End-of-Project Evaluation – “Peace-Building Fund Programme”

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Evaluation Plan:
2018-2022, Papua New Guinea
Evaluation Type:
Final Project
Planned End Date:
01/2019
Completion Date:
12/2018
Status:
Completed
Management Response:
Yes
Evaluation Budget(US $):
35,000

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Title End-of-Project Evaluation – “Peace-Building Fund Programme”
Atlas Project Number: 00049466
Evaluation Plan: 2018-2022, Papua New Guinea
Evaluation Type: Final Project
Status: Completed
Completion Date: 12/2018
Planned End Date: 01/2019
Management Response: Yes
UNDP Signature Solution:
  • 1. Governance
  • 2. Gender
Corporate Outcome and Output (UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021)
  • 1. Output 1.2.3 Institutions and systems enabled to address awareness, prevention and enforcement of anti-corruption measures to maximize availability of resources for poverty eradication
SDG Goal
  • Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
  • Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
SDG Target
  • 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
  • 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels
  • 5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life
  • 5.c Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels
Evaluation Budget(US $): 35,000
Source of Funding: Project
Evaluation Expenditure(US $): 35,000
Joint Programme: No
Joint Evaluation: No
Evaluation Team members:
Name Title Email Nationality
Lawrence Robertson Dr. robertsonlawrence@hotmail.com
GEF Evaluation: No
Key Stakeholders: Department of the Prime Minister & the NEC, Department of the President & the BEC, PNG National Parliament, National Electoral Commission, Bougainville House of Representatives, ABG Department of Bougainville Peace Agreement Implementation, ABG Health Department, Office of the Bougainville Electoral Commission, Bougainville Catholic Diocese, Nazareth Centre for Rehabilitation, Bougainville Womens Federation, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, United Nations system in PNG, Peace Building Support Office
Countries: PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Lessons
1.

Relevance

Based on the way the United Nations developed, reached agreement on, and implemented the Peacebuilding Priority Plan in PNG and Bougainville over 2014-2018, the UN does not have issues with staff, partners, or stakeholders about whether it is appropriate and relevant for the UN to support the dialogue between the two governments on the implementation of the BPA, awareness raising on BPA implementation, or social cohesion. The engagement of the UN in peacebuilding, when conducted after gaining the approval of stakeholders through consultations, is widely recognized as appropriate and relevant in PNG and the ARoB.


2.

Effectiveness

The PPP team first implemented the referendum ready concept through a private firm that was contracted with to manage the transfer and acquittals of funds with BHOR members. This process did not work well.  The PPP team learned in the course of working with the BHOR on public awareness activities through the firm that the PPP team would have to instead work directly with BHOR members and staff on programme implementation to be able to successfully implement effective outreach activities in a timely way in accordance with UNDP rules and regulations. Training was required, as was monitoring of implementation by PPP staff.


3.

Efficiency of Planning and Implementation

While the UN can implement with a lean staff team, the PPP would be better served by a more robust staffing structure to provide greater support and strengthen partnerships in implementing PPP activities.


4.

Potential for Sustainability, Replication and Magnification

Peacebuilding activities in Bougainville have had limited sustainability and potential for replication or magnification based on support from the 2015-2018 PPP as PPP partners have lacked capacity and funding to consider how they might continue or build on the initiatives pursued under the PPP.


Findings
1.

Relevance

Appropriateness and relevance for the PPP to work to strengthen relationships and trust between the GoPNG and ABG to support the implementation of autonomy arrangements and the BPA (Objective 1)

Objective 1 of the PPP was developed in consultation with GoPNG, ABG, and development partners and built on the basis of the PDA which was developed with civil society and briefed to the GoPNG and ABG. The UNRC, PBSO, GoPNG and ABG signed a Project Document approving the PPP in September 2014. These processes ratified that both governments, civil society, and development partners felt that it was appropriate and relevant for the UN to work through the PPP to strengthen relationships and build trust between the two governments.

All interviewees from both governments, the UN, development partners, and civil society for the evaluation’s fieldwork noted that it was appropriate and relevant for UN organisations to work to strengthen relationships between the two governments. Interviewees emphasized the value of combining a willingness on the part of the UN to encourage or nudge holding meetings between the two governments with resources to facilitate discussions, particularly face-to-face talks, between key officials from the GoPNG and ABG. BHOR staff and members appreciated the support for building their institution and recognized the importance of building relationships between the BHOR and the PNG Parliament through the Papua New Guinea Parliamentary Bipartisan Committee on Bougainville Affairs and the support of the PPP for this engagement. The PNG Parliament is particularly important as the Parliament has roles ratifying the results of the anticipated referendum in the ARoB.

Interviews noted the important benefits of UN engagement as a neutral, impartial actor in this area – where there are no alternatives that could provide neutral international support. The limited number of interested bilateral donors in the region are definitely seen as not neutral or impartial and not welcome to take up this role.

Change in appropriateness or relevance

The Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) in charge of BPA implementation continued to meet at least annually throughout the project, which was an improvement on the period prior to the project. Support from the PPP was seen as important in keeping at least an annual pace of JSB meetings (which reportedly had not been held even once in the four years prior to the PPP), setting up new key mechanisms for executive branch engagement such as the Bougainville Referendum Committee, and developing relationships between legislators through the Bipartisan Referendum Committee of the PNG Parliament and the Referendum Committee of the ABG House of Representatives. Interviewees from the two governments noted that the project helped build and maintain relationships between key counterparts from both governments. Interviewees appreciated the support of the project for Joint Technical Team (JTT) meetings to prepare for JSB meetings as critical steps in building relations between the two governments and working towards implementation of the BPA.

Interviewees noted continued problems in the relationships between both governments and in implementation of autonomy arrangements and the BPA. These issues were seen as validating the need for the PPP to continue to support dialogue between the two governments. Interviewees did not report that UN staff were able to address the content of these persistent disagreements between the two governments in BPA implementation (such as the distribution of development grant funding from the GoPNG). Some UN interviews asserted that the UN should have been more involved in the substance of these differences and had a greater role in the outcomes of dialogue between the two governments. Other UN interviewees argued that the UN role was to facilitate the dialog between the two governments and should not be engaged in the substance of what the dialog was about. In this view, which was taken by PPP management, the UN role it to facilitate engagement and agreement between the two on the issue, not what the resolution should be. This can be contrasted to the first view where the UN should engage on what the resolution would look like in a technical way (e.g. what the proper level of development grant funding from PNG to the ARoB is).

The public in Bougainville also continue to be concerned about the implementation of the autonomy arrangements and the BPA. The PPP’s two surveys of the population found that there is a lack of confidence in the population across the ARoB in the commitment of the PNG Parliament and Government to BPA implementation (although confidence has improved some in 2017). The 2016 survey found 56 percent calling the commitment of the GoPNG and Parliament poor or very poor; this response declined by 7 percentage points in 2017 as 49 percent of those surveyed gave the GoPNG and Parliament poor or very poor marks on their commitment to BPA implementation. People across Bougainville were almost as critical about the commitment of the ABG government to implementing the three pillars of the BPA, with 44 percent assessing the ABG commitment as poor or very poor in 2017. These facts can be seen as validating the need for the PPP to support the implementation of the PBA and autonomy.

Objectives still valid today

Interviews with GoPNG, ABG, and civil society leaders as well as UN management and staff noted the ongoing challenges of strengthening relationships and trust between the GoPNG and ABG to support the implementation of autonomy arrangements and the BPA. The survey data above also confirm that problems in implementing autonomy and the BPA continued to exist in the view of the people across the ABG as of fall 2017. No interviewee noted reasons or evidence why this popular perception would have changed significantly from fall 2017 to the time of fieldwork in July 2018.

Adjustments associated with changes in threats and opportunities to implementing the BPA

GoPNG, ABG, and UN managers noted ways the RC and PBF project continued to engage with both governments in a flexible way to help keep dialogue moving between the two governments. The dialogue between the two governments was recognised as highly political and risky in the PDA, in the design of the project, and in implementation. The project was designed to help improve relationships between the two governments in a context where other, non-project risks to relationships between the GoPNG and ABG were seen as likely, happened, and continued to cause frustrations for the ABG, the project team, and key counterparts in the GoPNG that worked on Bougainville. As interviews noted, progress has been slow in implementing the BPA because key people and institutions “want it to be slow.”

The project continued to maintain a flexible approach to facilitating dialogue throughout implementation. This included maintaining flexibility in funding travel and facilitation for key meetings, particularly of the JSB, which were frequently delayed, postponed, or changed over the entire period of PPP implementation. Frustrations were high and consistent from key ABG counterparts with GoPNG delivery of their commitments to the BPABPA (as ABG counterparts saw it). This dissatisfaction was particularly with the drawdown of powers under autonomy, and especially on the transfer of financial resources, which created severe fiscal constraints on the ABG. The fiscal challenges experienced by the GoPNG also inhibited the government’s support for relations between the two governments, including reportedly by limiting GoPNG funding for NCOBA and JSB meetings. Limited capacity of the ABG has continued to inhibit how the ABG delivers on its commitments under the PBA; with limited resources to support the development of the ABG, the government has not developed to the extent sought or anticipated in the BPA. The resource and capacity challenges continued to pose risks for implementing the BPA throughout the PPP.

Differences of opinion between the two governments, the slow pace of GoPNG actions on its commitments, limited capacity in the ABG, and the challenges of aligning the GoPNG and ABG to meet and make timely joint decisions at the JSB, other fora, and through other mechanisms continued throughout PPP implementation. This pacing also frustrated key counterparts and was a challenge to BPA implementation. The UN was careful to respect the sovereign rights of the governments and need for the two governments to lead in these processes themselves. PPP leadership and the RC were not able to move the two governments (especially the GoPNG) to expedite and smooth the engagement of the two governments in general – although interviewees noted particular times where the UN was helpful in facilitating the organisation and structure as well as the logistics for key meetings and dialogues. Some of the differences of opinion, such as over the correct level of funding from the GoPNG to the ABG through the Restoration and Development Grant (RDG) and actual disbursements under RDGs, persisted over the entire period of the PPP.

Appropriateness and relevance for the PPP to work support access to more objective and accurate information and fora for dialogue and debate to help people of Bougainville make informed choices at the Bougainville referendum and have increased confidence in the BPA process (Objective 2).

