End of Project Evaluation - Joint Programme on Youth Employment

Report Cover Image
Evaluation Plan:
2018-2020, Somalia
Evaluation Type:
Final Project
Planned End Date:
10/2018
Completion Date:
05/2018
Status:
Completed
Management Response:
Yes
Evaluation Budget(US $):
80,000

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Title End of Project Evaluation - Joint Programme on Youth Employment
Atlas Project Number: 00085376
Evaluation Plan: 2018-2020, Somalia
Evaluation Type: Final Project
Status: Completed
Completion Date: 05/2018
Planned End Date: 10/2018
Management Response: Yes
Focus Area:
  • 1. Poverty and MDG
  • 2. Others
Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021)
  • 1. Output 6.1. From the humanitarian phase after crisis, early economic revitalization generates jobs and other environmentally sustainable livelihoods opportunities for crisis affected men and women
SDG Goal
  • Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere
  • Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries
SDG Target
  • 1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day
  • 10.1 By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average
Evaluation Budget(US $): 80,000
Source of Funding: Project funds
Evaluation Expenditure(US $): 80,000
Joint Programme: No
Joint Evaluation: Yes
  • Joint with UN Agencies
Evaluation Team members:
Name Title Email Nationality
Richard Mahachi Chiwara, PhD Mr
Hussein Yusuf Ali Mr SOMALIA
GEF Evaluation: No
Key Stakeholders: ILO, UNHabitat
Countries: SOMALIA
Lessons
1.

Establishment of an inclusive national steering committee

The design had provision for of an inclusive national PSC with membership of key line Ministries at federal and regional level, donors and PUNOs at Head of Agency level ensured quick decision-making as well as mutual accountability.

 

Support to the Federal MOLSA in its coordination function

The allocation of 3% of available funds to the government enhances their capacity for programme planning, monitoring and coordination. 

 

Applying the programme strategy in the fisheries sector

 

Full implementation of the programme strategy in Bossaso provided a good case study the efficacy of the strategy as well as for joint programming. Also, positive results were achieved through private sector engagement in Bossaso.

 

Lessons Learnt

 

Fragmented implementation of programme components

Lack of a broad consensus on the programme approach and strategy, can result in fragmented implementation and discourages collaboration among partner UN agencies.

 

Duplication of roles among JP partners

Lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities at design level can lead to duplication and reduces the benefits of joint programming.

 

Lack of enabling environment, including national institutional capacity

Employment creation cannot happen in a vacuum, it requires investment of resources to develop conducive enabling environment as well as institutional capacity development. 

 

Lack of targeted private sector engagement

Key success factors and programme risks should be managed and integrated in the programme design, such as for example targeted private sector engagement and development strategies.

 

All players should play at the same level

Effective implementation requires ‘all hands on deck’, which requires deliberate and programmed institutional capacity development of the key players, particularly government capacity at subnational level.


Findings
1.

4. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This chapter presentsthe evaluation findings based on analysis of data and information obtained from multiple sources. The evaluation was also cognisant of the fact that only 43.7% ($23.65 million) of the initial programme budget of $54 million was funded. In order to present the findings in a user-friendly and useful manner, while also responding to the evaluation terms of reference comprehensively, the findings are structured around the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. 

4.1. JP Relevance

A. Alignment with needs and priorities of all stakeholders

Youth unemployment is widely considered to be among the key push factors that drives youth migration as well as recruitment of youth into extremist groups such as Al Shabab. The FGS notes in the NDP that “Approximately 50% of the population is below the age 15 years. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future due to a high fertility rate. It has been and probably will continue to be the major source of conflict in Somalia, where two-thirds of youth are unemployed – one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world. This is among the factors fuelling AlShabaab‘s appeal.”

The international community also recognises the creation of economic opportunities, and particularly employment creation as one of the major cornerstones for stability in Somalia. This was aptly reflected in the Somali Compact, which states that: “The economy has a critical role to play in Somalia’s state-building and peacebuilding processes. Employment generation can help build trust in government and encourage social cohesion. A growing economy can generate critical revenue to support public service delivery and build the legitimacy of public institutions. An improved economy, with a vibrant private sector, can also increase opportunities for peace and reduce conflict. This is achieved through broad-based and inclusive engagement of the population, including the diaspora, in productive activities, and the generation of employment” (page 8).

The JP objective to provide employment opportunities for youth is therefore consistent with the needs of the country as well as priorities of government and its development partners as illustrated in Figure 2 below.

Various stakeholders, including government officials interviewed noted that the JP was not only critical, but that it was also the only initiative where Government and local authorities are involved and have a role to jointly, with the United Nations, address the critical challenge of youth unemployment nationally. Other key informants also noted that it was the only UN joint programme although much smaller than the bilateral efforts such as the USAID funded Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihoods (GEEL) programme; or the DfID funded Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia (PIMS). The JP is therefore well aligned with the national and international development frameworks for Somalia, and also addresses one of the key challenges and push factors that drive instability and youth migration in Somalia. 


Tag: Coherence Relevance Joint UN Programme Programme/Project Design Humanitarian development nexus Peace Building Social cohesion Jobs and Livelihoods Youth

2.

4.2. Effectiveness

In line with the evaluation terms of reference, effectiveness focuses on the JP’s efficacy and assesses the extent to which its overall objectives have been met or are expected to be met, taking into account their relative importance. In this regard, the reader’s attention is drawn to the overall objective, which is creation of sustainable long term jobs for the youth. By definition, employment creation is ‘the process of providing new jobs, especially for people who are unemployed’. 

C. Implementation of the strategy model

As illustrated in Figure 1 above, the JP strategy was to create sustainable employment while also providing immediate jobs and relief to the large pool of unemployed youth. To quote directly from the JP document, “…the Programme will shift from a traditional “livelihood perspective” towards a “competitiveness perspective”. This means that we will focus less on individuals – though they will be the ultimate beneficiaries - and focus more on identifying and removing the binding constraints for companies, sectors, and value chains that have the potential for future growth and employment (page 15)”. 

