evaluation of UNDP Malawi CP 2012 - 2016

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Current reported status	Rating
	% voter turn-out	70	90	70.78	
	Proportion of women elected during Presidential and Parliamentary Election)	22	33	16.5	
	A gender responsive National Human Rights Action Plan for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Developed and implemented	0	1	1	
	Number of institutions aligning to a coordinated mechanism for human rights	0	9	6	
	% of rural and urban population able to claim human rights (disaggregated by Gender)	16% females; 19% males; 20% urban; 17% rural	50% Males: 50% Females; 50% Urban; 50 % rural	No survey conducted	
<b>Output 4.1.2:</b> Capacity of national institutions strengthened for collaborative dialogue to support the establishment and operationalization of the national peace architecture	Number of districts piloting early conflict warning early response teams	0	5	3	
	Percentage of Women participating in conflict mediation and dialogue initiatives at the national level	0	20	10	
	Number of media houses adopting conflict sensitive reporting guidelines	0	8	3	
<b>Output 4.1.3</b> Local governance structures strengthened in participatory planning, budgeting and managing integrated rural development	Number of Councils trained in the IRD strategy	0	28	28	
	Percentage of Net Government Revenues allocated to the District Councils through the General Resource Fund.	1	5	3	
<b>Outcome 4.2</b> Public institutions are better able to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016.	% of senior public servants trained in leadership and management	45% (2010)	70%	65%	
	Percentage of aid reported in the national budget	55% (2009)	75%	28% (2015)	
<b>Output 4.2.1</b> Capacity for public sector management strengthened for effective service delivery.	PA SWG functional	2011: None	2016: Done	Done	
	% of MDAs delivering at least 60% of their organizational performance agreements targets	2011: 40%	2016: 60%	60%	
<b>Output 4.2.2</b> Public institutions utilize RBM systems for planning, monitoring and	No. of public institutions practicing RBM	2010 : "0"	2016: "16"	4	
	Timeliness of MGDS annual results reporting.	Dec	Sept	Dec	

End of Term Evaluation of UNDP Malawi CP 2012 - 2016

Outcome/Output	Indicators	Baseline	Target	Current reported status	Rating
evaluation to enhance ownership and leadership for achievement of development results.	No. of public institutions utilizing MDGs based planning and budgeting tools ( 2; 2016: 16)	2010: "2"	2016: "16"	Indicator dropped	
<b>Output 4.2.3</b> Government has sufficient capacity to effectively negotiate, manage and account for development assistance	% of Ministries with functional M& E systems	2010: "60"	2016: "90"	90%	
	# of functional dialogue structures for development cooperation put in place	1 (2011)	3 (2016)	3	
	% of development budget (part 1 and 2) utilized	30 (2010)	80 (2016)	75%	
	Number of functional sector working groups (baseline: 6, Target: 16).	3 (2011)	16 (2016)	9	
<b>Outcome 4.3:</b> National institutions advance gender equality and status of women by 2016.	2. Proportion of women in decision making at all levels {P: Parliament; LC: Local council; CS: Civil service; Ps: Parastatal}	P: 22% <sup>(2009)</sup> LC: 8.3% <sup>(2000)</sup> CS: 23%; Ps: 22% <sup>(2010)</sup>	P: 50% LC: 20% CS: 30% Ps: 25%	P: 16% LC: 11% CS: 30% Ps: 27%	
	2. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector	15% (2006)	20%	30%	
	3. Ratio of Girls to Boys in Secondary Education	0.79 (2010)	1	1.01	
	4. Gender Status Index	0.639 (2010)	0.75	0.639	
Output 4.3.1 Government capacity to integrate gender in prioritized sectors enhanced	1. Number of sectors reporting on Gender in the MGDS annual reviews	1 (2010)	7	7	
	2. Proportion of ministries (institutions and districts) exercising gender budgeting.	0 (2010)	6	6	
Output 4.3.2. Women have the capacity and benefit from an enabling environment to claim and exercise their right to participate in decision making in public and private sectors	1. Number of political parties participating in the 2014 election with quotas for women	2 (?)	4	2	
	2. Percent of women holding senior positions in the Civil Service	23% (2010)	50%	30%	
	3. Percentage of women Parliamentarians	22.3% (2010)	50%	16%	
Output 4.3.3 Advocacy for effective response to key gender issues enhanced	1. Number of gender related laws revised to promote gender equality	1 (2010)	3	6	
	2. % of GBV cases reported and prosecuted	36% (2010)	50%	Updated data unavailable	



