Terminal Evaluation: Recovery and Resilience in Selected Typhoon Yolanda-affected Communities in the Visayas

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Evaluation Plan:
2012-2018, Philippines
Evaluation Type:
Final Project
Planned End Date:
Completion Date:
Management Response:
Evaluation Budget(US $):


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Title Terminal Evaluation: Recovery and Resilience in Selected Typhoon Yolanda-affected Communities in the Visayas
Atlas Project Number: 00077295
Evaluation Plan: 2012-2018, Philippines
Evaluation Type: Final Project
Status: Completed
Completion Date: 05/2018
Planned End Date: 02/2018
Management Response: Yes
Focus Area:
  • 1. Crisis Prevention & Recovery
  • 2. Others
Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017)
  • 1. Output 6.1. From the humanitarian phase after crisis, early economic revitalization generates jobs and other environmentally sustainable livelihoods opportunities for crisis affected men and women
SDG Goal
  • Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
SDG Target
  • 11.b By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels
Evaluation Budget(US $): 27,000
Source of Funding: Project funds
Evaluation Expenditure(US $): 35,150
Joint Programme: No
Joint Evaluation: No
Evaluation Team members:
Name Title Email Nationality
Ramon Noriel Sicad Evaluation Team Leader noriel_sicad@yahoo.com
GEF Evaluation: No
Key Stakeholders: EU, NEDA, DTI, OCD, TESDA, DA, PCA, DENR, City/Municipal/Barangay LGUs and Individual/Group Beneficiaries

On Resilient Infrastructure (Component 1)

  1. 1.  Design of buildings for CEC should take into account the climatic and weather conditions prevailing in the locality, which were not addressed in the building orientation of the CEC in Ormoc City.

  2. 2.  Need to ensure balance of achieving the twinDobjective of providing skills training and pakyaw contract of beneficiaries with optimum timelines and budget on the completion of site development and housing in resettlement areas, with reference to the different challenges encountered in the implementation of the three (3) resettlement areas.

3. Implementation of programs and projects in postDdisaster recovery was influenced by factors that were outside the control of the project such as the timing and duration of the CFW, which influenced the work attitude of beneficiaries on resettlement housing and livelihood components. A review by the government, on extended implementation of CFW with other programs, beyond one (1) year after the disaster, as part of the key elements on the coordination of postDdisaster recovery efforts.

On Sustainable Livelihood (Component 2)

  1. 1.  Livelihood programs targeting medium and agriDbased industry enterprises, with strong elements of value chain upgrade as compared to micro and individual crop production, seem to be more promising in terms of economic returns and sustainability, as demonstrated in the livelihood programs on cassava and seaweeds. The value adding activities in the form of semiDprocessing and marketing support, generated additional incomes to community groups. It also strengthened the entrepreneurial capacities of the community groups with use of tools such as business plans, financial targets and organizational development.

  2. 2.  The linking of different livelihood groups across the project areas provided opportunities for additional incomes and sustainability. The linking of graduates on skills training (constructionD related skills) with the shelter construction was a good initiative on local employment generation. This approach however, as mentioned during the FGD, should have been more elaborately planned and implemented at the earlier stage to optimize opportunities for community contracting D not only for the shelter component but also on the community evacuation centers (CEC) towards creating enormous employment opportunities.

  3. 3.  The provision of several livelihood interventions (farm inputs, tools, skills training, starter kits and postDharvest and marketing support) was well acknowledged during the FGD, as an effective strategy for the recovery of livelihoods and increasing incomes of households. This multiDtargeted approach reduced the economic vulnerability of the beneficiaries (strengthening resiliency) by diversifying their livelihood assets (human resource or skills assets, physical assets), optimization of natural resource assets (water, land) and social assets (increased access to information and services both from the duty bearers and other nonDgovernment entities) that demonstrated a clear response to the principle of “building back better.”

  4. 4.  Conduit scheme or partnerships with NGOs and other entities with the needed expertise provided better opportunities for sustainability and impact of projects with the provision of longer term livelihood services such as the following: (a) organizational development; (b) financial and project management; (c) product development; (d) marketing; and (e) savings mobilization. This approach was clearly demonstrated in the partnerships of Project RECOVERY with the PCF and the PRRM.

