UNDP Outcome Evaluation on Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation

Report Cover Image
Evaluation Plan:
2011-2015, Iraq
Evaluation Type:
Outcome
Planned End Date:
12/2015
Completion Date:
12/2016
Status:
Completed
Management Response:
Yes
Evaluation Budget(US $):
150,000

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Title UNDP Outcome Evaluation on Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation
Atlas Project Number:
Evaluation Plan: 2011-2015, Iraq
Evaluation Type: Outcome
Status: Completed
Completion Date: 12/2016
Planned End Date: 12/2015
Management Response: Yes
Focus Area:
  • 1. Others
Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017)
  • 1. Output 2.1. Parliaments, constitution making bodies and electoral institutions enabled to perform core functions for improved accountability, participation and representation, including for peaceful transitions
  • 2. Output 2.4. Frameworks and dialogue processes engaged for effective and transparent engagement of civil society in national development
  • 3. Output 2.6. Legal reform enabled to fight discrimination and address emerging issues (such as environmental and electoral justice
  • 4. Output 4.4. Measures in place to increase women's participation in decision-making
Evaluation Budget(US $): 150,000
Source of Funding: Projects
Evaluation Expenditure(US $): 90,909
Joint Programme: No
Joint Evaluation: No
Evaluation Team members:
Name Title Email Nationality
Ashraf Hassan Bakr Ahmed Elsherif Team leader international M&E consultant ashraf.bakr@resultsegypt.org EGYPT
Abhijit Bhattacharjee International M&E consultant abhijit@results-matter.co.uk
Abbass Majeed Al-Bakry National M&E consultant abbass.qed@gmail.com IRAQ
GEF Evaluation: No
Key Stakeholders: UNOPS, UNESCO, UNIFEM, UNAMI-EAD, UNAMI-Pol, IHEC, Communications and Media Commission, Council of Representatives, MoWA, NGOs, political parties, MOPDC, CSOs, Media entities, Media professionals
Countries: IRAQ
Lessons
1.

Output 1

  1. The UNDP election programme has contributed considerably to the development of IHEC capacity to manage election processes, with acceptable levels of fairness and transparency. IHEC, however, remains in need for further support - primarily at political level but also to some extent at technical level - to safeguard its independence and neutrality, as well as its capacitated core civil service, against pressures emanating from an extremely complex and deeply divided political environment.

Findings
1.

Section 3: Evaluation Findings

3.1 Output 1: Strengthened capacity of the IHEC

3.1.1 Overview

Through this output, UNDP focused on strengthening the institutional framework, organisational and human resource capacity of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to carry out fair and transparent elections. Additionally, UNDP also undertook interventions for increased public awareness campaigns with effective support from the media and CSOs on electoral processes to encourage participation in elections and the promotion of independent media, and protection of press freedoms.Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) was provided through three major projects during the current CPAP: Technical Assistance to IHEC - Phase II: a 24-month project (1/2009 - 12/2010) with a total budget of USD 3,674,736 million from UNDG ITF. The project aimed to provide IHEC with essential and urgent technical assistance through securing the required number of international electoral experts and advisers for electoral events. Institutional Development Support to the IHEC: a 36-month project (10/2010 - 10/2013 for a total of USD 24,861,991 million from UNDG ITF.  This project provided capacity building support to IHEC to effectively plan, implement, monitor and evaluate its short and long term goals through application of best electoral management practices, policies and processes. Institutional Development Support to IHEC - Phase II: a 15-month project (10/2013 - 12/2014) with a total budget of USD 7.9 million (of USD 2,134,050 million from UNDG ITF and the remaining from other sources that were to be determined)


Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Civic Engagement Election Communication Donor relations Human and Financial resources Knowledge management Institutional Strengthening Technical Support Data and Statistics Civil Societies and NGOs National Institutions

2.

3.1.2 Findings UNDP contribution (continuation)

Overall IHEC capacity

The general consensus among those interviewed - from IHEC, UNDP, UNAMI, UNOPS as well as other donor agencies - is that IHEC now has adequate capacity to successfully manage election processes with minimal or no external support – during 2013-2014, the country had seen four successful elections at national and regional levels, and IHEC is now seen as a “mature” institution capable of managing its political dimension. The same assessment was made in the ROARs for 2013 and 2014. IHEC is regarded by the majority of key informants interviewed as one of the success stories of international assistance in Iraq. The ADR came to the same conclusion noting that the “support to elections has achieved considerable results as IHEC is now regarded as an institution that can run wellorganised elections.” That said, the voter registry remains quite a problematic issue which, if not properly addressed, may undermine the credibility of future elections. The current registry is based on the food rations system, inherited from the dictatorship era with all its inaccuracies. Key informants interviewed in IHEC, UNDP and UNAMI indicated that IHEC is considering moving to a biometric system. This is an overly-ambitious plan from both technical and financial perspectives. It also bears considerable data, and national and security risks, given the security situation in Iraq and lack of data protection infrastructure, legal or technical, according to key informants.


Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Election Risk Management Institutional Strengthening Technical Support Civil Societies and NGOs National Institutions

3.

3.1.2 Findings 

UNDP and UNAMI relationship

By and large, with regard to managing election processes and supporting the IHEC, the general view among those interviewed was that the two agencies - UNDP and UNAMI - coordinated well. Many saw the IEAT as a good example of how the three UN agencies - UNAMI, UNDP and UNOPS - came together in a concerted and coordinated approach. However, an issue that came up repeatedly in discussions as well as in reports was the confusion and tension over the division of roles between UNAMI and UNDP. The working relationship between the two entities seems to have been contentious with perceived trespassing into each other’s territory. There were instances when either agency agreed to or implemented an activity/ intervention with IHEC without consulting or coordinating with the other - an issue that did not go unnoticed by IHEC, as some IHEC interviewees also brought it up. There were also instances where UNDP was less consultative. The issue is perhaps more profound when it comes to reconciliation, as discussed in section 3.2.2. 


Tag: Effectiveness Sustainability Civic Engagement Election Partnership Country Government UN Agencies Peace Building Institutional Strengthening

4.