## ANNEX 4. EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

### 1. Background

#### 1.1 Country Programme Components and Outcomes

The UNDP Executive Board approved the Malawi Country Programme (CP) in September, 2011. The programme had three outcomes but four components as follows:

CP Components	CP/United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF) Outcomes
Sustainable Economic and Inclusive Growth	<b>CP/UNDAF OUTCOME 1:</b> National policies, local and national institutions effectively support equitable and sustainable economic growth and food security by 2016. <b>Related Strategic Plan focus areas:</b> <i>Energy &amp; Environment; Crisis Prevention and Recovery</i>
Disaster Risk Management, Climate Change, Environment and Sustainable Development	
MDGs Achievement; Gender and HIV	<b>CP / UNDAF OUTCOMES 1 and 3:</b> Government policies, local and national institutions effectively support transparency, accountability, participatory democracy and human rights. National response to HIV/AIDS scaled up to achieve universal access to prevention, treatment, care and support. <b>Related Strategic Plan focus areas:</b> Poverty Reduction and Millennium Development Goals Achievement
Governance and Public Sector Management Reform	<b>CP / UNDAF OUTCOME 4:</b> National institutions effectively support transparency, accountability, participatory democracy and human rights. <b>Related Strategic Plan focus areas:</b> <i>Fostering Democratic Governance</i>

The 2012-2016 Country Programme Document (CPD) was developed in parallel to the 2012-2016 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and in effect the UNDP CPD was completed before the UNDAF document. Following an undertaking by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), UNDP adopted the UNDAF outcomes as its CP outcomes. However, since the CPD was finalized before the UNDAF, it meant that the UNDP CP based its outcome on an earlier version of the UNDAF. These differed from the final UNDAF outcomes.

From 4 outcomes, the final UNDAF document had 17 outcomes. What was conceived as outcomes in the initial stages became UNDAF thematic areas. In keeping with the agreement that agencies adopt relevant UNDAF outcomes, it now meant that UNDP would take on board 6 UNDAF

outcomes to match the scope of its CP. The six UNDAF outcomes which became UNDP's outcomes are as follows:

- i) **Outcome 1.2:** Women, youth, people with disability and households benefit from decent employment, income generation and pro-poor private sector growth by 2016. This outcome was changed to Outcome 1.3: Productive poor benefit from decent work, income generation and pro-poor private sector growth by 2016. This was an outcome of a rationalization process conducted in 2013 which resulted in three instead of four outcomes in the thematic area of sustainable economic growth.
- ii) **Outcome 1.3:** Targeted population in selected districts benefit from effective management of environment, natural resources, climate change and disaster risk by 2016. Following the rationalisation process noted earlier, this outcome was subsequently revised to become Outcome 1.2 Improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development at national and district level by 2016.
- iii) **Outcome 3.4:** The national response to HIV is evidence-informed, coordinated, sustainably resourced, efficient and based upon a supportive legal and policy environment by 2016. This outcome was later changed to: Outcome 3.2: Critical enablers for the implementation of the national response enhanced and utilized by 2016.
- iv) **Outcome 4.1:** National institutions foster democratic governance and human rights to promote transparency, accountability, participation and access to justice for all, especially women and children by 2016.
- v) **Outcome 4.2:** Public institutions are better able to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016.
- vi) **Outcome 4.3:** National institutions advance gender equality and status of women by 2016.

## 1.2 UNDAF Action Plan

The UNCT resolved to develop an UNDAF Action Plan (AP) instead of individual agency Country Programme Action Plans (CPAPs). The UNDAF AP presented outputs which were expected to contribute towards each outcome. Each output listed key result areas (actions) which were required to achieve it. Each of the UN agencies determined the outcomes, outputs and key actions where they would contribute thereby making the UNDAF AP an important tool for joint programming.

Further to the UNDAF AP, UNDP opted to develop programme/project support documents (PSDs) to facilitate planning and implementation of activities towards achievement of outcomes. PSDs also facilitate multi-year budgeting and annual output target setting and tracking. Multi-year programming is particularly important where donor-support is involved and where release of funds is meant to be on annual basis. Over 25 projects have developed/implemented during the period of the evaluation. Most of the documents were approved in 2013. Although 2012 annual works plan took into account the 2012-2016 UNDAF Action Plan provisions, the scale of implementation was relatively low.

