- Evaluation Plan:
- 2015-2020, Afghanistan
- Evaluation Type:
- Mid Term Project
- Planned End Date:
- 12/2018
- Completion Date:
- 12/2018
- Status:
- Completed
- Management Response:
- Yes
- Evaluation Budget(US $):
- 50,000
Mid-term Evaluation of the Project Support to Afghanistan Livelihoods & Mobility (SALAM)
| Document | Type | Language | Size | Status | Downloads |
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| Title | Mid-term Evaluation of the Project Support to Afghanistan Livelihoods & Mobility (SALAM) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atlas Project Number: | 00094515 | ||||||||
| Evaluation Plan: | 2015-2020, Afghanistan | ||||||||
| Evaluation Type: | Mid Term Project | ||||||||
| Status: | Completed | ||||||||
| Completion Date: | 12/2018 | ||||||||
| Planned End Date: | 12/2018 | ||||||||
| Management Response: | Yes | ||||||||
| UNDP Signature Solution: |
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| Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021) |
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| SDG Goal |
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| SDG Target |
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| Evaluation Budget(US $): | 50,000 | ||||||||
| Source of Funding: | Project Resources | ||||||||
| Evaluation Expenditure(US $): | 50,000 | ||||||||
| Joint Programme: | No | ||||||||
| Joint Evaluation: | No | ||||||||
| Evaluation Team members: |
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| GEF Evaluation: | No | ||||||||
| Key Stakeholders: | |||||||||
| Countries: | AFGHANISTAN |
| Lessons | |
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| Findings | |
| 1. | 2. Relevance The policy context for SALAM was the massive returns of Afghan refugees and asylum seekers from Pakistan and Europe which was at its height in 2016. How to absorb the very large numbers of returnees and how to regularise the opportunities for legal labour migration were high on the agenda of the Afghan government. At the Geneva Conference in November 2018 the Afghan Government acknowledged that a number of large-scale, multi-partner reintegration programmes are being implemented around the country in line with the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF). These efforts have been appreciated by the principal countries hosting Afghans, which have long maintained that voluntary repatriation and sustainable reintegration is the preferred solution for Afghans residing on their territories. However, it was also noted that, given the current humanitarian context and systemic development challenges facing Afghanistan, return and sustainable reintegration is a task that will require long-term interventions and investments, and which cannot be accomplished by the Governments in the region alone. Tag: Relevance Local Governance Policies & Procedures Displaced People Refugees |
| 2. | Afghan government policy Tag: Relevance Policies & Procedures Migration Jobs and Livelihoods Capacity Building Displaced People |
| 3. | One UN for Afghanistan A key element of the UN effort is providing capacity support to the Government to establish the required regulatory framework and strategy and promote the transition to productive employment and decent work. The mandates of the UN partner agencies in SALAM are anchored in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and committed to the principles of universality, equality and leaving no one behind. Tag: Relevance UN Agencies Agenda 2030 Leaving no one behind |
| 4. | Government of Finland policy Article 6 on Migration states that the Parties will work in partnership to tackle the trafficking and smuggling of human beings and will continue to engage in close cooperation aimed at preventing illegal immigration and the illegal presence of physical persons of Afghan and Finnish nationality in the other Party’s territory and will facilitate the return of such illegally present persons to their country of origin. Tag: Relevance Bilateral partners |
| 5. | 2.2. MOLSAMD MoLSAMD is mandated to work on labour affairs, social protection and welfare. For labour policy the Ministry has worked with ILO on employment strategies, Labour Law reform, international labour standards, migration, skills development, child labour and social dialogue. For skill development the framework is the National Skills Development Project (NSDP), which was one of the first National Priority Programs (NPPs) commencing in 2004. It preceded but was included in the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and retained in the 2017 ANPDF. Government policy is that other initiatives on skills development are supposed to be anchored within NSDP. The main and ongoing support to NSDP has been the World Bank-funded Afghan Skills Development Project (ASDP). There have been various projects in MOLSAMD that have skills development as an objective. The diagram below situates SALAM among these within a 14 year timeframe starting in 2004 with the launch of NSDP up to the present in 2018 and in the context of the Afghan government’s policy framework. It also shows the World Bank-funded PLACED, which is a project in preparation on managed labour migration. Two other projects are relevant to SALAM: Skills Assessment and Certification for Afghanistan (SACA) (2014-17) and Non-Formal Approach to Training, Education, and Jobs in Afghanistan (NATEJA) (2014-18). Tag: Partnership Results-Based Management Country Government International Financial Institutions UN Agencies Capacity Building |
