Evaluation of Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)

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Evaluation Plan:
2015-2019, Afghanistan
Evaluation Type:
Final Project
Planned End Date:
04/2016
Completion Date:
07/2016
Status:
Completed
Management Response:
Yes
Evaluation Budget(US $):
50,000

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Title Evaluation of Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP)
Atlas Project Number: 00060777
Evaluation Plan: 2015-2019, Afghanistan
Evaluation Type: Final Project
Status: Completed
Completion Date: 07/2016
Planned End Date: 04/2016
Management Response: Yes
Focus Area:
  • 1. Others
Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017)
  • 1. Output 5.6. Mechanisms are enabled for consensus-building around contested priorities, and address specific tensions, through inclusive and peaceful processes
Evaluation Budget(US $): 50,000
Source of Funding: Project resources
Joint Programme: No
Mandatory Evaluation: No
Joint Evaluation: No
Evaluation Team members:
Name Title Email Nationality
GEF Evaluation: No
Key Stakeholders: The Joint Secretariat of the High Peace Council
Countries: AFGHANISTAN
Lessons
Findings
Recommendations
1

The evaluation report provides a set of recommendations on the design and outline of the programme including the content for future reintegration and reconciliation programmes, the implementation of an outline content for APRP successor, its approach and a possible future role for UNDP.

1. Design and Outline

1.1 Design:

  1. Reintegration initiatives should acknowledge and seek to mitigate the security risks to those who participate
  2. Providing economic incentives ignores the reasons why many people fight and why many are angry with and distrustful of the government. Poverty helps to fuel the conflict; but unresolved grievances, foreign support for the insurgency and other local tensions also contribute to instability. Reintegration and reconciliation efforts will be superficial and unsustainable without addressing these.
  3. Reintegration and reconciliation initiatives should be rooted in a programme of structural and policy reform that addresses the underlying drivers, including corruption, of the insurgency.
  4. Before any reintegration project is finalized, an adequate baseline and needs assessment is required.
  5. Consensus mechanisms are needed for developing programme based on needs of wide range of stakeholders and for promoting widespread ownership of the result. This requires wider consultation with stakeholders on concrete issues.

Lessons from past reintegration and reconciliation initiatives in Afghanistan need to be properly studied and not repeated. 

1. Design and Outline

1.1 Design:

  1. Reintegration initiatives should acknowledge and seek to mitigate the security risks to those who participate
  2. Providing economic incentives ignores the reasons why many people fight and why many are angry with and distrustful of the government. Poverty helps to fuel the conflict; but unresolved grievances, foreign support for the insurgency and other local tensions also contribute to instability. Reintegration and reconciliation efforts will be superficial and unsustainable without addressing these.
  3. Reintegration and reconciliation initiatives should be rooted in a programme of structural and policy reform that addresses the underlying drivers, including corruption, of the insurgency.
  4. Before any reintegration project is finalized, an adequate baseline and needs assessment is required.
  5. Consensus mechanisms are needed for developing programme based on needs of wide range of stakeholders and for promoting widespread ownership of the result. This requires wider consultation with stakeholders on concrete issues.

Lessons from past reintegration and reconciliation initiatives in Afghanistan need to be properly studied and not repeated. 

2
  1. Support HPC nationally – subject to HPC clearly defining its role, function and methodology
  2. Support PPCs targeting local reconciliation
  3. Support necessary administrative support for both HPC and PPCs: the very limited administrative support provided to ARTF is relevant in this respect
  4. Review the number of salaried positions supported in the security ministries.
  5. All salaries that are paid should be compatible with public service scales and definitely not in excess of CBR scales
  6. Ensure Transitional Assistance is provided for vetted reintegrees/reconciles for a minimum six month bridging period

GoIRA’s National Development Strategy will address socioeconomic development, including job creation. This can be expected to contribute to support for a new programme. Some international donor organizations’ may choose to support this national thrust through bilateral agreements with individual Line Ministries. Desirably, such support should be through budget support agreements, which will provide predictability to financial flows. Donors may wish to include performance-based incentive tranches along with basic budget support through their bilateral agreements.