  5. 5.  Expanding the intervention efforts with the private sector might have expanded the impact and sustainability of the livelihood projects through dialogues between the business sector and the government. The private sector could then identify and align measures in stabilizing public employment services and in restoring the disrupted labor market as well as greater participation in recovery planning and implementation. The government may consider policy support for recovery incentives, such as tax holidays and fastDtracking business permit processing, among others.

6. The livelihood program restored the economic activities of the beneficiaries while also contributed in creating a sense of hope and dignity, among the beneficiaries, in starting a transition from relief mode to a more permanent and longDterm economic activities.

On Resettlement Housing (Component 3)

  1. 1.  The resettlement program is a large development initiative that involves a considerable amount of land, labor and capital in its implementation. It involves social, economic and physical infrastructure interventions that must the planned and implemented jointly by the development actors to effectively achieve the desired results. Where different offices are involved, (i.e., EUD UNDP PMO and LGU) an acceptable integrating and coordinating mechanism must be formulated in orchestrating and synchronizing the different activities of all the stakeholders.

  2. 2.  The UNDP and the Government to continually pursue the sharing of the knowledge gained and lessons learned in ongoing and completed projects that were implemented in Eastern Visayas.

On DRRM Capacity Building (Component 4)

  1. 1.  Intervention on the CLUP makes a big difference in building resiliency and DRRM capacity of the LGUs. The case, for example, of Salcedo municipality wherein technical assistance on the preparation of their CLUP resulted into multiple results and outputs. Through the CLUP intervention, risks and hazard mapping (vulnerability assessment) and zoning plan were improved making their sectoral and social programs more resilient. The CDP on the other hand, was expected to make their communities, places, infrastructure and environment more sustainable and safe. The CLUP process likewise became the mechanism in promoting DRRM principles and plans at a wider public scale of stakeholders.

  2. 2.  The combination of hardware support (equipment for emergency operations center) and the trainings on DRR, emergency response and drills on community preparedness made the project holistic and responsive to the needs of the LGUs. The FGDs with the LGUs and community groups showed that the results and effects of the DRRM assistance had surpassed their preDYolanda capacities in terms of knowledge, skills, emergency response efficiency, contingency and DRRM planning.

  3. 3.  DRRM is not as a sectoral concern but rather a crossDcutting issue that should be incorporated in all aspects of recovery and development planning. The project inputs on DRRM and contingency planning that also influenced sectoral plans such as infrastructure, social, environmental and institutional are good accomplishments and manifestations of mainstreaming DRRM. As such, the role of the OCD in terms of its postDdisaster coordination mandate as well as in linking humanitarian work to recovery must be maximized. Logistical support, especially when capacity is lacking or impaired by the impacts of disaster should be considered as one of the priorities.

  4. 4.  The DRRM component has likewise contributed to facilitating seamless transition and managing emergency relief to early recovery and recovery program. The integration of DRRM component in the overall project package has enabled the other components (livelihoods, public infrastructure and shelter) to focus and adhere towards the objective in improving capacities for resiliency, sustainability and safety.


RELEVANCE The project "Recovery and Resilience in Selected Typhoon Yolanda9affected Communities in the Visayas",

in short Project RECOVERY has a high relevance.

The UNDP is well placed to play a coordinating role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts of multiple national and international stakeholders. The action is adequate to the capacities of the beneficiaries, i.e. Local Government Units (LGUs) and communities, who have lost capacity (physical infrastructure and human resources). The project addressed their restoration needs in both the physical infrastructure and social infrastructure, as well as sought to increase their resilience and capacity to respond to future disasters that are expected to occur more frequently due to overall climate change, applying principles of sustainable development.

Whereas the overall project components with their respective outputs are pre9defined in terms of budget allocations and general description of the outputs. The actual types of infrastructure, the designs of constructions, the locations, as well as the specific livelihood and DRR activities are jointly determined by the project management and the direct target groups, the LGUs and CBOs. This consultation process enhanced the ownership of the involved LGUs. LGU officials (Barangay chairmen, Mayors and Planning Officers of Municipalities were very happy with the multifunctional Community Evacuation Centres (CEC), and actively participated in the various exercises related to DRR, such as the CVAs (Capacity and Vulnerability Assessments) and the preparation of the Contingency Plan. The HOAs are directly in charge of the construction of their shelters in good cooperation with project staff and are keen on having more responsibility in the procurement of construction materials (now fully taken care of by UNDP). Whereas the communities are participating in the livelihood activities, they were not well informed about the objectives and planned and future activities of the sub9project they were participating. Consequently, they were not pro9active, but rather waiting for what the project would bring.