As with Objective 1, Objective 2 was developed in consultation with GoPNG, ABG, and development partners, on the basis of the PDA which was developed with civil society and briefed to the GoPNG and ABG. The UNRC, PBSO, GoPNG and ABG signed the Project Document approving the PPP in September 2014 which thus validated that the area was appropriate and relevant. All interviewees from both governments, the UN, development partners, and civil society all felt it was appropriate and relevant for UN organisations to work to support access to more objective and accurate information and fora for dialogue and debate to help the people of Bougainville make informed choices.

The PPP’s surveys have been the only instruments to directly gather systematic information across the population of the ARoB about the future referendum and BPA implementation. These data are important for project M&E and also provide crucial information for informing community, ABG, and GoPNG leaders about popular sentiments. Their accurate knowledge of popular views is important for avoiding surprises in democratic processes like the forthcoming referendum.

Some key informants noted that the PPP was seen as imbalanced in its engagement with the two governments and people of PNG since the focus, particularly in Objectives 2 and 3, is on the population in Bougainville. The lack of knowledge and information about BPA implementation in the rest of PNG may also be an important challenge to further implementation of the peace agreement. This absence of knowledge and information in the PNG population may affect the lack of knowledge and information of PNG Parliamentarians as well, who will be critical in the wake of the anticipated referendum in Bougainville.

The 2017 Interim Survey for the PPP gathered information from a multi-strata sample of the population of the ARoB and compared this knowledge to the public opinion data from the earlier September 2016 baseline survey for the PPP. One of the largest changes in sentiment was on expected voting behaviour. In the 2016 survey, 87 percent of respondents declared that they were inclined to vote for independence for Bougainville. In September 2017, this figure had declined to 73 percent. To date, the GoPNG has not made much, if any effort to organise support among Bougainvilleans to remain in PNG. While interviewees did not expect this kind of effort from the GoPNG in the future - if the GoPNG chose to make targeted efforts to swing voters to vote remain, these efforts might make the divisions within the population on independence greater which would have the potential to inflame social tensions within communities and between them in Bougainville.

Change in appropriateness or relevance

Interviews for the evaluation, project reporting, and the analytic work to develop the successor PBF project noted the continued relevance of this area and continued appropriateness of UN support for information dissemination and dialogue across the ARoB.

Objectives still valid today

Interviews noted that the population in the ABG still faced ongoing problems with the level of information available about key political and governance issues, including on BPA implementation and the upcoming referendum. Interviews, project reporting, and the analytic work to develop the successor PBF project found continued support for UN engagement in this area, which was seen as even more important in the run up to the target date (15 June 2019) for the referendum.

Adjustments associated with changes in threats and opportunities to implementing the BPA

The project implemented a number of key initiatives in this area late in the PPP period, in particular the information dissemination and dialogue done through the BHOR members in their constituencies. This outreach may have substantially increased knowledge and dialogue - although there is no systematic data from a survey of the population available to measure any effects of this set of activities. Prior to this activity, the 2016 and 2017 surveys found that 67 percent of Bougainvilleans felt that their BHOR member provided little to no information to them in support of the BPA and referendum.

Appropriateness and relevance for the PPP to work to support community social cohesion and security through dealing with conflict-related trauma effectively, supporting the resolution of local disputes peacefully, and through better access to information to access appropriate post-conflict support-services (Objective 3)

Like Objectives 1 and 2, Objective 3 was developed in consultation with GoPNG, ABG, and development partners, on the basis of the PDA which was developed with civil society and briefed to the GoPNG and ABG. The UNRC, PBSO, GoPNG and ABG all signed the Project Document approving the PPP in September 2014 which affirmed that the area was appropriate and relevant for UN engagement. All interviewees from both governments, the PPP team, and civil society all felt it was appropriate and relevant for UN organisations to work to support community social cohesion and security through dealing with conflict-related trauma effectively, supporting the resolution of local disputes peacefully, and through better access to information to access appropriate post-conflict support-services. The ProDoc was clearer on how the UNDP would support trauma healing and UNFPA would provide access to information and services focused on youth than the document was on plans for local dispute resolution. This area was used flexibly to support factional unification and key ceremonies promoting reconciliation - such as the Roreinang Unification of May 2017 - that brought factions not party to the BPA into the agreement.

However, questions were soon raised by development partners about the appropriateness and relevance of the particular initiatives and areas within the Objective. The PBSO mission that conducted the Evaluability Assessment in April 2016 expressed dissatisfaction with the activities under the objective as too small, too disparate, and not focused on community security. PBSO thus sought a restructuring of implementation and the activities under the objective; key donor partners also sought change in this area. Some UN, development partner and PBSO interviewees reported that development partners felt that UNDP and UNFPA activities in this project were potentially duplicative and/or focused on areas that were perceived as less strategic (i.e. working to support trauma healing through the refurbishment of facilities, training and networking of professionals, and service provision itself rather than pursuing a strategy of developing policies and frameworks for trauma healing, which was the approach taken by DFAT). Some UN staff noted that development partner staff turnover and challenges of institutional memory led to differences of opinion about what had been agreed to under this objective between UN staff and DFAT staff at the time of its development.

The PPP team revised the objective in response to these assertions. The revised ProDoc was approved in September 2016 by the JSC. No interviewee with detailed knowledge about this change felt that the changes made within the objective were major ones. These revisions thus did not end the dissatisfaction expressed by the PBSO, development partners, and some UN staff about the activities and strategy of the PPP in this area. The most notable part about this disagreement was that it persisted throughout the PPP despite the revision of the ProDoc for Objective 3.

Social cohesion was recognised by UN, ABG, and development partner interviews to have many aspects and potential opportunities in Bougainville. Objective 3 was the lowest funded area of intervention despite Bougainville having so many aspects to social cohesion that could and should be addressed – although not necessarily by the PPP.

Survey data demonstrated that while Bougainville has made progress in unification, people remain concerned about the potential for conflict arising from ex-combatants. Reintegration, although envisioned as an area the project could support in the ProDoc, did not get direct support from the PPP. However the area remains relevant. PPP surveys found that a majority of almost three-quarters (72 percent) of the population of the ARoB felt that ex-combatants had resettled peacefully back into the community in 2017 – an increase from the two-thirds (65 percent) with this sentiment in 2016. 26 percent felt they had settled back in ‘somewhat poorly’ but only 1 percent said ‘very poorly’. However, Bougainvilleans were more concerned about the reintegration of ex-combatants across the island. In 2017, as in 2016, about half of survey respondents (50 percent) felt that ex-combatant integration in ARoB remained worrisome and that the potential for conflict still remained. This concern supports the choice to include this areas in the PBF II program.

Change in appropriateness or relevance

The project team revised the ProDoc for Objective 3 in an effort to address issues of appropriateness and relevance. UN and development partner interviews saw the revisions as minor. Thus, development partners interviewed continued to be sceptical of whether the initiatives pursued in this area were relevant. However, ABG and civil society partners interviewed in the ARoB appreciated and valued the support of UNDP through the PPP in this area which they saw as appropriate and relevant.

Objectives still valid today

The support of the PPP strengthened the framework and system for addressing conflict-related trauma in the North of Bougainville through the system of state clinics; the project’s reach to Central and South Bougainville - which are also seen to face the same set of issues with conflict trauma – was more modest through support to the Catholic Church in coordination with the Nazareth Centre for Rehabilitation to strengthen mental health trauma healing services in vulnerable communities in Central and South Bougainville. UNFPA activities developed three youth centres in the North, Central, and South. Interviewees that knew about the youth centres appreciated the support for youth, which they recognized as an important issue for Bougainville, but did not see the youth centres as addressing the broader issues of local dispute resolution, better information provision, and providing services to deal with conflict-related trauma that continue to exist in Bougainville. Interviewees emphasised that the need for services to manage conflict-related trauma remains to be met in most of Bougainville, as does broader support for local dispute resolution. Local dispute resolution was viewed by interviewees from the BHOR and ABG as particularly important for weapons disposal and unification in the run up to the referendum.

Adjustments associated with changes in threats and opportunities to implementing the BPA

The adjustments made to Objective 3 were not seen in the documents or interviews as related to changes in threats or opportunities to implementing the BPA.

CONCLUSIONS

The UN’s work in two of the three objectives of the PPP (strengthening relationships and trust between the GoPNG and ABG to support the implementation of autonomy arrangements and the BPA and supporting access to more objective and accurate information and fora for dialogue and debate) was clearly appropriate and relevant. All interviewees appreciated the UN’s willingness to work on these mandates and saw this work as appropriate for the UN; bilateral development partners recognised that there were advantages of working with the UN, in particular for neutrality in political areas where governments have recognised interests and are not seen as impartial.

The only issues in appropriateness for the PPP were in relation to the appropriateness of particular interventions in the area of trauma healing, where development partners and some UN staff felt that the activities under Objective 3 did not target appropriate areas for supporting trauma healing in a comprehensive or strategic way. The revisions made to Objective 3 of the PPP in this area were not seen to have much effect on these perceptions. The evaluation found that PPP made important contributions to trauma healing through support for state clinics, contributed to the limited support available in Central and South Bougainville through civil society, and that the youth centres (which were soon to become operational) were expected to make contributions to young people and Bougainville going forward. The support for the unification activities from the PPP was more significant in terms of promoting peace and social cohesion in Bougainville through this direct work supporting the resolution of local disputes. These successes did not change the fact that some key partners and stakeholders felt the activities in this area were not strategic enough.

 

While appropriateness was not much of an issue, development partners and some UN staff felt that challenges in implementation existed everywhere across the portfolio. Some interviewees suggested that this broad portfolio was “too much” for the small staff of the PPP; several interviewees felt that the PPP team “really struggled” with the time it took to design mechanisms to implement the PPP, to work out how to deliver on priorities in the PPP, and how to be sustainable in supporting peacebuilding in the challenging environment of Bougainville. Interviews that were critical about implementation challenges also noted that the post-conflict environment in Bougainville and working with both governments was extremely difficult. The implication of these challenges however that was the PPP team needed to be more robust in order to make more headway on these challenges.


2.

Effectiveness

The evaluation has focused on effectiveness of the main activities and achievements of the PPP. Project reporting has not made it straightforward to identify many specific activities or outputs of the project – or to identify and discuss the importance and effects (or impact) of this support. The evaluation has endeavoured to ask interviewees about main activities and outputs as well as what these achievements have meant for progress in the three outcomes supported by the PPP.

