The TOR envisaged a three-phased approach

I. Inception phase

- Inception phase
- Desk-research phase
- Fieldwork phase

In accordance with the TOR, the team will pursue the envisaged three-phase approach.

II. Desk study phase

During this desk phase, the evaluation team conducted a detailed

(i) review and analyse all relevant documents (Annex 3) (While the TOR noted that this should have been completed in the Inception Phase, the contractual reality was that, with the exception of the TL, the other team members had not been contracted at the time of the IR and, although the national consultants had received the documentation made available, the international consultant, as of 19 April, had not. Furthermore, a shared and detailed review was necessary to finalise a shared understanding on the evaluation approach. (ii) summarized the information already gathered and limitations, and identify issues still to be covered (iii) developed the (participatory) tools (semi-structured interviews, focus groups, etc.) to be applied in the field phase (Kabul and the sample of provinces), together with all preparatory steps already taken (iv) developed a detailed work plan for the field phase, taking into account the time available and security-acceptable flight schedules. This resulted in a departure from the proposal contained in the Inception Report, this being discussed with the UNDP Programme Manager and team.

III. Field phase

The evaluation team developed and discussed with UNDP and key stakeholders; an indicative list of provinces to be visited, including focus group discussions with individual project beneficiaries, where possible. Arising from this, the national consultants visited and/or met with project representatives and beneficiaries from Nangahar, Khandahar, Zabul, Herat, Baghdis, Balkh, and Jawzjan (seven provinces); representatives of Kabul, Laghman and Logar met with the evaluation team in Kabul, bringing the total to 10 provinces (29%). If Programme structures assessed included HPC, JS, National and Provincial Peace Councils, Provincial Joint Secretariat teams, and the relationship between the Technical Assistance and the Afghan structures, the efficiency of the flow of funding in the course of the programme’s life were analysed.

The evaluation team held a debriefing meeting outlining the preliminary conclusions and recommendations on 17 May.

1.2.ii Geographical coverage

Geographical coverage outside of the capital was based upon security advice provided to the team at the time of the field mission and the approved flight schedules within the timeframe available. Initial discussions on the possibility of an extension to the national consultant’s contract to permit additional provincial visits were held, the decision to be finalised once the initial data analysis was completed.

1.2.ii.a Selection of Sample

The sample was based upon available key Government and donor stakeholders, as well as indicative sample of programmes financed in the course of the five-year (2010 – 2016) implementation period. The team’s focus was on the contribution of the activities supported to the goals of peace building and the contribution of ex-combatants’ reintegration to this. The sample of identified provinces is discussed above; project beneficiaries, both of the SGPs and CRPs (including VET trainees and Public Works Corps members), were interviewed in focus groups.

1.2.ii.b Risks

The major risk confronting the achievement of the TOR related to the shifting socio-political and security situation in Afghanistan and the related security implications, particularly in respect of the team’s visits to a sample of provinces7 and movement in Kabul. Initially, it was proposed that the national consultants, having undertaken the requisite SAFFE training8, should pursue a triangular geographic approach. As discussed above, the available time for provincial visits was impacted by security-approved flights. This required that the provincial visits be scaled back in the first instance to five provinces (10 provincial teams interviewed) with UNDP facilitating three additional provinces travel to Kabul. Subject to the need for additional data, UNDP would consider an extension of the national consultant’s contract for additional provincial visits. In total, the national consultants visited. Additional risks include access to key informants in the field and their safety, as well as possible political interference in the process.

1.3 Outline of the Report

The report is structured in accordance with standard OECD DAC criteria. In Section 2, it discusses the programme’s design and relevance including an assessment of the logframe. This is followed in Section 3 by a discussion of Efficiency and, in Section 4, of Effectiveness. Section 5 makes a preliminary assessment of Impact, followed by consideration of programme Sustainability in Section 6. Section 7 outlines the consultants’ conclusions and recommendations arising from the foregoing analysis.
7 SAFE Training for internationals is scheduled for mid-April and mid-May, neither dates being suitable for the international consultants on this assignment. The mid-April training slot takes place before either international consultant is contractually in-country, while the mid-May slot occurs too late to be feasibly taken up in time for the internationals participation in the planned provincial visits. 8 UNDP has ensured that the SAFE training schedule for nationals, including the offer to undertake special courses, will guarantee that the national consultants complete the training before the team launches the field mission, commencing 24 April.

