



# CONFLICT ANALYSIS



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# 1. Executive Summary

The image that best describes the conflict dynamics in Guinea-Bissau is a serpent with the tail in its mouth – the ouroboros – an infinite cycle of destruction and regeneration, alternating between moments of crisis and hope encapsulated in the name of development programmes: *Djitu Ten*<sup>1</sup>, *Terra Ranka*.<sup>2</sup>

Independent from 1973, Guinea-Bissau has been faced with successful or attempted coups. With a population of less than 2 million, it is today the world's 12<sup>th</sup> poorest country and placed among the ten most perceived corrupt countries.

The country is trapped in a high poverty, chronic low growth dynamic. Guinea-Bissau's GDP *per capita* could have been 65-90% higher if not for its endemic fragility<sup>3</sup>. Successive governments have been unable to bring about structural transformation in the economy to reduce widespread poverty and generate sufficient resources for the State to ensure basic level of services for its population.

Weak governance and regulatory frameworks limit the capacities of the State to collect revenues and to effectively re-distribute gains and resources. At the same time, the rentier economy reinforces the underdevelopment of State institutions and deprives the State of resources for public investment as well as the potential for private investment and private sector development. Ultimately, the State is unable to ensure a shared prosperity for its citizens.

The lack of a functional state to promote, implement and support infrastructure investments, reforms and a macroeconomic enabling environment for human development has directly hindered progress towards all the SDGs, peace and stability.

The dynamics of instability in Guinea-Bissau show that there are structural conflict factors (root causes) at the political, institutional, security and economic levels that have not been addressed since the country's liberation from colonialism. On the contrary, these have been further aggravated by successive crises and conflicts such as the political and military conflicts of 1998/99 that affected public life in Guinea-Bissau until recent times. The following are root causes:

- a. Historical and Geopolitical Factors contributed to the creation of a State, not adapted to the society and highly dependent on foreign assistance

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<sup>1</sup> Kriol expression for *It is possible!*

<sup>2</sup> Kriol expression for *our land moving forward*

<sup>3</sup> IMF, 2015, World Bank, 2016.

- b. Undiversified and unsustainable economic system which has marginalised large sectors of the population, created and encouraged inequality.
- c. The persistent political conflicts that have roots in the incomplete consolidation of the political system, and the lack of democratic formal mechanisms to ensure broad participation (beyond political elites) in policy-making,
- d. The interdependent relationship of the military with political elites, contributing to the excessive size of the military budget on the State and resistance to reform by political and military actors.

Drivers of instability (fragility of the State and its governance framework, Impunity and Transnational Organized Crime) interact with root causes of conflict and exacerbate its effects throughout the political crisis. When confronted they could mitigate its effects.

Systems and processes to ensure accountability and transparency are weak and leave public administration permeable to highly informal [illegal] resource allocation and recruitment processes, making it a hotspot for chronic instability. Such weaknesses in the governance framework also fuel (and fuel) impunity which, together with the lack of state response to serious crimes and human rights violations, are catalysts for conflict: they fuel (and are fuelled by) conflict dynamics.

Like impunity, transnational organized crime that flourishes in an environment of informal economy and fragile institutions is a catalyst for conflict, both the cause and consequence of political instability and contributes to impunity in Guinea-Bissau.

The political crisis which began in 2015 brought the country to a standstill and paralysed the state for almost four years. A strong and coordinated approach of the international community, and a consensual framework to overcome the political crisis was key to avoiding the resurgence of old disputes and grievances.

Despite the absence of a consolidated State, Guinea-Bissau has a high level of social cohesion and inter-ethnic tolerance. A strong civil society, including women's organisations, is also gaining ground in the country. A new generation of leaders, including women, in different social areas is emerging from within civil society, and together with NGOs and the media is taking an increasingly relevant position in defending the interests of the local population, the environment and human rights. Young, urban and educated populations are contributing to increased public debate on good governance and political issues, requiring greater participation in political life and decision-making to ensure better access to basic services for the population. Guinea Bissau has also seen the mobilisation of the population in public demonstrations demanding respect for civil rights and the rule of law. Political instability has had an impact on the social fabric, and affected social cohesion.

Although Guinea-Bissau's macroeconomic situation has had some considerable macro-economic growth, these positive developments have not reflected in the reduction of poverty. Poor economic governance and unequal distribution of wealth, coupled with the reduction of

international assistance, persistent political conflicts and patronage networks continued to marginalise large sectors of the population, with a disproportionate impact on rural women and youth.

Persistent political conflicts stemming from the incomplete consolidation of the political system and diverse interpretations of the constitution continue to fuel political crisis. Civil society participation, alongside the international community in the facilitation of political dialogue contributed to the recognition that key reforms, in the political system, public administration, defence, justice and security, are needed to overcome cyclical instability.

The interdependent relationship between the military and the political elites has not led to the former interfering in politics during the recent institutional and political crisis. However, the influence of the military, as evidenced by government provided subsidies, cannot be overlooked. Provisions made in recurrent State budgets for the military are notable and incomparable to most public institutions. This privilege has fuelled resistance to any reforms, both from political and military actors. The Government continues to rely on ECOMIB to ensure security as national security institutions have limited capacity to deliver effective, accountable and inclusive services.

The fragility of the State and its weak governance framework has reinforced the tendency of public administration to resort to informal processes of allocating resources and recruitment in public administration. Attempts at implementing reforms are often met with resistance from those who wish to maintain the status quo, whilst a large portion of the population remains indifferent to and disconnected from the State. Widespread impunity continues to pave the way for patronage networks and the capture of State institutions by transnational organized crime.

In view of the drivers of instability and peace capacities identified in the conflict analysis, the following peacebuilding priorities, and entry points, for the UN transition and repositioning to address the causes of conflict are noteworthy. For each peacebuilding priority, the conflict analysis identifies entry points, which builds on peacebuilding capacities and addresses proximate causes and accelerators of instability.

1. Support and encourage inclusive and meaningful political dialogue and far-sighted reform of the political system for the implementation of urgently needed key reforms and strengthening of an environment conducive to long-term stability and sustainable development. In coordination with international partners, engage with a broad range of national stakeholders, supported by continuous national dialogue at the strategic levels on the above-referred to key reforms as outlined in the Stability Pact and Conakry Agreement, encourage and support national institutions to address corruption, CDTOC and poor governance practices. Incorporate a good office role to promote peacebuilding priorities, gender equality and respect for human rights and compliance with international standards.
2. Support the Government of Guinea-Bissau in strengthening democratic accountable institutions and enhancing the capacity of state organs to function effectively, in accordance with the Constitution, including through a progressively decentralized and

inclusive governing system, and a National Parliament which fully assumes its oversight role. And strengthening democratic governance, particularly with regard to the implementation of necessary urgent reforms on the path towards long-term stability and sustainable development.

3. Support an enabling environment to expand socio-economic opportunities and inclusiveness and implementation of fiscal policy and accountability. Furthermore, facilitate improvement in natural resource management and extraction, climate change mitigation as well as environmental protection.
4. Support the Government of Guinea-Bissau in its fight against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime through capacity-building and advisory assistance for an effective implementation of its National Strategy Plan and the introduction of innovative approaches, among which (i) the provision of high-caliber mentoring services to key Criminal Justice institutions, including through the investigation, prosecution and Case progression and management of actual cases; (ii) the strengthening or creation of oversight and accountability mechanisms, and (iii) the proactive, UN System-wide promotion of a conducive political environment, shielded from the nefarious influence of drug trafficking / transnational organized crime networks and their facilitators.
5. Strengthen judicial capacity and the national human rights protection system to effectively address impunity, promote and protect human rights, including through the adoption of a national policy on human rights, a strategic plan to combat impunity, the adoption of human rights responsive legislation and the establishment of a national human rights institution in compliance with the Paris Principles by providing technical assistance to state institutions to implement the reforms, and support the government to ratify the international human rights treaties.
6. Support the mainstreaming of gender equality concerns in all actions, with a gender, age, and diversity perspective and a lifecycle approach to "leave no-one behind" through the promotion of full, meaningful and effective participation and representation of women, and their empowerment at all levels - in the political dialogue, and in economic, peacebuilding and development processes. Support the revision of the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 (2000) to implement the women, peace and security agenda.
7. Support the efforts of the Government to ensure effective civilian control and oversight over the defence and security forces, through effective and timely strategies and policies that promotes political will and an adequate resource environment for the reconfigured UN presence in Guinea-Bissau to assist in the implementation of the Security Sector Reform programmatic implementation aspects, in close coordination with ECOWAS, as part of regular development interventions.
8. Enhance alignment of international assistance with the peacebuilding priorities of Guinea-Bissau, through agreed upon interventions with national counterparts. Ensure respect for core peacebuilding values such as inclusive gender-sensitive politics, participatory dialogue and reconciliation as well as environmental sustainability. ECOWAS' Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) to be used to complement the sustainable peace agenda, alongside the

so-called "Praia" Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa, signed by ECOWAS Heads of State in December 2008; as well as the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to Address Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crimes and Drug Abuse in West Africa 2016-2020 and its successor.

## 2. Background

The UN Security Council resolution 2458 (2019) requested the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) to reprioritise tasks and operate as a streamlined special political mission as of June 2019. The resolution called for UNIOGBIS to reconfigure after the conclusion of the electoral cycle in 2019 and gradually drawdown in three phases:

Phase 1: Electoral phase, that prioritises UN's support for the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 2019;

Phase 2: Post-electoral phase to focus UN's efforts in supporting the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement ECOWAS Roadmap and key reforms, and to initiate a planning phase for UN transition process, with full ownership by the Government and other key partners; and

Phase 3: Transition and closure of UNIOGBIS by 31 December 2020.

The transition is guided by the United Nations Secretary-General's Planning Directive on UN Transition Processes, and benefits from the experience and lessons learned from previous transitions, such as in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

As part of the transition in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS established a UN Integrated Transition Task Team (ITTT) to coordinate and implement the drawdown and handover of mission work. The Bissau-based ITTT is overseen and guided by the Transition Sub-Working Group of the Guinea-Bissau Integrated Taskforce. UNIOGBIS and the UNCT benefitted from a UN-Headquarters organised and facilitated country-specific transition workshop to provide the necessary guidance on policies and tools for managing the transition.

The tools include: a transition calendar; a matrix of transition activities with a timeline monitoring mechanism to guide transition-related activities and plans for handover of activities to UNCT, UNOWAS, national authorities and international partners; a conflict analysis; and a mapping of resources, assets and gaps analysis.

The transition coincides with the start of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the new UN-Guinea-Bissau Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the period 2021-2025 – a significant planning benchmark for the UNCT going forward. The Cooperation Framework will

constitute the UN's Transition Plan. This conflict analysis is therefore timely and will guide planning for the transition and reconfiguration of UN presence in Guinea-Bissau.

### 3. Methodology

The starting point of the analysis is a concept of conflict. Conflict is inherent to human interaction. Actors in different power relations compete for limited resources and may perceive their needs or interests to be incompatible with those of others. They may adopt adversarial or hostile attitudes and act in ways that can mitigate what can possibly compromise their well-being. Conflict is in this way transformative and may be acted out in violent or non-violent forms.<sup>4</sup>

Analyses of conflicts are necessary when the management of conflict is perceived to be lacking or is ineffective. This, we understand is the case for Guinea-Bissau conflict has manifested itself in chronic cycles of instability and State fragility.

Therefore, a conflict analysis<sup>5</sup> can be understood as a tool for the desired positive transformation. The preparation of this conflict analysis and the selection of tools were based on two key sources, the UNOWAS *Conflict Analysis Handbook* (2018) and the UN System Staff College's *Conflict Analysis Handbook* (2016).

This conflict analysis draws upon extensive desk-based research, contributions received from UNIOGBIS sections the UN Country Team, as well as UNHQ through the Guinea-Bissau Integrated Task Force and information gathered from consultations. Consultations were carried out with informants, including through focus groups, international and national academic institutions

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<sup>4</sup> This conceptual framework draws upon the following definitions of conflict:

*"Contradictions inherent in power relations, which manifest themselves in individual and group interactions with one another and with nature in the pursuit of limited resources or opportunities. Conflict is the motor of transformation and is neither positive nor negative. It can be creatively transformed to ensure equity, progress and harmony; or destructively transformed to engender acute insecurity"* (UNOWAS, 2018).

*"[A]n inevitable aspect of human interaction, conflict is present when two or more individuals or groups/parties presume their interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, emotions and take adversarial actions that can cause the conflict to escalate as parties' act to "win" or mitigate perceived interference or threats to their well-being. Conflict is a motor of change and can be waged violently, as in a war, or non-violently, as in an election, an adversarial legal process, dialogue or through other mechanisms."* (School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution - George Mason University).

<sup>5</sup> A conflict analysis consists of "...a structured process of analysis to understand conflict, focusing on the conflict profile (history and characteristics of conflict), actors involved and their perspectives, the structural and proximate causes and the dynamics of how these elements interact." (UNOWAS, 2018).



(INEP, CESAC and ISCTE); representatives from the security and defence forces, *Comissão Organizadora da Conferência Nacional* (OCNC)<sup>6</sup>, local civil society organisations (including two women's groups [*Conselho das Mulheres Facilitadoras do Diálogo*<sup>7</sup> and *Rede das Mulheres Mediadoras*<sup>8</sup>]; *Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos*<sup>9</sup>, *Tiniguena*<sup>10</sup>, *Rede das Organizações da Sociedade Civil para a Monitorização das Reformas*<sup>11</sup>); representatives from the judiciary system, from GITOC (*Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime*) and from national authorities.

Further to strengthening the participation of national voices in the process, the work sessions were jointly planned with a group of facilitators, the "Accra Group", who in part facilitated discussions. This group, a combination of national UN staff and local activists (two men and two women), took part in a training of trainers on conflict resolution, with funding from the PBF project "Support to women and youth's political participation, in Accra, Ghana, organised by UNOWAS, ECOWAS and the UN Staff College in May 2019.

### **Phases of the process:**

- a. Desk-based research and literature review at the level of UNIOGBIS Political Affairs Section to structure the analysis and identify patterns and knowledge gaps from previous analyses. The structure and the tools were adapted from proposals within the UNOWAS and UNSSC Handbooks cited above.
- b. Three workshops with four constituencies to include a diversity of national perspectives and expertise. UNIOGBIS PAS and the Accra Group team of facilitators worked together to prepare them.

- **Workshop on causal analysis and conflict dynamics with Researchers**

The Accra Group facilitated the session on 15 July 2019. Participants worked in groups to discuss the root causes proposed in the document and made contributions according to two matrixes prepared to structure the discussion. The discussion provided new elements to deepen the root causes and better understanding of the dynamics of instability.

- **Working session on stakeholder's analysis with Accra Group**

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<sup>6</sup> Organizing Commission for the National Conference (OCNC)

<sup>7</sup> Council of Women Facilitators of Dialogue

<sup>8</sup> Network of Women Mediators.

<sup>9</sup> Bissau-Guinean Human Rights League.

<sup>10</sup> NGO working on community and environmental projects.

<sup>11</sup> Network of CSOs monitoring the implementation of reforms.

This discussion on 16 July led to the readjustment of the categories and information on stakeholders.

- **Workshop on scenario-building with local partner organisations**

The Accra Group facilitated this session on 17 July 2019. Participants included members of national partners in the PAS-led PBF project “Support to political dialogue and national reconciliation”. They provided unique insights for scenario building, for identifying possible entry points, risks and opportunities, based on knowledge of conditions on the ground. The discussion was supported by a matrix prepared by facilitators.

- c. Consultations with UNIOGBIS and UN Country Team
- d. Consultation with the UN Integrated Task Force (ITF) for Guinea-Bissau
- e. A specific gender consultation with the participation of UN gender focal points, together with other gender, economy and political specialists, and women’s representations from Bissau and regional civil society
- f. Consultation and validation with the national counterparts

The final version of the document has been translated into Portuguese to facilitate consultations with national counterpart and validation.

## 4. Political Profile

Guinea-Bissau's emergence as a nation State was marked by immense challenges. In the fight for independence, Amílcar Cabral organized an armed struggle against Portugal, resulting in the liberation of the country. Importantly, he managed to start building a new nation whilst still an occupied territory. After independence in 1973, the challenges of state building, modernisation and industrialisation were overwhelming. Political and military conflict started to shake the foundations of the State especially since the 1980 coup d'état, the 17 October 1985 case, which culminated in an 11-month-long armed conflict from 1998-1999. This conflict pitted different factions of the political-military elite of the country against each other. From 1998 to 2012 recurrent instability resulted in Guinea-Bissau having: three elected presidents, none of whom could complete his mandate; three interim presidents, resulting from military interventions; ten prime ministers; four Chiefs of General Staff of the Armed Forces, who were removed from their post by the military, including three who were assassinated by fellow members of the armed forces.

In 2012, military officials overthrew the government before the second round of a presidential election in which the then Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior was the main candidate. Following a two-year transitional period, legislative and presidential elections were held in 2014, marking the return to constitutional order.

The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won both elections and José Mário Vaz was elected President of the Republic with the PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira appointed Prime Minister in a government supported by a majority in parliament (55 out of 102 MPs). The second largest party, the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), with 27 MPs, was invited to join the Government.

The return to constitutional order and the appointment of an inclusive government created momentum around a national vision for development and peacebuilding, as well as renewed hope for political change. The government program, "Terra Ranka", received wide international support at the donor conference in Brussels in March 2015.

This created momentum around a national vision for development and peacebuilding. Instead, the country plunged in another crisis that led to the intervention of ECOWAS and to the 2016 Conakry Agreement. But only in April 2018, the country progressively emerged from the crisis with the nomination of a Prime Minister of consensus and the appointment of an inclusive government, which primary tasks was the organization of the 2019 legislative and presidential elections. Expectations were high for the post-electoral period, for sustainable peace and stability, national cohesion and reconciliation, for a political consensus around a reform agenda, and for addressing development demands. However, the post-electoral crisis and political uncertainties have amplified the atmosphere of deep mistrust and polarized positions among political actors and among communities.

## 5. Analysis of Root Causes of Instability

The continuous instability in Guinea-Bissau shows that there are structural conflict factors (root causes) at the political, institutional, security and economic level that have not been adequately addressed since liberation from colonialism. On the contrary, these seem to have been further aggravated by political and military conflict of 1998/1999 and continue to trigger recurrent crises.

There are many competing interpretations on the root causes of instability in Guinea-Bissau. These can be grouped into external factors linked to historical and geopolitical factors and to the influences of the global economy, and internal causes, related to the national political system. Both dimensions feed onto each other and create a complex constellation of root causes for instability. Proximate factors (manifestations) of root causes, as well as triggers to the current political crisis, as they relate with root causes, are described in annex 1.

### A. Historical and Geopolitical Factors

Guinea-Bissau is impacted by strong regional and sub-regional forces, having maintained strong connections since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to Trans-Saharan trade networks controlled by regional elites (Green, 2016). Portuguese colonial occupation left deep marks on Guinea-Bissau, including what would later become the post-colonial state. Portuguese colonial power only achieved control of the territory in the late 19th century. Until then, numerous military campaigns were met with extreme resistance and revolts followed by massacres. Over the centuries, Guinea-Bissau was slowly integrated into a system culminating in the establishment of direct colonialism until independence in 1973.

The Cold War and rise of nationalist movements set the tone for the Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau liberation movement of the 1950s and 1960s. These nationalists drew on regional, continental and international connections to forge alliances at several levels and to integrate themselves in the dynamics of liberation movements, which were expanding throughout the African continent. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape-Verde (PAIGC) had strong ties with the pan-African movement, particularly with its West-African neighbours. The support that the PAIGC, led by Amílcar Cabral, obtained from neighbouring Senegal and Guinea, was the result of this strategy. However, it was not limited to neighbouring countries and extended to various countries of the then Organisation of African Union (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Ghana) as well as to other countries in the socialist bloc, and included support in the provision of arms, military and technical training as well as higher education and state-building.

In addition, Guinea-Bissau developed strong ties with other territories that, although separated geographically, shared the same language, identical history of oppression under Portuguese

colonialism, and, above all, the same desire to free themselves from the scourge of colonialism. The ideological trajectory followed by all five African countries colonised by Portugal had remarkable commonalities and, in many ways, was emblematic the general movement of Third World "radical" politics in the second half of the twentieth century. The resistance to colonial power and the relations established with other liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe (and with Cape Verde, through the liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) forged a sense of Lusophone community of resistance.

These historical ties and solidarity have certainly left positive milestones, and today, Guinea-Bissau is integrated into diverse communities. Examples of these influences are its multiple memberships in ECOWAS, AU and CPLP. This also means that the interests of other countries play out in Guinea-Bissau as witnessed during the 1998/1999 conflict (on 7 June), and in the various periods of crisis that followed (the most recent being the 12 April 2012 *coup d'état*).

Historical and geopolitical factors have strongly influenced the way Guinea-Bissau is integrated into the global order, on how it is influenced by the dynamics of globalization, or on the degree to which it is penetrated by external models and principles. These dynamics in combination with complex internal factors, contributed to making Guinea-Bissau an externally oriented economy: a state subject to a range of external interests and influences that would affect its internal stability.