| 6. | 2.3. SALAM design At the time of design in 2016, SALAM was a highly relevant project seeking to respond to a significant and urgent problem. It was designed jointly by UNDP, ILO, UNHCR and MOLSAMD and, at the point of signing the agreement, there was a strong sense of ownership and shared vision. This included a clarity of focus on the need to contain the problem of Afghans using informal routes of migration to Europe. The partnership between UNDP, ILO and UNHCR had the potential to address labour migration at policy level and to work on the nexus of relief and development at local level by building on UNHCR’s humanitarian base of support to returnees using UNDP’s long term approach to sustainable livelihoods. In view of the scale of the problem, the ambition for SALAM was high with a budget of US$120 million and scope across five provinces with linkages to the wider region. Tag: Programme/Project Design UN Agencies Migration |
| 7. | Theory of change SALAM works in two streams (outputs):
Each stream has a theory of change, summarised below and shown in greater detail in Annex 3. The framework project had a third output which was dropped when it became clear that the project would not be funded in full. However, although available funding from Finland was only around 4 percent of the desired, there was no change to the intended outputs. Such a level of ambition was unrealistic. Tag: Programme/Project Design Theory of Change Migration Jobs and Livelihoods |
| 8. | Beneficiaries At midterm, when the process of identifying beneficiaries in Nangarhar is only just starting, the target group has widened. It includes IDPs, in recognition of similar and sometimes greater need than returnees. It extends to members of the host communities, in recognition of the potential for conflict when the influx is massive. Women are an equity-based target group, further specified as IDP female heads of household, young women and girls, and women entrepreneurs. A second equity-based target group is people with disabilities. Inclusion also extends to unskilled labourers as an especially vulnerable group. The two recently issued contracts for delivery of job placement and TVET include quotas for women, disabled and youth. The additional rationale for inclusion of youth is that extreme vulnerability increases the risk of radicalization and recruitment for violent extremism. All these rationales are valid, and they are in line with donor commitments to invest in durable solutions for refugees, internally displaced people and sustainable support to migrants, returnees and host/receiving communities, as well as for other situations of recurring vulnerabilities. However, the result is that the criteria are so inclusive that almost everyone has the potential to be included. At the point that beneficiaries are to be selected, and in a context where opportunity and income are highly desired and contested, the process of selection is more likely to be mired in compromise than if it was more tightly defined. The challenge of identifying beneficiaries is exacerbated because the total number (originally 2,400 reduced to 1,400) is very small in relation to demand (estimated at more than 100,000 families). This will inevitably undermine the desired result of job creation and reduce the relevance of SALAM in the area that is most important to the donor and the provincial authorities. Tag: Migration Displaced People Refugees Vulnerable Youth Gender Equality Programme/Project Design |
| 9. | Labour market analysis Tag: Challenges Programme/Project Design Jobs and Livelihoods Trade and Development |
| 10. | Donor engagement Tag: Resource mobilization Donor relations Partnership |
| 11. | 3. Effectiveness During 2017 - the inception phase - all activities related to start-up and there was no progress on outputs. At the time of the MTE in late 2018 the project still cannot demonstrate results at output level although there are a number of activities underway that are heading in that direction. The slow progress, especially for beneficiaries is Nangarhar, is a source of frustration for all partners. For 2018 the indicators were refined and the number reduced. Targets were also revised downwards to be more realistic but were set as a cumulative total for 2019. Output 2: National and international employment opportunities for women and men potential migrants and returnees in Nangarhar are increased As with output 1, there was minimal progress on output indicators and targets set for 2017 were not reached. Likewise, indicators were revised for 2018 and new targets set for 2019. For indicator 2.1 the wording about completion of training reflects the fact that, although beneficiaries may graduate from SALAM training, there is no official certification process for the skills they attain. Tag: Effectiveness Capacity Building |