2. Relevance

Relevance discusses the extent to which the project design fit the socioeconomic and socio-political realities of Afghanistan at the time of its design and now. It asks how appropriate were the problem analysis, the intervention logic, and risk analysis? What adaptations are desirable in the light of experience?

2.1 The Context

The APRP was introduced at a politically opportune time, and was relevant to the context of when it was designed in 2010. As such, even though it was a project to support reintegrates through development interventions, it was mostly a political project to gain support for the Government’s peace agenda. This subtext made the project relevant to the context but not effective in terms of reaching objectives that were more political than realistic.

After winning reelection in 2009, President Karzai was discouraged by the criticism waged by the American administration about the election process and disillusioned that his international coalition partners would be genuinely able to eradicate the safe heavens that were popping up the Taliban in Pakistan. He placed reconciliation with his Taliban ‘brothers’ at the top of his agenda, having lost confidence that the Taliban could be defeated militarily, including with the help of coalition forces. At the January 2010 London Conference, he asked the international community to support his government’s peace plan and in June 2010, he convened the Consultative Peace Jirga, bringing together sixteen hundred largely handpicked delegates, who gave him a strong mandate for talks with the Taliban. The “peace jirga” ended by backing an amnesty and job incentives to induce militants to give up arms. If the end goal was to diminish the number of insurgents in the field, the strategy also fit well the agenda of the Americans by 2010 who by then were preparing to deploy more troops as part of a surge and welcomed a chapter way to defeating/reintegrating Taliban fighters. The idea represented a good political compromise on all sides.

On July 20, 2010, the government introduced the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) at the International Kabul Conference, where it received overwhelming support from the representatives of seventy countries and international organizations. Later that year, the government established the High Peace Council (HPC) to open a dialogue with the Taliban and guide and oversee the APRP’s implementation. A Joint Secretariat was set up in 2010 to provide implementation support to the HPC and UNDP designed a project to support the APRP, which came at the hee of its past programmes to support the demobilization process (such as the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program). When it negotiated its engagement, UNDP was strongly encouraged by the donor pool and the NATO mission to take up management responsibility of APRP.

The programme was designed by the government, with little indication of content support by UNDP in its design phase. There is also no indication of the design being consultative, involving civil society, women’s groups etc. The only vetting system was the broad recommendations of the Loya Jirga, and the experience, if not necessary the lessons learned, of past initiatives on reintegration and reconciliation by UNDP.

2.1.1 Knowledge about the Context

Because the project was designed on the basis of a programme that had been presented to donors at the London Conference and was vetted by the Loya Jirga, it did not bother to conduct a needs assessment, a baseline or provincial context analysis on which to base its interventions. The interventions were instead designed to implement a political vision, and not necessarily one based on concrete knowledge about the needs. Action research was not included for a variety of reasons, all of which have to do at the end of the day, with the question of lack of willingness and commitment to go from the realities on the ground: Not enough time nor resources were dedicated to a proper analysis before the design of the project. For example, the team’s provincial visits provided not mention of conflict sensitivity (Do no harm) analysis.

One of the main challenges of evaluating the projects at the local level (whether through community Recovery Projects or through Small Grant Projects) from the perspective of peace building was the lack of conflict analysis from the start. With a conflict analysis and baseline, it would have been necessary to determine region by region what the conflict factors and dynamics would have been and how the projects directly impacted the outcomes. As the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) conducted in December 2012 had already noted, no formal Conflict Analysis or opportunity mapping exercise, or even formal needs assessment had been carried out at the national level, nor any provincial analytical studies of local factors and players.

The lack of conflict analysis/baseline has to do with resources and timing. However, there was also no political commitment to carry one out at the onset, hence to clarify who was weighting whom in each region, knowledge that would have complicated the tendency to put all grievances under the broad chapeau of the “Taliban” and not shed light on potential capture by different factions. UNDP also did not have the technical resources to carry out such an analysis at the provincial level. However, it could have done so, utilising the experienced Regional Programme Coordinators (RPCs) or collaboration with UNAMA that does such analysis at the national and provincial levels, although this possibility was affected by differences in culture, bottlenecks in information sharing and challenges of coordination at the regional/provincial level. The evaluation team was told that better streamlining of UNDP and UNAMA activities are being put in place in the recent past only.

The Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) had suggested back in 2012 to undertake Conflict Analysis, Opportunity Mapping Studies or Provincial Conflict analysis Profiles (PCAP) for each province in order to help make APRP decisions more strategic. Guidelines were sent to provinces to collect data on analytical maps and was suppose to be compiled in July 2013 with the help of NDS, ILDG, RPCS and UNAMA. Such an
analysis however was not shared with the Evaluation Team. When she joined the JS as part of UNDP’s Technical Assistance in 2015, the Peace building and Development Specialist saw the need to adjust the projects to peace building objective and start by having a proper needs assessment conducted. She developed a list of types of SGP projects that could be conducive to sustainable peace on the basis of needs assessments through the RPCs and PISTs in the region. The assessment and recommendations in terms of guidelines to guide the communities to identify their needs was however removed from the SGP instruction package by the JS leadership. Where there was information, it was not used strategically.

2.2 Relevance to Past Approaches to Reintegration and Reconciliation

The APRP was introduced as a continuation or alternative to two streams of government-led, donor supported initiatives: Stream 1: DDR and reintegration and Stream 2: Political reconciliation and negotiation.

1. Reintegration before demobilization: Lessons had been integrated from DDR and DIAG?

On the reintegration front, APRP came at the heel of the Government-led UNDP-supported Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) initiative and the subsequent Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan (DIAG) that had contributed to the collection of weapons.

The DDR of Afghan military forces ran from 2002-2006, supported by the Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) of UNDP with $150 million in funding from international donors. An estimated 60 000 former combatants were disarmed and provided with agricultural support, vocational training etc. However, the program had minimal lasting impact, was often obstructed or co-opted by warlords or criminal elements, and few participants are believed to have been genuine ex-combatants. By 2005, at the completion of the DDR process, there were still an estimated 1,800 armed bands consisting of up to 100,000 individuals.

The $36 million DIAG program was created in 2005 and implemented under UNDP management between 2006 and 2011 as the successor of the DDR. DIAG was intended to disband those remaining armed groups in the areas of the country not covered by DDR and outside the control of the central government in Kabul. The initiative aimed at offering community projects, worth upwards of $150,000 each, in exchange for the handover of weapons and a pledge to demobilize. By the time it was integrated into the APRP in 2011, DIAG no longer dealt with criminal groups but only armed insurgent groups and became the implementer of the reintegration programme. By then, DIAG lacked donor support and community projects had proved to be insufficient incentives, even though the program claimed to have disbanded several hundred groups. It was questionable how many of these represented organized armed groups at all.

The impact of past DDR and DIAG programs has not been tangible: Illegal armed groups continue to be a primary obstacle to peace in Afghanistan. While each program claims to have incorporated lessons from its predecessors, many technical shortcomings and flaws in design recurred across programs which continued through APRP.

Lesson learned and incorporated:

APRP incorporated the lesson that complete disarmament cannot happen before reintegration. With ongoing security, weapons in the hands of reintegrees represented a security guarantee against the ongoing threats by the Taliban and other anti-government (AGE) groups. In the special case of Afghanistan where war was ongoing, reintegration should come before disarmament and demobilization, reversing the conventional sequence.

Lesson unlearned or neglected:

The main reason that the DDR programs implemented since 2001 have fallen short in Afghanistan was the adverse political and security context rather than any flaw in the programs per se. A political settlement is a prerequisite for DDR: without a peace deal that includes all parties, including the Taliban leadership, the Haqqanis, Hizb-i-Islami and the main former Northern Alliance factions, it is unlikely that any DDR program will yield major results. The lack of peace agreement and lack of security guarantees would create disincentives for many commanders to disarm.

Lack of security for the reintegrees means that by joining the program, they risk their lives. APRP, like its predecessors, did not clarify what types of security guarantees would be provided to those who join the process. It mentioned that they would be able to reintegrate into the communities, but the program and the project never had enough resources – or intention - to appoint guards to protect the reintegrees. No reintegrees interviewed viewed were satisfied with security support they could access.