This historical path has had an overwhelming impact on the structure of society and in its integration in the global economy and political systems. The colonial administration was mainly confined to coastal areas and focused on the extraction and exportation of natural resources. Portuguese colonialism operated on the basis of a deep social and racial segregation by creating socio-economic categories within the local population based on their "level of civilization" and degree of assimilation into "Portuguese norms and culture". This fuelled post-independence tension between Bissau-Guineans and Cape Verdeans (the latter were prominent in colonial public administration). Another level of division stemming from colonialism was that many were locally recruited into the Portuguese Armed Forces and served as "African Commandos" against fellow Bissau-Guineans during the liberation war. Most were virtually abandoned by the Portuguese State after the war and were subjected to post-independence retaliation, including executions, which generated resentment that has persisted to date. This legacy of divisions is still reflected in the social stratification and identities of contemporary Bissau-Guinean society.

The influence of such external factors in Guinea-Bissau can be seen in the processes that shaped the construction of the State over time. As a consequence, its structure and form were also the

result of the cumulative effect of different and contradictory strategies projected upon it, which disregarded traditional institutions and overlooked the aspirations of the post-colonial state<sup>12</sup>.

The State, which had become increasingly authoritarian, came under heavy pressure from internal and external forces to democratise, a process that had had little time to mature and remained incomplete. The economic crisis of the 1970s and the rising debt situation led to a change in the international paradigm on the role of the State in the economy. In the 1980s, Guinea-Bissau was subject to Structural Adjustment Programmes that had major impacts on the State, triggering government downsizing, and cuts in public spending, particularly in the health and education sectors. The State focused only on payment of salaries. This reduction of the State's capacity to deliver public services contributed to its fragility and concentration in Bissau.<sup>13</sup>

The State became ever more dependent on external assistance.<sup>14</sup> This further deepened the dynamics of extraversion (Bayart *et al.*, 1999): the State became dependent on international assistance, oriented to comply with the demands of its donors instead of those of its own population, and manipulated for the enrichment of elite networks. This aggravated the connection between the State and its citizens, especially the rural population. The State in Guinea-Bissau is thus the result of many "unfulfilled promises and incomplete processes" (Pureza *et al.*, 2007).

In the context of rethinking external assistance in the 2000s, Guinea-Bissau became a member of the international dialogue for the consolidation of peace and strengthening of the State (IDPS), launched under the aegis of the UN after the Busan declaration in December 2011.

This period also saw a shift in regional approaches to conflict resolution: from a conflict management approach to dealing with several threats to regional stability. ECOWAS entered a 'conflict resolution' phase from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, following the adoption of the 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security. This resulted in the establishment of key peace and security organs such as the Authority of Heads of State, the Mediation and Security Council, the Council of the Wise, and the Early Warning System, among others. In 2001, ECOWAS adopted the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which contained the important "Constitutional Convergence Principle" highlighting zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained through unconstitutional means. Equally important was its Article 1(E), which mandates that armed forces be apolitical and under the command of a legally constituted civilian authority. This paved the way for a more consistent role of the sub-regional body in support of Guinea-Bissau.

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<sup>12</sup> Pureza, José Manuel (2007) "Do states fail or are they pushed? Lessons learned from three former Portuguese colonies", paper presented at the 48th Annual Convention da International Studies Association, Chicago, 2 March.

<sup>13</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>14</sup> According to data from the World Bank.

## B. Economic system

Guinea-Bissau inherited an extractive economic model from the Portuguese colonial system, and the structure of the economy remains largely unchanged. The country remains an agrarian society with an economy based entirely on its natural capital, which represent 47% of per capita wealth, the largest proportion in West Africa.<sup>15</sup> The production and export of raw cashew nuts is the main driver of the formal economy in Guinea-Bissau and constitutes the main source of income for over two thirds of households.<sup>16</sup>

The World Bank (2016) describes Guinea-Bissau as a country rich in natural resources, with a rich biodiversity and ecosystems of both local and global significance, with the potential for unlocking currently untapped income-generating opportunities for growth. According to the Bank's assessment, economic growth is low and volatile, poverty is entrenched, inequality is high and other human development outcomes are weak. Furthermore, the economic base is undiversified and the business climate is unfriendly.

In the same study, the World Bank identifies as a cross cutting challenge stemming from endemic fragility and a weak governance framework, the establishment of a rentier economy and the related competition for rents among the elite. Cashew being an important element of this rentier economy.<sup>17</sup> Others include the appropriation of resources and budget through public offices which is another significant source of rents, as well as resource flows from illegal activities – such as drug trafficking, illegal fishing and illegal logging. The extractive economy system benefits the private interests of top political-business elites, while Guinea-Bissau remains the 12<sup>th</sup> poorest country in the world where about 56% of the population experiences multidimensional poverty<sup>18</sup>. Women are particularly affected by poverty and exclusion, owing to extreme gender inequalities, characterised by very limited land ownership, high levels of illiteracy and barriers to participation in policy and decision-making.

Inequalities are aggravated by an unbalanced distribution of gains and resources: according to the World Bank, evidence shows that even the modest economic growth recorded in the 2000s

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<sup>15</sup> Terra Ranka (2005)

<sup>16</sup> World Bank (2018) "Seizing the Moment: Managing public finance for development". *Guinea-Bissau Public Expenditure Review*.

<sup>17</sup> For an explanation of the concept of rentier economy, see World Bank (2016)

<sup>18</sup> Joint Work Plan 2019-2020: Outcome 1 (based on UNDP and UNICEF data for MICS 2016).

(assuming adequate redistribution) would have reduced poverty by over 8%. Yet since growth happened at the top, consumption fell for the rest of the income distribution, while poverty increased by 3.7%.<sup>19</sup> Likewise, although 55% of agricultural production is undertaken by women,<sup>20</sup> land rights limit their capacity to fully benefit from the result of their work. An unattractive business environment reinforces the *status quo* and impedes the emergence of local initiatives, which remain relegated to the informal economy.

The country is trapped in a high poverty, chronic low growth dynamic. Guinea-Bissau's GDP *per capita* could have been 65-90% higher if not for its endemic fragility.<sup>21</sup> Successive governments have been unable to bring about structural transformation in the economy to reduce widespread poverty and generate sufficient resources for the State to ensure a basic level of services for its population.

Weak governance and regulatory frameworks limit the capacities of the State to collect revenues and to effectively re-distribute gains and resources. At the same time, the rentier economy reinforces the underdevelopment of State institutions and deprives the State of resources with which to make public investment and provide basic goods and services.<sup>22</sup> Instability and fragility negatively affect the business environment, the potential for private investments and private sector development.

Processes of economic transition, first to a socialist-inspired planned economy and then to a liberalized market economy dependent on a cash crop, had neglected and were unable to accommodate informal economic practices and institutions, mainly oriented to satisfy needs at the family and at the community-level.<sup>23</sup> The shrinking of public expenditure in social areas prescribed by economic liberalization reinforced the reliance of certain parts of the population, from rural communities to urban youth, on informal economic schemes for subsistence and for paying for accessing services<sup>24</sup> and has trapped a large part of the population in political and socio-economic exclusion. Ultimately, the State in Guinea-Bissau has been unable to ensure a shared prosperity for its citizens.

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<sup>19</sup> World Bank, 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Relatório "Direito Económico das Mulheres na Guiné-Bissau: percepções, práticas, tendências e paradigmas" in: Tiniguena, 2015, p.47

<sup>21</sup> IMF, 2015, World Bank, 2016.

<sup>22</sup> 95% of capital spending in Guinea-Bissau is foreign funded. Public investment is financed de facto by external development assistance (Joint Work Plan 2019-2020: Outcome 1).

<sup>23</sup> Cateia, Júlio Vicente; da Silva, Igor; Rohenkol, Júlio (2018) "A mudança estrutural em Guiné-Bissau" *Revista Textos de Economia*, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 21:1. Florianópolis, pp. 97-124.

<sup>24</sup> de Barros, Miguel (s.d) "Economia informal e estratégias juvenis em Contexto de Contingência", part of the research project "Feiras Livres e Mercados no Espaço Lusófono: Experiências de Trabalho, Geração de Renda e Sociabilidade", envolvendo três centros urbanos (Praia - Cabo Verde, Bissau - Guiné-Bissau e São Paulo - Brasil).



Both the Pre-MAPS mission (2018) and the Fragility Assessment (2016) have singled out economic governance and public finance management, which, coupled with the country's lack of an effective whole-of-government and whole-of-society coordination mechanism for planning, implementation and monitoring, are considered stumbling blocks to the effective implementation of development policies and strategies.

## C. Political System

As seen above, the end of the Cold War, the third wave of democratisation and trends for economic liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s set the tone for pressure by international partners on Guinea-Bissau to transition to a liberal democracy and open economy. However, there was neither enough time nor adequately solid systemic conditions for an effective democratisation.

The Constitutional review of 1991 abolished the one-party system as well as the possibility for the military to occupy political posts. The number of political parties increased considerably<sup>25</sup>, resulting the new legal framework, but also from internal PAIGC splits. Political parties in Guinea-Bissau are fragile and prone to internal disputes over power and control that often spill over to the political arena. They lack coherence, internal cohesion and discipline (Chabal, 1996; Rudebeck, 2001).

These fragile foundations had an impact on the Constitutional text, which created a semi-presidential political system (maintaining elements of the authoritarian state), and its functioning, which depends on constant negotiation and dialogue between the branches of the government. Competing interpretations of the Constitution and the delineation of Executive powers, have left the system open to manipulation. The conceptualization of power as a zero-sum game, has led political actors to take a winner-takes-all approach to politics and governance. The power struggle has prevented successive governments from completing their terms and has led to a general paralysis of the State. The violation of the constitution and non-application of election results according to the popular vote has fuelled tensions and led in recent years to youth associations and women's groups challenging what they consider to be a violation of democratic principles, particularly in undermining popular will.

There is an absence of inclusive and constructive political dialogue processes, stemming from lack of capacities and skills, and the absence of established mechanisms of consultation that enable participation of different constituencies on policy formulation. These gaps have led to an inability to generate political agreements on priority reforms or to establish policy agendas. This reinforces the disconnect between the political elite and the people and has instead enabled the pursuit of

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<sup>25</sup> Based on the March 2019 legislative elections, now over forty.

agendas based primarily on the interests of the political, business and military elites. The lack of trust among the political institutions and actors, aggravated by grievances from the past and the need to navigate informal networks to access state resources, has eroded the notion of social welfare. Furthermore, without local elections, rural constituencies lacked effective engagement mechanisms that could bring the State closer to the people, and enable greater self-determination.

According to results from a research study carried out by the NGO Voz di Paz (2010) on the root causes of conflict in Guinea-Bissau<sup>26</sup>, the conflictual relationships among the country's political elite are related to a deficit of dialogue. While this could be understood in the context of an incomplete development of the democratic and institutional landscapes, Voz di Paz proposes another cultural reason - a culture of *matchundade* ("patriarchy"). The patriarchal system that thrives in Guinea-Bissau views power as a zero-sum game where there can only be winners and losers. Thus, negotiating to reach a compromise is perceived as giving in and losing face. Such an approach makes building trust between political actors exceedingly difficult.

Incomplete statebuilding and the lack of a transition to effective democracy had a particularly negative impact on the political participation of women and other marginalised groups. It is difficult for persistent barriers to gender inequality to be broken in the face of deep-seated gender roles and stereotypes, and systemic discrimination against women.

The rise of informal strategies and loyalty-based networks to access the State also restrict the political engagement of women. As a result, women tend to be more civically engaged through the informal economy, in civil society and at the community-level, where they have a greater opportunity to influence decision-making in informal ways, due to cultural norms that severely limit women's formal participation in leadership positions.

The absence of the State, especially at the local level, drives the population to rely on local and traditional systems of governance and dispute resolution. While these systems play a key role in addressing the gaps in service-delivery while fostering social cohesion, they also present clear limitations, including the exclusion of and persistent discrimination against women and side-lining of youth, whose legitimacy is at the same time being progressively eroded by modernisation, the cash economy, illegal practices and competing sources of authority. Furthermore, traditional systems are oftentimes not adaptive to new circumstances, and leaders often lack the skills and methodologies for dealing with the complexity of modern day conflicts.

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<sup>26</sup> Voz di Paz, Roots of Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau: the voice of the people. Voz di Paz/Interpeace, August 2010.

## D. The interdependent political-military relationship in the State and national politics

The 1991 Constitution enshrines an eternal debt of Guinea-Bissau to the freedom fighters who liberated the country from colonialism. These fighters came to constitute the post-independence military. Establishing civilian oversight over the military was not a priority for the new State as part of the nation-building process, and a lack of clear distinction between the military and civilian political actors endured throughout the first years of independence and the regime set up by Nino Vieira after the 1980 *coup*.<sup>27</sup>

At present, security and defence forces number about 8,500 men and women. Of these, the military accounts for about 4,000. There are about two soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants, a significantly higher ratio than other countries in the region, such as Senegal.<sup>28</sup>

As already mentioned, economic liberalization in the 1990s was accompanied by political liberalization with a Constitutional review that expanded the space for the inclusion of new political and social actors.<sup>29</sup> Among other things, it included the separation of the Armed Forces and the PAIGC, after more than 20 years of symbiosis. The party had to distance itself from those who intended to stay in the military structure, and the military was barred from accessing political office. These measures, and their impact on the Balanta ethnic group (which at the time made up about 80% of the military) aggravated tensions within PAIGC. The Party for Social Renovation (PRS) emerged at that time and capitalized on internal tensions within the PAIGC to consolidate its electoral base.

During the regime of Nino Vieira, grievances within the military regarding their socioeconomic conditions remained unaddressed. The 1998-1999 political and military conflict marked a resurgence of the military control over politics.<sup>30</sup> In general, the military were perceived as willing to remain an active stakeholder in political affairs. Since independence, the country has been faced with successful or attempted *coups*.<sup>31</sup> After the end of the conflict in June 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMGFA), General Ansumane Mané, clashed with President Kumba Yala, elected in the 1999-2000 elections, over changes in the military structure<sup>32</sup>. He was later killed in

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<sup>27</sup> Embaló, Birgit (2015) "Conflict Analysis: Guinea-Bissau", analysis commissioned by UNIOGBIS.

<sup>28</sup> Institute of Security Studies (2018) "Relaunching defence and security sector reforms in Guinea-Bissau", Policy Brief 5, commissioned by UNIOGBIS.

<sup>29</sup> Cardoso, Carlos (s.d.) "A Formação das Elites Políticas na Guiné-Bissau", Centro de Estudos Africanos, p. 24.

<sup>30</sup> Voz di Paz (2010) Roots of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau: the voice of the people. Voz di Paz/Interpeace.

<sup>31</sup> UNDP (2017) *Avaliação da Fragilidade – Guiné-Bissau*, p. 31.

<sup>32</sup> O'Regan, Davin; Thompson, Peter (2013) "Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa's First Narco-State", ACSS Special Report, The Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

late 2000, following confrontations with troops loyal to the President. Up until now, none of the Army Chiefs of Staff has completed the duration of their mandates.<sup>33</sup> It is worth noting that the current Chief of Staff, Biaguê Nan Tam, has been in his role since 2015 and his commitment to the rule of law was largely reiterated.

Since independence, politically motivated violence, characterised by a series of political assassinations of high-level political and military figures, notably the late President Nino Vieira and CEMGFA Lieutenant Tagme Na Wai in March 2009<sup>34</sup> dominated the scene in Guinea-Bissau. These assassinations have been linked to illicit trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, especially drugs and arms trafficking<sup>35</sup>.

Furthermore, the military have effectively managed to resist successive attempts of Defence and Security Sector Reform (DSSR) and ensure that the process is conducted on terms that are favourable to them. The DSSR seems to be currently deadlocked in Guinea-Bissau: the military equates reforms with compulsory retirement and economic loss<sup>36</sup>. The military deeply mistrusts the political elite and holds high expectations towards a pension fund and gratification scheme, which they hope will be funded by international donors.

At the same time, there is an undeniable and profound change in the behaviour of the Armed Forces under the current leadership of CEMGFA Biaguê Nan Tam. Following 2014, the military refrained from interfering in national politics. CEMGFA Biaguê Nan Tam continuously condemned any form of military intervention, stating that it is not the role of the Armed Forces to interfere in political disputes and promising to uphold the Constitution<sup>37</sup>. The initial change of attitude could perhaps be credited to their hopes for the promised pension and gratification funds and for the

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<sup>33</sup> CEMGFA Veríssimo Seabra and Tagme Na Wai were assassinated, CEMGFA Zamora Induta was removed from office in a coup and CEMGFA António Indjai was dismissed (O'Regan, Thompson, 2013).

<sup>34</sup> On 1 April 2010, there was an attempted *coup*, with both Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and CEMGFA Admiral Zamora Induta being temporarily detained by military acting under presidential instructions through Vice-CEMGFA Brigadier-General António Indjai, who was subsequently sworn-in as CEMGFA by President Malam Bacai Sanhá (at the proposal of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior). On 26 December 2011, another attempted *coup* took place resulting in armed confrontation on the streets of Bissau. On 12 April 2012, the military perpetrated a new coup in between the two rounds of the Presidential elections, during the run off between Carlos Gomes Júnior and Kumba Yalá. António Indjai again arrested candidate Carlos Gomes Júnior. This coup dynamic led to sanctions being applied by the UN against eleven elements of the Armed Forces, which were later extended to another ten elements at the request of the EU. The events in 2012 led to the deployment of a peace force in Bissau, ECOMIB, staffed by ECOWAS and funded by the EU.

<sup>35</sup> Shaw, Mark (2015) "Drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, 1998–2014: the evolution of an elite protection network" *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 53:3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>36</sup> Institute of Security Studies (2018) "Relaunching defense and security sector reforms in Guinea-Bissau", Policy Brief 5, commissioned by UNIOGBIS.

<sup>37</sup> Declarations to the newspaper "O Democrata": <http://www.odemocratagb.com/?p=16886> [access 19/7/2019]  
Declarations to Voz da América media <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/forcas-armadas-guine-bissau-biague-nam-tam/3218365.html> [access 19/7/19]

modernization of the sector; their interest in being taken off the UN sanctions regime (UN resolution 2048 (2012) and participate in international peace operations; and, last but not least, the desire to restore their historical image among the Bissau-Guinean population as well as the international community. This has also been credited to the attitudes of political leaders, who chose not to resort to the Armed Forces to resolve political disputes, preferring to bring these before the judicial system.

The Government continued to rely on ECOWAS troops (ECOMIB) for the provision of state security. Established in 2012 following the coup d'état, ECOMIB's presence had been requested by the Government and international partners to guarantee the security of State Institutions and support security sector reform.

Despite the mandate to support security sector reform (SSR), few steps were taken to implement SSR and the core issues for the reform remain unaddressed and no consensus has been reached by political groups on options for downsizing military personnel, including through (i) retirement and pension plans for those approaching retirement age (which are around 40% of the army), as reported in the World Bank Public Expenditure Review, and (ii) defining gratuities for soldiers qualifying for demobilization and reintegration

Parliamentary paralysis has negatively affected civilian oversight and control of the armed forces. Members of Parliament and civil society have not contributed to policy and budgeting-making of the security sector institutions. .

## 6. Drivers of Instability

Drivers of instability interact with root causes and accelerate its manifestations throughout political crisis. When addressed they can, on the contrary, mitigate its effects.

### A. Weak governance framework

Guinea-Bissau is one of the most fragile states in the African continent. As explored above, this fragility was influenced by external factors and further aggravated by endogenous national level factors. The PAIGC understood the potential of education for emancipation<sup>38</sup>: even during the war for liberation, a network of schools was created throughout the country in “liberated areas”, as well as a pilot school in Guinea Conakry. After independence, the fight against illiteracy was inspired by the model of pedagogy of Paulo Freire, who resided in the country from 1977-1979, including mobile literacy brigades and *theatre of the oppressed* techniques. The State invested in expanding access to and improving the quality of education. Students benefited from civic and political education, artisanal work, music lessons, and practical training. The PAIGC advocated for the role of education in preparing citizens to be civically engaged in advancing the social transformation of their societies.

However, these initial efforts were not sustained and were subsequently undermined by political and economic crisis. In addition, State institutions and initiatives became concentrated in the capital and detached from the regional community-based administration. As pointed out by Barros and Rivera<sup>39</sup>, the benefits of the State are perceived by people as being very limited. Indeed, the involvement of the State in the lives of the majority of the population is marginal and often manifests itself in a coercive way (e.g. through tax collection). This generates resistance to State actions and mistrust of external assistance. The population has therefore developed informal strategies to subsist, especially in rural areas<sup>40</sup>.

In areas such as public administration, access to justice, security sector, taxation and revenues, and the reform of the political system, such as the reform of the Constitution, successive attempts

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<sup>38</sup> This paragraph draws on the interview to Miguel de Barros by Raquel Paris featured in the magazine “Periferias”, April 2019.

<sup>39</sup> De Barros, Miguel; Rivera, Oscar (2011) “A (Re) Construção do Estado no contexto de Estados Frágeis: o Caso da Guiné-Bissau”, paper presented at the II Congresso Internacional “África-Occidente” Corresponsabilidad En El Desarrollo.

<sup>40</sup> *Idem*.

to support the state in addressing the needs of the population, through the implementation of key reforms have historically faced strong opposition. The fragility of state institutions and difficulties in the implementation of its regulatory frameworks created the space for elites to engage in corrupt practices and violation of administrative procedures.<sup>41</sup> Securing jobs, promotions, loans, contracts and licenses became dependent on informal relations and networks rather than on merit. Furthermore, some institutions have become co-opted by illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, through what Shaw terms as “the political economy of protection”<sup>42</sup>, controlled by a political, economic and military elite that uses protection as a strategy to facilitate and sustain illegal activities.