| 12. | 3.2. Activities At activity level, under pressure to demonstrate results, activities have finally gathered momentum. The table shows their status. The activities in the Annual Workplan were not revised during inception and have not been revised since. Establishment of a TVET Board is no longer appropriate as the government has established a TVET Commission in its place. Although a Board is still on the agenda, GIZ is the main and most appropriate partner along with an EU-funded investment to follow this through. Also not active is conducting a labour market review as the Oxfam assessment is fit for purpose. Tag: Donor relations Project and Programme management |
| 13. |
The activity which most interests the donor and the provincial authorities (DOLSAMD and the Governor’s Office) is delivery of competency-based training programs for priority trades. This activity has only just started with contracts recently issued to private sector providers for job placement (200 beneficiaries) and TVET (600 beneficiaries). When time was running short and the HACT assessment risk rating for procurement was significant, UNDP undertook procurement on the government’s behalf. Once the contractors were engaged, UNDP continued to manage the contractors rather than handing programmatic responsibility back to MOLSAMD to be managed by DOLSAMD at provincial level where the activities are taking place. At the time of the MTE the Director of DOLSAMD had not been officially informed of the activities and had not wished to meet the contractors until the necessary information and authority was provided. The most recently contracted consortium AVTI/PADO has not worked in Nangarhar previously and had not registered with the Department of Economy. This is important because, regardless of whether there is capacity to do so, DOLSAMD has responsibility for monitoring skills provision which is designed and delivered outside of government-supported systems to ensure that it does not fall short of national standards. In fact, due to shortage of time before the end of SALAM, the duration of training is too short to deliver the quality expected by MOLSAMD. But, as one of the National Technical Assistants (NTA) in Nangarhar has the title of Field Monitoring and Reporting Officer, there should be capacity to take on this role. These were very immediate factors that pose a high risk to successful completion of activities unless they are addressed with urgency (see factors affecting achievement). Outstanding are training activities for a further 600 beneficiaries under ILO’s management. At the time of the MTE it was not clear what form they would take. Tag: Local Governance Procurement Jobs and Livelihoods Capacity Building |
| 14. |
It is clear that there have been some shifts in project focus during implementation although these are difficult to track. At the higher level there has been a shift from emphasis on migration to emphasis on reintegration with a focus on areas of high return. The Annual Report of 2017 indicates that activities oriented to promotion of outward migration as a primary response to unemployment were replaced by those oriented to in-situ job-creation. There was also mention of increasing opportunities for host communities as well as returnees as an important conflict prevention consideration. However, one year on, job creation is receiving far less attention than training. This matters because a guiding principle of TVET is that it should be matched by job creation to mitigate against the potential to increase frustration among job-seekers who believe training will lead to a job. In the design of SALAM there is mention of strengthening the capacity of DOLSAMD’s Employment Service Centres (ESCs) because they serve the public as well as SALAM beneficiaries. It is not clear whether, or why, this has been dropped. Tag: Jobs and Livelihoods Capacity Building |
| 15. | 3.3. Factors affecting achievement The main factor affecting achievement is clarity of purpose. The intended outputs are set at an unrealistic level. Some of the activities are individually useful but they are spread widely and it is difficult to see how they connect to each other and what they add up to. In other words, SALAM lacks the kind of focus that would enable progress on results to be tracked. In output 2 there is a lack of clarity about whether the project is working on job creation or simply on vocational training. In fact most of the activities are about training but it is not easy to understand whether this has happened because job creation was assessed to be too difficult or inappropriate or whether, in the face of pressure to demonstrate results, it was simply missed. Tag: Challenges Effectiveness Sustainability Project and Programme management |
| 16. | Capacity A key contribution of the project is supposed to be capacity development. The approach taken is to add capacity to the ministry at national and subnational level in the form of NTA. The number of people, and their job descriptions, seem to have been taken from the framework project without consideration of the exact capacity problem that the NTA are supposed to be a solution to. The framework design does not include a capacity assessment and, although the subproject has implicit and explicit objectives of capacity development, there is no capacity development plan. The result is that the NTA have not been provided with clear direction and some have not been able to establish roles for themselves that are likely to increase the effectiveness of the project. Consequently NTA appear to be under-utilised. Tag: Risk Management Jobs and Livelihoods Private Sector Challenges Effectiveness Results-Based Management |