However, documentary evidence from JP reports, as well direct observation in the field visits and key informant interviews suggests that the model has not been put to the test in its totality. Based on documentary evidence, as at end of 2016, a total of 112 public, private and academic actors had received training on value chain methods. Three value chains were identified, although only one for the fisheries sector had been approved by the time of this evaluation. Key informants noted that the most comprehensive case study of the model so far implemented was for the dry fish sector in Bossaso, Puntland. The other two value chains – dairy and sesame - were not pursued after realisation that available funding was not sufficient to cover implementation of all three value chains nationally. Besides, it was also observed that there were other value-chain programmes focusing on the sesame sector. Based on review of the value chain analysis undertaken by UNDP in 2016, specific constraints were identified (Figure 3). Some key informants noted however that the value chain analysis was done by UNDP rather than FAO, given the latter’s comparative advantages in fisheries. This is an indication of how Participating United Nations Organisations (PUNOs) did not leverage on their collective comparative advantages as discussed below in Section 4.3. Figure 3. Main activities and constraints on the various fishery actors

An analysis of Figure 3 shows that the key constraints affecting almost all levels of the value chain are; (i) lack of access to finance, (ii) lack of skills and knowledge, and (iii) inadequate policy and regulatory framework. It is logical to assume therefore, that these three constraints would have been identified as ‘key success factors’, without which the strategy would not be able to realise the intended outcomes. Figure 4 below shows the interventions that were undertaken by PUNOs to address the above constraints.Figure 4. JP Interventions to address market constraints in the value chain.

The above case study illustrates important lessons. Firstly, it shows that a value chain approach should take a complete view of the system from start to finish. If other links in the value chain are not addressed, they can impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole chain. Secondly, it illustrates the opportunities that can be available for interagency collaboration based on their individual mandates and comparative advantages in the context of a joint programme. Thirdly, it also illustrates how the programme’s components [value chain development; infrastructure development; and skills training] are all linked towards the desired outcome. UNDP undertook the initial value chain analysis to identify the systemic constraints. UNDP also constructed dry fish processing facilities in the IDP camps to benefit disadvantaged youth as well as rehabilitation of Bulsho gravel road in Ga’ate through cash for work resulting in creation of 150 short term jobs for the youth in Bosasso. ILO did a skills gap analysis to identify the knowledge gaps in the industry, including identification of local TVET institutions capable of providing the required training. In collaboration with UNDP, ‘training of trainers’ (TOT) workshop on dry fish processing using minimal resources available at community level was undertaken. FAO provided tools and equipment for harvesting of small pelagic fish species, as well skills training for IDP youth in dry fish processing and packaging, and other specialised training such as on-board handling, nutrition and market awareness. FAO also supported trial shipments to selected export markets to assess market availability, and at the time of drafting, was also engaged in developing quality standards with relevant government institutions and the Ministry of Fisheries.

UN Habitat received the funding for 2017 in June and had engaged the required support staff in August, with implementation starting the following month. In line with its planned activities for 2017, UN Habitat provided life skills training to youth who did not finish or qualify for the apprenticeship scheme undertaken earlier by ILO. However, the life skills training activities are not directly related to the fisheries value chain; for example, youth speakers’ corner, which provides a forum for youth to air out their views on multiple issues including political participation. They also did a city clean-up campaign whereby youth are involved in activities to clean up the city. The evaluators noted however that this activity does not fit in with the ‘cash for work’ model because UN Habitat does not pay for such services, other than providing them with protective clothing and meals. Other than as exemplified in Bossaso, the programme strategy has not been comprehensively implemented, with its interventions seemingly fragmented and therefore losing the key advantage that should be provided by joint programming. 


Tag: Challenges Effectiveness Joint UN Programme Knowledge management Policies & Procedures Project and Programme management UN Agencies Capacity Building Inclusive economic growth Jobs and Livelihoods

3.

4.2 Effectiveness (continuation)

4.2.2. Component 2. Vocational and skills training

Component 2 of the joint programme aimed at addressing the skills gap in enterprises through market-driven skills training, with a target to train 20,000 youths. Available evidence, including observations from the field indicate that most of the PUNOs were involved in life skills and/orvocational skills development. It was also evident that there was gender parity in the selection of participants, with almost all those that were directly observed having fifty percent female participants. Some of the training providers noted that selection is done by local community elders, who are given specific and pre-determined number of female participants as part of the selection criteria. In the case of UNIDO, beneficiary selection was based on surveys of enterprises in the light industrial areas of Kismayo and Baidoa to identify potential trainees who had requisite skills and familiarity with the equipment, technology and tools that would be used for training. However, some of the indicators were not monitored, while those that were monitored, modest progress was achieved (Figure 6). The number of youth trained by year is in annex 3a. Figure 6. Component 2 outcome and output assessment.

While the planned targets for vocational and skills development are unlikely to be achieved; taking into account that the available resources were US$23.65 million out of an initial total planned budget of US$ 54 million, the number of youth trained is considered proportionate. However, based on information obtained from key informants at national and regional levels, the content of the training was not satisfactory as elaborated below.

Key informants noted that most of the training followed the traditional model of skills training focusing on such skills as carpentry, masonry, plumbing, tailoring, and hospitality. Although some key informants noted that these skills are linked to the construction value chain, there was however no value chain analysis undertaken for the construction sector/subsector. In Baidoa however, stakeholders noted that the training skills were not market relevant. They also observed that the training packages were usually for a duration of 3 to 4 months, which was hardly sufficient to impart meaningful skills, especially if the training was targeting the most disadvantaged youth who will likely have very limited formal education or illiterate. The evaluation team also noted that the JP missed opportunities for developing strategic partnerships with established training providers in the regions. For example, in Garowe, SIDRA Institute was an established private institution with capacity to undertake both research and training within the Puntland region and nationally.