The weak governance system and resistance to reforms, which negatively affect the capacity of public administration to deliver, are also the consequence of the brain drain, resulting from the non-implementation of the careers statutes, and alternative opportunities with International Organizations and CSOs. This aggravates the gap in the level of expertise and qualifications of human resources serving in the State apparatus, which coupled with the high illiteracy rate remains a tremendous obstacle for any State reform process and for upholding standardized, accountable and transparent public processes. Illiteracy, which disproportionately affects women and girls, prevents the constitution of an informed and active citizenry, which can articulate demands and hold the State accountable for unfulfilled responsibilities, and is a pillar of any democratic system. This also explains the low number of women in the public service.

Root Causes	Driver	Accelerators	Transformation (transformations will be analysed in the next chapters)
Historical and Geopolitical Factors	Weak governance framework impact on the capacity of the State to provide basic services and goods to satisfy the needs of the population and promotes inequalities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of trust of International partners in the capacity of the State to implement reforms , and consequent lack of investment</li> <li>Brain drain; better opportunities in projects led by international partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some State institutions were able to attract international partners interest</li> <li>Early attempts at developing an education system date from the post-independence period</li> </ul>
Undiversified and unsustainable economic system		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The State is perceived as the only employment opportunity beyond subsistence agriculture;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Informal strategies to subsist, especially in rural areas - strategies of resilience</li> </ul>

<sup>41</sup> Cardoso, Carlos (s.d.) “A Formação das Elites Políticas na Guiné-Bissau”, Centro de Estudos Africanos, p. 28.

<sup>42</sup> Shaw, Mark (2015) “Drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, 1998–2014: the evolution of an elite protection network” *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 53:3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 341.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of economic governance and public finance management leading to corruption and related economic crimes;</li> <li>• Socio-economic exclusion, disproportionately impacting women and youth</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Informal economy</li> <li>• Treasury Committee</li> </ul>
<b>Persistent conflicts stemming from the incomplete State Building</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The centralized State only provides limited basic services in the capital and is unable to provide these outside the capital and unable/unwilling to implement local governance systems</li> <li>• Lack of systems and processes (and/or lack of implementation of existing processes) to ensure transparency and accountability in public administration</li> <li>• Space for elites to engage in practices of corruption and violation of administrative procedure</li> <li>• State perceived as coercive (tax collection) and not bringing benefits - resistance to State actions and mistrust of external assistance</li> <li>• Resistance to reforms</li> <li>• Co-opted by illegal activities, including corruption and organized crime</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some State institutions could overcome these challenges – based on respect for systems and processes and proximity to the population and/or international partners</li> </ul>
<b>Interdependent political-military relationship</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political interference in public administration (including security, defence and justice sectors)</li> <li>• Weight of military expenditure in State Budget</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Non-interference by the armed forces in the recent political crisis</li> </ul>

## B. Impunity and unaddressed past violations of Human Rights

The absence of mechanisms to deal with serious crimes of the past, corruption, patriarchy and lack of effective access to the administration of justice, form the basis of a widespread culture of impunity in the country. Women have particularly faced the brunt of impunity, with regard to Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and domestic violence. The traditional Guinea-Bissau justice system perpetuates the belief that women have fewer rights than men.

Contemporary Guinea-Bissau inherited a past marked by a strong ethos of resistance against external occupation. The liberation war and post-independence period generated resentment,



power disputes and violence,<sup>43</sup> especially by way of political assassinations and extra-judicial killings among the political and military elites. Some argue that the 14 November *coup* (1980) against President Luís Cabral lay the groundwork for systemic impunity by setting a precedent for the subversion of the constitutional order.<sup>44</sup> Guinea-Bissau remains a country of “episodes”: the 14 November, 17 October, 17 March, 7 June case and 12 April, which help “cement” a culture of impunity and destructuring of an already fragile state.<sup>45</sup> These episodes of political violence are open cases of political assassinations, executions, war and *coups d’état*. Incipient investigations were initiated but never concluded. Charges were made in the case of the assassination of General Tagme Na Waie, but the trial is yet to start.<sup>46</sup> Effective administration of justice, including prosecution, trials and possible convictions and reparations for victims, never happened. Political persecutions, extrajudicial killings, restrictions to freedom of assembly and expression and arbitrary detentions remain to be investigated.<sup>47</sup>

Amnesty has been the preferred instrument to deal with past serious human rights crimes and abuses. In 2008, the ANP passed an Amnesty Law covering all crimes committed by the military from 1973 to October 2004. In May 2012, a Political Transition Pact proposed again an amnesty policy to deal with crimes and human rights violations committed during and after the coup of 12 April 2012.<sup>48</sup> Amnesty has been used as a tool for stability, but in the absence of measures for truth-seeking and reparations, as applied in countries such as South Africa, amnesties tend to simply perpetuate a state of impunity and constitute a denial of justice.

Among other principles and norms, now reflected in international jurisprudence, the cornerstone of the fight against impunity is by addressing the past violations to prevent their recurrence by providing remedies and reparations to the victims and their families, and to society at large by seeking the truth. This right is not solely for direct victims and their relatives but rather for the entire society as a right to historical memory. In his Special Report on Guinea-Bissau of 30 April 2012, the Secretary-General stressed that “Any lasting solution to instability in Guinea-Bissau should include concrete actions to fight impunity and ensure that those responsible for political assassinations, including those committed in 2009, and other serious crimes such as drug-trafficking-related activities and breaches of constitutional order are brought to justice”. The Secretary-General subsequently highlighted the need to take urgent action, with the support of the international community, “to ensure effective, credible investigations in accordance with

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<sup>43</sup> COCN (2018) *Em Nome da Paz* - Relatório Final da Consulta Nacional sobre Paz, Reconciliação e Desenvolvimento (2009-2017). Instituto Padre António Vieira.

<sup>44</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>45</sup> LGDH (2013) *Quarenta Anos de Impunidade na Guiné-Bissau*. Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos.

<sup>46</sup> Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on her mission to Guinea-Bissau*, A/ HRC/32/34/Add.1, 4 April 2016.

<sup>47</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>48</sup> UNIOGBIS (n.d) Analysis of the key drivers of instability and UN strategy for Guinea-Bissau (2013-2017).

international standards into the 12 April 2012 coup, the killings of 18 March 2012, the 26 December 2011 and 1 April 2010 military events and March and June 2009 political assassinations and the prosecution of those responsible for criminal acts.” To that end, he suggested that one possible option could be “the establishment of a mixed tribunal in Guinea-Bissau” and the provision of security for its members and witnesses. No steps have been taken in that connection so far.

Impunity reflects a given power balance.<sup>49</sup> The one-party system and revolutionary ideology meant that from early on conditions did not allow the judiciary to become truly independent and apolitical.<sup>50</sup> Since then, the notion of an independent judiciary remains incomplete<sup>51</sup>, subject to constant interference from the Armed Forces and political executives<sup>52</sup>. As the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers noted, based on her visit to Guinea-Bissau in 2016, impunity affects the perceptions of people regarding justice and formal judicial system – that people are not held accountable for their actions.<sup>53</sup> This comes on top of the historical mistrust that Bissau-Guineans legitimately have of the judiciary owing to its oppressive role during colonialism.

The mistrust of people in the official justice system reflects the findings that place Guinea-Bissau among the ten most perceived corrupt countries in the world.<sup>54</sup> Corruption fuels the culture of impunity and erodes the rule of law, the capacities and even legitimacy of State structures in Guinea-Bissau. The Bissau-Guinean Human Rights League has called for the fight against impunity in the country to focus on investigating and prosecuting not only political but also economic crimes as violations of socio-economic human rights.<sup>55</sup> Corruption diverts resources from the economy that could be used in areas such as health, education, social protection and justice, that is, on the provision of public goods and services to the population.<sup>56</sup> This predatory dynamic disproportionately affects the more disadvantaged people in society, namely women. In Guinea-Bissau, women – especially those in rural and remote areas - are overburdened with economic and domestic responsibilities; deprived of educational and political opportunities; and are

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<sup>49</sup> LGDH (2013) *Quarenta Anos de Impunidade na Guiné-Bissau*. Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos.

<sup>50</sup> Embaló, Birgit (2015) *Guinea-Bissau: Conflict Analysis*.

<sup>51</sup> LGDH (2013) *Quarenta Anos de Impunidade na Guiné-Bissau*. Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos.

<sup>52</sup> COCN (2018) *Em Nome da Paz - Relatório Final da Consulta Nacional sobre Paz, Reconciliação e Desenvolvimento* (2009-2017). Instituto Padre António Vieira.

<sup>53</sup> Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on her mission to Guinea-Bissau*, A/ HRC/32/34/Add.1, 4 April 2016.

<sup>54</sup> Transparency International: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018> (access 20/07/2019).

<sup>55</sup> LGDH (2013) *Quarenta Anos de Impunidade na Guiné-Bissau*. Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos.

<sup>56</sup> OHCHR <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/CorruptionAndHR/Pages/CorruptionAndHRIndex.aspx> (access 21/07/2019)

subjected to discrimination and gender-based violence.<sup>57</sup> The cost of corruption falls hardest on the poorest, it limits the access, availability and quality of services that could assist in empowering women and girls, while a lack of political will deprives the community of the leadership needed to promote gender equality.

In Guinea-Bissau, corruption is also the result of the non-implementation of administrative frameworks; these create system and processes to ensure transparency and accountability within the public administration. Recruitment processes and the awarding of public contracts lack transparency. The funding of political parties and campaign practices also perpetuate corruption.

Corruption impinges on services and goods provided, as well as the credibility of the State in the eyes of the population. Corruption and informal practices tend to maintain certain networks in power, based on the appropriation and redistribution of resources, thus excluding diverse constituencies from participating in public structures and decision-making<sup>58</sup>.

Root Causes	Driver	Accelerators	Transformation capacity (transformations will be analysed in the next chapters)
Historical and Geopolitical Factors	Impunity and unaddressed past violations of Human Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Absence of mechanisms to deal with serious crimes of the past</li> <li>Amnesty has been the preferred instrument to deal with past serious human rights crimes and abuses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The mandate of the Organizing Committee on the National Dialogue was extended by the new elected parliament</li> </ul>
Undiversified and unsustainable economic system		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of accountability and investigation of crimes committed in public administration (corruption)</li> <li>Corruption fuels the culture of impunity and erodes the rule of law, the capacities and even legitimacy of State structures in Guinea-Bissau</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The treasury committee resumed its activity</li> <li>International support to the ministry of finance</li> </ul>
Persistent conflicts stemming from the incomplete State Building		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of effective access to, and administration of justice, leading to mistrust in the judicial system perceived as only serving the interests of “the powerful”</li> <li>Corruption fuels the culture of impunity and erodes the rule of law, the capacities and even legitimacy of State structures in Guinea-Bissau</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some criminal investigations of high-level people were initiated</li> <li>Some audits were commissioned</li> </ul>

<sup>57</sup> Voz di Paz/Interpeace (2018) *Fala di Mindjer. Beyond Social Pressure and Institutional Barriers: The Role of Women in Decision-Making in Guinea-Bissau*.

<sup>58</sup> A concrete example can be seen in political campaigning: the amount of financial resources needed to finance political campaigning was found to be an obstacle for women’s access to political roles since they cannot compete on an equal footing against men because of their chronic economic exclusion.

Interdependent political-military relationship		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political interference in public administration (including security, defence and justice sectors)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Non-interference by the armed forces in recent investigations</li> </ul>
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## C. Drug Trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime (DTOC)

With a vast archipelago and little State presence, porous borders and a privileged connection to Europe through Portugal, in addition to its regional links with West African neighbours, all represent conditions enabling Guinea-Bissau to become an attractive hub for transnational organised crime and drug trafficking, namely the transshipment of cocaine from Latin America.

The fragility of the State is both a cause and consequence of the expansion of illegal trafficking in Guinea-Bissau. The lack of an effective judicial system's response to illegal activities enabled political, economic and military elites to set up an "elite protection network" especially for cocaine trafficking, supported by a group of mostly foreign entrepreneurs with established links to criminal groups in Latin America.<sup>59</sup>

This phenomenon, in turn, drives both institutional fragility and instability in the country. Decisions by senior civilian and military elite are co-opted to serve corporate and personal interests. Due to the amount of resources raised, this elite is less constrained by the obligations of their offices or by institutions or the overall political system<sup>60</sup>. The unprecedented profits and persistent precarious economic growth generate few incentives for the elites to comply with the rule of law and good governance standards, engage in reforms for the justice system, administration or security sectors and anti-corruption efforts, all of which feeds back into rendering institutions fragile. Some elements of the elite have become spoilers of any process aimed at stability and good governance<sup>61</sup>. This multiplies the effects of corruption in depriving the State of resources and in deepening the divide between the State and its citizens. Instability is further aggravated by the effect that drug trafficking has been generating fierce intra-elite competition and power shifts<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>59</sup> Shaw, Mark (2015) "Drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau 1998-2004: the evolution of an elite protection network". *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 53:3, pp. 339-364.

<sup>60</sup> O'Regan, David; Thompson, Peter (2013) "Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from Africa's first Narco-State". Washington D.C: The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Special Report no.2.

<sup>61</sup> UNIOGBIS (2018) "Relaunching defence and security sector reforms in Guinea-Bissau". Policy Brief 8, Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

<sup>62</sup> *Idem*.

Similar to corruption and the state of the judicial system, the penetration of criminal interests in state structures feeds into the resentment of the population over the culture of impunity. Voz di Paz<sup>63</sup> also calls attention to the social effects of drug trafficking that are sometimes overlooked: consumption among local youth and consequently a rise in violent criminality; family and community tensions over drug consumption and the perception that the State is mainly responsible for the effects of drug trafficking in society.

Root Causes	Driver	Accelerators	Transformations (transformations will be analysed in the next chapters)
Historical and Geopolitical Factors	Transnational Organized Crime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Natural and geo-political conditions (vast archipelago, porous borders), privileged relations with CPLP and ECOWAS countries, and existence of regional criminal networks operating between these two blocks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cooperation agreements to Combat DTOC were signed with international partners</li> </ul>
Undiversified and unsustainable economic system		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Widespread poverty</li> <li>Lack of economic opportunities</li> <li>Informality of the economy providing the conditions for money launder, illegal fishing and logging</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Feeds into the resentment of the population</li> </ul>
Persistent conflicts stemming from incomplete statebuilding		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of an effective judicial system</li> <li>Political interference in the Judiciary and/or Law Enforcement Agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminal investigations led to the apprehension of more than two tons of cocaine</li> </ul>
Interdependent political-military relationship		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political, economic and military elites set up an “elite protection network” especially for cocaine trafficking, but extended to other trafficking’s such as timber</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Non-interference by the armed forces in recent investigations</li> </ul>

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<sup>63</sup> Voz di Paz (2010) Roots of Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau: the voice of the people. Voz di Paz/Interpeace.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Generates fierce intra-elite competition and power shifts</li></ul>	
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## 7. Conflict dynamics

Despite the set of structural factors explaining instability, as shown in the previous section, Guinea-Bissau also presents factors that explain why the country has never experienced widespread conflict, and why political instability remains confined to political elite. Furthermore, in the last five years, the political situation has been marked by some elements of discontinuity that may be seeds of change that could anchor transformations in the political system, state institutions, economic structure, and society as a whole.

The present chapter articulates continuities, discontinuities, dividers and connectors identified during the consultation (listed in annex 2), and the peacebuilding capacities (identified in the annex 3) and analyse their interaction during the current crisis, which started shortly after the legislative elections in 2014, and which lasts until today.

Throughout the consultations, many endogenous virtues and strengths have been highlighted, namely: the capacity for interethnic and religious co-existence, including a large number of intermarriages; the dynamics of associative life; a social fabric shaped by norms of solidarity, sharing and kindness; robust rural communities with effective local leadership structures and a sense of pride and attachment to local culture and traditions. Abundant food sources and water, lessening conflict between communities.

During consultations for the current conflict analysis, it was unanimously recognized that Creole remains a factor of national unity since the national liberation struggle. This stems from Creole not only serving to overcome linguistic barriers amongst the various ethnic groups, but also as a basis for Bissau-Guinean people's sense of belonging to one nation. The use of Creole as a *lingua franca*, spoken by most of the population, is a legacy on which to build the common future of Guinea-Bissau. Another important feature of the Bissau-Guinean identity is the Portuguese language. Although spoken mostly by the literate elite, Portuguese allows the country to connect with the outside world and affirms its "Lusophone identity" *vis-à-vis* the regional Francophone and Anglophone linguistic identities. At the regional level, the linguistic identity is intersected by a multiplicity of ethnic identities. These multiple identities coexist within Guinea-Bissau and across its borders and are therefore shared with neighbouring countries. The Senegalese *Djiola* and *Felupe* in Guinea-Bissau are noteworthy examples. Their common ties across the border, and a strong sense of "African identity" further strengthens good neighbourly relations with Senegal and Guinea (Conakry).

The national liberation war united the people of Guinea-Bissau across tribal and ethnic boundaries. It is the founding myth of the new nation-state and national identity. Freedom fighters were the heroes of the people. Decades after independence, these veterans (former combatants) still feel a sense of entitlement emanating from their sacrifices. In addition to this feeling of patriotism,

there is a collective sense of victimisation of the nation, especially among the poorest communities, by a State defined by weak governance, corruption and drug trafficking at the service of private agendas rather than the needs of the people.<sup>64</sup>.

This sentiment has been a striking element of national identity that has generated a strong social cohesion and solidarity amongst the people, as demonstrated by the solidarity of the people in the 1998/99 war. Rural communities opened their homes and shared their meagre food with many displaced coming from the capital, regardless of their ethnic and religious affiliation. This was an impressive lesson about solidarity and nation building from the grassroots where the people saw the nation as a collective victim of State affairs.

Despite the absence of an effective state, Guinea-Bissau enjoys a high-level of social cohesion and inter-ethnic tolerance. A strong civil society, including women's organizations, has also been gaining ground in the country. A new generation of leaders in different social areas is emerging from within civil society, and together with NGOs and the media are taking a more prominent stance in advocating for the interests of the local population, environmental protection, and human rights. Young and educated urban populations are contributing to increase public debate on good governance and political issues, demanding greater participation in political life and in decision-making for better basic service delivery to the population. Guinea-Bissau has also seen the mobilisation of the population in public demonstrations calling for respect for civil rights and the rule of law.

Nevertheless, during the consultation, participants also highlighted that political instability has been impacting on the social fabric and weakened social cohesion. The absence of State, particularly in rural areas, and the consequent lack of services to the population, coupled with the need to navigate patronage networks were examples of why many participants insisted that a new social contract is needed.

Instability has affected family relationships and dynamics at various levels, including creating family conflicts resulting from different political affiliations and ideologies among family members. Women tend to adopt the position of their husband, even when they have different political affiliations from their own. This is because patriarchal pressure exerted on women prevents them from expressing their political opinions for fear of reprisals. Usually, women who involves themselves in politics and expresses their own opinion freely, continue to suffer continuous discrimination from their partners and family members by considering their views inferior and irrelevant.

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<sup>64</sup> Kohl, Christoph (2010) "National Integration in Guinea-Bissau since independence" *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, 20, Identidades, Percursos e Clivagens nos PALOP, pp. 85-109.



Women highlighted that undertaking activities previously assigned to men has increased their understanding of their rights and how to fight for them, but this does not mean that in practice women are better able to exercise their rights. Loyalty to clan and tradition hold stronger sway over individual rights. Training sessions in the regions on the right to property, inheritance, among other topics, have been of paramount importance. However, it is men who continue to make decisions within the family. Although knowledge of their rights empowers women, the state has failed to create institutional measures for its implementation

Fewer young people hold strong feelings of belonging to ethnic groups. However, high unemployment levels are frustrating for youth and this can cause an openness to religious, political and ethnic radicalization. Young people sometimes take partisan positions and align themselves with certain parties, not because they identify with ideologies or have genuine interest in politics, but to acquire material resources.

**Despite political instability, Guinea-Bissau's macroeconomic situation has been marked by some positive developments in recent years.** However, weak economic governance and successive political interference, such as changing the rules before the cashew nut marketing campaign, and/or setting prices based on political expediency as opposed to market considerations, negatively affected the economic landscape. The informality of the economy, including cashew, has contributed to create a favourable environment for money laundry.

Political instability impacts, on the one hand, on the capacity of the state to mobilize external assistance and provide services to the population, and on the other to tackle the structural fragility of the economy and create opportunities for the population, especially in rural areas, which remains poor, socially unprotected and confined to informal agricultural production and subsistence trade.

The consequences of instability impact more heavily on the most vulnerable, which aggravates inequality: poor households rely on sub-optimal coping strategies, such as reducing consumption, cutting back on investments in the human capital of children, high interest borrowing (Work Bank, 2016). This fact reinforces the vulnerability of communities and exclusion, especially youth who could easily be manipulated into violence.

Economic instability impacts also on women relegated to the informal economy as well as youth, especially girls, who are forced to leave school, to help with family income, due to financial pressures. This has led to an increase in forced and early marriages, especially in the rural areas, as a family survival strategy to tackle financial instability. Likewise, unemployment of women and young people, particularly in urban areas, is a growing concern and a latent threat to stability and peace.