 

The language of the PPP often overstated the role, influence and expected outcomes to be achieved with the support of PBF resources. This rhetoric was seen to overstate what the UN could realistically achieve, especially with modest resources. These high aspirations led to the inclusion of areas and setting of targets in the M&E plan that were not within the managerial control of the project.

 

Main achievements of the PPP in strengthening partnership and political dialogue between GoPNG and ABG 

The main achievements evident in documents and from interviews from the PPP’s engagement in strengthening relationships and trust between the GoPNG and ABG was keeping the processes of dialogue between the two governments moving despite the many issues that impede BPA implementation. The contrast between the pre-PPP period when the JSB did not meet regularly, with the pace of PBA implementation and at least annual meetings of the JSB was attributed to UN engagement and PPP support by many ABG interviewees. Without this support, many interviewees noted that the two governments would not be where they are today in their relations. The project supported three JSB meetings and intergovernmental engagement that comprised the progress that was made in these three years in partnership and dialogue between the two governments. The PBF and UN team was appreciated by both governments and development partners as able to remain a trusted partner for both sides in these contentious processes between the GoPNG and ABG. Interviews in both governments noted appreciation for the patient, flexible ways that the PBF and UN team worked to pull together each meeting between the governments. The relationship was described as “like an elastic band, a constant tension that has to constantly managed.” PBF support for JSB meetings was critical for each JSB meeting, which set the agenda and moved BPA implementation with each annual meeting. The most noted specific achievement were setting the target date for the referendum. Greater stakeholder awareness of BPA implementation is also notable across Bougainville, as found by the PBF-surveys. Having the target date allowed for more outreach, which was done with PPP support. PPP community based monitoring work and the PBF-surveys found a great deal of demand for accurate, timely information about BPA implementation, most centrally the anticipated referendum. This desire has been difficult for the PPP project, ABG and BHOR leaders, and community leaders to meet as much of the most sought information by elites and the public has not been agreed upon by both governments (e.g. the question or questions to be asked in the referendum). A lack of agreement by both governments has impeded the ABG, BHOR, and PPP supporting knowledge-building and understanding of the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

 

The PNG Electoral Commission and ABG Electoral Commissioner expressed gratitude for PBF support in creating the Bougainville Referendum Commission through support for meetings and technical advice from a PBF-funded consultant. The support of the PPP was also seen as critical to get the Joint Bipartisan Parliamentary Committee that had been created in 2012 to actually meet and start engaging on BPA implementation.  The achievements of the Committee include: attaining a MOU on relations between the two parliaments, making bi-partisan visits to Bougainville, and tabling a report at the Parliament of PNG on Bougainville. The PPP also supported the institutional development of the ABG Parliament, providing a resource room, information technology equipment, and website design and construction. BHOR members and staff appreciated this support from the PPP.

 

The PPP’s survey data noted appreciation among the population for the work of the PPP. Nearly two-thirds of respondents (64 percent) in the 2017 asserted that they were aware of UN work on Bougainville, and 88 percent of the respondents who were aware UN was present were also aware of their active presence in peacebuilding. This comprised nearly all men (97 percent) and 72 percent of women. Among respondents that asserted their level of awareness was adequate (46 percent of those who knew of UN peacebuilding work), there was almost universal confidence that UN peacebuilding is helping constructive dialogue to be maintained between the two governments. There was also almost universal confidence among this cohort that UN support will continue to ensure the two governments follow through on their obligations.

 

Process of weapons disposal and its prospects under the PBA

The team developing the PBF projects reportedly considered working on weapons disposal in the design of the PPP in 2014. However, in the development of the first PPP, the two governments did not seek to focus work in this area. The UN had previously declared that weapons disposal had been a success in 2005. In 2014, there was not the interest from the two governments, the interest from development partners, or a prioritisation from communities in the consultations done in the PDA that the issue should be a focus in the PPP. Weapons disposal has become higher on the agenda in discussions between the two governments since that time, in the discussions about BPA implementation and in preparations for the referendum. The issue is linked to the more focused one of how to bring outlier groups into BPA implementation. Some UN, development partner, and ABG interviewees noted that while there are certainly undeclared weapons remaining across Bougainville, arms issues are more severe with high powered weapons in the Highlands than in Bougainville.

 

Concerns of the population in Bougainville about the process of weapons disposal and its prospects

Since weapons disposal was not an explicit part of the PPP, the M&E framework for the project did not focus on weapons disposal. The surveys done by the project did ask about respondents’ confidence in the implementation of weapons disposal as one of the three pillars of the BPA. Survey respondents across Bougainville had the least confidence in weapons disposal of the three pillars and confidence levels declined from 2016 to 2017, falling from 50 percent to 43 percent confidence over the year. This decline in confidence may be affected by greater attention to this pillar of the BPA and more information being made available (in part through the PPP) in the run up to the referendum. Interviews with BHOR staff and members, ABG staff, and UN staff noted that weapons disposal was one of the issues addressed in the referendum-ready work in constituencies.

 

Main achievements of the PPP in supporting knowledge-building and understanding of the Bougainville Peace Agreement

The main achievements evident in documents and from interviews from the PPP’s engagement in supporting access to more objective and accurate information and fora for dialogue and debate is expanded knowledge among the population in Bougainville. Interviews noted that this change was a major development; before the PPP, people were seen to have no knowledge of the BPA and what the next steps were to be in implementation. UN, development partner, GoPNG, and ABG interviews all noted greater awareness of BPA implementation across the population of Bougainville. Interviews noted different mechanisms supported by the PPP that contributed to this awareness: support for the ABG Media Bureau, the installation of three video boards in Buka, Arawa, and Buin broadcasting public messages, and awareness activities led by Members of the BHOR.

 

The PPP supported the ABG’s work on unification. The Bougainville conflict had a fragmented landscape of groups fighting, especially in its last years. The BPA did not bring all groups in the conflict into the agreement. This gap left the ABG working to bring outlier groups into the peace process, which has been seen to be increasingly important in the run up to the expected referendum. The ABG President has made unification a priority, and worked with the UN and PPP to reach out to some key outlier groups and hold ceremonies on reconciliation which are important in the Melanesian tradition of conflict resolution. The PPP was credited with supporting ABG processes on unification by key UN staff and ABG counterparts. The PPP was able to support the preparatory work and the logistics of several of the largest unification meetings/ceremonies, which brought some of the groups that had not been a part of the BPA into the implementation of the accord. The lead in these processes was the ABG, with the PPP quietly providing funding and logistical support.

 

The awareness of the population of how to access information about the implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) increased by 5 percentage points between the two PPP surveys. However, in September 2017, only 33 percent of those surveyed asserted that they knew where they could access such information. Problematically, awareness has been much lower among women and girls (20 percent) compared to men and boys (46 percent). This survey data is not useful to determine the relative effectiveness of the assistance to the ABG Media Bureau, video boards, and BHOR outreach in raising awareness.

 

In Baseline 2016, respondents’ comprehension of the three pillars of the BPA was seemingly quite low; only a third of respondents (33 percent) claimed a good command (7 percent) or some command (26 percent) of the three pillars (these being 46 percent in males against 20 percent in females). In 2017, these figures have slipped a little; now only 27 percent of respondents claim comprehension of the three pillars (good command 4 percent, some command 23 percent). This may be a function of the “pillars” language; respondents expressed greater confidence in these areas than awareness. The reasons for this decline, despite project-supported and other outreach to the population, are not clear from the survey, from other M&E products, or from interviews.

 

In this 2017 survey, the population of Bougainville felt even more strongly (68 percent) that their BHoR member was providing little or no information about the BPA and referendum. The PPP then designed and implemented a two-round activity to support the outreach of BHoR members to their constituencies. The results of this activity were not measured by a survey, as the PPP did not conduct the end-line survey of the population anticipated in the M&E framework.

 

Specific data from the 2017 PPP survey demonstrated that people’s knowledge had improved from 2016. In the PPP baseline, only 16 percent of respondents were aware of the newly-set referendum target date of 15 June 2019. This figure was much improved in 2017, with 50 percent now claiming knowledge of the date. A question to verify this knowledge found evidence to support their knowledge; of respondents who claimed to know the date, 54 percent gave the exact date, 19 percent said June 2019, and 26 percent asserted 2019.

 

Among respondents that knew of the UN’s engagement in Bougainville, knew of the UN’s engagement in peacebuilding, and asserted their level of awareness of this work was adequate (46 percent of those who knew of UN Peacebuilding work), there was almost universal confidence that the agencies that were responsible for disseminating information were working well. This does not measure UN support for these agencies; however, UN support is one of the main sources of support for knowledge dissemination in Bougainville.

 

The PPP project’s monitoring and evaluation of the BHOR outreach on referendum readiness in specific constituencies in March 2018 found that almost all participants in the awareness raising activities undertaken by members had a clear understanding of the BPA and their roles in implementation. BHOR interviews assessed the technique of working through the Members, as the democratically elected representatives of their communities, as highly effective in reaching their constituents. BHOR members and staff appreciated the support which gave them additional opportunities to reach out to their constituencies and to lead on the important issues in the run up to the anticipated referendum. BHOR members and staff, as well as UN staff that monitored these activities, asserted that the population in their constituencies valued these meetings and the information that they learned about BPA implementation and the upcoming referendum from these meetings.

 

Main achievements of the PPP in promoting security and social cohesion in Bougainville

The main achievements evident in documents and from interviews from the PPP’s support for community social cohesion and security through dealing with conflict-related trauma were direct project outputs. UNFPA developed three regional youth resource centres, one for the North, Central, and South (athough these centres were not yet open at the time of the evaluation). UNFPA reported reaching more than 150 youth through Self-Management Clinics that targeted out-of-school youth. UNFPA reported that youth reached through the project had been sensitized to sexual and reproductive health issues and issues of gender-based violence. Support through the clinics also led to rehabilitation of youth with social or behavioural issues; UNFPA also reported that 80 percent of these girls and boys returned to school. The facilities still reportedly needed some attention to complete their construction and make them fully operable. UNDP refurbished spaces in 10 health facilities in North Bougainville and supported the training and deployment of counsellors to address self-identified crisis-related trauma cases in appropriate private, local spaces.