The piecemeal approach targeting different armed groups in different programs at different times has not worked. Each of the different programs targeted different groups. This had to do with the lack of a unified conflict analysis to identify who the AGEs were and where they were operating. Disarmament is unlikely to work without a settlement that includes all armed groups. The problem is not only disarming Taliban foot soldiers and commanders, but also strongmen and warlords, and their followers, many of which are not technically Anti-Government Elements (AGE) because they are in the government. As the Evaluation Team was told by an informant involved in the weapons collection program, it is not enough to collect weapons from Taliban members when strongmen in the government together with their followers all circulate with their arms. Their weapons also need to be collected.

There are also questions over what a program to collect weapons and reintegrate fights can accomplish among a rural population that is heavily armed at the individual and household level by tradition and where porous borders with Pakistan mean that any arms collected could be easily replenished. Given the small number of weapons collected, there are also indications that fighters tend to hide their guns and not surrender all that they have.

It remains unclear as to how the reintegrated fighters could be absorbed into the ANP or ALP. The Evaluation Team was told that the absorption depended on objective criteria (such as age) but that decisions had been left to the local level representatives of MOI, MOD and NDS. However, given the lack of trust, it is unlikely that the reintegrees would be able to join official government forces, leaving former fighters idle, and dangerous.
In the meantime, a process of re-arming and establishing paramilitary, semi-irregular groups as part of a framework and discourse of “community defence” forces, through the Afghan Local Police (ALP) referred to as Arbaki, could create tensions at the local level and would certainly erode the objectives of DDR and DIAG and APRP in seeking the de-militarization of Afghan society.

1) Reconciliation, negotiation and political outreach

On the political, negotiation front, the APRP came to replace the reconciliation initiative named Tahkime- Solh (PTS) (established in 2005) implemented by an Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission led by former president Sebghatullah Mujadidi, then Speaker of Mishrano Jirga, the upper house of the Afghan National Assembly. Initially based in Kabul, the PTS later expanded to open field offices in twelve provinces in the south, southeast and east of the country regions where the threat of the insurgency was highest. The PTS was abandoned and instead, the APRP established an HPC in 2010, administratively supported by the JS.

The PTS boasted to have reconciled 7 106 militants and arranged the release of 763 prisoners from prisons and detention centres. However, it too had no tangible impacts on the reduction of violence and insurgency. The PTS had failed to make headways in the peace process and gain political support.

The PTS faced a number of critical challenges: it did not have a publically available strategic direction, guidelines and known procedures, leaving the actual work at the discretion of individual officials in the field. There was a lack of public knowledge on actual budgets and working procedures of the Commission. Additionally, it was poorly managed, beset by allegations of corruption, and was eventually abandoned by donors. Other criticism included allegations that insurgents joined the process in order to get an official letter only to be able to move around freely without really giving up their causes; and that the program had either reached nor targeted, the main insurgents actively involved in combat, the majority of those reconciled not being involved in recent conflicts.

By the time the APRP led to the creation of the HPC with the JS as administrative support office, there were hopes for outreach to Taliban leadership abroad. While a more direct role for outreach with leaders that mattered was established, the linkages between the national level initiative and the field level reintegration was unclear. Furthermore, given that many of the representatives of the HPC were former Alliance members, or there was interest to work and show results in areas that were safe, many of the projects of the APRP were directed towards the north and north-west, where donors like the Germans, Italians and Spanish also had their presence, eventually moving the focus away from the originally envisaged insecure areas.

Lessons learned and applied by APRP

The APRP project designed and implemented by UNDP put more emphasis on developing an SOP on how to operate for the HPC and the JS. How much this SOP was publically available or disclosed enough to prevent allegation of incompetence and corruption however was not sufficient.

The APRP tried to target more closely those that were involved in conflict or fighting. However, it remains unclear to the Evaluation Team who these fighters were: Taliban members or local groups fighting on behalf of ethnic leaders of the north. It is for this reason that the appellation of “Taliban” became increasing changed with AGE, even though by 2015, technically these were not AGEs but local militias of government warlords.

