End of Project evaluation - Support to Institutional Capacity Development and Support to Emerging State Formation projects

Report Cover Image
Evaluation Plan:
2011-2017, Somalia
Evaluation Type:
Final Project
Planned End Date:
03/2018
Completion Date:
01/2018
Status:
Completed
Management Response:
Yes
Evaluation Budget(US $):
150,000

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Title End of Project evaluation - Support to Institutional Capacity Development and Support to Emerging State Formation projects
Atlas Project Number: 00085367,00085379
Evaluation Plan: 2011-2017, Somalia
Evaluation Type: Final Project
Status: Completed
Completion Date: 01/2018
Planned End Date: 03/2018
Management Response: Yes
Focus Area:
  • 1. Democratic Governance
  • 2. Others
Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021)
  • 1. Output 3.1. Core functions of government enabled (in post conflict situations) to ensure national ownership of recovery and development processes
  • 2. Output 6.4. Recovery processes reinforce social cohesion and trust and enable rapid return to sustainable development
  • 3. Output 7.3. National development plans to address poverty and inequality are sustainable and risk resilient
SDG Goal
  • Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
  • Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
SDG Target
  • 1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day
  • 1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance
  • 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
  • 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
  • 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels
  • 16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance
Evaluation Budget(US $): 150,000
Source of Funding: Project funds
Evaluation Expenditure(US $): 150,000
Joint Programme: Yes
Joint Evaluation: No
Evaluation Team members:
Name Title Nationality
GEF Evaluation: No
Key Stakeholders: Government of Somalia, UNSOM, donors
Countries: SOMALIA
Lessons
Findings
1.

Strengthening Institutional Performance Output Findings

To reiterate, the twofold objectives of SIP are to

  • enable the government to fill critical capacity gaps in the civil service; and
  • strengthen the capacities of key ministries and agencies to perform core government functions.

The resulting outcome is expected to be: Strengthened Government systems, processes and capabilities to deliver the New Deal Compact.

Initially, SIP was divided into three components (with outputs numbered as they are in the workplan) amenable to upscaling:

Component 1  Endowment of core institutions with the right staff in the right positions (capacity injection)

1            Provision of advisory (6) staff (through the WB Capacity Injection Mechanism - CIM)

5            Strengthening capacities for gender mainstreaming

6            Strengthening capacity for Planning and Aid coordination

Component 2 Establishing a solid civil service management framework for sound future public service management

2  Basic framework for civil service management established; and

3  Institutionalisation of training system, including establishment of Civil Service Training Institute.

Component 3 Ensuring coherent and coordinated central planning and decision-making functions.

4  Strengthening Coordination, Good Governance and Communication Capacity at the Centre of Government


Tag: Human and Financial resources Project and Programme management Service delivery Country Government Education Coordination Institutional Strengthening

2.

A bridging phase of the project, following the closure of the SIDP, began on 1 January 2015.  SIP formally began on 1 July 2015.  From that point, to the end of September 2017, the project spent a total of about $10,650,000 or 71% of the available budget of $14, 970,779 (the formally amended budget in July 2016 was $16, 895, 581 but not all funds were received from donors).  The project had a major revision/amendment following an increase in funding in mid-2016 that restructured the project design and added a considerable number of deliverables to several of the existing outputs.  The following discussion is based on the amended version of the project document.  Due to inadequacies of the UNDP financial reporting system, ATLAS, it was not possible for the evaluators to obtain disaggregated financial information for Puntland.  This is a significant drawback in attempting to assess the efficiency of the project as each output had specific deliverables assigned to Puntland State.  This is particularly unfortunate, as will be seen below, since in outputs 3, 4 and 5, the only meaningful deliverables generated during the evaluation period were produced by Puntland, pointing to a missed potential for higher performance at lower administrative costs if underutilized funds at the federal level had been tranferred for use in Pungland.

Implementation of outputs with each associated partner was maintained through the preparation of Letters of Agreement (LOA), updated annually, which specified the assistance to be provided, its value and a timeline for resource allocation.


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources Implementation Modality Monitoring and Evaluation Partnership Programme/Project Design

3.

Output One   Capacity Gaps Filled

Purpose: to place advisory staff in partner agencies in the FGS and Puntland State government.

Expected achievement: 39 advisors in FGS and 16 in Puntland.  In addition, 75% of supervisor ratings should be satisfactory.  

Significant results:  All targets were met or exceeded with 53 advisors at Federal and 20 in Puntland.  Nearly all assessments were positive.

There was an assumption made at the outset of the project design that the government partners did not have sufficient qualified staff remaining in the civil service to be able to perform their new functions as an organized state.  As a result, one of the primary intentions of SIP was to identify and finance a set of short term consultants/advisors who could assist the partner agencies.  In the agreement worked out with the World Bank, initially SIP was assigned to finance six long-term positions, but later this was downgraded to the task of providing short-term advisors while the Bank was finalizing its preparations for a formal mechanism to finance merit-recruited civil servants (at higher than normal pay scales).

However, as designed, Output One is not an output in normal project design parlance.  It is an input.  The use of funds here is limited to paying the salaries of Somali advisors who are selected for engagement with partner government organizations. 


Tag: Resource mobilization Human and Financial resources Programme/Project Design Capacity Building Technical Support

4.

Despite the limitations, by all accounts, the local advisors proved to be useful and well appreciated, both in FGS and Puntland. No doubt this was the case as the national managers had greater flexibility in using these teams in the way they felt would best serve the needs of the beneficiary organization.  In fact, many were extended in their posts and some have gone on to high posts in government service.  Unfortunately, due to the anticipated start of the World Bank civil service remuneration program, SIP reduced its allocation for Output One by 50% in 2017 (from the expenditure level of 2016), but the World Bank program only got underway after the middle of the year.  This has resulted in 43% of the output’s available budget remaining to be spent as of December 2017.

Questions have been raised regarding the ability of UNDP to effectively assess the quality of the work of these advisors who operate under government supervision at the federal level.   Project staff members were responsible for tracking the work of 53 advisors in 2016 located, at various times, in the Ministries of Planning (MOPIED-14), Women (4), Labour (2), Finance (1) and Interior (2), plus the Civil Service Commission (CSC-7), Aid Coordination Unit (ACU-23), Office of the Prime Minister (OPM-1) and the Office of the President (OOP-10 advisors).  This meant that the project staff had limited interaction, rarely met the advisors and had difficulty obtaining reports of their work.  This was particularly problematic in the OOP and OPM, where the advisors asserted they were government staff, not under UNDP supervision. In other units, an increase in the number of staff contracted by Government facilitated the accomplishment of tasks outlined in the respective LOA.  This reflects a positive move towards linking project-financed recruitment to output generation.


Tag: Challenges Human and Financial resources Quality Assurance Technical Support

5.

UN staff assessments of the reports produced by the advisors for UNDP varied from “cut and paste of TOR” to ‘short paragraphs’.  A UNDP-wide Third Party Monitoring contract was issued by the M&E office of UNDP and upon request by the project, one of the purposes was to review the work of the local advisors, but management reported that this led to ‘not much difference’ in their knowledge of the advisors’ functioning due to ‘massaging of information’. 

Where the process worked best is where the government agencies had a strong interest in the outputs to be achieved.  Thus, the fundamental point here is that simply adding bodies to a government unit without linking them to a specific output that has been identified by the receiving unit has a greater potential to result in less beneficial outcomes.

In the ACU, all 23 advisors were provided full-time (unclear if this was in keeping with the short-term provision in the agreement with the World Bank. However,  the WB had stated it would endeavoour to take the positions over in the CIM, but as of lae 2017 this had not materialised. UNDP then decided to continue financing the ACU in this, with additional donor funding, in its critical funciton to assist existing the Aid Coordination Architecture,  with 100% of salary and operational costs covered by UNDP/SIP.  It was reported that ‘heavy input from UNDP in writing reports” was required, and it was felt the ‘output doesn’t match the cost’ (see Output 6 below for more details).  Nevertheless, the advisors supported the Government’s efforts to engage rationally with the international community by performing secretariat functions for many of the FGS/Donor dialogue groups.


Tag: Monitoring and Evaluation Operational Efficiency Results-Based Management Service delivery UN Agencies UNDP Management UNDP management

6.

While the advisory services provided in many of the agencies have been seen generally as managerially problematic, those provided to MOPIC and Puntland State appear to have been managed more carefully.  In MOPIC, the TOR for each advisor was prepared to achieve specific objectives of the Letter of Agreement.  The Ministry advertised locally, sending UNDP a shortlist of candidates.  UNDP sat in on the recruitment interview panels (as an observer).  The Ministry signed the contract and submitted regular reports to UNDP to justify payment.  

While the advisory services provided in many of the agencies have been seen generally as managerially problematic, those provided to MOPIC and Puntland State appear to have been managed more carefully.  In MOPIC, the TOR for each advisor was prepared to achieve specific objectives of the Letter of Agreement.  The Ministry advertised locally, sending UNDP a shortlist of candidates.  UNDP sat in on the recruitment interview panels (as an observer).  The Ministry signed the contract and submitted regular reports to UNDP to justify payment.  


Tag: Challenges Human and Financial resources Service delivery Country Government UNDP Management UNDP management

7.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

It is interesting to note in the table above that while the provision of qualified staff is characterised as one of the key purposes of SIP, the percentage of total project funds allocated to this output was reduced steadily over time.  When the Amended Budget was approved in July 2016, Output 1 was allocated 15% of the total budget, but could only access 13% of the available budget reported to the evaluators.  As of the time of the evaluation, only 9% of project resources had been used to finance these advisors, but only 57% of the budget allocation for this output had been utilized by end September 2017. Part of this reduction was tied to the expectation that the World Bank CIP project would be taking over this role, but as of the time of the evaluation, that had not fully materialized.


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources

8.

Assessment

Once the decision was made that UNDP would not finance long-term staff, this output should have been closed and the funds should have been reallocated so that the advisory service could be directly linked to the activities of the four substantive outputs so as to track performance against production of output deliverables.  This did not happen, resulting in confused, and sometimes double, reporting on results.  It seems clear that the project staff did not have enough time to adequately handle this task as well as manage all of the activities of the substantive outputs.  The TPM reviews were not considered to have been of any use. It may have been advisable to have established a unit in the Civil Service Commission (as one option), similar to the one for Young Graduates, to provide quality control oversight on the recruitment and supervision of the short-term advisors or to shift recruitment of all advisors under LOA arrangements so that Government units were fully responsible for ensuring their worth in reaching output targets.

However, since the output was continued  at a much lower than expected level of operation, underutilized financial resources from this Output could have been transferred to Puntland to enable that program to move ahead more rapidly and, by so doing, reduce the burden of the fixed administrative costs for the overall project . 


Tag: Challenges Human and Financial resources Monitoring and Evaluation Oversight Quality Assurance Service delivery UNDP Management UNDP management Civil Societies and NGOs

9.

Output Two   Civil Service management policy framework developed

Purpose: to provide a basic framework for civil service management in FGS and Puntland.

Expected achievements: to have new laws at Federal & Puntland levels prepared by 2016, approved in 2017; two HR management frameworks completed in 2016, and specific HR management instruments prepared and approved.

Significant Results:         At the time of the evaluation, both Federal and Puntland laws had been sent for final review prior to submission to cabinet with legislative approval yet in the future.  Regulations to accompany the Puntland civil service law have been drafted and are being reviewed simultaneously.

Federal Results

The design of SIP identified significant gaps in the legal and regulatory framework, put in place in the 1970s, for a modern civil service in Somalia.  A design assumption was made that the civil service law would need to be re-written before further work could be undertaken on regulations and management arrangements.

Unfortunately, work on a revision of the civil service law, espcially on the Federal level, was problematic since the early days of the project.  Initially, the leadership of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) was uninterested in the assistance.  The leadership’s primary focus at the time was on upgrading of the national sports stadium.  Disputes also arose early in the project between UNDP management and the MoLSA leadership over the recruitment of advisors for the Ministry.  At a fundamental level, preparing a new civil service law without either a fully endorsed Constitution or a labour code has proven quite tricky.  Within the MOLSA team, including  SIP embeds , there was some disagreement over whether to incorporate the regulations in the legislative bill to be presented for approval by Parliament.  Perhaps more importantly, the government was unclear what it wanted beyond getting staff they could use who were paid by the donors. They were uncertain about the political repercussions of a real civil service reform process.  According to MoLSA in September 2017, there is still no agreement on what civil service reform means and how it should be undertaken. The government’s initial  preference was for a cosmetic update of the existing law that could facilitate recruitment of civil servants by the new government. This  attitude was overcome through  quite a bit of ‘teaching’ from UNDP consultants on the purpose and process of civil service reform.  Government slowly understood that the current law, which included all regulations, would require Parliamentary approval for each and every modification and this would prove unworkable in a newly forming governance environment.  The situation had improved markedly by the time of writing this report.


Tag: Rule of law Ownership Service delivery Country Government Coordination Policy Advisory Civil Societies and NGOs

10.

Puntland results

Puntland established a civil service law in 1998 that is still in force.  It was revised in 2005 to reduce detail.  In 2006, the original Puntland Good Governance Bureau prepared a report advising the government to establish a Commission to manage the Civil Service, which it did in 2007.  However, the current civil service reform process in Puntland has also faced similar delays to that at  the federal level, but is now closer to completion.  The Puntland State of Somalia (PSS) elected to revise Civil Service Law #5 and Civil Service management decree #150 at the same time.  The process involved both national and international consultants together with PSS working groups.  The discussion went through many consultations with different sets of stakeholders.  Again, the disagreements between Civil Service Commission and Ministry of Labour were a major impediment to the process.  By 2017, most of these disagreements had been resolved.  At the end of September 2017, law #5 was being reviewed by the State President’s legal advisor with the anticipation of being presented to Cabinet by late October.    

SIP also provided a series of consultant interventions to prepare technical advisory notes on public administration structure and functions, together with dialogue and drafting of the relevant set of regulations needed to accompany the civil service law.  This package was being reviewed as amendments to regulation #150 at the State President’s office together with the law at the time of the evaluation.