 

The PPP also encouraged and supported ABG efforts on unification and reconciliation among former combatants and communities across Bougainville. This support contributed to significant achievements – most significantly the Roreinang Unification of May 2017 under which most of the former combatant factions that were not part of the Bougainville Peace Agreement became part of the process. The project also supported the ABG’s referendum-ready unification drive, in particular in the Bolave and Hagogohe constituencies where significant outlier groups had not supported the BPA. This support contributed to these two tough constituencies being declared weapons-free and referendum-ready.

 

UNDP also supported the work of key ABG Departments on crisis-related trauma healing. However, PPP reporting, UNDP interviews, and interviews and reporting from ABG partners in the Departments of BPA Implementation, Health, Community Government and Community Development noted that the continued capacity limits of ABG institutions, in particular shortages of staff and limited financial resources, made for limited progress in reaching communities across Bougainville under AGB leadership. PPP efforts to mitigate these challenges by providing more support – in both logistics and technical program design – found limited success. The few key ABG staff were members in almost all government technical working groups, which limited their availability and focus on trauma healing.

 

The project mitigating these challenges by remaining flexible, continuing to urge government leadership, providing additional logistical support, and aiding with more technical support – including through staff and consultant participation in scoping and dialogue missions. PPP staff continued to push for government drive and leadership in security and social cohesion to encourage ownership, sustainability and the opportunity to leverage government leadership into increasing confidence in ABG institutions by the population.

 

In the 2016 survey, only 25 percent of respondents claimed to be aware of services for dealing with trauma caused by the conflict. In the 2017 survey, 40 percent of respondents were aware of trauma healing services – a marked improvement. There are also non-PPP supported trauma healing facilities (including through PBF-funded UN Women projects that were associated with the PPP and the longstanding activities of some CSOs in this area). Awareness levels were slightly higher among males than females and significantly higher in North Bougainville (50 percent) where the UNDP program operated compared to Central Bougainville (30 percent) and South Bougainville (35 percent). Respondents who were aware of trauma counselling services named Chabai Trauma Healing Services, Buin Safe House, Hahela Counselling & Rehabilitation Centre, Sisters of Nazareth Rehabilitation Centre, Hospital Counselling Services, Patupatuai Rehabilitation Centre, Leitana Nehan and a few others. In 2016, only 22 percent of respondents felt that these trauma-healing services were easy for them to access; in 2017, 30 percent reported easy enough access. Men (33 percent) reported slightly higher ease of access than women (27 percent) and residents of North Bougainville (39 percent) noted easier access to trauma services compared to Central Bougainville (22 percent) and South Bougainville (26 percent). This geographic difference may have been affected by PPP support to establish space in 10 clinics across the North and the additional efforts of the project in this region.

 

In the 2016 survey, 47 percent of respondents claimed to know of local activities on peace, security, social cohesion and reconciliation. In 2017, knowledge had improved substantially - by 19 percentage points – as 66 percent of those surveyed were aware of these activities.

 

Among respondents that knew of the UN’s engagement in Bougainville, knew the UN’s engagement in peacebuilding, and asserted their level of awareness of this work was adequate (46 percent of those who knew of UN Peacebuilding work), there was almost universal confidence that past UN support helped community security and social cohesion. Similar support was expressed for past UN support to encourage peace and reconciliation.

 

 

 

Failures or lapses in the implementation of the PPP

Documents and interviews noted challenges with the completion and handover of key activities of the PPP. Issues with handover were twofold. First, activities of the PPP that required the development of new facilities proved difficult for the PPP to complete. This was the case for the three youth centres, with issue after issue holding up completion. These challenges also affected the main technical equipment installed for messaging under Objective 2, the video boards. Second, ABG institutions were not seen as interested in or being fully capable of using these facilities going forward. However, this challenge was not noted in the development and hand over of the facilities in the North for trauma healing in Objective 3. Second, ABG partners were seen as not being ready to take ownership of facilities or activities. This challenge was seen for example with the UNFPA youth centres, where the Department of Community Government still needs to be supported by UNFPA towards taking up roles running the centres though the new PBF-supported Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI). These limitations on the capacity of the ABG to pick up on project-supported activities is seen as related to the overall challenges the ABG faces with financing and the continual disputes with the GoPNG about the level of funding they provide for ABG operations. The ABG Media Bureau faced similar financial and capacity constraints, but also was seen to date to have limited interest in utilising the video boards for messaging.

 

The PPP faced constant challenges with the development and dissemination of messages to inform the population about BPA implementation under Objective 2. Challenges included the lack of agreed positions between the two governments on key issues in BPA implementation. The lack of agreement between the two governments left a lack of messages to be disseminated. These areas where agreement was lacking were sometimes in the key areas that the public sought information about, such as the questions to be voted on in the planned referendum (and for a long time the anticipated date of the referendum). The PPP team and its ABG partners found it difficult to carry out awareness activities when key information on BPA implementation sought by the population was not agreed upon by the GoPNG and ABG. Messaging had to come through the ABG Media Bureau, which some interviews outside of the Bureau felt were not sufficiently updating their messages and not addressing the priorities of the population in terms of information in a timely way.

 

The PPP has to date not been able to stimulate other non-PBF funding for peacebuilding in Bougainville. This has limited the effects of the PPP, as demonstration activities have thus not had the catalytic effects envisioned by the PPP. This challenge is most apparent in the support provided in Objective 3 towards social cohesion, where the modest size of the PPP’s interventions have not been able to develop broader effects on the many challenges of social cohesion, including for young people. As interviews noted, youth are the majority of the population in Bougainville – but the UNFPA project was only able to reach 160 youth with this level of funding. This level of penetration was seen as too small to be able to reach across the population, who also face issues with schooling, employment, and social cohesion. Youth are seen as vulnerable to agitation that could threaten social cohesion.

 

Unforeseen impacts of the PPP (positive or negative)

No interviewee in the fieldwork for the evaluation noted unforeseen impacts of the PPP. That the PPP was not able to stimulate other funding was not seen as surprising to interviewees as UN staff, ABG partners, and development partners did not think other funding outside of the UN was ever likely.

 

Best practices or lessons learned

BHOR staff and members interviewed saw the outreach by BHOR members as a best practice; they noted both the value of using elected representatives as the legitimate representatives of communities as messengers to these communities and the merits of implementing awareness activities with and through the BHOR staff with a substantial role for PPP staff in monitoring and evaluation of these activities. PPP staff agreed that their training and M&E roles were critical in implementing the awareness activities effectively. These practices were seen as necessary to have outreach through the BHOR members be managed in accordance with UNDP requirements as well as conducive to better promotion of information about BPA implementation. The locally-owned way of conveying information through politically influential members of their own communities in face-to-face meetings appears to be a best practice based on interviews for the evaluation. The practices used in this second tranche awareness activity were revised from the first tranche, when the lack of training for BHOR staff and members on how to implement activities and the engagement of a private sector firm to provide management were seen to impede implementation of dialogue and debate in constituencies. Some UN and development partner interviews were more sceptical of working through BHOR members as “too political.”

 

CONCLUSIONS

The support of the PPP was seen as critical to the main achievements in implementing the BPA over the 2015-2018 period. The PPP’s work on building relationships and trust between the GoPNG and ABG was seen as the most successful of the three objectives pursued under the PPP. The main achievements identified in the evaluation’s fieldwork were the PPP’s support for JSB meetings and the preparatory work for these meetings. Weapons disposal was not a separate, explicit part of the 2015-2018 PPP but as part of BPA implementation featured in dialogue between the two governments, awareness messaging on BPA implementation, and in social cohesion, particularly unification meetings in communities. The issues of weapons disposal do concern the population in Bougainville. The main achievement of the PPP in supporting knowledge-building and understanding of the BPA noted in the evaluation fieldwork is greater knowledge about BPA implementation across Bougainville. Community-based dialogue and face-to-face discussions were seen as the most comprehensive and effective approaches to building understanding by key partners and stakeholders. The main achievements of the PPP’s support for community social cohesion and security through dealing with conflict-related trauma identified in the evaluation were the direct project outputs of three UNDP regional youth resource centres and UNDP’s refurbishment of appropriate private spaces in 10 health facilities in North Bougainville for the deployment of counsellors to address self-identified crisis-related trauma

Failures or lapses in the implementation of the PPP noted in the fieldwork were challenges completing the development of new facilities, which proved difficult for the RUNOs to complete, and persistent challenges with having ABG counterparts fully utilise project activities after they were handed over to ABG institutions. The PPP was constantly challenged by the slow development of BPA implementation by the two governments which in turn made it difficult to have the two governments agree in a timely way on the content for awareness messaging about BPA implementation. The PPP has also not been able to stimulate other non-PBF funding for peacebuilding in Bougainville.

No unforeseen impacts or best practices of the PPP were identified in the evaluation.


3.

Efficiency of Planning and Implementation  

While all interviewees agreed that the areas pursued under the PPP were appropriate and relevant – and were able to identify accomplishments of the PPP – interviews with development partners and some UN informants noted the challenges the RUNOs had with developing and implementing activities in the difficult environment of the ARoB and PNG. These interviews focused particularly on the challenges for the UN, mainly UNDP as the implementer of all but the USD 230,000 of the PPP implemented by UNFPA. The main challenges were seen in staffing the project and its activities, designing and implementing activities, and in managing, monitoring, and reporting on these activities in the challenging environment of PNG and the ARoB.

Attention to managing activities to economically use resources

Some interviews recognised that the PPP team inherently faced difficult challenges with planning and the economical use of resources. The sensitivity of high--level political issues between the two governments and propensity for delay and postponement challenged planning and increased costs to the project. The project’s role as facilitator and inability (by design) to push the two governments too hard as part of recognising and affirming their control of dialogue processes left the project often waiting to execute plans, at a financial cost.

Awareness activities also depended to a substantial degree on progress in dialogue between the two governments. Progress in dialogue was needed to develop the most relevant content in terms of providing the kind of accurate, timely messaging on BPA implementation to date and the next steps in implementation that the population wanted and needed. Then generating the content for awareness was shaped by the capacity of the ABG and PPP.

The procurement team was attentive to the economic use of resources and used a variety of best practices such as long term agreements with vendors to procure goods and services rapidly and competitively, even in the limited environment for competitive procurement for some goods and services in Bougainville. This support was seen as useful by UNFPA for the development of the Youth Centres.