Lessons unlearned or neglected

The work of negotiations and mediation at the national level required expertise, which went beyond UNDP’s traditional mandate. Not being involved in mediation and reconciliation at the national, UNDP’s role focussed on the efficient disbursement of, and accounting for, funds for technical development projects or the disbursement of salaries. Yet, the projects were not straight cut development oriented one and had to be directly linked to the peace building agenda, the nature of which remained unclear to all involved parties.

The SOP of the HPC and the JS was not publically available. The Evaluation Team was even told by a member of the HPC about the lack of knowledge of members about the budget available through the JS and allocations.

There was no clear communication strategy made available to HPC members and especially not communicated directly with the larger public. Communication and outreach strategies at the field/province level were left up to PPCs using traditional methods with the ulama.

2.3 Problems with Assumptions about Peace building Models and Modality

The main assumption of APRP was that by providing monetary incentives, the rank and file of the insurgents could be persuaded to peel away from the insurgency, putting pressure on the leadership whom would then be more ready to sit in negotiations with the government. The model of peace building was based on a narrow understanding of peace as the absence of conflict (negative peace), and not as positive sustainable peace that would require good governance, development, human rights, justice etc.

This narrow conception of peace (in terms of reintegration) from below, meeting peace (in terms of negotiations) from above, formed the basis of the theory of the change of the APRP program and the UNDP project. However, the very theory of change was based on wrong assumptions to begin with, assumptions that deserve critical scrutiny. The questionable nature of the assumptions underpinning the APRP is elaborated upon in Annex 4.

2.4 Relevance and Rationale of the HPC Structure

When the High Peace Council was established, it was supposed to replace the Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission that had implemented the failed PTS. Initially encompassing 68 members supposedly chosen by the 2010 Loya Jirga, the number rose to 73 by 2015. However, a number of design problem plagued the effectiveness of the HPC, not least being its size10.
Besides the membership of the HPC, two other structural problems, which stemmed from the initial design, damaged the potential of the HPC: the first concerned their role and the second, the resources available to them.

As far as their role was concerned, given questions over their competence and marginalization within government, they were ineffective initially in the role as mediators. According to one senior informant, it would have been better to bypass the creation of an HPC and rely on existing structures within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NDS or the NSC to prepare the ground for negotiations in a more subtle, behind the scenes manner. A structure such as the HPC was too large to maintain confidentiality around sensitive information.

The second design problem related to the creation of a JS to support the HPC in the implementation of the decisions of their members; in reality, because of the strong personality and connections of the JS leadership (in the person of Massoom Stanikzai), and the finances the JS controlled, the implementing structure was the real power. The position of the HPC was further weakened by the interregnum occasioned by the Presidential election, the contested results and the lengthy US-brokered negotiations required to establish the Unity Government; in this connection, the HPC and JS experienced over 12 months delay in the appointment of their respective chief executives with Pir Seyyed Ahmad Gailani, an influential, elderly Sufi leader who would most likely play the role of moral authority.

The HPC leadership gap further damaged its effectiveness and its legitimacy and concerned Window C donors, withdrawal of whose support was threatened in February 2016, which accompanied by press 10 The council’s 68 members were not initially chosen on the basis of their influence with Afghan tribes or their skills as neutral mediators. Rather, they were handpicked10 to appease and then divide the non-Pashtun political opposition (former Northern Alliance leaders) and broaden the political base among the President’s Pashtun constituents10. Membership was a way to legitimize support for the Karzai Administration. Some HPC members were established Taliban sympathisers, known to serve a Taliban agenda rather than the Government’s interests. The representation of women on the HPC, despite the considerable advocacy efforts in the run up to and during the Loya jirga of the AWF, was symbolic; the Evaluation Team was told, for example, that female members were not allocated cars (symbolic but nonetheless illustrative since male members had access to armored 4x4s), and had only a marginalized role in making suggestions (their views seldom, if ever, being sought). 11 Notwithstanding the unquestioned challenges experienced, the evaluation was informed that the HPC was instrumental in facilitating the exit to transfer of loyalties to GoAfghan of at least six senior members of the Queta Shura, including the former Finance Minister; one recent Queta Shura member, who had initiated preliminary discussions with an HPC representative in Dubai was assassinated immediately on his return home in Pakistan.

reports that the HPC members were effectively ‘foreign agents’. In early 2016, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US, reawakened hopes for more direct talks with the Taliban; revamped at the same time, the HPC membership was decreased from 70 to 50, the new composition comprising a more ethnically and politically balanced grouping than a strong team of negotiators. Even though the HPC is more inclusive now of women and ethnic groups (such as the Hazaras), it seems likely to remain as a side show to the peace process, not least because it has no legal status.