3
  1. A peace agreement is necessary to guarantee the security. The peace agreement should also have binding provisions to deal with local grievances, justice, etc.
  2. Provide security for the reintegrees
  3. Include all groups and not just loosely-defined (or undefined) AGEs.
  4. Conduct a proper mapping of armed groups
  5. Conduct labor market assessments to see what sustainable projects can be implemented as part of peace building initiatives.
  6. Jobs are not enough:  Armed groups need to be re integrated into politics, security forces or civil society.
  7. Mechanisms need to be put in place to avoid the capture of such projects just for an ID that would allow reintegrees to freely circulate.

Settle the question of the Arbakis. On the one hand, integrating reintegrees into the local police and army may provide long term jobs but there will always be a problem of loyalty and lack of trust.  Setting the reintegrees up against the local ALP Arbakis would mean creating local militias that could increase insecurity and conflict.

4

1.4 Future Political Reconciliation Programmes:

  • The role of the HPC needs to become clearer vis-à-vis potential negotiations in the future.  Even though President Ghani is more directly involved, or involves other entities like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a political role for the HPC is still necessary to get buy-in, especially among non-Pashtuns who are seeing more conflicts in the north involving a variety of groups: Local militias, Taliban, Central Asian fighters such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as members of Daesh/ISIS).

The focus of the future APRP programme could be on reconciliation at the local level. This would mean that while high level negotiations could continue under different formats (quadrilateral etc.) and by different institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.), there is still a need for an HPC develop and conduct a Peace Campaign. Such a campaign could involve civil society, the media, Ulema and women’s groups more closely and more widely.

5

Three types of interventions for ‘peace’ might be envisaged. Although these need GoIRA simultaneous pursuit, UNDP, with donor support, has a limited role only in some of them. A sustainable successor APRP requires, beyond management structures and funding mechanisms, three objective streams achievable through specific interventions:

1. Political peace at the National Level, negotiations pursued by GoIRA through NSC/NDS/MFA. In this framework, the HPC has a symbolic or facilitating role in peace negotiations. It is important to emphasise that the HPC has no legislated, executive role and, therefore, is not in a position to negotiate effectively on behalf of GoIRA. At the local Level, it is proposed that Reconciliation is emphasized, through grievance resolution, mediation, and rendition of justice between families, communities, tribes and ethnic groups. In this, there is a clear role for PPCs and local governors/governance structures.

2. Social/cultural Peace: National and local level

This requires developing and implementing a Peace Campaign. Conditional on this being effective are peace building training, peace education in schools, civil society group mobilization, including the media, in support of peace, and intra-regional religious leaders’ exchanges.

3. Economic Peace requires economic security (as well as health and food security) for all segments of the population (recruitment disincentive) [not just as a ‘bribe’ to draw insurgents in]. This necessitates a massive campaign for economic recovery based on investing on human capital, job creation. Other aspects include an overall policy Jobs for Peace, but not for combatants only, with more focus on vulnerable groups, including youth.

6

Sketching the approach

This implies that a successor to the APRP could include:

  • A smaller HPC in charge of launching national peace campaign and regional PPCs that would mirror those in provinces.
  • A much smaller JS that will only support the HPC as needed

The activities could be limited to

  • developing and launching a peace campaign with all stakeholders, reconciliation
  • possibly facilitating peace negotiations
  • Peace education campaign, including school-based peace education
  • Peace messaging though the media
  • Creation of a peace movement.
  • Dispute resolution at the local level
  • Reconciliation at the local level

The international donor community has indicated that it will not support reintegration at this point in time. Government’s poverty eradication and job creation strategies should be informed through HPC-organised studies and campaigns, as well as those of international partners (including, as appropriate, UNDP), into linkages between poverty and violence. National and regional development projects are desirable to target specifically vulnerable groups through existing development projects, implementation of which should be through normal line ministries, which benefit from HPC advice not duplicated unsustainable structures.

7

A Possible Role for UNDP

There appear three specific areas where UNDP could provide added value to a peace programme.

Social peace: UNDP might accompany national and local stakeholders through technical assistance, advising, sharing of experiences from other countries, sponsoring campaigns, conducting and sharing studies, trainings etc.

Political peace: UNDP, if  mediation experiences, could help with building the capacity of provincial peace

councils, governors etc. in 1) mediation, 2) grievance resolution, 3) rendition of justice, 4) abiding by human’s rights and 5) ensuring protection and participation of women.

Economic peace: UNDP support Line Ministries through commissioning studies of vulnerability of populations and their potential security risks, and then advising the creation of targeted poverty eradiation and economic development projects which target vulnerable groups on a case by case, region by region approach.