3.2 Output 2: Strengthening Council of Representatives (CoR)

3.2.1 Overview

This output was designed to contribute to the outcome of strengthening participatory mechanisms for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation through strengthening technical and administrative capacity of the CoR. The specific intermediate result expected from various activities under this output was to enhance the CoR’s capacity to support national dialogue and reconciliation. As per the CPD, the Council of Representatives was to be supported to improve integrity of operations, and to develop capacity for inclusive governance, gender and human rights through enactment of laws and strengthening oversight functions. Regional and sub-regional mechanisms were to be strengthened to support intergovernmental dialogue in a participatory manner so that these institutions can address development issues and respond to needs of vulnerable communities more effectively. Support to the Council of Representatives was provided through a 30-month project which started in 2011 and ended in 2013 and involved support to women parliamentarians, the administration (the Secretariat) of the Council and support to six parliamentary committees (covering programmes to which UNDP provided funding under other programme areas) with a total budget of USD 1.4 million from UNDP’s Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund and the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Additionally, the Strengthening Participatory and Accountable Governance Project (SPAG) which began to be implemented from early 2015 also focuses on strengthening the operational, outreach and oversight capabilities of the Council of Representatives. This is a 24-month project with a budget of USD 1,797,999 from SIDA. Broadly, this is a continuation of the previous project (Capacity and Support programme to the Council of Representatives “CoR”, 2011-2013), though the SPAG project document refers to it as a “new programme phase”, which “will consolidate the gains of the first phase”; and there was no specific reference to the previous project by title or number.


Tag: Effectiveness Gender Equality Gender Parity Women's Empowerment Civic Engagement Election Parliament Donor relations Country Government UNDP Management Conflict resolution Peace Building Promotion of dialogue

5.

3.2 Output 2: Strengthening Council of Representatives (CoR) 

Capacity building of CoR

UNDP’s major contribution and support to the women’s committee of the CoR in the current as well as the previous parliament has focused on amending laws that discriminate against women: discriminating sentences in the penal law, the personal status law specifically with regard to Article 2 on citizenship and the domestic violence law. UNDP provided the services of a parliamentary development expert to support the Secretariat of Council of Representatives, its research directorate, parliamentary development committee, women’s committee and the CSOs committee in developing the CoR Strategic Development Plan, performance evaluation criteria, and conduct capacity building programmes targeting staff. The research directorate helps parliamentarians on technical issues, budget analysis, etc., and UNDP helped their capacity building, including in IT.UNDP worked with the CoR at technical level, keeping itself distant from the political battles and turf war that go on among the parliamentarians and their staff who represent the various political and religious ideologies. This has not always been easy. UNDP suggested setting up a budget analysis office of the parliament at the CoR Secretariat for which it developed ToR and helped lead a consultation process. Initially it ran into difficulty as the Deputy Speaker of the CoR insisted on having staff recruited based on ‘quota’; UNDP rightly rejected this idea and insisted on merit-based recruitment, rather than religious and political affiliations. So UNDP dropped the idea of going with the budget office of the parliament and instead attached this to the office of the Speaker who was amenable to the idea of recruitment based on professional competence only. This will provide members of the parliament (MPs) and Advisors with budget and financial analysis to enable them to efficiently vote and approve the Iraqi National Budget and also support MPs to perform their oversight function.


Tag: Effectiveness Gender Equality Gender Parity Civic Engagement Election Human rights Justice system Parliament Communication Institutional Strengthening National Institutions

6.

3.2 Output 2: Strengthening Council of Representatives (CoR) 

Human Rights Commission

The first Iraqi government established post-2003 included a State Ministry for Human Rights for the first time in Iraq’s history. The initial task of this ministry, assisted by national councils, committees and CSOs, was to document the abuses of the previous regime. CSOs involved in the process not only partnered with the government, but also collaborated with the UN, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other international actors in the field of human rights advocacy. Subsequently, UNDP (and UNAMI) initially assisted the Iraqi CoR in establishing the first Independent High Commission for Human Rights at central level, and the independent Board for Human Rights at regional level.53 UNDP also successfully supported the establishment of the first Kurdistan Commission of Integrity.

The launch of the new Human Rights Commission was seen as a major opportunity to strengthen capacities of key government and non-governmental institutions to better promote human rights, and enable reconciliation. The Human Rights Commission, however, can hardly be called independent as its membership is allotted based on preagreed religious-political quota system, with each religious group (Shia, Sunni, Kurds and minorities) nominating fixed number of Commissioners to represent them. As the Commissioners (who are appointed at the same level as a Director General of a GoI Ministry) could not agree on a consensus candidate for a permanent chair of the Commission, a monthly-rotational system of chairing is followed. For the same reason, the Commissioners have also not hired any senior civil servant (at the level of DG) to head the organisation or to provide continuity when the Commission is reconstituted every four years with new members replacing the current Commissioners. After an initial phase (2012-2013), UNDP has not supported the Commission which is currently supported by UNOPS in the areas of staff capacity, IT, M&E, and equipment and furniture.


Tag: Effectiveness Civic Engagement Election Human rights Country Government Donor UN Agencies Capacity Building Institutional Strengthening Civil Societies and NGOs National Institutions

7.

3.2 Output 2: Strengthening Council of Representatives (CoR) 

CoR and national reconciliation

By and large, UNDP’s assistance to the CoR has been at technical level. Key informant interviews including with over half a dozen senior politicians and parliamentarians during this evaluation indicated that while UNDP’s (and UNAMI) continued engagement with capacity development and technical support for various Committees are helpful for the CoR, they would have liked to see greater engagement of the UN (UNAMI included) using its convening power and reputation and neutrality to facilitate dialogue at political level to facilitate a reconciliation process in the country. UNDP tried to engage with the CoR on reconciliation and brought in a consultant to develop a Community Reconciliation Strategic Framework. The framework focused on the role of the CoR and CSOs as well as ethnic minorities and religious groups in promoting and coordinating national reconciliation efforts in Iraq. However, the work of the consultant, according to parliamentarians, produced very little usable output (except a report of the consultancy) and certainly involved no process facilitation. Several interlocutors opined that UNDP tends to come up with its own idea of what the country needs, rather than facilitate dialogue to bring different political groups together. Such criticism was targeted at both UNDP and UNAMI. It is reported that during the year 2015, a Finnish peacebuilding organisation (Crisis Management Initiative - CMI) has been able to create a platform to foster serious dialogue among different political groups involving senior politicians in the country, and this has attracted attention of all major players including donors. The role of UN in this has been minimal, according to several senior parliamentarians. Added to this, turf war and lack of coordination between UNDP and UNAMI was mentioned by majority of the stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation as creating confusion in the minds of various interlocutors over the role of these agencies.


Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Civic Engagement Election Human rights Rule of law Human and Financial resources Policies & Procedures Conflict resolution Peace Building Promotion of dialogue Institutional Strengthening Technical Support

8.

3.2 Output 2: Strengthening Council of Representatives (CoR) 

CoR and national reconciliation

The situation changed during implementation, but UNDP did not change its plans as different communities were affected at different points in time. Since the project started with stakeholders from one particular area where communities were initially affected, when dynamics of the conflict changed and the same community was committing atrocities on another community later, UNDP continued to implement the project as per initial design. According to some key informants, this ran the danger of compromising UNDP’s neutrality. Similar comments were made by several parliamentarians interviewed for this evaluation to the effect that sometimes UNDP was seen sticking to its “own plans”, rather than accommodating what was actually needed by stakeholders. The reconciliation projects were premised on the expectation that lessons learned from these will provide a basis for engagement with various communities on peace and reconciliation, an assumption that turned out to be unfounded, given the complex dynamics of conflict and civil war raging in the country. As was observed in the ADR, “some regarded the projects as naively conceived. While the overall objective is relevant to the critical issues facing the country, these projects have not engendered wider interest; support was found to be minimal.


Tag: Challenges Effectiveness Civic Engagement Election Local Governance Parliament Conflict resolution Peace Building Promotion of dialogue Institutional Strengthening National Institutions

9.

3.2 Output 2: Strengthening Council of Representatives (CoR) - CoR and national reconciliation (continuation)

According to key informants interviewed in UNAMI, this document was thought to be a fully-fledged strategy for national reconciliation, developed and submitted unilaterally by the UNDP. The issue, it is said, escalated to the highest ranks of the UN mission in Iraq. It is understood that the issue has now been cleared, but this example perhaps serves to highlight the lack of joint, coordinated programming. Key informants reported that now the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) has put in place a mechanism (in the form of a task force) for coordination between the two agencies. Overall, UNDP’s contribution to reconciliation has been minimal. This, however, should be read in the context of the complex and deep-seated sectarian divide and extremism ravaging the country. As one senior UN staff put it, “now we are in a worse situation in relation to reconciliation than three years ago as all avenues are shrinking due to the fact that political space for dialogue is getting limited as all sides get polarised to the extreme.” UNDP is now changing tack and has begun focusing on stabilisation measures in areas which have been reclaimed from the daesh and/or where displaced people are returning to. Stabilisation activities include repair and rehabilitation of essential services like water, electricity and infrastructure to enable people to return, as well as supporting the local authorities and returning communities to take charge of the area. This is essential for subsequent dialogue and engagement for reconciliation at political level.


Tag: Gender Equality Gender Parity Women's Empowerment Civic Engagement Election Conflict resolution Peace Building Promotion of dialogue Coordination Institutional Strengthening Civil Societies and NGOs Displaced People National Institutions

10.

3.3 Output 3: CSOs engagement in national development and reconciliation processes

3.3.1 Overview

This output was intended to develop the capacity of CSOs to promote participation in elections and national reconciliation. Through a project ‘Empowering CSOs’ during 2012-2014, UNDP provided grants to CSOs selected through a competitive bidding process with the intent that enhanced capacity of civil society would promote citizens’ oversight in human rights, service delivery, integrity and transparency. The project was  administered through direct implementation modality of UNDP (DIM) and had 2 separate components: the UNDP component funded by UNDAF Trust Fund for US$ 2,221,818 and a UNOPS component for US$ 1,015,601 funded by DANIDA. Technical support was provided to participating CSOs for proposal development, institutional capacity building, and project management and implementation through training workshops and on-the-job coaching and support. As a follow up to this project, the SPAG project also focuses on establishing a permanent capacity development resource for Iraqi NGOs within the NGOs Directorate of the Council of Ministers Secretariat, and creating a civil society consultation mechanism at the CoR for Iraqi citizens to engage in legislative process.

UNOPS and UNDP have helped to build an enabling legal framework for Iraqi civil society, supporting the drafting and passage of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (Law 12 of 2010) and the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations Operating in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Kurdistan Parliament Law 1 of 2012). They have also supported development of the NGOs Directorate in the Council of Ministers Secretariat, the government agency charged with registration and supervision of Iraqi NGOs. UNDP’s support to the NGOs Directorate during 2015 has included technical assistance for development of NGOs database.


Tag: Civic Engagement Election Human rights Humanitarian development nexus Peace Building Technical Support Civil Societies and NGOs National Institutions

11.

3.3.2 Findings

Under the SPAG project, during 2015, UNDP conducted capacity assessment of CSOs and identified candidates from CSOs to be trained as Master Trainers - 25 trainers from all Governorates of Iraq were selected to undergo the TOT. UNDP continued to support the NGOs Directorate to effectively facilitate the NGOs work in Iraq. In doing so, UNDP recruited 4 national experts who started the development of the NGOs data-base. The data-base will constitute an accurate source of information and many reports can be generated to assess the capacity of CSOs, geographical location, reports and area of work.


Tag: Effectiveness Civic Engagement Election Local Governance Project and Programme management Quality Assurance Results-Based Management Country Government Donor Institutional Strengthening Data and Statistics National Institutions

12.

3.3.2 Findings (continuation)

It needs to be noted that civil society is increasingly playing an expanded role in the country, taking on several functions which were previously prerogatives of the state into their own hands. With increasing polarisation along ethnic and sectarian lines on the one hand, and ongoing conflict in different regions of the country, the authority and capacity of the national government to provide services is being eroded. As the state withdraws from service delivery, various individual and collective initiatives are taking over these functions. Many local enterprises have emerged to operate and manage local electricity supplies and water provisions in cities and rural areas. People are increasingly relying on local support and solidarity systems to meet their communities’ needs. Tribal networks are now the main security providers, and are even being used as proxies by the government in order to maintain stability at the local level. This is also leading to increasing politicisation of civil society as the sectarian and tribal divisions in social and political life gets superimposed on CSOs. This will have consequences for any peace building and reconciliation initiative at community level as Iraqi CSOs, unlike their western counterparts, are not independent from traditional social structures and political parties, including militia groups. 