Political and socio-economic exclusion has led a part of the population, in particular women, to put in place strategies of resilience: to rely on community-level organisation schemes, for access

to micro-credit for investment in small businesses, for funding of educational scholarships and for mutual health organisations. These stem from traditional practises of community resilience and are sometimes articulated with and supported by formal civil society organisations. Another noteworthy example is the successful community-level management of natural resources. At the same time, the population also seeks to engage with the State through informal strategies, involving patronage networks where ethnic, communal or religious identities may play a role.

Women have been in the centre of these initiatives and have developed strategies to gain profits in the informal economy. As Miguel de Barros (2019) points out <sup>65</sup> the *bideiras* (women's groups organize to re-sell goods); the *lumos* (informal markets) and the *abota* (system of savings and credit) were crucial to provide access for women into the public space. Despite these positive consequences, the involvement of women in the informal economy is due to the difficulties they face in meeting the requirements of the formal economy. This is the result of women's and girls' low literacy and traditional rules that makes women responsible for housework and home education of their children.

International assistance and support to empower rural women and youth, has also created economic opportunities while strengthening women and youth movements and their capacity to participate in the political discourse. Likewise, the Women's Council was able to mobilise women from all regions of the country to participate in a women's fora which produced recommendations for the development of a political agenda for the women. This was critical to providing legitimacy to the facilitation role that the Women's Council played during the political dialogue.

**Discrepancies between the population and political elites are demonstrated by the national political agenda:** the element that has divided Bissau-Guineans since the dismissal of the government in 2015, has been the extent of the President's powers and the interdependence of powers within the current political system. This has placed on one side, those who advocate for a presidential system of government, and on the other, those who favour maintaining the *status quo* – a semi-presidential system.

Most of the tensions related to the recent political history of the country has been rooted in conflicting interpretations of the institutional rules defining the political system, used to justify access and or maintenance in power.

Linked with the diversity of interpretations of the legal framework, other divisive issues include – which attempt to look at root causes -- include: (1) the role of political parties, as mediators

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<sup>65</sup> Miguel de Barros (2019) Direito ao trabalho e à mobilidade através do empoderamento feminino no contexto africano: reconfigurações no espaço social guineense – publication in process

between the people and political power, and the extent to which the Political Parties Law contributes to the fragility of political parties. Intra-party disputes have often affected the majorities at the ANP, resulting in the dismissal governments and political instability. Likewise, internal PAIGC disputes have led to the paralysis of the ANP from 2015 to 2018; (2) the non-implementation of proposed local elections has aggravated the divide between political elites and the people.

Civil Society Organizations, and the recently created Civil Society Network for monitoring reforms has organized debated around reforms, and developed a common agenda for CSOs.

Many defend that another important element contributing to deepening the current crisis, which translate in the alienation of the political elite, is the absence of an inclusive and constructive political dialogue aimed at generating agreements on priority reforms and policy, as opposed to a dialogue based on power sharing. CSO have been defending that political dialogue has to be conducted within the framework of the constitution, and should not pervert the rules of the game, benefiting political elites.

**The political-military dynamics has led to Guinea-Bissau being referred to as one of the most *coup* prone and politically unstable countries in the world.** The changing attitude of the military in relation to politics has been attributed to the leadership of Biaguê Nan Tan, and the behaviour of political leaders who now sought to resolve political conflicts in court, instead of calling on the military to intervene.

From 2014 to 2020, the military has not intervened directly in politics, partly due to the UN sanctions regime, and the presence of ECOMIB. Throughout this period the Armed Forces seemed to be focused on rehabilitating its image in the country and abroad, to be perceived as an actor for stability and peace, acting in accordance with its constitutional role.

Throughout this period, it was not possible do develop a consensus [a shared vision of the reform, including with the armed forces], implement the reform of the security sector, nor negotiate with international partners support for the sector that would allow its transformation. Instability and short time vision, have only allowed for the implementation of isolate measures, some of which outside the legal framework, namely promotions and recruitments, which have increase public expenditure.

What became apparent during this period, was that like in other areas of public administration, the implementation of reforms, in accordance with the law, is key to change the power dynamics and guarantee respect for the rule of law

An analysis that places the onus of the political instability in Guinea-Bissau solely on the role of the military fails to recognize the complexity of the politico-military dynamics, and the way drivers of conflict (weak governance system, impunity and DTOC) accelerate the effects of root causes in the political crisis, and contribute to create resistance to change.

**Weak governance systems have led to the permeability of public administration to highly informal processes [illegal] of resource allocation and recruitment, making it a hotspot for cyclical instability.** Given that controlling the State apparatus provided easy access to state resources, political disputes have revolved around the competition for positions in public administration, especially those linked to revenue collections, such as Customs and Port authorities, transports, fisheries, and other natural resources. These also reflect sectors where the influence of informal networks has become consolidated and entrenched, leading to resistance to reforms, and generating tensions and divisions among Bissau-Guinean society.

Periods of stability have provided short windows of opportunity for the implementation of administrative reforms. After the 2014 elections, the government started to implement ambitious administrative reforms<sup>66</sup> (World Bank, 2016), which included the abolishment of FUNPI<sup>67</sup>, strengthening domestic revenue mobilization, significantly increasing non-tax revenues (especially through fishing licenses), and raising custom and tax revenues. In addition, structural reforms were put in place tightening controls over fuel imports, reduced tax exemptions, rehabilitated custom posts and intensified tax audits to large taxpayers. These measures, which aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability, were a source of concern for some individuals with vested interests, who resorted to unlawful interference, thereby further weakening State institutions by creating institutional conflicts and fueling political disputes and instability.

The subsequent instability prevented progress in implementing the necessary reforms and the current political crisis affected the state's ability to guarantee basic services to communities (education and health), provide water and electricity and ensure timely payment of salaries to civil servants, which had the effect of deteriorating living conditions, fuelling protests and social mobilization. Successive strikes by civil servants further paralyzed the sector, affecting the lives of the people.

The panorama was even more evident outside the capital, where the state is virtually absent. Some communities organized responses to mitigate these effects, including the expansion of community-based schools and continuing school feeding programs (with support from international partners), which explains why teachers in rural areas were less willing to join strikes. This resistance/resilience of communities, while contributing to the well-being of the population, also contributes to their remoteness from the state and political elites.

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<sup>66</sup> World Bank, 2016.

<sup>67</sup> Fund for Promoting the Industrialization of Agricultural Products.

Some State institutions could overcome these challenges and articulate the population's needs, to build resilience and attract both political support and external assistance. The Institute of Biodiversity and Protected Areas (IBAP) is one of such examples. As pointed out in the Pre-MAPS assessment it is one of the "examples of effective, responsive and accountable institutions (...) which provide[s] an endogenous example of what works in the context of Guinea-Bissau and a benchmark for other institutions".

Likewise, EAGB is being supported by an international consortium, selected through an international public tender. Key to its success of the partnership was the inclusion, within the international team, of national experts highly qualified, with a good understanding of the national culture and able to establish a good relation between national institutions and international partners.

Other, more recent examples include the Justice Thematic Group, established within the Ministry of Justice to support decision-making and coordination of external assistance in the justice sector. One important outcome of this thematic group was the establishment of a civil registration system for births, which was successfully implemented. The Judiciary Police is also an example of an institution that was able to attract the confidence of international partners, through the implementation of systems and processes for recruitment, which impacted positively in their capacity to investigate and resist political interference.

**The weak governance system feeds (and is fed) by impunity [which is also a driver of conflict]. Impunity over serious crimes and human rights violations continues to feed (and is fed) by the conflict dynamics.**

Accusations of corruption, mismanagement of public funds, illegal exploitation of natural resources and abuse of authority continue to be traded between national actors, including the President, members of current and past government and the ANP, combined with the launching of commissions of inquiry, audits and judicial actions. Yet rather than enforcing accountability, the trading of accusations generated deep mistrust among political actors, and especially between the population and its elected representatives.

Interference between the executive and judicial powers, and in administrative supervisory and oversight bodies constituted, as well as open conflict publicised through press release are obstacles to building confidence in these institutions. Together, they reinforced the perception that state institutions do not act impartially in the application of the law. This perception was aggravated by the judicialization of political disputes throughout the political crisis, which demonstrated the fragility of the independence of the judiciary in Guinea-Bissau

This exchange of accusations [many referring to past human rights violations] also demonstrate that the inability of the State to deal with these crimes continues to fuel present crisis.

The investigation on the diversion of rice donated by China (April/May 2019), which led to an institutional dispute between the Judiciary Police and the Attorney-General's Office and between the government and the President of the Republic are typical examples. The phenomenon has also led to the resurfacing of public accusations within the political elite of involvement in criminal activities to finance political campaigns.

**As impunity, transnational organized, which flourish with informal economy and weak institutions, is a driver of conflict, at the same time cause and consequence of political instability in Guinea-Bissau, and contributes to impunity in Guinea-Bissau.** There is considerable evidence of the resurgence of drug trafficking in West Africa, and part of the elite in positions of power have been linked to international trafficking<sup>68</sup>. Politicians and military leaders have succeeded in bringing a large number of people into illegal businesses, encouraged by high profits and well-protected safety nets.

Nevertheless, the Government of Guinea-Bissau has recently showed a renewed commitment to strengthening its fight against DTOC, through the establishment of an Aircop Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force which has seen impressive results (April 2018); the appointment of a new Head and Deputy Head of the Judicial Police (May 2018); the resumption of the WACI Transnational Crime Unit's (TCU) operations (May 2018); the establishment by the Government of a Working Group on the National Action Plan on Countering Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime - CDTOC (October 2018), followed by the Ministry of Justice's official request to UNODC to support the development of a National Strategic Plan on CDTOC, which was adopted by the Council of Ministers in January 2020.

Despite the mistrust towards the actions of security and defence forces, the Judiciary Police has been stepping up its anti-drug trafficking capacity and cooperation with international partners.<sup>69</sup> There has been an improvement in the level of cooperation between investigative criminal police at the international and sub-regional levels leading to the signature of an MoU between Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and the organization of "controlled deliver operations" initiated in Portugal and finalized in Guinea-Bissau. This was only possible because the Judiciary Police enjoys increased level of trust from the international and sub-regional partners.

In 2019, the judiciary police has seized circa 850 kg of cocaine, during operation "carapau" and almost two (2) tones, during operation "navarra". The investigations have generated, again, accusations and counter-accusation of political leaders and military. The accusation and sentenced of the suspects of the "carapau" operation was a sign that the judicial was working, but the

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<sup>68</sup> Shaw, Mark (2015) "Drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, 1998–2014: the evolution of an elite protection network" *Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 53:3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>69</sup> From 2014 to 2018, the Judiciary Police seized a total of 57.6 kilograms of cocaine and arrested 67 suspects in various operations throughout the country.

successive adjournment of the reading of the sentence of the accused of the “navarra” operation – and rumours on the way the process was conducted – generated doubts about its possible conclusion.

The mobilization of communities and CSO, on the one hand, and the resilience some state institutions have demonstrated, have contributed to the emergence of different voices, which impacted the conflict dynamic, but were not sufficient to change its course through the emergence of endogenous political solutions to solve the successive crisis/impasses the country has faced since 2015.

The intervention of the International community, through the P5 Group, and under the lead of ECOWAS to support Guinea-Bissau to overcome the current political has therefore been a necessity.

It should be recognised that this intervention was unprecedented and has helped to create conditions for a political solution. The regional framework on conflict resolution provided the tools to keeping Guinea-Bissau on the international (and regional) agenda and the approval of measures aimed at supporting mediation efforts, which included the UN, EU and ECOWAS sanctions regime and the deployment of the ECOMIB force are reference cases.

Following a request by the President of the Republic, ECOWAS undertook a series of mediations to overcome the political crisis, with joint support from the African Union, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the European Union and the United Nations (represented by UNIOGBIS).

The mediation process resulted in a six-point roadmap for the resolution of the political and institutional crisis, signed in Bissau in September 2016 followed by a 10-point agreement signed in Conakry in October 2016 to facilitate the implementation of the roadmap. The Conakry Agreement has since become the most viable framework for overcoming the successive political and institutional crises affecting the country.

The Conakry Agreement was signed by the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Government, the leaders of political parties represented in Parliament, and the coordinator of the “Group of 15” PAIGC dissident MPs. The signatories agreed to, inter alia, (i) chose, by consent, a Prime Minister trusted by the President of the Republic to remain in office until the next legislative elections; (ii) form an inclusive government that would implement a programme developed by a national dialogue roundtable; and (iii) develop and adopt a Stability Pact, signed by key political and social forces, through - a national dialogue roundtable for the implementation of key reforms including of the Constitution, the electoral law, the law governing political parties and the defence and security sectors. An agreement was also reached on the principle of an effective reintegration of the 15 dissident MPs into the PAIGC, without conditions, but in accordance with the internal rules of the party. Additionally, the Agreement foresees the establishment of an ECOWAS

monitoring and follow-up mechanism and the support of the “Guinea-Bissau P5” (AU, ECOWAS, CPLP, EU and UN).

The Conakry agreement has centred attention on the need for a coordinated approach, as well as the need to implement key reforms, that address root causes of conflict. The success of ECOWAS mediation is also linked with its capacity to approve measures to ensure respect for the Conakry agreement.

The ECOWAS-led mediation process created the momentum for mobilization around the development of a Stability Pact (outlined in the Conakry Agreement). Civil Society Organizations, including women’s organizations, and the Organizing Commission for the National Dialogue (OCNC), coordinated their positions and led a process of consultations, to develop a Stability Pact aimed at finding consensual solutions to counter cyclical instability. After extensive consultations and negotiations with political parties, the Stability Pact was signed by most political parties, including those represented at the ANP. Although the follow-up committee foreseen in the Stability Pact to monitor its implementation has not yet been installed, this initiative has put the reform of the political system, public administration, justice and security sector back in the political agenda.

Other CSO initiatives described in annex 3 have also contributed to raise awareness not only on the priority of the reforms’ agenda for stability, but also to ensure that they are developed, implemented and monitored, through a consultative process. Another example of Civil Society mobilisation was the process that led to the adoption of the quota/parity law in parliament, resulting from the combined efforts of women’s Civil Society Organizations and members of political parties.

Mobilization of CSOs during the current crisis also led to the political engagement of a broader constituency within political parties. This was particularly the case with the PAIGC, which took the opportunity to renew its internal structures, particularly on women and youth. This contributed to creating a new dynamic within the party. Although it is still too early to evaluate the impact of these party dynamics, it resulted in the appointment of a gender-balanced government in July 2019, as well as the inclusion of several highly qualified youth. This was perceived as opening a new window of inclusion and an important step in overcoming the current political crisis.

Despite the broad mobilisation towards a return to stability and constitutional order, as the country prepared for presidential election scheduled for 24 November 2019, the risk of further instability remained high. Difficulties in appointing a government and the inability of political parties to resolve the impasse over the election of the ANP Executive Bureau, pointed to unresolved political crisis, and triggered a new ECOWAs mediation.

Ahead of the presidential election in 24 November 2019, opposition parties questioned the legitimacy and independence of the electoral management bodies, as well as the capacity of the



new government to conduct free, fair and transparent elections, which having not been fully addressed, contributed to mistrust in the electoral process and the credibility of the election results.

Furthermore, the legislative elections saw a radicalisation of political discourse linking grievances from the past, also making use of ethnic and religious undertones to agitate feelings of social/economic exclusion. Support from the international partners and CSO initiatives aimed at monitoring the electoral process, which included the signing of a Code of Conduct on 14 February 2019, were instrumental, but not sufficient to ease tensions and ensure the credibility of the legislative and presidential elections.

Throughout the drafting of this conflict analysis [from May 2019 to March 2020] the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau has deepen, and the resolution of the many political impasses that arose during that period was only possible through the mediation of ECOWAS and an increased reliance on sanction, or threat of sanctions.

This has highlighted that the right balance between political dialogue and accountability measures can yield positive results and have a positive impact in the conflict dynamics. These were however not sufficient to strengthen internal mechanisms to manage political conflict, and overcome the need to depend on ECOWAS to solve them. If continued support is given to this approach, adopting a long-term strategy to strengthen national institutions, the gains achieved by ECOWAS can be consolidated, bringing the country closer to long lasting peace and stability.

## 8. Scenarios

### A. Presidential election and return to constitutional order

#### Short term perspectives (up to 2 years)

The stability prospects of the country will likely be shaped by the ability of political actors to respect constitutional order, and in particular, the elected president to build consensus and establish a working relationship with the government and the ANP. Should there be a peaceful transfer of power (following free and fair elections) and a cooperation between organs of sovereignty established, the election will mark a return to constitutional order and create a context for positive developments and the normal functioning of democratic institutions, including the implementation of urgent reforms.

In such a positive scenario, there would be a favourable environment for dialogue and consensus building. The converging interests of political actors could potentially ensure the sustainability of the government.

In this context, the parliament would be functional and the government would be able to create political conditions to implement its programme and initiate medium-to long-term development initiatives.

The success will depend, among other factors, upon whether there is:

- (a) Acceptance by the military of the civilian oversight role over the Armed Forces;
- (b) Consensus, or at least a convergence of positions, in the preparation and implementation of political reforms, which implies a collaboration between branches of government (President, ANP and government), in accordance with the Constitution;
- (c) Transparency and accountability measures are put in place to create increased confidence in public administration;
- (d) Independence of the judiciary system to ensure accountability and a perceived sense of justice;
- (e) Resilience of State institutions to stem corruption by transnational organized crime networks; And other elites who prefer maintaining the government a source of wealth.
- (f) An increase in State revenues and an improved revenue management system;
- (h) The ability of political and social actors to maintain social peace and institutional stability;

- (i) Substantial support from international partners<sup>70</sup> aligned with national priorities;
- (j) Targeted and well-funded initiatives to support women's empowerment and gender equality, and to counter systemic violence and discriminatory attitudes towards women and girls.

The successful implementation of key reforms could create adequate conditions to begin the arduous process of State re-building, including improvement in public institutions' performance, the fight against impunity through a more functional justice system, and the establishment of an environment conducive to economic growth and improved social indicators.

### **Medium term perspectives (up to 5 years)**

In the medium-term (up to five years), assuming a positive economic and political context, there will be: (a) significant advances in the reform process; (b) an improved political governance framework; (c) sustained international assistance, including donors' financial resource mobilizations efforts, to fund the country's development programme; (d) exploitation of natural resources in the national interest and an improved socio-economic situation; and (e) the implementation of a robust strategy to combat drug trafficking.

The above scenario hinges upon continuing cooperation towards a meaningful consensus among national actors, which presupposes a shift from the zero-sum paradigm of Guinea-Bissau politics to an emerging positive-sum or win-win approach.

## **B. Status quo and eventual relapse into political and social instability**

Should the president not be able to establish a good cooperation with the other organs of sovereignty, within the framework of the constitution, the election will not result in a return to constitutional order, and political and social instability will likely be exacerbated: (a) the political actors will maintain the established patterns of winners playing a zero-sum game and losers pushing for dialogue; (b) there will be no political will or resources to have significant progress in the implementation of reforms and State building; (c) governments will continue to succeed each other in the wake of exacerbated divisions within and across political parties/majority alliance in Parliament; (d) the culture of impunity will remain unchanged; (e) human rights violations and the security situation in general will not improve; (f) the justice system will remain compromised and

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<sup>70</sup> The effective reconfiguration of ECOMIB and its presence as a deterrent is also essential for short-term stability. Following the recent ECOWAS Summit on 29 June, the mandate has been extended until March 2020.

powerless in addressing impunity and corruption; (g) the international community may further scale down its support.

Should this happen, the prospects for Guinea-Bissau in the medium-term would be bleak:

(a) Differences amongst political actors would persist, with the possibility of a “negative peace”, festering a new cycle of political and institutional instability. Military intervention could be inevitable.

(b) Vested interests may become entrenched whilst political, economic and military agendas in the State, including the risk of political campaigning along ethnic lines and spread of hate speech could persist;

(c) Components of the Defence and Security Sector Reform programme would be implemented in terms set by the military and may not change the balance of power. This, coupled with attempts by political leaders to influence the military, could set the stage for a new *coup*;

(d) Few traditional donors would continue to provide aid, and non-traditional donors may step in, but would not provide adequate funding for development;

(e) Organized crime and drug trafficking networks may go back to using the country as a haven and logistics base.

## 9. Options for engagement: peacebuilding priorities and entry points

Peacebuilding Priorities and entry points for the UN transition and repositioning address the proximate causes of conflict and drivers of instability (listed in annex 1) and build on peace capacities identified in the conflict dynamic (vide. annex 2). They were determined by the application of the following criteria:

- Timely and visible impact on sustainable stability and/or on addressing collectively identified risk and resilience factors.
  - Inclusive targeting of the poorest and most vulnerable groups and/or the most disenfranchised groups and parts of the country (leaving no one behind).
  - Impact on social cohesion
  - Realistically implementable
- 
1. Support and encourage inclusive and meaningful political dialogue and far-sighted reform of the political system for the implementation of urgently needed key reforms and strengthening of an environment conducive to long-term stability and sustainable development. In coordination with international partners, engage with a broad range of national stakeholders, supported by continuous national dialogue at the strategic levels on the above-referred to key reforms as outlined in the Stability Pact and Conakry Agreement, encourage and support national institutions to address corruption, CDTOC and poor governance practices. Incorporate a good office role to promote peacebuilding priorities, gender equality and respect for human rights and compliance with international standards.
  2. Support the Government of Guinea-Bissau in strengthening democratic accountable institutions and enhancing the capacity of state organs to function effectively, in accordance with the Constitution, including through a progressively decentralized and inclusive governing system, and a National Parliament which fully assumes its oversight role. And strengthening democratic governance, particularly with regard to the implementation of necessary urgent reforms on the path towards long-term stability and sustainable development.
  3. Support an enabling environment to expand socio-economic opportunities and inclusiveness and implementation of fiscal policy and accountability. Furthermore, facilitate improvement in natural resource management and extraction, climate change mitigation as well as environmental protection.