1. Recommendation:

The evaluation report provides a set of recommendations on the design and outline of the programme including the content for future reintegration and reconciliation programmes, the implementation of an outline content for APRP successor, its approach and a possible future role for UNDP.

1. Design and Outline

1.1 Design:

  1. Reintegration initiatives should acknowledge and seek to mitigate the security risks to those who participate
  2. Providing economic incentives ignores the reasons why many people fight and why many are angry with and distrustful of the government. Poverty helps to fuel the conflict; but unresolved grievances, foreign support for the insurgency and other local tensions also contribute to instability. Reintegration and reconciliation efforts will be superficial and unsustainable without addressing these.
  3. Reintegration and reconciliation initiatives should be rooted in a programme of structural and policy reform that addresses the underlying drivers, including corruption, of the insurgency.
  4. Before any reintegration project is finalized, an adequate baseline and needs assessment is required.
  5. Consensus mechanisms are needed for developing programme based on needs of wide range of stakeholders and for promoting widespread ownership of the result. This requires wider consultation with stakeholders on concrete issues.

Lessons from past reintegration and reconciliation initiatives in Afghanistan need to be properly studied and not repeated. 

1. Design and Outline

1.1 Design:

  1. Reintegration initiatives should acknowledge and seek to mitigate the security risks to those who participate
  2. Providing economic incentives ignores the reasons why many people fight and why many are angry with and distrustful of the government. Poverty helps to fuel the conflict; but unresolved grievances, foreign support for the insurgency and other local tensions also contribute to instability. Reintegration and reconciliation efforts will be superficial and unsustainable without addressing these.
  3. Reintegration and reconciliation initiatives should be rooted in a programme of structural and policy reform that addresses the underlying drivers, including corruption, of the insurgency.
  4. Before any reintegration project is finalized, an adequate baseline and needs assessment is required.
  5. Consensus mechanisms are needed for developing programme based on needs of wide range of stakeholders and for promoting widespread ownership of the result. This requires wider consultation with stakeholders on concrete issues.

Lessons from past reintegration and reconciliation initiatives in Afghanistan need to be properly studied and not repeated. 

Management Response: [Added: 2016/11/23]

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) together with the High Peace Council (HPC) has developed a new peace strategy for Afghanistan called Afghanistan National Peace and Reconciliation (ANPR) strategy. The design of the ANPR strategy considers all the above-mentioned six recommendations into account. The strategy is designed based on the lessons learned from the

previously implemented projects – Disarmament of illegally Armed Groups (DIAG), and APRP. The strategy is focused on the following three objectives:

  1. Armed opposition reconciles to a peaceful political life through the negotiation and implementation of strategic peace settlements
  2. National and international consensus for Afghan-led solutions to peace embodied in a National Peace Plan
  3. Institutionalising and promoting a culture of peace

The ANPR Strategy does not focus on reintegration as a core component. Instead, it suggests a reconciliation process that should pave the way for ending violence in the country through a comprehensive political process that includes negotiated strategic settlements and reconciliation between the government and strategic armed opposition groups. After a negotiated strategic settlement will the integration of combatants and associated personnel into peaceful civilian life begin through effective mechanisms (including vetting, disarmament, demobilization reinsertion, socio-economic integration, community recovery, disabled support, psycho-social support, gender considerations and impacts, etc.) so they do not return to insurgency. Furthermore, security sector transformation and the potential integration of opposition forces into state security forces and services as appropriate and desired, potential integration of associated and non-combat personnel into civil administration, and integration of former armed opposition groups into democratic politics will be agreed upon during the negotiations process and implemented afterwards.

Integration initiatives will be led by the security ministries as per the ANPR Strategy rather than implemented directly by the HPC. Given that the HPC will have the role of coordination, advice and control on the integration work of the security ministries, the HPC will put in the TOR for the security ministries to seriously make arrangements for the security of reintegrees/reconcilees. HPC will be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the integration work by the security ministries.    