Within these structural limitations, UNDP has done well to tread cautiously on providing support to the CSOs. However, a joined up approach by all major players who support civil society would have been called for in the national context. Key informant interviews indicated that with withdrawal of funding by most agencies, major agencies (USAID, NDI, Mercy Corps) which took a lead role in developing the capacity of CSOs have either wound down fully of partially most of their support to CSOs. This does not augur well for civic participation in national reconciliation in future. Politicised as they are, CSOs could partly bridge the gap between sectarian politics on the one hand, and communities’ needs on the other.


Tag: Effectiveness Civic Engagement Election Policies & Procedures Strategic Positioning Donor UN Agencies Conflict resolution Peace Building Capacity Building Civil Societies and NGOs

13.

3.4 Output 4: Women’s Participation

3.4.1 Overview

The fourth and last output designed to contribute to Outcome 1 was a clear focus on women’s participation in national and local governance processes. UNDP also works on gender issues through Outcome 3 at various levels including creating conditions for realising the full potential of women as citizens and significant contributors to development as well as through supporting implementation of Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council resolution 1325 for protection of women. 82 Under this output, the focus has been primarily on promoting women’s participation in elections and political process of decision-making.Gender equality is a core value of the UNDP, and an integral cross-cutting theme underlying its strategy, programmes and interventions. As such, it is not surprising that all projects under Outcome 1 (for which Project Documents were available) made clear and explicit reference to gender equality. Gender mainstreaming was well articulated in all projects, and a number of them had gender-specific results and indicators in their Results Framework.  


Tag: Effectiveness Gender Equality Gender Mainstreaming Gender Parity Gender-Based Violence Women's Empowerment Civic Engagement Election

14.

3.4.2 Findings Women in elections

Perhaps more important than numbers or percentages is women’s performance once they become members of parliament (MPs). Political parties regard the female quota as guaranteed CoR seats and, once elected, female MPs are regarded as secured votes when a bill is put to motion. Key informants interviewed in the CoR, IHEC and UNDP noted that very few female MPs are truly “active” as they are often expected to follow the lead of their male counterparts. A key informant interviewed in the CoR reported that when an amendment to the political parties law was proposed - to secure women’s quota in political parties’ leadership – even many female MPs did not vote in favour. This was also borne out in one study by UNDP which found that having gained their seats through nominations by their political parties, women parliamentarians tend to prioritise their parties’ agenda, and are less likely to speak out on gender equality issues. There were a few instances of individual women leaders who spoke out publicly on issues of interest to women.

This is a reflection of social conditioning and prevailing cultural attitudes that restrict women’s participation in decision making. The lack of internal political party democracy and the double threat of sectarian and gender-based violence make for a very challenging environment. Women candidates for governorate councils and the CoR face discrimination within their parties at the nomination stage, with preference being given to men. The 2014 Gender Inequality Index of 0.539 placed Iraq at position 123 out of 188 countries globally. It is not surprising, perhaps, that political parties have had no motive or interest in promoting a greater role for women in the political process.


Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Gender Equality Gender Parity Women's Empowerment Civic Engagement Election Human and Financial resources Data and Statistics

15.

Section 4: Assessment Against Evaluation Criteria

This section presents the findings of the evaluation along the four evaluation criteria.

4.1 Relevance

Alignment with national priorities and changes in context The CPAP 2011-2014 was based on the priorities and challenges identified in the 2009 common country assessment (CCA) and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2011-2014 which were based on the draft National Development Plan (NDP) 2010–2014. As can be seen from the Table 4 below, the Outcome 1 of the CPAP was rooted in the NDP vision of good governance based on participation, collective opinion and accountability as well as the UNDAF’s emphasis on inclusive governance.


Tag: Coherence Relevance Gender Equality Women's Empowerment Civic Engagement Election Institutional Strengthening Civil Societies and NGOs National Institutions

16.

4.1 Relevance 

UNDP approach and programme framework The results and resources framework (RRF) which flows from CPD becomes the guiding document for CPAP during its implementation. An examination of the results chain shows that the Outcome 1 indictors are clearly linked to the outputs. However, when output targets are broken down into projects which constitute one of the primary tools for delivery of UNDP programmes, lack of a theory of change (TOC) which analyses the contextual factors, drivers and inhibitors of change, and assumptions that underpin the activities’ potential to contribute to the outputs, becomes a limiting factor. Most project documents begin with a description of the situation followed by a statement of desired state and then moves on to identifying project outputs and activities. This misses out looking at change as a process, instead of being a simple input-output logic model. If programme designs were informed by a clearly articulated TOC, the analysis would have identified the assumptions that were being made, for example, in designing the two reconciliation projects or the limitations of the one-off interventions on CSOs. A TOC would have also provided the programme team opportunities to work cross-thematically to ensure that linkage between, for example, Outcomes 1 and 3 were leveraged adequately during programme planning and implementation.

As discussed in the findings section, while interventions on IHEC followed a coherent approach and built on long-term support that was being provided since 2005, support to CSO capacity development in particular was ad hoc, though with some contribution to short term output. Work with the CoR may have built some technical capacity, but this did not go deep enough toward promoting any dialogue on reconciliation. 


Tag: Relevance Election Operational Efficiency Policies & Procedures Project and Programme management Results-Based Management Strategic Positioning Theory of Change

17.

4.2 Effectiveness Progress on outcome and outputs, and UNDP contribution

Achievements under Outcome 1 do not represent a coherent picture; the level of effectiveness has varied from one output to the other making it difficult to arrive at an overall assessment at the outcome level. As noted in the ROAR for 2015, the “outcome is not yet fully achieved but is partially achieved.” This evaluation echoes the finding of the ADR: “Support to elections has been a flagship programme for UNDP, having achieved considerable results. Performance in the other programme areas of the outcome is reduced by the lack of synergy among programme areas, in meeting the expectations of the national counterparts and the small scale and stand-alone character of the activities undertaken.