In addition, there are missed opportunities for strategic long term and sustainable engagement through institutional capacity development. Key informants in Baidoa observed for example, that there is no TVET institution in the region. Supporting the establishment of such an institution would be more strategic to provide sustainable skills development. Furthermore, such an institution could provide accredited and certified qualifications, which would be more useful and marketable for the youth. The evaluation team also noted that UNIDO had a different approach in which they target youth that are already in employment. UNIDO staff noted that their interventions were mainly for the construction value chain, and aimed at ‘increasing the number of productive working hours, income generation, and strengthening the productive capacity of workshops’. While this improves productivity, and may in the long term contribute to make companies more competitive thereby helping to secure sustainable jobs. However, as also noted earlier, some of the training was outside the selected value chains, or lacked explicit reference to initiatives addressed to other value chain constraints. The trainees are given $6 a day as an incentive to participate, personal protective equipment, first aid and work safety and nutritional support. In addition, on completion of training, the best 35 percent are given tool kits to use when they return to their jobs.

UNIDO also provides training for inmates in Baidoa Central Prison, including convicted Al Shabab. The training covers basic vocational skills, which enables them to do useful work while inside, such as repairs and painting of prison infrastructure. This also enables their reintegration into the community upon release. The impact of this approach, i.e. whether or not this will effectively discourage them from rejoining Al Shabab is not yet known, but if lack of opportunity and skills was the only factor, that assumption would be logical. One inmate who undertook brickmaking training while in prison was released on 5 January, and was already engaged in brickmaking using the tool kit provided. The ex-inmate also helped to establish a farming plot and chicken coop at the prison in collaboration with other Al Shabab inmates as a ‘champion’ of the programme.

In 2016, FAO also undertook training of 210 youth in good agricultural practices (GAP) and modern farming techniques in the sesame sector in Baidoa, Beletweyn and Jowhar. The project combined GAP training with agribusiness training to promote the idea of agriculture as a profitable business opportunity and not just “farming” – which is more in line with the JP strategy model. In some cases, the youth were provided with starter kits upon completion of training in order to provide them with productive capital assets and tools to start and own small enterprises. There is no evidence however, that the JP had institutionalised a formal monitoring mechanism to follow up on these youths to check if indeed they were establishing such enterprises and if so, whether or not they were sustainable. The evaluation team noted that such information, if available was only anecdotal and not formally monitored or reported. Some PUNO programme staff noted that while the JP may not have such a monitoring mechanism, individual UN agencies do. Other programme staff also agreed that lack of effective tracking for individual training beneficiaries was a challenge; and the practical difficulties of following up individual trainees – often in remote rural areas – and the costs of doing so were prohibitive.

According to youth groups interviewed in Bossaso and Garowe, the major challenge they faced was lack of capital. The programme has provided small grants in some cases, but this aspect is generally lacking from the implementation model. The programme has an opportunity to introduce a micro finance model based on a revolving fund, which has been tested in other countries such as Bangladesh and Ethiopia. There was also high level of duplication by UN agencies, with all of them engaged in skills training of one form or another with little or no coordination. The evaluation team noted that the JP missed opportunities to build synergies, such as ensuring that the youth that are trained by one agency are offered preference on opportunities arising from the activities of partner agencies. In the regions visited by the evaluation team, PUNOs generally had no idea what the other agencies were doing. In some cases, project officers did not even know each other or had never formally talked to each other about their JP activities. Overall however, while there was high level of satisfaction among youth beneficiaries of the training programmes, there appeared to be rather mixed views among other stakeholders who tended to see the training packages as too traditional or short term to make an impact on longterm employment. 


Tag: UN Agencies Conflict Humanitarian development nexus Peace Building Capacity Building Cash Transfers Jobs and Livelihoods Micro-credit Social Protection Urbanization Youth

4.

4.2 Effectiveness (continuation)

E. Programme monitoring and reporting

The programme quarterly and annual progress reports are the major tools through which the PSC and other stakeholders monitor the performance of the programme, and based on that make informed decisions to accelerate progress or bring it back on track in the event of any deviation. This implies that reporting should be comprehensive and should not be done in a selective manner, whereby only those indicators with positive progress are reported on. An analysis of the programme’s quarterly reports shows that reporting of the outcome and output indicators varies from time to time. In some reports some of the indicators are omitted, only to reappear in subsequent quarter reports. The following examples illustrate the inconsistences in reporting (Figure 8). 

As illustrated above, reporting on indicators varies from time to time. Not all of the indicators as contained in the programme results framework were consistently shown in the quarterly and annual reports. However, even when no activities are carried out during any given quarter, all the indicators should be reported and shown in the reporting matrix. For quantitative indicators, a zero should be reported if/where no activities are results were achieved, because this information will be useful for management decision-making. Although some programme staff noted that this was a directive from the Multi-partner Trust Fund to omit indicators for which no substantial progress had been made during the project reporting period, the evaluators’ opinion is that this defeats the whole purpose of reporting.


Tag: Effectiveness Efficiency Multi Donor Trust Funds Monitoring and Evaluation Results-Based Management Peace Building

5.

4.2.4. Implementation and coordination

G. Programme visibility among key stakeholders

After its approval and signing in June 2015, the joint programme experienced a delayed start with fund release in September and actual activity implementation starting thereafter. Some members of the Steering Committee noted that there was not much progress during the first year because many of the national institutions were seized with the issues and uncertainties associated with elections, which were held in October and November 2016. The national Programme Steering Committee (PSC) was established as per programme design, and the Federal Chamber of Commerce was also invited to join the steering committee in order to improve cooperation with the private sector. This is a good practice and in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. However, further evidence suggests that the Chamber of Commerce has not participated in any meetings of the PSC. The JP plan was to establish a four-tier management and coordination structure comprising of PSC, Technical Committee (TC), Programme Management Unit (PMU) and Regional Implementation Unit (RIU). 

The RIU “will be responsible for the program implementation at the regional level. It will mirror the PMU at the regional level, and will work directly with contractors/NGOs working on the ground submitting progress reports to the programme secretariat. The Regional Implementation Unit will participate in the TC meeting to maintain horizontal program transparency and accountability”. The Regional Implementation Unit was not established as per the programme plan, and this appears to have affected coordination at that level. In Puntland, the evaluation team noted that the JP had no visibility among stakeholders and generally people were not talking about it, not even the staff of PUNOs among themselves. As already noted in page 20 above, in Garowe, the field programme officers for ILO and UNDP had never shared any information or held discussions about the programme even though they are co-located in the same compound. The UN Habitat Programme Officer had never met with, and didn’t recognise the FAO Programme Officer although both are based in Bossaso. 