The ANPR strategy will work strategically to deal with the root causes of the conflicts rather than provision of small scale unsustainable solutions. It encompasses specific components on consensus building, and institutionalizing and promoting culture of peace. The strategy also asks for involvement of all relevant security and development ministries to work on the underlying drivers of conflicts. As per the ANPR Strategy, the HPC will also undertake research and conduct studies to unlock the underlying reasons of conflicts leading to the design of specific programmes to tackle the structural issues. The ANPR Strategy also suggests that before any integration is planned, adequate baseline and quantitative and qualitative assessments will be made to determine if a potentially reconciling opposition group should be deemed ‘strategic’, including assessing what would be the potential impact of the cessation of fighting from that group. Only after successful negotiations with armed opposition groups, will the reconciliation/ integration process commence.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Incorporate the above mentioned suggested areas in the ANPR strategy.
[Added: 2016/11/23]
Rule of Law and Human Security Unit 2016/09 Completed All of the above suggested areas have been incorporated in the final version of the ANPR strategy.
2. Recommendation:
  1. Support HPC nationally – subject to HPC clearly defining its role, function and methodology
  2. Support PPCs targeting local reconciliation
  3. Support necessary administrative support for both HPC and PPCs: the very limited administrative support provided to ARTF is relevant in this respect
  4. Review the number of salaried positions supported in the security ministries.
  5. All salaries that are paid should be compatible with public service scales and definitely not in excess of CBR scales
  6. Ensure Transitional Assistance is provided for vetted reintegrees/reconciles for a minimum six month bridging period

GoIRA’s National Development Strategy will address socioeconomic development, including job creation. This can be expected to contribute to support for a new programme. Some international donor organizations’ may choose to support this national thrust through bilateral agreements with individual Line Ministries. Desirably, such support should be through budget support agreements, which will provide predictability to financial flows. Donors may wish to include performance-based incentive tranches along with basic budget support through their bilateral agreements.

Management Response: [Added: 2016/11/23]

Most of the recommendations about programme content are already considered in the ANPR Strategy. Supporting HPC is an integral component of the ANPR strategy. Effective ANPR implementation will be supported by a number of capacity development and technical assistance modalities. UNDP will provide management support and technical assistance to the HPC, such as wider HPC policy development, planning, programme administration, finance, reporting, M&E and capacity development of the HPC Secretariat and technical staff. A specific component on Capacity Development and Technical Support is added to the ANPR Strategy.

For support to the PPCs, UNDP together with the HPC will involve in consultations on how best the PPCs could be assisted. UNDP will assist the revision of TOR for Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs). The work of the PPCs has been significantly re-oriented as per the ANPR Strategy. Rather than focused on individual reintegration, PPCs will have a much wider, comprehensive and concrete mandate under the second objective (national and international consensus for Afghan-led solutions to peace embodied in a National Peace Plan) and third objective (institutionalizing and promoting a culture of peace) of the ANPR strategy. The HPC will put in place greater mechanisms to manage and support PPCs so that they are effective and achieve results.

The ANPR strategy will no longer fund security and development ministries and directorates. The strategy will seek the collaborating government bodies to maintain and fund their own related capacities and units as a reflection of the President’s commitment to reconciliation and peace building.

Under the ANPR strategy, UNDP will ensure that the salaries are paid in accordance with the government’s CBR salary scales. UNDP will hire a consultant to do a functional review of the HPC and its Secretariat staff, and recommend future National Technical Assistance (NTA) areas for support in the HPC and its Secretariat in line with the approved Results and Resources Framework and Implementation Plan for ANPR Strategy and future UNDP Support Project to the HPC.

In the ANPR strategy, reintegration and provision of Transitional Assistance to the reintegrees is not part of HPC’s direct mandate. Only after the HPC successfully reaches a peace agreement with an opposition party, will the HPC, security ministries and other relevant government institutions decide on the type

and duration of support to the reconcilees.