### 1.3 Malawi United Nations Development Assistance Framework and UNDAF Outcome Evaluations

The Malawi UNDAF (2012-2016) was evaluated in May, 2015. In addition, four outcomes of the UNDAF/CPD outcomes, namely: **Outcome 1.2**, *Improved management of environment, natural resources and climate change for sustainable development at national and district level by 2016*; **Outcome 4.2**, *Public institutions are better able to manage, allocate and utilize resources for effective development and service delivery by 2016* and **Outcome 4.3**, *National institutions advance gender equality and status of women by 2016* have been evaluated between May and September, 2015 and UNDAF **outcome 4.1**, viz: *National institutions foster democratic governance and human rights to promote transparency, accountability, participation and access to justice for all, especially women and children by 2016* have been evaluated between May and December, 2015. These evaluations were initiated by UNDP in response to an audit query to ensure that its CP outcomes are evaluated during the course of the cycle. Hence, although there were essentially UNDAF outcome evaluations, each of them has included a specific assessment of UNDP's contribution and performance.

In 2014, UNDP embarked on a process to align its work to its new Strategic Plan (2014-2017). The Vision of the Strategic Plan is to achieve the simultaneous eradication of poverty and significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion. Among other areas, the scope of the alignment process included an assessment of targeting of beneficiaries, portfolio management, exit strategies and scale/scaling up considerations at the level of the country programme.

### 1.4 Extension of the UNDAF and Country Programme

As expected the UNDAF 2012-2016 is aligned to the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) II (July 2011- June, 2016). Thus, the next UNDAF, 2017-2021, was expected to be aligned the national development strategy for the period July, 2016 to June, 2021. However, due to developments in the political economy, the successor national plan to the MGDS II will not be



ready in 2016. It is not certain when the plan will be ready but this is unlikely to happen before July, 2017. Consequently, the UN Country Team in Malawi has requested for a two-year extension of the current UNDAF.

## **2. Purpose of the evaluation**

This end of term evaluation is carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy. In line with the Evaluation Plan of the CO, evaluations are being conducted in 2016 to assess the impact of UNDP development assistance across the major thematic and cross cutting areas of Democratic Governance and Public Sector Management, Disaster Risk Management, Climate Change, Environment and Natural Resources Management, Inclusive Sustainable Economic and Inclusive Growth, HIV and AIDS and Gender. The evaluation will capture evaluative evidence of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of current programming, which can be used to strengthen existing programmes going forward and to set the stage for new initiatives. The evaluation serves an important accountability function, providing stakeholders and partners with an impartial assessment of the results. The will provide an opportunity for UNDP to engage key stakeholders to discuss achievements, lessons learned and adjustments required in response to an evolving development landscape and changing national priorities.

## **3. Evaluation Scope and Objectives**

The end of term evaluation will be conducted before the end of August, 2016, with a view to compiling what the programme has achieved while providing strategic direction and inputs to the preparation of the next country programme, specifically the evaluation will assess:

- 1) The relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP CO support to national development agenda.
- 2) The programmes and strategies devised to support on to democratic governance and public sector management; environment and natural resources, disaster risk, climate change management; inclusive and sustainable economic growth, HIV/AIDS and gender, including partnership strategies, and whether they are well conceived for achieving planned objectives.
- 3) The progress made towards achieving the CP outcomes through specific projects and advisory services, and including contributing factors and constraints.
- 4) The lessons learnt from the experience with the design and implementation of programmes.

The evaluation will also take into account the findings of the UNDAF and four UNDAF/CPD outcome evaluations.

The objectives of the end of term evaluation are to:

- Assess whether the outcomes and output in the Country Programme Document have been achieved or the extent to which they have been achieved;
- Assess the impact of the Country Programme;
- Provide evidence of UNDP's contribution towards the achievement of six Country Programme outcomes:
- Determine the strategic positioning and relevance of UNDP in these sectors – the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps - especially with regard to the appropriateness of their partnership strategy (including choice of beneficiaries), their Theory of Change (ToC), and any need for mid-course adjustments to meet the outcomes;
- Propose areas of re-positioning and re-focusing of future CPDs within the current Malawi's development context, and in light of UNDP's new strategic plan;
- Review of factors influencing the achievement of results;
- Assess the sustainability of results achieved and likely to be achieved during the implementation of the Country Programme;
- Assess the extent to which gender was mainstreamed in the design, implementation and reporting of the country programme;
- Distil lessons learnt and provide recommendation for future programming, including to inform higher level evaluations and future decision-making and planning for the remainder of the programme cycle.