The field officers attributed this lack of visibility and coordination to the limited programme budget. For example, according to UNDP field staff, the annual budget for Puntland region was $350,000 compared to $10 million for the Joint Programme on Local Governance (JPLG). With its large budget, the JPLG naturally attracts more focus and excitement as it delivers more resourcessuch as vehicles and office equipment. The Puntland Regional Ministry of Labour and Youth also noted that the programme has coordination challenges. They said that the Ministry was not involved in the programme planning and design and there was no inception meeting at the start of implementation. In South West Region, the lead national counterpart is the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS). However, the Ministry said they assumed the role of lead Ministry in the last quarter of 2017, as previously there was lack of clarity about their role and that of the Regional Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA). According to some members of the Youth Association and Women Association consulted in Garowe, “the programme was shrouded in secrecy, and there was no transparency by line Ministries about its activities”. The FGS is allocated 3 percent of the total budget funds available for coordination. Three Technical Advisors, one Finance Officer and 4 Interns who are paid by the JP have been seconded to the Federal MOLSA since September 2017. In all target five regions, two professional positions of Technical Advisor and YES Focal Point were established and paid for by the JP also from September 2017. However, the Focal Point position had since been abolished by the time of this evaluation, ostensibly due to lack of clarity about their specific roles and responsibilities. This will likely further affect coordination due to already weak coordination among line Ministries. The Regional MOLSA also felt that lack of engagement of line Ministries affects not only coordination, but long term sustainability.


Tag: Joint UN Programme Knowledge management Oversight Partnership Project and Programme management Country Government UN Agencies Jobs and Livelihoods Youth Coordination

6.

4.3. Joint Programme Efficiency

The section contains an assessment of the programme’s utilisation of available resources, including the extent to which PUNOs have collaborated to deliver results cost effectively. As already noted earlier, there has been minimal coordination among PUNOs, and weak information sharing. In addition, the analysis will also show that the cost of creating a single job was high.

J. Collaboration among PUNOs to leverage their respective comparative advantages

According to United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Guidelines, a joint programme is appropriate if “its components build on each other, there is clarity on the roles and responsibilities of each partner, and mutual accountability on the delivery of development results”. By definition therefore, the case study on page 16 illustrates a typical joint programming model in which three UN organisations and government undertook activities contained in a joint work plan and related common budgetary framework to achieve a common result. In other activities, PUNOs have been undertaking stand-alone interventions that were not directly linked to the activities of any of the other JP partners. The following extracts from the third quarterly report (2017) illustrates the fragmented nature of PUNO interventions undertaken independently of each other:

- FAO mobilized and supported 2,000 youth farmers and agro-pastoralists (897 being women) with 240 grams of assorted vegetable kits (Capsicum, Carrots, Tomatoes, Onions, Amaranthus and Watermelon); - ILO engaged private sector companies in the Somalia Working skills programme…including telecommunications, ICT, garment making, banking, media/printing, energy, construction, hospitality, retail and logistics; - UN-Habitat has finalized the Agreement of Cooperation (AoC) with the local administration in Mogadishu for Shaqeyso III training 120 hours of comprehensive life skills training, 120 hours of vocational (construction) training, 20 hours of ‘build your own business’ entrepreneurial training, and 240 hours of community works activities; - UNIDO’s vocational training technical assistance focused on trades based skills training…producing agricultural implements and tools for farmers, welding and metalwork trainings are producing goods for the construction sector as well as items to enhance local schools. 

As noted earlier, the ‘joint work plan’ is done separately by each UN agency and then collated by the JP coordinator into the annual work plan. Similarly, at the field level, there is no joint implementation or joint monitoring; in fact, field-based project staff do not share information even when they are co-located. When asked how they collaborated with other UN agencies, some of the responses by UN agency senior management and programme staff included the following: “…there is no joint programming, we are joined in one programme” “…we would still be doing what we are doing even if there was no joint programme” “…there is competition for funding among UN agencies, and therefore very little incentive to work together”.

One of the lessons from evaluations in other countries, including ‘delivering as one’ countries is that inter-agency collaboration is stronger when the government is directly involved in coordination of implementation. The need for developing and strengthening institutional capacity of government counterparts, especially at subnational level cannot be overemphasised. As was noted elsewhere in this report, the State MOLSA in South West for example has no staff, with the Minister working alone as at the time of the evaluation.


Tag: Efficiency Joint UN Programme Partnership Strategic Positioning Country Government UN Agencies Capacity Building Jobs and Livelihoods Youth Coordination

7.

4.4. Sustainability

As programme implementation progresses through its various stages, sustainability often also changes in both form and content. During early stages of implementation, sustainability is concerned about the probability that activities/processes will continue after initial funding ends. Towards the end of implementation, the concern shifts towards the programme’s potential to self-replicate and upscale its target beneficiaries. This implies that programme sustainability should be planned and monitored through specific sustainability indicators over its life cycle. This analysis is based on assessment of the key sustainability indicators in both stages of the programme – early implementation and end of programme.

M. Institutional capacity development and national ownership

The joint programme partners use different implementation modalities. Some of them use direct implementation, while others use national implementation through non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For example the joint implementation partner for ILO and UNDP in Baidoa s a local NGO known as Warshiikh Rural Development Organization (WARDO). However, none of the PUNOs have any government-led interventions. This is mainly because in some regions, government does not have the requisite institutional capacity to implement the projects. For example as noted earlier, the South West State MOLSA does not have any staff. While this is a genuine limitation for PUNOs to engage government as an implementing partner (IP), it also impacts on the programme’s sustainability. This is further compounded by the absence of relevant legislative and policy framework for the employment and labour sector. Among some of the lessons that informed the formulation of this joint programme, the authors noted that ‘Capacity development of relevant government institutions is necessary if programmes are to be sustainable in the future. Capacity development has been mainstreamed across all components of this programme and it is in line with the partner’s needs’31 . In that regard, the programme provided salaries for technical staff in the federal MOLSA, but these efforts have not been sufficient, especially at FMS level. In South Weststate, for example, UNIDO had plans to provide institutional support to the State MOLSA, but as at the time of the evaluation, no action plan for this activity had been developed yet.