Use of planning to deliver the project

Planning was a constant challenge for the PPP as the project’s key partners were the two governments. The project developed annual plans for 2016, 2017, and 2018 (through April). The PPP staff reported that these plans were largely implemented. Planning had to be and was done in ways that allowed for flexibility in the budget, in order to accommodate the sensitivities, control over the agenda by the two governments, and persistent delays in meetings and messages to be agreed upon by the two governments. The continued slippage in the timing of meetings and agreements between the two governments required frequent adjustments in workplans. This slippage also required an extension of the PPP’s period of performance. Some interviews noted a rush to program funds towards the end of 2017 and early 2018. This rush was seen as problematic in terms of the work with BHOR members and referendum-ready activities; development partners thought that this rush contributed to the problems with implementing the first outreach activities with the members.

Percentage of activities in the workplan delivered

PPP project reporting noted full delivery of the activities developed in the ProDocs. Few interviewees were able to assess whether the project team were delivering activities according to plan as most did not have detailed knowledge of the PPP’s plans. Of those with knowledge interviewed (PPP staff, UNFPA, and UNDP country office management), all felt that the project was 100% delivered. The project team developed lines in annual work plans in a manner that appears to have facilitated using more than one budget line for activities that made for flexibility in delivery which was seen as important to address the frequent delays and highly political processes in BPA implementation.

Financial expenditures according to plan 

The PPP project reporting indicates that financial expenditures were in accordance with the amounts planned under each of the four Project Documents. Few interviewees were able to assess whether financial expenditures were according to plan. Of those with knowledge, interviews with PPP staff, UNFPA, UNDP country office management suggested that the financial expenditures of the projects were in accordance with four project documents and the annual plans of the projects. The PPP team developed the work plans in flexible ways that they were able to modify and move some expenditures across similar activities or budget lines in the work plans to meet the evolving priorities of partners and address partner delays. Thus some staff felt “90%” was according to plan, with the remaining 10% used to address other requests from governments on both sides.”

M&E data collection and availability to inform future plans

The PPP was developed with the PBSO and followed PBSO results-based management practices that included rigorous demands for M&E systems and data. PBSO recognized in the evaluability assessment that the project was falling behind in the ambitious M&E plans for the project, and encouraged the PPP to engage an external consultant to support the development and implementation of three M&E mechanisms envisioned in the project documents or discussion with PBSO that had not been put in place as of July 2016: a repeated survey of the population of the ARoB, a repeated community-based monitoring mechanism, and a repeated elite survey. After consultancy support, the PPP conducted two surveys of the population and developed a CBM mechanism through BWF and community government leaders from a sample of communities in North, Central, and South Bougainville. These mechanisms produced high-quality data that was unprecedented in Bougainville on the perceptions and amount of information of community leaders and the population on the BPA. This mechanism appears to have not been used to a great extent, however, as the CBM process did not work autonomously but instead required substantial work from the M&E specialist to fund, organise, and lead meetings with community leaders to get any monitoring data. No interview noted the use of the CBM data for PPP management. While the data from the two population surveys was available, no interviewee noted specific ways that this information was used to inform PPP planning or implementation. This information is potentially useful for management. The PPP team did not develop an elite survey; instead, program management interacted with key elites in the ABG and GoPNG as a part of implementing the PPP. This provided the team with the views of key elites. However, these views were not reported on systematically or used in the M&E system.

Successes in programme management in the implementation of the PPP

The neutrality that was possible through an international project manager was seen as important by some UN staff as well as by development partners. An expatriate was seen as potentially able to resist the constant pressure put on programme activities from the GoPNG, ABG, and development partners.

PBF outreach communications and work on awareness “should have been better” was a common view expressed by some UN staff and donor partners. This was seen as weak in both capturing stories that could be used as examples and in capturing the results of the PPP.

The programme team was seen to learn from experience in implementing the PPP to improve delivery. For example, the first tranche of support for members of the BHOR to support public dialogue and debate on BPA implementation was implemented through a contract to a private firm, who in then worked with the BHOR members and staff. This practice was seen to work poorly. The PPP team adjusted and provided the second tranche of support for public dialogue and debate on BPA implementation through members of the BHOR in their constituencies directly through the BHOR staff, which was seen to work much better by the PPP team and BHOR members and staff.

Any capacity gaps in the project team that affected delivery

The PPP was implemented with a lean team; USD 7.2 was implemented basically by five professional UN staff, with the support of UNFPA for Objective 3 plus a UNDP Governance Specialist and the Peace and Development Adviser from Port Moresby. The PBF Coordinator was brought on board first and then filled out the rest of the team. For most of the period of implementation, the PPP was implemented under the leadership of the international PBF Coordinator who led a team of one or two Project Officers, an M&E officer, an international procurement expert and a national procurement specialist. UN staff and development partners interviewed noted substantial challenges of identifying and hiring well-qualified staff to implement the PPP, particularly in Bougainville. There are not many experienced, well-qualified development professionals interested in working in Bougainville. UN staff noted that UN positions were not competitive with the salaries offered by the main international extractive industry firms that work in PNG. The M&E Specialist left the project in mid-2017 for graduate school. One Project Officer was hired for and posted to Arawa for part of 2016 and 2017 and then left the project. One Project Officer was posted in Port Moresby and came to also take the M&E duties on after the departure of the M&E Specialist. Only one project officer was working in Buka for most of the PPP where most of the project was developed, implemented, and reported on.

UN staff, development partners, and government partners saw this as a lean staffing team for PPP implementation, given the challenging environment for implementation in PNG and the ARoB. The challenges hiring and stationing staff in Bougainville was seen to have affected delivery at the outset of the PPP, when it took substantial time to design and implement activities due to the limited number and limited capacity of PPP staff. This pace at the start was later noted by some interviewees to have led to a rush to deliver the project towards the close of the extension period for the PPP (and the extension was granted in part because substantial resources remained to be expended). The project document envisioned a national project manager for each of the three projects plus a national monitoring and evaluation specialist. Rather than these four, the project never had more than three technical staff: two project managers and an M&E specialist. After the M&E specialist left to pursue a graduate degree, one of the project managers took over this responsibility. Limited M&E was seen as a challenge by UN colleagues, but not one that affected delivery.

Any capacity gaps at UNDP that affected delivery

The limited size and capacity of the project team was seen to have affected PPP communications, M&E, and reporting by PPP staff, UN staff and development partners – but not delivery of the PPP. The focus of PPP and UNDP staff appears to have been on delivery. Interviews noted areas and instances where UN staff and development partners were less than satisfied with the extent of PPP reporting, communications, and M&E. Despite complaining to the PPP, these interviewees felt that these issues were never addressed to their satisfaction; these stakeholders felt that the PPP should have done better in communications, M&E, and reporting to them and other stakeholders throughout the implementation of the PPP.

Any capacity gaps among partners that affected delivery

UN staff and development partners noted the challenging environment for working with government and civil society partners in the ARoB. The small size of civil society in Bougainville restricted the number of potential partners, including private sector contractors, and both civil society and government partners were seen to have limited capacity to partner with UN organisations. These capacity gaps led to challenges in delivery. These challenges were apparent for example in the first award to the BHOR for outreach. With limited understanding and knowledge of UN procedures for acquittals and receipts, BHOR members found it challenging to complete these processes as needed to receive the second tranche of funding for awareness. These challenges led to slowdowns in delivery. The PPP team learned from this experience and used different procedures and provided more training to address these capacity gaps in the second phase of the BHOR outreach program.

Working relationships with partners, stakeholders and donors

Development partners interviewed felt that greater communication from the project would have been beneficial for their own development efforts. This was not seen as a poor relationship – but instead as a limited one. Engagement was perceived to have increased with the deployment of a Liaison Officer from the UN Department of Political Affairs in late 2017 to Buka which was seen as having increased communications with partners, media and stakeholders. UN staff in PNG shared this view. The PPP leadership noted that collaboration in person in Buka with partners had been strong and that it was important for the PPP to be seen as independent from key donors; PBF staff interviewed noted ways that the project could have been more open to communications with development partners.

The PPP’s government partners, particularly those in the ABG, had important positive and negative effects on delivery; most of these effects were based on their limited capacity, however, not relationships. While other relationships did not affect delivery, one key ABG counterpart reportedly refused to communicate with the PBF coordinator in midstream of project coordination. Only the replacement of this ABG staff person restored communications between the project and this department.

Pursuit of learning, coordination, and exchange with related projects

No interviews noted explicit attention to learning as part of PPP implementation.

The PPP was implemented during the period when UN Women implemented two IRF-funded projects with PBSO resources. The UN Women project team was collocated in the same office as the PPP team and had good relations throughout the period of implementation. The close relationships between the two teams may have facilitated exchange and learning. Interviews for the evaluation did not note explicit coordination.

Lessons learned in the implementation of the PPP were said to have been a part of the processes of development of the current PBF II project, Referendum Support Project, and GYPI. Lessons learned from the PPP contributed to the GYPI and PBF II having a stronger focused on communications at grassroots levels using local approaches, greater attention to women and youth, and more consultation with donor partners in design.

Internal communication among the PPP team

The PPP team reportedly did not always meet regularly as a team. Some PPP interviews noted that staff did not communicate effectively enough between themselves in implementation. Staff also reported on instances when PPP management changed plans for activities without consultation among the staff and in cases without providing the information about the changes to staff. This in cases they argued affected delivery in two ways: by hampering staff’s engagement with partners and stakeholders, as their messaging was not seen as definitive since it could be changed by management, and in impeding the implementation of these activities.

Communication with external stakeholders

Project communication and reporting was seen as not as informative as PBSO would have liked throughout the project. Other partners and stakeholders interviewed suggested that they would have benefitted from greater transparency from the PPP team about the goals and activities of the projects. GoPNG stakeholders in particular sought wider briefings on project plans, activities, and impact. Development partners reported acquiring information on project support through their own contacts with both governments, their own partners in civil society, and through the representatives of their own governments at the UN in New York. While they recognised that having the PPP keep its distance from development partners helped with maintaining the reputation of the UN as neutral in the ABG and PNG, they would have liked to see more communications, briefings, and reporting from the PPP to donors.

Members of the PPP team saw the requests for information from PBSO as too extensive and as micromanaging. PPP interviews also noted that disagreements about the extent of communications with development partners continued throughout the project, with partners seeking more information and the PBF-funded project not fully satisfying these requests as part of the UN’s independence. PPP and UN staff emphasized that these communications and reporting disagreements and weaknesses did not affect delivery.