Tag: Public administration reform Service delivery Country Government Coordination Technical Support Civil Societies and NGOs

11.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

Only 6% of the total available project resources were used under this output, this turns out to be less than one-half the level planned in the July 2016 amended project budget.  There was some percentage reduction in output 2 allocation between the official amended budget (13%) and the available budget (9%), but the primary reason for the limited role of the output in the overall project implementation scenario is that only 51% of the output budget had been consumed by end December 2017 due to the UNDP decision to withhold further assistance until the Government was more clear on its approach.  Of the amount spent, 75% was used for national and international consultants.

As noted, it is not possible to fully distinguish the expenditures at the Federal level from those in Puntland.  However, the Puntland manager was able to provide his calculation of expenditures by LOA.  Thus, it can be estimated that for support to the CSC, 81% of funds were used in 2016, while 37% had been spent by September for 2017 (but it appears that several items are merely pending payment).  As with the Federal level, the major cost items were for consultants, but there was also a study tour.


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources

12.

Assessment

There is greater hope for the initiation of civil service reform now that these two bills will move forward to their respective Cabinets and Parliaments.  If these pass, it will be important for the respective Governments to clarify to the international community how they wish to proceed with writing the critical rules and regulations as both World Bank and UNDP have expressed an interest to lead in this area.  At the time this report was being drafted, the World Bank already had consultants fielded during the time of the evaluation preparing certain regulations based on the existing law, arguing that the UNDP support was limited to a bill that had yet to be be approved by Parliament.  Unless WB and UNDP can resolve their differences it can be assumed that such agency discord will remain standard practice as long as both remain involved in civil service reform in Somalia.  Clearly, the FGS will need to make a decision on how (and with whom) to develop their civil service system going forward.


Tag: Public administration reform Service delivery Civil Societies and NGOs

13.

Output Three  Improved Training Policy

Purpose:  To improve training policy, facilities and plans

Expected Achievement: civil service training policies at Federal and Puntland levels, training standards and modules developed and training institute concepts developed

Significant Results:  No results at Federal level.

The Puntland training policy was prepared and approved.  A reassessment of the suitability of establishing single-purpose civil service training institutes is in progress.

Federal Evidence:

There has been no progress at the national level on a training policy. This remains a point of friction between the CSC and MoLSA, with each arguing the other has no role to play in the matter.  MoLSA believes that a training policy should go beyond the civil service, but it is unclear how this would work as private sector needs are far different, and insists that it is wholly in charge of training the civil service.  CSC, on the other hand, claims that while MoLSA has a mandate from the previous government for training government employees, the ministerial TOR, apparently drawn up by the previous government in 2014, has taken that away and given it to a special unit, to be created, that will be a National Training College.  CSC does not claim that it has a mandate to train civil servants.

Comments were made by UNDP that the new minister of MoLSA has endorsed resuming support to preparing a federal training policy.

At the time of the evaluation, the World Bank had initiated financial management training at the University of Somalia.  This would appear to make more sense that spending limited resources on a specialised training centre for a total of 6000 employees.

A number of ad hoc training activities were conducted by SIP for Federal agencies.  With the exception of an activity launch workshop for the civil service law review, all other were related to the preparation of the National Development Plan and Aid Coordination.  In the 17 events that the evaluators could identify, a total of 322 persons participated, including 27% women.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Implementation Modality Country Government Capacity Building Policy Advisory

14.

Puntland Evidence

A training policy was developed by MOLSYS with SIP technical assistance and approved in Puntland, stating the PSS intention to devote 1.5% of its annual budget to civil service training as an incentive to improve recruitment and retention.  The policy was prepared over a six month period involving five government organizations.  It is expected to be taken to Cabinet in October 2017.  The CSC has agreed that the training policy belongs with MoLYS, while recruitment belongs to them.

While the policy discusses the establishment of a Puntland Civil Service Training Institute, it recognizes that interim measures should build upon existing training institutes as there is a growing recognition of the high cost of such a single-purpose public institute.  Recently, the CSC has engaged assistance from the Ethiopian Civil Service University for advanced degree education for an initial 24 staff and from Tanzania to improve the capacity of the Puntland State University Public Administration Department to conduct basic training for civil servants.  SIP should closely monitor the progress on this in Puntland as it could have important implications for federal and State public service training policies nationwide. 

Ad hoc trainings were also conducted in Puntland with almost all partner agencies taking part in one or more.  These involved RBM and M&E training, LOA management, database management, HACT findings review, HR skill resource training, and gender mainstreaming.  In the 16 events the evaluators was able to identify, a total of 314 persons participated, including 23% women.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Country Government Capacity Building Policy Advisory South-South Cooperation Technical Support

15.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period. Only 1% of project expenditures were used under this output and only 15% of the output budget has been consumed, again mostly consumed by consultants.  It is not possible to accurately calculate the level of financial assistance to Puntland for Output 3, but financial support to MoLYS was utilized mostly for national and international consultants, rehabilitation of the ministry office, and IT equipment. 


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources

16.

Assessment

No progress was made at the federal level, but a consultant written training policy was prepared for Puntland.  A donor/government (incorporating FMS) Capacity Development Working Group, mentioned in the original CD flagship programme document, is the body that should be setting the framework for a coordinated donor approach to civil service training. 

Puntland stressed that a more systematic approach to training within SIP is necessary.  They are dissatisfied with the short (3-4 day) sessions provided ad hoc by individual consultants.  They would prefer that SIP make an arrangement with local higher education institutes to prepare a package that civil servants can use to obtain formal certification.  (The project implementers state this was SIP’s original idea.) However, the State needs to establish a policy regarding who can access formal training and what retention requirements will be placed on those who receive government assisted training. English as a medium of instruction does not appear to be an impediment, at least for higher level staff. 

Underutilized financial resources from this Output could have been transferred to Puntland to enable that program to move ahead more rapidly and, by so doing, reduce the burden of the fixed administrative costs at the project headquarters level.  Progress in Puntland could be used as peer learning opportunities, as was the case when the new States went to Garowe to learn about Puntland’s development planning process.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Country Government Capacity Building Policy Advisory

17.

Output Four   Strategic guidelines development

Purpose:  Develop strategic guidelines for internal government coordination and communication

Expected Achievement:  guidance for improving executive/legislative as well as OOP/OPM relationships; federalism organic law, policy development framework, performance management structure, 10 ministerial functional reviews completed, support to PFM, concept for engagement with non-state actors

Significant results: No significant results at Federal level aside from upgrade of OPM premises. 

Puntland completed 2 functional reviews, significantly upgraded the capacity of the Good Governance Bureau as a strategic link with civil society.  The GGB also fulfilled its obligations of producing a Citizens’ Charter and Complaints Mechanism

Federal Evidence:

It would appear that the proposed work at the federal level with the OOP and OPM was premature.  (Project implementors state UNDP only got into the OOP  at the request of the EU, as it was not a part of the original project plan.)  The fragile, consensus-oriented political setting was simply not prepared to be structured around a western-style governance framework.  It was noted by UN staff that UNDP had probably failed to articulate the expected results in an understandable manner.  No LOA was ever finalized with the OOP, reflecting the difficulty of establishing a sound working relationship, but funding continued through November 2016.  An LOA was signed with OPM in April 2016, but progress towards objectives beyond facility rehabilitation could not be achieved.  To the knowledge of the evaluators, no functional review was conducted at the federal level although an organization structure discussion paper was prepared for MOPIED.     Nevertheless, an agreement with the new management team in the OPM on strategic communication and performance management has been reached and international consultants are being sought.  This reflects an ability on the part of UNDP to learn and on the part of government to rationalize their demands.


Tag: Challenges Public administration reform Rule of law Communication Programme/Project Design UNDP Management UNDP management Policy Advisory

18.

Puntland Evidence:

Puntland had benefited from earlier assistance from the SIDP which had already done functional reviews for several ministries.  Puntland began with a public sector review in 2013, followed by a more detailed civil service review and the initial 4 functional reviews in 2014.  The changes that could be seen in the functionality of those offices were clear enough that the Ministry of Labour, Education and the Civil Service Commission requested functional reviews from the project.  This process had a useful impact in helping the CSC and MOLYS to clarify the distinctions in their functional assignments, with civil service recruitment and management clearly being shifted to the Commission. SIP also supported a functional review of the Health Ministry.  In addition, it is useful to note that the Ministry of Environment borrowed the methodology and carried out a functional review and restructuring of its own unit without any external assistance, attesting to the utility of the approach.

The Ministry of Women’s Development and Family Affairs (MoWDAFA) had two functional analysis undertaken as the first did not prove useful.  Although the second international consultant only had time to undertake, in his words, a ‘theoretical desktop study’, reports from the Ministry are that it was successfully used to help clarify the roles and functions of each unit.  This has enabled them to prepare departmental operational plans that reduce friction within the ministry.  The Ministry now has an HR Policy, TOR for key staff and all personnel have official identity cards.  This Ministry now has more staff than MoPIC and is seen as a key player in Cabinet.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Country Government Institutional Strengthening Technical Support

19.

The most interesting outcome of Output 4 has been the re-invigoration of the Puntland Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Bureau.  The PGG/ACB was founded as an NGO in 2006 by a group of Puntland intellectuals who helped the State to rationalize its responsibilities in four sectors of Finance, Security, Judiciary and Establishment.  Somaliland copied their example, creating a similar unit in 2013. The Bureau is now beginning to play a more active role within the State Government and with civil society, following SIP supported preparation of a three-year strategic plan.  The current President added Anti-Corruption to their mandate in 2014.  With the assistance of international and national consultants, the Bureau was able to fashion a workable strategy for its overall mandate.  In addition, it completed a Citizen’s Public Service Delivery Charter for Public Services, a Public Complaints Mechanism and has initiated an advocacy strategy for anti-corruption with the public.  A cursory review of the Charter indicates that it is a useful initiative.  It could be improved by more adequately clarifying service delivery standards and accountability measures to objectively assess a deficiency in service.  Work on the Charter was stimulated by study tours to the Kenya Anti-corruption bureau and the Rwanda Ombudsman’s Office.  The Bureau engaged all sectors to validate the Charter through open discussions with follow up orientation once it was completed.  It should be presented to Cabinet for approval in November 2017.  The Complaints Mechanism seems to be a mix of public grievances and internal discipline issues.  The document could be improved by more carefully identifying the administrative level at which the complaint should be redressed.  The team had the sense that this is still a consultant output and could be upgraded with more engagement with users.

PGG/ACB was initially seen as incapable of effectively utilizing UN assistance.  Government had wanted SIP to build it from scratch, but SIP refused, explaining that the State must get it started.  A building was rented with sufficient furniture and management systems were put in place before the LOA was signed. 


Tag: Anti-corruption Rule of law Ownership Service delivery Advocacy Institutional Strengthening South-South Cooperation Civil Societies and NGOs

20.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period. Except for Puntland, work on Output 4 dropped off the radar.  The total spent for the PGGA/CB was about $140,000 over two years.  The MoPIC office management retreat only cost $3000.  Compared to the lack of progress at the Federal level, despite considerable expense to upgrade the OPM facilities, Puntland clearly illustrates the value of working on areas where the partner is fully committed to the work and the consultants provided were put to useful work


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources

21.

Assessment

Puntland State shows the potential to be a leader in public service reform among the Somali States. Obviously, it has been at it for 20 years, but all interviewees, government and NGO, recognized the positive changes over the past three years.  Everyone mentioned ‘enhanced accountability’ as the most significant change, but also recognized it as the biggest continuing challenge going forward.  Improved vertical and horizontal coordination, coupled with a decrease in conflict within organizations was noted as a result of a number of public sector reform interventions.  There was no indication that any SIP intervention had contradicted the work of any other donor, although the World Bank did make some (reportedly minor) changes to functional reviews as they introduced their CIM recruitment program.

potential commitment to further improvement.   It will require strong support from the State government to be able to play a meaningful role within government, but it is already serving as a conduit for communication to the public.  This institutionalized engagement with citizens is important and not seen anywhere else in SIP (in StEFS only with SWS Planning Ministry).  The Federal Minister of Interior asked the Bureau to present their work to the other FMS.  They are eager to gain recognition for their progress, but recognize the difficulties they will face in operationalizing their policy documents and, therefore, anticipate future support from UNDP. 


Tag: Effectiveness Rule of law Communication Country Government Conflict resolution Coordination

22.

Output Five   Gender mainstreaming

Purpose:  Prepare assessments, tools and plans to mainstream gender

Expected Achievements:  10 Tools developed at Federal and Puntland levels, 20 partners supported and 30 staff trained

Significant Results:  Puntland completed the preparation of a Gender Mainstreaming Toolkit

Federal Evidence

It appears that the focus of the output on the production of technical documents delayed progress at the federal level.  The 2016 LOA indicated that gender data collection, gender sensitive legal and policy instruments and gender-based budgeting would be the focus of attention.  Aside from the gender mainstreaming guidelines, no documentation of draft or completion of any of this work was provided to the evaluators.  The international consultant recruited to produce the gender mainstreaming toolkit was deemed incapable of completing the work and was dropped before the completion of her contract.   

Both MoLSA and CSC reported on their efforts to encourage women to apply, including providing a wage supplement for female civil servant entrants.  A research paper funding by UNDP with the CSC on gender inequalities in civil service was still in its first draft. 


Tag: Challenges Gender Equality Gender Mainstreaming Human and Financial resources Technical Support Data and Statistics

23.