| 17. | Certification and standards The project discovered very late, during the development of the TVET tender, that a national assessment and certification system does not yet exist. National Occupational Skills Standards (NOSS) and course curricula have been many years in the making, including under the project NATEJA, but are not at the stage that they can be used to certify any training conducted under SALAM. This means that anyone who completes a course under SALAM will not have a recognised qualification. MoLSAMD will only be able to certify that they attended and completed training but not that they are proficient or reach the approved NOSS quality standards. In fact, as the duration of training is less than MOLSAMD consider necessary to acquire the skills to do the job, the training provided through SALAM is unlikely to result in proficiency. Tag: Challenges Operational Efficiency Capacity Building |
| 18. | Gender Tag: Effectiveness Gender Equality Women's Empowerment |
| 19. | SALAM is a very ambitious project in scope and far too ambitious within the timeframe. Output 1 is essentially about institutional development. Global experience is that institutional capacity development is a long term endeavour which can only be led from within government as part of the political process of reform. For that reason it is not easily influenced by development partners within the constraints of a timebound project. This output seeks to develop an institutional framework for labour migration. ILO research shows that Afghanistan is 10–15 years behind other South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan in instituting a proper system for governance of formal labour migration. Recent World Bank research, undertaken as part of the preparation process for the PLACED, shows that countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have taken two to three decades to build a fully functioning labour- sending system. ILO-led activities in this output are therefore unrealistic within a three year timeframe. This was already known as, for example, the activity relating to training on labour migration is an extension of work to develop a national training course that had not been completed in 2013 when the project ended and no further funding was available. Tag: e-Governance Migration |
| 20. | Output 2 relates to job creation and skill development. The experience of NSDP is instructive in terms of what is reasonable to achieve and within what timeframe. Many factors beyond the control of the implementing partners (MOLSAMD and MoE) limited achievement: the elections in 2009; increasing insecurity; entrenched bureaucratic structures; a high degree of centralisation of the public TVET sector; and high turnover in the leadership of the implementing ministries. One of the sticking points - essential if the quality of TVET was to be improved - was granting financial autonomy to public, project-supported TVET institutes, which did not have buy in at political level. The original Project Development Objective of the second ASDP was to increase the potential for employment and higher earnings of graduates from Vocational Education and Training institutions through improvements in the skills delivery system. When progress stalled in 2015, the project was restructured to focus more narrowly on improving TVET teacher competencies and curriculum in selected priority trades. In that case the reasons for slow implementation were: insufficient coordination between implementing agencies; poor procurement and contract management; and high staff turnover. Within that project was a sub component to develop a system for benchmarking and certification of competencies, led by ILO. In the light of all this experience it is not surprising that SALAM is not achieving as intended. Institutional capacity development takes a very long time. Not least, to be successful a range of relationships of trust must be built and that cannot be done quickly. When individuals move on, that relationship building has to start over. For international staff, who are used to delivering in tight timeframes this can be challenging and, when under pressure to demonstrate results, they may forego the relationship in favour of speed, as in the case of managing contracts. But this is a high-risk approach, which may damage the relationship with DOLSAMD beyond repair and have a knock on effect on the delivery of training. Tag: Operational Efficiency Procurement Capacity Building Coordination |