1. The project has focused on C,1 (infrastructure), which is reflected by a physical delivery rate of 54%. However, the performance for each of the 10 CECs differs a lot: from a few that are nearly completion, to some that have hardly started and one (Tacloban) that involves massive land preparation (excavation of a hill top), before the actual construction can take place. Solar panels and generator are not yet installed. The contractor is just starting (November) the foundation for the cold storage. None of the 5 critical structures are yet identified. The work on the mangrove rehabilitation is behind schedule, some planting is done, but it is not clear if maintenance is being done.

  1. 2.  The Livelihood Component (C,2) has a physical rate of 27%, if it did not continue the emergency coco9lumbering project that was initiated prior to the start of RECOVERY, the financial delivery rate would be half this figure. During the second half of 2015 a total of 16 subprojects were approved, for which the procurement started, so implementation rate will soon increase significantly. Although the figures are not yet available, indications are that the high targets for delivery of inputs and training and acreage under commercial crops will not be obtained.

  2. 3.  C,3 (Resettlement) has a physical delivery rate of 38%. After a long preparation process (selection of beneficiaries, formation and training of HOAs, selection of resettlement sites and obtaining legal documents, etc. The construction is now well underway on two sites (Hernani and Tacloban) and just started in Ormoc. It was decided to upgrade the drinking and sanitation system from level II (community9based) to level III (individual facilities). Expected completion is by mid92016.

  3. 4.  C,4 Disaster Risk Reduction. This component has a physical rate of 49%. Twenty9five ADs were developed, including conducting Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (VCAs) and Contingency Planning (CP) workshops at provincial, municipal and Barangay level, provision of communication means, Early Warning Systems, rescue equipment and drills. Technical assistance was provided to the OPARR, OCD and recently to NEDA in planning and strategy development for DRR.

The quality of the CECs is satisfactory to very good, depending on the contractor. The project staff is on the spot and checking the contractors. The quality of the permanent shelters is good. It is too early to assess the quality of the 10 soft infrastructures (mangroves) and the cold storage, as these activities have just started. The livelihood activities are just starting and it is too early to assess the quality of the outputs. The quality of the outputs of DRR programme is good, this applies for the training of facilitators, as well as the VCA reports and the Contingency Plans that were prepared in a highly participatory manner.

On Outcomes:

  1. 1.  C,1 disaster resilient public infrastructure: partially yes, for CECs and potentially the rehabilitated mangroves, but for the other outputs it is doubtful if they will be achieved: other critical infrastructure is not yet identified. The cold storage is an example of a high risk investment, so far RECOVERY considers it just as a procurement and construction task and not as an productive asset, requiring a business plan; it may turn out to be a nice facility, but under9utilized.

  2. 2.  C,2 potentially yes, the provision of agricultural inputs and alternative livelihood training is expected to have a positive effect on the livelihoods of rural people; however there are risks related to alternative crops, processing and marketing; it may even lead to adverse effects (lower than expected yields, selling the crops and/or processing at a loss, etc.)

    UPDATES: Terminal Evaluation Mission (August 2017): The marketing of dried cassava chips and seaweeds, produced by farmers and fisherfolks were already established with the guidance of service providers (PCF and PRRM) on organizational development and marketing. These conduit organizations helped in building the capacity of cooperatives in Balangkayan and Salcedo, both in Eastern Samar. In the case of BACO, the technical assistance and production loans were being provided to member9farmers who were engaged in the production and drying of cassava chips to institutional buyers such as the San Miguel Corporation (SMC). The members of BACO also include those farmers and fisherfolks in adjoining LGUs.

  1. 3.  C,3 yes the permanent shelters will be built, but much more capacity building is required to ensure that the HOA will successfully continue constructing entering the market as a commercial contractor (which is the aim of the model.