PPP communication was not the only mechanism for development partners to know about PPP implementation. The UN also participates in bimonthly meetings among the Embassies in Port Moresby to share information and coordinate activities, plus holds informal coordination meetings for development partners working on Bougainville.

Did project implementers received the funds needed to implement activities in a timely way?

UN interviews noted that one of the great advantages of PBSO funding was the early delivery of resources. PBSO transferred the entire amount of the PBF award to the RUNOs in August 2015. No UN interviewee noted any challenges with the timely provision of funds from the projects to start activities. Development partners interviewed did not have a clear understanding of the financial modalities used by the PBSO. Donor interviews instead attributed some of the challenges in PPP start up to delays in the transfer of finances.

PPP staff interviews did not note challenges with the timeliness of providing funding to partners. The outreach and dialogue activities done by BHOR members in late 2017 however did lead to challenges with the timeliness of funding in providing the second tranche of resources for the initial set of members’ activities. The challenges BHOR members and their staff had with completing the acquittals process for the first tranche of funding led to delays in providing the remainder of the resources to some of the members, which in turn made it more challenging for them to complete their outreach and dialogue activities. The additional support provided by the PPP staff and the different funding modality used in the second set of BHOR outreach activities resolved these timeliness problems.

Project management 

The project management team was able to implement the PPP. This suggests that that project management was robust enough to meet the implementation needs for the PPP. The small team came in for substantial praise for their ability to execute the challenging project in the demanding conditions of PNG and the ARoB. Key UN interviews noted that the PBF coordinator was inherently put in an extremely difficult situation in leading the PPP by having the key roles in facilitating engagement between the two governments in the small, resource constrained ABG. The tasks of supporting the ABG while adhering to the PPP and UN regulations were seen as demanding; ABG counterparts were seen as not systematic and often last-minute in their demands on the project. The frequent and last-minute requests for support from the ABG were seen as inherently leading to tensions between the ABG and the PBF Coordinator, who needed to follow regulations and plans.

Some UN interviews emphasized the benefits of having a neutral international serve as PBF Coordinator and of having an international in charge of operations and procurement. The highly political positions, small size of the ABG, and place of the project in between the GoPNG and ABG was seen as requiring international staff. Expectations were noted that national staff were not going to be seen as neutral and impartial, either favouring ABG if from Bougainville or the GoPNG if from the rest of PNG. Some interviews felt it was unlikely that national staff would to be able to manage professionally with this much political pressure as PBF Coordinator or as operations manager.

While interviews praised project management, UN staff, development partners, and some government partners noted room for improvement in management, in particular in the size of the project team, use of M&E, and in communications. These areas are addressed separately below.

Monitoring of programme performance and results 

The PPP project team monitored activities and results and reported on these activities and results through semi-annual and annual reports to the PBSO. The monitoring and reporting however did not provide the level of information and detail that the PBSO had hoped for. Monitoring and evaluation processes and baseline data were collected relatively late rather than at the inception of the project. The PPP team included an M&E specialist who was tasked with developing and implementing an M&E system for the project. At the urging of the PBSO, the project also hired an IC to assist the M&E specialist with the development of several specialized M&E tools in 2016. This support was used to develop the survey used as the baseline in July and August 2016 for Objective 2 as well as for developing the community-based monitoring mechanism. The July-August 2016 Baseline survey was contracted through competitive processes to a well-regarded PNG survey firm, which also then implemented the interim survey in Bougainville in July and August 2017. The PBF team reportedly decided in consultation with the UNDP/PNG Governance Team not to conduct an end-line survey since the period of time between the interim survey at the end of the PPP’s extension period in April was so short (less than a year) that the results were not expected to be meaningfully different from those of the interim survey. No interview noted that monitoring and evaluation data were used for management purposes.

Project Board discussion and results in terms of effective follow-up action on issues noted in reporting

The JSC was not noted as an active management board for the project in interviews with UN, ABG, or GoPNG leaders. The board was noted as active only in the area where development partners and the PBSO had indicated issues and dissatisfaction in approving the revised design of Objective 3 on trauma healing. The JSC did accept the revisions of Objective 3 and approve the revised ProDoc for this objective. The official records of these meetings are meagre. The JSC members signed annual reports on project activities.

Efficient use of partnerships in implementing activities

The partnerships used by the PPP to implement activities were seen by some partners as the most effective; some other interviewees were particularly concerned about the quality of some programming implemented by partners (especially the awareness activities conducted through BHOR members – which other interviewees emphasized were the most effective activities).

 

CONCLUSIONS

The United Nations had numerous challenges in staffing the project, and the PPP team had many challenges in designing and implementing activities as well as managing, monitoring, and reporting on these activities in the challenging environment of PNG and the ARoB.

The PPP team was attentive to the economical use of resources in programme implementation. The political nature of the programme and delays from both governments challenged planning and increased costs to the project. The procurement team used best practices to procure goods and services rapidly and competitively. Planning was a constant challenge for the PPP; annual plans were developed and implemented in ways that allowed for flexibility since much of the timing and agenda was under the control of the two governments with constant slippage in the timing of meetings, agreements, and message development between the two governments that required adjustments in workplans. The financial expenditures of the projects were in accordance with the four project documents and annual plans.

PBSO placed heavy demands on PPP M&E systems to deliver data. The project was able to develop the surveys and community-based monitoring mechanism envisioned, but choose not to develop an elite survey as unnecessary given the small size of the elite in Bougainville. Data on elite views were not reported on systematically or used in the M&E system. M&E data does not seem to have been used for management – only to report to PBSO. None of the UN managers interviewed in PNG stated that they had used the M&E data to manage the implementation of the PPP. These data were potentially useful for management and could be used to manage PPP implementation. PBSO sought more detailed data and reporting from the project than the project delivered to New York.

The PPP was implemented with a team of five professional UN staff; interviews suggested that the team should have been larger. The UN found it challenging to find experienced, well-qualified development professionals willing to work in Bougainville. The neutrality of an international project manager was seen as important as able to resist the constant pressure put on programme activities from the GoPNG, ABG, and development partners; A Bougainvillean or New Guinean was not thought to be in a position to resist these pressures. An international head of procurement was similarly seen as vital. PBF outreach communications and work on awareness was seen as relatively weak. The challenges hiring and stationing staff in Bougainville was seen to have affected delivery at the outset of the PPP, which contributed to a rush to deliver the project towards the close of the extension period for the PPP.

UN staff and development partners noted the limited capacity of the ABG (and PNG) government and civil society partners in the ARoB made it challenging for the PPP team to partner with them.

The PPP team was able to develop, implement, monitor, and report on the PPP although communications within the team was sometimes a problem and different leadership styles posed problems for the team. Development partners sought greater communication from the project. Relations with ABG counterparts were good, with one exception.

Learning does not appear to have been a focus in PPP implementation nor coordination with other projects. Lessons learned from the PPP influenced the development of the GYPI, Referendum Support Project, and the development of the successor PBF II. The funds to implement activities were sent by the PBSO at the start of implementation and transferred to RUNOs and partners in a timely way.

 

The project management team was able to implement the PPP. This suggests that that the small project team was robust enough and to meet the implementation needs for the PPP. While interviews praised project management, UN staff, development partners, and some government partners noted room for improvement in management, in particular in the size of the project team, use of M&E, and in communications. The project board was not seen as active in management; the only use of the JSC was to approve the PPP, approve modest changes in design of Objective 3 on trauma healing sought by be development partners, and approve the annual reports. Staff and stakeholders had different views on whether the PPP had made efficient use of partnerships in implementing activities, particularly on the BHOR outreach activities.


4.

Potential for sustainability, replication and magnification

PPP acceptance in PNG and the ARoB

Seen as relevant and appropriate, interviews found that UN activities under the PPP were accepted across partners, stakeholders, and beneficiaries in PNG and the ARoB. Interviewees agreed that UN support through the PPP was accepted – and expressed appreciation for UN support across the board. This appreciation followed discussion of efficiency and effectiveness, which is where interviewees noted some challenges in PPP implementation.

The main areas where the PPP came in for criticism in acceptance was in Objective 3 on social cohesion, where development partners and UN staff felt more care could have been taken in the design, monitoring, reporting, and communication of results.

Attention towards making the activities and results continue on beyond the end of the funding

PBSO and PPP language in reporting has an evident stress on the potential for catalytic effects from these interventions. This rhetoric was seen by some UN staff and development partners in interviews as overstating the potential for catalytic effects in the context of PNG and the ARoB. Interviewees noted the limited finances of both governments as well as the paucity of donors that made it unlikely that modest support from the PBF had much potential to stimulate other resources or activities (in the absence of additional resources). This was the case for civil society as well; the modest resources of the BWF, the Nazareth Centre for Rehabilitation (NCFR), and other organisations did not allow for expansion, and these organizations did not note additional opportunities for funding through their engagement with the PPP or other programming.

Partners continuing to use practices from the PPP

Interviews noted ways that PPP-supported practices were continuing in the ARoB. In trauma healing, the NCFR continues to work on community programming and through its safe houses after support from the PPP has ended; the government health centres in North refurbished by the PPP continue to operate with the staff that were supported by project training.

While appreciated, some PPP-provided equipment has to date apparently found limited use. This is particularly the case for some of the technology provided by the PPP. The three electronic boards procured and installed by the project are not yet incorporated into an ongoing series of information packs and dialogues led by DBPAI staff. The ABG and NCOBA report only using the video conference facilities provided by the project occasionally and noted in interviews that they prefer in-person meetings between the two governments.

Interest in continuing, scaling up or replicating PPP activities through local ownership

Some activities in all three outcomes had evidence for sustainability through local ownership. Key civil servants from the GoPNG and ABG noted that they continued to work together on BPA implementation and referendum planning – but also that they benefitted greatly from continued logistic and technical support from the UN for this progress. BHOR members asserted that they planned to continue to do outreach among their constituents on the BPA and future referendum through BHOR funding provided for their use. The NCFR and community health centres in the North remain interested and able to continue their work. In an environment with few resources, no interview noted ways that they would be able to scale up PPP activities through local ownership.