4. Support the Government of Guinea-Bissau in its fight against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime through capacity-building and advisory assistance for an effective implementation of its National Strategy Plan and the introduction of innovative approaches, among which (i) the provision of high-caliber mentoring services to key Criminal Justice institutions, including through the investigation, prosecution and Case progression and management of actual cases; (ii) the strengthening or creation of oversight and accountability mechanisms, and (iii) the proactive, UN System-wide promotion of a conducive political environment, shielded from the nefarious influence of drug trafficking / transnational organized crime networks and their facilitators.
5. Strengthen judicial capacity and the national human rights protection system to effectively address impunity, promote and protect human rights, including through the adoption of a national policy on human rights, a strategic plan to combat impunity, the adoption of human rights responsive legislation and the establishment of a national human rights institution in compliance with the Paris Principles by providing technical assistance to state institutions to implement the reforms, and support the government to ratify the international human rights treaties.
6. Support the mainstreaming of gender equality concerns in all actions, with a gender, age, and diversity perspective and a lifecycle approach to "leave no-one behind" through the promotion of full, meaningful and effective participation and representation of women, and their empowerment at all levels - in the political dialogue, and in economic, peacebuilding and development processes. Support the revision of the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 (2000) to implement the women, peace and security agenda.
7. Support the efforts of the Government to ensure effective civilian control and oversight over the defence and security forces, through effective and timely strategies and policies that promotes political will and an adequate resource environment for the reconfigured UN presence in Guinea-Bissau to assist in the implementation of the Security Sector Reform programmatic implementation aspects, in close coordination with ECOWAS, as part of regular development interventions.
8. Enhance alignment of international assistance with the peacebuilding priorities of Guinea-Bissau, through agreed upon interventions with national counterparts. Ensure respect for core peacebuilding values such as inclusive gender-sensitive politics, participatory dialogue and reconciliation as well as environmental sustainability. ECOWAS' Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) to be used to complement the sustainable peace agenda, alongside the so-called "Praia" Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa, signed by ECOWAS Heads of State in December 2008; as well as the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to Address Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crimes and Drug Abuse in West Africa 2016-2020 and its successor.

## 10. Annexes

### Annex 1 – Mapping of Root Causes, Proximate Causes and Triggers

The table builds on root causes and triggers identified in Chapter 4 and looks at its present manifestations (proximate causes). It also identifies triggers, which could lead to a relapse into crisis.

#### i. *Root Causes*

HISTORICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS		
ROOT CAUSES	PROXIMATE CAUSES	TRIGGERS
<p>Strong regional and sub-regional dynamics, link to Trans-Saharan trade networks</p> <p>Portuguese colonial occupation, met with extreme resistance and revolt followed by massacres.</p> <p>The Liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo-Verde, which fought the liberation war that led to independence, had strong ties with the pan-African movement in particular its West African neighbours, and extended to various countries of the Organization of African Union. The resistance to colonial power also forged a sense of a Lusophone community of resistance.</p> <p>Geopolitical interests and intervention of the sub-regional and international community</p> <p>Dependency on external assistance leads to the extraversion of the State which responds to external needs and not to those of its people. This also leads to inconsistencies in foreign policy, which weakened Guinea-Bissau's international standing.</p>	<p>The State in Guinea-Bissau stems from the imposition of a western conception of a State and is also the result of the cumulative effect of different and contradictory strategies that were projected on the country from the colonial model to the socialist inspired model, as well as the neoliberal model implemented through international interventions.</p> <p>The State became ever more dependent on external assistance. It also deepened the problem of extraversion<sup>71</sup>, which came from colonial times: the State is oriented to respond and comply to the needs and demands of its donors instead of those of its own population. This deepens the disconnect between the State and its citizens.</p>	<p>Donor fatigue leading to considerably reduced support to structural reforms recognized as crucial for stabilization</p>

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<sup>71</sup> For the concept of extraversion see Bayart *et al.*, 1999

UNDIVERSIFIED AND UNSUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC SYSTEM		
ROOT CAUSES	PROXIMATE CAUSES	TRIGGERS
<p>Poor conditions inherited from the colonial rule – insufficient State capacities and institutions, - shaped the development of extractive/rentier economy controlled by elites</p> <p>Elite patronage networks have consolidated rule over access to, and redistribution of, resources for private gains.</p> <p>Agrarian-based economy based on single commodity (cashew nuts), legacy of the Structural Adjustment push for integration in world economy<sup>72</sup></p> <p>Lack of economic planning that incorporated informal practises and institutions] at the local level</p>	<p>Public expenditure considerably dependent on international assistance;</p> <p>Widespread corruption and impunity;</p> <p>Impoverishment of rural population, lack of planning and inadequate investment in agriculture and lack of opportunities for economic diversification, and continued degradation of basic services</p> <p>Urban poverty and unemployment driving people to rely on informal strategies of subsistence, especially urban youth – possible effect on criminality</p> <p>State with very limited capacity to deliver quality goods and services to citizens</p> <p>Widespread poverty: Guinea-Bissau is the 12th poorest country in the world and 56% of the population experiences multidimensional poverty;</p> <p>Unattractive business environment; weak private sector</p>	<p>Inadequate liquidity in State treasury</p> <p>Persistent low level of salaries and delay in payments</p> <p>Sense of frustration and desperation</p> <p>High urban youth unemployment</p> <p>Decrease in donor support, especially in areas of basic needs</p> <p>Bad weather conditions that can impact crop production</p>

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<sup>72</sup> Agriculture accounts for almost 85% of total employment (African Economic Outlook 2019). Cashew is the main income source for two thirds of the households. This renders households extremely vulnerable changes in the international cashew markets and namely to volatile cashew prices. Cashew exports account for 85% of all country exports (World Bank, 2016)



PERSISTENT CONFLICT WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM		
ROOT CAUSES	PROXIMATE CAUSES	TRIGGERS
<p>Legacy of colonialism: over 10 year-long liberation war, followed by a one-party rule until 1999</p> <p>Pressures for liberal democracy did not allow enough time to build internal democratic processes into the political system.</p> <p>Failure to build a solid foundation for the democratic system with checks and balances and mechanisms to solve institutional conflicts caused permeability of the political parties to patronage networks (with their respective political-economic-military agendas), prolonged intra-party disputes and intra-institution fighting.</p> <p>Failure to build independent institutions such as the judiciary and electoral bodies that are trusted by all actors.</p> <p>Aspirations to assume the model of “charismatic leader” (and regional Presidential models) set the stage for the personification of politics.</p> <p>The Presidential models in neighbouring countries laid the groundwork for claims by President Mario Vaz for a concentration of power</p>	<p>The gaps in Guinea-Bissau’s legal framework on the political system have been exploited to fuel political instability. The lack of implementation of a substantial part of the political system (e.g. local elections), resulted in the lack of formal mechanisms to bring the State closer to the people.</p> <p>The disconnect between the political elite and the people (and the lack of mechanisms of consultation and participation of different constituencies) enabled the pursuit of the latter’s agenda [as well as the interests of the military, within their patronage networks].</p> <p>Absence of an inclusive and constructive political dialogue process prevents prospects of generating agreements on priority reforms and policies.</p> <p>Lack of political dialogue between the organs of sovereignty leads to a political impasse, which prevents the advancement of key reforms</p> <p>Absence of political mechanisms to solve institutional conflicts [and/or exercise shared powers] leads to political crisis/impasses, constitutional disruptions, and/or have impeded the organization of elections. Use of grey areas in legal framework to postpone elections and/or impede its organization.</p> <p>Inability of Governments and President to complete terms [Vaz was the first President to complete his term] and to exercise shared powers in accordance with the Constitution.</p> <p>Lack of trust among political actors, aggravated by grievances from the past. Erosion of social cohesion stemming from the need to navigate patronage networks to access state resources.</p>	<p>Conflicting interpretation of legal framework giving rise to institutional disputes which create a new political impasse and paralyse the country</p> <p>Elections [seen as an essential platform to access power and resources]</p> <p>Post Electoral (power sharing) and shifting majorities in ANP</p> <p>Competing interpretations of legislation, division of power and procedures exacerbate political tensions</p> <p>The legitimacy and independence of electoral bodies is questioned by opposition parties, leading to mistrust in the electoral process</p> <p>Divisiveness of political discourse emanating from past grievances and the current feeling of social/economic exclusion in the run up to presidential elections</p> <p>The newly-elected government is unable to ensure the payment of civil servants’ salaries and the delivery of basic services, such as electricity and water.</p>

ENTANGLED POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN STATE AND NATIONAL POLITICS		
ROOT CAUSES	PROXIMATE CAUSES	TRIGGERS
<p>The lack of a functional Parliament and its impact on ensuring oversight and control of the armed forces, direct policy and budgets</p> <p>Dysfunctional political-military relations, post-liberation war “we are all politicians”. Revolutionary legitimacy of FARP – lack of post-liberation war professionalization and transformation into a republican force</p> <p>Uneven participation of different ethnic groups in the construction of military, political and administrative structure of new State after liberation war,</p> <p>Military interference in politics through coups</p> <p>Lack of civilian oversight/civilian manipulation of armed forces</p>	<p>Promotions are not done according to national and international legal standards resulting in the perception of favouritism. New recruitment, leading to an increased weight of the military and security forces on the State budget</p> <p>Inverted pyramid in the military due to lack of retirement plans for former combatants</p> <p>Persistent insufficient socio-economic and medical support provided to former combatants;</p> <p>Lack of ownership and adequate funding for Security Sector Reform</p>	<p>Lack of funds for salary/pension payment</p> <p>Security Sector Reform measures taken without being properly negotiated with the Armed Forces</p> <p>Cut in State budget in areas allocated to Security and Defence Forces leading to the deterioration of the living conditions of the military</p> <p>Investigations of military personnel by civilian/military courts</p>

## ii. *Drivers*

WEAK GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK IMPACT ON THE CAPACITY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS TO DELIVER BASIC SERVICES AND GOODS TO SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE POPULATION AND PROMOTES INEQUALITIES	
PROXIMATE CAUSES	ACCELERATORS
<p>Fragile governance framework<sup>73</sup>. Weak systems and processes to ensure accountability and transparency lead to limited trust in public institutions [notably lack of transparency in recruitment led to politicization of public administration, growing numbers of civil servants, including police and military]</p>	<p>Political disputes are fuelled by patronage networks to access state resources</p> <p>No political will / leverage to dismantle vested interests and promote accountability and transparency.</p>

<sup>73</sup> Guinea-Bissau ranks in the bottom decile globally, scoring poorly on government effectiveness, the control of corruption, the quality of regulations, and the upholding of the rule of law (WB, 2016).

WEAK GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK IMPACT ON THE CAPACITY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS TO DELIVER BASIC SERVICES AND GOODS TO SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE POPULATION AND PROMOTES INEQUALITIES	
PROXIMATE CAUSES	ACCELERATORS
<p>Lack of measures aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability, which would have disturbed patronage networks and led to unlawful interference</p> <p>State Institutions are permeable to patronage/ illegal networks, which leads to the politicization/partisanship in the State apparatus [maintaining the winners take all approach].</p> <p>The centralized State only provides limited basic services in the capital and is unable to provide services outside the capital and unable/unwilling to implement local governance systems</p> <p>Erosion of social cohesion stemming from the need to navigate patronage networks to access state resources</p> <p>The Commission of Inquiry created to investigate arms trafficking in Guinea-Bissau is considered as having triggered the political and military conflict of 1998/1999</p>	<p>On-going criminal investigations with potential disruption by unlawful influences, which aggravates current institutional conflicts.</p> <p>Incapacity (financial) of the State to meet its obligations leading to a deterioration of living conditions (electricity, water), which in turn fuel protests or social mobilizations</p> <p>New reforms/laws in specific sectors/issues (e.g. Defence and SSR), and attempts to fight corruption, or impose administrative measures of transparency and accountability, upset vested interests and fuel political disputes and instability</p>

IMPUNITY AND UNADDRESSED PAST VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS	
PROXIMATE CAUSES	ACCELERATORS
<p>Inequality related to access to the formal justice system as well as gender-based injustices foster popular discontent and increase the danger of violent confrontation. Significant parts of the population, mainly the poor and illiterate and particularly women and children, find great difficulty to access justice (UNDP, 2011, pp. 38-40).</p> <p>Perceptions of corruption and appropriation of the judiciary by the most powerful in society. The Judicial system inadequately funded, thus, deprived of resources for investigations and prosecution.</p> <p>The Executive has systematically interfered in the right to peaceful assembly, de facto banning demonstrations organized by political coalitions or social and youth movements, resorting to delaying tactics, the deployment of security forces or restrictive interpretations of the law</p> <p>Non-compliance with human rights standards, practices, etc. and absence of a mechanism for the victims and witnesses of human rights violations to seek redress and protection</p> <p>Increase use of violence to resolve conflict [further eroding social cohesion] stemming from the incapacity of the justice system to address disputes. Transfer to the judicial system of the authority to solve disputes which were solved through traditional means, creating a vacuum and</p>	<p>Political pressure on the judiciary over high profile cases</p> <p>Setting up of truth-finding mechanisms (as an outcome of the National Conference)</p> <p>Opening new investigations into crimes of the past and or against high profile individuals</p> <p>Inadequate State response to intercommunal crime (cattle theft, wrongful property occupation or use) that could lead to inter-communal violence</p>

IMPUNITY AND UNADDRESSED PAST VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS	
PROXIMATE CAUSES	ACCELERATORS
<p>leading to the emergence of authority entrusted to solve these conflict [notably police officers with no legal authority to solve disputes and who are called to solve/mediate local disputes]</p> <p>Weak land administration and management aggravating land disputes, which result in increased violent conflicts between communities</p>	

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME	
PROXIMATE CAUSES	ACCELERATORS
<p>State institutions permeable to illegitimate interests, including corruption and transnational organized crime networks</p> <p>Changes in the operations of regional criminal networks impacting drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau</p> <p>Fragile Law enforcement institutions, which lack systems and processes to ensure the credibility of its administration, leads to political interference in law enforcement agencies (LEAs), through promotions and an incoherent system of training abroad, which further weakens LEAs</p> <p>Money laundering, illicit drug trafficking and transnational organized crime</p> <p>Illegal exploitation of natural resources, including illegal fishing and logging, human trafficking</p> <p>Links to violent extremist movements in the sub-region</p>	<p>Ongoing investigations affecting patronage networks</p> <p>Rise of influence of regional and international criminal networks within the State Institutions</p>

## Annex 2 – Continuities, discontinuities, dividers, connectors

Guinea-Bissau presents a set of structural factors that explain the conflicts the country has experienced in its recent history. In the last five years, whilst some elements remained unchanged, the political situation has considerably changed, presenting elements that could anchor the country's transformations in the political system, State institutions, economic structure, and society at large.

To understand the conflict dynamics, in addition to identifying some trends (continuities and discontinuities), we have identified factors that accelerate conflict (key drivers), as well as those which have contributed to preventing it from escalating. The latter are connectors, which can strengthen existing peace capacities to promote the desired change.

The consultations held as part of this exercise identified the following continuities, discontinuities, dividers, drivers and connectors and provided the basis for the drafting of the conflict analysis:

### Continuities

- a. Lack of political dialogue and “winner takes all approach” results in disputes between branches of government (including over institutional appointments) due to different interpretations of division of the Executive branch (between Presidency and Prime Minister), leading to sub-regional and international mediation to overcome the crisis.
- b. State institutions and public administration are highly influenced by political impasses rendering them unable to provide basic services and used to support political conflicts.
- c. Past crimes that remain unresolved are manipulated for political gain and aggravate the politicisation of the judiciary.
- d. Systematic discrimination against women undermines the political, educational and economic opportunities for women from fully contributing to Guinea-Bissau achieving its Sustainable Development Goals.

### Discontinuities

- a. Absence of direct military interference in politics in the last five years.
- b. First President of the Republic to complete its mandate.
- c. Human rights violations committed by police and military against journalists, opposition politicians are no longer a serious concern.
- d. A Stability Pact promoted by civil society organizations was signed by all political parties in February 2019 and articulated principles to guide the implementation of state reforms.
- e. Increased levels of social unrest and tension.
- f. Politicisation of the judicial system.

- g. UN Strategy for Guinea-Bissau / UN repositioning / closure of UNIOGBIS.

### **Dividers**

- a. Perceived manipulation of geo-political influences and external assistance to political elites for their own benefit creates a sense that internal dynamics are not taken into consideration when resolving political impasses, thus further aggravating the cycle of instability.
- b. Politics is not perceived “for the common good”: lack of formal mechanisms for broad participation in the development and implementation of public policies, which have been replaced by informal patronage networks of influence, shifted public debate from key peace and development priorities to issues around power sharing (and access to state resources aimed at maintaining those networks functioning).
- c. Corruption: Counter accusations by the political elites over corruption and other illegal/criminal acts created distrust in and the perception that “all are equally corrupt”, which aggravated the people’s feeling of being disenfranchised, particularly in rural areas.
- d. Culture of impunity.

### **Connectors**

- a. The liberation war as a strong nation-building myth with social mobilisation potential.
- b. Social relations and practices across ethnic lines: high social cohesion.
- c. Traditional structures ensure conflict prevention and access to some basic services.
- d. Creole: language as a peacebuilding tool.
- e. Lusophone community: access to political and economic benefit of Lusophone countries.
- f. ECOWAS community: access to political and economic benefit of West African countries.
- g. Poverty is distributed horizontally, not across rigid regional, religious or ethnic identities.

## Annex 3 – Stakeholders and Peacebuilding capacities

### i. *Civil Society and NGOs*

The history of civil society in Africa is incomplete. Civil society in Africa is an open debate which involves contending perspectives about their role and relationship with society and the state. In the liberal perspective civil society includes different forms of organizations found between the family and the state. These perspectives exclude from the history of civil society in Guinea-Bissau many types of organizations that do not fit the modern understanding of organizations and that existed during pre-colonial times, colonial occupation, and in the post-colonial state.

Cardoso (2014) defends that the strength of civil society in Guinea-Bissau lies in the evolution of interethnic relations and alliances, in the various forms of ethnic social structures namely the ones based in age classes, in the various forms of organization of power within these societies, in the socio-religious institutions and in a series of rural institutions involved in decision making processes such as the allocation of natural resources (Cardoso, 2014, cit. in Barros 2014). Makumbe (1998) also mentions that African political systems recognise the role of popular participation in decision making so it can be argued that they have a political system that requires consultation processes. According to several authors, these structures are of paramount importance because they constitute the strength of civil society in Guinea-Bissau (Cardoso, 2014; Forest, 2003; Barros, 2014). As Barros (2014) mentions, it is from these types of spaces that different forms of informal collective organization that have a large transformative potential can emerge. The mobilisation of the population for the liberation movement was also the result of a large civic space.

In recent years, we have also seen on numerous occasions the organisation of several forms of public protest to defend democracy and human rights. These include demonstrations, strikes, protests and petitions. To a large extent these protests mobilize the youth which are ever more engaged in political issues. They are successful in mobilising international attention and contributed to change on several occasions.

Regarding the more formal types of organizations, although it is also possible to trace the history back to colonial times, their emergence is usually associated with the period of political liberalization. They include several types of associations including religious organizations and NGO, trade Unions and professional organizations. NGOs have had an important role in helping to deliver basic services to the population such as health and education, but their range of activity has expanded to the promotion of human rights, environment, peace and democracy. Several NGOs have been engaged in the process of elections monitoring both in 2014 and, even more so, during the 2019 legislative elections. There are limits to the actions of NGOs as they have been criticized for being co-opted by the logic of international cooperation and individual interests, by the pernicious links between political and social activity and the system of patronage in force.

Peace capacity: NGOs contribute directly to the improvement of the conditions of the population and also to the development of democracy. Alongside traditional structures and related types of associations and social movements they create are spaces for informal collective action, protest and development of alternatives that can be important peace initiatives.

They mobilised around the 2014 crisis, especially women's groups who showed their capacity for a change and were considered by many as having a positive effect on the political stakeholders. Throughout the current political crisis, alongside ECOWAS and international partners, CSOs, traditional and religious leaders, have promoted political dialogue and contributed to finding political solutions to successive political and institutional impasses. Paradigmatic examples include, the participation of a delegation of CSOs in the ECOWAS negotiations held in Conakry, Guinea, the organization of two Women's forums, which brought together women from all regions to advocate for a peaceful resolution of the political disputes, and several public demonstrations demanding respect of the Constitution. In 2019, a network of CSOs was established to monitor public policies and advocate for key reforms and is developing a coordinated CSO advocacy strategy for monitoring and advocating for the reforms of the political system (including the Constitution, the Electoral Law and the Political Parties Law). All these initiatives contributed to expanding the democratic space and challenging the control of informal patronage networks over the political discourse.