Puntland Evidence

Puntland Ministry of Women and Family Affairs was supported to produce a Gender Mainstreaming Toolkit.  This was launched by the State Vice President in November 2016 and apparently is the first in the nation.  Several workshops were held during the formulation and piloting of the Toolkit. A focus of attention was placed on identifying gender gaps in government operations.  A national consultant was assigned the task of ensuring gender was mainstreamed into the work of the CSC and MoLYS on the civil service reform measures.  The Puntland Development Plan was also revised to make it more gender sensitive.  They are currently working on modifying the toolkit to make it applicable at the district level.  Special sessions in the regions were held for senior clan elders to build their awareness of the value of women in Puntland society, but the ministry acknowledges the difficulty of cultural barriers to change.  Gender focal points were trained in all line ministries, a move proposed by the Minister Women to Cabinet and a women’s cell has been established in the State House.  Civil society groups in the regions also received special orientation sessions as well. The Puntland MoWDFA is now quite active on social media (SIP provided an ITC consultant and a communications advisor, but the initiative is self-organized and funded) and is using that capacity to promote the role of women in Somali society. 

The Ministry remarked that support from SIDP had been similar, but much more. 


Tag: Gender Mainstreaming Local Governance Public administration reform Communication Human and Financial resources Country Government Technical Support Civil Societies and NGOs

24.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to more accurately account for late booking of expenditures during the evaluation period.

Only 2% of total project resources were used under this output and only 45% of the available output budget has been used.

The reported expenditure on the Puntland LOA for MoWDAFA for 2016 and 2017 is $145,410.  The value of the LOA at the Federal level was budgeted for a total of $194,500.  Therefore, aside from the international consultancies, it appears only minimal charges were made at the federal level under this output.  Four national advisors were provided to the Federal Ministry, but their costs would have been covered under Output One.


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources

25.

Assessment

It is unclear why UNDP and donors approved SIP to open a separate gender technical output at the federal level.  UNSOM, UNDP, UNICEF and UNWOMEN, plus bilaterals and other agencies all have ongoing technical gender programs.  There was a coordinated effort by all major actors in this field to establish a national Gender Policy that culminated in May 2016.       

Given the difficulties of moving ahead technically at the federal, it was wise of the project management to hold back on further guidance-writing inputs.  However, given that CSC and MoLSA had made moves to introduce recruitment and retention rule modifications, SIP could have looked at ways and means of working with other government entities to foster a more conducive working environment for women in the civil service…using guidance materials already produced by other specialised organizations.

Puntland MoWDAFA appears to have been active in completing the work under its two LOA (2016-96%; 2017-75% to end September).  Underutilized financial resources from this Output could have been transferred to Puntland to enable that program to move ahead more rapidly and, by so doing, reduce the burden of the fixed administrative costs at the project headquarters level.  Progress in Puntland could be used as peer learning opportunities, with the only Gender Mainstreaming Guidelines in the country being produced in Puntland.


Tag: Gender Mainstreaming Harmonization Human and Financial resources Operational Efficiency Bilateral partners UN Agencies Coordination South-South Cooperation Technical Support Civil Societies and NGOs

26.

Output Six   Aid Coordination, Development Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation

Purpose:  Provide guidance to build capacity to undertake development planning, M&E and aid coordination

Expected Achievements: Variety of documents, processes and arrangements addressing the elements of the Purpose

Significant Results:    Production of the first National Development Plan in 30 years, shifting of locus of aid coordination from international community to FGS; established national system of monitoring for NDP. In Puntland, Puntland Development Plan redesigned to match timeline and structure of NDP; state Statistics Law passed; establishment of the Puntland Development Forum

Federal Evidence

The most significant result of this output, and of the project as a whole, was the preparation of the National Development Plan (NDP).  The entire process took nearly three years.  National and International consultants worked closely with MOPIED staff to organize a wide range of consultations, over 60 in total, in many parts of the country to generate ideas, interest and understanding in the national plan, the first to be produced in the past 30 years.  In the process, the MoPIED[1] has built one of the more functional units in the FGS.  After  consultation, the NDP was accepted by the international community as the primary framework for aid discussions between all stakeholders. All five States have agreed, to varying degrees, to be engaged with the FGS in NDP implementation.  Southwest State had its Strategic Plan approved by the Cabinet and distributed to all members of the SDRF.  Puntland had already reformatted their existing PDP to match the timeframe of the national.  Jubaland has some concerns over the demographics used in the NDP, but has agreed to collaborate.  The other two states are still in the early stages of plan preparation.

The MoPIED (originally MoPIC) acknowledges the importance of SIP assistance in building their organization and supporting the preparation of the NDP.  In 2015, the FGS recognized that most public services were being funded by international agencies and delivered by NGOs, but reporting was often spotty and, at times, fake.  They saw the need to upgrade the capability of government to plan and implement basic services.  The first problem encountered was the lack of data in the hands of government.  International agencies and NGOs had data, but they were (and still are) unwilling to share their analyses.  The overall information system was haphazard (recent discussion with the DINA consultants indicates the situation had not changed by late in 2017) leading, at times, to overlapping and contradictory assistance.  While recognizing that international assistance helps keep the country together, this lack of government capacity was allowing development to proceed “from the perspective of the donors”.

 


[1] MOPIED is the current acronym.  Previously the ministry was known as MOPIC.  Today this is the preferred acronym for state planning ministries.


Tag: Monitoring and Evaluation Programme/Project Design Strategic Positioning Coordination Institutional Strengthening Data and Statistics Civil Societies and NGOs

27.

MoPIED leadership began to lay out a plan for improving its capacity, recognizing that little of its work was being done systematically:  There was no M&E, planning was conceptual at best, statistics were managed by international agencies, their financial management system was unworkable and the concept of human resource management lacked an incentive framework. 

To address these perceived gaps, the ministry turned first to UNDP for assistance.  In their view, UNDP was “willing to listen” and responded immediately with support in all substantive areas, as well as refurbishing the building, adding necessary furniture and equipment and financing eight advisory posts.  In the process, UNDP did not act as a controller of the process, but did keep close tabs on the use of funding through a pre-approval process that helped to build an effective working relationship. MoPIED was asked to initiate the relationship by preparing a concept note of the results it wanted to achieve.  The concept note was then deconstructed into a workplan and formalized through a LOA, beginning January 2016.  This assistance enabled MoPIED to begin to put its house in order, so it could manage its own resources.  The next step was to devise a national development plan that would enable the FGS to have greater leverage over the use of international resources for the development of Somalia.


Tag: Challenges Human and Financial resources Monitoring and Evaluation Programme/Project Design Strategic Positioning Country Government Data and Statistics

28.

In December 2015, the National Advisory Council, consisting of FGS, FS, youth representatives and civil society met to elaborate the process for preparing the NDP, particularly the regional consultations to ensure broad buy-in.  The first consultation in Puntland enabled the other States to recognize they needed to organize preliminary consultations among their own constituents before meeting with FGS to discuss a national plan. These State level consultations were financed by UNDP.  The process continued for nearly half a year providing the opportunity for the most inclusive dialogue in many years.

The preparation of the NDP provided a raison d’etre for the National Development Council, by pushing the FGS to realize the need for consultation with the States.  It also influenced the advancement of the National Statistics Act, the National NGO Act and the National M&E Framework (which has been endorsed by Cabinet).  Perhaps the most important outcome of the plan preparation has been the realization of the need for systematic management of implementation and reporting on outcomes.  MoPIED is currently involved in rolling out the monitoring framework to all the federal line ministries.  This effort has been facilitated through the intervention of a SIP international consultant who deconstructed the NDP into a detailed Gantt chart indicating tasks, responsibilities and timelines creating a comprehensive workplan.  Within MoPIED now, the M&E unit prepares an internal performance report and senior staff hold regular meetings to share progress.  The workplan being finalized now is for 2017 due to the significant disturbance caused by the change in administration after the election.  At this point, States are still invited to NDP Pillar meetings as observors, but next year the intent is to switch to joint programming once all FMS have completed their planning process.  


Tag: Election Public administration reform Programme/Project Design Strategic Positioning Country Government Coordination Policy Advisory

29.

As MoPIED has shown progress in its own organization, more donors are becoming involved.  The M&E unit now has support from World Bank and UNICEF, while Statistics has assistance from World Bank, IMF, SIDA and UNFPA. UNDP involvement in Statistics now is limited . 

Although SIP has an activity result for ‘localizing SDGs’ this seems to be managed by a unit separate from Statistics and M&E (and it was not met by the evaluator).  Nevertheless, both Statistics and M&E DGs informed that all goals and indicators of the NDP are already aligned to SDGs.  In addition, an M&E MOU has been prepared for all FMS to facilitate the exchange of information and to collaborate on collection of data.  This has helped to advance towards a single common M&E framework with the FMS.  The NDC endorsed the national M&E framework.  Support for this was a collaboration of UNICEF and SIP.

While tracking SDG progress is important for the long-run, the immediate need is to improve implementation.  For this, MoPIED has developed a performance monitoring framework to track implementation of all NDP indicators, both in terms of process and output by both federal line ministries and FMS.  This was still in process during the evaluation, but sufficiently developed to be clearly explained by MoPIED.  While progress tracking is important, building capacity of the line ministries and FMS is the paramount objective so that MoPIED can shift to a less hands on arrangement in the future as each element of government develops the capability to track its own progress.


Tag: Resource mobilization Monitoring and Evaluation Results-Based Management Agenda 2030 Data and Statistics SDG monitoring and reporting

30.

Aid Coordination

The Aid Coordination Unit (ACU) was created by FGS in 2014, and the UNDP was the first to offer assistance.  This mean providing furniture and computers, plus all 23 staff members have their salaries fully paid by SIP.  UNDP supported the preparation of TOR for the unit, designed the workplan and prepared and funded the budget.  In addition, an international staff has provided backup for the team to ensure quality and timeliness of reporting and event management.

According to its latest report, the “Aid Coordination Unit provides strategic advice, information and technical support to the Offices of the President and of the Prime Minister, different ministries in the Government, including the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED), the Parliament, Federal Member States (FMSs) and the Somali Public Cabinet to promote the effective utilization of aid resources to attain peacebuilding, state-building and development results”.

Since the ACU has the capacity to provide high level secretarial and logistic support to the Government, it has been pulled from the OPM, to Ministry of Finance, to MoPIED, and back to OPM in the matter of a few years.  Fortunately, they have not had to physically move, but the change in leadership has been difficult.  According to the chief, OPM is the best place as it reduces the frictions caused by attempting to formally coordinate ministries from inside another ministry.

Although all costs are covered by UNDP, SIP can still be credited with facilitating a more positive relationship between FGS and the international community on issues of aid management.  The 23 advisors working in the ACU were largely responsible for the organization, facilitation and documentation of many high-level meetings such as the SDRF, May 2017 London Conference and the first Pillar Working Group (PWG) under the NDP in July.  In addition, in recognition of their capacity,the ACU was also called upon to facilitate the work of the recent drought early recovery planning efforts.


Tag: Disaster Recovery Public administration reform Strategic Positioning Country Government Peace Building Coordination Institutional Strengthening Operational Services Technical Support

31.

Puntland Evidence

Puntland State has been assisted to produce three development plans this century.  SIP successfully assisted the State to modify their current plan to bring it in line with the NDP.  While much of the work was more a matter of reformatting, their willingness to adapt its existing plan to the structure and timeframe of the National Plan illustrated the State’s acceptance of its role in the federation.

From discussions with key actors, and review of budget and documents, it is clear that the process has been driven by the ministry with catalytic support from SIP.  MoPIC acknowledges the support from SIP as providing the ‘backbone’ for the ministry.  In their view, the ministry “owns all activities of SIP” because each year they identify what are the important activities to be funded by SIP.  The work in 2016 focused primarily on the revision of the PDP and enhancing the functioning of the Puntland Development Council.  Support from SIP consisted of one month international consultant and four national advisors (planning, Aid coordination, M&E and Finance & Procurement). The 2017 focus has been on the preparation and execution of ministerial implementation plans.  This year there has been no dedicated international consultant support for this output, with only three short-term (8 month) supporting national consultants (proposal writing, Aid coordination, and communications).  Much of SIP assistance went into producing PDP materials (bilingual) and facilitating orientation workshops for line ministries. 


Tag: Human and Financial resources Strategic Positioning Country Government Technical Support

32.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures.

As the project ran into difficulties in delivery on other outputs, particularly Civil Service reform, resources were re-allocated to match the growing need from the Aid Coordination Unit and the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED).  Over 41% of the SIP project resources have been utilized in producing the deliverables under this output and as of the end of December 2017, 120% of the available output budget had already been consumed.  With increased focus on support to line ministry monitoring of the NDP and PDP it can be expected that the percentage of total budget used by this output will continue to increase as others at the federal level are far less active.  In Puntland, the largest share of the 2017 SIP resources have gone to MoPIC, and over 50% of the remaining unspent funds (as of September) were associated with the MoPIC LOA. 


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources

33.

Assessment

There is no question that SIP delivered with the MoPIED.  The result is more than ‘a book’, as the NDP has been referred, it is the revitalization of the Ministry and, associated with that, energizing the FGS to play a greater role in the management of the international assistance it receives.  It was a mutual collaboration, with the UNDP Country Director noting, “The Planning Ministry did so well, they made us look good!”

While the ACU remains essentially a step-child of UNDP, the creation of the NDC represents a true outcome level development.  The NDC is perhaps the only Somali led and managed forum that facilitates regular dialogue between the FMS and FGS. 

However, in both Puntland and FGS there are a number of draft policies and laws that have been lingering for over a year.  The reasons for these delays likely differ from one document to another.  A critical lesson, however, is SIP should perhaps temper its enthusiasm for delivering technically competent documents before ensuring that the partner (and all associated stakeholders, including politicians) fully understand and own the product. It is entirely possible that the change in the FGS leadership in 2017 has played a role in the evaluators perception of lack of ownership.   Nevertheless, a more participatory, facilitated process will be explained in the Recommendations section as a suggestion for moving away from an expert-driven approach to a more catalytic engagement, requiring shorter inputs from internationals, but greater buy-in from partners.