Output 1 The UNDP election programme has achieved notable results and contributed considerably to the development of IHEC capacity. During 2013 - 2014, IHEC successfully managed four elections at national and regional levels. The consensus among all those interviewed, as well as all available documentation, consent to the view that IHEC is a “mature” institution and currently has adequate capacity to successfully manage election processes with acceptable levels of fairness and transparency, with little or no external support.  As discussed in section 3.1, UNDP’s support addressed both institutional and staff capacity issues through training and exposure which helped IHEC to adopt some of the best practices (e.g., the voter registry and complaints system) from different countries. The progress made over the years has given IHEC the confidence to hold elections without much external assistance. However, the ethno-sectarian politics which dominate all Iraqi institutions mean that total withdrawal of international engagement runs the danger of undermining the progress made in the future.


Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Civic Engagement Election Human rights Human and Financial resources Policies & Procedures Capacity Building Civil Societies and NGOs

18.

4.2 Effectiveness Progress on outcome and outputs, and UNDP contribution

Output 3. UNDP’s support to CSOs has had only marginal impact with regard to the creation of an improved political and legal environment for CSOs to engage in national development and reconciliation process. Engagement with CSOs has not been at a large enough scale to register a discernible impact. While UNDP’s support may have been effective in building the capacity of participating organisations, the extent to which this capacity contributed to the objective of promoting human rights, reducing corruption and holding the government accountable in service delivery remains unclear.

Output 4 UNDP has made some positive contributions to women’s political empowerment in Iraq. UNDP pushed for women’s representation in parliament and supported the adoption of reduced registration fee for women-only political entities and women candidates by IHEC. 


Tag: Coherence Effectiveness Impact Gender Equality Women's Empowerment Civic Engagement Election Parliament Partnership Policies & Procedures Conflict resolution Peace Building Promotion of dialogue

19.

4.2 Effectiveness Progress on outcome and outputs, and UNDP contribution

Partnership strategy

UNDP had a successful, long-term partnership with IHEC since the latter’s early days (then IECI). This has enabled UNDP to continue providing requested technical support to IHEC. The UNDP election programme came to an end in February 2015; since then, there has been no interventions with IHEC. For the most part, the IEAT was a good example of how the three UN agencies - UNDP, UNAMI and UNOPS - came together in a coordinated approach. However, there have been instances of confusion and tension over the division of roles and responsibilities between UNAMI and UNDP. The lack of a joint strategy between UNDP and UNAMI is perhaps more evident, and influential, when it comes to national reconciliation. This is an extremely complex and politically charged issue. In order to ensure the relevance and safeguard the efficiency and effectiveness of technical support and intervention, this has to be preceded by serious discussions at the highest political levels. In the absence of such political engagement, UNDP’s support to the CoR has had virtually no impact on the latter’s capacity to enhance national dialogue on reconciliation. UNDP’s partnership with CSOs to address reconciliation at the community level was short lived, and lacked a coherent strategy within UNDP itself to leverage the country programme in support of CSOs. Further, there are no indications of interaction between the UNDP and USAID which invested heavily in capacity development of CSOs when it comes to supporting CSOs in monitoring elections. 


Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Civic Engagement Election Human and Financial resources Monitoring and Evaluation Partnership Project and Programme management Quality Assurance Results-Based Management UN Agencies Promotion of dialogue

20.

4.3 Efficiency 

Resource utilisation There has been an overall realisation of 96 percent of planned budget for Outcome 1 during 2015 for which data is available. Data on outcome-wise utilisation for rest of the CPAP period were not available. Table 5 shows the total programme budget and expenditure, and utilisation ratio, for the duration of the CPAP. It is noted that overall realisation, at the programme level, ranged from as low as 66.57 percent in 2015 to as high as 76.83 percent in 2013.

4.4 Sustainability

The sustainability prospects of achievements made under the different components and projects of Outcome 1 are mixed. The fact that IHEC has successfully managed four rounds of national and regional elections in 2013-2014 at acceptable levels of fairness and transparency, with limited or no external support, is a strong indication the UNDP’s election programme has developed IHEC’s institutional and personnel capacities. The long-term strategic partnership with IHEC has enabled UNDP to effectively transfer knowledge from international experts to national staff which should stand the organisation in good stead for future. 


Tag: Efficiency Sustainability Resource mobilization Civic Engagement Election Human and Financial resources Peace Building Promotion of dialogue Institutional Strengthening Technical Support

21.

4.4 Sustainability 

The sustainability of any improvements in the capacity of CSOs is also uncertain. The number of CSOs that remain active in areas directly related to the Outcome has sharply declined over the past few years. Building CSO capacity is a long-term process that needs sustained engagement and support. The evaluation has found little evaluable data to comment on how UNDP engages with CSOs on other outcomes and the way the shortterm, once-off interventions under Outcome 1 were linked up with these. Women’s representation in the political life, at least in terms of numbers, is now enshrined in the Constitution. Actual participation in governance is a completely different issue, though. Gender equality, in general, remains a concern in a country with such a wide gender gap and absence of a national entity to advocate for and protect women’s rights.


Tag: Sustainability Gender Equality Gender Mainstreaming Women's Empowerment Civic Engagement Election Human rights Justice system Policies & Procedures Conflict resolution Peace Building Promotion of dialogue Institutional Strengthening Technical Support

22.

Section 5: Overall Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Findings

Output 1 The UNDP election programme has contributed considerably to the development of IHEC capacity to manage election processes, with acceptable levels of fairness and transparency. IHEC, however, remains in need for further support - primarily at political level but also to some extent at technical level - to safeguard its independence and neutrality, as well as its capacitated core civil service, against pressures emanating from an extremely complex and deeply divided political environment.

Output 2 UNDP has made some positive contributions to women’s representation in the parliament and has supported gender-sensitive review and drafting of legislation, besides strengthening some of the housekeeping and internal administrative capacity of the CoR. However, UNDP’s support to the CoR has achieved far less than expected and made very little contribution to the Council’s capacity to enhance national dialogue and reconciliation. This is primarily due to the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 which institutionalised sectarian divide through a quota system. That said, it should also be noted that UNDP projects in this regard were small, pilot initiatives. 