The ANPR Strategy does not include development work as part of its mandate and therefore, the HPC will not be directly responsible for implementing peace settlement components. Instead, the Strategy suggests that various operational components of peace settlements be prepared during the negotiation phase, and then appropriately mandated bodies (e.g. line ministries, directorates, independent national bodies, non-governmental bodies, international organisations, etc.) should be responsible for establishing the programmes and operations that will implement peace settlement components—for example: amnesty provisions might be implemented by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ); the return of fighters to sustainable civilian lives might be managed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) or a specific Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Commission that coordinates appropriate ministries and bodies, as well as civil society service providers and local government; refugee returns might be organised under the auspices of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation; development projects might be implemented by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MOLSAMD), Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) etc.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Incorporate the above mentioned suggested areas in the ANPR strategy.
[Added: 2016/11/23]
Rule of Law and Human Security Unit 2016/11 Completed The relevant recommendations have been incorporated in the final version of the ANPR strategy. Transitional Assistance and implementation of the National Development Strategy is not part of HPC’s work, so not considered in the ANPR Strategy. The functional review of the HPC and its Secretariat is planned to be completed by December 2016.
3. Recommendation:
  1. A peace agreement is necessary to guarantee the security. The peace agreement should also have binding provisions to deal with local grievances, justice, etc.
  2. Provide security for the reintegrees
  3. Include all groups and not just loosely-defined (or undefined) AGEs.
  4. Conduct a proper mapping of armed groups
  5. Conduct labor market assessments to see what sustainable projects can be implemented as part of peace building initiatives.
  6. Jobs are not enough:  Armed groups need to be re integrated into politics, security forces or civil society.
  7. Mechanisms need to be put in place to avoid the capture of such projects just for an ID that would allow reintegrees to freely circulate.

Settle the question of the Arbakis. On the one hand, integrating reintegrees into the local police and army may provide long term jobs but there will always be a problem of loyalty and lack of trust.  Setting the reintegrees up against the local ALP Arbakis would mean creating local militias that could increase insecurity and conflict.

Management Response: [Added: 2016/11/23]

As mentioned above under the design section, the ANPR Strategy does not focus on reintegration as a core component. Instead, it suggests a reconciliation process that should pave the way for ending violence in the country through a comprehensive political process that includes negotiated strategic settlements and reconciliation between the government and strategic armed opposition groups. Once a peace agreement is reached with armed opposition, the agreement will have binding provisions to deal with issues such as integration of combatants, their vetting, biometrics, disarmament, demobilization, safety and security etc.

Before developing the ANPR Strategy, UNDP conducted a country conflict analysis and stakeholder mapping of the groups that are pro peace and against peace, which helped to inform the design of the ANPR Strategy. UNDP has also put in a place a mechanism for regular update of the analysis and mapping. The ANPR Strategy also includes in its provisions, a proper mechanism for identification, mapping and assessment of the armed opposition groups so that sufficient data is available about the groups, their composition, strategic value, their interests etc. Updated first hand data will help the HPC make informed efforts and decisions on the ‘who, how, where and when’ of peace negotiations and reconciliation. 

Furthermore, the ANPR Strategy does not consider provision of short-term jobs for integrated combatants, it rather recommends integration of opposition forces into state security forces and services as appropriate and desired, integration of associated and non-combat personnel into civil administration, and integration of former armed opposition groups into democratic politics.

Development initiatives in support of peace will be the responsibility of the development ministries, such as MRRD, MOLSAMD, MoPW, MAIL etc. Thus, labor market assessments will be the responsibility of these ministries to undertake based on which sustainable development projects should be initiated in support for peace and reconciliation.  The issue of settlement of Arbakis is not within the mandate of ANPR Strategy; however, the Strategy suggests establishment of a national coordination committee which will be represented by HPC, the National Security Council, relevant security and development ministries and directorates. Issues such as safety and security of integrated combatants, Arbakis, and others will be discussed in this platform.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Incorporate the above-mentioned recommendations in the ANPR Strategy
[Added: 2016/11/23]
Rule of Law and Human Security Unit 2016/10 Completed Relevant recommendations have been incorporated.
4. Recommendation:

1.4 Future Political Reconciliation Programmes:

  • The role of the HPC needs to become clearer vis-à-vis potential negotiations in the future.  Even though President Ghani is more directly involved, or involves other entities like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a political role for the HPC is still necessary to get buy-in, especially among non-Pashtuns who are seeing more conflicts in the north involving a variety of groups: Local militias, Taliban, Central Asian fighters such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as members of Daesh/ISIS).

The focus of the future APRP programme could be on reconciliation at the local level. This would mean that while high level negotiations could continue under different formats (quadrilateral etc.) and by different institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.), there is still a need for an HPC develop and conduct a Peace Campaign. Such a campaign could involve civil society, the media, Ulema and women’s groups more closely and more widely.

Management Response: [Added: 2016/11/23]

The role of the HPC has been clarified in the ANPR Strategy as a top-level and independent national political leadership body appointed by the President to bring together all government and non-government stakeholders for coherent and strategic collaboration to restore fair and sustainable peace across the country. The Strategy further clarifies the role of the HPC by putting together 11 responsibilities for it. (For the specific roles of the HPC, please refer to the ANPR Strategy.)