One area that both FGS and Puntland requested additional assistance is in data management.  Each of the two planning ministries respectively has set up a fledgling Geographic Information System with little or no assistance. Development planning in a large area with dispersed population needs to have a place-based development information system, especially when working at the State level.  Sectors/Pillars do not help in knowing where aid is actually going (geographically) and who is being left out. In Mogadishu, a satellite image has been matched with an unlicensed GIS software to plot the locations of all building of Banadir to be used in determining the sample frame for the DHS.  This level of initiative needs to be supported with technical advice, cross-visit opportunities, hardware, software and support to induce all international agencies to share their data in a single unified geographically referenced information system managed by MoPIED and shared with the FMS.


Tag: Monitoring and Evaluation Ownership Partnership Country Government UNDP Management UNDP management Technology Coordination Data and Statistics

34.

Output Seven The SIP project management

Purpose:  Establish management and implementation arrangements

Expected Achievements:  Project Board meetings held, project progress reports produced, staff recruited

Actual Results:  No effective project board meeting since February 2016.  Project staff can be considered to be the bare minimum necessary to implement the project under UNDP rules.

Federal Evidence

SIP is operated by a very small team in Mogadishu.  Supervised by a part-time programme manager and the part time deputy programme manager.  The team consists of two full time internationals (team leader and Aid Effectiveness/Efficiency specialist), one national officer, one M&E UNV and one shared accountant.  Together they have disbursed and accounted for activities amounting to over $9 million over the past two years.  Despite these staffing limitations, no government partner complained about late delivery of assistance.  Logistical delivery is clearly their strong suit. 

Knowledge management capacity is not as well developed.  Naturally, the project team cannot have technical capacity in all the subject areas of the project.  However, many technical reports have been written by consultants, but, in many cases, have not been critically reviewed by either project management or government.  The sense obtained by the evaluators was that delivery was the focus, and this has its merits when dealing with an FCAS that is struggling to get its feet on the ground and is anxious for immediate assistance.  However, donors complain that reporting is restricted to the activity, and even input, level, failing to provide a nuanced assessment of either progress or constraints.  The project leadership stressed that MPTF fund management board emphasises reporting on activity level and production of deliverables (laws, etc.)[1]  The use of Third Party Monitoring facilities from both UNDP and DFID did not provide any high-level analysis, synthesis or lessons learned to advance project or partner thinking. 

 


[1] This apparent prioritization of production over facilitating a learning by the international community appears worrisome and will be addressed in the Conclusions and Recommendations.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Knowledge management Monitoring and Evaluation Project and Programme management Technical Support

35.

There is also seemingly no shadow budget or project management tool used by the project manager to aggregate expenses of all operational budget lines by geographic location or to track progress and expenditure by LOA as none was provided to the evaluators when requested.  UNDP clearly needs to upgrade their ATLAS system so it can function as a project management systems rather than just as a fund administration system.   

The M&E officer prepares a annual monitoring plan for the federal part of the project.  According to the SIP M&E officer, the project manager is expected to provide the implementation details, but this was not done.

Letters of Agreement have been well used to define the nature of assistance to be provided to each partner.  All partners were very clear about the assistance they expected to receive and when it was due.  It was less clear whether they sensed an obligation on their part to use that assistance generate change that is meaningful to their constituents.

The last effective Steering Committee meeting was in February 2016.  There has been no Steering Committee meeting at all since October 2016, but UNDP was not invited to present on SIP progess at that last meeting as it focused on the lack of progress from the World Bank side.  Donors have stated that an agreement was reached to downgrade the meeting chair to the Permanent Secretary from the Deputy Prime Minister, but this was never implemented.   Project implementors could not adequately explain why the the critical function of external oversight fell into disarray. The national election did play a role in the latter stages, but according to donors, agreement had been made to downgrade the chairmanship post to the Permanent Secretary level.

There was a striking lack of linkage between the Puntland and Federal staff of the project, almost as if they were operating as completely different projects.  This limited communication reduced the potential for the federal partners to benefit from lessons already learned in Puntland.


Tag: Challenges Election Communication Donor relations Human and Financial resources Implementation Modality Monitoring and Evaluation Oversight Project and Programme management Technology

36.

Puntland Evidence

One aspect of the project that illustrates cost savings, with accompanying quality management, was the shift from an international to a national component manager in Puntland.  The evaluator found the Puntland activities to be well managed with all partners fully aligned with project objectives.  A strong reason for this alignment is that all activities were already identified in the earlier Puntland Development Plan and all partners were required to prepare a concept note before initiating a LOA.  Their apparent interest comes out clearly in the minutes of the Project Board meetings.  These are clearly meetings of partners, rather than implementers reporting on activities completed.  On several occasions, it was clear from the minutes that the State was holding UNDP accountable for promises made.  Meaningful insights into project operations were obtained by scanning these documents.

Only Puntland management provided the evaluators with a detailed breakdown of the costs associated with each partner LOA and ready access to materials produced.  Management and overhead costs were not included presumably as these are calculated in Mogadishu.  Nevertheless, the evaluators was provided with the most comprehensive view of what work had been undertaken, what it had cost and where savings remained. 


Tag: National Partnership Project and Programme management

37.

Financial Evidence

The financial analysis of each output has been updated to include December 2017 expenditures in order to account for late booking of expenditures.

The management of SIP is an expensive affair.  Fully 37% of project finances were consumed in management personnel, operational expenses and UNDP administrative costs and 96% of the available management output budget allocation has already been consumed, which amounts to 117% of the fomal amended budget for administrative charges. 

The management budget has continually increased as a percentage of the total project.  It was anticipated to be only 22% of the Amended Budget, but is now nominally 31% of the Available Budget, yet comprises 37% of actual expenditures through December 2017.  Staff cost is emphasized as the breakdown of the management costs  come out as 54% staff costs, 15% operational expense and 30% UNDP administrative costs.  Considering that staff are essentially sunk costs,  the percentage of project expenditures devoted to management costs may continue to increase through to the end of the project.


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources

38.

Assessment

It appears that senior project management has not been able to control administrative expenditure increases, despite leaving several international posts unfilled.  The management cost as a percentage of total budget  is now nearly twice what was originally proposed.  This rate of growth is questionable, even for work in a FCAS.  When a project budget is laid out by an implementing organization certain assumptions are made regarding holding down management costs.   In the case of SIP, management costs grew steadily while the total resources available for substantive work steadily decreased. This appears to be a problem of a combination of the expensive staffing and administrative costs for UNDP.

 Slow project implementation,plus increases in UNDP chages, had a major impact on the administrative costs. However,  no evidence was provided, expect in Puntland, indicating  the project managers understood what it cost to deliver a specific activity.  This is not the norm in professional project mangement.  The evaluators were left with the sense that UNDP does not consider implementation cost reduction to be a core management objective.  


Tag: Human and Financial resources Implementation Modality Operational Efficiency Project and Programme management

39.

The lack of a functional Steering Committee has meant that critical high level issues were not discussed at an appropriate venue with Governmant, reducing the potential for donors to address these bilaterally.

If resources had been shifted from slow moving federal activities to Puntland, it is likely the available budget could have been spent at a lower fixed rate of administrative costs.  Unfortunately, there has been little or no peer learning or exchange of experiences between the Puntland and federal parts of SIP.  The two operate as if they were part of independent projects with the project manager in Mogadishu focused only on federal work.  A more unified approach should be considered for the next phase.


Tag: Challenges Knowledge management Oversight Project and Programme management

40.

Support to Emerging Federal States Output Findings

According to the Prodoc summary, StEFS is the  key UN support to address ‘….needs primarily at the emerging federal state level but also supporting those federal government structures that critically facilitate new state formation’. StEFS overall goal supports the FGS’ Peace and State Building Goal 1 (PSG 1) to….achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes.

The upper end of the StEFS logic model is in line with the goal structure of the Somali Compact The StEFS overall Goal supports the Peace and State Building Goal 1 (PSG 1) to “….achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes. The StEFS primary Outcome, also aligned with Priority 1, is to “Advance inclusive political dialogue to clarify and settle relations between the federal Government and existing and emerging administrations and initiate processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities.”

It is important to note that this encompasses three intermediary level outcomes. First, the project aims to resolve the disputes/disagreements surrounding efforts to create a federal system beginning in 2012; second, it seeks to clarify the respective responsibilities of the FGS and the Somali FMS; and third, StEFS aims to support inter- and intra-clan reconciliation and trust building.


Tag: Conflict resolution Peace Building Social cohesion

41.

Output 1:  The political dialogue and consultations around federalism and state formation have been supported.

StEFS enabled, through planning and logistic support, for reconciliation to go ahead in two instances, Galmudug and HirShabelle, this was a critical contribution to creation of these two FMS. There is a widely shared view amongst project staff and state government officials that without StEFS support it was unlikely that these two states would have been established. Furthermore, enhanced efforts in reconciliation has contributed to the sustainability of all four. The fact that the project supported the finalisation of the state formation process and contributed to promoting their sustainability through key inputs to the reconciliation (political and social) process (see below) is notable. The evaluation emphasises that sustaining the contribution in this area will be critical to the new states medium-term sustainability.

During the course of the StEFS pre-project phase, it became clear that an extended reconciliation process was necessary if the emergent states were to achieve sustainability; so support in this regard was incorporated as an component of the full StEFS project. It is important to emphasise that, despite this understanding, the StEFS project deliberately took a back seat to the UNSOM political office and other players, such as Finnish Church Aid (FCA) in this respect[1]; its support was broadly confined to logistics and subsistence, as well as physical planning.  This support was seen by all as useful in enabling the many stakeholders to be able to spend enough time together to establish a basis for understanding.

 


[1] There was a clear recognition that the project team lacked the requisite expertise to fulfil any other role; developing the requisite level of political, cultural and socioeconomic understanding would simply take too long and limited knowledge and understanding was too risky. Another part of the decision not to play an active political role was that this is clearly the mandate of UNSOM and having diversion in this within the UN did not seem a good idea.


Tag: Sustainability Country Government UN Agencies Coordination Operational Services Civil Societies and NGOs

42.

StEFS support was principally in respect of planning and provision of logistics. Because this is a demand driven area, frequently determined at short notice, planning is particularly difficult. The travel expenditure (Table below) underlines this.

The data clearly underlines the acknowledged reality that when the project committed to support the reconciliation process, project managers were unaware of the scale of the implications of this commitment. Variations over the two years of +371% and -66% over planned totals emphasise the project’s adaptability and the efficiency with which it was able to respond to, very often, last minute requests for assistance.

Facilitators recorded the reaction of the participants to the utility of the Galmudug State Formation Workshop to the state formation process.  Overall, participants expressed a positive reaction to the workshop’s utility.  

StEFS’ logistical role in the reconciliation efforts reflected the clear understanding with UNSOM’s political office that it would take the lead as the international partner in terms agenda setting and identification of desired outputs. In this respect, the key international actor was UNSOM, a StEFS partner; national actors included MOIFAR and FMS. Basically, StEFS’ role was to meet the costs associated with the reconciliations[1].

A key reason for this was the recognition of the challenges surrounding the understanding of socio-political nuances of the reconciliation process and the impossibility of gaining such an understanding in the relatively short time available to project actors; in line with ‘Do No Harm’ principles, UNDP preferred to defer to UNSOM’s political office and federal and local partners. As a result, although cost issues were raised (e.g. Do you really need to send a party of 20?), project management accepted the explanations provided (e.g. The Minister needs to have people on the ground.). In this regard, the evaluators broadly support the background role that the project played as well as the flexibility and rapid responsiveness that project staff demonstrated[2].

 


[1] The evaluation was informed that at the start of providing this support, the project ‘didn’t have a clue’ about the level of possible financial commitment. Notwithstanding, it was decided that support for reconciliation was too important to prevent what were essentially open-ended undertakings in support of the process.

[2] The evaluation was informed that the project manager frequently received telephone requests between 22.00 and 24.00 pm with requests that he arrange flights for participants the following morning, in which he was mostly successful.


Tag: Implementation Modality Partnership Project and Programme management Country Government UN Agencies Operational Services Civil Societies and NGOs National Institutions

43.

According to information received, the reconciliation processes sought to make use of established traditional reconciliation approaches. In this, key local stakeholders included clan elders, community members, and religious leaders. Clan elders’ task in traditional approaches broadly is to hold the ring and facilitate ongoing discussion and negotiation between the conflicting parties with a view to a shared consensus around an agreement on the terms of the reconciliation. Such an approach has been successfully applied in other conflicts, albeit usually on an individual level[1].

 


[1] For example, with regard to ex-combatants seeking to reintegrate in home communities. Having said this, in many post-conflict or ongoing conflict environments, ex-combatants choose not to seek reintegration in their communities of origin, fearing that this will prove impossible. As a result, they swell urbanized numbers, seeking the relative anonymity of urban areas.


Tag: Conflict resolution Peace Building Social cohesion Civil Societies and NGOs

44.

Assessment

Notwithstanding the project’s positive use of iterative adaptation, which is to be strongly welcomed, the evaluation needs to emphasise a number of points. First, it received information from different sources that the most serious conflicts (including Lower Shabelle and Galmuduug) remain unresolved. In several instances, interlocutors questioned whether the ‘right’ people had participated, illustrating their questions by pointing out that the key participants in the reconciliation meetings were elite political actors as opposed to those active in the conflict.

The evaluation understands that the StEFS purpose is to facilitate the emergence of the FMS and, for this to occur, engagement of political elites is necessary. However, the evaluation was informed (it is important to emphasise that, with one exception[1], the evaluation was unable to engage directly with participants in the reconciliation exercise; as a result, the evaluation cannot independently verify the reports received) that political elites with 

business interests were active stakeholders in the still unresolved Middle and Lower Shabelle conflict[1]; if this is the case, their involvement in reconciliation attempts appears incomplete.

Regardless of the challenges surrounding the process, interim agreements were reached in every instance in which the project was involved; but in more intractable conflicts, these quickly broke down and the conflicts resumed. It is important to emphasise that reconciliation is not a ‘once and for all’ process; rather, in most cases, it is a case of ‘one step forward, two steps back’; as such, here is an obvious ongoing need for sustained investment in this regard. As in all ‘hot’, and indeed ‘frozen’, conflicts, reconciliation remains a priority both for stabilization and general peace building and for establishing conditions under which a sustainable political dispensation (viable federal and state governments, supported by further decentralization through municipal and district government is achievable.