Furthermore, the linkages that were meant to be established with the JPLG through the PBF funding were not yet apparent. In theory, the area based approach would enable the JPs to provide their respective support in a specific locality, whereby the JPLG would provide support to extend state authority, while the JPYES focuses on employment creation. This is not yet happening in practice. This therefore means that when the joint programme exits at the end of funding, it will not leave government with capacity to continue with the programme’s processes nor ability to upscale or replicate to other regions. Some key informants noted that in an ideal situation, the responsibility for monitoring development programmes should rest with the government. This means that the government has to be involved in the planning and implementation of the programme in order to engender a sense of ownership. When asked about the probability of the programme’s sustainability, one key informant in Baidoa summed it up by saying: “UN projects leave no trace”.

In Puntland Region, the Ministry of Labour and Youth informed the evaluators that they were not involved in the planning, implementation or monitoring of activities “but only get invited to give speeches at official events.” In plain language, this means that there is no sense of ‘local ownership’ of programme processes and results.


Tag: Sustainability Private Sector Financing Civic Engagement Implementation Modality Ownership Private Sector Humanitarian development nexus Capacity Building Jobs and Livelihoods Micro-credit Youth

Recommendations
1

6.3. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing analysis and evaluation findings, 12 recommendations are proposed to enable the programme to refocus and enhance its performance towards expected results. Four of the recommendations address critical strategic considerations, with the remaining eight focusing on operational issues.

Strategic-level recommendations

Recommendation No. 1 Recommit to the programme approach based on value chain development Government’s employment strategy

Programme implementation has been fragmented with evidence suggesting lack of consensus on the efficacy of the strategy and its potential to create sustainable employment. This was further compounded by the absence of a national employment strategy and associated policy instruments. For the programme to move forward with all its partners contributing towards a common result, it is imperative that stakeholders, including PUNOs and donors, led by the Federal MOLSA revisit the design and develop an agreed programme strategy and approach.

2

Recommendation No. 2: Develop government institutional capacity at all levels

Job creation requires the right policies as well as adequate capacity to enforce implementation of those policies. The programme should aim to develop government capacity in these three critical areas:

a)       Capacity to coordinate all actors in the employment sector, including development partners to ensure coherence and avoid duplication,

b)       Capacity to develop and monitor implementation of its employment policies and strategies, and

c)       Capacity to develop, implement and coordinate programmes.

3

Recommendation 3: Promote effective engagement with private sector

The private sector is the main driver for employment creation. The private sector’s capacity and ability to create employment is not only critical to the programme’s success, but also a major risk. The programme should therefore invest some of its resources towards managing this risk, by engaging the private sector and demonstrating added value for its participation.  As ‘private sector’ covers a wide range of actors and sectors; engagement should include (a) business development policy, strategy and services, (b) business linkages and value chain development, and (c) access to finance and credit.

4

Recommendation No. 4:  Establish an e-information management system

Considering the finding of weak of information flow at all levels, the Government with support of the PUNOs should consider establishing an e-information management system to enable integrated data collection, analysis, documentation, dissemination and lessons learned on employment creation. The e-platform should be based within Government and linked to M&E systems, as well as decentralised and integrated to FMS level.

5

Operational-level recommendations

Recommendation 5: Extend programme to December 2018 through no-cost extension

In light of Recommendation 1 above, programme implementation may have to be stalled for a month or two. It will therefore be unlikely that available funds can be exhausted by June 2018. The PSC should therefore consider a no-cost extension to extend the programme timeline to December 2018.

6

Recommendation No. 6: Donors should consider funding second phase of the programme

In light of the strategic recommendations above, and given the overall relevance and importance of youth employment in the broader context of stability and economic development, donors should consider funding a second phase of the programme. In the second phase, donors should also consider providing specific funding for a micro-credit revolving fund to facilitate the development of a small and medium enterprise (SME) sector. On the other hand, the government, with support of relevant PUNOs, should develop relevant legislative instruments, including for example, (a) SME policy and strategy, (b) micro-finance policy and strategy, and (c) TVET capacity development.

7

Recommendation No. 7: Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for PUNOs

Joint programming entails inter-agency collaboration as well as efficiency gains arising from the collective comparative advantages of more than one UN agency working together. The programme should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of individual UN agencies such that their respective activities have mutual dependability and are demonstrably linked to and contribute to the expected outcomes.

8

Recommendation No. 8: Revive the programme Technical Committee

As the programme intends to work across multiple sectors and value chains, it is imperative that there is an institutional mechanism to drive the programme daily activities with a broad-picture lens. The PSC should therefore consider reviving the Technical Committee with clear terms of reference, and performance indicators for accountability. The Technical Committee should be accountable to the PSC and be required to report at every PSC meeting.

9

Recommendation No. 9 Establish Regional Implementation Units

As programme implementation is based in the respective FMS, the PSC should consider establishing or strengthening the existing RIU as per the planned management arrangements. In addition, the PSC may also consider establishing an Extended PSC which includes the chairpersons of the RIUs and would meet at least biannually or on an ad hoc basis particularly if/when there are major changes and/or decisions to be made about the programme strategy, funding or activities.

10

Recommendation No. 10: Establish a Programme Management Unit

According to the JP document, the PSC is the highest body for strategic guidance, which meets quarterly to ‘provide strategic direction and oversight, set allocation criteria, allocate resources, review implementation progress and address problems, review and approve progress reports budget revisions/reallocations, and evaluation reports, notes audit reports, and if needed initiate investigations’. Activity implementation is vested in individual UN agencies, with programme coordination vested in the JP Coordinator. The PSC should consider establishing a Programme Management Unit headed by a Programme Manager with delegated decision-making authority to drive and coordinate activity implementation on a day-to-day basis.