In terms of ethnic composition, particularly non-Pashtuns in the HPC, the new leadership of the HPC that was appointed by the President in February 2016 is composed of all major ethnic groups – 2 Pashtuns, 1 Tajik, 2 Hazara, 1 Uzbek, and 1 Turkmen. Out of the above 7, three of them are from the north.

As long as the recommendation about local level reconciliation and peace campaign is concerned, the ANPR Strategy places its focus on both national and local level reconciliation. The fact that the Strategy suggests maintenance of Provincial Peace Committees (in a modified smaller version) in all 34 provinces is to ensure the local presence of the HPC in the provinces to lead reconciliation work at the local level. The recommendation about peace campaign is included in the ANPR Strategy; the third objective of the Strategy is about institutionalizing and promoting culture of peace, which is mostly focused around peace education, peace awareness, peace capacities, peace research and peace campaign.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Incorporate the above-mentioned recommendations in the ANPR Strategy.
[Added: 2016/11/23] [Last Updated: 2017/04/10]
Rule of Law and Human Security Unit 2016/10 Completed All recommendations have been included in the ANPR Strategy.
5. Recommendation:

Three types of interventions for ‘peace’ might be envisaged. Although these need GoIRA simultaneous pursuit, UNDP, with donor support, has a limited role only in some of them. A sustainable successor APRP requires, beyond management structures and funding mechanisms, three objective streams achievable through specific interventions:

1. Political peace at the National Level, negotiations pursued by GoIRA through NSC/NDS/MFA. In this framework, the HPC has a symbolic or facilitating role in peace negotiations. It is important to emphasise that the HPC has no legislated, executive role and, therefore, is not in a position to negotiate effectively on behalf of GoIRA. At the local Level, it is proposed that Reconciliation is emphasized, through grievance resolution, mediation, and rendition of justice between families, communities, tribes and ethnic groups. In this, there is a clear role for PPCs and local governors/governance structures.

2. Social/cultural Peace: National and local level

This requires developing and implementing a Peace Campaign. Conditional on this being effective are peace building training, peace education in schools, civil society group mobilization, including the media, in support of peace, and intra-regional religious leaders’ exchanges.

3. Economic Peace requires economic security (as well as health and food security) for all segments of the population (recruitment disincentive) [not just as a ‘bribe’ to draw insurgents in]. This necessitates a massive campaign for economic recovery based on investing on human capital, job creation. Other aspects include an overall policy Jobs for Peace, but not for combatants only, with more focus on vulnerable groups, including youth.

Management Response: [Added: 2016/11/23]

The ANPR Strategy addresses the political and social/cultural peace, and asks for other government institutions’ involvement in providing economic security for integrated combatants and all Afghans. The first objective of the Strategy is focused around political peace by reconciling armed opposition to a peaceful political life through negotiation and implementation of strategic peace settlements. The second and third objectives are about social and cultural peace mainly focused around consensus building and promotion of culture of peace.

For the economic peace, the Strategy suggests the HPC coordinate with the development ministries in close cooperation and leadership of the Presidential Palace to initiate development projects, provide job creation opportunities, and enable the vulnerable groups to make an honorable living for integrated combatants.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Incorporate the recommendations in the ANPR Strategy.
[Added: 2016/11/23]
Role of law and Human Security Unit 2016/10 Completed Relevant recommendations are included in the ANPR Strategy.
6. Recommendation:

Sketching the approach

This implies that a successor to the APRP could include:

  • A smaller HPC in charge of launching national peace campaign and regional PPCs that would mirror those in provinces.
  • A much smaller JS that will only support the HPC as needed

The activities could be limited to

  • developing and launching a peace campaign with all stakeholders, reconciliation
  • possibly facilitating peace negotiations
  • Peace education campaign, including school-based peace education
  • Peace messaging though the media
  • Creation of a peace movement.
  • Dispute resolution at the local level
  • Reconciliation at the local level

The international donor community has indicated that it will not support reintegration at this point in time. Government’s poverty eradication and job creation strategies should be informed through HPC-organised studies and campaigns, as well as those of international partners (including, as appropriate, UNDP), into linkages between poverty and violence. National and regional development projects are desirable to target specifically vulnerable groups through existing development projects, implementation of which should be through normal line ministries, which benefit from HPC advice not duplicated unsustainable structures.