  2. 4.  C,4 yes, the comprehensive DRR package enhanced the capacity of provinces and LGUs to implement similar programmes in municipalities and barangays that are currently not covered by the project.


  1. 1.  In October 2015, the M&E expert introduced Accomplishment Reports (ARs) and an “Integrated Physical Progress Monitoring Matrix”, to track progress against planning for the ADs, to the physical and quantitative targets in the logframe, and budget codes. The AR template 9if well filled in 9 provides excellent monitoring data, as it not only informs about the accomplishment rate, but also the factors that affected implementation, the actions that were or will be taken, and possible modifications made. The matrix gives a good overview of the physical and financial delivery rates, but is still fully output oriented. To achieve the Expected Results (ER) that are outcome9oriented, the Matrix need to be expanded with the formulation and assessment of outcome indicators. Another activity is "beneficiary profiling" that seeks to gather baseline data that will be used to assess outcomes towards the end of the (sub9) projects.

  2. 2.  All activities for the livelihood and DRR component require (sub9) project write9ups, called "Activity Designs" or ADs. Whereas this implementing mechanism in principle is excellent, it was found that they were restricted to the Annual Work Plan of 2015, causing a disconnect with the (sub9) project's multi9year time frame and objectives. This system leads to uncertainty in the beneficiaries and project officers, of what the RECOVERY project would deliver the next year, whereas new ADs need to be prepared and approved for 2016, requiring additional time and resources.

    UPDATES: Terminal Evaluation Mission (August 2017): Starting in 2016 the MCGA was implemented for greater ownership of community/livelihood groups in buying the needed materials and ensure better quality control by beneficiaries on goods delivered by Suppliers. It was also mentioned during the FGD that some suppliers delivered goods that were not according the specification and has to returned and replaced with correct item took consideration time (Sustainable Organic Farmers of Ormoc on building materials and Salcedo Multipurpose Cooperative on supplier of cassava stalks). As such, the implementation of project by community groups were delayed and timing of planting was also affected. It was also mentioned during the FGD that price quotations using the direct procurement by UNDP were higher as compared to price quotations being requested in the name of the community groups (Sustainable Farmers Organization and Nanguan Mangrove Association, Ormoc City, etc.)

  3. 3.  The project has a hierarchical structure, with all decisions on funding and project management taken by the UNDP Manila's Office and in case of investments of over 50,000 Euro by the Bangkok Office. All procurement is done by UNDP directly, without involvement of the partners. UNDP project staff based in the field may assist in the preparation of the documentation, but the actual procurement is done by the Manila9based procurement unit. Although this ensures that no funds are being diverted, it also leads to delays the actual delivery of the goods and services to the sub9 projects. The two visited HOAs could not work at full speed in the construction of the houses

("permanent shelters"), instead they had to send part of the workers home, for lack of materials, most of which was locally available.

  1. 4.  The EU budget for field staff contains only 7 positions for technical staff, as well as 2 positions at the national level (TA seconded to OPARR, OCD, NEDA). There is no budget provision for staff in the hubs, whereas the project cannot be implemented without such staff. Hub staff are currently on the payroll of two other UNDP implemented projects (KOICA, UNICEF), but they are said to be spending part of their time to the project RECOVERY. Technical staff in Tacloban were mobilized by March/April 2015 (about 10 months after the project start), which together with time consuming processes, such as official approvals, allocation of land, non9complying contractors and suppliers, etc.9 led to significant delays in implementation.

  2. 5.  This is reflected in low delivery rates: total disbursement as per October 31, 2015 has been EUR 2.9 million, or 30% of the total budget (3% in 2014 and 27% in 2015), corresponding to 40% of the planned expenditure for this period; the expenditure rate by component is as follows: C 91: 45%; C92:13%; C93: 25%; and C94: 30%. Expenditure on Human Resources 17%. These delays are particularly critical for the livelihood component and the non9 CEC infrastructure.

  3. 6.  Overall, the outputs were delivered in a cost9efficient manner.