Additionally, traditional structures and related types of associations and social movements have been involved in informal collective action, protest and the development of alternatives to socio-political narratives. The concept of "mediation" is strongly rooted in African traditional conflict management. Communities trust traditional leadership mechanisms for conflict resolution within or between groups. Guinea-Bissau has been historically noted for its high degree of social cohesion and low inter-communal violence. Traditional leadership structures have a complementary role to the formal judicial system. UNIOGBIS and the UNCT, in collaboration with Voz de Paz and other CSO, have made concerted efforts to strengthen mediation capacities in the country over the last 10 years and it has had an impact at the community level.

### ***Women's movement***

Throughout the consultations, women considered that the access to knowledge and the implementation of their human and women's rights was the best form to promote their agency, by acting towards their goals to achieve women's empowerment, advancement of their rights and inclusion, and promoting social change. In Guinea-Bissau the way that social norms shape and restrict women's agency puts women at a disadvantage in all aspects of life, with limited choice and decision-making. This situation is induced by the discrepancy of the social status of men and women, which is based on exclusion and injustice and is expressed in discrimination, unequal access to opportunities and being victims of acts of violence.



In this context, Bissau-Guinean women express their agency through the way they control natural resources (i.e. producers and traders), logistics and cultural activities, and civil society, from which they can have greater participation and representation in politics and society, in order to influence decision making. It is through these spaces of power and collective agency that women can make greater use of their individual agency.

Women through civil society organizations, traditional groups and associations create social spaces for dialogue. These collective groups serve as a space for social concertation, exchange of experience and dialogue that enable women to become empowered as peacemakers in terms of local mediation, but also at electoral and even political levels.

From 1994 to 2014, the vitality of women's participation was greater in the field of Civil Society. Personalities such as **Augusta Henriques** (Tiniguena), **Diana Lima-Handem** and **Isabel Almeida** (Alternag), and **Isabel Nosolini** (AD) inaugurated a successful intervention in the community of NGOs. However, it is mainly in the last decade (2008-18) that we notice the boom of women-led organizations and the formation of feminist social movements. These are the cases of **Aissatu Indjai** (RENLUV), **Silvina Tavares** (PPM), **Elisa Pinto** (REMPSECAO), **Maria da Luz Imbali** (RNMT), **Nelvina Barreto** (Miguilan), **Helena Neves** (Women Lawyers Association), **Monde Balde** (**Radio Mulher Bafatá**), **Aida Fadia** (Women's Police) **Aissatu Forbs Djaló** (CNJ), **Fatumata Sane**(RENAJELF) and **Ude Fati** (Voz de Paz).

Women have since also attained a more mature collective standing in peacebuilding, as shown by their capacity to unite around the inclusive Guinean Women's Council, coordinated by **Francisca Vaz**, which is playing a key role in facilitating internal dialogue among political actors and institutions and promoting track 2-level peace and conflict resolution initiatives, jointly with the Network of Women Mediators across the country.

Building on these dynamics, women's organisations led by the women mentioned above, and others, have been working to create their own dialogue space that reweaves broken connections across differences in society; as well as formal dialogue spaces to emphasize that they want more spaces for inclusion and participation from local to institutional and political level. In seeking to create space for women's engagement in mediation processes, several networks have been established at the national and regional levels. The Women's Mediators Network (WMN) has over the last 2 years trained women in mediation and negotiation, both in Bissau and at the regional level, which supported their participation in mediation, prevention and management of conflicts. These initiatives created spaces for collective collaboration, consultation, exchange of experience and dialogue among women, which empowered them as peacebuilders at the national and local level.

In the private sphere, within the family, women are still subject to male decisions, being excluded from decision-making on family dynamics, namely number of children, forced marriages. In the latter case, young girls are more vulnerable, as they are convinced and/or forced to marry early to help their families.

At the political level, despite their recognised participation in the construction of the State (including during the National liberation struggle), women do not have a strong presence in national institutions, and in political decision-making. The formal structures of the parties give few opportunities for women to ascend to decision-making positions. Despite a wide and recognized representation of women as base-militants within political parties, women have not yet reached the decision-making spheres of political parties. Women's participation is limited and conditioned by factors linked to culture and tradition, reinforced by values inculcated through education since the young age. Women are defined as housewives, mothers and wives and must remain self-sacrificing for the good of the family, regardless of whatever achievements, potentialities and personal experiences they may have. Although considered a big achievement of the women's movement, the Parity Law, which was approved just before the March 2019 legislative election, has yet to produce the desired results to increasing women's participation in politics.

### *Youth movement*

The youth movement, is comprised of two predominant national networks: CNJ, created by government to enable youth engagement and RENAJ which was created by youth themselves and emerged in connection with the June 7th war to strengthen youth association in the post war period for youth pacification and reconstruction. The two networks overlap in membership but have nevertheless had stages of rivalry and collaboration. The organization reached a new low in 2016 when both were weak and heavily manipulated by the political elites.

With growing awareness and dissatisfaction with the current crisis, the two youth networks are more united than ever, and their utterance reflects a strong rejection of any form of manipulation. They have more partnerships and projects than in the past to promote livelihoods and social entrepreneurship. They are working on a new Parity Law for youth and regional networks of the organization and are more vocal on social conditions facing communities particularly land conflicts, forest preservation, cattle rearing, waste management and inter-community relations. The youth are the greatest advocates for a functioning state and public-sector reform. Despite their disillusion with the old guard of politicians they are not sufficiently mobilized to offer alternative candidates.

## ii. *Traditional power and religious leaders*

There are over 15 ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau and almost all communities are headed by a traditional leader ("régulo"). While their influential role remains largely at the local level, it was only after the democratisation process in the 1990s that the political elite started reaching out to these traditional powers. Authorities soon realized the potential role that traditional power representatives could play in influencing formal politics by securing support from their various communities.

Traditional leaders perceive themselves as partners to authorities for conflict mediation and resolution in local communities, as well as in mobilizing communities for civic education, economic and environmental issues. They participate in land distribution within their communities together with local officials. Most experience a precarious financial situation and are therefore susceptible to political manipulation.

The main religious groups in Guinea-Bissau are Traditionalist, Muslims and Christians. Together with traditional leaders, religious leaders also play a historically important role in decision-making and conflict resolution at the community level. There is a high degree of religious tolerance, inter-faith dialogue and respect in the country. High-level figures from the main religious denominations have publicly taken joint action in seeking to mediate between political actors, such as in the war 1998-99 and in recent political crises.

Depending on the ethnicity, women can play an active role in decision-making and conflict resolution at the community level. Although the traditional structure of most ethnic groups often places the man as the leader of the community, decision-making capacities on behalf of women, and of women, is dependent and varies amongst ethnic groups. Ethnic groups like Manjaco and Papel define the actions and roles of women, according the tradition based on the rituals where they make sacred commitments, but for Bijagó community, the role of women is highly valuable due to its matriarchal structure.

Despite the polarisation along ethnic and religious line during electoral periods, the most evident being the 2005 second round of presidential election between Nino Vieira and Malam Bacai Sanha, and to a certain extent between Kumba Yala and Malam Bacai Sanhá, none of the post electoral crisis that ensued had an ethnic or religious basis. Inter-ethnic and religious co-existence proved to be stronger than political divides and religious leaders were often called to support mediation amongst political leaders. In this regard, their mediation during the political and military conflict of 1989 was widely recognised.

Recently, religious groups leaders participated in the most relevant mediation initiatives and negotiations to find a solution for the current political crisis, namely the Conakry and Lomé agreements. During the 2019 presidential election, which was marked by inflammatory ethnic or religious remarks in public and private gatherings, as social and traditional media, religious leaders mobilised and organised several joint initiatives, which contributed to defuse political tension. Despite the strong leadership demonstrated by religious leaders, this remains an area of concern where peace capacities should continue to be strengthen.

UNIOGBIS has been working with faith-based groups, supporting their peace mediation and working towards the stabilisation of the country. At their request, in 2013-2014, UNIOGBIS organised several trainings in conflict management and mediation for religious groups to improve their skills in that field.

### iii. *Media*

Until 1994, which marks the transition to a multi-party democratic system, the media in Guinea-Bissau was completely controlled by the State, which resulted in an environment of restricted press freedom. This media environment was a continuum from the colonial propaganda only countered by the PAIGC set radio “Radio Liberdade”, operating until the independence. Most journalists carried with them a culture of self-censorship until present days, reinforced by the interference of the State in the editorial policy of national television (TGB) and radio (RDN).

The radio is still the preferred media by 80 percent of Bissau-Guineans. In 1994, the NGO AD created the first community radio in the outskirts of Bissau and today there are 40 of these radios coordinated by a National Network (RENARC). The community radios are staffed by young volunteers and managed by community-based associations. They are the only Bissau-Guinean media available in the border areas, as national radio and TV still do not have national coverage. Private radios started to flourish in the capital Bissau in late 90’s early 2000.

Both private and public media have benefited from the international community support, either through bilateral or multilateral organizations, directly or through content diffusion agreements. However, the situation is dire. Over 70 percent of journalists still do not have a regular salary and most media are funded by private donors, who in most cases aspire to a political career. Many journalists move with their “sponsors” once they move into political office. The regulatory media framework – as well as the journalists’ ethics code - exist but as in other places is not respected due to immediate private and sectorial interests.

The rising internet usage by young journalists, in urban centres and in the diaspora, the establishment of a university degree programme in journalism in 2014-2015, as well as journalism training interventions throughout the years, has led to the emergence of a new style of doing journalism which is more assertive and investigative. The coverage of the 2019 parliamentary elections, setting the agenda of the campaign around the different party proposals, is evidence of that.

As in other countries, the emergence of social media has brought about not only more access to information, but also the capacity to spread hate speech, unchecked and fake information, which in turn leads to manipulation of public opinion that could pose a risk to social cohesion. In this regard, UNIOGBIS supported a fact-checking unit, within the national commission for social communication, to support their work in identifying breaches to the regulatory media framework, as well as the spread of fake news.

The potential of the media to act as a trigger of conflict or as a peacebuilding agent is considerable and should not be underestimated.

#### iv. *Private Sector*

The private sector is considered since the 90s as a key actor in the development of Guinea-Bissau and it has been at the centrepiece of government policies. However, despite the consensus around its importance, efforts to develop the private sector rarely succeeded. Until now, its development has been very limited, with a large degree of informality and constrained by poor infrastructure and a poor business and regulatory environment.

Behind this lies a plethora of complex historic, political and economic factors. The weak economic system inherited from colonialism and from the peripheral position of Guinea-Bissau in the international trade system, the lack of industrialization (efforts to industrialise were stifled by the crises in the 1980s and 1998/99 and thereafter almost abandoned), the lack of national capital, and the centralised economic planning in the years after independence, all contributed to this situation.

In the 90s, there were several major programmes with international support to develop the private sector aimed at improving regulatory framework and business environment. However, these efforts were shattered by the 1998/99 conflict and according to some analysts, have never recovered since then. On the other hand, the privatization strategies and efforts to support the private sector under Structural Adjustment Programmes were inefficient and favoured the unproductive appropriation of these opportunities by a small economic elite in close relationship with the political elite.

As a result, the private sector continues to be embryonic and focused around cashew exports. The cycles of political instability and the patrimonial running of the State create an environment favourable to rent seeking and the very uncertain policy and regulatory environment deter national and foreign actors to invest. This is compounded by extreme difficulties in accessing basic services (transport, water and electricity).

The cost of doing business is consequently, extremely high. In the latest World Bank Doing Business report, Guinea Bissau ranked 174 out of 190 economies with respect to the ease of doing business. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) lack operating capacity and there is a high degree of informality. The financial sector is small with weak governance and also risk-adverse compared to banks in other countries in the region, this being one of the main obstacles to the development of the private sector pointed out by these actors.

However, private business development continues to be a central part of government policy and international support. The OECD's analysis of the economic situation in Guinea-Bissau in 2016 points out that after the elections in 2014 and the March 2015 Round Table, private sector confidence returned, domestic demand grew and financial reform allowed for tax revenue in the first six months of 2015 to be 75% higher than in the same period in 2014 (OECD Africa Outlook, 2016, Guinea – Bissau). This shows how crucial the political environment is in the development of the sector.

According to national and international analysis, the private sector has a role to play in “specific areas such as agriculture, fisheries and tourism that could provide greater opportunities for

livelihood resilience, economic diversification and poverty reduction”. Private-Public Partnerships may also be explored, for example in the management of major public utilities and for large projects on economic diversification and industrialization”.

The private sector has an important role to play in economic development. Equitable economic development is an important dimension of cohesive and peaceful society. The private sector can be expected to contribute to the diversification of economic opportunities and to the improvement of revenues for small entrepreneurs and farmers through the strengthening of the competitiveness and inclusiveness of the cashew sector. Efforts to support women entrepreneurship may also be an important contribution to the inclusion of women in economic activities. The private sector can also play an important role in encouraging the development of a rule of law and more transparent regulation as well as in encouraging public investment in the development of infrastructure outside the capital. This includes voicing their concerns for the lack of roads, which are important for business but also for rural households which are very isolated, and electricity supply which is very limited and non-existent in some rural areas.

The risks come from the close links between private sector and political elites and the potential for the appropriation of resources without making a contribution to a productive and equitable economy. The private sector may also have operational impacts that create social and environmental harm. These issues should be addressed and managed to ensure a positive contribution of the private sector to peacebuilding efforts. “Private sector enterprises in fragile and conflict-affected contexts are neither intrinsically peace-positive nor intrinsically peace-negative. Whether the impacts of foreign investment, corporate initiatives, and the like are positive or negative in terms of peace depends on how a company operates and how it engages with other actors.”

## V. *Political Parties*

Until 1991, Guinea-Bissau was a one-party state. The liberation war, the construction of the post-independence State in Guinea-Bissau and the PAIGC are inextricably intertwined. All political parties created after the 1991 Constitutional review are effectively the result of internal factions and disputes within the PAIGC, which could no longer accommodate the divergent internal competing agendas.

However, political parties have been acting, for the most part, as interest groups with very few ideological differences across the board. There are about 49 political parties, an indication of the difficulty in building consensus, and in submitting to party discipline. Many registered parties do not have the human, material or ideological resources to build a national base. In many cases, parties are extremely dependent only on their respective founders. The electoral results from 1994 to 2014 show that only four political parties were represented at the national level with candidates in all constituencies: the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde

(PAIGC), the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), the Party for a New Democracy (PND) and the Union for Change (UM).

Many of these parties emerged from internal PAIGC splits, and in some cases, have little to distinguish themselves ideologically. They lack coherence, internal cohesion, discipline and well elaborated programs (Chabal, 1996; Rudebeck, 2001). They often consist of groups of individuals with aspirations for power, struggling for prestige and economic influence rather than for reasonable political objectives (Voz de Paz, 2010: 34). They are prone to intra-party disputes, inter and intra-institutional fighting and are also vulnerable to patronage networks with mixed political-economic-military agendas. These small parties have a limited ability to put forward and defend concrete policies and to play the role of constructive opposition. They cannot coordinate and build a common front against the hegemony of the PAIGC, which has won five of the six multiparty elections.

The current legislature has shown a change, with a new alliance between MADEM-G15 and PRS emerging to constitute opposition to the alliance led by PAIGC formed by three other political parties (APU-PDGB, PCD and UM). MADEM-G15 boycotted sessions at the ANP due to the dispute over the composition of the ANP Bureau. MADEM-G15 is the most recent major political party, directly born out of an internal split in the PAIGC. The PRS and its leadership were weakened after the 10 March 2019 legislative election results, in which the party lost half of its parliamentary representation.

Peace capacity: There has been a historical trend of lack of identity-based political parties (e.g. ethnic or religious identities). Interests and consequently alliances are fluid and not rigid. A certain shared political background and high level of interconnectedness between party elites may be encouraged to create an openness to dialogue and compromise.

## vi. *State Institutions*

### *Organs of sovereignty*

Guinea-Bissau is a semi-presidential political system, one of the few in West Africa. The uneasy relations between this institutional architecture (Presidency, Government and Parliament) have been one of the main drivers of the recent cycle of instability in the country. These actors have competing interpretations of the Constitution about the division of powers, decision-making processes and, particularly, the enforcement of the Executive power. These are inherent tensions to any system, requiring the consolidation of effective mechanisms for political dialogue, consensus-building and for inter-institutional conflict-resolution. These dynamics and internal capacity for dialogue have so far been largely lacking.

Peace capacity: A review of the current system, coupled with the creation of conditions for local elections, could maximise its potential to bridge current political divisions. It is feasible to create

the conditions to broaden the political space to enhance the participation of women and youth, strengthen the independence of the judiciary, and the protection of human rights. Inclusive discussion can also explore different models that could address the identified needs to promote political dialogue and the opening of the political space to other constituencies, which are currently underrepresented.

### *Public administration*

The public administration in Guinea-Bissau suffers from many structural problems. As many studies indicate, the weaknesses in the public administration have deep and complex causes. They are, firstly, linked to the nature of the state, sometimes called fragile or incomplete. These reasons contribute to the explanations of some of the negative traits that are ingrained in public administration and its role in patrimonial networks. As identified in the causes of conflict, the attribution of positions in government and in public administration is one of the ways members of government and political leaders have for distributing resources through their client networks. This has led to a public administration where there are many competencies but also many positions are not attributed based on merit and competencies. Very often, if the budget has not been approved, government entities have no budget to carry out the functions attributed to their institutions. This makes it difficult for many institutions to perform their statutory roles.

### *Police*

The fragility of the State vis-à-vis its law enforcement agencies has created perception of widespread impunity and a general sense of insecurity amongst the Bissau-Guineans. The professionalization of Guinea-Bissau's police has been a national priority, an endeavour requiring long term support. The law enforcement agencies are under-resourced in personnel, infrastructure, training and equipment. Guinea-Bissau is unable to conduct basic training for both cadets and existing police officers, leading them to rely on international experts without a national standard of certification for basic, advanced and specialized policing service. The professionalization of the law enforcement agencies requires a systemic approach to planning, recruitment, training and development, and the establishment of a nationally owned police training academy. There is limited technical capacity at the land, sea and air border points for control of people, goods and vehicles entering or exiting the country. This is impacted by gaps in methodology (laws, procedures, technical capacity) and means (logistics, budget, equipment) for interception, interdiction and investigation of serious Transnational Organized Crime including drug trafficking.

Peacebuilding Capacities: Recent criminal investigations and the role of the Judiciary Police has shown the resilience of some institutions to resist political interference and their capacity to establish cooperation with international partners to ensure the fulfilment of its mission. The recently signed MOU between the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal on police cooperation is one example of this cooperation.



## *Defence and Security Forces*

The Defence Forces are one of the key stakeholders in the cycle of instability in Guinea-Bissau. Since 1980, the Armed Forces have intervened directly in politics through coups. The dynamics of the liberation war led to military high-ranking officials occupying political positions in the new State and reinforced the relations between the Armed Forces, the ruling PAIGC and the State. This defined the intimate relation between political and military elites. The Constitutional review of 1991 prevented the military from occupying political positions and having party membership. This effectively led to a significant loss in ranks of the PAIGC of those military who opted to remain in the Armed Forces (mainly Balanta). Both political civilian and military elites have maintained close patronage networks. The military is vulnerable to being influenced by political agendas and, in the past, have sought to directly interfere in politics to ensure their interests were secured. The Armed Forces enjoy considerable autonomy in their policy decisions, resource management and are without civilian oversight. They are disproportionately allocated funding from the General State Budget compared to areas such as education, health or social security. Military officers have been found to be linked to drug trafficking, some of whom have remained under international sanctions since 2012 for their perceived role of undermining constitutional order.

Peace capacity: Since 2012, the military has not intervened directly in politics. High-ranking military officers have rejected attempts by political actors to influence and requests for military involvement. The Armed Forces appear focused on rehabilitating its image in the country and abroad, and to be seen as contributing to stability and peace as constitutionally prescribed. The Armed Forces seem interested in the reforms of defence sector, a process which would broadly follow the strategies elaborated in the National SSR Strategy Document to ensure the buy-in of the military. The reforms need to be gradual and carefully negotiated.

## *Judicial system*

The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers<sup>74</sup> and participants in the consultations held by the Bissau-Guinean NGO Voz di Paz<sup>75</sup>, have pointed out that access and administration of justice was never a priority for government. Among other challenges for the system, there is insufficient coverage of the judicial network in the country, high judicial fees that the average citizen is unable to afford, inconsistent application of the law, inadequate training of judicial staff to carry out its functions, a limited number of lawyers outside of Bissau as well as police officers, and limited access to information by the people. There are no legal mechanisms or

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<sup>74</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>75</sup> Voz di Paz/Interpeace (2010) *Root Causes of Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau: the voice of the people.*

programmes in place for the protection of witnesses or judicial staff. Delays in the justice system is tantamount to a denial of justice. The justice system in effect underscores the inability of the State to promote and protect human rights and leaves the justice sector vulnerable to corruption. This results in mistrust on the part of the population who perceive it as only serving the interests of “the powerful”.

One other important effect of the mistrust of the population in the formal justice system is that it coexists in parallel to traditional and religious practises, which the population continued to rely upon<sup>76</sup> since the formal justice system is not able to fulfil its promise of providing an alternative accessible to all. This has created a gap in the justice system that is sometimes filled by intermediaries, such as local governors, administrators, and the police.