| 21. | 4. Efficiency At midterm none of the partners – MOLSAMD, UNDP, ILO, UNHCR and Finland - were happy with the progress made by SALAM. By the end of 2017, delivery was only 19 percent against target. For 2018 official figures are not yet available but the guesstimate for expected delivery at the time of the MTE is 30 percent for ILO and 80 percent for UNDP (actual delivery plus commitment). In order to protect funding for 2018 this includes expenditure on activities that have been initiated in 2018 but will not be delivered until 2019. Common concerns are the length of the inception phase, the slow pace of initiating results-oriented delivery, and the difficulty establishing a collaborative working relationship between partners. In Nangarhar, DOLSAMD has expressed concern about the delay in implementation in the province since at least March 2018. For MOLSAMD, an additional and major concern has been the proportion of the budget allocated to international staff costs. The inception phase lasted much longer than intended. On the side of UNDP, processes for recruitment and establishing the fund transfer mechanism between partners were prolonged. On the side of MOLSAMD, the change of leadership led to delays in some important approvals necessary to move forward. In part, the nature of some processes is that there are several steps, each of which takes time. But the failure to establish consistent and full time project management to follow through on start-up activities and to ensure timely delivery was a significant cause of delay in delivery. Tag: Efficiency Donor relations Partnership |
| 22. | 4.2. Project management Recruitment of other staff has also been slow. International positions were not filled until September 2017 for the Planning, Monitoring and Reporting Specialist (PMRS) after two rounds and December 2017 for the Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) after three attempts. Eight positions for NTAs are allocated. Filling the four in MOLSAMD was not easy but was eventually successful. In Nangarhar the Provincial Coordinator and the Senior Inter-Agency Liaison Officer (based at the Governor’s Office) were filled but both resigned and the posts are currently vacant. Tag: Project and Programme management |
| 23. | 4.3. National implementation Tag: Efficiency Implementation Modality Ownership Procurement Private Sector |
| 24. | 4.4. Institutional and governance arrangements Governance At strategic level the Project Board is the governance mechanism. Two Boards have been held, in December 2017 and June 2018. When the gap in project management due to the lack of a Project Manager became apparent, a Technical Working Group (TWG) was initiated. This has been successful in raising and dealing with important matters requiring decisions. However, in the absence of routine project management meetings that would normally be convened by a project manager, the TWG acted as a substitute. There does not seem to have been any control over who attended. In the June 2018 TWG there were Tag: e-Governance Project and Programme management |
| 25. | Strategic coordination Another coordination forum is the Labour Migration Working Group (LMWG), hosted by the World Bank to bring together partners and experts working to support the development of a labour migration management system. At provincial level it was hoped that there would be a P-DiREC. SALAM aimed to promote its success by placing a Coordinator in the Office of the Governor in Jalalabad. However, the recruit was never clear about the purpose of the role and there was insufficient support from Kabul to make it a reality. Subsequently the person resigned and there has been no further action. Nangarhar does have a Provincial DSWG in which UNHCR is very active. However, after energetic coordination in 2016 and 2017 when there were massive returns, the group has reportedly settled back into a less active role. ILO has coordinated closely with the World Bank during the project preparation for PLACED because of the close relationship between Output 1 and PLACED. Tag: Donor relations Coordination Displaced People |
| 26. | 4.5. Factors affecting efficiency The way the project structure (organogram) is presented (see Annex 5) does not reflect the NIM modality. Normally the top of the organogram would be the Project Director who, in SALAM, is the MOLSAMD Director of Skill Development. The Project Manager would report to him as well as, for accountability purposes, to UNDP. However, in SALAM, the PM reports only to the Head of the Livelihoods Unit in UNDP, as do the international CTA and PMRS. This, combined with the PM mainly being performed by a UN staff member in an acting capacity, has distorted the ownership of SALAM. International staff believe that they are working for UNDP, not the government. Even though the NTA are on government contracts, the fact that their positions are funded by SALAM has created the impression that they too work for UNDP. In the absence of a PM it would be reasonable to expect that the CTA might take a technical lead and the PMRS might take the lead on planning. This has not happened and there is a vacuum of leadership. The impression given is that everyone has a hand in everything but no-one is in charge. Combined with ambiguity around the outputs (see effectiveness section), the result is that SALAM lacks direction. The reason SALAM has lacked a permanent PM is supposedly because of the difficulty of recruitment. However, especially after the closure of several very large USAID-funded projects after the security transition in 2014, the kind of senior person who can manage a project and cultivate appropriate and respectful relationships with government can be found in the market relatively easily. Other agencies do not face the same difficulties that UNDP claims to have. Tag: Efficiency Implementation Modality Project and Programme management UNDP Regional Bureaux |