  1. 1.  C,1: The delivery of disaster resilient infrastructure depends on external funding; it is certainly beyond the reach of LGUs. The LGUs are capable to use the multifunctional CECs and take care of maintenance, as these structures are low cost in maintenance (robust structures, solar power). LGUs could partly implement the rehabilitation of mangroves themselves, but still require additional funding to reach a reasonably large scale to become effective. The Guiuan Municipality requires additional technical assistance to effectively make use of the cold storage as an important asset in the supply chain of whole fish, fillet and ice products.

    UPDATES: Terminal Evaluation Mission (August 2017): Cold storage Facility was completed and turned over to the LGU last quarter of 2016. It was not made operational yet by the LGU, though a Business Plan has already been prepared. It was pointed out during the 25 August 2017 Project Board meeting, the UNDP will exert effort with the LGU Guiuan, Eastern Visayas.

  2. 2.  C,2: The main sustainability strategy is to build capacity in the beneficiaries and their organizations (source: entry conference for this monitoring mission). Project support to already well9functioning CBOs, providing them with essential inputs, thereby boosting their operations is sustainable. However, the sustainability of the support to farming and fishing communities in increasing productivity, processing and marketing is doubtful. Support should not be limited to social preparation and mobilization. These actions require long9term technical and organizational assistance to CBOs that so far is not being offered, and due to the late start of the (sub9) projects, few time is left. Relying on government agencies, such as BFAR and DA is not realistic, as they lack resources.

    UPDATES: Terminal Evaluation Mission (August 2017): Linkages were already established by the CBO with institutional buyers (private sector businesses) of dried cassava chips and seaweeds. Conduit scheme of technical assistance for organizational development, management of cooperatives and marketing were already started in last quarter of 2016, with service providers such as the PCF for cassava and the PRRM for seaweeds.

3. C,3: the HOAs are currently trained in the planning of work and are providing the skilled and unskilled labour, but they are not trained and not gaining experience in negotiating and purchasing of building materials. This will negatively affect their positioning as contractors for future resettlement projects, which is an important aim of this component.

UPDATES: Terminal Evaluation Mission (August 2017): The participants to the FGD indicated that they would request quotations from the suppliers to get better price from among the suppliers. As such, most of them have already developed the skill for negotiating and purchasing building materials. However, there is a need to develop further the capacity of the HOA on the construction management and scheduling, which could be provided by an established construction firm through a construction management consultancy arrangement similar the conduit scheme of the PCF and PRRM.

4. C,4: The comprehensive DRR package that is provided to the LGUs enhances them to implement similar programmes in municipalities and barangays that are currently not covered by the project. However, financial contributions from external sources remain necessary, in particular for sharing part of the cost of trainers and DRR9related equipment

All hard9infrastructural structures are typhoon9proof. The soft man9made coastal structures, primarily the replanted mangrove forests help to protect the coastal areas against storm surges and hard winds, and at the same time increase the quality of marine life feeding and breeding in the forests. Equally, the comprehensive DRR package helps to increase resilience of local communities and to reduce environmental impact of disasters.

Initial steps are taken to link producer associations (fishermen and farmers) to processors and buyers. The project collaborated with the private sector for linking trainees of its alternative livelihood programme to employment opportunities through the Leyte Chamber of Commerce. This has to be intensified to effectively provide new and sustainable opportunities for these project beneficiaries.


1. On Resilient Infrastructure: Designers of future CECs and related infrastructure should integrate knowledge of local conditions such as prevailing wind conditions during rainy season. As such, local engineers or engineering firms should be involved in the design of infrastructure that will be responsive to the needs of local communities in times of disastrous events.

1. Recommendation:

1. On Resilient Infrastructure: Designers of future CECs and related infrastructure should integrate knowledge of local conditions such as prevailing wind conditions during rainy season. As such, local engineers or engineering firms should be involved in the design of infrastructure that will be responsive to the needs of local communities in times of disastrous events.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/11/29]

This recommendation and accepted and will be taken into consideration for future projects that will have Community Evacuation Centers as one of its outputs.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
This recommendation will be applied to future projects that will have Community Evacuation Centers as one of its outputs. The evaluation and its recommendations will be shared with the Inclusive and Sustainable Development Unit for application in Project RAPID.
[Added: 2018/11/29]
CO, Resilience and Peace Building Unit 2018/12 Completed

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