Results being incorporated into local, ABG, or GoPNG institutions

Project reporting and interviews for the evaluation repeatedly noted how capacity constraints have impeded the incorporation of project-supported activities or results into government institutions. For example, the ABG Department of Community Development had not yet staffed and taken up the three UNDP-developed regional youth resource centres (perhaps in part because aspects of the centres still needed to be completed by the project).

Estimates of costs to scale up impact 

Interviews, with a few exceptions, did not have well-informed, clear estimates of how much it would cost to scale up the activities and the impact of the PPP. Interviewees did not see that there were potential resources that could be used to scale-up impact. Instead, interviewees focused on the plans of the second, successor PBF programme for Bougainville, which they viewed as critical to support continued BPA implementation in the absence of other donor and government financial support.

Recommendations on future PBF-funded activities, handing over activities, or stopping activities in the future 

Interviewees almost exclusively focused on and supported the plans and approaches of the second, successor PBF programme for Bougainville which had been developed in 2018 based on the activities and experience of the PPP, extensive stakeholder consultations, and a PBSO mission to PNG and the ARoB in February 2018. Interviewees framed recommendations around the three objectives of the new PBF award and endorsed continued support for dialogue between the two governments and parliaments, increased awareness and dialogue on the BPA, referendum, and post-referendum issues, and progress on weapons disposal as the foci of future PBF-funded activities.

Interviewee recommendations for activities focused on continuing what were seen as successful practices of the PPP supporting government-to-government dialogue, outreach and discussion with the population and communities, and making progress on weapons disposal and unification with outlier groups in Bougainville. Almost all interviewees knew of the plans for the successor PBF project and appeared to focus on these areas for future activities.

The last PPP was seen to have focused mainly on the two governments; UN and civil society interviews sought more programming with other partners, particularly NGOs and the churches for the future PPP. This approach was seen as part of a need to do more work that reaches communities, while not neglecting the high-level partners and issues that had been the priority of the first PPP.

In the run up to the anticipated referendum, UN and development partner interviewees recommended more activities oriented towards public information in the next PPP.

The next PPP was also seen as an opportunity to partner with more UN agencies in implementation. Partnering with UNFPA and UN Women to reach communities was seen as particularly promising.

Recommendations for priority actions to support peacebuilding and the work done under the PPP going forward

Interviews found support for the three priority areas of the successor PBF program. Interviewees also spoke to and appreciated the work of the UN to support the BRC and the GYPI programme, the latter also funded by the PBSO. People interviewed in the ARoB were focused on the upcoming referendum which they recognized was not a long time away and needed to be prioritized. Interviews thus emphasized the importance of being referendum ready through weapons disposal.

 

CONCLUSIONS

UN activities under the PPP are accepted by partners, stakeholders, and beneficiaries in PNG and the ARoB. Acceptance, however, does not do justice to the role of the PPP in supporting PBA implementation in Bougainville. The two governments depend on the PPP for practical facilitation of meetings, are accustomed to nudges from the UN about the need for meetings on BPA implementation, and rely on the PPP to help facilitate their face-to-face interactions. Engagements outside of the face-to-face forums are limited. This has left complaints by ABG leaders that the GoPNG has not met or was continuing to not meet what they saw as its responsibilities under the BPA as constant features of dialogue.

PBSO and PPP language about catalytic effects was not seen as realistic in the context of PNG and the ARoB. The limited finances of both governments as well as the paucity of donors mean that there is little expectation of PPP financing stimulating other resources.

Although some PPP-supported practices continued to be implemented by partners after the support of the PPP had ceased, the limited capacity of the ABG and GoPNG challenged assumptions that both governments would be able to continue these activities after the hand-over of PPP activities to the governments. Facilities and PPP-provided equipment has in cases to date apparently found limited use by government partners. Interests in continuing activities in all three outcomes is clear but key counterparts do not have the capacity or financial support to continue the activities of the PPP at present. These capacity constraints have impeded and are likely to continue to impede the incorporation of project-supported activities or results into government institutions.

Scaling up PPP activities requires substantial resources which are not now available. In a resource constrained environment, the successor PBF programme for Bougainville is seen not as scaling up but instead as essential funding for BPA implementation.

Interviewees recommended as future PBF-funded activities the plans and approaches of the second, successor PBF programme: continued support for dialogue between the two governments and parliaments, increased awareness and dialogue on the BPA, referendum, and post-referendum issues, and progress on weapons disposal. Interviewees sought future PBF activities towards these three ends and recognized that time was of the essence if Bougainville was to hold a successful referendum by 15 June 2019.


Recommendations
1

Relevance

 The next several years will be critical in sustaining peace in Bougainville. As an accepted and valued partner, and in the absence of other accepted neutral organizations that could serve as alternative partners, the United Nations should continue to support the implementation of key processes in the implementation of the BPA in 2018, 2019, and 2020 as critical years for the implementation of the BPA.

2

Effectiveness

Based on past successes and current needs, the UN should continue to support the implementation of the BPA through targeted assistance to building relationships and trust between the GoPNG and ABG, supporting access to more objective and accurate information and fora for dialogue and debate, and assistance on social cohesion and security in Bougainville.

The PBSO should consider more modest language, objectives, and indicators in developing support for peacebuilding that take into account that the UN is not responsible for key processes and meeting key deadlines in peacebuilding. The PPP and the process of drafting and attaining government approval make it clear that the UN not solely responsible for the PPP– instead the two governments have the lead and the UN through the PPP aims to support their achievement of the goals of the PPP. Writing PPPs in ways that are sensitive to the UN’s roles as neutral facilitators may produce targets that are not only achievable based on what UN organizations can reasonably be expected to achieve themselves in the PPP but also prove more supportive of national ownership and leadership in peacebuilding.

3

Efficiency of Planning and Implementation

A future PPP team should have a more robust staffing structure, with a full-time program officer for each of the main work streams of the PPP.

PBSO should consider developing ways to accelerate project start up, particularly through staffing support, to help PPP activities get off to a more rapid start. This may be especially critical in contexts where peace agreements have more recently been negotiated and agreed to than in Bougainville. PBSO should consider developing a roster of potential staff through consultancies or working within the UN system to potentially deploy regular UN staff for a brief period, particularly for the design and start-up of programming.

UN project management and procurement in Bougainville should continue to be led by international staff to be able to clearly and visibly demonstrate that they are independent of both governments and avoid perceptions of partiality given the small size of Bougainville and the Melanesian context of PNG.

The UN team should work with the PBSO, partners, and stakeholders to identify additional ways in future programming on awareness to systematically encourage culturally appropriate face-to-face communication and dialogue across the ARoB, as these types of mechanisms are the most used mechanisms and most respected ways to support information dissemination and the discussion of community issues across Bougainville.

The UN system in PNG should consider additional ways to work systematically over a sustained period of time with community-based and ABG institutions working with youth to enable a wider reach to this large, critical population across the ABG.

The PBSO should consider less demanding monitoring and evaluation modalities and reporting on PPP implementation, and work with PPP leaders to develop M&E systems that will be used as part of PPP management as well as for information sharing with PBSO in New York. In theory, M&E is most effective when it is used for management. The content and extent of M&E for a project should thus depend on what the project needs and can utilize for management. The detailed information collected by the PPP may have been too much information for management to use in this case in the ARoB.

The PBSO should consider developing programmes with longer time periods than the three-year term for the PPP. Peacebuilding is a long-term process; years after the signing of the peace agreement in Bougainville, the limited support for peacebuilding in the years after the signing of the BPA in 2001 has made supporting key aspects of peace a long-term proposition. The three-year time period of the PPP was not long enough to have as strong a set of effects as anticipated in the context of continued delays and tensions between the two governments, limited capacity across Bougainville, and a challenging environment for supporting community cohesion. If time periods are not to be lengthened but PGSO expects to have multiple rounds of funding, PBSO should make it clear to partners and stakeholders that multiple rounds of PBF funding are envisioned.

4

Potential for Sustainability, Replication and Magnification

PBSO should continue to consider supporting peacebuilding priority plans that may not be able to focus on sustainability, replication, or magnification but that are able to support priority actions to build or sustain peace at critical periods in the peacebuilding processes in countries and regions around the world. The PBSO should consider placing less emphasis on sustainability and change, not necessarily using the language of sustainability, replication, and magnification in PBF programming.

International support for peacebuilding is critical in the short term in the run up to the anticipated target date for the referendum (15 June 2019) and the transition period thereafter. Since peacebuilding in Bougainville is increasingly important in the run up to the planned referendum and there are not alternative neutral providers to facilitate peaceful management of key peacebuilding processes, the UN should continue to support the implementation of key processes in BPA implementation. The experience of developing, implementing, monitoring, reporting on, and evaluating the 2015-2018 PBF-funded project also suggests the continued utility of another PBF-funded programme.

Project design and implementation should focus on key priorities of both governments in helping them prepare for and implement processes around the referendum and its aftermath. Public awareness activities remain critical, as are needs to support them. These activities will be critical even if the timing of the referendum moves to after the 15 June 2019 target date.

While there still are urgent short-term priorities in peacebuilding in Bougainville and PNG, the design of activities in a successor PBF-funded programme on peacebuilding in Bougainville should be done in collaborative ways with RUNOs, GoPNG, ABG, BHOR, and civil society partners to focus more on sustainability and national ownership than was done under the 2015-2018 PPP.

1. Recommendation:

Relevance

 The next several years will be critical in sustaining peace in Bougainville. As an accepted and valued partner, and in the absence of other accepted neutral organizations that could serve as alternative partners, the United Nations should continue to support the implementation of key processes in the implementation of the BPA in 2018, 2019, and 2020 as critical years for the implementation of the BPA.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2018/12/17]

Agreed. The success of the PBF 1 in maintaining momentum in progress against the PPP, including strengthening of strategic political partnerships which greatly contributed to agreements in support to implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement such as the date of the referendum, has informed the design of PBF 2 project. UNDP, UNFPA and UNWOMEN have developed a project under the PBF (PBF 2) that continues to support the implementation of key processes in the BPA (Autonomy, referendum and weapons disposal) over the duration 2018, 2019, and 2020.