| 27. | 4.5. Factors affecting efficiency Capacity Capacity development has been covered in the effectiveness section. It is also an important influencing factor for efficiency. Like many ministries, MOLSAMD is still developing its capacity after the turmoil of the years of conflict and the sometimes capacity depleting effects of projectized donor funding. Since 2002, a solution to capacity weakness has been to add capacity in the form of international and national TA. If the added NTA capacity is strong it can, to some extent, compensate for weakness in the tashkeel (civil service).However, years of experience in Afghanistan and globally have shown that NTA is rarely successful at developing capacity and tends to perpetuate substitution. Often, NTA do not themselves have capacity due to the political economy of recruitment, which tends to favour nepotism. Tag: Efficiency Implementation Modality Operational Efficiency Oversight Capacity Building |
| 28. | Insecurity Insecurity does not directly impact on SALAM activities. However, ongoing and worsening insecurity in Nangarhar and mandatory UN security restrictions on travel does reduce the number of times and length of visits of the international staff. This affected the assessment of VTCs, which was done late and less thoroughly than desirable. It currently makes it difficult to monitor activities and to mitigate the risk of the inexperience of the NTA. Time Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Partnership Procurement Security |
| 29. | 5. Sustainability As detailed in the effectiveness section, activities are still in their early stages. This means that no comment can be made on sustainability. For activities relating to institutional development, the timeframe needed is much longer than the three years of SALAM. In fact, some of the activities of ILO are building on work that was started but not completed several years ago and, especially that relating to the normative role of the UN, is work that will continue indefinitely. For the activities directly benefiting beneficiaries, sustainability of the results of training and job placement will depend very much on the quality of experience the trainees receive. If it is high quality they may have improved job opportunities. However, since access to jobs is so heavily influenced by connections and networks, even high quality training may not lead to jobs. Low quality training almost certainly will not result in jobs. As previously discussed, the timeframe and the inexperience of the contractors means that the quality of training is compromised. Tag: Sustainability Jobs and Livelihoods |
| Recommendations | |
|---|---|
| 1 | Confirm the leadership role of the Project Director and recruit a Project Manager. |
| 2 | Develop an Annual Workplan for 2019 with realistically achievable indicators of activities so that SALAM can come to a satisfactory conclusion. |
| 3 | Revisit the governance arrangement especially the purpose and membership of the Technical Working Group, paying attention to appropriate hierarchy. |
| 4 | Revisit the role of the international staff so that MOLSA can re-establish ownership |
| 5 | Develop an exit strategy and consider the future beyond SALAM |
1. Recommendation:
Confirm the leadership role of the Project Director and recruit a Project Manager.
Management Response: [Added: 2019/04/25]
Agreed. The leadership role of the Project Director is confirmed under National Implementation Modality (NIM) and the project implementation is on-going. The Project Manager recruitment is also under process.
Key Actions:
| Key Action | Responsible | DueDate | Status | Comments | Documents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conduct monthly meeting with Project Director to ensure government ownership
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/06/09] |
Acting Project Manager and Chief of Livelihoods and Resilience unit | 2019/06 | Completed | Monthly meetings are being conducted with the national project director. History | |
| Conduct recruitment of the shortlisted candidates (Project Manager)
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/06/09] |
Acting Project Manager and Chief of Livelihoods and Resilience unit | 2019/05 | No Longer Applicable |
[Justification: Based on donor's decision and official letter, no new recruitment in 2019, will be carried out by the project. ] History |
2. Recommendation:
Develop an Annual Workplan for 2019 with realistically achievable indicators of activities so that SALAM can come to a satisfactory conclusion.
Management Response: [Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/04/25]
Agreed. The 2019 AWP with two new indicators and realistic annual targets has been developed in close consultation with the implementing partner .