## 6. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The evaluation seeks to answer the following questions, focused around the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability:

**Relevance:** The extent to which the programme designed and implemented were suited to national priorities and realities:

- to what extent are the outcomes and outputs of the CPD relevant and contributing towards national development priorities and outcomes such as the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) and other strategic documents.
- Are the intended outputs and outcomes aligned with the key development strategies of the country? Are they consistent with human development needs of the country and the intended beneficiaries?

- Do the outputs and outcome address the specific development challenges of the country and the intended beneficiaries? Were there any unintended consequences (positive or negative) that have implications to the human development goals of the country?
- To what extent has UNDP Malawi selected method of delivery been appropriate to the development context of the country?
- Has UNDP Malawi been influential in Country debates on CPD-related initiatives and has it influenced policies on any of the thematic areas?
- To what extent have UN reforms influenced UNDP Malawi's support in the country and in what sectors?

**Effectiveness:** the extent to which the CP has achieved its intended outcomes and planned results.

- Were the stated outputs achieved? Did they contribute to the stated outcomes? What are the key development and advisory contributions that UNDP has made/is making towards the outcomes, if any?
- If not fully achieved, was there any progress? If so, what level of progress towards outcomes has been made as measured by the outcome indicators presented in the results framework. What evidence is there that UNDP support has contributed towards an improvement in the country's capacity, including institutional strengthening in the themes areas of the CP?
- Has UNDP utilized innovative techniques and best practices in its programming initiatives and processes?
- Taking into account the technical capacity and institutional arrangements of the UNDP Malawi CO, is UNDP well suited to providing the respective thematic support in the country?
- What contributing factors and impediments enhance or impede UNDP performance in various areas of the CP?
- What/How is the quality of expertise provided to the partner government institutions?
- What concrete successes in policy formulation, advice and coordination have been achieved, where applicable?
- How useful has the knowledge and skills transfer proven to be so far?
- How effectively has the CPD been structured? How has the surrounding structure in which the CPD operates affected its delivery?
- How can the effectiveness of support to the CPD be strengthened in future country programmes?

**Efficiency:** measurement of the outputs in relation to the inputs.

- Are UNDP approaches, resources, models, conceptual framework relevant to achieve the planned outcome? Are they sufficiently sensitive to the political and development constraints of the country?
- Were the results delivered in a reasonable proportion to the operational and other costs?
- Has there been an economical use of financial and human resources? Could a different type of intervention lead to similar results at a lower cost? How?
- Are the monitoring and evaluation systems that UNDP Malawi CO has in place helping to ensure that programmes are managed efficiently and effectively for proper accountability of results?
- Were alternative approaches considered in designing the Projects?

**Sustainability:**

- What is the likelihood that UNDP's interventions are sustainable?
- Are there exit strategies in place for different programmes and projects?
- What mechanisms have been put in place by UNDP Malawi to support the government/institutional partners to sustain improvements made through these CPD interventions?
- What changes should be made in the current set of partnerships in order to promote long term sustainability?

**Partnership strategy**

- Has the partnership strategy as indicated in the CPD and projects been appropriate and effective?
- Are there current or potential complementarities or overlaps with existing regional partners' programmes?
- How have partnerships affected the progress towards achieving the outputs?
- Has UNDP worked effectively with other donors to deliver on the CPD initiatives?
- How effective has UNDP been in partnering with civil society (where applicable) and the private sector to promote its initiatives in the Country?

The evaluation should also include an assessment of the extent to which programme design, implementation and monitoring have taken the following cross cutting issues into consideration:

**Human rights**

- To what extent have poor and physically challenged, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefitted from UNDP CPD interventions?

**Gender Equality**

- To what extent has gender been addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of CPD interventions? Is gender marker data assigned the projects representative of reality

- To what extent has UNDP promoted positive changes in gender equality? Were there any unintended effects? Information collected should be checked against data from the CO Results-oriented Annual Reports (ROAR) during the period under review.

### **Capacity Building**

- Did the CPD adequately invest in, and focus on, national capacity development to ensure sustainability and promote efficiency?
- Are the knowledge products (reports, studies, etc. where applicable) delivered by different interventions adapted to country needs?

Based on the above analysis, the evaluator is expected to provide overarching conclusions on UNDP Malawi CO results in this areas of support, as well as recommendations on how the UNDP could adjust its programming, partnership arrangements, resource mobilization strategies, and capacities to ensure that the CPD portfolio fully achieves current planned outcomes and is positioned for sustainable results in the future. The evaluation is additionally expected to offer lessons for UNDP support in country and elsewhere based on this analysis.