Tag: Challenges Coherence Effectiveness Sustainability Gender Equality Gender Parity Women's Empowerment Anti-corruption Civic Engagement Election Human rights Justice system Parliament Peace Building Promotion of dialogue

Recommendations
1

Recommendation 1: Maintain strategic relationship with IHEC and support to CSOs to ensure the integrity and inclusiveness of future electoral processes.

Senior management response: Importance of maintaining relations with IHEC is noted and understood. Current plans of the Government of Iraq  to hold next important round of elections of 2017 is reinforcing strategic nature of this partnership. These are the elections during which voters will choose provincial officials and council authorities. Despite the Mosul liberation and economic crises still dominating the country’s agenda, the country is already looking ahead to this event. It should be added, however, that maintaining working relationship with a Government institution with no financial resources whatsoever is rather difficult. The same applies to support to CSOs even though in this particular case, support and assistance available under other sources allows to bridge this gap. UNDP is looking forward to reactivate existing and start new partnerships with the Electoral authorities availing itself of its previous successful cooperation record.

While withdrawing regular funding support to IHEC is the right approach, this should not lead to total disengagement by the international community. UNDP needs to maintain its strategic relationship with IHEC, to enable the latter to safeguard its capacity, independence and neutrality amidst a complex, volatile and a highly-polarised political environment. This will clearly involve high-level political dialogue and, as such, UNDP is strongly advised to synergise its approach in this regard with UNAMI. Additionally, while UNDP may have no future plans for direct interventions, IHEC remains in need of support in particular areas - technical and non-technical. UNDP may be able to advise IHEC on prioritising its needs and identifying appropriate sources for such support, as needed. On the other hand, UNDP is advised to re-consider its support programme for CSOs in the area of election monitoring, so that the Iraqi civil society can continue to play its critical role in ensuring the integrity of electoral processes. 

2

Recommendation 3: Emphasis should be on a programmatic approach to addressing critical, complex development issues

Senior management response: Dedicated effort is being made to ensure cohesion and synergy within various UNDP programmatic intervention. It is being achieved through clustering a number of flagship interventions such as FFIS, ICRRP and LADP. In the meantime, other key issues and areas, such as reconciliation, gender and youth are also being looked at in terms of identifying and harnessing potential for mutual complementarity and multisectoral reinforcement. Continuous attention is also paid to synchronization of relevant interventions at federal and regional levels. This said, there is a lot more to be done on enabling comprehensive programmatic approach and this is expected to be a subject of series of internal discussions including programme retreat and the CO retreat next year, as well as of regular programme meetings. It should be added that this efforts are underlined to ensure programmatic approach based on respective pillars of the CPD.  

UNDP needs to ensure its operations under the new country programme is channelled through a robust, strategic and coherent programme approach to maximise synergies among and leverage its different components, if development results were to be achieved. While maintaining focus on intended results, projects and interventions under the new CPD should evolve in line with and in response to contextual changes and developments. This is particularly so given the complex and fluid nature of the Iraqi context. Related, projects under the new CPD should look at change as a process, articulate their theory of change, identify assumptions and be the subject of continuous, in-depth monitoring and results measurement. 

3

Recommendation 5: Develop a coherent gender strategy

Senior management response: UNDP CO is known for successfully mainstreaming gender in a number of programmatic interventions. However, when it comes to coherent gender strategy encompassing a number of major challenges women are facing in Iraq today, it is yet to be achieved. While difficulties in mobilizing resources for the purpose should also be brought up/mentioned, it should be emphasized that gravity of problems such as gender based violence and sexual exploitation, economic difficulties and drastic increase in number of households led by women requires special attention. This is further reinforced by rather unfortunate decisions of the national Government to abolish respective Ministries at all levels.   

Promoting gender equality in Iraq is made even more challenging due to the sociopolitical environment and dynamics. It is even more compounded by the absence of a national counterpart - ministry, commission, etc. - that is appropriately positioned and empowered to advocate for Iraqi women’s rights in a sustained and coordinated manner at all levels. UNDP may be well positioned and equipped to address gender issues at the community level through its stabilisation programme. However, there is clearly a pressing need for high-level dialogue to support Iraq in bridging the gender-related institutional gap. UNDP, therefore, needs to approach gender equality in its new CPD through a coherent strategy that has to be developed in partnership with other agencies. The Interagency Gender Theme Group, led by UN Women, of which UNDP has been an active member, clearly provides the mechanism to facilitate the development of such a coordinated strategy.

4

Recommendation 2: Develop an integrated approach to national reconciliation

The draft CPD 2016-2020 focuses on stabilisation in newly liberated areas to create conditions for the safe return of IDPs. UNDP’s proposed strategy clearly focuses on community-level reconciliation. However, stabilisation is no substitute for national reconciliation which, in a country like Iraq, is extremely challenging and complex and has to be approached in a balanced manner at both political and community levels. In partnership with UNAMI and all major religious/political groups and development partners, a coherent strategy for national reconciliation needs to be developed, through which entry points and engagement of different agencies are all well articulated and coordinated. The task force recently established by the SRSG offers the venue and means to a synergized approach towards national reconciliation among UN agencies. Without a coherent political approach national reconciliation in Iraq will remain a distant dream.

5

Recommendation 4: The CO needs to examine its monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management systems and practices in order to establish a continuous learning culture and approach to the implementation of the new CPD.

Among other critical factors, the effectiveness of the new CPD also depends on the institutionalisation of a learning culture in the CO. The CO needs to establish a robust and efficient monitoring and results measurement system, coupled with a functioning and accessible information and knowledge management system. Interventions under the new CPD should be the subject of rigorous monitoring and periodic evaluation - both of which should ensure the primary focus is on progress towards achieving intended results and, equally important, contextual developments. In-depth analysis should be at output and outcome levels, and should provide management with the valid information and wellfounded recommendations for any adjustments to the programme that may be due. The CO should ensure the integrity of its institutional memory in order not to undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of the country programme

6

Recommendation 6: Conduct an evaluability assessment before commissioning any evaluation in the future.

The establishment of a robust monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management system at the CO level is very likely to minimize the constraints future evaluations may encounter. Nonetheless, UNDP is advised to ensure that before commissioning any evaluation, an evaluability assessment is carried out to check and identify potential data that may or may not be available and the constraints an evaluation would face, if commissioned. 