 


[1] Reports in November 2017 indicated that over 1 million people had fled the fighting in the region in the course of recent months, overwhelming the capacity of Mogadishu’s refugees camps.

 


[1][1] Abdul Kadir Nur Arale, former Minister of Reconciliation and Constitutional Affairs, Southwest State.


Tag: Challenges Conflict resolution Peace Building Social cohesion Civil Societies and NGOs

45.

Output 2: The capacity of FGS, particularly those institutions engaged in the federalism process, is strengthened. 

This output had three distinct partners, the Boundaries and Federation Commission (BFC) (2.1), the Ministry of Interior (MoIFA, now MoIFAR) (2.2, 2.3) and Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) (2.3). 

StEFS support was an important contribution to improve (and in BFC’s case create) the human resource capacity of both the BFC and MOIFAR. Furthermore, both federal institutions benefitted from the functional equipment of office spaces, thereby establishing the necessary conditions for both to be able to carry out, and in BFC’s case begin, basic functions. The project, for example, successfully facilitated MOIFAR’s role and functionality in Output 1, while BFC was enabled to commence operations according to its constitutional function. Despite the contentious nature of the discussion, BFC is now able to initiate dialog on state boundaries.


Tag: Conflict resolution Peace Building Social cohesion Institutional Strengthening Operational Services

46.

Activity Result 2.1: BFC is equipped and supported to fulfil its mandate

It is important to note that the BFC was an entirely new institution and StEFS support was critical in establishing it and its attainment of the capacity to initiate challenging formal and informal discussions around the issue of state boundaries.  Comments from other government officials alluded to BFC not understanding its role before StEFS began to provide assistance.  Although the Commission was to have started in 2012, it took until 2015 before approval was granted and the Commissioners were selected.  By the time the evaluators visited, that situation had clearly changed.  The BFC leadership is now fully capable of explaining its work, to include the political constraints they face from those who are suspicious of either boundaries or federalism.  StEFS support in facilitating the clarification of the organization’s mandate and preparation of the strategic plan had helped to place BFC on more solid footing.  StEFS helped to organize 13 workshops in Mogadishu aimed at alleviating such fears.  Although they have been assisted to make use of public mass media, they feel more awareness is still needed in the regions because the core challenge rests with minimizing violence.  StEFS financed the construction of temporary facilities for the BFC.   After two years of building their team and building public awareness of their role, they feel now is the appropriate time to begin to get involved in demarcating boundaries.  As a beginning, they have started to establish deconcentrated offices in the FMS.  They are recruiting interns/fresh graduates to help alleviate their staffing shortages. Practical problems, such as the loss of historical maps and boundary description, are now able to be addressed through StEFS support, and facilitated links with external sources.  The most recent assistance from StEFS, arriving just as the evaluation was being completed, has been the provision of a modern Geographic Information Systems workstation, plotter and access to remotely sensed imagery.  The plan is to have a national map completed with all boundaries agreed in time for the 2020 election.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Conflict resolution Awareness raising Institutional Strengthening

47.

Activity Result 2.2: FGS structures are better able to fulfil their mandate with regard to the establishment of new federal states

The project has been an important contribution to the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation’s (MOIFAR) ability to support the political reconciliation process at state level. This was clearly critical in the formation of the above two FMS and in ensuring an active federal presence in reconciliations in other states too.


Tag: Country Government Peace Building Institutional Strengthening

48.

Activity Result 2.3: FGS/OPM is supported to facilitate federalism dialogue

Although the work with the OPM was delayed until recently, StEFS supported efforts to extend information on the national federalism process. Key aspects in this regard were successfully sponsored state and national university-based essay competitions and debates, federalism not being a topic taught in Somalia’s universities. Although of limited outreach, these events achievements were positively noted by numerous interlocutors in both states the evaluation visited. In addition, a number of public events in which federalism was discussed were held; again, inevitably, the actual outreach was limited but the evaluation was informed that they contributed to a better understanding and appreciation of federalism as more local decision-making. Finally, greater outreach was attempted through radio broadcasts and on-line streaming of discussions about federalism. The evaluation was unable to assess listenership but is aware that radio is a powerful communication tool in Somalia. There is some evidence of improved understanding and appreciation of the national federalist system of governance through the perception survey supported by the project. Having noted this, there remain clear challenges in securing a requisite level of national ownership.


Tag: Challenges Communication Ownership Promotion of dialogue Education Awareness raising

49.

Assessment

The process of developing Somalia’s Provisional Constitution [2012] has been subject to considerable criticism both within the country and from Somali academics in the diaspora. Major aspects of this relate to the August 2004, Ethiopian-controlled and Kenyan-hosted, peace process’s drafting of the Transitional Federal Charter, widely perceived to respond to Ethiopian and Kenyan concerns surrounding Somali irredentism, the secrecy surrounding the constitutional revisions introduced by the Committee of Experts and, subsequently by six Somali politicians[1] and the SRSG, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah subsequently replaced by Tanzania’s Augustine Mahiga[2]. Further revisions (two in Addis Ababa and subsequently in Nairobi) were introduced without any participation by the original drafters. The revised version was signed on 22 June 2012 and subsequently endorsed[3] the content on 1 August 2012.

Elmi[4] concludes :  “From its inception, Somalia’s constitution-making process was deeply flawed. The process was designed, funded and controlled by UNPOS, with help from the regional organization IGAD and the neighbouring countries. Originally, the constitution-making process aimed at keeping the politicians at bay. Ironically, the process ended up in the hands of six unrepresentative Somali politicians and the SRSG of the UN. These seven individuals have dominated the constitution- making process of Somalia. Elmi argued that the process excluded civic, political and Islamist forces; they have secretly and hastily negotiated on the articles of the constitution; that  a poor draft was imposed through a non-transparent process.. As a result of this political expediency, secrecy and haste, both the IFCC and CoE which were tasked to prepare the draft and many civic and political forces distanced themselves from the UN-controlled constitution-making process. In short, flawed processes lead to illegitimate outcomes – and this has proved to be the case with the UN-led constitution-making process in Somalia. More problematic is that besides the failure to regulate individual, institutional and group disputes, there is an increased risk of further conflicts, particularly if plans to establish the second chamber are implemented.”

 


[1] The TFG President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the TFG Prime Minister Abdiweli M. Ali, former TFG speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Puntland President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, Galmudug President Mohamed Ahmed Alim, and one of the leaders of the Ethiopian-supported Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama’a, Abdulkadir Moallim Nur.

[2] The SRSG brought these six individuals together in Mogadishu and they (including Mahiga himself) signed an UNPOS-prepared Roadmap in 2011. The Roadmap had four components, of which security and constitution-making were the most important. They signed a protocol, “Establishing the Somali National Constituent Assembly”. In this protocol, the signatories created an 825-member ‘National Constituent Assembly’. Somalia’s traditional clan leaders select the members through the 4.5 tribal formula – such that the so-called four ‘major’ clans will get about 183 members of the NCA while the fifth clan would get 93 members. But, ironically, the signatories’ Technical Facilitation Committee managed the adoption process and the minister of the constitution (a proponent seeking a Yes vote) was the chair of the NCA. Moreover, the NCA voted on the following loaded question: “Should this draft provisional constitution provisionally adopted to provide for a better Somalia, help reconstruct our country, and set us on the right path to justice and lasting peace, pending final adoption at the referendum?

[3] The National Assembly, elected on the 4.5 ratio basis, was only allowed to approve or reject the draft before it.

[4] Afyare Abdi Elmi: Revisiting the UN Controlled Constitution Making Process for Somalia, E-International Relations, September 2012


Tag: Challenges Anti-corruption Parliament Public administration reform Rule of law UN Agencies Peace Building National Institutions

50.

It is worth emphasising that similar critiques were shared with the evaluators on numerous occasions: Somali interlocutors questioned the need for a federation, emphasising that Somalis are one ethnicity, share the same language and religion, usual criteria for a unitary 

state. Interlocutors also emphasised the perception of the desire of Ethiopia and Kenya to ensure a weak Somali state[1], referencing both the presence of Somali minorities in both countries and their predominance in Djibouti, possibly giving some legitimacy for Ethiopia and Kenya’s concerns surrounding Somali irredentism. 

Furthermore, there is evident dispute surrounding the relative roles and responsibilities of centre and state[2] despite the Provisional Constitution reserving only four areas to the central government: Defence, Foreign Affairs, Citizenship and Immigration and Monetary Policy; a fifth, Natural Resource Management will be discussed between central and state governments The contestation surrounding the constitutionally reserved powers underlines the contested nature of the federalisation process.

 


[1] There were numerous references to the two military defeats at Somali hands of Ethiopian forces in earlier Ogaden border conflicts.

[2] While the constitution provides for the establishment of three tiers of government – central, state and district/municipal – only two had been established at the time of the evaluation.


Tag: Natural Resouce management Parliament Public administration reform Rule of law Country Government Conflict Peace Building

51.

Output 3: Foundational support to Interim State Administrations to ensure an appropriate physical working environment is provided.  

Output 3 largely dealt with the establishment of a conducive work environment in the four newly established state administrations[1]. This involved building and refurbishing workspace facilities (e.g. Government and Civil Service Commission offices in JSS, office and meeting space in SWS). In both states, the project also supplied vehicles. In addition, the project provided necessary, but limited equipment, in particular office furniture, desk- and laptop computers, printers, projectors, air conditioning, etc.

 


[1] JSS’s establishment preceded the StEFS launch by approximately two years.


Tag: Country Government Operational Services

52.

Activity Result 3.1: Key priority infrastructure is identified and delivered in coordination with existing infrastructure support mechanisms Over the period of the PIP and at the StEFS’s launch, the baseline revealed that FMS ministries lacked offices or the buildings from which they operated were in such states of disrepair that working was not possible. As a result, StEFS supported the refurbishment, and on occasion, construction of government offices. At the time of the evaluation, StEFS had supported the refurbishment and construction of the following infrastructure:

The evaluation does not question the need for a conducive physical environment for the efficient conduct of government (or indeed any) business. However, the differences in the degree of facilities’ utilisation is worthy of comment. The JSS administration has not yet adopted the SWS approach with meeting rooms (which admittedly were not financed by the project) standing idle for most of the week. By contrast, SWS’s two meeting rooms (one a standalone building and the second in the Ministry of Planning) are utilized both by the state administration [MOPIC meetings, Donor (Drought) Coordination Meetings, Sector Working Group meetings (the evaluation observed a WASH sector meeting)] and for state and public training (the evaluation observed a Communications training taking place).


Tag: Country Government Infrastructure Operational Services

53.

In total US $564 755.34 was spent on contracting construction companies and US $150 171.89 on providing the requisite equipment for the offices. Respectively, this represented 42% and 80% of the respective AWP totals; furthermore, 412% increase in the cost of equipment provided in 2017 over 2016 reflects sequencing. Office Furniture and Equipment Physical infrastructure alone is insufficient to establish a conducive working environment. Sure, they are one part. Furnishings and equipment are necessary components of any office space. StEFS sought to address this need. Fig. 11 provides an overview of the furniture, equipment and other items provided through the project.

As is to be expected, Jubaland, as the longest established administration, has received the most, followed by SWS. Galmudug, recently established, has received the least and HirShabelle, nothing. Equally, the provision of office furniture has dominated, followed by computers and computer accessories (monitors, mouses, laptop carry bags, etc.).

In the course of the field visits, the evaluation noted that the goods provided were functional and in use. The evaluation concurs with the project’s premise that such equipment is necessary if the government offices are to be functional. It is important, however, to emphasise that the supply of this equipment is insufficient for a functioning and functional administration    


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources Operational Services

54.

 Output 4: The capacity of the interim State Administrations with a dedicated focus on core public sector capacities is enhanced.

Activity Result 4.1: Emerging state administrations have improved understanding of capacity needs and gaps

StEFS contracted international consultants to carry out functional analyses and restructuring of state administrations and assist in developing strategic plans for their future development paths. The evaluation is not able to assess the utility of these outputs, but regardless of quality, they remained (by the end of the evaluation period) unused  in they had not yet been put into practice by the individual states and departments (again bringing into question the timing of the evaluation). Much state-building activity in other FCAS fails at this hurdle, reflecting either that the partner does not perceive the activity as a priority (i.e. there is little, if any, ownership of the draft) or other, more pressing priorities intervene and turning the draft into actionable policy is, ultimately often indefinitely, shelved. The potential for this exists, but may be mitigated to a degree by the state’s potential to access World Bank RCRF II funding for senior staff following administrative restructuring[1].  

 


[1] Despite this potential existing in most FCAS benefitting from international state building/capacitating support, it is seldom a decisive factor in decisions to implement reforms. Rather, the crucial influence is the coincidence of decision-makers interests with the proposed reforms.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Ownership Institutional Strengthening Technical Support

55.

Activity Result 4.2: Emerging state administrations have increased human capacity and other support to deliver services

StEFS provided human resource support to the new administrations, embedding technical advisors and interns. This increased these administrations’ leadership access to advice and support (e.g. in SWS, TAs/TOs provided to the Ministry of Planning were shared with the Office of the President (OPP) so increased the advisory capacity in both arms of government). As with all embedded technical advisors, assessing their quality is a challenge: state administrations were largely positive about their contributions and their proximity to senior officials (Ministers, deputy Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and Directors General) was evident. In addition, the evaluation was also made aware of successful efforts to recruit embedded advisors to the public service in senior positions (in one instance in JSS as a Director General in the Planning Ministry) strongly suggesting that their roles were viewed positively. This is further underlined by the overwhelming contract renewal and, therefore, retention of advisers and officers by the project.