2.5 The UNDAF and UNDP Country Programme

The UNDAF, 2010 – 13 outcome was: Capacity in state and non-state institutions increased to contribute to overall stabilization and peace-building. The APRP’s outcome indicators were directly drawn from the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets. As such, the APRP was fully in line with the UNDAF and Country Programme.

2.6 Flexibility and Change

For the reasons outlined above, the initial design of APRP was relevant at the time of the writing to the political context, but a political context that was based on false assumptions that together were not likely to reach the desired outcomes. Since the project was implemented, a number of new factors came to impact on the project, many of which had not been taken into account from the beginning. These included:

1) The changing paradigm and support about negotiations at the geopolitical level. This means that while APRP was a way to nationalize the talks with the Taliban (or in other words put the Afghan Government in the drivers’ seat), by the end of the project, the support of other countries such as Pakistan the US and China were seen as necessary for negotiations. The return of external actors/guarantors downplayed the importance of the HPC and local structures at the field level that could impact negotiations.

2) The 2013 elections which resulted in huge delays until a coalition government was announced became the major force major that led to lack of confidence and disinterest among donors who consequently withdrew their support. The stalemate meant that disbursements stopped before the end of the project, dealing a heavy blow to the fulfillment of the projects’ objectives.

3) The impact of rising insecurity was also not foreseen in the APRP project design, which put all of its baskets on the hopes for a success of tow down and bottom up peace process.

4) Donor fatigue and demands for transparency, accountability etc. led to dwindling funds with donors, a factor that should have been taken into consideration from the beginning. While the assumption was that APRP project initiatives will start with donor money but eventually be cost-shared by the government, neither the Karzai nor the Ghani Government did much in terms of preparing for burden sharing.

At the operational level, a number of other elements could have been better planned to better fit the context of unpredictability: While the NDS may have known the potential number of reintegrees, given that they had started paying them one year in advance, this number was not properly communicated to the line ministries so that they could plan their interventions in the regions where expected to receive most reintegrees.

The project was also designed on the expectation that most of the reintegrees will be from the volatile regions of the south and East. However, most of the projects were implemented in the north and west. This factor had to be taken into consideration from the start.

2.7 Risks
2.8 The Results Framework

Like logical framework analysis, Results Frameworks (RF) should reflect a logical progression from planned activities through Outputs to Outcomes. The APRP project RF was developed in accordance with the UNDP Country Programme and Resource Framework, 2010 – 13 and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) of the same period. According to the UNDAF, the priority outcomes were ‘Good governance, peace and stability’, [incorporating] ‘stabilization process...strengthened through effective integrated United Nations support to the Government and communities [and the] ‘institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation-state’. UNDP’s Country Programme’s intended outcome was that ‘the capacity of state and non-state institutions was increased to contribute to overall stabilization and peace building’.

Within this context, the APRP’s intended outcome (as set out in the July 2010 project document) was that ‘critical institutions provide the enabling environment for peace and reintegration at the sub-national level’. This reflected the twin-track strategy GoI/RA developed in the wake of the London Conference and the CPG, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, July 2010, which sought to address peace-making at the national (through the HPC) and local levels (PPCs and encouraging reintegration). What is lacking, however, as a peace building project, is an explicit statement of change to describe the desired/expected future socio-political situation. This change would address a root cause of conflict, such as improved perceptions about security situation, improved inter/intra group relationships, increased momentum for peace, etc. There is also no plausible theory of change within and beyond the program logic, to say nothing of a testable and credible TOC. Successive Outcomes (viz. ‘Successful implementation of key components of the APRP’ and ‘Peace and Reintegration processes delivered through existing national programmes’ are necessary conditions for achieving the primary outcome; as such, they are possibly misnamed; in a logframe, for example, they would be termed Results, not the immediate objective or Purpose.