7

Final Note

Since the submission of the final draft report (14 March, 2016), there has been numerous media reports of public demonstrations throughout Iraq but mostly in Baghdad, fuelled by deteriorating living conditions, rising unemployment and, mounting allegations of widespread corruption. On 24 April, 2016, hundreds of thousands of supporters of the prominent Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr heeded his call and marched to the Green Zone - where the government is based.100 Mr. al-Sadr wanted protesters to “compel” MPs to agree to the Prime Minister’s proposals for a non-partisan cabinet reshuffle. It was also reported that more than 100 MPs have been staging a sit-in in the parliament since mid-April to express their frustration at others who have blocked votes on the reshuffle. The situation escalated even further on 30 April, 2016 - the day this report was submitted. Supporters of Mr. al-Sadr broke through the barricades of the Green Zone and hundreds of them stormed Iraq’s parliament; a state of emergency was declared in Baghdad.The evaluation team had no access to independent, in-depth information of these recent developments; nor was it feasible to discuss these with any of the stakeholders. While the outcome of this turmoil remains uncertain, it adds weight to the call for an integrated approach between UNDP and UNAMI. Community-level stabilisation, as envisioned in UNDP’s new CPD 2016-2020, is no substitute for national dialogue and reconciliation. As a matter of fact, these recent events may well offer UNAMI the opportunity to leverage tactical pressure on all concerned stakeholders to chart a path for Iraq out of the sectarian division and political impasse it has been suffering from for a long time. The situation may also necessitate broadening UNDP’s scope of socio-economic development interventions beyond only the recently liberated areas.

1. Recommendation:

Recommendation 1: Maintain strategic relationship with IHEC and support to CSOs to ensure the integrity and inclusiveness of future electoral processes.

Senior management response: Importance of maintaining relations with IHEC is noted and understood. Current plans of the Government of Iraq  to hold next important round of elections of 2017 is reinforcing strategic nature of this partnership. These are the elections during which voters will choose provincial officials and council authorities. Despite the Mosul liberation and economic crises still dominating the country’s agenda, the country is already looking ahead to this event. It should be added, however, that maintaining working relationship with a Government institution with no financial resources whatsoever is rather difficult. The same applies to support to CSOs even though in this particular case, support and assistance available under other sources allows to bridge this gap. UNDP is looking forward to reactivate existing and start new partnerships with the Electoral authorities availing itself of its previous successful cooperation record.

While withdrawing regular funding support to IHEC is the right approach, this should not lead to total disengagement by the international community. UNDP needs to maintain its strategic relationship with IHEC, to enable the latter to safeguard its capacity, independence and neutrality amidst a complex, volatile and a highly-polarised political environment. This will clearly involve high-level political dialogue and, as such, UNDP is strongly advised to synergise its approach in this regard with UNAMI. Additionally, while UNDP may have no future plans for direct interventions, IHEC remains in need of support in particular areas - technical and non-technical. UNDP may be able to advise IHEC on prioritising its needs and identifying appropriate sources for such support, as needed. On the other hand, UNDP is advised to re-consider its support programme for CSOs in the area of election monitoring, so that the Iraqi civil society can continue to play its critical role in ensuring the integrity of electoral processes. 

Management Response: [Added: 2016/12/06] [Last Updated: 2021/01/24]

Recommendation 2: Develop an integrated approach to national reconciliation

Senior management response:UNDP and UNAMI work closely under the framework of the National Reconciliation Task Force keeping all the partners well informed about respective plans and developments through regular inputs into and ongoing discussion on the NRTF activities and pipelined initiatives. UNDP is leading efforts to analyze the impact of the military operations on inter-community dynamics and anticipate the various post-ISIL political scenarios that will stem out of a prolonged living under the terrorist organization, combined with demographic re-engineering. These efforts are currently focused on the city of Mosul and what would be the potentially destabilizing impact on surrounding and strategic areas in the governorate. UNDP regularly conducts in-depth conflict analysis and updates on the needs, local formulation and expectation of a reconciliation process to develop a targeted programmatic intervention. The conflict analysis not only underpin our strategy for reconciliation but they also inform our programmatic approach. UNDP  undertook a series of consultation back in August with CSOs, Human Rights organizations and Forensic organizations, as well as Iraqi leadership (PM office, NRC and the 3 presidencies’ office) towards developing and implementing an effective media communication promoting NR, which should be in development before January 2017. UNDP has been engaging actively with HRO to develop a Human Rights Violations database that aims to record all human rights violations in living memory, starting with the current IDP’s as a result of ISIL. This project should start in the second half of 2017 and should be done by 2018, and will lead to a series of recommendations that will be made to the international community, the UN, the government of Iraq and various bodies involved in reconciliation including the NRC and the 3 Presidencies committee for reconciliation.

Key Actions:

2. Recommendation:

Recommendation 3: Emphasis should be on a programmatic approach to addressing critical, complex development issues

Senior management response: Dedicated effort is being made to ensure cohesion and synergy within various UNDP programmatic intervention. It is being achieved through clustering a number of flagship interventions such as FFIS, ICRRP and LADP. In the meantime, other key issues and areas, such as reconciliation, gender and youth are also being looked at in terms of identifying and harnessing potential for mutual complementarity and multisectoral reinforcement. Continuous attention is also paid to synchronization of relevant interventions at federal and regional levels. This said, there is a lot more to be done on enabling comprehensive programmatic approach and this is expected to be a subject of series of internal discussions including programme retreat and the CO retreat next year, as well as of regular programme meetings. It should be added that this efforts are underlined to ensure programmatic approach based on respective pillars of the CPD.  

UNDP needs to ensure its operations under the new country programme is channelled through a robust, strategic and coherent programme approach to maximise synergies among and leverage its different components, if development results were to be achieved. While maintaining focus on intended results, projects and interventions under the new CPD should evolve in line with and in response to contextual changes and developments. This is particularly so given the complex and fluid nature of the Iraqi context. Related, projects under the new CPD should look at change as a process, articulate their theory of change, identify assumptions and be the subject of continuous, in-depth monitoring and results measurement. 

Management Response: [Added: 2016/12/06] [Last Updated: 2021/01/24]

Recommendation 4: The CO needs to examine its monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management systems and practices in order to establish a continuous learning culture and approach to the implementation of the new CPD.