## **6. Methodology and approach**

The evaluator will engage a wide array of stakeholders and beneficiaries, including government, development partners, academicians and subject experts, private sector representatives, relevant Civil Society Organizations and UNDP staff.

The evaluation of outcomes is expected to take a “theory of change” (TOC) approach to determining causal links between the interventions that UNDP has supported, and observed progress in the different portfolios. The evaluator will develop, in consultation with the programme team, logic models of how UNDP interventions are expected to lead to achievement of results. The models will be validated by the Programme Leaders.

The evidence gathering will closely track the results and resources framework (RRF) for the outcomes. Evidence obtained and used to assess the results of UNDP support should be triangulated from a variety of sources, including verifiable data on indicator achievement, existing reports, and technical papers, stakeholder interviews, focus groups, surveys and site visits.

The steps in data collection are anticipated but not limited to the following: the evaluation will determine the approach best suitable to conduct the evaluation.

Desk reviews: The evaluator will collect and review all relevant documentation, including the following: i) national programme documents; ii) project documents and activity reports; iii) past evaluation/ self-assessment reports; iv) client surveys on support services provided to institutions

if any; v) country office reports; vi) UNDP's corporate strategies and reports; and viii) government, media, academic publications.

Interviews and focus group discussions: The evaluator will conduct face-to-face and/or telephone interviews with relevant stakeholders, including: i) UNDP staff (managers and programme/project officers) at the Country Office; and ii) policy makers, beneficiary groups and donors in the country. Focus groups may be organized as appropriate.

Field visits: The evaluator will visit selected programme sites to observe first-hand progress and achievements made to date and to collect best practices/ lessons learned. A case study approach will be used, as appropriate, to identify and highlight issues that can be further investigated across the programme

## 7. Deliverables

The following reports and deliverables are required for the evaluation:

- Inception report
- Draft CP Evaluation Report
- Presentation at the validation workshop with key stakeholders, (partners and beneficiaries)
- Lessons Learned report
- Final report on the CP Evaluation

One week after start date of the consultancy, the evaluation manager will produce an **inception report** containing the proposed theory of change for UNDPs work under the different outcomes. The inception report should include an evaluation matrix presenting the evaluation questions, data sources, data collection, analysis tools and methods to be used. Annex 3 provides a simple matrix template. The evaluator will also propose a rating scale in order that Performance rating will be carried out for the four evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The inception report should detail the specific timing for evaluation activities and deliverables, and propose specific site visits and stakeholders to be interviewed. Protocols for different stakeholders should be developed. The inception report will be approved by the Deputy Resident Representative (Programme) or her designate in consultation with the Senior Management of CO before the evaluator proceed with programme visits.

The **draft evaluation report** will be shared with stakeholders/reference group, and presented in a validation workshop (if applicable). Feedback received from these sessions should be taken into account when preparing the final report. The evaluator will produce an 'audit trail' indicating whether and how each comment received was addressed in revisions to the **final report**.

A **lessons learned report** will also be produced and discussed during the validation workshop. Feedback received should be taken into consideration when preparing the lessons learned report. The lessons learned report should cover the different facets country programme implemented by the CO. This reports should be annexed in the main evaluation report.

See Annex 7 of the UNDP M&E Handbook for the evaluation report template and quality standards.

## **8. Evaluation Required Competencies**

### **Required Qualifications of the Evaluator**

- Minimum Master's degree in economics, political science, public administration, development studies, international relations or other related social sciences;
- Minimum 7 years of professional experience in at least two subject areas of UNDP Malawi's work: democratic governance and public sector management; environment, natural resources, disaster risk and climate change management; inclusive and sustainable growth and gender equality;
- Proven experience in leading evaluations of national policies, strategies or programmes of government and international aid organisations;
- Knowledge and experience in gender mainstreaming;
- Excellent reporting and communication skills;
- Fluent in written and spoken English.

The evaluator will have overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of the draft and final evaluation report.

