Peace Support Facility Mid-Term Evaluation

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Evaluation Plan:
2019-2021, Yemen
Evaluation Type:
Mid Term Project
Planned End Date:
06/2021
Completion Date:
06/2021
Status:
Completed
Management Response:
No
Evaluation Budget(US $):
50,000

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Title Peace Support Facility Mid-Term Evaluation
Atlas Project Number: 00118265
Evaluation Plan: 2019-2021, Yemen
Evaluation Type: Mid Term Project
Status: Completed
Completion Date: 06/2021
Planned End Date: 06/2021
Management Response: Yes
UNDP Signature Solution:
  • 1. Resilience
Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021)
  • 1. Output 3.2.1 National capacities strengthened for reintegration, reconciliation, peaceful management of conflict and prevention of violent extremism in response to national policies and priorities
SDG Goal
  • Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
SDG Target
  • 1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters
Evaluation Budget(US $): 50,000
Source of Funding: Peace Support Facility donors
Evaluation Expenditure(US $): 39,000
Joint Programme: No
Joint Evaluation: No
Evaluation Team members:
Name Title Email Nationality
Paul George Mr paulgeorge.paul@gmail.com
Ahmed Noor Al-Deen Mr nooraldeen.a@outlook.com YEMEN
GEF Evaluation: No
Key Stakeholders:
Countries: YEMEN
Lessons
1.

The evaluation team concluded that the evaluation occurred too soon, and that it would have been more apropos had it taken place, say, after six months (around December 2021). This would enable an objective assessment of progress and lessons learned.   At the time of the evaluation, the Facility has yet to achieve its core output goals and little could picked as lessons learned for replication.


Findings
1.

Effectiveness

Despite the clear objectives outlined in the Project Document and the revised approach to project selection and implementation, the evaluation finds that the Facility has yet to achieve its core output goals.

Although major investments have been, and are being, made to rehabilitate the Port of Hodeidah it is hard to see how this will materially influence the political situation on the ground. The conflict revolves around control of the port.

As for the progress against the overall PSF outcome, it cannot be argued that the project has contributed to the peace process given the significant volatility and insecurity that Yemen continues to experience.

The question of whether the purpose of the Facility is widely understood highlights the disconnect between the ambitious project outputs and the reality on the ground. In essence, the objectives and outcomes as presented are not measurable.

The Facility has demonstrated flexibility, responsiveness and efficiency in trying to support the work of the Special Envoy albeit, arguably, against almost insurmountable odds.


2.

Relevance

The Facility fits seamlessly into Programme Priority 1 of UNDP’s Strategic Plan for Yemen - Peace Operations Support - as well as with the Country Programme Framework’s objective of building a foundation for inclusive peace. 

 On the basis of being the funding mechanism that supports such activities, the Facility is highly relevant to the peace process.

Without the financial support the Facility provides, the Special Envoy’s efforts to reach a sustainable peace agreement in Yemen would not make headway.

The Facility has also demonstrated its ability to provide fast and flexible funding to a project that stemmed from priorities discussed by the parties in Stockholm. At the practical level, the Facility is much faster than normal funding instruments and more flexible than UNDP would normally be.

The projects being implemented under Window 2 are in keeping with the country programme’s objectives and the UNDP Strategic Plan as well as the attainment of SDG16. At this time, however, not enough progress has been made in implementing them to arrive at any definitive conclusion as to their impact.

The Facility is relevant conceptually, but it has, to date, focused too narrowly on supporting the outcome of higher-level political interaction. It embodies, in effect, a top-down process.

The Facility is too dependent on future political stability and falls short in addressing gender equality. Although it contributes ostensibly to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, it is not evident that these are objectives the project pursues deliberately


3.

Efficiency

Although there was a coordination group with OSESGY aimed at consulting on everything down to the agendas of the SCM and donor briefing, several interviewees have flagged their concerns over the lack of collaboration and coordination with the OSESGY, as well as limited information sharing from the OSESGY to the Facility.

At the operational level, the management of the Facility is widely regarded as being professional, accessible and efficient.

Implementation delays and cost overruns are not necessarily the “fault” of the Facility. Rather, they reflect the complex situation on the ground.

 Although the Facility hasn’t always been able to achieve what was expected of it, in general, it has proven to be valuable, flexible, adaptable, quick and efficient.


4.

Sustainability

A simple analysis in terms of outputs delivered versus the funds available to continue building on them indicates that there would be significant challenges in terms of assuring their long-term viability without continuing financial support from the donors. Yet, the lack of clear-cut exit strategies for all projects would appear to imply that the Facility’s programming will continue on the assumption that it always will. This is a dangerous misperception.

Donors have provided generous support to the Facility. However, in interviews, most were non-committal about whether they would continue their funding when the present project end date expires.

A comprehensive vision and strategy for the next phase of the Peace Support Facility has yet to emerge. The extension to December 2022 appears to be a stop-gap measure designed to maintain its presence but without any underlying strategic plan.

The evaluation concludes that the strategic priorities and areas of focus identified in the Peace Support Facility Project Document are a good fit with national needs and UNDP’s position as a trusted partner in Yemen. Although there has been a disappointing level of performance in key output areas this should not be attributed in any major way to any fault of the Facility.


5.

Cross Cutting

The absence of a dedicated gender specialist has left the Facility without a strategy to address gender issues systematically.

 


Recommendations
1

The Project Document should be revisited to enable opportunities for the Facility to engage in developing initiatives in support of peacebuilding in keeping with the objectives of the UNDP Country Programme Framework. This would complement the work of the OSESGY, not supplant it.

2

The Facility should support an international effort to learn from the experiences of other countries in developing gender-specific programming strategies, through virtual workshops or other kinds of information exchanges.

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