Baselines conducted for the project amongst targeted ministries and states in existence in the course of the PIP (2015 ff) clearly demonstrated the critical need for human resource capability that would enable existing (including Federal ministries) and emerging administrations to perform minimum governmental administrative functions. Functional reviews were carried out for all states and provide a basis for the elaboration of a staffing complement plan. At the time of the evaluation, these plans existed, but were still to be implemented, largely, in the evaluation’s view, owing to the acute financial resource scarcity that all FMS experience. Until such time as the resource challenge can be addressed, it appears likely that these will remain plans. It was reported that some of the FMS were encouraged to complete their functional reviews as a precursor to gaining access to external funding for senior staff from the World Bank facility.

As a result, StEFS sought to provide limited human resources to the newly established and to be established administrations for this purpose. Fig. 12 indicates the human resources provided through the project and to which arms of government.  By far the greatest number were interns, who were recent university graduates.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Country Government Capacity Building Technical Support

56.

The evaluation engaged with both beneficiary institutions and the human resource assistance provided through the project. [It is worth emphasising that Technical Advisers and Officers were much more willing to engage than (particularly female) interns.] With two exceptions[1], respondents expressed considerable appreciation of the support received through the deployment of TAs[2] and TOs. Interns were particularly appreciated, not least because they provided support across a range of departmental areas. UNDP emphasised that TAs/TOs were required to report regularly on their activities and, in the main, this was carried out satisfactorily. From the project manager’s perspective, the key determinant was the relationship that the TAs/TOs succeeded in establishing with the partner institution and its leadership. If this was successful, retention, including extension of contracts, were more likely than not.

Embedding skilled personnel in government departments and commissions/agencies is intended to provide the opportunity for the transfer of skills and expertise. This is best done through mentoring, where the embedded expert is shadowed by a public service counterpart. Two factors appear to have militated against this. First, the TAs and TOs recruited through the programme were under short-term contracts; while the vast majority of contracts were renewed (66%)[3], the situation was less than optimal for skills transfer[4].  Second, embedded TAs/TOs’ (and possibly Interns’) pay rates are substantially above those of the public service (when they get paid[5]). International experience[6] is that such differentials disincentivise public servants, who pass on their work and responsibilities to the much better paid international staff. This both limits the efficacy of the embedded personnel

 


[1] The international consultant sourced for the federal Ministry of Women whose outputs, the Ministry deemed an unacceptable cut and paste of existing materials and not adjusted/adapted to Somali reality. The evaluation has briefly reviewed the Gender Mainstreaming Tool; it is obvious that significant portions have been cut and pasted from existing documentation, which is normal practice, there being, after all, no reason to re-invent the wheel. As it stands, the document has limited relevance to a Somali reality. In the evaluation’s opinion, it is open to question whether it would have been possible to achieve this within the timeframe (10 days) remaining to the consultant but no effort in this regard was possible because of the Ministry’s unilateral action. The second international consultant was terminated because of an unsatisfactory demeanour that undermined relations with the stakeholder.

[2] In JSS, for example, the StEFS’ TA was recruited to the public service as Director General in the state Ministry of Planning, taking office soon after the evaluation’s visit.

[3] Itself an indicator of general satisfaction with performance.

[4] The WB was expected to recruit and embed long-term TAs/TOs for both federal and state administrations through the Capacity Injection Mechanism (CIM); for whatever reason, this expectation was unrealized.

[5] The evaluation was informed that rostered public servants (i.e. those on the pay roll) could go for months without being paid, essentially meaning they were volunteers, with the accompanying attendance and productivity challenges. Furthermore, this only referred to a minority of the overall total; most were outsourced to projects and received payment only during the project’s implementation (In South-west, for example, 350 of the state’s reported 650 public servants in the Health department were dealt with in this way. 

[6] Afghanistan, Liberia, and Yemen, for example.


Tag: Challenges Human and Financial resources Knowledge management Project and Programme management Country Government

57.

Notwithstanding, the foregoing general points, programme management is of the view that the overall skills transfer picture varied and was highly dependent on the individual. Strengthening the Capacity of Human Resources through Training StEFS provided numerous training opportunities at both Federal and State levels. Fig. 14 details the training provided for federal ministries and commissions and Fig. that for state administrations.

Despite training forming a standard component of all capacity development programmes, international experience shows that it seldom achieves the expected results. StEFS is no exception in this regard; project interlocutors were hard put to identify any behavioural or procedural changes resulting from the trainings provided[1]. There are a number of reasons for this. First, participants generally are drawn from junior/middle ranking staff. Even where they are enthused by what they learn from the training, they lack to authority to introduce it into their day – to – day work. Supervisors, feeling challenged by new or unfamiliar approaches, often instruct them to carry on business as usual, undoing any benefits that might have accrued from the training.

Second, training targets/benefits individuals, not organisations, which may or may not benefit from increased individual expertise and knowledge. Very often, the capacitated individual is recruited away from the public service to employment in INGOs and other donor organisations.

Third, the training time frame is limited. The average length of training provided at federal government level by the StEFS was five (5) days[2]; that at state level was 4.3 days. Such brief (and largely one-off – repeated interventions and refresher courses/trainings have a better success ratio but take-up of repeats is often limited because of the ‘been there, done that’ syndrome) interventions are unlikely to result in necessary behavioural work changes.

 


[1] The sole exception to this was in South-west where communications training, focusing in report writing and letter drafting, reportedly resulted in a marginal improvement in the quality of reporting although ‘much more improvement was necessary’.

[2] Two events, totaling 23 days, significantly skew the average.


Tag: Human and Financial resources Knowledge management Capacity Building Institutional Strengthening

58.

4.3 Cross-cutting Issue: Gender

Gender is a cross-cutting issue in all UNDP projects. In StEFS, gender is more than a cross-cutting issue since it seeks to support the achievement of the of the 30% quota for women’s participation. As such, it can be seen to represent a core aspect of the project. In seeking to achieve this, StEFS undertook a number of actions targeting women (and men). Fig. shows the overall number and percentage of men and women trained though the project to end June 2017.

The Figure clearly shows that there were twice as many of mixed group trainings as women-only ones. This is in keeping with current gender theory suggesting that engaging both men and women around specific gender subjects is more likely to have successful outcomes than gender-segregated events.

Figires. show that the majority of training support for women related to their participation in Somalia’s political life, which took place around the 2016 elections.  While the 30% quota representation was not achieved, the 24% (at federal level, with similar numbers in states that also held elections), rising from 14%, reflects a significant degree of progress in this regard. StEFS contributed to this achievement.


Tag: Gender Equality Gender Mainstreaming Gender Parity Women's Empowerment Election Parliament Rule of law

59.

Output 5: Civic participation and engagement with Interim State Administrations is strengthened

StEFS implementation commencement coincided with the 2016/17 elections and the concerted efforts to promote increased female representation in the federal and state legislatures in line with the constitutional 30% target for women’s participation. StEFS created opportunities for engagement between Women’s Ministries and civil society actors, women’s groups, in this regard and these clearly contributed to the increased female representation in the federal lower house and state legislatures.

Achievements outside this area were more limited. Despite the internationally recognized role that women can play in peace building, the gender disaggregated participation in reconciliation and conflict management and mitigation training fell below the 30% target. Furthermore, despite the generic nature of much of the training offered, participation was often limited to single ministries/government departments. As a result, outreach in this regard was limited whereas with some effort to reach out beyond individual silos, greater levels of participation, including that of women, could have been achieved.

StEFS also sought to address federalism issues by organising workshops for civil society and community members. Overall participation in these workshops was c. 700 persons, women comprising around 24% of the total. In addition, StEFS supported debates and an essay competition at university level around federalism, a topic not taught in the country’s universities. Following some initial resistance to identifying female student participants in both[1], The StEFS project management insisted on the reluctant institutions identifying female participants. The evaluation was informed that the female student debate teams outperformed their male colleagues.

 


[1] Some universities reportedly expressed the view that female students would not ‘represent their university appropriately.’ There is possibly a parallel in this regard with clan elders’ concerns that women’s divided loyalties (their fathers’ and husbands’ clans) meant that they would not represent the clan interests in the legislatures.


Tag: Gender Equality Gender Parity Parliament Rule of law Peace Building Awareness raising Civil Societies and NGOs

60.

Activity Result 5.1: Increased public awareness on federalism and the role of emerging state administrations

StEFS Interventions in Support of the Federalisation process

Output 5 (supporting PSG 1) of the StEFS project is ‘civic participation and engagement with Interim State Administrations is strengthened’. This is pursued through three key activities, Activity 5.1 being ‘Increased public awareness on federalism and the role of emerging state administrations’. In pursuit of this, the project supported a number of interventions intended promote such increased awareness (and understanding) of the national federalism project in an effort to address the public’s questions and concerns surrounding the intended governmental model.

Figures  18, 19, 20  set out the events, participants and gender disaggregated number of participants in each event.   

In total, StEFS supported 12 events; the available data reports that there were a total of 951 participants drawn from national and state governments, academia and civil society. Fig.  indicates the distribution of participants’ by the number of events.

Half (50%) of all events drew participants from both civil society and government, with civil society only participants being the next largest number (30%). The remaining 20% were only government staff.

In addition to the formalised events discussed above, StEFS supported radio programmes (music, talk shows, question-time like events, etc.) broadcast at both state and national levels. The outreach achieved through these events is not recorded[1] but, given radio coverage is likely to have been considerable. Broadcasts also included radio soap operas dealing with the theme, a strategic communication approach with considerable evidence of success in, inter alia, Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide.

 


[1] The project failed to record the radio stations potential listenership and/or TV station’s viewership so even ballpark figures are not available. It is additionally worth noting that this outreach is not recorded in the activities’ matrix in the project reports; instead it is buried in the narrative reporting sections; yet, potentially a far wider audience was accessed than in any of the formal events.


Tag: Parliament Public administration reform Communication Awareness raising Civil Societies and NGOs

61.

Output 6: Project Management

Project management is relatively efficient and, in the case of Output 1, remarkably so: the evaluation was informed of numerous occasions that project management being contacted at 23.00 hours for 10+ flights the following morning and the passengers travelling as organisers planned. Furthermore, the project team has demonstrated considerable flexibility to changing circumstances; once again Output 1 underlines the point since reconciliation was not conceived of as a core part of the original project plan. Furthermore, the team has demonstrated considerable responsiveness to partner demands, adapting plans and making themselves available often at short notice. The evaluators noted partners’ positive relationships with project team members, including regret when they were unable to participate in meetings.

Organisationally, delivery was timely and in accordance with plans. Equipment supplies were positively received and used by ministries. Infrastructure improvements were appreciated and, if behind schedule, the evaluation’s experience is that this is a usual risk experienced in all infrastructure projects. One shortcoming is the team’s apparent failure to think ‘out of the box’, particularly about maximizing women’s participation. Clearly, the team are not able to issue workshop and training invitations themselves but greater encouragement may have led to greater women’s involvement and avoided the observation of Women’s ministries that, aside from a few workshops, the project had done nothing for them.


Tag: Gender Parity Project and Programme management Risk Management Peace Building Infrastructure

62.

StEFS management occurred both nationally and at FMS levels. Based upon the evaluation’s two visits, personnel interacted positively with FMS counterparts, clearly demonstrating effective project management skills at local level. Furthermore, they interacted effectively with both local counterparts and national management and demonstrated clear understanding of the project and its activities.

Nationally, project staff demonstrated competence and, particularly in respect of support to reconciliation efforts, attention to responsibilities that was clearly demand-responsive and frequently well outside normal office hours. Interlocutors emphasised to the evaluation, their appreciation of the efforts made both by national and local (FMS) staff. Replacements for personnel who had resigned were in place by the conclusion of the evaluation, suggesting that, all else being equal, minor delays experienced in preparation of third-quarter reporting were now a thing of the past.

Reporting was largely of activities completed, rather than the results of those activities. As such, quarterly and annual reports reviewed did not focus on outputs, to say nothing of outcomes. However, interlocutors pointed to outputs (e.g. the effective networking with development partners, including NGOs, in SWS; the reconciliation meetings that resulted in interim agreements; the positive relationships between the TAs/TOs and interns and the institutions in which they were embedded being three examples). This strongly suggests that the project management team needs to refocus its reporting emphasis away from activities (infrastructure rehabilitation, delivery of office equipment, training participation) towards what occurred as a result of the activities (e.g. utilisation of the infrastructure, improved efficacy as a result of furnished and equipped offices, performance improvements as a result of the training, etc.). In its turn, this requires greater engagement with stakeholders since they are the ones who are able to report on this.


Tag: Challenges National Transborder Monitoring and Evaluation Project and Programme management

63.

StEFS Budget Utilization

The Programme Document budgeted US $13 991 639 for StEFS envisaged two year (April 2015 – March 2017) operational period. The Annual Report 2016 and Quarterly Reports (1 & 2) 2017 indicate that StEFS budget total was c. 8% lower: US $12 847 772, however, accurately assessing the utilization of financial resources in an incomplete project is always problematic. The table below provides an overview of StEFS budget by donor for the project period (April 2016 – March 2018).

According to StEFS financial data as recorded in ATLAS[1], total resources available to the project and the AWPs for 2016 and 2017 equaled US$ 9 035143.02 and US $12 789 890 respectively. However, the fact that the UNDP fund administration orientation requires the project to report on three separate budgets, makes all of these assessments problematic.  This suggests the significant widening in divergence of recorded information relating to income after StEFS’ implementation started.

 


[1] The evaluation was informed that, initially, the project’s finances were managed through four project accounts. Largely, this was due to the reality that recording MPTF data requires that only it be inputted; other donors’ financial data required other project account headings. The decidedly unsatisfactory result is that financial data must be searched for under different headings and the system is largely dysfunction, from a project financial management perspective, unless the project team has access to substantial expertise in the ATLAS system. The net result is that the project team separately records financial information (e.g. the budget and output expenditure presented) and LOA-linked expenditure) but pressure of work results in this often falling behind (e.g. as with the LOA expenditure tracking).