11

Recommendation No.11 Progress reporting should be consistently based on the programme results, monitoring and evaluation framework

The JP Coordinator (or PMU, when it is established) should ensure that the programme monitoring and evaluation framework is consistently used for all quarterly and annual progress reports. This includes the disaggregation of data by rural/urban or men/women as stipulated in the M&E framework. In addition, all the indicators should be reflected in the progress reports, even if there were no activities undertaken during the reporting period, in order to provide clarity and inform appropriate management decisions. In addition, the targets should be revised to reflect the available funding.

12

Recommendation No. 12: Accelerate implementation of the Daldhis project

One of the major efficiency gains of joint programming is enhanced effectiveness arising from the synergy of different UN agency mandates. The Daldhis project presents an opportunity for PUNOs to contribute towards a larger outcome of expanding state authority in new districts. The PSC should accelerate implementation of the YES component of the Daldhis programme. This may entail convening a joint Steering Committee meeting with the other JPs – JPLG and JPROL – to develop a common strategy to accelerate implementation.

1. Recommendation:

6.3. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing analysis and evaluation findings, 12 recommendations are proposed to enable the programme to refocus and enhance its performance towards expected results. Four of the recommendations address critical strategic considerations, with the remaining eight focusing on operational issues.

Strategic-level recommendations

Recommendation No. 1 Recommit to the programme approach based on value chain development Government’s employment strategy

Programme implementation has been fragmented with evidence suggesting lack of consensus on the efficacy of the strategy and its potential to create sustainable employment. This was further compounded by the absence of a national employment strategy and associated policy instruments. For the programme to move forward with all its partners contributing towards a common result, it is imperative that stakeholders, including PUNOs and donors, led by the Federal MOLSA revisit the design and develop an agreed programme strategy and approach.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: With respect to the fragmentation of programme implementation there needs to be some consideration that the YES programme involves specific outcomes for UNIDO and UNDP under the DALDHIS programme. Further, sustainability enhancing mechanisms tend to be introduced later in programme cycles so the employment enhancing support might be picked up in the final EVAL report. Regarding commitment to programme strategy, there is broad consensus that the work of each agency is committed to the original YES strategy which was to stimulate the productivity of major sectors, especially through strengthening the links in the relevant value chains, and through improving infrastructure for transport, markets, trade and energy. The approach taken will need to also formalize different outputs between DALDHIS and YES as well as endorse the value chains we are supporting. Finally, there are a number of value chain upgrading strategies being funded in the country (OUTREACH, GEEL, PIMS, etc) and greater linkages should be established to avoid duplication and amplify in-the-fields results.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
1. Programme design inputs for Phase II will include initiatives to integrate relevant employment/labour strategies and greater attention to government-led coordination;
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed As per the developed Concept Note on Phase II, endorsed by all partners, the two aspects, such as the initiatives to integrate relevant employment/labour strategies and greater attention to government-led coordination, was included. The programme design inputs were integrated in Phase II programme proposal that concluded in December 2019. History
2. Ensure UNDP technical assistance includes more focused commitment to the original YES theory of change between the three components and will allocate sufficient resources given scope;
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP project manager 2019/12 Completed UNDP technical assistance/resources focused more on renewable/solar and fishery value chains, based on the YES Theory of Change between the 3 components – short term jobs creation, skills development and sustainable jobs creation. History
3. Will continue to work to see the finalization of a national employment strategy, to be endorsed by the Ministry of Labour;
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/08]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/08 Completed A National Employment Policy has been developed and is expected to be endorsed by the Cabinet soon. History
4. UNDP project managers will prioritize value chain upgrading strategies in line with available resources, community action plan requests, and synergies with other value chain programmes in the country;
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed UNDP prioritized the development of 2 value chain sectors, such as solar and fishery, linking with the community action plan requests. History
5. Support a Ministry led review of the current value chains proposed for technical assistance. Greater resource will be allocated to improve coordination activities.
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed UNDP intensified its effort to increase governments’ involvement in the ongoing value chain development initiatives. Greater resources allocated to improve coordination activities. In Phase II, government-led review of the value chains included. History
2. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 2: Develop government institutional capacity at all levels

Job creation requires the right policies as well as adequate capacity to enforce implementation of those policies. The programme should aim to develop government capacity in these three critical areas:

a)       Capacity to coordinate all actors in the employment sector, including development partners to ensure coherence and avoid duplication,

b)       Capacity to develop and monitor implementation of its employment policies and strategies, and

c)       Capacity to develop, implement and coordinate programmes.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: UN agencies working under YES work directly with ministerial counterparts. Further, Letters of Agreement are in place that provide significant resources (3% of total funds) to the Ministry of Labour. These funds are used for the payment of salaries, purchase of IT and office infrastructure/assets, cover the costs of transportation and conferences. In addition to direct support to the ministry, UN agencies are working with the MoLSA to roll out M&E capacity building initiatives, information management upskilling, and study tours focused on promoting youth employment in fragile operating environments. In the future, there will be support being directed at MoLSA to fund positions like a Job Creation Specialist and a Communication/Advocacy Officer for the YES programme. YES now has a dedicated Programme Coordinator that is working with the YES technical focal points at MoLSA on calibrating YES programming between FGS and RMS (regional member states).

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Will continue to work to strengthen support to the MoLSA (FGS/RMS); • UNDP Phase I close out (DALDHIS) and Phase II design efforts will work with the YES Programme Coordinator to build greater federal, regional, and district linkages to support implementation and M&E activities; • Will work to finalize a MoLSA endorsed national employment strategy.
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed UNDP improved its working relationship with the federal MoLSA and its line ministries at regional level, in developing their capacities in planning, coordination and M&E. In this regard, technical and financial resources were provided to the ministry by signing a LOA and organizing a number of activities. History
3. Recommendation:

Recommendation 3: Promote effective engagement with private sector

The private sector is the main driver for employment creation. The private sector’s capacity and ability to create employment is not only critical to the programme’s success, but also a major risk. The programme should therefore invest some of its resources towards managing this risk, by engaging the private sector and demonstrating added value for its participation.  As ‘private sector’ covers a wide range of actors and sectors; engagement should include (a) business development policy, strategy and services, (b) business linkages and value chain development, and (c) access to finance and credit.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: The original project document, if fully funded, would include efforts and interventions to address sector-specific enabling environment issues, such as: i) microfinance and matching grant schemes to improve access to finance for youth and businesses, ii) technology for value addition and iii) business development services. However, when only partial funding is available some interventions need to be scaled back and/or dropped. It is certainly the case that these sorts of recommendations can be integrated into Phase II design and development activities. Further, there should be greater attention to and commitment to providing an analysis of systematic constraints in the various value chain diagnostic studies.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Phase I will seek funds for its micro-grant based enterprise development proposals targeting the renewable energy and fisheries value chains; • Phase I close out and Phase II design inputs will look to develop more substantive engagement with the private sector so as to systematize and better coordinate programme implementation activities;
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/08]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/08 Completed Phase I mobilized resources and implemented its micro-grant-based enterprise development initiatives in solar and fishery sectors. History
4. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 4:  Establish an e-information management system

Considering the finding of weak of information flow at all levels, the Government with support of the PUNOs should consider establishing an e-information management system to enable integrated data collection, analysis, documentation, dissemination and lessons learned on employment creation. The e-platform should be based within Government and linked to M&E systems, as well as decentralised and integrated to FMS level.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

 DSP: Agencies have been working modestly to help develop the Ministry of Labour to develop a basic M&E platform. This includes the procurement of IT hardware and software packages for MoLSA. At the Programme Coordination level a Dropbox-centered information sharing portal is being rolled out that will provide MoLSA and YES-linked technical ministries with technical assessments, value chain handbooks, project advocacy efforts, and other reports to support government-led initiatives to engage in the process of Youth Employment in the country.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
YES Phase II design inputs will include providing resources for setting up e-information management system to link vertical/horizontal data collection, info and document management, and info sharing platforms
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed As per the developed 2nd generation employment project proposal, one of the components focuses on the governance and the development of e-information management system. History
5. Recommendation:

Operational-level recommendations

Recommendation 5: Extend programme to December 2018 through no-cost extension

In light of Recommendation 1 above, programme implementation may have to be stalled for a month or two. It will therefore be unlikely that available funds can be exhausted by June 2018. The PSC should therefore consider a no-cost extension to extend the programme timeline to December 2018.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: In addition to this justification, looking at the expenditure profile since the start of the programme confirms that there is a need to extend the project into the end of 2018. There is no evidence to support a claim that UN agencies have the rate of delivery required to exhaust all available resources. Further, some additional funds are available to re-focus the programme back on a rigorous value chain-based upgrading strategy. Having said that, the 01 March 2018 YES Technical Working Group meeting endorsed this recommendation to extend to the end of 2018.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Phase I Annual Work plan has been updated to extend operations until the end of 2018. For this, we need additional MPTF resources to cover 2018.
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/09/09]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/07 Completed The 2018 Phase I Annual Workplan has been revised and extended until 2018 and additional resources mobilized for this. Phase I has been extended until 31st December 2019 and adequate resources have been made available. History
6. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 6: Donors should consider funding second phase of the programme

In light of the strategic recommendations above, and given the overall relevance and importance of youth employment in the broader context of stability and economic development, donors should consider funding a second phase of the programme. In the second phase, donors should also consider providing specific funding for a micro-credit revolving fund to facilitate the development of a small and medium enterprise (SME) sector. On the other hand, the government, with support of relevant PUNOs, should develop relevant legislative instruments, including for example, (a) SME policy and strategy, (b) micro-finance policy and strategy, and (c) TVET capacity development.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: I would put the recommendation to consider micro-credit/revolving fund windows for the micro and small-scale enterprise sector and legislative instruments as a second order priority below building ministerial capacity to undertake value chain research, analysis, mapping, monitoring, and reporting. With respect to micro-finance there are serious institutional challenges to be addressed that will require work with the local finance/banking sector, government, remittance services, etc. These are long term financial product development challenges that will need to be addressed that are conceivably and likely to take much longer than a targeted value chain-based job creation programme initiative.  Although ILO is working to update the country’s current labour law and employment law(s) other multilaterals (like World Bank) who’s mandate is closely aligned to SME and Enterprise Finance and that have attempted to implement a SME focused strategy (like SCORE: Somali Core Economic Institutions and Opportunities’ project face continual implementation delays that are unlikely to be addressed differently by UN agencies working in the sector. With respect to legislative instruments aimed at TVET policy the challenge will be to link policy to the economic drivers and the capital, human, and technological assets that already existing VoTech service providers have at their disposal.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Will work with the YES Programme Coordinator to design a demand driven, government led, Phase II technical assistance programme targeting high return and commercially viable sections of endorsed value chains • Will reach out to UN sister agencies to identify subject matter experts who can advise on higher level policy development strategies to support YES outputs and objectives. • Will work with Programme Coordinator in designing a strategy for resource mobilization for the new generation YES programme
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed The design of Phase II was completed UNDP and other PUNO worked with the YES Programme Coordinator and developed a demand-driven and government-led Phase II, in which productive value chains were given priority. History
7. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 7: Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for PUNOs

Joint programming entails inter-agency collaboration as well as efficiency gains arising from the collective comparative advantages of more than one UN agency working together. The programme should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of individual UN agencies such that their respective activities have mutual dependability and are demonstrably linked to and contribute to the expected outcomes.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: This recommendation is an important reminder of the importance of working collaboratively from the initial design phase to leverage presence, capacity, and mandate into the delivering of joint programming interventions. As the YES programme moves from Phase I close out towards Phase II intervention design there should be a focus on mandate, presence, and capacity. Based upon those criterion we can move towards roles and associated responsibilities. Sequencing of actions should also be looked at closely.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Under Phase II, will work with the YES Programme Coordinator to strengthen planning, coordination, activity implementation, between the YES UN agencies and other stakeholders
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed UNDP, in collaboration with other UN-agencies and partners, strengthened YES coordination for effective planning, coordination and implementation of activities. History
8. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 8: Revive the programme Technical Committee