Senior management response: The CO is currently looking into wide range of issues related to M&E under the overall effort to improve respective in house capacity. It should be added that previously undertaken effort to combine several related functions have yielded no desired results amid departure of key team members. In the meantime, this issue continues to be among top priorities given both current as well as project rapidly growing CO delivery warranting dedicated M&E capacity. As for knowledge management, dedicated effort is being made with special emphasis on needs of national colleagues. Special National Staff Capacity Development staff has been designed and is under implementation, with sizable resources invested to offer national colleagues career development opportunity through strengthening their knowledge and understanding of respective rules, procedures and regulations, and enhancing their ability to utilize toolkits available within the Organization.   

Key Actions:

3. Recommendation:

Recommendation 5: Develop a coherent gender strategy

Senior management response: UNDP CO is known for successfully mainstreaming gender in a number of programmatic interventions. However, when it comes to coherent gender strategy encompassing a number of major challenges women are facing in Iraq today, it is yet to be achieved. While difficulties in mobilizing resources for the purpose should also be brought up/mentioned, it should be emphasized that gravity of problems such as gender based violence and sexual exploitation, economic difficulties and drastic increase in number of households led by women requires special attention. This is further reinforced by rather unfortunate decisions of the national Government to abolish respective Ministries at all levels.   

Promoting gender equality in Iraq is made even more challenging due to the sociopolitical environment and dynamics. It is even more compounded by the absence of a national counterpart - ministry, commission, etc. - that is appropriately positioned and empowered to advocate for Iraqi women’s rights in a sustained and coordinated manner at all levels. UNDP may be well positioned and equipped to address gender issues at the community level through its stabilisation programme. However, there is clearly a pressing need for high-level dialogue to support Iraq in bridging the gender-related institutional gap. UNDP, therefore, needs to approach gender equality in its new CPD through a coherent strategy that has to be developed in partnership with other agencies. The Interagency Gender Theme Group, led by UN Women, of which UNDP has been an active member, clearly provides the mechanism to facilitate the development of such a coordinated strategy.

Management Response: [Added: 2016/12/06] [Last Updated: 2021/01/24]

Recommendation 6:  Conduct an evaluability assessment before commissioning any  evaluation in the future.

Senior management response: Noted and will be considered for future evaluations.

Key Actions:

4. Recommendation:

Recommendation 2: Develop an integrated approach to national reconciliation

The draft CPD 2016-2020 focuses on stabilisation in newly liberated areas to create conditions for the safe return of IDPs. UNDP’s proposed strategy clearly focuses on community-level reconciliation. However, stabilisation is no substitute for national reconciliation which, in a country like Iraq, is extremely challenging and complex and has to be approached in a balanced manner at both political and community levels. In partnership with UNAMI and all major religious/political groups and development partners, a coherent strategy for national reconciliation needs to be developed, through which entry points and engagement of different agencies are all well articulated and coordinated. The task force recently established by the SRSG offers the venue and means to a synergized approach towards national reconciliation among UN agencies. Without a coherent political approach national reconciliation in Iraq will remain a distant dream.

Management Response: [Added: 2021/01/24] [Last Updated: 2021/01/24]

Key Actions:

5. Recommendation:

Recommendation 4: The CO needs to examine its monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management systems and practices in order to establish a continuous learning culture and approach to the implementation of the new CPD.

Among other critical factors, the effectiveness of the new CPD also depends on the institutionalisation of a learning culture in the CO. The CO needs to establish a robust and efficient monitoring and results measurement system, coupled with a functioning and accessible information and knowledge management system. Interventions under the new CPD should be the subject of rigorous monitoring and periodic evaluation - both of which should ensure the primary focus is on progress towards achieving intended results and, equally important, contextual developments. In-depth analysis should be at output and outcome levels, and should provide management with the valid information and wellfounded recommendations for any adjustments to the programme that may be due. The CO should ensure the integrity of its institutional memory in order not to undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of the country programme

Management Response: [Added: 2021/01/24] [Last Updated: 2021/01/24]

Key Actions:

6. Recommendation:

Recommendation 6: Conduct an evaluability assessment before commissioning any evaluation in the future.

The establishment of a robust monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management system at the CO level is very likely to minimize the constraints future evaluations may encounter. Nonetheless, UNDP is advised to ensure that before commissioning any evaluation, an evaluability assessment is carried out to check and identify potential data that may or may not be available and the constraints an evaluation would face, if commissioned. 

Management Response: [Added: 2021/01/24] [Last Updated: 2021/01/24]

Key Actions:

7. Recommendation:

Final Note

Since the submission of the final draft report (14 March, 2016), there has been numerous media reports of public demonstrations throughout Iraq but mostly in Baghdad, fuelled by deteriorating living conditions, rising unemployment and, mounting allegations of widespread corruption. On 24 April, 2016, hundreds of thousands of supporters of the prominent Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr heeded his call and marched to the Green Zone - where the government is based.100 Mr. al-Sadr wanted protesters to “compel” MPs to agree to the Prime Minister’s proposals for a non-partisan cabinet reshuffle. It was also reported that more than 100 MPs have been staging a sit-in in the parliament since mid-April to express their frustration at others who have blocked votes on the reshuffle. The situation escalated even further on 30 April, 2016 - the day this report was submitted. Supporters of Mr. al-Sadr broke through the barricades of the Green Zone and hundreds of them stormed Iraq’s parliament; a state of emergency was declared in Baghdad.The evaluation team had no access to independent, in-depth information of these recent developments; nor was it feasible to discuss these with any of the stakeholders. While the outcome of this turmoil remains uncertain, it adds weight to the call for an integrated approach between UNDP and UNAMI. Community-level stabilisation, as envisioned in UNDP’s new CPD 2016-2020, is no substitute for national dialogue and reconciliation. As a matter of fact, these recent events may well offer UNAMI the opportunity to leverage tactical pressure on all concerned stakeholders to chart a path for Iraq out of the sectarian division and political impasse it has been suffering from for a long time. The situation may also necessitate broadening UNDP’s scope of socio-economic development interventions beyond only the recently liberated areas.

Management Response: [Added: 2021/01/24] [Last Updated: 2021/01/24]

Key Actions:

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