Tag: Efficiency Human and Financial resources Operational Efficiency

64.

Universally, the evaluation was informed that StEFS support through provision of local consultants was a success, enabling the new and emergent institutions to establish a degree of functionality that would have been impossible without them. Respondents emphasised the human resource short falls that individual ministries and commissions experienced:, BFC spokespersons, for example, reported the Commission’s intention to recruit the interns provided through StEFS to permanent positions. MOIFAR emphasised the considerable value-added achieved through the Technical Advisers, Officers and Interns embedded within the Ministry. In Jubaland, one TA was recruited as a Director General.

While all these point to the efficiency of the local consultant provision, there is little in the way of hard evidence that the appointments were a success and delivered the expectations. Consultants are required to report their activities on a monthly basis and stakeholder ministries and institutions indicate their satisfaction or not with the individual’s performance. However, there are no formalised performance assessments in place and performance judgement appears idiosyncratic and more to do with how well the individual and/or group has fitted into the organisational culture and perceived value to an individual. 


Tag: Effectiveness Human and Financial resources Operational Efficiency Quality Assurance

Recommendations
1

Recommendation No. 1: SIP and StEFS are essentially two sides of the same coin. As such, future interactions of these projects should be designed and implemented as a whole, and rooted in the NDP and State Strategic Plans relevant to state capacity development.

2

Recommendation No. 2: UNDP should play the role of a catalyst

 

There is a need for a profound overhaul in the current way UNDP capacity development programming is designed and implemented in Somalia.  The focus of future programming needs to shift from what a government should look like to what it needs to do.

3

Recommendation No. 3: Complex local dynamics suggests a shift from pushing to nudging

 

As in most post-conflict states, the complex set of human interactions in Somalia suggests that the international community can contribute best by providing suggestions to improve immediate action rather than overly concentrating on extended analyses and the creation of formal rule structures.  It was mentioned that UNDP will never be able to comprehend the political economy of Somalia, therefore it is best to focus down on smaller scale issues that are amenable to near-term resolution, and serve as learning opportunities for partner agencies to think for themselves how to improve their organizational dynamics.

4

Recommendation No. 4:  Limit efforts at the federal level to 2 or 3 organizations at most

 

Practical considerations require that the project be focused. The evaluators suggest that the project design restrict the range of partnerships at the federal level to two, at most three, organisations but engage with all FMS, with attention to ensuring all state ministries benefit.

5

Recommendation No. 5 State structures have been put in place, emphasis should now shift to practical engagement with citizens

 

At the State level, all cabinet ministries have undergone a functional analysis and restructuring.  They all have, or soon will have, access to RCRF funding for key posts.  Each State has an existing set of international support programs.  The most useful role for a future UNDP project would be to build the capability of the individual States to facilitate collaborative action among government agencies, and co-production with civil society and business communities.  The dual aim would be to engage the States (often together with the FGS) to create collaborative solutions to existing problems while identifying the most appropriate rules and structures that need to be put in place that can build bridging social capital among all stakeholders.

6

Recommendation No. 6: Focus attention on building government’s ability to collaborate with non-state actors

 

Given the paucity of resources available to the FGS, the focus on planning should be on building collaborative relationships with civil society and business to address problems of common concern.  The use of participatory planning exercises involving a broad set of stakeholders, government and non-state (civil and business) is the best approach to identifying problems that can be resolved through joint efforts, supported by external assistance as and where necessary.

7

Recommendation No. 7: Use the drought crisis to concentrate attention on building systems that can solve problems

 

Humanitarian crises are fundamentally based on a failure of government.  The relatively better response to the current drought has been attributed to an improved government capacity to protect refugees and ensure equitable distribution of assistance. An underlying objective of future UNDP programming in governance capacity building could be placed on enhancing the capacity of both State and Federal governments to provide effectively coordinated support to the implementation of the early recovery plan following the recent drought and to identify developmental opportunities that can help mitigate the impact of future crises.

8

Recommendation No. 8: Shift from formal structures to improving capacity for direct action

 

Moving in the direction described above would necessitate a shift away from the dominance of expert-driven interventions aimed at producing strategies, policies and other written analyses towards a facilitation model that focuses on team efforts to solve immediate problems through direct action.  This will potentially facilitate a greater role for non-diaspora entrants in public service.

9

Recommendation No. 9 Empower government partners to determine the problems to be addressed

 

This will mean allowing the government partner agencies to take the lead in identifying the problems to be addressed.  By this we mean a substantive, outcome-oriented problem rather than the identification of a lack of expert staff, physical infrastructure or financial resources.

10

Recommendation No. 10: Encourage a diversity of solutions

 

Focusing on local problem identification implies facilitating the creation of local solutions. This also suggests the need for a shift from classroom training of individuals towards creating a conducive environment for working in teams.  This approach would encourage the generation of diverse approaches to mitigating existing problems. 

11

Recommendation No.11 Frequently share lessons across partners and celebrate success

 

An important part of building a team approach is the provision of frequent opportunities to celebrate success with peers in other parts of the country.  Solutions that work in one part of Somalia have a greater chance of being adapted in other parts of the country than will ‘international best practices’ introduced by a consultant who has no ‘skin in the game’.  A substantial part of future UNDP programming should be devoted to peer-based exchange of experiences, joint assessment of lessons and codification of those lessons in simple to use guides that can be widely disseminated.  Such an approach provides a framework for double-loop learning to assist partners go institutionalize new learning by continually assessing it within the local socio-economic context.

12

Recommendation No. 12: Shift from analytical skills to communication skills

 

A focus on team-based efforts calls for the provision, and use, of communication tools and skills.  Identification, provision and support for such tools should dominate UNDP assistance, replacing the current over-emphasis on the preparation of written technical analyses.  There are enough of these in circulation that needs to become institutionalized already.  Communication should be supported both for horizontal (including with non-state actors) and vertical (beginning at the level of the District Commission and ending with the FGS) linkages

13

Recommendation No. 13: Build a base of information from the ground up

 

Concentrate on building a system of ground level data that can be used in identifying opportunities for citizen-government and business-government collaborations.  One way to do this can be the joint collection and sharing of place-based data in a common information system linking district and state data collection with federal analyses.  Such detailed data can tell the story of the constraints and opportunities of people in ways that aggregated sectoral analysis can never do.  Localized information can become a part of a common national system, but they can also be developed explicitly for local problem solving.

14

Recommendation No. 14:  Facilitate the creation of a diversity of alliances

 

Enhancing the capacity to communicate and collaborate will build the ability to identify what government at state and federal level can do to help people to get on with their own development.  This would likely involve support to the creation of a diverse set of alliances, some formal some informal, that would be expected to continue such collaborative engagement after the end of the project period.  Public-private partnerships in small towns for water distribution is one example of a localized alliance.  The National Development Council is an example of one at the other end of the spectrum. 

15

Recommendation No. 15:  Require output achievement and reciprocal contributions in the LOA

 

A specific operational improvement would involve two changes in the LOA.  First, the LOA should be structured so that a theoretical maximum of support would be made available to a partner, which would be an individual agency at the Federal level, but should be the State Government at the sub-national level.  The utilization of such funds would be tied to the preparation of a series of specific requests for joint action on a problem identified by the partner.  Second, each request would require the specification of the output to be achieved and the level of the contributory obligation by the partner, which most likely would be in the form of committed staff time, facilities and equipment.

16

Recommendation No. 16: Measure and compare costs at the activity level as a means of enhancing financial efficiency

 

As noted, only Puntland management provided evidence of what it cost to deliver the outputs agreed in each LOA.  This could have been more detailed, but it represents a good start.  The budget prepared for the proposed AIMS program is broken down to the activity level.  Resources budgeted for activity level use should always be fungible, but creating accounting codes at this level is a valuable step towards aiding efficient project management.

17

Recommendation No. 17: Create a high-level Third Party Monitoring mechanism

 

Any program that is operating in a FCAS needs continual feedback from a non-participant’s perspective.  The TPM currently used by UNDP cannot provide the sort of policy-informing advice needed.  The next program should incorporate a learning component that involves regular (perhaps quarterly) visits by a recognized academic body that has requisite understanding of FCAS development, federalism, and sub-Saharan Africa.

1. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 1: SIP and StEFS are essentially two sides of the same coin. As such, future interactions of these projects should be designed and implemented as a whole, and rooted in the NDP and State Strategic Plans relevant to state capacity development.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

SIP/STEFS understands the recommendation and accepts that federal and state level support should be merged together as one larger project to bring synergy and coherence of the support at both the levels

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
1.1. Develop concept note for the new project design and get it endorsed by SDRF (as pipeline project) 1.2. Initiate consultation process with partners on the design of the new project and submit it to PWGs working group and SDRF for endorsement
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/13]
UNDP 2018/12 Completed A new concept note was developed for a combined project to attend to the core of government need (planning, civil service, M&E and planning) as well as another component to work on the states formation part. Consultations with government partners were carried out with Government officials from the FGS, and all the FMS at the Ministerial level as well as the donors. The concept was endorsed at the PWG and SDRF levels but failed to get traction on the donor side in 2018. Subsequently end of 2018 UNDP removed the states formation component and it became part of the Inclusive Politics Portfolio. The proposed projects in their original form are now dormant. History
2. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 2: UNDP should play the role of a catalyst

 

There is a need for a profound overhaul in the current way UNDP capacity development programming is designed and implemented in Somalia.  The focus of future programming needs to shift from what a government should look like to what it needs to do.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted

 

UNDP has been playing catalyst role to support FGS and FMS to create governance structures to deliver the services and we agree there is need to do more to be the facilitator of the change. The repeated comments of the evaluators that in the end government structures are relevant only if they provide added value to the citizens and provide services that answer to the expectations of the citizens are fully accepted. The next iteration of the support will focus more on the citizen – government interface, among others through a dedicated component on M&E&L focusing on getting to terms with change in a complex environment. However, the evaluators seem to underestimate the required support to the initial establishment of government structures as well as the need to ensure there is sufficient horizontal and vertical alignment in role and responsibility distribution.  

 

In addition, UNDP Somalia has redesigned its programme in the new Country Programme Document to reflect the New Way of Working.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
2.1. Restructure CD programme as Effective Institution support Portfolio, in line with NDP 2.2. Incorporate change and learning component/output in the new project
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2018/12/24]
UNDP 2019/03 Completed CD programme restructured an EI portofolio in line with the NDP. Change and learning components included in the new project History
3. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 3: Complex local dynamics suggests a shift from pushing to nudging

 

As in most post-conflict states, the complex set of human interactions in Somalia suggests that the international community can contribute best by providing suggestions to improve immediate action rather than overly concentrating on extended analyses and the creation of formal rule structures.  It was mentioned that UNDP will never be able to comprehend the political economy of Somalia, therefore it is best to focus down on smaller scale issues that are amenable to near-term resolution, and serve as learning opportunities for partner agencies to think for themselves how to improve their organizational dynamics.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted.

 

StEFS/SIP both projects have been working with counterparts to facilitate the governments partners(FGS/FMS) to deliver their mandate. The evaluators seem to interpret the attention the projects have given to formalized decision-making arrangements (like the approval of the NDP and State Development Plans, the establishment of the NDC, the Aid Coordination structure, the development of the FMS ministerial organizational structures and personnel requirements, the committee arrangements around the development of the Civil Service Law) as unnecessary ‘rule structures’. While UN/UNDP is conscious of not imposing agendas to the partners and limitations in comprehending the complex environment in which we operate, assisting the partners in developing and managing inter-agency coordination and decision-making structures as well as creating transparency and accountability around priorities for development do not seem to be overly rule based nor unnecessary arrangements. That said, more can be done in order to facilitate government counterparts to accomplish the development agenda.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
3.1. Facilitate partnership learning forum to support partners to reflect on their agenda and priorities.
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP 2019/12 Completed The recommendations have been taken up by the project and were recommended to the Federal Government of Somalia. History
4. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 4:  Limit efforts at the federal level to 2 or 3 organizations at most

 

Practical considerations require that the project be focused. The evaluators suggest that the project design restrict the range of partnerships at the federal level to two, at most three, organisations but engage with all FMS, with attention to ensuring all state ministries benefit.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted.

 

The projects accepts the recommendation that the next phase of SIP/StEFS cannot support all the ministries at FGS level. Building upon the support by the SIP and StEFS projects, support to FGS partners will be prioritized in line with the scope of the new project.

However, it does not accept the recommendation that on FMS level all ministries should benefit from the project. This is practically not possible (as it would lead to some 150 different partner agencies) and would lead to the new project being very fragmented, most likely overlapping with other support and requiring a knowledge base in the project that is not feasible.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
4.1. The project will work with FGS/FMS counter parts to prioritize the interventions 4.2. Coordinate with other implementation partners to create synergies and collaboration and to avoid duplication
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/13]
UNDP 2019/03 Completed This was initially partially accepted by the project team. Accepting the recommendation would mean that on the FMS level all ministries would have to benefit from the project. This is practically not possible (as it would lead to some 150 different partner agencies) and would lead to the new project being very fragmented, most likely overlapping with other support and requiring a knowledge base in the project that is not feasible. History
5. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 5 State structures have been put in place, emphasis should now shift to practical engagement with citizens

 

At the State level, all cabinet ministries have undergone a functional analysis and restructuring.  They all have, or soon will have, access to RCRF funding for key posts.  Each State has an existing set of international support programs.  The most useful role for a future UNDP project would be to build the capability of the individual States to facilitate collaborative action among government agencies, and co-production with civil society and business communities.  The dual aim would be to engage the States (often together with the FGS) to create collaborative solutions to existing problems while identifying the most appropriate rules and structures that need to be put in place that can build bridging social capital among all stakeholders.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted.

 

Through StEFS and SIP, efforts have been made to engage with citizens. E.g in the context of the NDP development, the Puntland Coordination structures, as well as the Pilot Citizen reports that were developed in Jubaland and South West States, which are expected to expand to other states in next phase, and it is expected that in the different areas the new project will support, outreach to citizens will be scaled up.