Setting that to one side, the RF established three Outputs for Outcome 1 and one each for Outcomes 2 and 3. Two of the three outputs that aim to promote the achievement of Outcome 1 are, however, essentially the same: thus Output 1.1 – Capacity for the implementation of peace and reintegration programmes in critical institutions developed (the indicator being the result of an activity, which, actually establishes the unknown baseline) – and Output 1.2 – Capacity for the delivery of peace and reintegration processes in the sub-national APRP governance structures developed – focus on institutional and organisational capacity building, which could as easily be expressed as a single output or result. Logically, one requires the necessary capacities within Government and programme management to deliver the programme; splitting this into two Outputs/Results is redundant. Output 1.3 addresses the necessity of communication of project purpose – peace and reintegration – and the associated mental shift within the population as a whole (both combatants and civilian community members) in order to accept the reintegration of ex-combatants within their communities.

Outputs 2.1 and 2.2 focus on the reintegration of ex-combatants; but it should be noted that Output 2.2 also focuses on organisational and institutional capacity development. Together with Output 3, ‘Peace and reintegration processes delivered through existing national programmes’, arguably Outputs 2.1 and 3 forms the meat of the peace-building project and are logical steps to achieve the overall outcome (purpose).

Finally, one output rarely contributes in any significant way to achieving one outcome, suggesting in this case the absence of an overall logical sequence in the RF.

Having noted this, however, there is a consistent problem with the indicators for all the outputs. Before turning to indicators for the Outputs, it is important to emphasise that there were hardly any targets and/or milestones for each province or in respect of the project, in general. This limited measuring progress towards Outcomes in a major way. The confusion between an output indicator and activity (Output 1.1) has already been noted. Furthermore, those for Outputs 1.2 and 1.3 are essentially the same - # of media campaigns; but, this only reports on an activity not the results of that activity, i.e. increased public awareness of the desirability of and means to peace. The inappropriateness of identified indicators continues in Outcome 2’s outputs: for example, measuring successful implementation of the APRP needs much more than numerical measurements since reintegrees require more than the initial process (disarmament and registration); key indicators for the success of this Output (as for the Outcome) include the number of jobs, self-employment opportunities created, a satisfactory level of personal physical and economic security and so on.

Much the same comment can be made with regard to the Outcome 3 indicator12; disbursements may be a measure of financial support to line ministries but they do not contribute to the project 12 It is also important to note that the Baseline is incorrect. LM national programmes existed: MAIL, MoLSAM, MoPW and MRRD all had pre-existing programmes, MAIL’s Agricultural Conservation Corps, MoPW’s Public Works Corps, MoLSAM’s TVET programme and MRRD’s NABP, NRAP and RuWATSIP (and other donors) already supported. Outcome/purpose. Rather it is the function for which the disbursements are made (e.g. # Reintegrees/Community Members engaged in national programmes; # benefitting from satisfactory levels of personal security; and # with permanent jobs) are far more telling indicators of progress towards peace and security.

Furthermore, means of verification for each indicator were not proposed. As things turned out (see below), this was a probable contributory factor to the project reporters’ emphasis on reporting activities, rather than Outputs/Results.

Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the Results Framework’s weakness is the reality that it was ignored. The project’s reporting, first, established its own five outputs, which bore little, if any, relation to those identified in the RF. Second, in general, even the inadequate indicators identified in the RF were generally ignored, perhaps, unsurprisingly, since the reporting structure outlined in the project document does not appear to have been implemented. Indeed, all the evidence provided to the evaluation demonstrated that first, a project-wide M&E system that was Results Framework responsive was never designed, not least since the respective secretariats (FCOS and JS) either did not have M&E capacity at the start of the project or the Technical Assistance provided (in the case of the FOCS) did not address their M&E design needs.
2.9 Conclusions

The main design problem of the APRP project has to do with a contested assumption from the beginning: that it would be possible to have a reintegration program in the absence of a peace agreement.

The design was based on a definition of peace that is the absence of conflict. Instead, it should have taken broader sustainable peace into consideration and built interventions in the context of not only projects of the government but reforms and policies.

Because it was based on number of false assumptions, the APRP project was not a logical path from A to B. The design therefore did not contribute to attitude change because it was based on wrong assumptions.

The Results Framework was inadequate and was not utilized as a project management tool. Arguably, had it been, it would have been adjusted to the experienced reality and proved utilitarian over the project’s life.