As the programme intends to work across multiple sectors and value chains, it is imperative that there is an institutional mechanism to drive the programme daily activities with a broad-picture lens. The PSC should therefore consider reviving the Technical Committee with clear terms of reference, and performance indicators for accountability. The Technical Committee should be accountable to the PSC and be required to report at every PSC meeting.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: The Programme Coordinator arrived in the middle of February and on 01 March held its first Technical Working Group meeting. During that meeting the TWG reviewed the Mid Term Evaluation recommendations and the Annual Workplans for the agencies. During the TWG meeting new Terms of References for the TWG were presented and endorsed. Technical Working Group members are now coordinating to set up a Heads of Agencies meeting and a follow up YES Steering Committee meeting. The YES Programme Coordinator is travelling to the Ministry of Labour on Wednesday, 14 March to discuss the MTE recommendations and an update on agency workplans, MoLSA-focused potential capacity building initiatives, and how to strengthen FGS/RMS ministerial communication and coordination.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Under Phase I, will work to expand the TWG to become a forum of YES multi-stakeholders meeting regularly and presenting their inputs to the YES Steering Committee.
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed The TWG and PSC meetings were held regularly. The recommendations of the meetings were implemented for the effective and efficient implementation of Phase I and design of Phase II. History
9. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 9 Establish Regional Implementation Units

As programme implementation is based in the respective FMS, the PSC should consider establishing or strengthening the existing RIU as per the planned management arrangements. In addition, the PSC may also consider establishing an Extended PSC which includes the chairpersons of the RIUs and would meet at least biannually or on an ad hoc basis particularly if/when there are major changes and/or decisions to be made about the programme strategy, funding or activities.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: At this time, there are extremely limited funds to set up these RIU. However, improving programme objectives, intervention logic, and FGS/RMS coordination are Phase I goals for the Project Coordinator. There appears to be a role for the technical focal points at regional ministerial counterparts. Building up the capacity of these project stakeholders is possible within the current resource constraints of the PUNOs.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Phase I programme and operational efforts will strengthen coordination activities in Baidoa and Kismaayo. • Will work with other YES UN agencies to expand and replicate this model of regional/district coordination; and • Direct the recently recruited YES Technical Advisors at the federal and regional level to take a more active role in monitoring results being reported in the field.
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed More focus was given to strengthen the coordination efforts in Baidoa and Kismayo, as majority of the activities were implemented in SWS and Jubaland. In a regular interval, the line ministries in these regions held multi-stakeholder coordination meetings and reviewed their activities and took actions accordingly. UNDP Project Team, in collaboration with the YES Coordination Unit, conducted several tailored-made trainings for developing technical capacities of the YES Technical Advisors. UNDP Team was sharing knowledge and experience/resource materials through a communication network. History
10. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 10: Establish a Programme Management Unit

According to the JP document, the PSC is the highest body for strategic guidance, which meets quarterly to ‘provide strategic direction and oversight, set allocation criteria, allocate resources, review implementation progress and address problems, review and approve progress reports budget revisions/reallocations, and evaluation reports, notes audit reports, and if needed initiate investigations’. Activity implementation is vested in individual UN agencies, with programme coordination vested in the JP Coordinator. The PSC should consider establishing a Programme Management Unit headed by a Programme Manager with delegated decision-making authority to drive and coordinate activity implementation on a day-to-day basis.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: Initial discussion with PUNOs indicate that each agency has an already existing Programme Management Unit. Efforts will be directed at better coordination between these various agency-specific PMUs.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Supports the efforts of the YES Programme Coordinator to pull various YES managers closer together at the operational and monitoring levels.
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed Close communication was made between YES Programme Coordinator and all programme managers in operational and monitoring levels. Joint monitoring missions and review of the ongoing activities were undertaken History
11. Recommendation:

Recommendation No.11 Progress reporting should be consistently based on the programme results, monitoring and evaluation framework

The JP Coordinator (or PMU, when it is established) should ensure that the programme monitoring and evaluation framework is consistently used for all quarterly and annual progress reports. This includes the disaggregation of data by rural/urban or men/women as stipulated in the M&E framework. In addition, all the indicators should be reflected in the progress reports, even if there were no activities undertaken during the reporting period, in order to provide clarity and inform appropriate management decisions. In addition, the targets should be revised to reflect the available funding.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: With the re-establishment of a structured Technical Working Group it was agreed that the Programme Coordinator would invite private sector informants to make short discussions on what works in establishing and growing private sector initiatives in the country. The creation of a sharing portal via Dropbox will also support this recommendation. Furthermore, joint monitoring missions will also provide project managers with evidence based intervention feedback. 

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Under Phase I, will work to strengthen current efforts to promote State to State knowledge and info exchanges; and • Under Phase II, will develop a more robust monitoring and results based Phase II programme framework
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed Through regular monitoring, meetings and communication with the regional partners, a network of information and knowledge exchange was developed. Phase II design took into consideration of effective results-based programming. History
12. Recommendation:

Recommendation No. 12: Accelerate implementation of the Daldhis project

One of the major efficiency gains of joint programming is enhanced effectiveness arising from the synergy of different UN agency mandates. The Daldhis project presents an opportunity for PUNOs to contribute towards a larger outcome of expanding state authority in new districts. The PSC should accelerate implementation of the YES component of the Daldhis programme. This may entail convening a joint Steering Committee meeting with the other JPs – JPLG and JPROL – to develop a common strategy to accelerate implementation.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2020/12/05]

Programme Management Response:

DSP: This issue is being addressed through the DALDHIS project. It will involve a rebalancing of funds and with commercial agreements with service providers and suppliers coming into effect.

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
• Under Phase I efforts will continue to be made to speed up the delivery rate now that previous constraints and activity barriers have been resolved; • Under Phase II, greater resources will be allocated in programme components to ensure more effective support in the field for building up the capacity of ministerial staff and experts involved in various Phase II outputs and activities.
[Added: 2018/05/23] [Last Updated: 2019/12/19]
UNDP Project Manager 2019/12 Completed A delivery acceleration plan was developed and implemented. As a result, the delivery rate dramatically increased. All the planned activities were completed. In Phase II design, the capacity development was mainstreamed in it. History

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