Key Actions:
| Key Action | Responsible | DueDate | Status | Comments | Documents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Add two new indicators under the second output of the project
[Added: 2019/04/25] |
UNDP Programme Analyst | 2018/12 | Completed | Minutes of project board meeting. 2 indicators added and approved by the project board. | |
| Add realistic achievable annual targets
[Added: 2019/04/25] |
UNDP Programme Analyst | 2018/12 | Completed | 2019 AWP, revised RRF and Log Frame History | |
| Conduct a Project Board Meeting to approve the 2019 AWP with revised indicators and annual targets
[Added: 2019/04/25] |
UNDP Programme Analyst | 2018/12 | Completed | Minutes of project board meeting of 3rd Dec 2018 History | |
| Sign the 2019 Annual Workplan by the Project Board members
[Added: 2019/04/25] |
UNDP Programme Analyst | 2019/03 | Completed |
3. Recommendation:
Revisit the governance arrangement especially the purpose and membership of the Technical Working Group, paying attention to appropriate hierarchy.
Management Response: [Added: 2019/04/25]
Agreed. The governance arrangement with the purpose and membership of the Technical Working Group will be re-visited jointly with Ministry of Labor Social Affairs (MoLSA).
Key Actions:
| Key Action | Responsible | DueDate | Status | Comments | Documents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initiate monthly meetings with project director to ensure the ownership of government
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/06/09] |
Acting Project Manager and Chief of Livelihoods and Resilience unit | 2019/06 | Completed | Monthly meetings initiated with the project director. History | |
| Invite senior staff of MoLSA, UNDP, ILO, UNHCR and Finland Embassy to participate in the meetings of the technical working group (TWG)
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/06/09] |
Planning Monitoring and Reporting Specialist | 2019/05 | Completed | Senior staff of MoLSA, UNDP, ILO, UNHCR and Finland Embassy are regularly participating in TWGs. History |
4. Recommendation:
Revisit the role of the international staff so that MOLSA can re-establish ownership
Management Response: [Added: 2019/04/25]
Agreed. The role of international staff was and will continue be revisited. In view of the no cost extension granted exceptionally by the donor, the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) was not extended after December 2018. Technical support will be sought through ad hoc consulting and a higher involvement of the project national technical advisers. The Planning, Monitoring and Reporting Specialist (PMRS) will provide technical support to MoLSA and build the monitoring capacity of NTA staff to monitor the project. Project implementation remains the responsibility of Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as the UN project implementing partner.
Key Actions:
| Key Action | Responsible | DueDate | Status | Comments | Documents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monitoring Tracking Tools to be developed for SALAM project
[Added: 2019/04/25] |
Planning Monitoring and Reporting Specialist and Programme Analyst | 2019/03 | Completed | Tracking tools for contract management added to the existing project M&E system | |
| Capacity Development plan for NTA staff to carry out the implementation of the project
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/09/24] |
Planning Monitoring and Reporting Specialist | 2019/08 | Completed | This action completed on August 2019. History | |
| Start Implementation of the capacity development plan
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/12/16] |
Planning Monitoring and Reporting Specialist and PSRT | 2019/12 | Completed | This activity is completed. History |
5. Recommendation:
Develop an exit strategy and consider the future beyond SALAM
Management Response: [Added: 2019/04/25]
Agreed. In the project document, there is already exit strategy meanwhile, the project in consultation with all stakeholders will consider the future beyond the project. The exit strategy also includes collection and inclusion of project lessons of experience into the current UNDP research on population movements with UNHCR and IOM.
Key Actions:
| Key Action | Responsible | DueDate | Status | Comments | Documents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prepare an exit strategy plan
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/12/16] |
Programme Analyst, Planning Monitoring | 2019/12 | Completed | The Exit strategy plan that focuses on an improved capacity and understanding of project national technical advisory staff in the implementing agency (the Ministry of Social Affairs) to sustain project results as per RRF and logical framework and develop future interventions on reintegration and return based on lessons of experience from SALAM. History | |
| Organise a project board meeting to focus on exit strategy
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/06/09] |
Programme Analyst, Planning Monitoring and Reporting Specialist | 2019/06 | Completed | The Project board meeting decided to close the project by December 2019, as per the plan. History | |
| Closure of contracts, transfer or relocation of assets
[Added: 2019/04/25] [Last Updated: 2019/12/16] |
Programme Analyst, Planning Monitoring and Reporting Specialist | 2019/12 | Completed | This can be agreed in the 2019 July project board meeting. History |