### **Evaluator's competencies:**

- Team work skills
- Work planning skills
- Strategic thinking
- Strong analytical, reporting and communication skills
- Result oriented

## **9. Evaluation Ethics**

The evaluation must be carried out in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation' and sign the Ethical Code of Conduct for UNDP Evaluations. In particular, evaluators must be free and clear of perceived conflicts of interest. To this end, interested

consultants will not be considered if they were directly and substantively involved, as an employee or consultant, in the formulation of UNDP programme documents relating to the outcomes under review. The code of conduct and an agreement form to be signed by each consultant

#### **10. Management and conduct of evaluation:**

The UNDP CO will select the evaluator through an open process, and will be responsible for the management of the evaluation exercise. The UNDP M&E Specialist will be the focal person for the evaluation. He will work closely with two Programme Portfolio Managers. Each programme portfolio will assign a Programme Analyst to support the M&E Specialist including:

- ✓ Compilation of documents and background materials for the review team;
- ✓ Stakeholder mapping of the main partners;
- ✓ Preliminary Itinerary of field visit;
- ✓ Linking and liaising within UNDP CO as well as with Implementing Partners and other stakeholders.

The M&E Specialist will arrange introductory meetings within CO and the two Programme Portfolio Managers and will establish initial contacts with partners and project staff. The evaluator will take responsibility for setting up meetings and conducting the evaluation, subject to advanced approval of the methodology submitted in the inception report. The Management of the CO will develop a management response to the evaluation recommendations within two weeks of report finalization. The evaluation mission will be facilitated by Operations and Programme Sections for other logistical support along the process.

An evaluation Reference Group will be set up in order to ensure objectivity as well as technical soundness of the process. Specific tasks of the Reference Group will be to review and provide guidance to the evaluation process, including the evaluation questions, Inception Report, facilitate access to information, comments to draft reports, among others. The evaluation Reference Group will also advise on the conformity of evaluation processes to the UNEG standards. The evaluator is required to address all comments of the reference group completely and comprehensively. The Evaluator will provide a detail rationale for any comment that remain unaddressed. The composition of the Reference Group:

- Debt and Aid Management Division, Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
- Economic Planning and Development Department, Ministry of Finance;
- Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining;
- Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
- Ministry of Industry, Trade and Private Sector Development



- Ministry of Gender, Child Welfare and People with Disabilities
- Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
- Public Sector Reforms Management Unit, Office of the President and Cabinet
- National Statistics Office
- UNRCO
- UN Agencies (UNFPA, UNWomen and UNICEF)
- EU
- Council for Non-Governmental Organization of Malawi (CONGOMA)
- University of Malawi
- Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCCI).

## **8. The End of Term Evaluation process**

The review will unfold in three phases, each of them including several steps.

### **A. Inception phase**

- Document and desk review (review of all relevant documents (project documents and reports regarding the CPD 2012 -2016)
- Stakeholder mapping (a mapping of stakeholders relevant to the CPD. The mapping exercise will include government and civil society stakeholders and will indicate the relationships between different sets of stakeholders)
- Analysis of the Results and Resources Framework (Result Resource Matrix and M & E Plan).
- Finalization of the list of evaluation questions.
- Development of data collection and analysis strategy as well as concrete work plan for the field phase

At the end of this phase, the evaluator will produce an Inception report, displaying the results of the above mentioned steps and tasks.

### **B. Field phase**

After the design phase, the evaluator will undertake a two-week in-country mission to collect and analyze the data required in order to answer the final evaluation questions, consolidated during the design phase. At the end of the Field phase, the evaluator will provide the UNDP CO with debriefing presentation on the preliminary results of the assessment, with a view to validating preliminary findings and testing tentative conclusions and/or recommendations.

## **Synthesis phase**

During this phase, the evaluation mission will continue the analytical work initiated during the field phase and prepare a first draft of the evaluation report, taking into account comments made by the UNDP CO at the debriefing meeting. The first draft of the report will be submitted to the Reference Group for comments in writing. Based on the comments from the Reference Group, the second draft of the report will be prepared. The second draft will be presented at the In-country validation seminar, which should be attended by the key programme stakeholders, including Implementing Partners, and UNDP staff. The final report will be drafted shortly after the validation seminar, taking into account comments made by the participants.

Availability: The consultant should be available between 1 June and 31 July, 2016.

### **11. Duration of contract**

The assignment is expected to require 35 work days. UNDP will pay the consultant fees per working day. Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) will be paid per night spent at the place of the mission following UN DSA rate applicable

Payment of fees will be based on the delivery of outputs, as follows:

- 20% upon submission of acceptable inception report
- 40% upon submission of acceptable draft report
- 40% upon satisfactory completion of assignment and endorsement of the evaluation report by UNDP CO.

### **12. Proposed Work Plan and Indicative Timeline**

It is planned that the evaluation starts on 1 June, 2016 and shall expire on the satisfactory completion of the services of the services described above by 29 July, 2016.