 

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Political Dialogue
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/03/04]
UNDP 2020/07 Initiated History
Awareness and Knowledge building on the Bougainville Peace Agreement
[Added: 2018/12/17]
UNFPA & UNWomen 2020/07 Initiated Activity is on track and will run for 2 years til July 2020 History
Weapons Disposal
[Added: 2018/12/17]
UNDP 2020/07 Initiated Activity is just commencing History
2. Recommendation:

Effectiveness

Based on past successes and current needs, the UN should continue to support the implementation of the BPA through targeted assistance to building relationships and trust between the GoPNG and ABG, supporting access to more objective and accurate information and fora for dialogue and debate, and assistance on social cohesion and security in Bougainville.

The PBSO should consider more modest language, objectives, and indicators in developing support for peacebuilding that take into account that the UN is not responsible for key processes and meeting key deadlines in peacebuilding. The PPP and the process of drafting and attaining government approval make it clear that the UN not solely responsible for the PPP– instead the two governments have the lead and the UN through the PPP aims to support their achievement of the goals of the PPP. Writing PPPs in ways that are sensitive to the UN’s roles as neutral facilitators may produce targets that are not only achievable based on what UN organizations can reasonably be expected to achieve themselves in the PPP but also prove more supportive of national ownership and leadership in peacebuilding.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2018/12/17]

Agreed. The UN in the new PBF project continue to strengthen strategic political partnerships formed in PBF 1 and ensuring regular dialogue with GoPNG and ABG, and the two Parliaments to support the two governments in achieving the PPP. PBF project objectives and intended results are joint Government-UN results and they take into account the lead (and ownership) by the Government and people of PNG. The UN is supporting the implementation of a range of different awareness activities by ABG and its endorsed implementing partners, through different mediums, directed at different actors, where relevant, including high level political dialogue, social and mainstream media, telecommunications, community storytelling and general awareness. The management having foreseen these have made provisions in PBF 2 for Monitoring, Evaluation and Communications to be an integral part of the project. Regular communication with Joint Steering Committee (the oversight body established under the PPP 2015 – 2017) members is a strategy used by the project to keep the two governments informed of the project’s progress, including the tracking and development of risk mitigation strategies, strengthening partnerships and supporting national ownership of the PPP and outcomes supporting the PPP. Given the costs and challenges of conducing formal JSC meetings and as the two governments and the UN have prioritised the implementation of the BPA (autonomy review, Joint Supervisory Body meetings) and the referendum preparations in detriment to formal meetings of the Steering Committee, the PBF is utilizing the UN Liaison Officer’s regular engagement with key stakeholders to disseminate project progress updates and plans. The Project Manager will also utilize opportunities to discuss project progress, key bottlenecks and plans with the relevant stakeholders in Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea.  JSC members will be invited to attend monitoring visits. We will compile a monitoring visits plan as part of the M&E plan.

 

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Development of a UN communication’s strategy to guide awareness activities
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/10/05]
PBF 2 2019/12 Initiated Communication plan is drafted and under discussion for finlization History
Recruitment of a full-time Communications personnel to develop a project Communications Strategy and coordinate its implementation
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/04/01]
PBF 2 (Outcome 2) 2019/02 Completed the Communications personnel full time is hired and resuming her function in the project. History
Review of the PBF 2 Results Framework
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/05/19]
PBF 2 (Management and M&E Units) 2019/03 Completed The Peace Building project is supporting the implementation of a range of different awareness activities that are endorsed by ABG, through different mediums, directed at different actors, where relevant, including high level political dialogue, social and mainstream media, telecommunications, community storytelling and general awareness. UNDP has developed its technical capacity to support awareness activities by recruiting a communications officer that has developed a communications strategy to guide interventions. PBF2 has developed comprehensive monitoring and communication plan as well as risk log and its mitigation measures, that is currently going under mid-term review to ensure that the BMT as well as indicators are strengthened to measure the facilitation of successful political dialogue between the two GOPNG and ABG. The revision is in the final stage, the consultative process will take place in last week of May and expected to be endorsed by end of July 2019. The project has a M&E officer that has developed an M&E framework that as part of the review will further develop the linkages with to strengthen our communications and awareness work. History
Recruitment of a full-time Monitoring & Evaluation personnel to set up project M&E system and coordinate its implementation
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/01/10]
PBF 2 2018/12 Completed Completed History
3. Recommendation:

Efficiency of Planning and Implementation

A future PPP team should have a more robust staffing structure, with a full-time program officer for each of the main work streams of the PPP.

PBSO should consider developing ways to accelerate project start up, particularly through staffing support, to help PPP activities get off to a more rapid start. This may be especially critical in contexts where peace agreements have more recently been negotiated and agreed to than in Bougainville. PBSO should consider developing a roster of potential staff through consultancies or working within the UN system to potentially deploy regular UN staff for a brief period, particularly for the design and start-up of programming.

UN project management and procurement in Bougainville should continue to be led by international staff to be able to clearly and visibly demonstrate that they are independent of both governments and avoid perceptions of partiality given the small size of Bougainville and the Melanesian context of PNG.

The UN team should work with the PBSO, partners, and stakeholders to identify additional ways in future programming on awareness to systematically encourage culturally appropriate face-to-face communication and dialogue across the ARoB, as these types of mechanisms are the most used mechanisms and most respected ways to support information dissemination and the discussion of community issues across Bougainville.

The UN system in PNG should consider additional ways to work systematically over a sustained period of time with community-based and ABG institutions working with youth to enable a wider reach to this large, critical population across the ABG.

The PBSO should consider less demanding monitoring and evaluation modalities and reporting on PPP implementation, and work with PPP leaders to develop M&E systems that will be used as part of PPP management as well as for information sharing with PBSO in New York. In theory, M&E is most effective when it is used for management. The content and extent of M&E for a project should thus depend on what the project needs and can utilize for management. The detailed information collected by the PPP may have been too much information for management to use in this case in the ARoB.

The PBSO should consider developing programmes with longer time periods than the three-year term for the PPP. Peacebuilding is a long-term process; years after the signing of the peace agreement in Bougainville, the limited support for peacebuilding in the years after the signing of the BPA in 2001 has made supporting key aspects of peace a long-term proposition. The three-year time period of the PPP was not long enough to have as strong a set of effects as anticipated in the context of continued delays and tensions between the two governments, limited capacity across Bougainville, and a challenging environment for supporting community cohesion. If time periods are not to be lengthened but PGSO expects to have multiple rounds of funding, PBSO should make it clear to partners and stakeholders that multiple rounds of PBF funding are envisioned.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2018/12/17]

The UN will make every effort to ensure an efficient and optimum staffing structure is on the ground in Bougainville given funding and recruitment challenges. In order to retain staff and avoid start up delays with the PBF2 efforts were made by the UN to retain those with key skills between PBF1 and PBF2, which was successfully achieved. Recognizing the importantly “neutral” and “independent” role of the UN in Bougainville the project document was adapted to ensure the organogram contains an international project manager overseeing the PBF2. In addition, an international liaison officer’s acts as a coordinator for the two PBF projects (Sustaining Peace and GYPI). An international procurement manager will provide support to the project from the Country Office in Port Moresby. A full-time program officer for each of the main work streams of three main outcome areas: Dialogue, communications and weapons disposal has already commenced. A project officer for weapons disposal has commenced and a project officer for awareness will be seconded from the Country office before a longer-term solution will be identified. Gender, youth and inclusive processes are mainstreamed into each of the PBF 2 activities. An M&E officer is in place and will design a M&E strategy to guide M&E interventions that are most effective for management. The strategy will be informed by the needs of the PBF team to monitor progress and impact of the PBF2 on sustaining peace in Bougainville. It will include the key indicators to follow, the instruments for measuring them and the regularity of their collection. This information will be applied to inform project progression.

 

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Recruitment of an International Project Manager
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/01/10]
UNDP 2018/12 Completed In final stages of recruitment History
Recruitment of Project officers
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/07/08]
UNDP/UNFPA/UNWomen 2019/06 Completed the project has recruited one project officer, who has started the role, the second project officer role was filled in temporary through reassignment of duties from our national awareness officer in port Moresby who is managing the PBF2 awareness component. History
Development of an M&E Strategy
[Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2019/05/16]
UNDP/UNFPA/UNWomen 2019/12 Initiated This M&E Strategy is currently under review. An updated version will be uploaded soon as it has been finalized. History
4. Recommendation:

Potential for Sustainability, Replication and Magnification

PBSO should continue to consider supporting peacebuilding priority plans that may not be able to focus on sustainability, replication, or magnification but that are able to support priority actions to build or sustain peace at critical periods in the peacebuilding processes in countries and regions around the world. The PBSO should consider placing less emphasis on sustainability and change, not necessarily using the language of sustainability, replication, and magnification in PBF programming.

International support for peacebuilding is critical in the short term in the run up to the anticipated target date for the referendum (15 June 2019) and the transition period thereafter. Since peacebuilding in Bougainville is increasingly important in the run up to the planned referendum and there are not alternative neutral providers to facilitate peaceful management of key peacebuilding processes, the UN should continue to support the implementation of key processes in BPA implementation. The experience of developing, implementing, monitoring, reporting on, and evaluating the 2015-2018 PBF-funded project also suggests the continued utility of another PBF-funded programme.

Project design and implementation should focus on key priorities of both governments in helping them prepare for and implement processes around the referendum and its aftermath. Public awareness activities remain critical, as are needs to support them. These activities will be critical even if the timing of the referendum moves to after the 15 June 2019 target date.

While there still are urgent short-term priorities in peacebuilding in Bougainville and PNG, the design of activities in a successor PBF-funded programme on peacebuilding in Bougainville should be done in collaborative ways with RUNOs, GoPNG, ABG, BHOR, and civil society partners to focus more on sustainability and national ownership than was done under the 2015-2018 PPP.

Management Response: [Added: 2018/12/17] [Last Updated: 2018/12/17]

The UN will continue to support the implementation of key processes in BPA implementation. In particular, in the areas of dialogue, awareness and weapons disposal under a second PBF-funded programme. Activities under this second PBF 2 were conducted in a collaborative way across UN, GoPNG, ABG, BHOR and civil society. This resulted in a three UN agency partnership programme and project endorsement from GoPNG and ABG. The project will support key discussions, actions and awareness in the lead up to the referendum, the post referendum transition procedure and weapons disposal.

 

Key Actions:

Key Action Responsible DueDate Status Comments Documents
Consultations and stakeholder engagement on new PBF activities
[Added: 2018/12/17]
UN 2018/06 Completed History
New PBF project developed and awarded
[Added: 2018/12/17]
UN 2018/07 Completed

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