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<sup>76</sup> *Idem.*

## Annex 4 – Peacebuilding Priorities

For each identified peacebuilding priority, the table articulates proximate causes of conflict (as identified in Annex 2) with peacebuilding capacities and other elements of conflict dynamics leading to the theory of change that could support breaking the Cycle of Instability

A. ENCOURAGE INCLUSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
<p>The legal framework that regulates Guinea-Bissau's political system has gaps, which have been exploited to fuel political instability</p> <p>The non-implementation of a substantial part of the system (e.g. local elections), resulted in the lack of mechanisms to promote formal linkages with the people.</p> <p><b>Conflicting interpretations of the legal framework gives rise to institutional disputes</b></p>	<p>A commission on the revision of the political parties and electoral law was created by the new Parliament</p> <p>Local Elections are seen as providing another space for current power disputes</p> <p>PBF project on Supporting Women's and Youth Political Participation for Peace and Development in Guinea-Bissau - UN Women (UNFPA/WFP)<sup>77</sup></p> <p>UN Women - GU Lessons Learned Seminar on the Parity law and mobilisation of women's civil society led by Association of</p>	<p>The renewal of the mandate of the ad hoc commission on the revision of the Constitution was the first decision of the new elected parliament. UNIOGBIS has been supporting the work of the commission and also strengthening the capacity of CSOs to participate in the constitutional review process.</p> <p>Women parliamentary network and women's civil society across political divides mobilization was crucial to approve the parity law</p> <p>CSO Reforms monitoring network</p> <p>Some NGOs conducted training on the local elections law (Could you add date if older than 2019?)</p>	<p>The process of the revision of the Constitution, political parties and electoral law is not inclusive and serves as a means to accommodate demands of the powerful.</p> <p>Local governance is captured by the same patronage networks that operate at the central level and remains male dominated</p>	<p>If the process of the <b>revision of the Constitution, Electoral Law and Political Party Laws</b> is inclusive, it will provide in the short term a space for political dialogue, and in the medium term creates a framework, which is inclusive of women and youth, and where mechanisms are introduced for political power to be exercised for the good of the people. A gender perspective during the debates is key to the political participation of women.</p> <p>If the conditions for local governance are created (legal framework), coupled with the empowerment of women at leadership and technical /professional/managerial level this will create a better responsive local administration</p>	<p><b>Support inclusive and participatory political reform (constitution, electoral laws and political party framework law)</b></p> <p><b>Support the revision, extension and enforcement of the gender Parity law</b></p> <p>Support local governance structures and legal frameworks, including organisation of local elections</p>

<sup>77</sup> This project empowers women and (mainly urban) youth leaders to engage in the political life of the country. It provides a conduit to political power for change makers, support to youth and women's wings of the parties, candidates for election and election oversight. It also enables FP to work with women farmers and enable rural advocacy on issues affecting rural communities

A. ENCOURAGE INCLUSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
	Women Lawyers and PPM			which might be able to support opportunities for youth to remain in the rural areas and they will be less vulnerable to be recruited to illegal networks (trafficking, violent extremism ...)	
The disconnect between the political elite and the people enabled the pursuit of the former's agenda [as well as the interests of the military, within their patronage networks]	<p>Significant growth in the presence of an active civil society in the country</p> <p>For the first time there were debates, organized by the media, between the candidates within their circles.</p> <p>For the first time, all political parties who ran in the legislative elections had a political programme</p> <p>The Youth and women small cash grants awarded by the PBF project are drivers for change because they enable citizen government engagement to help address local problems –</p> <p>The huge civic programme launched by the EU in 2019 is premised on local</p>	<p>Political Parties trained on political communication, leadership, in particular women candidates. These were requested by political parties and conducted by the UN, with funds from PBF</p> <p>Awareness of human rights civic and women's rights, and conflict mediation capacity has been extended to the regions</p> <p>INEP, co-organized with UNIOGBIS, a series of debates on democracy and the political system</p> <p>Peace capacities for youth and women's groups were carried out in 27 local peace initiatives</p> <p>Some CSOs conduct their regular training and reflection meetings on peacebuilding conflict mediation and human rights, and have reporting mechanisms(HRDN, Kumpunduri de Paz, VdP, etc)</p>	<p>If political parties are not able to fulfil their constitutional mandate of mediating between the people and the legislative power, elections will only be a formal exercise and the disconnect between the people and political elites will widen</p> <p>Lack of accountability continues due to poverty which makes civil society dependent, subject to manipulation and prone to blackmail</p>	<p>If political parties open up to youth and women, and their training targets national and local leadership dialogue and peacebuilding capabilities, this will increase their capacity to contribute to the political debate and reach to the people</p> <p>If the debate on Local elections [and concrete experiences on local governance/decentralization are supported], the political space will widen, which will in turn create conditions for a debate on the interactions between central and local governance</p> <p>The theory of change is that citizens can and need to take initiative to build relationship with government and demand accountability. A certain degree of apathy and lack of capacity inhibits these initiatives.</p>	<p><b>Strengthen political parties' capacity to engage with the population, including training on communication strategies</b></p> <p>Support local structures of political parties to engage in debates on local elections</p> <p>Support local constituencies' claims for accountability and responsive governance</p>

A. ENCOURAGE INCLUSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
	community support and self-reliance	A database of trained members of mediation organisation is available with breakdown to the sector and village level			
Absence of an inclusive and constructive political dialogue process causes an inability to generate agreements on priority reforms and policy agendas	<p>The Stability Pact [promoted by CSO with wide consultation at the regional level] was signed, and foresees a follow up/monitoring mechanism</p> <p>Synergies across PBF projects have fostered an understanding among CSOs, which have taken the debate on stability outside the capital and held consultations/ outreach sessions in all regions of Guinea-Bissau</p>	<p>Civil Society Organizations, including the Women's Council and OCNC joined efforts to hold consultations/outreach session in all regions and to advocate with political parties for the signing of the stability pact, covering elements that could prevent a relapse into political crisis.</p> <p>The establishment of a follow-up committee for the stability pact was agreed by all political parties which includes provisions for the facilitation of a dialogue on its implementation</p> <p>SCO Network created to monitor urgent reforms</p>	<p>The Stability Pact and/or urgent reforms are not implemented creating a sense that Political Agreements are not complied with, and therefore, an understanding that political dialogue is not needed is developed.</p> <p>The structure (composition?) of the Follow-up Committee envisaged by the Stability pact is dysfunctional and fails to promote/facilitate its implementation</p> <p>Some constituencies are not included or are perceived as being excluded from political dialogue (ethnic groups, rural constituencies, women, youth) undermining support for the process and potentially fuelling political grievances</p>	<p>If CSO organizations, including the Women's Council bring together different factions among the political elites, as well as neglected communities especially in rural areas [inclusive political dialogue] to resolve disputes through constructive dialogue, the cycle of short-sighted and rent-seeking behaviour leading to political instability will be broken</p> <p>If inclusive political dialogue is supported by a strong communication strategy, this will mitigate perceptions that the dialogue is not inclusive and build a constituency of community-level support for the dialogue and implementing any outcomes from it</p> <p>If the Stability Pact is implemented and its follow up mechanism, which foresees a continuous dialogue on transparency, as well as key reforms, is established, political actors and CSO will have a platform for political dialogue</p>	<p><b>Support a continuous national dialogue/agreement at the strategic level on key reforms:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- promote inclusive political dialogue and an agreement on key reforms (Stability Pact and Conakry Agreement); engage with CSO, particularly women's groups, on priority inclusive reform efforts</li> <li>- support for youth engagement and participation in governance and development processes at all levels;</li> </ul>

A. ENCOURAGE INCLUSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
				and will be able to generate consensus on key reforms.  If CSO monitoring and CSO advocacy for key reforms to creates pressure for urgent reforms, this will encourage the State to pursue reforms	
<p>Lack of political dialogue between the organs of sovereignty leads to a political impasse, which prevents the advancement of key reforms</p> <p>Lack of political/judicial mechanisms to address institutional conflicts [and/or exercise shared powers] leads to political crises/impasses, constitutional disruptions, and/or impedes the organisation of elections</p>	<p>Resorting to the justice sector (exploring legal ambiguities) to solve political conflict instead of resorting to the military and persecution of political opponents</p> <p>Proposed changes to the military justice code (and the military tribunal) foresee that crimes committed by military de judged in civilian court, which would help end impunity</p>	<p>Organs of sovereignty have legal and political offices with highly qualified personnel, which have produced legal analysis to their respective organ holders and, when needed, have sustained their positions in the courts</p>	<p>Lack of political will to promote constructive political solutions could jeopardize the inter-institutional dialogue and tensions between organs of sovereignty remain unaddressed</p> <p>Use of legal ambiguities to postpone elections and/or impede its organization</p> <p>The Military prefer their tribunal because it fosters impunity of military -- any threat to their privileges could be confronted with violence</p>	<p>If organs of sovereignty engage in a constructive dialogue [and their legal/political cabinets] they will be able to agree on a political agenda, as well as on systems and processes to exercise shared powers [given by the constitution]</p> <p>If legal/political cabinets of the holders of organs of sovereignty are equipped with embedded national and/or international advisors and its technical personnel trained in leadership dialogue, they will be able to find common positions and political solutions for political conflicts that might arise</p>	<p><b>- promote dialogue between branches of government</b></p>
<p>Conflicting interpretation of the legal framework gives rise to institutional disputes; inability to exercise shared powers defined in the Constitution leads to the</p>	<p>An agreement on the extent of the mandate of the President [until presidential election] was reached at the ECOWAS Summit in Abuja, which can</p>	<p>ECOWAS mediation, UNIOGBIS Good Offices and coordinated pressure from the International community, including the Group of Five</p>	<p>Uncoordinated action by the international community is used to justify irreconcilable positions of the political</p>	<p>If the international community shares a common understanding and strategy to support Guinea-Bissau authorities to solve political crisis and maintains coordinated pressure, this will support the</p>	<p>Coordinate international community's efforts to solve the political crisis and support engagement of a broad range of political stakeholders</p>

A. ENCOURAGE INCLUSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
inability of governments and PR to complete their mandates	support a convergence of positions in the exercise of political functions		actors and further aggravates tension	implementation of strategies to break the cycle of instability in Guinea-Bissau.	
The legitimacy and independence of electoral bodies is questioned by opposition parties and leads to a mistrust in the electoral process	Political parties run on concrete programmes which were debated in public and citizens could pose questions  Elections continue not to be contested in Guinea-Bissau	GTAPE and CNE have recently conducted legislative elections with the support of the international community  CSO have accumulated experience in coordinating efforts to monitoring elections and compliance with the code of conduct	Upcoming Presidential election [which is seen as crucial to guarantee access to power and resources for those who did not win the legislative elections]  Mistrust of the new Secretariat of State exclusively for Electoral Affairs	If the organization of presidential election is supported by the regional and international community it will provide confidence in the electoral process and contribute to a stable and peaceful environment conducive to the election  If a Code of Conduct on the election and a CSO-led monitoring system is established, including the monitoring of political discourse and ensuring information is shared at the community level, this will mitigate the effects of negative political campaign	Support and strengthen the bodies that organize elections, including voters registration
Lack of trust among political institutions and actors, aggravated by grievances from the past  Political discourse of divisiveness building on grievances from the past and current feelings of social/economic exclusion in the run up to Presidential election	One of the first decisions taken by the ANP was the renewal of the mandate of the OCNC	The OCNC has conducted regional and sectoral consultations both on the dissemination of the stability pact and on the preparation of the national conference for peace and development  Existence of a tradition of peaceful, cooperative coexistence within a multi ethnic society, with endogenous mechanisms for conflict	If the national dialogue is not inclusive and perceived as unable to address grievances from the past it will not be successful to organize a meaningful national conference and will aggravate the disconnect between the elite and the people	If the OCNC generates social attention on the issue of reconciliation as a mean to mitigate divisive political discourse, it will lay down the foundations of a process that will help the country reconcile with its past and recognize the value of endogenous mechanisms for conflict prevention and satisfy basic needs of the communities in	<b>Support the national dialogue and reconciliation, in line with UN policies</b>

A. ENCOURAGE INCLUSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND THE REFORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
		<p>prevention and satisfy basic needs of the communities</p> <p>Multi-ethnic composition of society with a long tradition of peaceful coexistence</p>	<p>It would therefore be a missed opportunity to address issues from the past, which until today overshadow the political life of Guinea-Bissau</p> <p>Exploitation of ethnic and religious grievances for political purposes</p>	<p>ensuring the peaceful and cooperative coexistence of the different communities</p> <p>If support is given to OCNC to ensure the inclusiveness of the process, and enhance the participation of youth and women, this will mitigate the risk of disconnect between the State and the people</p>	

B. SUPPORT STRENGTHENING OF STATE INSTITUTIONS AND FOSTERING ACTIVE CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING CSOs AND MEDIA FOR INCLUSIVENESS AND OVERSIGHT					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
<p>Fragile governance framework. Weak systems and processes to ensure accountability and transparency leads to limited trust in public institutions [i.e. lack of transparency in recruitment leads to politicization of public administration, growing numbers of civil servants, including police]</p> <p>Political disputes are fuelled by the need to navigate patronage</p>	<p>The stability pact identifies priority measures to ensure transparent and accountability measures. It also establishes compensation (social justice) measures aimed at gaining civil servants support to the reform process.</p> <p>Priorities included in the stability pact includes measures related to inter-alia accountability, transparency in the recruitment processes;</p>	<p>CSO have advocated, and will likely continue to advocate for the implementation of such measures</p> <p>The stability pact also established concrete measures (indicators) for each one of these priorities</p>	<p>Past attempts to exert control on the management of state affairs, have been hindered and further weakened institutions which initiated them.</p>	<p>If international and/or national advisors are imbedded in State institutions to support the establishment of transparent systems and processes, they will provide the necessary expertise [and guarantees of impartiality, as well as quality control] in the implementation of these measures.</p> <p>If state institutions initiate the reform process with inter-party agreed measures, highly supported by CSO and public opinion, these will be more likely successful and can create</p>	<p><b>Provide technical capacity to State Institutions to implement key reforms (embedded technical advisers),</b></p> <p><b>Support the implementation of key reforms (operational level), through inclusive processes [build on the stability pact, which was promoted by CSO and signed by all Political Parties], namely: political parties, electoral, constitutional and public-sector reforms</b></p>



B. SUPPORT STRENGTHENING OF STATE INSTITUTIONS AND FOSTERING ACTIVE CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING CSOs AND MEDIA FOR INCLUSIVENESS AND OVERSIGHT					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
networks to access state resources	social justice measure (salary scale and minimum wage); good governance in natural resources; combat crimes committed during the exercise of public functions			an environment conducive to further reforms.	
State Institutions are permeable to patronage/illegal networks, which leads to the politicization/partisanship of the State apparatus [maintaining the winners take all approach]	<p>. Civil society engagement with monitoring and advocate for key reforms</p> <p>PBF Project to Support to Political Dialogue and National Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau (UNDP/UNIOGBIS)<sup>78</sup></p> <p>PBF Project Boosting the Media Sector for Greater Peace and Stability in Guinea-Bissau (UNDP/UNIOGBIS)<sup>79</sup></p>	<p>Audit Court</p> <p>High inspectorate against corruption</p> <p>ANP ethics commission</p> <p>General Prosecutor's Office</p> <p>Superior Council of the Magistracy (CSMJ)</p> <p>Superior Council for the Public Prosecution (CSMP)</p> <p>CSO network to monitor and advocate for key reforms was created</p> <p>Media Center</p>	<p>Audits and investigations are perceived as being partial and further erode national institutions</p> <p>Small gains of the past were eroded by accusations of partisanship and led to institutional tensions (recent rice investigation).</p> <p>The existence of parallel legal regimes and the lack of clear definition of the functions of the institutions entrusted to fight corruption can</p>	<p>If the State puts in place consensual measures to ensure transparency and accountability, it will increase the effectiveness in designing and implementing policies, and will slowly recover the trust from its citizens</p> <p>These measures can create incentives to abide by rules and the rule of law, and increase the resilience of the State to unlawful interferences</p> <p>If state institutions initiate the reform process with inter-party measures, highly supported by CSO and public opinion, these will be more likely successful</p>	<p><b>Support the implementation of systems and processes (at ministry level), as well as oversight mechanisms aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability, including gender parity policies, and anchoring stability</b></p> <p><b>Provide international support to commissions established to investigate illegal management/use of State resources</b></p> <p><b>Support the implementation of key reforms (operational level), through inclusive processes [build on the stability pact, which was</b></p>

<sup>78</sup> This project contributes to the political stabilization process by enabling constructive dialogue among key political stakeholders and the national reconciliation process

<sup>79</sup> This project contributes to institutional stabilization of the media sector in Guinea-Bissau by helping create better conditions for journalists to perform their role in a democratic society in a more professional manner

B. SUPPORT STRENGTHENING OF STATE INSTITUTIONS AND FOSTERING ACTIVE CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING CSOs AND MEDIA FOR INCLUSIVENESS AND OVERSIGHT					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
			<p>further weaken these institutions.</p> <p>Politicization of the debate and incapacity to engage in a constructive dialogue on what is feasible, stemming from State perceptions that CSO are intransigent, and/or politicised, and the State is unwilling to respond for their demands for more accountability</p>	and can create an environment conducive to further reforms.	<p><b>promoted by CSO and signed by all Political Parties], namely: political parties, electoral, constitutional and public-sector reforms</b></p>
<p>No political will/leverage to dismantle vested interests and promote transparency among current political insiders</p> <p>Erosion of social cohesion stemming from the need to navigate patronage networks to access state resources</p> <p>Political disputes are fuelled by the need to navigate patronage networks to access state resources</p> <p>Incapacity (financial) of the state to meet its obligations leading to a deterioration of living</p>	<p>The 2014 elections provided a short window of opportunity [which lasted until August 2015], and the government started to implement ambitious reforms (WB, 2016). Reforms included the abolishment of FUNPI, strengthen domestic revenue mobilization, significantly increasing non-tax revenues (especially through fishing licences), raising custom and tax revenues by 39% and 9% year on year respectively (World Bank, 2016). In addition,</p>	<p>The Planning Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been supported by UNDP</p> <p>The leader of the majority party (PAIGC) was nominated as the head of the Reforms' Unit of PM Cabinet</p> <p>Some CSO argue that an outside candidate or woman candidate with no links to the patronage collusive system would be able to advance reforms because she may not feel accountable to anyone.</p>	<p>The government is unable to mobilize resources to solve the pressing governance issues [such as the provision of basic services, which leads to successive strikes] and will not prioritize the reform agenda</p> <p>The government will be pressured to deliver, whilst doing things differently; the electoral period is not favourable period to initiate unpopular reforms</p>	<p>If the new cabinet created in the office of the Prime Minister to oversee reforms can establish a reform strategy as a national priority, mobilize resources and support the implementation of quick win initiatives to improve service delivery to the citizens, this will mitigate the impact of resistance to reforms [by people who might have vested interests] and create the necessary environment for needed structural reforms.</p> <p>If the government implements measures to address the discontent of the public administration's large bureaucracy caused by</p>	<p><b>Support the coordination of External Assistance and the unit which was established in the PM office for the implementation of reforms; fully integrate a gender perspective into planning and programme development</b></p> <p><b>Support implementation of the Women Peace and Security agenda for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding</b></p>

B. SUPPORT STRENGTHENING OF STATE INSTITUTIONS AND FOSTERING ACTIVE CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, INCLUDING CSOs AND MEDIA FOR INCLUSIVENESS AND OVERSIGHT					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
<p>conditions (electricity, water), which fuel protests or social mobilizations</p> <p>New reforms/laws in specific sectors/issues (e.g. Defence and SSR), and attempts to fight corruption, or impose administrative measures of transparency and accountability, upset vested interests and fuel political disputes and instability</p>	<p>structural reforms were put in place that tightened control over fuel imports, reduced tax exemptions, rehabilitated custom posts and intensified tax audits to large tax payers.</p>			<p>attempts to change the status, it will mitigate public discontent which could otherwise be instrumental to fuelling to instability</p>	
<p>The centralized State only provides limited services in the capital and is unable to provide basic services outside the capital, and unable/unwilling to implement local governance systems</p>	<p>UNDP local Governance project</p> <p>Recent programmes initiated by women ministers (Agriculture, Health, to deliver to the local population, restructuring of IMC)</p>	<p>Coordination Councils created bring together State Authorities and the population Young competent and motivated cadres working in Governors offices / Planning advisors</p> <p>Bissau Local council</p> <p>Community Policing committees in some areas</p> <p>House of Justice and CAJ</p>	<p>Local governance system established mirrors the inefficiencies of the central government, instead of opening democratic space</p>	<p>If the conditions for local governance are created this will create opportunities for youth to remain in the rural areas and they will be less vulnerable to be recruited to illegal networks (trafficking, violent extremism)</p> <p>If the Bissau Local Council is supported to become an elected body, it can serve as a model for creating the conditions for local elections</p>	<p><b>Support the creation of conditions for decentralized governance system</b></p> <p>Support youth engagement and participation in governance and development processes at all levels;</p>