Management Response: [Added: 2016/11/23]

The recommendation about HPC and PPCs’ structures is well-reflected in the ANPR Strategy. The HPC membership has been reduced from 72 to 50. The PPCs composition has reduced too, with only two paid positions. The Joint Secretariat is proposed to be restructured to provide necessary technical support to the HPC. The Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams will be dissolved – each PPC will have an operations officer to support the PPC operationally.

The activities the evaluation report is proposing for APRP successor are included in the ANPR Strategy. Following is a summary of the main ANPR activities under objective 3:

Institutionalising and reinforcing Afghan capacities for peace:

  • Mapping and coordination of national and local peacebuilders
  • Capacity development
  • Supporting centers of peace research
  • Peace monitoring, tracking and analysis systems

 

Promoting a culture of peace:

  • Women's role in peacebuilding
  • Culture of peace public communications, advocacy and education
  • Engagement of religious scholars
  • Insider facilitation and mediation
  • Local conflict resolution and peace initiatives through local authorities, tribal elders and civil society
  • Peace education & peace campaigns
  • Small grant and development / recovery projects

Peace negotiations, local reconciliation, consensus building are also part of the ANPR Strategy placed under objectives 2 and 3.

Commissioning studies and campaigns for poverty eradication and job creation strategies is not the work of the HPC. However, HPC will advocate for such studies to be undertaken by the relevant mandated government institutions. The HPC will raise such issues in the ANPR National Coordination Committee that is represented by a number of government ministries and directorates including the ministries working in the areas of development and poverty eradication.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Incorporate the recommendations on the approach of APRP Successor in the ANPR Strategy.
[Added: 2016/11/23]
Role of Law and Human Security Unit 2016/10 Completed Relevant recommendations are considered in the ANPR Strategy
7. Recommendation:

A Possible Role for UNDP

There appear three specific areas where UNDP could provide added value to a peace programme.

Social peace: UNDP might accompany national and local stakeholders through technical assistance, advising, sharing of experiences from other countries, sponsoring campaigns, conducting and sharing studies, trainings etc.

Political peace: UNDP, if  mediation experiences, could help with building the capacity of provincial peace

councils, governors etc. in 1) mediation, 2) grievance resolution, 3) rendition of justice, 4) abiding by human’s rights and 5) ensuring protection and participation of women.

Economic peace: UNDP support Line Ministries through commissioning studies of vulnerability of populations and their potential security risks, and then advising the creation of targeted poverty eradiation and economic development projects which target vulnerable groups on a case by case, region by region approach.

Management Response: [Added: 2016/11/23]

Agreed, UNDP will provide support to the implementation of ANPR strategy in the following three areas:

  1. Political Peace: ANPR Strategy’s first objective is ‘Armed opposition reconciles to a peaceful political life through the negotiation and implementation of strategic peace settlements’ – UNDP will provide capacity building support to the HPC and PPCs in conflict resolution, mediation, grievance resolution, rendition of justice, human rights, protection and participation of women, and other necessary issues as per UNDP and HPC’s capacity assessment results.
  2. Social Peace: ANPR Strategy’s second objective is around National and international consensus for Afghan-led solutions to peace embodied in a National Peace Plan – UNDP will support the HPC’s consensus building process within the country and will contribute to the development of the 10-year Peace Plan as part of the ANPR deliverable.
  3. Social Peace: ANPR Strategy’s third objective is about Institutionalising and promoting a culture of peace – UNDP will add value to the social peace by accompanying the HPC and providing technical support in terms of advising, sharing experiences, sponsoring campaigns, conducting studies and researches, and providing trainings.

As per the ANPR Strategy, commissioning studies of vulnerability and poverty is not HPC’s mandate. UNDP will not be directly linked to the development ministries and thus will not be able to provide any kind of support. Instead, the HPC will have the opportunity through the ANPR National Coordination Committee to coordinate with the development ministries for commissioning studies for vulnerability assessment, and designing projects for economic development.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Develop UNDP project document incorporating UNDP’s areas of involvement in supporting the implementation of the ANPR strategy.
[Added: 2016/11/23]
Role of law and Human Security Unit 2021/01 Initiated The Prodoc development process with begin in November 2016.

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