However, some care is to be taken. In line with the nature of recommendation 2 and 3, UNDP is not in the position to make such decisions. Entering or not into collaborative arrangements concerning e.g. service delivery is a government decision, not a project decision. Also, the exact nature of roles and responsibility distribution between the three-tiers of the government is still to be designed as well as the policy intentions concerning the structure of service delivery – which indeed may include collaborative approaches, but may also more strongly veer into the direction of ‘outsourcing’ and other approaches.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
5.1. Develop citizen reports by the State administrations. 5.2. Establish Public accountability forums in all State to bring together State governments and citizens together and enhance States’ legitimacy.
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP 2019/12 Completed The Effective Institutions portfolio initiated an anti-corruption project, a media and freedom of expression project as well as a public engagement process under e media and it enhanced processes of public engagement following on from the recommendations. History
6. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 6: Focus attention on building government’s ability to collaborate with non-state actors

 

Given the paucity of resources available to the FGS, the focus on planning should be on building collaborative relationships with civil society and business to address problems of common concern.  The use of participatory planning exercises involving a broad set of stakeholders, government and non-state (civil and business) is the best approach to identifying problems that can be resolved through joint efforts, supported by external assistance as and where necessary.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

 

While being mindful of the cautionary comment under recommendation 5, this recommendation is in line with the implementation practices developed under SIP and StEFS.  SIP/StEFS supported FGS and FMS to develop National Development plan and State Strategic Plans, where CSOs and NGOs participated. The engagement of non-state actors can be further enhanced in next phase of the project.  Further, the project will continue to support Reconciliation efforts between State and non-state actors towards state building goals

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
6.1. Conduct training on Participatory approach 6.2. Establish CSO-Government networks in all States 6.3. Support Reconciliation efforts towards State building process
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/15]
UNDP 2019/08 Completed New projects launched and proposed by the Effective Institutions portfolio highlight they need to work with non-state actors where this is necessary in its projects. History
7. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 7: Use the drought crisis to concentrate attention on building systems that can solve problems

 

Humanitarian crises are fundamentally based on a failure of government.  The relatively better response to the current drought has been attributed to an improved government capacity to protect refugees and ensure equitable distribution of assistance. An underlying objective of future UNDP programming in governance capacity building could be placed on enhancing the capacity of both State and Federal governments to provide effectively coordinated support to the implementation of the early recovery plan following the recent drought and to identify developmental opportunities that can help mitigate the impact of future crises.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted

 

Humanitarian crisis has multiple causes and drivers. Some of them are related to government, others are not. While SIP/StEFS supported the initial establishment of drought Committees at FGS and FMS level and creation of Ministry of Humanitarian affairs and Disaster management(MoHADM)/FGS as part of capacity development support, now other programmes are providing dedicated support in the field of disaster management. Having said that, an overarching and important angle into the support UNDP provides to Somalia in the Humanitarian – development – peace/security nexus aims at addressing root causes and investing in areas that will help to avoid natural upheaval to evolve into humanitarian crisis. The follow up project for SIP/StEFS in a number of areas will contribute, e.g. in Planning, Statistics, M&E&L, reconciliation, service delivery arrangements.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
7.1. Coordinate with Humanitarian implementing partners to create nexus between development and humanitarian affairs
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP 2019/12 Completed UNDP projects are working with humanitarian agencies in Somalia and the coordination has been successful through the REINTEG and Durable Solutions projects. History
8. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 8: Shift from formal structures to improving capacity for direct action

 

Moving in the direction described above would necessitate a shift away from the dominance of expert-driven interventions aimed at producing strategies, policies and other written analyses towards a facilitation model that focuses on team efforts to solve immediate problems through direct action.  This will potentially facilitate a greater role for non-diaspora entrants in public service.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted

 

The evaluators seem to indicate that the FGS and FMS governments do not require longer term strategies and approaches, but need to focus on addressing immediate problems. This part of the recommendation is not accepted. All government partners have indicated that, in order to guide present and future action, a strategic approach is required. All government partners have equally indicated that external support in many cases is required (and this is also quite logical in a setting where governments are young and only partially staffed).

However, the other intention that seems to underlie this recommendation is that it is possible to support (Somali – Somali) platforms that have a more action-oriented approach to address urgent issues. And here we agree.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
8.1. Support organizational level retreat and team building process in the target institutions 8.2. Develop organization level strategic, performance and implementation plans at FGS and FMS level 8.3. Support FGS and FMS partners in action-oriented collaboration to address urgent issues.
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP 2019/12 Completed Team building exercises were supported for the MOIPC in Puntland. Communication lines and processes were opened between the project team at UNDP and different government officials to address process and management issues. History
9. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 9 Empower government partners to determine the problems to be addressed

 

This will mean allowing the government partner agencies to take the lead in identifying the problems to be addressed.  By this we mean a substantive, outcome-oriented problem rather than the identification of a lack of expert staff, physical infrastructure or financial resources.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

 

This is fully in line with the existing project implementation philosophy, and hence fully accepted. Thrust will be provided in the next phase of the project to empower government counter parts to help them determine the problems and address them.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
9.1. Develop Monitoring and learning/Change lab as dedicated output for next phase of the project
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/16]
UNDP 2019/03 No Longer Applicable [Justification: Project not taken forward after the failure to carry on with the new project. ]
History
10. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 10: Encourage a diversity of solutions

 

Focusing on local problem identification implies facilitating the creation of local solutions. This also suggests the need for a shift from classroom training of individuals towards creating a conducive environment for working in teams.  This approach would encourage the generation of diverse approaches to mitigating existing problems. 

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

 

SIP/StEFS agrees with the recommendation and has been promoting home grown solutions and facilitating local ownership. Having said that, care needs to be taken that locally defined solutions remain in line with overall federal arrangements.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
10.1. Provide conducive working environment to the target institutions to work in teams 10.2. Establish CSO-Government networks in all States
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/16]
UNDP 2019/03 Completed Platforms have been created through the provision of office spaces for FGS Ministries such as the MOPIED, MOIFA and several Ministries in the FMS to have one stop shop government complexes such as in Galmudug that was built in 2017 through STEFS. History
11. Recommendation:

Recommendation No.11 Frequently share lessons across partners and celebrate success

 

An important part of building a team approach is the provision of frequent opportunities to celebrate success with peers in other parts of the country.  Solutions that work in one part of Somalia have a greater chance of being adapted in other parts of the country than will ‘international best practices’ introduced by a consultant who has no ‘skin in the game’.  A substantial part of future UNDP programming should be devoted to peer-based exchange of experiences, joint assessment of lessons and codification of those lessons in simple to use guides that can be widely disseminated.  Such an approach provides a framework for double-loop learning to assist partners go institutionalize new learning by continually assessing it within the local socio-economic context.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

 

Peer-to-Peer learning and exchange is important and such initiatives will be intensified in the next phase of the project. Both SIP and StEFS have supported multiple activities in this sense e.g. the NDC, the Aid Coordination arrangements, the discussion series around the NDP and many others. While dumping of external solutions is generally unproductive, the Somali project partners have expresses great interest in learning from experiences in the region and globally. SIP/StEFS supported a series of regional exchange and this has led to emerging cooperation and exchange arrangements with Ugandan, Ethiopian, Rwandan and Kenyan (sister) organizations.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
11.1. Conduct Inter-State learning and exchange visits/forum 11.2. Support regional exchange and collaboration
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/16]
UNDP 2019/03 Completed This is part of project implementation. Where projects have components on South – South cooperation this is included. The FGS has taken upon itself and through UNDP support has gone on missions to FMS to share best practices. The SIP project for a long time worked with the Puntland government to have exchange visits with different MOPIC Ministries from other FMS as well as hosting meetings on aid management in Garowe. History
12. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 12: Shift from analytical skills to communication skills

 

A focus on team-based efforts calls for the provision, and use, of communication tools and skills.  Identification, provision and support for such tools should dominate UNDP assistance, replacing the current over-emphasis on the preparation of written technical analyses.  There are enough of these in circulation that needs to become institutionalized already.  Communication should be supported both for horizontal (including with non-state actors) and vertical (beginning at the level of the District Commission and ending with the FGS) linkages

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
12.1. Establish Horizontal coordination and communication mechanism at FMS level 6.2. Establish Inter-state and FGS forum on federalism/State building
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/16]
UNDP 2018/12 Completed Initiated SIP/StEFS projects are working with OPM/MoIFAR to establish intergovernmental forum on federalism and enhance communication and joint action on the state building agenda. Similarly, efforts have been made to develop horizontal coordination mechanism at FGS and FMS to enhance communication and coordination between the executive bodies, this will be further expanded in the next phase of the project. History
13. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 13: Build a base of information from the ground up

 

Concentrate on building a system of ground level data that can be used in identifying opportunities for citizen-government and business-government collaborations.  One way to do this can be the joint collection and sharing of place-based data in a common information system linking district and state data collection with federal analyses.  Such detailed data can tell the story of the constraints and opportunities of people in ways that aggregated sectoral analysis can never do.  Localized information can become a part of a common national system, but they can also be developed explicitly for local problem solving.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted.

 

While the recommendation that appropriate data is essential and that collection systems need further attention is accepted, the government is presently supported by various actors to build the required systems, including institutional, policy, legal and regulatory arrangements. Several projects and actors are collecting data, and the challenge in the short term is more in the field of accessibility than sheer unavailability. The new project – coordinated through the sub working group on Planning, M&E and statistics of the Pillar Effective Institutions – will support the relevant Somali institutions to sustainably improve the availability, accessibility and quality of statistical information. The Stabilization/CRESTA Pillar Working Group equally is looking into the data availability on the district level. The focus of the new project is more likely to be on supporting he coordination aspects than on becoming an additional actor in the actual collection of data.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
13.1. Organize discussion with MoPIED/FGS and FMS planning ministries to initiate establishment of data base system 13.2. Support MoIPED to establish national wide data base and information system
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP 2019/12 Completed Project closed History
14. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 14:  Facilitate the creation of a diversity of alliances

 

Enhancing the capacity to communicate and collaborate will build the ability to identify what government at state and federal level can do to help people to get on with their own development.  This would likely involve support to the creation of a diverse set of alliances, some formal some informal, that would be expected to continue such collaborative engagement after the end of the project period.  Public-private partnerships in small towns for water distribution is one example of a localized alliance.  The National Development Council is an example of one at the other end of the spectrum. 

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
14.1. Develop Synergies with other international partners and programmes 14.2. Support FGS/FMS to establish alliances forums to forward development agenda
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/16]
UNDP 2019/03 Completed UNDP Somalia is establishing a dedicated support team to assist the partners as well as the UNDP teams in the LoA management arrangements. This is not a project specific action and requires more corporate level intervention. History
15. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 15:  Require output achievement and reciprocal contributions in the LOA

 

A specific operational improvement would involve two changes in the LOA.  First, the LOA should be structured so that a theoretical maximum of support would be made available to a partner, which would be an individual agency at the Federal level, but should be the State Government at the sub-national level.  The utilization of such funds would be tied to the preparation of a series of specific requests for joint action on a problem identified by the partner.  Second, each request would require the specification of the output to be achieved and the level of the contributory obligation by the partner, which most likely would be in the form of committed staff time, facilities and equipment.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Partially Accepted.

 

The mutual accountability and result orientation parts of the recommendation are fully accepted. The LoA management arrangements at UNDP Somalia level are under review and issues concerning procedures, alignment with national systems and coherence in approach are being addressed to further strengthen this successful cooperation instrument. In line with global regulations concerning transfer of funds and based on HACT assessments, in the large majority of cases already the theoretical maximum of funds is advanced to be managed by the partners. However, each LoA has a defined partner and cannot be engaged on government level. UNDP Somalia is establishing a dedicated support team to assist the partners as well as the UNDP teams in the LoA management arrangements.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
15.1. Review and develop the LOA with UNDP Progamme assurance team 15.2. Develop LOA action/work plan for each partner to reflect the key outputs to be obtained with the resources provided by the project 15.3. Conduct Hact Assessment of all the partners
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/16]
UNDP 2019/08 Completed Advice taken on board. All processes observed with strict adherence to LPAC review, all LOAs have a clear workplan and all projects have to go through HACT assessments. History
16. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 16: Measure and compare costs at the activity level as a means of enhancing financial efficiency

 

As noted, only Puntland management provided evidence of what it cost to deliver the outputs agreed in each LOA.  This could have been more detailed, but it represents a good start.  The budget prepared for the proposed AIMS program is broken down to the activity level.  Resources budgeted for activity level use should always be fungible, but creating accounting codes at this level is a valuable step towards aiding efficient project management.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
16.1. Develop annual work plans with the partners and budget tracking system
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/16]
UNDP 2019/03 Completed Actions in the Finance Unit of the project have been taken to improve recording of transactions in Atlas as well as at the government level. History
17. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 17: Create a high-level Third Party Monitoring mechanism

 

Any program that is operating in a FCAS needs continual feedback from a non-participant’s perspective.  The TPM currently used by UNDP cannot provide the sort of policy-informing advice needed.  The next program should incorporate a learning component that involves regular (perhaps quarterly) visits by a recognized academic body that has requisite understanding of FCAS development, federalism, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2021/01/29]

Management Response: Accepted.

 

While the present TPM do provide useful information concerning activity verification, it remains challenging to gain evidence for higher level result realization, especially when change in society are concerned. The new project will be endowed with the dedicated output (on M&E and Learning) to come to terms with the instruments that would be required to gain insight in change and be able to formulate responses to that change, should this be required. These ‘real-time’ feedback loops are an essential characteristic of agile management. However, instead of focusing on project management, the activity will focus on thematic areas where the government requires these feedback loops, both to steer its own action and to steer the project support arrangements.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
17.1 Initiate discussion with partners on having M&E and Learning output in the next phase of the project 17.2. Initiate M&E and Learning process implementation plan
[Added: 2018/02/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP 2019/12 Completed Project closed History

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