C. SUPPORT AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT TO EXPAND SOCIO-ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND INCLUSIVENESS					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Risk	Peacebuilding capacities	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry points
The cost of political and institutional fragility has been very large (WB, 2016). In its 2015 article IV assessment, the IMF estimated that Guinea-Bissau's GDP per capita could have been 65-90% higher had it not been for its endemic fragility.	A short period of stability, after the 2014 elections, fostered important steps towards a set of reforms, including achieving stronger fiscal sustainability.	Absence of political stability	Treasury Committee	<p>If the government is supported to ensure macro-economic stability, which entails activities like monitoring and improving revenue collection, as well as the level of public expenditures and the effectiveness of debt management, it will be able to fulfil basic obligations like the regular payment of salaries</p> <p>The implementation of reforms to fight corruption, strengthen public administration and fiscal policies can lead to a more conducive environment to economic growth</p>	<b>Support the government to ensure macro-economic stability, including support to the implementation of fiscal policy and accountability.</b>
Impoverished rural populations, through extraction of rents, lack of planning and investment in agriculture and lack of opportunities for economic diversification, and continued degradation of basic services.	<p>PBF Project on Mobilizing Rural Youth and Adolescents to serve as Peacebuilding Leaders (UNICEF/UNDP/IOM),</p> <p>PBF project Toward a New Gender Equilibrium in</p>	Partners support to unsustainable projects which lack national ownership	<p>Rural Youth and Adolescents trained to serve as peacebuilding leaders</p> <p>Women and youth trained in conflict resolution and political participation</p>	If rapid interventions are at the micro-level to ensure that marginalized segments of the population see concrete 'stability dividends' these can experience a real improvement in their life conditions in terms of jobs, revenues, food security	Work with national stakeholders to develop specific programs aimed at eradicating persistent poverty and reduce inequalities, particularly those affecting women and girls, while building human capabilities in the society. These should target local communities, with the attention to promoting women and youth economic empowerment and strengthening the voice and participation of women and

C. SUPPORT AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT TO EXPAND SOCIO-ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND INCLUSIVENESS					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Risk	Peacebuilding capacities	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry points
	<p>Guinea-Bissau (Voz di Paz /Interpeace <sup>80</sup></p> <p>Youth who advocate for a sustainable development model, recognition of climate change and environmental stewardship.</p> <p>UPR Recommendations and SDGs</p>			<p>and better access to basic social services<sup>81</sup>,</p> <p>If rural youth and adolescents' abilities and leadership skills to advocate on their own behalf for influence in decision-making processes is strengthened, they will acquire the resilience they need to withstand manipulation by terrorism networks, religious extremists and/or political groups advocating violence</p> <p>If community-based sustainable livelihoods are supported, communities will become more resilient and especially youth will be provided with more incentives to remain in the regions and contribute to their development;</p>	<p>other marginalized communities</p> <p>Support improvement in natural resources management and extraction, climate change mitigation and environmental protection measures for the common good</p> <p>Adopt practices which will improve the human development prospects for all, with a particular focus on inclusive economic growth, high quality education, robust healthcare systems, infrastructure development, entrepreneurship and community livelihoods for women and youth.</p>

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<sup>80</sup> This project contributes to the reduction of women's exclusion in decision-making spheres, by reinforcing their participation in governance and local conflict-resolution throughout Guinea-Bissau

<sup>81</sup> Addressing the impediments to inclusive growth will require confronting the vicious cycle of fragility and elite capture by utilizing flexible strategies directly with the elite and with other actors that can legitimately circumvent it (World Bank, 2016)<sup>81</sup>

D. STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS IMPUNITY, PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTION					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
On-going criminal investigations are disrupted by unlawful influences, which aggravates current institutional conflicts.	Ongoing investigations of high-profile cases (rice diversion, drug trafficking) demonstrate the resilience of some Law Enforcement Agencies and the judiciary against unlawful interferences  UNIOGBIS, UNODC and UNDP support and good offices with judicial actors and the ministry of Justice	Judiciary Police  Judiciary inspection	Resistance to change within police and judicial institutions	If the independence of the judiciary is strengthened, the judiciary would be better positioned to fight unlawful interference.	<b>Support justice reform and the independence of the judiciary</b>  proposals to strengthen the independence of the judiciary include: the creation of an external judiciary inspection, the publication and dissemination of court decisions, which would allow public scrutiny of the judicial system
Perceptions of corruption and appropriation of the judicial by the powerful. Judiciary system inadequately funded deprived of resources for investigations and prosecution.	UNDP Justice Programme  PBF project on strengthening Public Confidence in the Justice System (UNDP). <sup>82</sup>  PBF project to promote Access to Protection and Civic Participation through Civil Registration (UNICEF/UNFPA) <sup>83</sup> .  PBF project Placing Women at the Centre of Justice Reform in	Courts  Centre of Access to Justice (CAJ)  Traditional leaders  Women Mediators Network  LGDH human Rights league	Resistance to change impeding the implementation of the anti-corruption agenda, further reinforcing the lack of trust in the system and the perception that corruption is widespread.	If the government establishes a national anti-corruption agenda, to improve transparency in state functioning and to strengthen the institutions in charge of overseeing budgetary control and procurement. And, the implementation of this agenda is supported through capacity building (e.g to halt revenue leakages), namely among middle management civil servants [preferably based on existent programs and expertise from the World Bank and IMF], the government will be able to	<b>Support an anti-corruption national agenda</b>

<sup>82</sup> This project helps improve the delivery of justice services and strengthen the Rule of Law and hence social cohesion and peace

<sup>83</sup> This project contributes to the improvement of civil registration and vital statistics to increase access of vulnerable groups to social services and civic participation

D. STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS IMPUNITY, PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTION					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
	Guinea-Bissau (UNDP/UN Women) <sup>84</sup> .			create confidence in the justice system	
Impunity in Guinea-Bissau has reinforced a general pattern of lawlessness and has emboldened a zero-sum approach to political power with no fear of consequences	Conference on impunity held on 4 December 2011 in Bamako  Recommendation of the conference on impunity organised in Guinea-Bissau in 2013	LGDH  HRDN	Lack of political will to fight impunity	If the government develops a consensual strategy aimed at implementing the Bamako Declaration on impunity, justice and human rights in West Africa, this would provide a forum for national and international actors to agree on concrete modalities to address the problem, including the possibility implementing the recommendations of the national conference	<b>Support the development of a national policy against impunity and national action plan on human rights</b>
Inequality related to access to the formal justice system as well as gender-based injustices foster popular discontent and increase the danger of violent confrontation. Significant parts of the population have great difficulties in accessing formal justice, including the poor, illiterate, women and youth	CAJ experience  UNDP Justice programme  PBF project on traditional justice and alternative Dispute Resolution.  PBF Gender Justice expected to create functioning networks of state institutions to prevent combat and respond to GBV	CAJ (Centres for Access to Justice)  CAJ gender strategy developed  RENLUV, CAJ, IMC Ministry of Justice and Police started trained and developed initial tools also with support of UNICEF	No funding for CAJ operations after hand-over to the government  Gender strategy not implemented  Inter-institutional network will not be put in place or will not become operational	If the functioning of CAJ and CENFOJ are strengthened to improve access to justice, including strengthening the population's knowledge on their rights and the available mechanisms to access law and justice [through the development of internal mechanisms at the CAJ], this will increase not only access to justice but also the quality of justice delivered;	Further support the role of CAJ and CENFOJ in bridging the gap between justice system and population, and improving access to justice  <b>Promote the establishment and deployment of mobile courts and investigation teams</b>

<sup>84</sup> This project places women at the center of the ongoing justice reform efforts in Guinea-Bissau, by promoting women's rights and gender equality, through the revision of the legal framework, capacity building, awareness raising and increased access to legal services

D. STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS IMPUNITY, PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTION					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
				<p>If the CAJ strengthens its capacity to bridge the gaps, within the traditional and formal traditional justice system, as has been the case so far, this will increase not only access to justice but also the quality of justice delivered.</p> <p>Considering the financial and infrastructure constraints most of the population faces for accessing the justice system, the deployment of mobile courts and investigation teams could bridge this gap and bring formal justice closer to communities.</p>	
The Judicial system has the authority, but not the capacity to solve disputes which used to be solved through traditional means, creating a vacuum and leading to the emergence of figures of authority entrusted to solve these conflict [notably police officers with no legal authority to solve disputes and who are	<p>PBF Project Supporting Political and Institutional Stabilization of the Justice Sector for Peace Consolidation in Guinea-Bissau. (UNICEF/UNDP)<sup>85</sup> is strengthening the capacity of traditional leaders</p> <p>PBF project for rural youth and women and youth is</p>	<p>Courts</p> <p>CAJ</p> <p>Traditional leaders</p> <p>Women Mediators Network</p> <p>LGDH</p>	Erosion of the legitimacy of the formal and traditional justice systems	If the judicial system and the traditional justice systems establish a collaborative framework, which defines their respective areas of authority, they will reinforce each other and ensure there are no gaps in the system.	Support justice reform and delivery of justice through a collaborative framework that can promote cooperation between formal and traditional justice systems

<sup>85</sup> This project contributes to the stability of the Justice Sector by enabling the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms with a restorative justice lens within the formal and informal justice systems with greater respect for human rights, with a particular focus on women and children's rights



D. STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS IMPUNITY, PROMOTE AND PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTION					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
call to solve/mediate local disputes]	strengthening community level dispute resolution mechanisms.				
<p>Increase use of violence to solve conflict [further eroding social cohesion] stemming from the incapacity of the justice system to solve disputes.</p> <p>Weak land administration &amp; management aggravating land disputes, which result in increasingly violent conflicts between communities</p>	<p>UNIOGBIS Capacity building on community policing to POP in Bissau and in the regions</p> <p>Women's mediation network has been analysing and supporting the mediation of land disputes</p> <p>PBF supported rural youth and women and youth projects include 27 small grants projects covering the entire country advocating for peaceful conflict resolution and strengthening local mechanisms</p>	<p>LEAs (Law Enforcement Agencies)</p> <p>Courts</p> <p>CAJ</p> <p>Traditional leaders</p> <p>Women Mediators Network</p> <p>LGDH</p>	<p>Land disputes becoming increasingly violent</p> <p>There are inconsistencies between the traditional and formal justice system on land ownership</p>	<p>If strategic and technical advice to national public security and law enforcement agencies is strengthened, it will reinforce a people-centred and community-based approach in their service, thus contributing to social cohesion and the establishment of a social contract between the people and the State;</p> <p>A specific community policing programmes aimed at preventing violence related to land disputes, involving POP, CAJ and the women's mediation network could prevent the escalation of land disputes</p>	<p><b>Support the strengthening and accountability of police institutions as well as community policing to prevent escalations of conflicts</b></p> <p>Support the design, adoption and implementation of specific measure to combat gender-based violence</p> <p>Support effective mechanisms to ensure access to justice for women and girls</p> <p>Support national authorities in land reform, data collection and registration, and in implementing improved natural resource management systems</p> <p>Support articulation between central State and local communities on land reform</p>
The Executive has also systematically interfered in the enjoyment of the right to peaceful assembly, de facto banning various demonstrations organized by political coalitions or social and youth movements,	Some CSO, namely LGDH have experience and leverage with LEAs and successfully managed to decrease tensions during demonstrations through dialogue with LEAs	<p>LGDH</p> <p>HR defenders 'Network</p>	Rise in Human Rights violations	If the mediation capacity of CSO is strengthened, they will be able to carry out regular demarches at the technical level, with the military and security forces to exert influence towards their non-interference in politics and	<p><b>Support the development of a CSO engagement strategy to inform the development of human rights protection efforts</b></p> <p><b>Strengthen Human Rights Protection System and the National Human Rights Institutions in line with international standards</b></p>

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Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
resorting to delaying tactics, the deployment of security forces or restrictive interpretations of the law				<p>respect for constitutional order, the rule of law, civilian oversight and human rights, including in relation to efforts to solve the crisis and during the electoral period</p> <p>If the Human Rights Defenders Network and other civil society actors to establish early-warning and effective coordination mechanisms, this will improve the capacity to advocate for Human Rights</p>	<b>to monitor situations that might pose threats of human rights violations</b>
Non-compliance with human rights standards, practices, etc. and no mechanism for the victims and witnesses of human rights violations to seek remedy and protection	The National Commission on Human Rights, which does not comply with the Paris Principles and the Lisbon Declaration and Protocol of May 2013, which creates the Network of NHRIs of the Portuguese Speaking Countries, has been receiving training from UNIOGBIS on monitoring, defending and promoting human rights	Some CSO, namely LGDH and Human Rights Defenders network are active in the monitoring, defence and promotion of human rights	Rise in Human Rights violations	If Guinea-Bissau established an independent Human Rights institution, compliant with the Paris Principles, it will increase its capacity to be compliant with international human rights standards	<b>Support compliance of Guinea-Bissau to human rights commitments' and standards</b>

ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT THE RECENT AND POSITIVE CHANGE IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATION					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Risk	Peacebuilding capacities	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
<p>Cut in defence and security budget in areas allocated to Security and Defence Forces leading to the deterioration of the living conditions of the military and security forces</p> <p>Investigations of military personnel by civilian/military courts</p>	<p>Internal processes within the armed forces were implemented to prevent political interference, including capacity development programs</p> <p>Approval of the military justice code</p> <p>ECOWAS support and ECOMIB</p>	<p>Replacement of the current chief of staff leading to a competition for the post</p>	<p>Posture of the military during the political impasse</p> <p>Civil-military relations and civilian oversight of armed forces have been significantly improving through sensitization and civic education initiatives, including Former Freedom Fighters' and Security constituencies' assertive contributions to the national dialogue and reconciliation process.</p>	<p>If the current drive for change within the armed forces is supported through capacity development programs [ particularly, its planning capacity] it will create an enabling environment for the implementation of the reform process. This will in turn, increase the State's capacity to mobilize sufficient resources to allow for the right-sizing and modernization of the defence and security forces based on the country's needs and affordability.</p>	<p><b>Support Defence and Security Forces to respect the principle of separation of powers and submission to Republican values, rejecting attempts from external manipulate.</b></p> <p><b>Support the implementation of Security Sector Reform, in coordination with ECOWAS.</b></p> <p>;</p>

E. SUPPORT COMBAT TO DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
<p>Law Enforcement Agencies are deprived of resources for investigations and prosecution.</p>	<p>UNIOGBIS resources' mobilization role</p>	<p>UNOGBIS and UNODC support, coupled with international and regional cooperation [stemming from credibility of the Judiciary police] lead to recent drug seizures and investigations:</p>	<p>Donors' Fatigue</p>	<p>If international partners promote good offices on the mobilization of resources to prevent and combat DTOC in Guinea-Bissau, and the coordination among relevant partners and stakeholders including ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the European Union (EU) is enhanced, they will be able to support and fund the national strategy against DTOC</p>	<p><b>Support the effective mobilization and coordination of the international community's support to combat DTOC</b></p> <p><b>Support the elaboration of National Strategic Plan to counter drug trafficking and organized crime through a broad consultative and inclusive process</b></p>

E. SUPPORT COMBAT TO DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
				If national authorities are supported to prepare a robust National Strategic Plan to combat DTOC, they will have an effective tool for resource mobilization and coordination;	
State institutions permeable to illegitimate interests, including corruption and transnational organized crime networks	The Government of Guinea-Bissau has recently showed a renewed commitment to enhance the criminal justice system, which lead to recent seizures including the largest ever cocaine seizure conducted by the Judicial Police and the TCU of 789 kg (March 2019)	UNOGBIS and UNODC support, coupled with international and regional cooperation [stemming from credibility of the Judiciary police] led to recent drug seizures and investigations	<b>Rise in Drug trafficking</b>	<p>If the judiciary police establish a good cooperation with regional and international partners, its instigative capacity, as well as the credibility of the investigations will be enhanced.</p> <p>If the Judiciary Police and other security forces establish vetting system, this will enhance their capacity to establish international and regional partnerships</p> <p>If a panel of experts is created to investigate the identity and activities of those involved in drug trafficking and organized crime in Guinea-Bissau, with the possibility of imposing punitive, targeted sanctions, this would help reverse the growth in drug trafficking activities</p>	<p>Support the capacity-building and technical expertise of the Judiciary Police and other security forces</p> <p>Support the creation of a panel of experts to investigate and identify those involved in DTOC in Guinea-Bissau, “name and shame”</p> <p><b>Support Regional and International partnerships to combat DTOC</b></p>
Changes in the operations of regional criminal networks impacting drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau	The judiciary police have a criminal information system and has requested support for its transformation in a national system	UNIOGBIS and UNODC supported the establishment of a “Judiciary Working Group” to promote information sharing and synergies between	Rise of Transnational organized crime	If information, analysis and reporting on DTOC in the country is consolidated, Guinea-Bissau authorities would be able to better assess the phenomenon and Combat	<p><b>Support the consolidation of strategic information, analysis and reporting on DTOC</b></p> <p><b>Support the engagement of communities in combatting</b></p>

E. SUPPORT COMBAT TO DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
	UNIOGBIS and UNDP commissioned a study on DTOC in Guinea-Bissau	prosecution and courts on the trial of cases, as well as the “Drug Observatory Working Group”, to serve as an “Early Warning platform” of national civil society organizations on combating drug trafficking		<p>DTOC. Without properly validated assessments, the development and implementation of the needed comprehensive and effective strategy to combat DTOC would not be possible</p> <p>if a “Drug Observatory is created it could serve as an “Early Warning platform” of national civil society and contribute to a better understanding of DTOC in Guinea-Bissau</p>	<b>transnational crime and its penetration among the youth</b>
Fragile Law enforcement institutions with lack of systems and processes within the LEAs to ensure transparency		<p>Judiciary Police</p> <p>INTERPOL</p> <p>Law Enforcement Agencies</p> <p>TCU</p>	Strengthen State institutions’ capacity to effectively combat DTOC	If state institutions are supported to effectively combat DTOC, including the entire criminal justice chain, they would be able to access and counter the linkages between DTOC and military and civilian/political actors.	<b>Strengthen State institutions’ capacity to effectively combat DTOC, including through tailored trainings for judges and prosecutors and development of operational coordination mechanisms among law enforcement agencies, prosecutors’ offices and courts</b>
Political interference in LEAs, through promotions and an incoherent system of training abroad, which further weakens LEAs	The Judiciary Police has established and implemented the law on recruitment and promotions	<p>LEAs</p> <p>Military</p>	idem	<p>If police and a military academy are established and human resources are trained, systems and processes could be better implemented as well as a competency based promotion system could be implemented.</p> <p>If the LEAs, with the support of technical advisers, establish strong administrative systems and process to regulate</p>	Strengthen the capacity of State institutions to combat CDTOC, including through creation of a police and military academies and enforcement of existing legal and bureaucratic frameworks

E. SUPPORT COMBAT TO DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME					
Proximate causes/ Trigger	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
				<p>training and promotions, they will be less vulnerable to political interference</p> <p>If Guinea-Bissau authorities are supported to implement current legislation, as well as revising the needed legislation and acceding to relevant international conventions, this will avoid overlapping between jurisdictions leading to conflicts among institutions and provide the necessary legal framework for combating DTOC</p>	

SUPPORT COORDINATION OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
Guinea-Bissau as a State stems from the imposition of a western conception of what the State should be, and is also the result of the cumulative effect of different and contradictory strategies that were projected on it from colonial model to the socialist inspired model, as well as the neoliberal model implemented through international interventions.	Creation of a Cabinet for Reforms in the office of the Prime Minister	<p>The Planning Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been supported by UNDP</p> <p>The leader of the majority party (PAIGC) was nominated as the head of the Reforms' Unit of PM Cabinet</p> <p>Guinea-Bissau is part of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States' endorsed at</p>	<p>The new government is unable to mobilize resources due to donor fatigue</p> <p>The new government is unable to deliver and build its legitimacy, and there is mismatch of international and national priorities</p>	<p>If the UN supports Guinea-Bissau to mobilize resources with traditional and non-traditional partners, including through south-south cooperation, the government will be able to initiate a reform process based in Terra Ranka</p> <p>Aligning international community interventions with peacebuilding priorities agreed with national counterparts will help ensure that efforts towards</p>	<p><b>Aligning multilateral and bilateral efforts to the implementation of the peacebuilding priorities agreed with national counterparts</b></p> <p><b>Ensure that respect of core peacebuilding values such as inclusive politics, dialogue and reconciliation, equal participation of women and men, youth, children and their advocates, and people living with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups as well as environmental sustainability,</b></p>

SUPPORT COORDINATION OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE					
Proximate causes	Drivers for change	Peacebuilding capacities	Risk	Theory of change	Peacebuilding entry point
<p>The State became ever more dependent on external assistance. It also further deepened the problem of extraversion, which came from colonial times: the State is oriented to respond and comply with the needs and demands of its donors instead of those of its own population. This deepens the disconnect between the State and its citizens.</p>		<p>the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness</p>		<p>state-building, peacebuilding and development are nationally-led and in line with national priorities, in order to consolidate the political legitimacy of the new government, and maximise effectiveness of international assistance</p> <p>The effectiveness of international assistance will also benefit from joint efforts in ensuring transparency, accountability and strategizing and coordinating the approach to peacebuilding among partners</p> <p>The reconfiguration of UN presence in Guinea-Bissau demands increased concertation with ECOWAS, taking into its prominent role as sub-regional organising and its mandate and capacities in the areas of peace and security, as well as a renewed importance of UNOWAS</p>	<p>remains at the heart of cooperation agreements between the Government and international partners.</p> <p>Ensure transparency, accountability and appropriate monitoring of funds to mitigate corruption, while promoting an inclusive, integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding.</p> <p>Recognize ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) as an ally of the sustaining peace agenda. ECOWAS' partnerships with the Government, the UN and international actors will be significant.</p>





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